Aerial torpedo training early in the war didn't explicitly include the fast mental footwork needed to calculate by how much, during the time between your drop (or when you're spotted, if that differs) and when the torpedo and present target paths converge, the target might be able to be at a different location as of that intended convergence time than where you expect them to be; and how short you need to make that time-between-drop-and-convergence (i.e. how close to the intended convergence point, but of course always farther away than the minimum depth-stabilization-and-fuze-arming run distance) so that the target is hit even if they maximally change their course and/or speed.

You also evaluate where you are, and the water depth. All aerial and surface-fired torpedoes usually dived to a considerable depth, then rose to their set depth. That might take multiple hundreds of yards. A torpedo dropped in too-shallow water would hit the bottom and be thrown off course, or damaged, or just stick in the bottom and be lost. A torpedo dropped too close to the target likely would run under it, because it wouldn't have risen to set depth yet.

This illustration shows an attack by a motor torpedo boat, but exactly the same techniques were used by torpedo planes. You estimate the target's speed, you know what your minimum run is (which depends partly on the sea state), you know what run depth and speed your torpedo(es) are set for, and you judge how much defensive fire there is already or is about to begin in regard to how close you can get before releasing your (first, if multiple) fish. Given those parameters and the angle between your attack course and the target's present course, you do a mental calculation of the offset angle that defines your firing point, and you continually measure (or mentally judge, but measurement is more accurate) that angle as you rapidly close on your drop point.

attackresized.jpg


If you have time and knowledge, you identify the target ship and mentally recall its propulsion capabilities and rudder authority, and calculate whether your attack will be defeatable if the captain / helm is maximally aware and the engine room and rudder crews are sharp.

What the target should do upon seeing that a torpedo attack is coming is change its speed and course. Almost all ships slow down much more readily than speed up, so what most ships should do is command their engine room to do an all stop and then emergency astern, plus a rudder command for full rudder to turn toward you (because a turn toward the incoming torpedo is more likely to cause a miss than a turn away).

(The reason why torpedo bombers and MTBs usually didn't try attacking destroyers is because destroyers' tactical radius...their tightest turn...is likely to be shorter than your torpedo's minimum arming and stabilization distance. So, if they were paying attention and not stopped or for some reason at very slow speed, you couldn't possibly hit them because they easily could be nowhere near your intended convergence point.)
Thank you, this was exactly what I was looking for. I knew US torpedoes were crap, thus many didn't go off, but the OTHER main issue early in the war was the sheer number of plain misses. Which kinda stunned me.
 
Did you locate the Asiatic Fleet info at NHHC? Or elsewhere? One of the irritants is that NHHC
begins their tables in Feb 42. I 've hoped to locate 1 DEC 41!

I like the BuOrd and BuAir info. I think that I followed links from a VP site and eventually
Bureau numbers, contracts locations and loss dates a while back.
Monthly BUAER Reports are not at NHHC - they should be! They're big files, 70-100 pages that were sent to me. With the Asiatic Fleet's challenges and considering that these were prepared at the Navy Department in Washington, December 31 numbers would be based on latest reports received, and therefore, are probably slightly off. FAW-10 (successor to PATWING-10) War History is here: https://catalog.archives.gov/id/77519727. Some NARA files that I've had declassified are also extremely large. I was able to post the weekly operation summaries for AIRLANT/PATWINGSLANT from 4 Dec 41 to the end of Jan 42 here: http://www.ww2f.com/threads/uss-wasps-aircraft.76433/#post-890078 which bridges the gap to the NHHC reports. The War Diaries for the Pacific are much better than those for the Atlantic, and the PHA and Grey Book are gold, so we have better numbers for PACFLT.

Unlike the archives available online from the UK, availability here remains a little weak.
 
Monthly BUAER Reports are not at NHHC - they should be! They're big files, 70-100 pages that were sent to me. With the Asiatic Fleet's challenges and considering that these were prepared at the Navy Department in Washington, December 31 numbers would be based on latest reports received, and therefore, are probably slightly off. FAW-10 (successor to PATWING-10) War History is here: https://catalog.archives.gov/id/77519727. Some NARA files that I've had declassified are also extremely large. I was able to post the weekly operation summaries for AIRLANT/PATWINGSLANT from 4 Dec 41 to the end of Jan 42 here: http://www.ww2f.com/threads/uss-wasps-aircraft.76433/#post-890078 which bridges the gap to the NHHC reports. The War Diaries for the Pacific are much better than those for the Atlantic, and the PHA and Grey Book are gold, so we have better numbers for PACFLT.

