marathag
Banned
Hope was that the French would try a cut thru Belgian territory to get at the Germans, so there would be much gnashing of teeth over that guarantee that Belgium had at Whitehall
No Belgium invasion
- Thread starter gurgu
- Start date
Hope was that the French would try a cut thru Belgian territory to get at the Germans, so there would be much gnashing of teeth over that guarantee that Belgium had at Whitehall
gurgu
Banned
also the french would simply smash without being able to siege ad conquer Liegi or other cities before the German aid arrives
If the French get permission to go through Belgium, than Belgium is really no longer neutral. If they go through without permission or asking, then they have violated the treaty. In either case the ability of those in Britain who wanted to join in against Germany is markedly reduced. IMHO the ability of the French to seriously threaten Germany by going through Belgium is limited, and the Germans would welcome such a move.
gurgu
Banned
as i commented before is there a possibility of a 3 alliances war? CP VS entente VS commonwealth
gurgu
Banned
then the french are not going to invade Belgium knowing that Britain is guaranteeing for their independence, they aren't that arroga.... oh yes i forgot they are.
The brits - esp. Grey and the Foreign office to be more precise - made an awfull lot of fuzz about the neutrality and integrety of belgium before the germans invaded it.
In case the germans don't invade and somewhat later the french do ... Grey Asquith and the whole of britains politicians would face a MAJOR fuck-up.
If they were concerned about british credibility before entereing the war IOTL at this position the only thing they could do to preserve their credibility would be ... to fight France.
Even simply standing aside would Britain make loose every bit of credibility it have. They are in terms of international politics in no way able to "permitt" to anyone using/abusing Belgium as a battlefield or means to deployment area for their own troops. And entering the war now on the franco-russian side, siding the 'violator' of what they deemed before the most precious of politics ... no way to sell this to anyone in Britain alone, not to talk of the international and still neutral community.
In case the germans don't invade and somewhat later the french do ... Grey Asquith and the whole of britains politicians would face a MAJOR fuck-up.
If they were concerned about british credibility before entereing the war IOTL at this position the only thing they could do to preserve their credibility would be ... to fight France.
Even simply standing aside would Britain make loose every bit of credibility it have. They are in terms of international politics in no way able to "permitt" to anyone using/abusing Belgium as a battlefield or means to deployment area for their own troops. And entering the war now on the franco-russian side, siding the 'violator' of what they deemed before the most precious of politics ... no way to sell this to anyone in Britain alone, not to talk of the international and still neutral community.
The only way Britain squeezes in to neutrality is if France asks for a narrow transit corridor and Belgium says yes. Since France did not "invade" Belgium and is not fighting Belgians, Britain can say that Belgium has put the treaty aside and "we wash our hands of the whole mess". TYhe Uk might try and use any German reaction/incursions in to Belgium as a justification, but IMHO that won't fly.
marathag
Banned
That corridor involes going thru the Namur area and then Liege, with many Forts at both.
Don't think King Albert would agree to that, any more than him letting the Germans use that corridor.
Can't go south of there, that's the impassable Ardennes, remember.
BooNZ
Banned
If you handwave Britain into the war without Belgium:
- there is no rationale for Britain to immediately build a million man continental army
- there is no obvious place for the British to deploy such an army if and when it is eventually built
- there is less material for the British PR campaign against Germany in terms of violation of Belgium neutrality and various Belgium atrocities
- the implementation of a British blockade becomes more challenging from a PR and logistical perspective
- the Germans do not have to waste time, resources and manpower - fighting through Belgium, seeking decisive battle with logistics strained to breaking point
The only potential 'exploit' is a German littoral campaign against British channel shipping, which would require non-existent foresight of Tirpitz, who was correctly sh*t scared of the Royal Navy.
Instead the diplomacy of German civilian decision makers was railroaded by an ill conceived military scheme, which was based on a set of obsolete assumptions, or conditions that never existed in the first place.
Riain
Banned
That's all well and good, but the plan that brought Britain into the war via the invasion of Belgium didn't simply fall from the sky.
Moltke had a bunch of plans right up until 1913, reflecting the multiple Diplomatic scenarios of the time but from December 1912 there was only 1 scenario Moltke was planning for; total war against Britain, France and Russia as per the advice of the Kaiser. Of course the change from 4 campaign plan options to a single option wasn't the only change in German planning, they also abandoned enacting a 6th Naval Law and enlarged the peacetime strength of the Army by 135,000, the first increase in size of a long time.
