Malaya What If

[Butchpfd]

Well done

Cruiser sweeping plans were pretty much the first thing to go, which is why I didn't include them in the docs I posted. Just before PH, TF-2 carved out TF-8 for the Wake reinforcement and TF-3 carved out TF-12 for the same at Midway. Many of Kimmel's cruisers were detached already as escorts either for convoys or other exercises, especially those of TF-3. Those not escorting convoys were to be recalled. If the Atlantic Reinforcement (CruDiv-5) wasn't ordered immediately to King, Kimmel could use them. Soc McMorris sent contingency memos to Kimmel, and per testimony, these were his intentions in the event of hostilities. Obviously, the successful IJN CV attack on PH caused these, as envisioned, to be canx, but they were later resurrected becoming the CV raids that occurred in early 1942.

PacFlt dispositions for each TF on 7 Dec:

View attachment 904461
View attachment 904462
View attachment 904463

Soc's memos to Kimmel modifying WPPac-46 and his intensions:

30 Nov 41:
View attachment 904464

Same for 5 Dec 41:
View attachment 904466
View attachment 904465

None of these plans matter if Kimmel is only given 30 min to an hour warning. The fleet doesn't have the time to concentrate and put the Marhsall Island Recce and Raiding Plan into effect. As mentioned by others, he probably gets more aircraft in the air, time for his ships to be placed into a better battle condition, maybe sorties his cruisers and destroyers not in the yard, and puts up a more effective AA defense, but he still gets hammered. He may not lose Arizona and Oklahoma, but the damage will be significant. They may even get lucky with a few extra PBYs and B-17s airborne to spot the IJN TF or get a better idea of where it is. Regardless, TF-1 is probably immobilized and sent to the West Coast like it was after PH. The DDs, AO's and auxiliaries do not exist for anything more than what had been mapped out in WPPac-46, and after a few months of high tempo operations and exorbitant fuel consumption, even those logistic plans are deemed insufficient. The Marshalls cannot be seized anytime soon.

So, this is how PacFlt is supposed to influence Japanese operations. With 30 chapters to go, hopefully some of this helps when the author gets to the PH part.

Well done on your research.
If I can ask, where did you find this? Does anything similar exist for the Asiatic Fleet? Thanks Butch

 

[fester]

The fundamental problem isn’t the speed of communication or the lack of preparation, availability of personnel, it’s simply the mindset of the players. All of the senior Admirals in the American, British, German, Italian and Japanese naves, were welded to the idea that the Battleship was the premier fighting vessel, and the ultimate decider of battle at sea. All five of the navies had plans to build either bigger and better Battleships, or the ultimate battleship. The Americans were looking at the Montana class, while the British’s had plans for the Lion class, the Germans and the Italians had numerous plans for better battleships, while the Japanese were planning to build the nil plus ultra super Yamato with 20 inch guns. Aircraft carriers were not seen as the major component of the battle line, but as auxiliaries that mirrored the role of scouting cruisers, which in the majority of navies themselves carried scouting aircraft. It was only after the loss temporarily of their battle line at Pearl that the Americans elevated their carriers to the primary position in their fleet. Without the major losses incurred at Pearl, I seriously doubt that the Americans would have promoted carriers to the prime position that they did so quickly. It should also be remembered that it takes a lot less steel in the 1940’s to build a carrier than it does to build a battleship.

RR.

I disagree. Look at the USN procurement requests pre-war as an example. The USN between 1936 and 1941 funding and wish list was for the following:

BB:
2 North Carolina
4 South Dakota
6 Iowa (you could argue were a heavy BC)
5 Montana
&
6 Alaska light battlecruisers (which really has a weird spot in how the USN thinks about its battle line and cruiser forces)

The BB funding requests were effectively an opportunity to recapitalize a battle line that was soon becoming block obsolete. The Big 5 Standards would be kept for a while as a heavy slow wing but the rest of the Standards and Pre-Standards were either getting scrapped or going to 2nd and 3rd line duties if there was no war.

CV:
1 Wasp
1 Hornet (1938 Naval Act)
3 Essex (1938 Naval Act)
8 Essex in 2 Ocean Navy Act

The USN was not retiring any of their carrier tonnage as these ships came online --- Langley was already converted to an auxiliary and Ranger was iffy as a 1st line carrier.

The USN pre-Pearl Harbor was almost tripling its active fleet carrier strength while having a modest increase in the battle line. Both the battle line and carriers would be brand new and shiny by 1944 from the pre-war funding but the carriers were going to eat up a way higher proportion of the naval construction and operations budget in 1944 than they were in 1940 relative to the battleships.

Doing the same with the RN -- the RN made sure that their carrier construction continued while the Lion class was quickly frozen once resources got tight.

This is substantial revealed preference that when choices had to be made both the RN and USN from 1939 to 1941 placed substantially more resources to updating their carrier lines than the BB lines.

 

[Ltlconf]

A tactical success but as Yamamoto knew a strategic failure.

I am not certain that the attack in Asia is so marvellous the Allied response was not great.

It was ultimately a strategic disaster, operationally brilliant (why does everyone forget the operational stage of things: here the Japanese definitely kicked ass), and were successful tactically because, yes, the Allies were caught utterly flat footed and often just sucked eggs. The Allies didn't recover in terms of initiative, morale, and improved doctrine tactically or operationally for some time.

 

[Undeadmuffin]

It was ultimately a strategic disaster, operationally brilliant (why does everyone forget the operational stage of things: here the Japanese definitely kicked ass), and were successful tactically because, yes, the Allies were caught utterly flat footed and often just sucked eggs. The Allies didn't recover in terms of initiative, morale, and improved doctrine tactically or operationally for some time.

For the British defense, Far-East was a third-rate (if not fourth) theater where only what could be sparred was sent. Europe and Africa was where the majority of resources were sent.
Now, obviously, as this timeline demonstrate, there was definitively room for improvement and the Japanese OTL demonstrated a very good, well planned and aggressive multi-front offensive with material superior to what its rivals had deployed in the east. But it really was the American being caught so flat-footed that has the least explanation.

