BooNZ

Banned
This is fair enough, however it applies to the situation of the July Crisis and mobilisations on the Continent. Once this is done Cabinet and Parliament will face different crises and the benched hawks may come back into favour or the doves may become hawks when facing the next crisis.
I doubt either of the OTL British hawks (Grey and Churchill) would be trusted with the reigns anytime soon. Lloyd George OTL illustrated staunch non-interventionists could be swayed to war if British vital interests were under threat, but in the scenario provided, there does not appear to be such a threat on the horizon. The British industry and economy will profit[eer] from the conflict on the continent, while the doves and non-interventionists will continue to congradulate themselves for avoiding the ensuing slaughter. If Anglo-German hostilities are avoided in 1914, Ireland home rule is likely to take greater prominance in British politics. In such an environment it is difficult to imagine a crisis of a sufficient scale to drag Britain into the war anytime soon.

Over time I could imagine increasing Anglo-German friction arising from a Germany suffering from victory disease and being increasingly less considerate. However, without Britain in the fight, I would expect the Entente to either tap out before 1916, or be in such poor shape that it would not be expected to last much longer. In such circumstances, the smart play from Britain would be to facilitate peace, before the French humiliation is complete.

The new British decision makers will face different circumstances than those who faced the lead-up to and breakout of war and their reactions to these circumstances cannot be predicted with the ironclad certainty that you espouse.
As outlined above, the political tide would be running increasingly against the British joining the war, since both parties will be seeking to avoid conflict. You need to a paradigm shift in the diplomatic attitude of both nations, coupled with a series of blunders/ incidents equivalent to the OTL invasion of Belgium to get Britain into the war. Even suspect German diplomacy would struggle to boast British beligerence to such a scale after it recognises British neutrality is a reality.

British beligerance is not impossible, but certainly implausible base on the information we have available or plausible scenarios we can imagine. In context, if the British do not enter the war on a timely basis (certainly before 1916), then the Entente war is lost. Prima facie, an alternative German war plan that avoids or meaningfully defers British beligerence is vastly superior to the OTL 'plan'.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Is it possible for the Tories to win the upcoming election?
I assume so, but from what I can remember the internal party cohesion within the unionist/conservative party was not much better than the Liberals. While they might have been less dovish than the Liberals, in July 1914 Bonar Law indicated the conservatives could not bring Britain into the war without the Germans being in Belgium. Prima facie, a conservative British government would also need a CB as compelling as the OTL German invasion to get Britain into the war.

I vaguely recall on another thread you had a low opinion of British leadership during the period, or was this only directed at British technical innovation? Perhaps I have misremembered? What are your thoughts?
 

BooNZ

Banned
Only 4 of the 10 Russian armies come into striking range of the Germans in the first months of the war. Another 4 were partying against AH and 1 guarding against the Ottoman Empire. In these circumstances the Germans simply cannot strike a knockout blow against the Russians.

I continue to be curious how you conclude west is best when merely a decisive victory against the French in the west is implausible, yet you discount the beast in the east because a first round knockout of Imperial Russian is not a done deal? The almost certain immediate destruction of at least four Russian armies and the preservation of the prewar A-H military resources are apparently scarcely worth the effort?

If the Russians likely lose 3-4 armies and the Polish fortress line in the opening couple of months, what is standing between 4 German armies and the rear echelons of the Russian southern front? In my opinion the Russians cannot hold the Polish salient against vastly superior CP forces, but the Russian commanders also lack the mandate to abandon the salient on a timely basis to preserve their forces.

Imperial Russia would be needing a Dunkirk style miracle not to be knocked out of the war.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
@BooNZ
I assume it has to do something with "home at X-mas".

The western campaign was the only one that 'promised' such an outcome however unfeasable and unsustainable such a promise actually was almost completly ignoring what would be left to do in the east - not to talk about the only to be dreamed-of but nevertheless not only hope-for but planned-with logistical performance - in case the western campaign which was a singled western-campaign-operational-plan-only far from anything resembling kind a 'strategic plan' for the whole problem of a two-front-war would have actually succeeded in its first goals.

Thereby also completly ignoring the only too well known fact what could or rather surely would happen after the 'military' victory as thought of. Once again the the lessons of the Franco-German war of 1870/71 were ignored by Moltke the Minor, which was 'militarily' won with the battle of Sedan. ... but ... then ... there came another french republique and the 'levee èn mass' to protract the war well into march of 1871, putting a damn awfull lot of strain upon the prussian and every other german military contingent. Actually they needed the Peace of Frankfurt almost as urgently as the french according to Moltke the Elder.
 
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