XLI: Drop Bear, June 1943
Twenty-four hours before the troops were set to storm ashore, four American battleships fired their guns at the southern coast of New Guinea. North Carolina, South Dakota, Indiana and Massachusetts were tasked with clearing the way for a combined Allied force, primarily Australians and Americans but including detachments from other nations as well, to take the beaches west of Port Moresby before storming the city itself. Beaches, to the annoyance of commanders both Allied and Japanese, was a relative term, for this part of New Guinea lacked any great expanses of open beach ideal for the easy unloading of troops and supplies. Steep hills extended almost to the sea in even the best of locations, and the Japanese had lost hundreds taking many of those hills the previous year. Getting the troops on land safely and then supplying them on the march east would be a challenge that worried virtually everyone involved, but it was a job that had to be done.
While the battleships battered jungles and hillsides, General MacArthur and Admiral Fitch were keen to finish the Japanese air presence over New Guinea for good. Fighters flying from the Saratoga, Hornet, Victorious and Illustrious were joined by P-38s and P-47s flying out of bases in northern Australia. Behind them were B-17s, directed to attack every known airfield in New Guinea. If the Japanese fighters did not meet their foes in the air, they would be destroyed on the ground.
The aerial assault on New Guinea began very successfully. Unlike the Navy, and probably just because the Navy was doing it, the Imperial Army had made no effort to pull experienced pilots out of the most dangerous roles, and eighteen months of intense operations had taken its toll on the Army’s Air Service. Well over two-thirds of the Army’s elite crews that had been serving Japan in the Pacific on December 7th, 1941 were now dead, and their replacements had been rushed through a training schedule that provided only a minimum of flying hours before sending them to the front. The Ki-43, while hardly the world-beater it had seemed at the beginning of the war, was still a capable aircraft in the middle of 1943. In the hands of novice pilots, it proved no match for its sturdier, better armoured rivals. Dozens were destroyed, while Allied losses were lighter than expected.
On the eve of the invasion, an air of confidence filled MacArthur’s headquarters. The ease with which the counterattack in New Caledonia had been conducted, the quick collapse of their position in Fiji and the destruction of their air power over New Guinea was making Allied commanders believe that the Japanese defence was fragile. They may still be capable on the offensive, their effort towards Tontouta had been proof enough of that, but the moment they were stopped was the moment they would begin to die. MacArthur was the most confident of all, and with two divisions (the 32nd US and 9th Australian) set to land, he had fair reason to be so. Intelligence was suggesting that the Japanese were in a complete shambles.
What MacArthur did not know was that the chaos in the Japanese command was occurring far behind the lines. Although the Imperial Navy had stationed some troops on New Guinea, General Hyakutake had wanted to ensure that it was Army troops that would have the glory of repulsing an American landing. The Navy troops were now being sent out of New Guinea, but they were leaving the sectors of the island considered less important by the Japanese. General Horii and the 55th Division were still manning the beach defences, only the interior was weakened.
On June 11th, 1943, nearly 4000 Japanese were stationed at MacArthur’s landing sites. Despite the air and naval bombardment of the previous day, too few had been dislodged from the hillsides, and now they swept the battlefield with machine gun and artillery fire while remaining safe in hundreds of wooden and concrete bunkers. Bombers originally planned to destroy Japanese bases across Western New Guinea were redirected to assist in the destruction of the hillside bunkers, while hundreds of MacArthur’s infantry fell. The first wave of Drop Bear suffered some of the heaviest losses so far seen in the Pacific war, but after nearly nine hours Blue Beach, one of the four landing sites, was declared taken. Smaller beachheads at Red, Green and Orange beaches were also occupied, but many of the bunkers in those sectors continued their menacing presence.
Horii, who had been forced to split his time between the Allied landings and the dispute with the Navy, was under the impression that the bunker lines were holding. He had built several such lines at every location close enough to Port Moresby that he thought an invasion could arrive at, but now found his manpower – 25,000 all up – divided along a nearly hundred kilometre front. An hour of disputes with a Navy officer delayed the decision of whether to pull forces from these other sectors, and intelligence reports suggesting a second invasion was soon to follow made the general even more uncertain. After dawn the next day, when another recon flight reported no second invasion fleet, Horii finally made the decision to pull some of his defences away from the bunkers east of Port Moresby.
MacArthur, on board the cruiser Louisville, watched nervously as his troops clinged on to the scraps of ground that they had lost a thousand men for. All through the night, there was a fear that the Japanese could push forward with some unseen reserves. The sea was just a few hundred metres behind them, and the destruction of a landing group remained a feared possibility, especially at Orange Beach where the situation was more precarious than anywhere else. The Australians at Blue Beach worked through the night to unload several artillery pieces, and by morning they were ready to push forward once again.
MacArthur’s hope to be in Port Moresby in three days had been dashed, and the situation was deemed to dangerous for him to personally join the troops on the beaches, but at the beginning of D+1 the position at Blue had been consolidated sufficiently for a new advance to be made. The troops at Blue, along with newly-landed forces, were ordered into the hills again with the difficult job of clearing the Japanese from their bunkers, one by one. Only once the bunkers had been silenced would it be possible to advance on Port Moresby. The fanatic soldiers fighting to the death in the hills of New Guinea were proving that Japan was just as fearsome on the defence as they had been on the attack.