 

[Ltlconf]

The fundamental problem isn’t the speed of communication or the lack of preparation, availability of personnel, it’s simply the mindset of the players. All of the senior Admirals in the American, British, German, Italian and Japanese naves, were welded to the idea that the Battleship was the premier fighting vessel, and the ultimate decider of battle at sea. All five of the navies had plans to build either bigger and better Battleships, or the ultimate battleship. The Americans were looking at the Montana class, while the British’s had plans for the Lion class, the Germans and the Italians had numerous plans for better battleships, while the Japanese were planning to build the nil plus ultra super Yamato with 20 inch guns. Aircraft carriers were not seen as the major component of the battle line, but as auxiliaries that mirrored the role of scouting cruisers, which in the majority of navies themselves carried scouting aircraft. It was only after the loss temporarily of their battle line at Pearl that the Americans elevated their carriers to the primary position in their fleet. Without the major losses incurred at Pearl, I seriously doubt that the Americans would have promoted carriers to the prime position that they did so quickly. It should also be remembered that it takes a lot less steel in the 1940’s to build a carrier than it does to build a battleship.

Yes their had been exercises during the 30’s that showed that an air strike against Pearl was possible, however given the state of aircraft at the time, they represented very little threat to the battleships of the day. Torpedo bombers that could only carry a 14 inch torpedo with a 300 pound warhead, and bombers that at best carry a single 500 pound bomb. They tremendous advances made in aviation in the late thirties early forties wasn’t imagined by the mostly battleship admirals of the inter war years, and the restrictions in place due to the various international treaties, severely restricted the number and size of aircraft carriers. What was considered a large carrier in 1938, unarmored 20,000 tons, was effectively a light carrier by 1944. It was a combination of the fantastic industrial might of the United States in the naval and aviation sectors, that enabled them to rapidly build and expand their carrier capacity, along with the fleet train to support them. That meant that by 1944, carriers had surpassed battleships as the premier capital units in naval warfare, and were to hold the position up until the present day. Note it was the British who designed the ultimate WWII carrier, but didn’t build it the Malta class, which wasn’t equaled until the Americans began building their Forrestal class in the fifties. One and all in all the major navies carriers, were regarded as auxiliaries to the battle line, and only a few visionaries had envisioned them becoming the primary capital ships, or able to conduct the sort of operations they were able to in the last two years of the war.

RR.

From what I've read, I think we must stress, "the last two years of the war." As you say Ramprat, up to then it seems carriers were used because it's what the USN had for a given fight in open seas, while the vast bulk of the battles in and around the Solomon's and Bismarks, and even the naval fights around Leyte, from 1942 into '44 were largely fought with the surface ships then available (chiefly destroyers, cruisers, and a few battleships) throwing shells and torpedoes at each other. We hear about the big carrier-on-carrier battles chiefly because they do stand out, but when one actually counts them, they're not all that numerous. Of course it helps that the IJN expended so many of their best veteran naval aviators in NON-carrier fights (Solomons, Bismarks, Formosa, The Marianas) so when the later carrier battles occurred, they became curb stomps for the Americans, even when the numbers said they could've been fairly fair fights. So those few were indeed disproportionately decisive. Once the IJN carrier arm was first neutered, then outright sunk, by early 1945 everything else still afloat (and by then there was comparatively not much) was target practice for the literal hordes of USN fleet and light carriers. This is the impression I'm getting.

 

[Ltlconf]

For the British defense, Far-East was a third-rate (if not fourth) theater where only what could be sparred was sent. Europe and Africa was where the majority of resources were sent.
Now, obviously, as this timeline demonstrate, there was definitively room for improvement and the Japanese OTL demonstrated a very good, well planned and aggressive multi-front offensive with material superior to what its rivals had deployed in the east. But it really was the American being caught so flat-footed that has the least explanation.

Totally agree, hence the "sucked eggs" part. The simple fact that Malaya was bottom of the barrel for any and everything is simply WHY they sucked eggs. That and Percival, despite having a solid plan, seems to me (among other issues, some not of his making) lacked the forceful personality to be a theater commander. This meant despite plenty of signs that the balloon may go up at anytime for months up December 8 (even without the benefit of hindsight) much that Percival knew (to his credit) needed doing wasn't done (not to his credit).
MacArthur screwed to pooch by changing plans way too late with forces grossly inadequate for them, then utterly boned the logistics! The last is especially unforgivable as he did have the time, with proper planning, during the campaign to get the supplies to Bataan.
The DEI? Too much to defend with too little and Dutch refused to accept that. Frankly, that was a defense doomed on those terms alone unless the Japanese convoys took some losses.
The Japanese road this advantage in Malaya, the Philippines, and DEIs ruthlessly, but that didn't take any real genius, just competent leadership, ruthless aggression, and a willingness to take a big gamble. The Japanese had these. But tactically speaking, I firmly believe any other competent, decently led, and properly acclimatized force could've pulled it off too.

 

[USNA91]

Well done
Well done on your research.
If I can ask, where did you find this? Does anything similar exist for the Asiatic Fleet? Thanks Butch

You are going to hate me for doing this, as I do not wish to send anyone down this rabbit hole unless they have a masochistic desire for frustration and pain, but all of the docs I posted are in the United States. Congress. Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, particularly Part 33: PHA Part 33, which is the latter half and all of the exhibits in the Navy Court of Inquiry. Besides the war diaries and Hart's report, which can be found online at NARA, RG-38, the only other material I have on the Asiatic Fleet is the FY-41 Annual Report, dated 11 Sep 41, which is exceptionally detailed, especially the operations, material and medical sections. It's 18MB so it may fit as an attachment, but 102 pages so impossible to post here.

