Proxima: A Human Exploration of Mars
- Thread starter defconh3ck
- Start date
inb4 OV-102 is actually NUCLEAR SPACE SHUTTLE PATHFINDER WITH A NERVA THAT IS USED IN THE ATMOSPHERE BUT IT'S SO COOL ANYWAY
Chapter 2.5: Image Annex
Hi all,
I wanted to make a quick note about Skylab's end of life. So, at the time of deorbit, the things left on station would be the adapter module, the orbital workshop, and the mounting bracket for the solar array wing that was pictured. Massive solar arrays are a huge asset, especially in early station building, so those would have been recovered and returned to Earth on the final shuttle flight to the station, most likely on STS-10. Shuttle-Skylab, while seemingly a good early idea for the Shuttle program, likely would have been fraught with issues that would plague any crew visiting. The first thing to note is the incompatible atmosphere, and would require the use of an adapter module to make the transition from Shuttle's atmosphere to Skylab's. The second issue would be the trash. Skylab was FILTHY. Unlike modern facilities like the International Space Station and China's Space Station, there were no resupply ships that dispose of unwanted materials (Such as Cygnus, Progress, Tianzhou etc). This lead to a lot of junk just hanging out, likely getting in the way of the crew. There are a whole host of engineering concerns for Skylab as well, such as thermal management, power generation, and an aging life support system that would most certainly cause headaches.
A quick note, since this week is Thanksgiving, I may not have a post ready to go on Monday, as I'll be spending time with family, so perhaps expect it around the middle of the week? Anyway, please enjoy some stellar images from the illustrious Jay, and I'll see ya next time!
I wanted to make a quick note about Skylab's end of life. So, at the time of deorbit, the things left on station would be the adapter module, the orbital workshop, and the mounting bracket for the solar array wing that was pictured. Massive solar arrays are a huge asset, especially in early station building, so those would have been recovered and returned to Earth on the final shuttle flight to the station, most likely on STS-10. Shuttle-Skylab, while seemingly a good early idea for the Shuttle program, likely would have been fraught with issues that would plague any crew visiting. The first thing to note is the incompatible atmosphere, and would require the use of an adapter module to make the transition from Shuttle's atmosphere to Skylab's. The second issue would be the trash. Skylab was FILTHY. Unlike modern facilities like the International Space Station and China's Space Station, there were no resupply ships that dispose of unwanted materials (Such as Cygnus, Progress, Tianzhou etc). This lead to a lot of junk just hanging out, likely getting in the way of the crew. There are a whole host of engineering concerns for Skylab as well, such as thermal management, power generation, and an aging life support system that would most certainly cause headaches.
A quick note, since this week is Thanksgiving, I may not have a post ready to go on Monday, as I'll be spending time with family, so perhaps expect it around the middle of the week? Anyway, please enjoy some stellar images from the illustrious Jay, and I'll see ya next time!
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I do have some plans for Carl Sagan and Ann Druyan, which I hope you all will enjoy when we get a little further along down the road!
Watched!
Reading the canon posts it is not so hard to see just what changes are ATL but as others note, a bit harder to account for them. I do assume that a combination of better luck with some things and throwing money (for reasons that do call for some explanation) at problems can account for a lot. Thus, finishing 5 Orbiters in a time frame which only saw say 3 OTL could be a matter of bigger budgets, especially if DoD is paying a larger part of the bill.
OTL a major show stopper, pushing the first (and crewed) launch of Columbia into 1981 with no uncrewed test launch whatsoever was hitches in developing the SSMEs. I can imagine either that the initial design early on the mid-70s was a bit more pessimistic and fail-safe but holding to the same standards, resulting in higher early program costs and schedule slips versus OTL but ultimately paying off in avoiding longer and more costly delays in finalizing the product at the back end. Or we might account for the engines being certified earlier by supposing a somewhat less stringent specification which would imply smaller payloads, with plans penciled in to do a Mark 2 makeover to achieve or perhaps surpass a bit OTL specs, and the less ambitious target proved possible to achieve closer to optimistic schedule.
Following through with the scheme to reuse Skylab (in ATL hindsight, not such a great idea but it seems overall a win to me as a practice exercise and useful as an institutional lesson in pragmatics of designing sustainable stations) suggests a more open purse from Congress across the board throughout the Carter years; boosting the station in 1978 clearly would require some years commitment prior to the operation, so probably going back well before the Jimmy's inauguration.
But I don't think it is crazy for an ATL fairly close to OTL to simply set somewhat higher, more generous funding for NASA in the 1970s, even granting the general atmosphere of low-grade crisis involving stagflation and controversy about the adequacy of US defense and diplomatic credibility in general in the wake of the Vietnam hangover, not to mention the general crisis of confidence symbolized by Watergate.
Perhaps the POD is some subtle ATL political thing. Why did Carter have to choose Fritz Mondale for VP for instance? Circumstances making some other Democrat more viable who among other things happens to be a space program booster instead of naysayer might be enough to account for stronger Carter Administration support for a visionary NASA mission (and perhaps prior to the 1976 elections in Congress and in the Ford Administration) accounting for some tens of percent funding increases and less hostility to talk of longer term major commitments such as an early space station and a view to proceeding to Mars for instance.