Tbh, I intended to stay away from any attempt to unravel this hotchpotch patchwork of singled-out bits of knockledge, some half-knowledge and some portion of lack-of-knowledge stitched together and gaps filled with contrafactual assumptions to someones taste. It would very likely need a several hours long lecture.
But ... as you asked for
Well, first part of the russian 9th army - more precisely parts of 37th division of XVIII.Corps - began to detrain off the railtrack from Iwangorod to Lublin on the open field at 26th/27th August parallel to parts of 46th division of XXV.Corps and 80th reserve division sent from russian 5th army (at this point of time Plehve seemed still feel able to 'afford' this lending of troops as the "Battle of Komarow" hasn't become as ...hard to him as 2-3 days later) as reinforcement comming from the opposite direction on the same track.
Thereby they caught the austrian I.Corps - mainly 12th and 5th division - in its left/northeastern flank while slowly advancing at Lublin from southeast and south (together with austrian V.Corps) despite almost complete exhaustion - but he russian XIV. and XVI. Corps of russian 4th army were in no better, perhaps an even worse condition being constantly beaten and driven back.
However, without these reinforcements of fresh troops - maybe aside the parts of 46th division from 5th army - russian 4th army would have been driven fürther back ... as they were alraeyd beaten by austrian I. army (you remember? "Battle of Krasnik"?) leading to the austrian capture of at least Lublin, with the germans (actually another though of 'only' second line formation : Landwehr-Corps Woyrsch)hot on their heel towards the Vistula crossings south of Ivangorod.
Only at 1st September most the russian XVIII.Corps was finally deployed along the Chodel-creek to the Vistula merely checked by altogether about 2 to 2 1/2 divisions of 2nd line troops of the so-called Armygroup Kummer.
Just another wee, "irrelevant" detail refuting at least one of your statements. ... letting once again the rest of your statements look ... somewhat weeker, dear @Gannt the chartist
And of course the above named battles only show how
But ... as you asked for
Lets perhaps begin with some detail :
You probably refer to the 9th russian army ?
Well, first part of the russian 9th army - more precisely parts of 37th division of XVIII.Corps - began to detrain off the railtrack from Iwangorod to Lublin on the open field at 26th/27th August parallel to parts of 46th division of XXV.Corps and 80th reserve division sent from russian 5th army (at this point of time Plehve seemed still feel able to 'afford' this lending of troops as the "Battle of Komarow" hasn't become as ...hard to him as 2-3 days later) as reinforcement comming from the opposite direction on the same track.
Thereby they caught the austrian I.Corps - mainly 12th and 5th division - in its left/northeastern flank while slowly advancing at Lublin from southeast and south (together with austrian V.Corps) despite almost complete exhaustion - but he russian XIV. and XVI. Corps of russian 4th army were in no better, perhaps an even worse condition being constantly beaten and driven back.
However, without these reinforcements of fresh troops - maybe aside the parts of 46th division from 5th army - russian 4th army would have been driven fürther back ... as they were alraeyd beaten by austrian I. army (you remember? "Battle of Krasnik"?) leading to the austrian capture of at least Lublin, with the germans (actually another though of 'only' second line formation : Landwehr-Corps Woyrsch)hot on their heel towards the Vistula crossings south of Ivangorod.
Only at 1st September most the russian XVIII.Corps was finally deployed along the Chodel-creek to the Vistula merely checked by altogether about 2 to 2 1/2 divisions of 2nd line troops of the so-called Armygroup Kummer.
Just another wee, "irrelevant" detail refuting at least one of your statements. ... letting once again the rest of your statements look ... somewhat weeker, dear @Gannt the chartist
And of course the above named battles only show how
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Now, dear @Gannt the chartist, in your seemingly so beloved "Variant G" of the russian 1912 deployment plan (mob.schedule 19) the austrian 1st and 4th armies would have to face together only the 5th army. ... which in the 1912 plans had for variant G only 3 Corps plus some late 2nd to 3rd line units instead of 4 full active Corps - plus 2nd line troops - as IOTL.
Compared to what happened to the 2 russian armies with their fully active 7 Corps this diminished 5th army would quickly vanish either being annihilated (look at the losses IOTL of 2 russian armies against 2 austrian armies) or flee... erhm retreating 'quickly' to Brest-Litowsk and Kowel at least with a number of bloody noses.
Thereby the 'back' of any russian troops - may it be 2 armies or 3 armies - still operation in Poland would be completly unprotected and free to take even for 2nd to 3rd tier troops like the austrian so-called Army Group Kummer.