NARA RG-38 Links for starters:
ADM THOMAS C HART USN - Events & Circumstances Concerning The “Strike Force”, 1/2/42 – 2/16/42
ADMIRAL THOMAS C HART (CINCAF) - Narrative of events, Asiatic Fleet leading up to War & from 12/8/41 to 2/15/42
COMSUBAF - War Activities Submarines, US ASIATIC FLEET 12/1/41 to 4/1/42
COMSUBAF - Submarine War Patrol Reports. Dec 1941

If you search within RG-38 using the ship's name and /41 or /42 applicable reports SHOULD pop up. NARA is finicky, however, so it really is hit or miss.

 

[Belisarius II]

From what I've read, I think we must stress, "the last two years of the war." As you say Ramprat, up to then it seems carriers were used because it's what the USN had for a given fight in open seas, while the vast bulk of the battles in and around the Solomon's and Bismarks, and even the naval fights around Leyte, from 1942 into '44 were largely fought with the surface ships then available (chiefly destroyers, cruisers, and a few battleships) throwing shells and torpedoes at each other. We hear about the big carrier-on-carrier battles chiefly because they do stand out, but when one actually counts them, they're not all that numerous. Of course it helps that the IJN expended so many of their best veteran naval aviators in NON-carrier fights (Solomons, Bismarks, Formosa, The Marianas) so when the later carrier battles occurred, they became curb stomps for the Americans, even when the numbers said they could've been fairly fair fights. So those few were indeed disproportionately decisive. Once the IJN carrier arm was first neutered, then outright sunk, by early 1945 everything else still afloat (and by then there was comparatively not much) was target practice for the literal hordes of USN fleet and light carriers. This is the impression I'm getting.

What you're leaving out is air power. In the South Pacific Allied air power was the dominate factor. Most of that air power was actually land based. Not having air superiority limited the IJN to night operations. After the Solomons Campaign ended late in 1943 the IJN cruiser/destroyer forces had almost no opportunities to engage in surface actions. What action they did have was trying to survive air and submarine attacks which ground them down month after month.

If I remember correctly the IJN lost 40 destroyers in 1944 most of them from air & sub attacks. 1/3 of all IJN ship losses were from subs and most of the rest were from aircraft. If I remember correctly of the 11 IJN battleships lost in WWII 1 was by sub, 2 by surface action, 1 by gunfire & air attack, and 7 by air attack. Subs & aircraft just attrited the IJN day after day. There were few Oppurtunites for USN battleships to blast their intended opponents.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

What you're leaving out is air power. In the South Pacific Allied air power was the dominate factor. Most of that air power was actually land based. Not having air superiority limited the IJN to night operations. After the Solomons Campaign ended late in 1943 the IJN cruiser/destroyer forces had almost no opportunities to engage in surface actions. What action they did have was trying to survive air and submarine attacks which ground them down month after month.

If I remember correctly the IJN lost 40 destroyers in 1944 most of them from air & sub attacks. 1/3 of all IJN ship losses were from subs and most of the rest were from aircraft. If I remember correctly of the 11 IJN battleships lost in WWII 1 was by sub, 2 by surface action, 1 by gunfire & air attack, and 7 by air attack. Subs & aircraft just attrited the IJN day after day. There were few Oppurtunites for USN battleships to blast their intended opponents.

The disproportionate strength in airpower shown in Cartwheel by the US and Commonwealth airforces pretty much shows how bad the situation was for the Japanese by 1943.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

You are going to hate me for doing this, as I do not wish to send anyone down this rabbit hole unless they have a masochistic desire for frustration and pain, but all of the docs I posted are in the United States. Congress. Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, particularly Part 33: PHA Part 33, which is the latter half and all of the exhibits in the Navy Court of Inquiry. Besides the war diaries and Hart's report, which can be found online at NARA, RG-38, the only other material I have on the Asiatic Fleet is the FY-41 Annual Report, dated 11 Sep 41, which is exceptionally detailed, especially the operations, material and medical sections. It's 18MB so it may fit as an attachment, but 102 pages so impossible to post here.

NARA RG-38 Links for starters:
ADM THOMAS C HART USN - Events & Circumstances Concerning The “Strike Force”, 1/2/42 – 2/16/42
ADMIRAL THOMAS C HART (CINCAF) - Narrative of events, Asiatic Fleet leading up to War & from 12/8/41 to 2/15/42
COMSUBAF - War Activities Submarines, US ASIATIC FLEET 12/1/41 to 4/1/42
COMSUBAF - Submarine War Patrol Reports. Dec 1941

If you search within RG-38 using the ship's name and /41 or /42 applicable reports SHOULD pop up. NARA is finicky, however, so it really is hit or miss.

Hi USNA91, that is a rabbit hole I will definitely be going down, how the Asiatic fleet might be used, and what options Hart had are most interesting for this TL.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

What you're leaving out is air power. In the South Pacific Allied air power was the dominate factor. Most of that air power was actually land based. Not having air superiority limited the IJN to night operations. After the Solomons Campaign ended late in 1943 the IJN cruiser/destroyer forces had almost no opportunities to engage in surface actions. What action they did have was trying to survive air and submarine attacks which ground them down month after month.

If I remember correctly the IJN lost 40 destroyers in 1944 most of them from air & sub attacks. 1/3 of all IJN ship losses were from subs and most of the rest were from aircraft. If I remember correctly of the 11 IJN battleships lost in WWII 1 was by sub, 2 by surface action, 1 by gunfire & air attack, and 7 by air attack. Subs & aircraft just attrited the IJN day after day. There were few Oppurtunites for USN battleships to blast their intended opponents.

Hi Belisarius II, I agree, the Japanese air forces were badly worn down in the New Guinea and Guadalcanal campaigns from the summer of 1942 onwards. If the initial Japanese attacks on the Malay Barrier are thwarted, I'd expect to see something similar in attritional air warfare in my TL. The only problem here is things would be happening six months earlier.