The decision to repurpose Skylab might involve some revision of the Orbiter's detailed specs, making it less of a Space Winnebago and more of a truck, underscoring the need to actually have some sort of LEO space station. OTL the Orbiter was so capable as a stand-alone mini-station that augmenting this with Spacelab took the pressure off building a station. Stripping the Orbiter down a bit might offset lowered boost to orbit mass budget in favor of maintaining cargo mass targets--which to be sure were never or rarely approaching maxed out OTL.
Speaking of trading off percentages of performance in favor of easier attainment or other goals, any word on the decision on booster segment seals? As I understand it, the doubled seal design adopted post-Challenger Disaster OtL was in fact presented as an option on paper back in 1978 or so, and the commission made a calculated risk decision that the added mass and cost would cost tons of payload, whereas the risk of gas jets escaping to cause problems would be low enough to justify the cheaper lighter approach chosen--which in fact resulted in observed leakage jets on every launch and of course eventually destroyed Challenger. The TL going with designing in drone control for the Orbiter and going with an uncrewed launch suggests to me that along with a bigger budget comes a bit more worry about safety which could mean that the boosters use the safer lower performance choice from the get-go and it never occurs to anyone there could be a Challenger-like failure mode.
For the rest I suppose time will tell, how the Mars mission profile works and so on, the nature of the coming new space station, etc.
FWIW I think it is a red herring to say "Mars missions require nuclear propulsion." I think the OTL plans for SpaceX's "Starship" sorties to Mars demonstrate that nuclear power is hardly necessary; realistic plans for engines needing nuclear power don't give a big overall advantage, whereas other approaches such as what the cool kids call "electric drives" nowadays and called "ion drives" back in an older day can use solar power as well as nuclear--perhaps not to go beyond Mars to asteroids or Jupiter or beyond, but even Mars is close enough to the Sun that solar power should be quite competitive, when one factors in all the auxiliary factors offsetting the concentrated power a fission core might offer. Stuff like radiation shielding considerations, needing to use hydrogen as reaction mass if one is to benefit from NTR, and so forth. At any rate, chemical can get a ship to Mars on a fast orbit pretty handily--Starship depends for its viability on atmospheric braking and on in situ replacement of propellant, but these things are available to NASA without any breakthroughs depending on 2020s tech not available in the '80s. Whereas prescribing nukes as vital is an invitation to wait for Godot; no one has proven a suitable NTR or even ion drive power generator for operation in space to this late date OTL.
Nukes must play a role in space travel someday I suppose, especially if we want to go farther out than Mars. But it hardly seems necessary to insist on some ATL nuclear rabbit out of a hat to plausibly send some astronauts to Mars before its development.
Reading the canon posts it is not so hard to see just what changes are ATL but as others note, a bit harder to account for them. I do assume that a combination of better luck with some things and throwing money (for reasons that do call for some explanation) at problems can account for a lot. Thus, finishing 5 Orbiters in a time frame which only saw say 3 OTL could be a matter of bigger budgets, especially if DoD is paying a larger part of the bill.
OTL a major show stopper, pushing the first (and crewed) launch of Columbia into 1981 with no uncrewed test launch whatsoever was hitches in developing the SSMEs. I can imagine either that the initial design early on the mid-70s was a bit more pessimistic and fail-safe but holding to the same standards, resulting in higher early program costs and schedule slips versus OTL but ultimately paying off in avoiding longer and more costly delays in finalizing the product at the back end. Or we might account for the engines being certified earlier by supposing a somewhat less stringent specification which would imply smaller payloads, with plans penciled in to do a Mark 2 makeover to achieve or perhaps surpass a bit OTL specs, and the less ambitious target proved possible to achieve closer to optimistic schedule.
Following through with the scheme to reuse Skylab (in ATL hindsight, not such a great idea but it seems overall a win to me as a practice exercise and useful as an institutional lesson in pragmatics of designing sustainable stations) suggests a more open purse from Congress across the board throughout the Carter years; boosting the station in 1978 clearly would require some years commitment prior to the operation, so probably going back well before the Jimmy's inauguration.
But I don't think it is crazy for an ATL fairly close to OTL to simply set somewhat higher, more generous funding for NASA in the 1970s, even granting the general atmosphere of low-grade crisis involving stagflation and controversy about the adequacy of US defense and diplomatic credibility in general in the wake of the Vietnam hangover, not to mention the general crisis of confidence symbolized by Watergate.
Perhaps the POD is some subtle ATL political thing. Why did Carter have to choose Fritz Mondale for VP for instance? Circumstances making some other Democrat more viable who among other things happens to be a space program booster instead of naysayer might be enough to account for stronger Carter Administration support for a visionary NASA mission (and perhaps prior to the 1976 elections in Congress and in the Ford Administration) accounting for some tens of percent funding increases and less hostility to talk of longer term major commitments such as an early space station and a view to proceeding to Mars for instance.
The decision to repurpose Skylab might involve some revision of the Orbiter's detailed specs, making it less of a Space Winnebago and more of a truck, underscoring the need to actually have some sort of LEO space station. OTL the Orbiter was so capable as a stand-alone mini-station that augmenting this with Spacelab took the pressure off building a station. Stripping the Orbiter down a bit might offset lowered boost to orbit mass budget in favor of maintaining cargo mass targets--which to be sure were never or rarely approaching maxed out OTL.