What OTOH would let look the fate of the russian 3rd army rather ... bleak.
By operational plan 19 it was still ordered to attack the austrian in order to 'fix' their forces from turning north deeper into Poland.
Only that ITTL with 5th army gone it would suddenly be out- to overflanked by austrian troops at its own right, northern flank while its IOTL split off and somewhat reinforced parts forming the russian 8th army would probably still advance deep into eastern galicia due to the fuck-up deployment of the austrians there (no to too late arrival of austrian 2nd army from the serbian campaign).
Compared to what happened to the 2 russian armies with their fully active 7 Corps this diminished 5th army would quickly vanish either being annihilated (look at the losses IOTL of 2 russian armies against 2 austrian armies) or flee... erhm retreating 'quickly' to Brest-Litowsk and Kowel at least with a number of bloody noses.
Thereby the 'back' of any russian troops - may it be 2 armies or 3 armies - still operation in Poland would be completly unprotected and free to take even for 2nd to 3rd tier troops like the austrian so-called Army Group Kummer.
What OTOH would let look the fate of the russian 3rd army rather ... bleak.
By operational plan 19 it was still ordered to attack the austrian in order to 'fix' their forces from turning north deeper into Poland.
Only that ITTL with 5th army gone it would suddenly be out- to overflanked by austrian troops at its own right, northern flank while its IOTL split off and somewhat reinforced parts forming the russian 8th army would probably still advance deep into eastern galicia due to the fuck-up deployment of the austrians there (no to too late arrival of austrian 2nd army from the serbian campaign).
Britain would have found an excuse, depending on how the political situation gelled out at home and in Ireland.
For the xx-time :
WHAT EXCUSE ! ... that would have convinced the british 'home front' (public, finance, industry, agriculture as well as the differing factions of the Liberral Party as well as the Labourt Party as well as the Conservative Party) to go to war
PLEASE ! If you have a proposal aside of handwaving, PLEASE name it.
Riain
Banned
Why is British entry held to so high a standard? Was it handwavium that bought Turkey into the war months after the other big players, or Italy and Bulgaria in 1915, or Romania in 1916 or the US some 3 years into the war?
Given how many countries entered the war I think it's handwavium to keep Britain out and willful blindness to believe that the war will not throw up circumstances for Britain to enter.
BooNZ
Banned
The British hawks had more-or-less staked everything on the expectation the Germans would invade Belgium, but some including Churchill were concerned a minor violation of Belgium neutrality would not suffice to get Britain into the war. The sovereignty of Belgium and control of the channel ports were considered in vital interests of Britain, while the technical trespass through the Belgium Ardennes was almost expected. A further concern of the hawks had was the British appetite for war if Belgium did not resist the German invaders or did not request assistance. I doubt Belgium would have seriously attempted to defend the Ardennes against anyone.
The French alone simply did not have the military assets or preparation for a wide sweep through Belgium and if the French in desperation chose to lurch through the Belgium Ardennes, British admonishment would be the least of their problems - IMHO.
No, it developed from a flawed and incomplete concept that landed in Moltke's lap in 1905-06.
Given the inability to provide any credible evidence or support, this entrenched "west is best" position appears more of a faith based belief system, clinging to the notion it was the one true plan or choice, disregarding all evidence to the contrary. The logic appears to be, if Moltke put all his eggs in one basket, that basket must have been very special indeed. The reality was the Schlieffen Plan was an epic military and diplomatic blunder - something even Moltke subsequently appears to have conceded.
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Riain
Banned
Can you provide a reason as to why Germany went from having 4 mobilisation-campaign plans in April 1913 to one mobilisation-campaign plan in April 1914? Keep in mind that the German mobilisation-campaign planning cycle takes a year and starts in April.
BooNZ
Banned
Moltke's mental health? Are you suggesting Germany limiting its available military options to one high risk, low reward maneuver in response to all conceivable scenarios is either rational or prudent?
In any event, even without a current alternative mobilization plan, Von Stabbs claimed the German rail network could have deployed the majority of the German armies to the east within two weeks. Similarly, Groener purportedly claimed it would take 2-3 days to formulate an updated eastern deployment plan.
Irrespective of the status of the available alternatives, the German rail infrastructure and organization could have delivered any number of alternatives on a timely basis. For example, Tannenberg replicated a 20 year old German war game, employing established German military doctrine from decades past.
Therefore, any self imposed restrictions on German war planning appear to have been serving a political purpose. As a self proclaimed 'west is best' advocate, perhaps you can provide an alternative explanation.