Regarding the lack of use of the USN battleships, in my mind their use only comes after the aircraft, submarines and light surface forces have all had their go, akin to the Japanese thoughts with their Kantai Kessen doctrine, as queens of the chess board, they're so difficult to replace.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Units, ships, or officers underscored not historical to this Command

For Hong Kong units see Hong Kong Garrison OOB

For Borneo or Burma units see Borneo & Burma Command OOB

Royal Navy Eastern Fleet
CinC Eastern Fleet – Admiral Sir Thomas Spencer Vaughan Phillips
Chief of Staff, Eastern Fleet – Rear Admiral Arthur Palliser
Captain of the Fleet – Capt Leonard Hamersley Bell
Paymaster Captain – Capt S. T. Beardsworth (Phillips Secretary)
Staff Officer, Plans – Cmdr M. G. Goodenough

CinC China Station – Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, 12 Sep 40 (until arrival of Phillips)
Chief of Staff – Commodore Fitzroy E. P. Hutton (until 08 Dec 41, see Singapore Station)
Asst Chief of Staff – Capt John Augustine Collins, RAN (Layton's staff)
Paymaster Captain – Capt Douglas Doig (Layton's secretary)

Senior Officer (intelligence) – Major J. C. Westall, Royal Marines (liaises with FECB)

Captain Archer M. R. Allen, USN (US Naval Liaison Officer)
Captain L. G. L. van der Kun, KM (Dutch Naval Liaison Officer)


Formations

Force Z– Vice Adm Tom Phillips (arr 02 Dec 41)
BB HMS Prince of Wales – Capt John C. Leach (arr 02 Dec 41)
BC HMS Repulse – Capt William (Bill) G. Tennant (arr 02 Dec 41)
CA HMS Cornwall – Capt Percival Clive Wickham Manwaring
CA HMS Exeter – Capt Oliver Loudon Gordon (arr Nov41)
DD HMS Jupiter – Lt Cmdr N. V. J. T. Thew (arr 02 Dec 41, in refit in Singapore)
DD HMS Electra – Cmdr Cecil Wakeford May (arr 02 Dec 41)
DD HMS Encounter – Lt Cmdr E. V. Morgan (arr 02 Dec 41, renewing propellor bush in Singapore)
DD HMS Express – Lt Cmdr F. J. Cartwright (arr 02 Dec 41)
DD HMAS Vampire – Cmdr W. T. A. Moran RAN (refit Singapore complete Nov 41)
DD HMS Thanet – Lt Cmdr B. S. Davies (arr from Hong Kong 14 Feb 41) historically at Hong Kong
Prince of Wales and Repulse each carried two Walrus seaplanes equipped with ASV radar

Light Squadron (Anglo-Dutch Squadron) – Commodore Flynn RN
CL HMS Emerald – Cpt Francis Cyril Flynn, RN (arr 28Sep41)
CL HNLMS Tromp – Cmdr J. B. de Meester, RNN (loan from Dutch)
DD HNLMS Kortenaer – Lt Cmdr A. Kroese (Asdic + DCs Sep 41) (loan from Dutch)
DD HNLMS Piet Hein – Lt Cmdr J. M. L. Chompff (Asdic + DCs Oct 41) (loan from Dutch)
DD HMS Tenedos – Lt Cmdr R. Dyer (arr from Hong Kong 05 Sep 41)
DD HMS Scout – Lt Cmdr Hedworth Lambton (arr from Hong Kong 25 Jul 41) Historically at Hong Kong

4th Submarine Flotilla
Captain Edward Longsdon 01Sep41
SS HMS Rainbow – Lt Cmdr Lewis Peter Moore, 22 Apr 40 (in Hong Kong)
SS HMS Regent – Lt Cmdr Walter Neville Ronald Knox, 25 Sep 40 (in Hong Kong)
SS HMS Regulus – Lt Cmdr Frederick Basil Currie, 31 Jul 40 (in Singapore)
SS HMS Rover – Lt Cmdr Richard Micaiah Towgood Peacock, 19 Mar 41 (in Singapore)
(All R class, 1,791t sur, 2,060t sub, 17 kts sur, 9 kts sub, 6x21in torpedo tubes bow, 2x21in torpedo tubes stern, 14 reloads, 1x4.7 in deck gun, 2xMGs, crew 53. Can lay mines through torpedo tubes.)
HMS Whang Pu – 3,204t, 10 kts, Depot Ship, ex Chinese river boat used as passenger and cargo liner (from 14 Feb41)

Deployment
Regent and Rainbow in Singapore until end of June, Regulus and Rover in Hong Kong until end of June. Submarine deployments change in June/July. Regulus and Rover in Singapore from July, Regent and Rainbow in Hong Kong from July

Attached are Dutch submarines
SS HNLMS O19 – Lt Cmdr Frederik Johan Adolf Knoops RNN, to 28 Dec 41, then Lt Hendrik Florentijn Bach Kolling, RNN(R)
SS HNLMS O20 – Lt Cmdr Pieter Gerardus Johan Snippe RNN


21st Minesweeping Flotilla (RAN) – Cmdr Glen Loftus Cant RAN
HMAS Maryborough – Cmdr Glen Loftus Cant RAN
HMAS Bendigo – Lt Cmdr J. R. Patrick
HMAS Goulburn – Lt T. Christy
HMAS Burnie – Lt George Edward Gough, RANR(S)
HMAS Wollongong – joins Jan 1942
(Bathurst class corvettes, 650t, 15 kts, 2850 Nmi, 1x4in ha AA gun, 1x40mm AA, 2x1 20mm, 40 DCs, minesweeping equip, crew 85)