Speaking of trading off percentages of performance in favor of easier attainment or other goals, any word on the decision on booster segment seals? As I understand it, the doubled seal design adopted post-Challenger Disaster OtL was in fact presented as an option on paper back in 1978 or so, and the commission made a calculated risk decision that the added mass and cost would cost tons of payload, whereas the risk of gas jets escaping to cause problems would be low enough to justify the cheaper lighter approach chosen--which in fact resulted in observed leakage jets on every launch and of course eventually destroyed Challenger. The TL going with designing in drone control for the Orbiter and going with an uncrewed launch suggests to me that along with a bigger budget comes a bit more worry about safety which could mean that the boosters use the safer lower performance choice from the get-go and it never occurs to anyone there could be a Challenger-like failure mode.
For the rest I suppose time will tell, how the Mars mission profile works and so on, the nature of the coming new space station, etc.
FWIW I think it is a red herring to say "Mars missions require nuclear propulsion." I think the OTL plans for SpaceX's "Starship" sorties to Mars demonstrate that nuclear power is hardly necessary; realistic plans for engines needing nuclear power don't give a big overall advantage, whereas other approaches such as what the cool kids call "electric drives" nowadays and called "ion drives" back in an older day can use solar power as well as nuclear--perhaps not to go beyond Mars to asteroids or Jupiter or beyond, but even Mars is close enough to the Sun that solar power should be quite competitive, when one factors in all the auxiliary factors offsetting the concentrated power a fission core might offer. Stuff like radiation shielding considerations, needing to use hydrogen as reaction mass if one is to benefit from NTR, and so forth. At any rate, chemical can get a ship to Mars on a fast orbit pretty handily--Starship depends for its viability on atmospheric braking and on in situ replacement of propellant, but these things are available to NASA without any breakthroughs depending on 2020s tech not available in the '80s. Whereas prescribing nukes as vital is an invitation to wait for Godot; no one has proven a suitable NTR or even ion drive power generator for operation in space to this late date OTL.
Nukes must play a role in space travel someday I suppose, especially if we want to go farther out than Mars. But it hardly seems necessary to insist on some ATL nuclear rabbit out of a hat to plausibly send some astronauts to Mars before its development.
Not that big of a advantage? Zubern was able to add two astronauts and a nucular powered airplane to his mars direct plan thanks to adding nucular propltion. Its not nessary but it is a big help.
As a true fan of the much-maligned Shuttle Program, this does make me smile. Subscribed on the condition that you continue to be amazing.
I'm so glad you're enjoying! i took a small break for the thanksgiving holiday, but more awesomeness will continue later this week!
Part of the issue with having the DoD pay part of the bill is the "main" (supposedly) driver on their part, the Air Force, was in fact not supportive nor willing to 'invest' in the Shuttle until they were actually forced to do so. The 'actual' main DoD component with actual interest in the program, that being the NRO, had tried to get the Air Force, (actually NASA preferences) toned down but not having 'official' status at the time, (and again NASA wanting a bigger and much more expansive Orbiter) this was ignored. It's plausible that the Air Force might have been convinced that they would indeed be required to use the Shuttle earlier and therefore have had more input and likely more funding early on but on the other hand that's likely to now 'require' them getting their own Orbiters so that NASA still only gets three while the Air Force gets two of them to use out of Vandenberg.
Getting anything "pessimistic" out of the post-Apollo NASA is asking a lot given how overly optimistic they consistently were
I'd agree that a Mark-1/Mark-2 philosophy would have made more sense but again this is the "we-can-do-anything-with-nothing" post-Apollo NASA which pretty much had this debate and rejected the idea, (see "we can do anything" above) insisting on going with the 'full-up' model from the start. Arguably a solid idea since they assumed, (later proven right) that Congress wasn't going to give them all the funding they wanted anyway. (This is also a major reason why Mars was politically off the table till just recently btw)
Carter, (specifically) wasn't a fan of manned space flight due to the expense but he was far from alone. No President was really 'for' manned spaceflight though Nixon could be argued to have been at least partially motivated towards that end given his need for a "big" (but not TOO big
) program to keep the NASA contractors alive to pad the election numbers in California. (Specifically post-Vietnam)Many on both sides in Congress opposed "space" spending in the '70s for the simple fact it was politically expedient to do so with few repercussions. You got a bit of 'boost' over the oil crisis but in general most of Congress was supportive of restricting NASA's budget and ambitions on a cost basis. (And as anything positive in the direction of budget caused NASA to assume "Apollo 2.0" to Mars was therefore right around the corner and begin proposing spending on similar levels which invarably ended badly for them. Not that they learned mind you
)Frankly willingness to actually spend significant money on NASA and space ONLY happened due to a set of very specific and complex circumstances and even then there was a move to 'back-off' that required Kennedy to get killed before he could scale back the effort. Once you had that 'martyr' complex going NASA was pretty much assured ridiculous levels of funding at least till the mid-60s but it was clear that was never going to last. Or happen again without similar circumstances.
