Actually, you've hit on something. It's a follow up to the prior 12 AUG 41 thread. I understand two things could be unfolding. The first is observing AND MENTIONING the pomposity of a "less than and never will be" in GEN Sutherland. The second is that Sutherland fellow reminds Lord Gort of someone familiar <insert name> in the British structure. The British military are far more adept where subtleties in politics are concerned. They've dealt for hundreds of years with "the Continent" and various prickly personalities. The way I read it is Lord Gort is suggesting that they remove Sutherland from the equation to achieve the desired results. And build up ADM Hart to ADM Stark, FDR, The Admiralty and the PM, so that some arms can be twisted in favor of mutual and powerful sea-based efforts. Never mention it yourself. Let your aides mention it and then they follow through.
Hi Nevarinemex, sorry to raise your hopes, Sutherland is staying!
Lord Gort and GEN MacArthur are peer level. Lord Gort was CIGS. GEN MacArthur was US RA CoS. Both have been at the top. Please do not dismiss the potential for their working cordially or complementing each other. Their pride is a bit hurt. A few quips over pink gins are merely remarking on ones' first impressions. The delivery of marching orders to subordinates. And agreeing whom to go after and who to support. The reality is that both Generals would appreciate that they now have a someone in theater who is on THEIR level. And both Generals are isolated from the powers in charge by an enormous distance. A pleasant but fruitful and supportive rivalry could be hatching.
I agree they are peers, but whether they could get on, character wise, I doubt. The big thing here is their land armies are too far apart to be able to help each other, other than tie down Japanese forces that might otherwise be free to support the other arm of attack. Both air forces were smashed in a few days.
ADM Stark, not ADM King runs the USN at this time. ADM Stark is appreciative of the efforts the RN. Vice versa. Is the RN more serious about its SE Asia commitment? This can segue into more belated commitment of US resources. it's a matter for discussion aboard USS Augusta in a few weeks. At this point in time, the USN has many of its decisions issued as GO or EO. It won't require the reshuffle until after FDR's Battleline Yacht Club rests in the mud of Pearl Harbor.
I've always viewed the US Navy as being out of step with Roosevelt regarding dealing with Japan. He wanted the fleet deployed forward to Hawaii, to help apply pressure on Japan, the Navy very much didn't want to go. MacArthur seemed to convince Roosevelt that the Philippines could be held, the US Navy never did, which is why they never built up the Asiatic Fleet.
At the start of the war, putting the devastation caused by the attack on Pearl Harbor to one side, the US Navy simply didn't have enough of a fleet train to support a substantial force projection towards the Philippines, and they most defiantly didn't have it before it all kicked off. So where does Roosevelt get this gung ho attitude towards the Japanese, did he appreciate he was bluffing the Japanese, or did MacArthur, with talk of turning the Philippines into a strategic base from which to bomb Taiwan (Formosa), China, and the Japanese mandate islands, add to his belief in any Japanese military action was a lost cause.
If you research Foggy Bottoms dismay with US Secretaries Morgenthau (Treasury) and Ickes (Interior) shenanigans while FDR was incommunicado aboard Augusta, the war could have been temporarily delayed. Their joint actions to shut off Japan totally were insubordinate to FDR's expressed plans to use the embargoes to throttle Japan. Reducing and then reopening resources were his thoughts. It provides the non-seppuku nationalists maneuver room. I've always wondered whether Japan had purchased oil from Interior and paid for it through reserves deposited at Treasury. Except Ickes sold the oil off and Morgenthau invested the funds elsewhere.
Its interesting you mention these guys, because a part of me thinks that some of this Gung Ho attitude stems from those around him, and not the military chiefs. I've been researching the defence of the Philippines to help me write those chapters, as well as understand what America might do once the fighting starts and my changes take effect. A source I use a lot, and highly recommend is Hyperwar
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/. And while I was going through one page re the defence of the Philippines, I found that military decisions were being overturned by FDR aides, with FDR later confirming that. Now I know in the democratic world we live in, even during war, sometimes its the democratically elected leader that makes the final decision, and bases that decision on whats right democratically, or even morally, while a military decision is based on hard military fact.
My example is the Pensacola convoy, and whether it should continue its journey or return to Hawaii, after the Pearl Harbor attack. Have a read of Chapter IX: Strategy and Logistics, see
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-PI/USA-P-PI-9.html. Mr Stimson kind of leads it for FDR initially, with a "we can't give up on them" (MacArthur) viewpoint to justify the decision, while Admiral Stark, ably supported by Hart is very realistic about what can be done militarily, and what can't, and Stark seem to be having to run a damage limitation exercise on what the civilians want to happen in the Philippines.
I'd welcome others views on this