2nd Motor Torpedo Boat Flotilla – Lt Cmdr GH Gandy
(Transfers from Hong Kong Feb-May 1941)
MTB 7 – 22t, 33 kts, Lt R. R. W. Ashby, 2x1 18in torpedoes, 2x2 MGs, crew 9
MTB 8 – 22t, 33 kts, Lt L. D. Kilbee, 2x1 18in torpedoes, 2x2 MGs, crew 9
MTB 9 – 22t, 33 kts, Lt A. Kennedy, 2x1 18in torpedoes, 2x2 MGs, crew 9
MTB 10 (F) – 22t, 33 kts, Lt Cmdr G.H. Gandy, 2x1 18in torpedoes, 2x2 MGs, crew 9
MTB 11 – 22t, 33 kts, Lt C. J. Collingwood, 2x1 18in torpedoes, 2x2 MGs, crew 9
MTB 12 – 22t, 33 kts, Lt J. B. Colls, 2x1 18in torpedoes, 2x2 MGs, crew 9
MTB 26 – 14t, 40 kts, Lt D. W. Wagstaff, 2x1 18in torpedoes, 2x2 MGs, crew 5
MTB 27 – 14t, 40 kts, Lt T. M. Parsons, 2x1 18in torpedoes, 2x2 MGs, crew 5
HMS Siang Wo, 2,595t, b1926, r1940 – Ty/Lt Cmdr A Woodley RNR, Yangtze River boat converted to MTB base depot ship, 1x12pdr HA, 1x2pdr AA PomPom, 2x1 Lewis MGs

Amphibious Forces
AMC HMCS Prince Henry – 6,893t, b1930, 22 kts, Capt Ronald Ian Agnew, OBE, RCN, converted to AMC 1940-4, 4 x 6in, 2 x 3in guns, room for 300-450 troops. Carries 6 Landing craft personnel (LCPL) Large No 180-185 (Total 6, 8 – 11t each). Currently training with 2/2 Australian Independent Company – Maj Alexander Spence (273 men)
Royal Marine Commando Coy (arrived 28 Nov 41, operational 01 Feb 42) – Major Victor John (Jack) Abbott (250 men).


Flag Officer, Malaya
Rear Admiral Ernest John Spooner RN (arr 22 Aug 41)

Singapore Dockyard & Station
Singapore HMNB, Commodore Superintendent – Commodore F. E. P. Hutton (took over duties 08 Dec 41)
Singapore HMNB, Deputy Superintendent – Capt Thomas Kenneth Whitmore Atkinson
Chief Constructor – William H. Jackman RCNC (Royal Corps of Naval Constructors)
Constructor – H. E. Newnan RCNC
Singapore HMNB, Engineer Captain – Capt (E) R. P. Chapman
Singapore HMNB, Passive Defence Officer – Lt Cmdr Berwick Maitland Douglas
Singapore EDO (Extended Defences Officer) – Capt George Francis Arthur Mulock DSO (Supervised expansion and maintenance of the extensive minefields surrounding Singapore Island. In addition, EDO was to co-ordinate visual reports between the various Post War Signal Stations (PWSS), dotted around the Singapore coastline. EDO would then further co-ordinate between the coastal batteries - the 15inch-gun emplacements - through Commander, Fixed Defences)
Singapore Auxiliary Vessels – Capt (post not filled, covered by Capt Mulock)
(Maintaining and running a small fleet of vessels pressed into service. Many of the ships were old tramp steamers, coasters, and the like, hastily retrofitted for wartime service)
CO Malayan Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve – Lt Cmdr Horace Vickers
Based at HMS Pelandok – The section's training centre and barracks were established at HMS Pelandok, tucked inside the sprawling naval base in Singapore. Under the command of Vickers, the recruits were trained as telegraphists, seamen, and signal visualisers before serving on board RN ships, mostly auxiliary and coastal craft.

Anti-Submarine & Patrol Vessels – Singapore
HMS Scarab – Lt Jack Broughton Cox, arrived 25 Jul 41, defence ship at Singapore ("Insect" class river gunboat, 625t, 14 kts, 2x1 6in guns, 1 x 3in AA, 1 x 2pdr Pom, 4x2 Lewis MGs, crew 55)
HMS Kedah – 2,499t, b1927, rDec39, 18 kts, Cmdr A W Sprott RN Rtd, 2x4in LA, 1x3in AA, 2x1 Lewis MGs, DCs and Asdic, Singapore having engines repaired Dec 7, ASW + Patrol

HMS Ban Hong Liong – 1,671t, b908b, r1940, Lt C L Brown RNVR, 1x4inch, 2x1 Lewis MGs, ASDIC, 20 DCs
HMS Fuh Wo – 955t, b1922, rMay40, patrol vessel (coal burning), Lt Norman Cook RNR, 1x4in gun, 2x1 Lewis MG
HMS Giang Bee – 1,646t, b1908, rSep39, freighter, A/Lt S K Rayner SSRNVR, 1x4in gun, 2x1 Lewis MGs, 20 DCs, Asdic
HMS Li Wo – 707t, b1938, rMar40, patrol vessel (ex-passenger/cargo riverboat), Lt Thomas Wilkinson RNR, 1x4in gun, 2x1 Lewis MGs, maybe 20 DCs, Asdic
HMS Raub – 1,161t, 12 kts, b1926, rsep39, ex-Straits Steamship Trader, T/Lt O R T Henman SSRNVR, 1x4inch, 2x1 Lewis MGs, 20 DCs, Asdic


Aux Minesweepers Singapore
HMS Banka – 623t, b1914, 8 kts, coastal cargo ship, Lt Arthur Ernest Stephenson RNR, crew 49
HMS Scott Harley – b1913, r1940, 6 kts, coal burning, Ty/Lt J. Rennie RNR
HMS Medusa – 793t, b1913, 10 kts, Ty/Lt P. B. Bruce RNR
HMS Circe – 778t, b1912, Straits Steamship converting to magnetic minesweeper, Ty/Lt A. Brown RNR

HMS Changteh – 244t b1914, rApr40, tug, Lt P. R. S. O. Spicer
HMS Chuting – 207t, r1941, tug
HMS Jarak – 210t, b1927, r1941, whaler, Lt H. C. Butcher SSRNVR
HMS Jerantut – 217t, b1927, r1941, whaler, Ty/Lt J. P. Upton RNVR
HMS Klias – 207t, b1927, rJan41, Lt H. N. Smyth SSRNVR
HMS Tapah – 208t, b1926, rSep39, Cmdr G. E. W. W. Bayly SSRNVR
HMS Wo Kwang – 350t, b1927, r1940, tug, Ty/Lt J. Robinson RNR
HMS Shun An – Lt O. R. T. Henman SSRNVR