You can have all the imagination you want in the Executive branch but it's Congress who holds that power of the purse and that's going to be as true TTL as OTL. And Congress, (again arguably with reason given some of NASA's Apollo antics) was hostile to raising NASA's budget and more specifically AGAINST allowing NASA any planning for something like Mars. If there was some way to keep NASA from attaching "..and on to Mars" (with heavy and purposeful emphasis on doing another "Apollo" level program and funding underscoring each and every word... no IPP did NOT help in the slightest
) to every post-Apollo proposition that would go a long way to helping defuse the political situation but in context the 70s were heavily anti-big-program years for Congress as a whole.Maybe 'saving' Skylab and it's plain need for a 'replacement' once some sort of operations are on-going could provide a more plausible purpose for both the Shuttle and any follow on. (Maybe something based on the unused Skylab II? But NASA is unlikely to want to 'settle' for anything less than a whole new Space Station program and of course being NASA they will pile Mars on the whole thing AND want a bigger budget as well.... You can likely see why Congress was hesitant on giving them an inch/millimeter on budget
)Not really as since the original "Space Station" plans were not authorized, (Nixon wasn't going to get as much as NASA wanted from Congress and as part of nixing the IPP the Space Station went by the wayside anyway) the Orbiter was always assumed to be having to take on a role as a 'mini-space-station'. This was further exacerbated with the canceling/not-funding of the "required" in space transport system (OTV) that was planned for the Shuttle. Without any station to support or OTV to move payloads it was clear from early on that the Orbiter was going to need to be a great deal more "flexible" than just a simple transport.
And that feeds into the whole "requirement" of flying manned every flight, (Astronaut office) being on-orbit longer, (space science and biology) needing an upper-stage, ("customer" requirements) and all the rest of the capabilities built into OTL's Orbiter that would have been different. Again you could argue that the whole "Space Transportation SYSTEM" is more useful AS a "system" if you avoid the Orbiter as a core and replace it with a recoverable avionics and engine pod. But...
I'd say it depends on NASA as the seals were seen as a acceptable "risk" meaning that development money could be spent on some other aspect of the system. Have one of them fail during testing in a rather spectacular way and that might free up the money (or put pressure on NASA to fix the problem at least) and therefore prevent that particular disaster. Not sure how long they would avoid a different one given the number of issues that the compromises of the Shuttle brought about. (TPS is always going to be an issue)
Nuclear propulsion/power was seen as needed because the entire idea was to NOT depend on any logistical build up or in-situ infrastructure in order to more closely adhere to the Apollo model to which NASA was used to. (Funny enough Zubrin's main 'complaint' about NASA Mars planning was that it was "not how we did Apollo" whereas "Mars Direct" was specifically NOT how NASA did anything for Apollo
) Solar power was not technically up to par until the late 80s at least so nuclear power was required for the electrical engines of the day, and since it was going to have to be essentially a nuclear power plant, (not radio or thermal mind you but actual honest-to-God nuclear power cycle) nuclear propulsion was an obvious choice. NTR's are actually proven and well tested whereas at the time almost all of the "electrical" drives were at a vastly lower TRL. (NERVA was flight test ready by 1972 for example)What we call "abundant chemical/ISRU' type missions were considered during the 60s but the needed mass and complexity along with the unknowns involved were rightly seen as the more risky and operationally questionable options. This included such "advanced" ideas as aerobraking since the exact nature and composition of the Martian atmosphere was very questionable at the time. Hence ALL missions demanded propulsive braking for arrival.
(I'd point out that "Starship" depends on a great many pre-existing "options" to be in place and proven before it can actually DO anything which is not a really plausible way to plan ANY mission. Given that it can't even land anywhere but a specially prepared and maintained pad and even that minimum capability is currently being looked to be 'traded' away, using it as an example is dubious at best)
But it's developed already whereas 'alternatives' are not within the context of the time line.
There's alternative 'chemical only' plans but they too depend on all the propellant being sourced and brought from Earth on every mission because at the time there was no incentive to add complications and unknowns to the planning. Everything TTL is going to necessarily be based on STS and it's components and capabilities which means modified ET's for the most part for propellant, SSME for chemical engines (or RL10s) and likely modified space station parts for the crew and cargo elements. (Guess I might get my recoverable engine pods after all
) So something on the order of the Aries from Baxter's "Voyage" could be possible if the nuclear option is taken off the table but the costs are going to go up significantly which is going to make it more difficult to get through Congress. (Of course I'd expect Congress to help nix any nuclear option during the 80s as well but we'll see)Randy
First blush in the plan had him adding another four astronauts AND a second lander hab using a single nuclear engine (expendable unfortunately) so I'd say the benefits were pretty plain from early on.
No pressure though, right?
Randy
Chapter 3: A Plan
Hi everyone! For everyone who celebrated, I hope you had a wonderful Thanksgiving, and if you don't hope you had a good week! I know many people have been very curious about the orbiter arrangement thus far, and I promise all will be revealed regarding OV-102 next week. This week, we're gonna start taking a look at some proposals, and pushing higher, further, and faster than ever before. I wanna thank Max for all their hard work on this post, they did a super job with this concept art I'm about to show you, and I'm so grateful! Normal posting schedule, as I've mentioned before, will resume next week and will stay consistently on Monday unless otherwise noted.
Anyway, on with the show!
Chapter 3: A Plan
After the learning curve of STS-11, and the resounding success of the program thus far, NASA officially put forward their call for additional astronauts, including those who did not have traditional degrees in science, or come from a test pilot background. To some, this seemed like a waste of time. Non scientists? What would be the point? Would anyone apply? But to those at NASA, they knew what they were doing. Looking at previous recruitment campaigns that the agency had run, NASA once again turned to television and the allure of science fiction. Citing their work with Nichelle Nichols in 1977, Leonard Nimoy, of Star Trek fame, would take to television and deliver a message for the agency that would ring true for generations of aspiring astronauts.