- BNC
Twenty-four hours before the troops were set to storm ashore, four American battleships fired their guns at the southern coast of New Guinea. North Carolina, South Dakota, Indiana and Massachusetts were tasked with clearing the way for a combined Allied force, primarily Australians and Americans but including detachments from other nations as well, to take the beaches west of Port Moresby before storming the city itself. Beaches, to the annoyance of commanders both Allied and Japanese, was a relative term, for this part of New Guinea lacked any great expanses of open beach ideal for the easy unloading of troops and supplies. Steep hills extended almost to the sea in even the best of locations, and the Japanese had lost hundreds taking many of those hills the previous year. Getting the troops on land safely and then supplying them on the march east would be a challenge that worried virtually everyone involved, but it was a job that had to be done.
While the battleships battered jungles and hillsides, General MacArthur and Admiral Fitch were keen to finish the Japanese air presence over New Guinea for good. Fighters flying from the Saratoga, Hornet, Victorious and Illustrious were joined by P-38s and P-47s flying out of bases in northern Australia. Behind them were B-17s, directed to attack every known airfield in New Guinea. If the Japanese fighters did not meet their foes in the air, they would be destroyed on the ground.
The aerial assault on New Guinea began very successfully. Unlike the Navy, and probably just because the Navy was doing it, the Imperial Army had made no effort to pull experienced pilots out of the most dangerous roles, and eighteen months of intense operations had taken its toll on the Army’s Air Service. Well over two-thirds of the Army’s elite crews that had been serving Japan in the Pacific on December 7th, 1941 were now dead, and their replacements had been rushed through a training schedule that provided only a minimum of flying hours before sending them to the front. The Ki-43, while hardly the world-beater it had seemed at the beginning of the war, was still a capable aircraft in the middle of 1943. In the hands of novice pilots, it proved no match for its sturdier, better armoured rivals. Dozens were destroyed, while Allied losses were lighter than expected.
On the eve of the invasion, an air of confidence filled MacArthur’s headquarters. The ease with which the counterattack in New Caledonia had been conducted, the quick collapse of their position in Fiji and the destruction of their air power over New Guinea was making Allied commanders believe that the Japanese defence was fragile. They may still be capable on the offensive, their effort towards Tontouta had been proof enough of that, but the moment they were stopped was the moment they would begin to die. MacArthur was the most confident of all, and with two divisions (the 32nd US and 9th Australian) set to land, he had fair reason to be so. Intelligence was suggesting that the Japanese were in a complete shambles.
What MacArthur did not know was that the chaos in the Japanese command was occurring far behind the lines. Although the Imperial Navy had stationed some troops on New Guinea, General Hyakutake had wanted to ensure that it was Army troops that would have the glory of repulsing an American landing. The Navy troops were now being sent out of New Guinea, but they were leaving the sectors of the island considered less important by the Japanese. General Horii and the 55th Division were still manning the beach defences, only the interior was weakened.
On June 11th, 1943, nearly 4000 Japanese were stationed at MacArthur’s landing sites. Despite the air and naval bombardment of the previous day, too few had been dislodged from the hillsides, and now they swept the battlefield with machine gun and artillery fire while remaining safe in hundreds of wooden and concrete bunkers. Bombers originally planned to destroy Japanese bases across Western New Guinea were redirected to assist in the destruction of the hillside bunkers, while hundreds of MacArthur’s infantry fell. The first wave of Drop Bear suffered some of the heaviest losses so far seen in the Pacific war, but after nearly nine hours Blue Beach, one of the four landing sites, was declared taken. Smaller beachheads at Red, Green and Orange beaches were also occupied, but many of the bunkers in those sectors continued their menacing presence.
Horii, who had been forced to split his time between the Allied landings and the dispute with the Navy, was under the impression that the bunker lines were holding. He had built several such lines at every location close enough to Port Moresby that he thought an invasion could arrive at, but now found his manpower – 25,000 all up – divided along a nearly hundred kilometre front. An hour of disputes with a Navy officer delayed the decision of whether to pull forces from these other sectors, and intelligence reports suggesting a second invasion was soon to follow made the general even more uncertain. After dawn the next day, when another recon flight reported no second invasion fleet, Horii finally made the decision to pull some of his defences away from the bunkers east of Port Moresby.
MacArthur, on board the cruiser Louisville, watched nervously as his troops clinged on to the scraps of ground that they had lost a thousand men for. All through the night, there was a fear that the Japanese could push forward with some unseen reserves. The sea was just a few hundred metres behind them, and the destruction of a landing group remained a feared possibility, especially at Orange Beach where the situation was more precarious than anywhere else. The Australians at Blue Beach worked through the night to unload several artillery pieces, and by morning they were ready to push forward once again.
MacArthur’s hope to be in Port Moresby in three days had been dashed, and the situation was deemed to dangerous for him to personally join the troops on the beaches, but at the beginning of D+1 the position at Blue had been consolidated sufficiently for a new advance to be made. The troops at Blue, along with newly-landed forces, were ordered into the hills again with the difficult job of clearing the Japanese from their bunkers, one by one. Only once the bunkers had been silenced would it be possible to advance on Port Moresby. The fanatic soldiers fighting to the death in the hills of New Guinea were proving that Japan was just as fearsome on the defence as they had been on the attack.
- BNC