Western Inshore Squadron (Based at Penang and Port Swettenham)
Commodore (Capt) Edmund Geoffrey Abbott RN (ex HMS Ceres) Oct 41
HMS Moth – defence ship at Penang, Cmdr R. C. F. Creer RAN (arrived 13 May 41)
HMS Cicala – defence ship at Port Swettenham, Lt Cmdr J. C. Boldero (arrived 05 Sep 41)
Both "Insect" class river gunboats, 625t, 14 kts, 2x6in guns, 1x12 pdr AA, 1x2pdr Pom, 4x2 Lewis MGs, crew 55

HMS Kampar – 971t, b1915, r28 Aug 39, 11 kts, Lt R. Hamer RNVR, 1x4in, 2x1 Lewis MGs, 20 DCs, Asdic
HMS Larut – 894t, b1927, passenger/cargo steamer, Captain C. E. Cleaver, 1x4in gun, 2x1 Lewis MGs, 20 DCs, Asdic
HMS Mata Hari – 1,020t, 11 kts, b1915, rSep39, Lt G. A. Brignall RNR, 1 x 4in gun, 2x1 Lewis MGs, 25 DC, Asdic, crew 63
HMS Pangkor – 1,250t, b1929, Straits Steamship Co. ship, Ty/Lt T. Sutherland, RNR, 1x4in gun, 2x1 Lewis MGs

RFA Tien Kwang – 787t, b1925, rOct39, coastal tanker for Asiatic Petroleum Company, sister to Shu Kwang, Act/Lt R. W. Heale SSRNVR, 1x4in gun 2x1, Lewis MGs, at Penang, twin screw. Supports Western Inshore Squadron


Penang Aux Minesweeper Group
HMS Hua Tong – 280t, b1927, rNov39, Ty/Lt O. G. Jones RNR
HMS Jeram – 210t, b1927, rOct39, whaler, Lt J. H. Evans RNVR
HMS Malacca – 210t b1927, rDec39, Lt J. W. Morphett SSRNVR
HMS Sin Aik Lee – 198t, b1928, rSep39, Lt J. M. Brander SSRNVR
HMS Trang – 205t, b1912, rNov39, whaler, Lt H. T. Rigden RNVR

Eastern Inshore Squadron (Based at Kuantan)
Commodore (Capt) Charles Alfred Evelyn Stanfield RN, (ex HMS Colombo) Flagship HMS Scorpion
HMS Scorpion – Lt Cmdr G. C. Ashworth SSRNVR
(Pre Dragonfly class river gunboat, 670t, 17 kts, 2x1 4in guns LA, 1 x 3.7in how, 2x1 3pdr OF Vickers AA (47mm), 4x1 Lewis MGs, crew 93

HMS Dragonfly – Cmdr A. W. Sprott
HMS Grasshopper – Cmdr J. S. Hoffman
(Dragonfly class river gunboats, 585t, 17 kts, 2x1 4in LA, 1 x 3.7in How, 4x1 Lewis MGs, crew 74

HMS Kelantan – 1,106t, b1921, rDec41, Lt H. W. Richardson RNR, 1x4in, 2x1 Lewis MGs, Asdic, DCs (Repair ship 1943). 04 Dec 41 Eastern Inshore Squadron
HMS Kuala – 954t, 12 kts, b1911, r1941, passenger/cargo steamer, Lt Franklin Caithness RNR, 1x4in gun, 2x1 Lewis MGs, Asdic, 20 DCs
HMS Lipis – 914t, 10 kts, b1927 rNov39, converted to oil, Lt W. E. Steel RNR, 1x4inch, 2x1 Lewis MGs (sent to Borneo with more explosives, and ready if evacuations needed)

RFA Shu Kwang – 788t, b1924, rOct39, coastal tanker for Asiatic Petroleum Company, sister to Tien Kwang, Cmdr A. D. Thomson DSC Rtd, 1x4in gun 2x1 Lewis MGs, at Kuantan (Lost 13 Feb 42) Supports Eastern Inshore Squadron
RFA Ping Wo – 3,105t, 14 kts, depot ship (ex-river steamer), Ty/Lt J. Fant RNR, 1 x 12 pdr, 2x1 Lewis MGs, (was later RAN, used as water carrier, later tender, then stores ship)

Kuantan Aux Minesweeper Group
HMS Gemas – 207t, b1925, whaler, Act/Sub Lt W. E. Quirke SSRNVR
HMS Rahman – 209t, b1926, rSep39, whaler, Act/Sub Lt D. G. Freeman SSRNVR

Minelayers
HMS Stronghold – Lt Cmdr GR Pretor-Pinney, S class destroyer currently configured as a minelayer
HMS Atreus – 6,546t, b1911, ex mine carrier, 14 kts, CO ?, 1x12pdr, 4x1 20mm AA, 246 mines, used in East Indies as base ship for minelayers
HMS Kung Wo – 4,636t, b1921, r09 Jun 41, ex Chinese river/coastal cargo/passenger steamer, 15-12 kts, 2 screws, T/A/Cmdr Edward James Thomson RNR, 1 x 4in gun, 1 x 12 pdr, 2x2 Lewis MGs, 240 mines
HMS Teviot Bank – 5,087t, b1938, 12 kts or 15 kts, Cmdr Robert Douglas King-Harman RN Rtd, 1x4in gun HA, 1 x 2pdr (40mm AA), 2x2 Lewis MGs, 280 mines


34th ML (Perak) Flotilla
HMS Kudat – 1,725t, b1914, r1940, 12 kts, used as Perak Flotilla Depot ship
ML 1101 Panji -
ML 1102 Pahlawan – Sub Lt Philip Dorian Cork
ML 1103 Panglima – Lt H. G. Riches
ML 1104 Peningat -
ML 1105 Pengail – Lt R. J. Draycott
ML 1106 Penghambat – Lt F. D. S. Mann SSRNVR
All above are HDML Motor Launches (built Thornycroft, Singapore, 1939, manned by Malay section RN), 60t, 72 ft long, 16 kts, 1 3pdr (or more commonly, 2pdr), 1 Lewis MG, crew 10