In the first half of 1981, NASA had quietly informed other international agencies that they had put out a request for proposals regarding a Mars mission. Within the industry, there was much excitement over the prospect of a bigger push towards space than Apollo. After months of work in the dark, those at NASA’s various centers, Houston, Rockwell, Boeing and Morton Thiokol came forward with the first draft of their proposals for a Mars-focused future. It had not been an easy road to approach this point, countless hours had been spent toiling over these documents in the hopes that it would be appealing to both the scientists at NASA, and their political higher ups. Known as Design Reference Mission 2000, it was a 325 page report detailing plans of a number of comprehensive architectures to get to Mars, at the earliest, by 1994, and the latest, having the first mission bound for Mars by 2000. Skylab had been a lot of things, but it showed that assembly in space was possible, and humans living and working in space was well within reach. The baseline for all of the proposals had leveraged using shuttle and assembling an in space refurbishing and construction facility. This facility would later see expansion into a fully fledged international laboratory, which would help assist NASA and its partner agencies in furthering spaceflight research. Another “must-have” for the Martian architecture would be a place to go on arrival at Mars, a station in Martian orbit that could be ready to receive crews in the event that a landing could not take place, and where they could wait out until the return window opened. The station soon became known as the Mars Base Station, with scientists equating it to the first coastal antarctic bases. This station could also be augmented with modules delivered by arriving and departing crews to enable further space for operations, as well as validate technology in the Martian environment. The final piece of must haves, a flurry of robotic precursor missions, dubbed semi informally as the “Mars Armada”, would need to be sent ahead of the human landing program to complement the work done by Mariner and Viking, from not just the United States. These vehicles would be essential in gathering as much data as possible about prospective landing sites, Martian weather, and conditions on the surface. International collaboration was strongly advocated for, and instruments from one country could theoretically be flown on another vehicle before the original country’s vehicle was ready. Advancements in manufacturing and rocket technology across the world would enable an international, cooperative effort between seemingly all space faring nations.
As these numerous organizations came forward, it was clear that there was a major split between the various architectures for a Mars mission; the Transfer Vehicle. Some simpler approaches saw a massive, expendable interplanetary craft that would use chemical stages derived from Saturn V hardware, assembled using a clean sheet design launch vehicle and serviced by Shuttle crews. Another proposal suggested using newly studied ion propulsion for a low energy transfer to Mars, which would reduce the overall size of the spacecraft at the cost of high flight times. The most promising study, however, came in the form of nuclear propulsion, using newly developed densified hydrogen, and experimental lightweight modules to enable high efficiency. NASA’s interest immediately peaked, and engineers and mission planners began to make their assessment. This new type of long term storage would be a tricky one to master, but many within the agency and in engineering circles felt that once that technology could be grappled with, even bolder missions than Mars would be possible. Outside of the transfer element, the other important component would be the lander. The lander, one of the most difficult components of the Apollo program before it, could be split up between nations to minimize cost and ensure that various minds were available to tackle problems. Propulsion for the lander would also be an issue, as Apollo veterans immediately looked to work on a storable design, at the cost of immense weight. Advocates of the cryogenics program were quick to point out that common fuel handling, and the inevitable in orbit refueling that would be required would be best suited to a common propellant type. It was thought that a cryogenic lander could offer more performance and mission flexibility, and avoid caustic fuels damaging the lander’s systems over the projected multi year missions.
The next big challenge would be assembly. Earlier studies of Mars missions had leveraged the immense lifting capabilities of Saturn V or other similar vehicles. However, the move to the Shuttle program had presented both challenges and benefits. The lifting capability of the shuttle, and the relative ease that NASA had with turning the vehicles around meant that modular construction was on the table, rather than the monolithic assembly methods proposed in Von Braun’s Mars studies. However, the limited size of the payload bay meant that the components would be relatively small, extending the construction period, and orbiters would need to be at the ready for a launch and construction campaign. Work on assembling the precursor space station would also enable a "practice run" of assembly techniques for construction of the upcoming Mars ships. All of the Shuttle contractors, in the back of their mind, had always looked to expand the capabilities of the orbiter system, and had drafted proposals for augmentation and modification of the vehicle, without modifying the pad. Several designs came forward, but the most promising was the Orbital Payload Assist Module. The OPAM, as it came to be known, would retain the mounting points of the launch pad, while the payload would ride on top. The engine pod would plug into the pad just as the shuttle would, enabling a common pad structure. This modification led to the acronym SDLV - Shuttle Derived Launch Vehicle. This vehicle could leverage the super heavy lift aspects of the Shuttle system without the orbiter, maximizing payload to orbit as well as outsized payloads that would not fit within the shuttle cargo bay. Preliminary design work showed that a system like this could enable cargo of up to 60 tons into orbit, and rumored vehicles being developed in other nations could enable even heavier cargo to be launched - if the political connections could be made. NASA reviewers commented on the commonality displayed on the pad, and the reusability factor of the SDLV system to work in conjunction with their existing shuttle fleet. Coupled with new infrastructure development at the Kennedy Space Center, estimates for up to 40 flights per year were thrown around, more than justifying the cost of these new vehicles and upgrades.