Unlike the archives available online from the UK, availability here remains a little weak.
Thanks for finding the aerial torpedos and locations. I dried NHHC but get a msg that they are moving to a new server
 
The 31 December 1941 Aircraft list for the Asiatic Fleet is off. The Cavite SOCs under repair were lost, in the Cavite bombing on the 10th the remainder had been moved to Mariveles on Bataan . All Utility aviation assets had moved to Mariveles, or Los Banos on Laguna de Bay by the 17th, which served as a temporary base for PBYs after Subic Bay became unsafe. Only the J2Fs were able to evacuate South with only 2 making it eventually to Australia. By 28 December PatWing 10 had moved to Ambon. My sources are Histories of the Asiatic Fleet and a Biography of a member of PatWing 10 who escaped the P.I..
Doesn't reflect all PBY losses either, only those Dec 8. Should be down 6 instead of just 2 due to the loss of 4 after Christmas. War Diary should also list operational losses too. I'll see about digging them up.


PW10 WH p4.JPG

PW10 WH p5.JPG
 
Thank you, this was exactly what I was looking for. I knew US torpedoes were crap, thus many didn't go off, but the OTHER main issue early in the war was the sheer number of plain misses. Which kinda stunned me.
Torpedo aiming skills are a lot like shotgunning birds. You have to know how to lead, and you have to choose targets at close enough range that your shot pattern will still get them even if they change course. Those are skills that you develop by experience, which means practice and more practice, plus doing it in combat when the pressure's on. Someone with mostly classroom knowledge of torpedo attacking, and maybe one or two training drops under ideal conditions with no real pressure, isn't going to be good at it.

On Guadalcanal, the Japs didn't have a lot of cannon and mortar ammo, but they did have grenades. So, they fired lots of rifle grenades and/or threw hand grenades on high arcs toward the Marine fighting holes. The Marines could see these coming, but quickly figured out that no one could hit and deflect them with rifle rounds. Some of their soldiers though said they could do it with shotguns. So, the commanders had some flown in. But, most Marines weren't good at it. The effective few were the ones who grew up around shotguns and bird-hunting...ducks, quail, pheasants...and had that experience-gained ability to judge trajectory, pick their range and lead by the right amount.

Of course, no one grows up firing torpedoes in combat, but the same principle applies. You learn to do it by being alongside someone else who does it successfully, then by doing it many times yourself... not by sitting in a classroom.

Submarine commanders got to "apprentice" as junior officers, so had a chance to learn some of what was needed on-the-job. Torpedo bomber pilots mostly learned from classroom training and a small number of practice drops. They weren't very likely to learn on-the-job because the survival rate was so low.
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
If you have time and knowledge, you identify the target ship and mentally recall its propulsion capabilities and rudder authority, and calculate whether your attack will be defeatable if the captain / helm is maximally aware and the engine room and rudder crews are sharp.

Some explanation in this scanned wartime booklet(?). Neat forum discussion on Vildebeest, Swordfish, dive-bombing etc too. Dave H and James (JDK) are mates of mine, and top blokes.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Hi Everyone

I'm a long time luker and I've been following this thread for quite a while. A big thanks to FBC for his excellent writing and to the posters on this thread.

The loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse has always saddened me. I can remember reading about it as a child and it struck a chord.

I do wonder if the outcome could have been different if the air search radar had been working and the ammunition was better. iirc the Japanese pilots were surprised at the lack of tracer.

Imho it was the million to one torpedo hit which sealed their fate. If the hit had struck the torpedo defence system then I believe both ships may have survived, albeit damaged. The AA fire during the first wave was quite accurate and several planes were shot down and damaged.

There are so many variables to this sad battle and changing one slightly could've made the outcome a lot different. I look forward to following the story..... and hope these fine ships survive ;-)

many thanks
Hi Anteos, thank you for your kind words, and welcome, please feel free to post, whether it be fact, question, or adding to off target chat we indulge in as we meander through this story.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Figured that.. also remember that there is 20, 000 pounds of US aerial ordinance in Singapore, which will fit just fine on any of the PBYs which at this time had a bomb load of
3,000 lbs,, for a reduction of 40% in max range. Cache would include bombs up to 500 lbs. 325 lb depth Charges, and possibly Mk XIII aerial torps. My money would be on mostly depth charges but possibly maybe a half dozen torps. But at this time PBY-5s could not carry 2 torps, usually 1 torp. and 1,000 lbs of bombs on the other wing
Hi Butch, at first it sounds a lot, but 20,000 pounds is only about 60 depth charges, which is what my money would be on