Motor Launches, ML
No. 310 – Lt H. J. Bull RNZNVR, com 29/11/41
No. 311 – Lt E. J. H. Christmas RANVR, com 29/11/41
No. 432 – Lt L. H. Herd RNZNVR, com 21/01/42
No. 433 – Lt Cmdr H. Campey RANVR, com 21/01/42
All above are Fairmile B Launches, 85t, 112ft long, 20 kts, 1x3pdr, 1x2 MGs or 2x2 MGs, crew 16+


Motor Minesweepers
MMS No. 51, No. 52 – 245t, 12 kts, 1-2 20mm, mgs, crew 20


Requisitioned Customs Motor Launches
Elizabeth – Lt R. C. Beckwith, RN
Rhoda (Rohda?) – Lt G. D. Inns RNVR
Sylvia – Lt R. J. D. Draycott SSRNVR
Heather – Lt St. Aubin RNR
Rosemary -
Mary Rose
Pontian
Artemis


Other Launches
Kelana – 88t, requisitioned coastal motor launch, used for river patrol, Lt C. J. Windsor RNR, guess 2xLewis MGs
Fanling (Fan Lin?) – ex-customs launch?, Lt D. E. M. W. Fiennes SSRNVR (or Lt John Pierce Upton RNZNVR, or Lt Ralph Crossley Ripley RCNVR)
Hung Jao – launch, Ty/Lt T. E. Mellor RNVR
Madras – motor launch, CO?, Singapore
Seekingjas – motor launch, CO?, Singapore
Poelau Soegi – 130t, river launch, Lt Arthur John Martin RNZNVR, crew 34

Support Ships

Survey Ship
HMS Herald – 1,341t, 17 kts, 24class sloop mod to survey ship, crew?

Tankers/Oilers
RFA Francol – 2,623t, b1917, Port Tanker/oiler, stationary
RFA War Sirdar – 5,518t, b1920, Port Tanker/oiler
RFA Ruthenia – 11,850t, b1900, used as stationary oil fuel jetty and pumping station, Woodlands, Singapore
SS Pleioden – 5,878t, b1922, Anglo-Saxon Petroleum tanker used as fuel storage hulk in Singapore, moored off Pulau Blakang Mati
SS Solen – 5,699t, b1922, Anglo-Saxon Petroleum tanker used as fuel storage hulk from 1938, Singapore, moored off Pulau Blakang Mati
SS Spirila – 5,695t, b1922, Anglo-Saxon Petroleum tanker used as fuel storage hulk from 1938, Singapore, moored off Pulau Blakang Mati

Colliers
Zannis L Cambanis – 5,317t, b1920

Boom Defence Vessels
HMS Barlane – 730t, 11 kts, 1x3in AA gun, 1938, crew 32
HMS Barricade – 730t, 11 kts, 1x3in AA gun, 1938, crew 32
HMS Barrier – 730t, 11 kts, 1x3in AA gun, 1938, crew 32

HMS Dowgate – 290t, b1935, 1x3in AA gun, no engine
HMS Ludgate – 290t, b1935, 1x3in AA gun, no engine
(Both used for Changi boom gate)
HMS Fastnet – b1919, Trawler, used as boom defence vessel

Depot and Accommodation Ships
HMS Anking – 3,472t, b1925, 12 kts, cargo vessel requisitioned 1941 as a base wireless depot ship
HMS Endeavour – 1,280t, b1912, 13 kts, used as boom defence depot ship (possibly at Loyang, Singapore)
HMS Sui Wo – 2,672t, 1896 11 kts, passenger and cargo vessel, used as a boom defence accommodation ship at Changi, Singapore


Fleet Tugs (Saint Class tug 860t, 12 kts, 1x12 pdr AA gun, crew 30)
HMS St Breock – Lt? Joseph Jappy RNR, based Singapore
HMS St Dominic – arrived from Yangtze 14 Feb 41, based Penang
HMS St Just – based Singapore
HMS St Sampson – arrived from Hong Kong 05 Sep 41, based Port Swettenham


Harbour Tugs
RFA Pengawal – Sub Lt L. C. Jago SSRNVR
RFA Yin Ping – Lt Patrick O. Wilkinson SSRNVR, 191grt


Merchant Ships
RFA Shengking – 3,000t, Requisitioned December 1941 by the Ministry of War Transport for service with the Royal Fleet Auxiliary as a supply ship in the Indian Ocean.
SS Wusueh – 3,099t, b1931, Hospital Ship, Requisitioned April 1941 by the Ministry of War Transport for service transporting troops around the Malayan coast. In Autumn 1941 Wusueh was converted to a hospital ship in Singapore
MV Siushan – 296t, b1926, motor vessel, requisitioned May 1941 in Shanghai and towed to Singapore in October.
CS Pacific – 1,570t, b1903, Danish, Cable & Wireless-run cable ship, coal fired triple expansion steam engines, twin screw, based at Singapore.
RFA Demodocus – 6,689t, b1912, used as a Victualling Stores Issuing Ship, holding extra foodstuffs for Malaya Command, anchored at Singapore

Singapore Naval Dockyard Repair or Refit
HMS Mauritius (Fiji class) – 8,000t, 33 kts, 4x3 6in guns, 4x2 4in DP guns, 2x4 +1x1 2-pdr pompom AA, 2x3 21in torpedo tubes, 2 Walrus aircraft, crew 730. (Repairs 07 Nov 41 onwards)

HMS Isis – Cmdr B. Jones from 16 December, in dockyard for bomb damage repair, taken in on 13 October, est completion March 1942

HMAS Vendetta – Lt Cmdr C. J. Stephenson RAN, started refit in Singapore, from 12 Nov 41. W&V class destroyer

HMS Rhu – 254t (maybe 393t), b1940, was fitting out as a Controlled Minelayer 1/42

HMS Tung Wo – 1,337t, b1914, passenger/cargo riverine/coastal steamer, ex Aux Examination Vessel, Lt William Rochester RNR, awaiting conversion to ASW Patrol duties with installation of 4in LA gun, Asdic, and 20 DCs, moored in Penang Straits.