These mission proposals were bold, and expensive, but NASA was in the public’s eye, as images beamed down from flights to Skylab and LEO displayed that human spaceflight was an optimal path forward, and leadership in this field would secure the United States as a prominent power for years to come. But there came another realization, that going alone to Mars would further isolate scientific communities and fail to spread a vision of peace and understanding. A vision of a sustainable future, NASA realized, would be one in which agencies marched into the cosmos hand in hand. The long road now would be assembling these teams, and building the bridges between space agencies to discuss the future of one such program. It was a relatively easy feat to offer a seat on Shuttle to an interested party, compared to the years of political headaches that starting a multi-decade program would be. Deals had to be finalized, industry contracts had to be awarded, and the public of each nation had to be just as on board to ensure continuity. In the words of NASA management, it was akin to herding cats.
The use of satellite navigation, weather satellites, and research conducted on Skylab was being realized around the world - space research mattered greatly, and advancing human footholds in space as a logical next step to Apollo seemed to be the right path forward. Other countries were realizing this too, and dreams of an international future in space began to circulate in classrooms, government buildings and design labs. Moving swiftly through governments worldwide, the Mars Project seemed to tick the boxes of those who wanted to go higher and faster, making bold discoveries for generations to come. The program was met with public and formal legal approval, and the true work on research, contract assignment and astronaut training could begin. But not before settling on a name, a name that would inspire and ring in the ears of a generation like Apollo would. It would come down to a remark, made by one of the geologists assigned to the program: “To name a mission to Mars Ares feels, well, redundant. Apollo was this godlike figure, and now we as humans are heading to the house of the gods - Olympus if you will… wait, why are you writing this down?” The name Olympus was ultimately selected, and work could begin in earnest on the most complex human spaceflight program in history.
Anyway, on with the show!
Chapter 3: A Plan
After the learning curve of STS-11, and the resounding success of the program thus far, NASA officially put forward their call for additional astronauts, including those who did not have traditional degrees in science, or come from a test pilot background. To some, this seemed like a waste of time. Non scientists? What would be the point? Would anyone apply? But to those at NASA, they knew what they were doing. Looking at previous recruitment campaigns that the agency had run, NASA once again turned to television and the allure of science fiction. Citing their work with Nichelle Nichols in 1977, Leonard Nimoy, of Star Trek fame, would take to television and deliver a message for the agency that would ring true for generations of aspiring astronauts.
The campaign would be a massive success, with thousands of astronaut candidates pouring in from all over the country. NASA would find itself awash with applicants, many of whom came from diverse backgrounds and represented the new age of humans in space that NASA had hoped for. Out of all of the candidates, 37% were women, 45% were non-white, and 40% had pilot experience in a military setting. This new, diverse and incredibly talented selection of individuals would have to be whittled down to 21 by 1985, a seemingly impossible task, but one that NASA’s recruitment office was eager to tackle. Around the world, international agencies were readying their new recruits; 10 from the European Space Agency, 7 from the Japanese National Space Development Agency, and 4 from the Canadian Space Agency, who would all train in Houston with the NASA astronauts. NASA’s Educator Astronaut corps had also blossomed, welcoming teachers from across the country, and ranging from elementary school to college and graduate level. For NASA, it was a win, more than enough astronauts to train and work with to advance their goals.
In the first half of 1981, NASA had quietly informed other international agencies that they had put out a request for proposals regarding a Mars mission. Within the industry, there was much excitement over the prospect of a bigger push towards space than Apollo. After months of work in the dark, those at NASA’s various centers, Houston, Rockwell, Boeing and Morton Thiokol came forward with the first draft of their proposals for a Mars-focused future. It had not been an easy road to approach this point, countless hours had been spent toiling over these documents in the hopes that it would be appealing to both the scientists at NASA, and their political higher ups. Known as Design Reference Mission 2000, it was a 325 page report detailing plans of a number of comprehensive architectures to get to Mars, at the earliest, by 1994, and the latest, having the first mission bound for Mars by 2000. Skylab had been a lot of things, but it showed that assembly in space was possible, and humans living and working in space was well within reach. The baseline for all of the proposals had leveraged using shuttle and assembling an in space refurbishing and construction facility. This facility would later see expansion into a fully fledged international laboratory, which would help assist NASA and its partner agencies in furthering spaceflight research. Another “must-have” for the Martian architecture would be a place to go on arrival at Mars, a station in Martian orbit that could be ready to receive crews in the event that a landing could not take place, and where they could wait out until the return window opened. The station soon became known as the Mars Base Station, with scientists equating it to the first coastal antarctic bases. This station could also be augmented with modules delivered by arriving and departing crews to enable further space for operations, as well as validate technology in the Martian environment. The final piece of must haves, a flurry of robotic precursor missions, dubbed semi informally as the “Mars Armada”, would need to be sent ahead of the human landing program to complement the work done by Mariner and Viking, from not just the United States. These vehicles would be essential in gathering as much data as possible about prospective landing sites, Martian weather, and conditions on the surface. International collaboration was strongly advocated for, and instruments from one country could theoretically be flown on another vehicle before the original country’s vehicle was ready. Advancements in manufacturing and rocket technology across the world would enable an international, cooperative effort between seemingly all space faring nations.