Assuming that they PBY crews haven't trained properly on torpedo attacks, I would suggest that they are better used on tasks other than a low-chance highly dangerous torpedo run.
Hi Errolwi, the British were desperately short of long range maritime aircraft, I think they only had five of these aircraft in Singapore, provided by the Dutch. The British had aircrew, and a lack of planes, and the Dutch had considerably more American built aircraft arriving than they could initially manage. I agree with you, though they might be able to fly these aircraft, I think any success in conducting a torpedo attack would be down to luck, and I suspect a depth charge attack would need a large slice too. Given time they could learn, but there's no time for that now.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
PBYs earned their Black Cat name by conducting night attacks. Especially after they got radar. I sadly doubt that any of the Albacores in Singapore had ASV radar, might be interesting to see if American MK XIIIs would mount on an Albacore.
Hi Butch, Yes there are some ASV radar sets for the handful of Albacores based in Singapore, see https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/malaya-what-if.521982/post-23790690, and https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/malaya-what-if.521982/post-23873624, but installing them was problematic. Strangely the Fleet Air Arm was able to get them working in the Swordfish well before the Albacore, although they tried the Albacore first. In this timeline, recognising that the FAA had the capability of ASV aircraft by early 1941, I will twist the historical line, overcoming the technical challenges to installing the ASV Mk II into the Albacore earlier, which will provide this backwater of the war with a very small number of easily identifiable ASV aircraft. But don't expect miracles from them.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
If extra sets existed, they should have gone into PBYs. Nothing made a long range search plane more useful than a 10x wider search track, plus ability to see through darkness and clouds, plus some ability to avoid patrolling enemy fighters.
Hi JWilly48519, totally agree, however...

We have two competing services for these ASV's, the RAF, who's Coastal Command was using them in the Atlantic, and the FAA of the Royal Navy. The few Catalina's that RAF 205 squadron have recently acquired are not fitted with ASV. The Lockheed Hudson, of RAAF 1 and RAAF 8 Sqn's is used in a maritime recon/bomber role but to my knowledge hadn't been fitted with them. The British manufacture of these radar sets was small and slow, but they had given one to the Americans as part of the Tizard Mission, and by 1942 the Americans were turning out hundreds, soon to move into thousands of them. Whether the Hudson's got them later I don't know, the Hudson's were used extensively in Martine Recon role around New Guinea and the Solomon Islands in 1942-43.

Now as a side note, but certainly of interest to this story, the Supermarine Walrus's carried by both HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, are equipped with the ASV Mk II, as they were historically!
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
For all their night fighting prowess, the Japanese Navy would've been totally helpless to defend their ships at sea against a nocturnal radar aided air strike. Bill Richards' successful midnight attack on Akebono Maru (in a radar equipped Catalina, no less) should be regarded as a yardstick for such speculation.
Hi Sekhmet_D, I didn't know about this, thank you.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Some explanation in this scanned wartime booklet(?). Neat forum discussion on Vildebeest, Swordfish, dive-bombing etc too. Dave H and James (JDK) are mates of mine, and top blokes.
Hi Errolwi, thank you for this, an interesting read.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Today's sad news is a reminder that no matter how much we want this wonderful story to get down to the nitty gritty, there are real people involved. Real people whose ships were sunk and whose buddies were lost. I salute all of them.
Hi Ihagambia, well said, and I need to keep that in mind as I go off killing thousands.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Is there some way that the ability of a Swordfish to perform an Immelmann after a torpedo drop can be worked into this?
Hi Edgeworthy, have a look at the Immelmann Turn, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immelmann_turn, I suspect the high climb to pre stall and half roll would offer up the aircraft as a splendid target for AA fire. Remember in the torpedo attack run in, the aircraft is already facing at an angle off the bow of the ship, the pilot simply turns further away from the ship to get away. But I think for any pilot making a torpedo attack against a warship, its brown trouser day!

That said, a torpedo attack is an exciting theme, and we're gonna have a few of them!
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Ah, so after that little flurry, you've probably noticed I've returned, having to accept I can't research everything down to the last detail, I'll never get the story written. Next story instalment coming tomorrow (that's Monday for me).
 
On Guadalcanal, the Japs didn't have a lot of cannon and mortar ammo, but they did have grenades. So, they fired lots of rifle grenades and/or threw hand grenades on high arcs toward the Marine fighting holes. The Marines could see these coming, but quickly figured out that no one could hit and deflect them with rifle rounds. Some of their soldiers though said they could do it with shotguns. So, the commanders had some flown in. But, most Marines weren't good at it. The effective few were the ones who grew up around shotguns and bird-hunting...ducks, quail, pheasants...and had that experience-gained ability to judge trajectory, pick their range and lead by the right amount.
First I've ever heard of using shotguns to deflect or harmlessly detonate incoming grenades, and on Guadalcanal against the Japanese at that. Is this for real?
 
First I've ever heard of using shotguns to deflect or harmlessly detonate incoming grenades, and on Guadalcanal against the Japanese at that. Is this for real?
They did train for it and it was first attested in WW1, however it does not seem to be very high chance. From Youtube
 
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