As these numerous organizations came forward, it was clear that there was a major split between the various architectures for a Mars mission; the Transfer Vehicle. Some simpler approaches saw a massive, expendable interplanetary craft that would use chemical stages derived from Saturn V hardware, assembled using a clean sheet design launch vehicle and serviced by Shuttle crews. Another proposal suggested using newly studied ion propulsion for a low energy transfer to Mars, which would reduce the overall size of the spacecraft at the cost of high flight times. The most promising study, however, came in the form of nuclear propulsion, using newly developed densified hydrogen, and experimental lightweight modules to enable high efficiency. NASA’s interest immediately peaked, and engineers and mission planners began to make their assessment. This new type of long term storage would be a tricky one to master, but many within the agency and in engineering circles felt that once that technology could be grappled with, even bolder missions than Mars would be possible. Outside of the transfer element, the other important component would be the lander. The lander, one of the most difficult components of the Apollo program before it, could be split up between nations to minimize cost and ensure that various minds were available to tackle problems. Propulsion for the lander would also be an issue, as Apollo veterans immediately looked to work on a storable design, at the cost of immense weight. Advocates of the cryogenics program were quick to point out that common fuel handling, and the inevitable in orbit refueling that would be required would be best suited to a common propellant type. It was thought that a cryogenic lander could offer more performance and mission flexibility, and avoid caustic fuels damaging the lander’s systems over the projected multi year missions.
The next big challenge would be assembly. Earlier studies of Mars missions had leveraged the immense lifting capabilities of Saturn V or other similar vehicles. However, the move to the Shuttle program had presented both challenges and benefits. The lifting capability of the shuttle, and the relative ease that NASA had with turning the vehicles around meant that modular construction was on the table, rather than the monolithic assembly methods proposed in Von Braun’s Mars studies. However, the limited size of the payload bay meant that the components would be relatively small, extending the construction period, and orbiters would need to be at the ready for a launch and construction campaign. Work on assembling the precursor space station would also enable a "practice run" of assembly techniques for construction of the upcoming Mars ships. All of the Shuttle contractors, in the back of their mind, had always looked to expand the capabilities of the orbiter system, and had drafted proposals for augmentation and modification of the vehicle, without modifying the pad. Several designs came forward, but the most promising was the Orbital Payload Assist Module. The OPAM, as it came to be known, would retain the mounting points of the launch pad, while the payload would ride on top. The engine pod would plug into the pad just as the shuttle would, enabling a common pad structure. This modification led to the acronym SDLV - Shuttle Derived Launch Vehicle. This vehicle could leverage the super heavy lift aspects of the Shuttle system without the orbiter, maximizing payload to orbit as well as outsized payloads that would not fit within the shuttle cargo bay. Preliminary design work showed that a system like this could enable cargo of up to 60 tons into orbit, and rumored vehicles being developed in other nations could enable even heavier cargo to be launched - if the political connections could be made. NASA reviewers commented on the commonality displayed on the pad, and the reusability factor of the SDLV system to work in conjunction with their existing shuttle fleet. Coupled with new infrastructure development at the Kennedy Space Center, estimates for up to 40 flights per year were thrown around, more than justifying the cost of these new vehicles and upgrades.
These mission proposals were bold, and expensive, but NASA was in the public’s eye, as images beamed down from flights to Skylab and LEO displayed that human spaceflight was an optimal path forward, and leadership in this field would secure the United States as a prominent power for years to come. But there came another realization, that going alone to Mars would further isolate scientific communities and fail to spread a vision of peace and understanding. A vision of a sustainable future, NASA realized, would be one in which agencies marched into the cosmos hand in hand. The long road now would be assembling these teams, and building the bridges between space agencies to discuss the future of one such program. It was a relatively easy feat to offer a seat on Shuttle to an interested party, compared to the years of political headaches that starting a multi-decade program would be. Deals had to be finalized, industry contracts had to be awarded, and the public of each nation had to be just as on board to ensure continuity. In the words of NASA management, it was akin to herding cats.
The use of satellite navigation, weather satellites, and research conducted on Skylab was being realized around the world - space research mattered greatly, and advancing human footholds in space as a logical next step to Apollo seemed to be the right path forward. Other countries were realizing this too, and dreams of an international future in space began to circulate in classrooms, government buildings and design labs. Moving swiftly through governments worldwide, the Mars Project seemed to tick the boxes of those who wanted to go higher and faster, making bold discoveries for generations to come. The program was met with public and formal legal approval, and the true work on research, contract assignment and astronaut training could begin. But not before settling on a name, a name that would inspire and ring in the ears of a generation like Apollo would. It would come down to a remark, made by one of the geologists assigned to the program: “To name a mission to Mars Ares feels, well, redundant. Apollo was this godlike figure, and now we as humans are heading to the house of the gods - Olympus if you will… wait, why are you writing this down?” The name Olympus was ultimately selected, and work could begin in earnest on the most complex human spaceflight program in history.
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The thing about Mars is that it has not one but two sites already in orbit around Mars where such a base could be--its two small moons Phobos and Deimos. To be sure these moons orbit somewhat higher than a Low Mars Orbit and thus would be harder to reach from Mars and somewhat more difficult to land on Mars from. But unlike Luna, where the cost in terms of rocket reaction mass to land on it and then ascend back into orbit is rather high, the two tiny Martian moons have very low surface gravity--"landing" on either is more akin to "docking."
Meanwhile, I think the major requirement for a diversion "base camp" orbital base in the event something (presumably a major dust storm episode) prevents direct landing is radiation shielding, specifically very heavy layers of material massing over 10 tonnes per square meter to cut cosmic ray incidence to levels comparable to those we endure on Earth's surface. For stations near Earth, we might get away with less shielding than the atmosphere of our planet gives us, but it turns out that the Sun's magnetic field is shielding us from a major part of the cosmic ray flux we'd find in interstellar space. Therefore if we go to Mars, averaging around 1.6 AU out, we'd face considerably higher background cosmic rays.
I'm not even considering attempting to shield the crew from CRs in transit between Earth and Mars. That's hopeless, barring either the invention of some high-tech magnetic or plasma type CR shielding, which is very hypothetical at best. The only tried and true method of blocking very energetic charged particles is to interpose mass to absorb their energy. With a charged particle of any given energy and charge, a finite amount of material will indeed absorb them completely (unlike shielding against neutral particles such as the massive neutron and gamma/X-ray flux produced by the proposed nuclear thermal engines, which is a whole other subject-neutral particles can be attenuated but never completely stopped, and the best materials involved are quite different). This business of being able to completely stop particles of a given energy is very important for handling shielding against Solar wind charged particles. The spectrum of these goes all the way up to CR energies for some particles, but only a small minority of them. Solar particles in the main are far less energetic individually. At 1 AU, anywhere beyond low Earth orbits where Earth's magnetic field deflects just about all of them (for orbits in tropical inclinations, and barring the South Atlantic Magnetic Anomaly) the solar wind flux is very dangerous to human life because first of all there is a sort of paradox about charged particles--the same considerations that tell us they can be stopped totally also show they do the most damage with their last bits of energy as they are being slowed to a stop, so their low energy does not make them individually less hazardous, but rather more so. (And with any shielding that fails to stop some of the more energetic particles, some of them are slowed from a speed where they'd do less damage to one where they do the most. It is a matter of tradeoffs to lower the overall damage). The main reason solar flux is deadly at 1 AU is that there are so many of the lower-energy typical particles. Shielding cannot stop all of them because some are especially energetic, but by cutting their number down to small fractions, an acceptably low flux can be achieved. And such shielding would accomplish the same percentage of reduction anywhere in the Solar system, whereas the overall intensity of solar wind flux must fall as the inverse square of distance from the Sun, so going to Mars would cut them in half just by distance alone. This does not mean we can scant on the shielding versus what is needed for near-Earth beyond LEO missions such as expeditions to the Moon, because any interplanetary ship will be departing from and returning to Earth. It does mean that a modest layer of shielding can protect crew from anything the Sun puts out--the more energetic Solar particles will get through to be sure, but they are the numerical minority by far.
But such material shielding adequate to stop hazardous levels of Solar particles won't do much to help with cosmic rays! These require as noted something like 10 tonnes per square meter. In transit between Earth and Mars, the ship is exposed to background CRs at higher intensity than in Earth orbit and the crew must simply survive them, or not. The key here is to speed up the transfers to cut down the travel time so exposed.
But arriving at Mars, if the mission were to involve a direct descent to the surface and later direct launch from it back to Earth, being landed on Mars is only partial help. The Martian atmosphere thin as it is ought to pretty much stop all solar particles, I suppose. But it will do very little against CRs. The solid planet itself will indeed block half of them. That still leaves anyone on the surface of Mars exposed to higher fluxes than those endured by people at the International Space Station for instance. Now people have lived there for periods approaching years--they do indeed suffer medical harm, but it is hard to sort out how much that is due to radiation flux and how much due to being in free fall. Experience with long term stays in low Earth orbit helps suggest crews might well survive transits to and from Mars around a half year or so, but we have to action to cut the cumulative exposure down when we have the opportunity. For people landed on Mars, the necessary thing is to use Martian surface material--regolith--to build barriers comparable to what Earth's atmosphere provides, which is to say we need to bury human habitats below 10 tonnes per square meter. Every time they venture out of such a covered habitation, to do any kind of areology, they add to their cumulative mission CR dose.
Being in low Mars orbit instead, they aren't much worse off; Mars covers half the sky and thus protects them much the same as on the surface. There is no atmosphere shielding against solar flux there, but we have to presume the ship is already shielded well enough against solar rays, enough for 1 AU, whereas out here the flux is halved. But in LMO, there is no extra mass to use to shield the crew further...
...unless we burrow into the surface of Phobos or Deimos. This should be far easier than moving regolith on Luna or Mars by the way, because both bodies appear to be heaps of loose rubble and the gravitational force is so low we can expect materials to be loosely consolidated. And certainly lifting and moving them is mainly a matter of inertia, not weight. Burrowing down, or digging up material and piling it on top of something, is relatively easy there.
It seems obvious then, given your choice of a mission profile involving braking into Mars orbit rather than direct descent and ascent, that the mission should head for one of these moons first. Matching orbits with one of them would involve less delta-V than a low Mars orbit too.
The price we pay for that is that transfers between Mars and Phobos will require more delta-V than to a very low Mars orbit, but I think it would work out reasonably, especially if it turns out we can plan on using some in situ materials. It is unclear whether any useful amounts of volatiles such as water can exist at either Martian moon, but at any rate oxygen exists in abundance, bound into rocks, and can be cracked out to an extent, so any exploration plan going beyond the basic "Apollo paradigm" can develop Phobos as a source of oxygen at the very least.