Singapore Shipyards, Building

Singapore Harbour Board
Moorwind – 1,000t, 9 kts, 1x12 pdr, 2x1 20mm AA, Mooring Vessel
Lantaka – tug, 300t, 9 kts, dockyard service
Fairmile B MLs 310, 311 (both completed Oct/Nov 41) 432, 433 (Launched and fitting out)

Voss Ltd, Singapore
Fairmile B MLs 362, 363, 364, 365, 372, 373, 374, 375, 388, 389

Walker, Son & Co. (Thornycroft), Singapore
HDMLs 1062, 1063 (already complete and in service). Building are 1096, 1097, 1167, 1168, 1169, 1170, 1213, 1214, 1215, 1216, 1217, 1218, 1219, 1220 – 46t, 11 kts, 1x1pdr + MGs

Vaughan Shipbuilding, Singapore
MMS (Motor Mine Sweeper) 51, 52 (both completed Oct/Nov 41), 93, 94, 125, 126, 127, 128, 166, 167 – 295t, 12 kts, 2x.50 MG, crew 20

Fleet Air Arm
12th Naval Air Wing – Royal Marine Major William H. N. Martin
FAA 814 Sqn – Lt Cmdr A. C. Lindsay, 12+6 Swordfish, Sembawang, waiting on HMS Hermes refit completion
FAA 839 Sqn – Lt Cmdr Roger King, 12+6 Swordfish, Sembawang,
FAA 895 Sqn – Lt Cmdr Stephen Edwards, 12 + 8 Buffalo, Sembawang
FAA 714 Sqn – several Walrus flying boats, also Albacores (some ASR equipped), Swordfish, and Buffalos, Sembawang, (July1941) Coastal Recon & Air/Sea rescue, OTU for other Sqns

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Ok so there's the Royal Navy OOB. Now a few things to point out, warships employed on protecting sea lanes are not mentioned, ie C and D class cruisers in the Indian Ocean, along with AMC's, as well as ships on the Australian and New Zealand stations. They will remain doing their thing there for now. The OOB is detailed because over the course of the next 50 plus posts your going to need it. And I like detail!

 

[steamboy]

Very interesting, I assume Force Z and the Light Squadron will be operating in close proximity to one another, the Light Squadron's a bit of an odd duck, you've got the large Dutch DD's that are a bit old but all of them have aircraft facilities aboard to launch scouts, but their AA armament is limited and at best they're passable in an anti-surface role, if somewhat under gunned, but they're fast enough to keep up with the Emerald, whereas the Scout and Tendos cannot, their max speed though is that of the Tromp which is more an oversized destroyer but is also the ship in the squadron that has the best AA fit with some VERY modern 40mm mounts that were fully stabalized and were the most advanced AA mounts made at the outbreak of war and are still in advance of what the RN and USN has.

The Tendos and Scout are probably a bit of a drag on the squadron, they're smaller and older than the Dutch DD's and would only probably be able to hit their max speed in good conditions now, whereas the bigger Dutch ships are more seaworthy.

The addition of Cornwall and Exeter to Force Z adds more AA guns to the mix for sure as well as some rather experienced crews but of the DD's deployed with the force really only the Jupiter is of any real value, followed by the Vampire E class DD's are old, the Thanet's older and honestly i'd have had the Exeter go with the scouts and have Tromp with the PoW and Repulse because the Tromp has the best AA fit of any ship there apart from the PoW.

This somewhat polygot force does really show that the Far Eastern Fleet was the poor third brother of the RN though with forces being focused in the Med and Atlantic, and this all coming at a time when a lot of ships were unavailable due to damage, overhauls or whatever reasons. An ideal world would see a Crown Colony class deployed with Force Z or something but they're still new and are needed elsewhere, so Phillips largely has the scraps of the table with whatever he could get from the Indian Ocean fleet and local commands. Shame the other Dutch ships didn't join him but they'd be busy elsewhere and there's the issues of command and having to get them to agree to help.

The big thing here though is that you've got 4 ships with Radar, as well as agreed upon air cover, albeit in a somewhat limited and light fashion.

 

[USNA91]

Rainbow 5 was an abstract strategic plan not an actual war plan. Most of the Pacific admirals were aviation minded and had no interest in bringing 20 kt battleships with them. They didn't have enough tankers or destroyers to support the battleline anyway. Most of the battleships at Pearl Harbor needed up grades that needed to be done on the West Coast. New crews needed to be trained to operate new radar and AA guns. New better protected Fast Battleships that could make 27-28 kts would be sent to operate with carrier raiding groups.

Nobody was thinking about having the USS Pennsylvania shell Truk in December 1941. At Midway Nimitz had 5 BBs that he let sit out the battle. He lacked escorts for them, and they were too slow and would only get in the way of faster ships. Only Fast BBs were ever used to directly confront the enemy surface fleet except under the very favorable circumstances at Surigao Stright. Task Force 1 spent most of the war guarding the West Coast. Some of the old BBs escorted convoys, and that was the best place for them. Later they did good service shelling islands in support of amphibious operations, but not till late 1943 when they could be properly protected.

Before PH, the plans I posted were to be executed once the CNO gave the word. In flag testimony before the PHA, these operational commanders were prepared to execute the plans described. Post PH reality, and as things actually occurred, is what you've written. All plans emanating from the highest level are conceptual in nature, and RAINBOW-5 is a perfect example. From highest to lowest:

ABC-1 (Annex III: Joint Basic War Plan #1 of the US and British CW)

RAINBOW-5 (Joint Army and Navy Basic Plan as conceptually determined by the Joint Board, but then massaged around ABC-1, from which it is derived as promulgated)

Navy Basic Plan RAINBOW-5 (WPL-46), which then directs lower levels to prepare operating plans.

WPL-46 then directs operating forces and the shore establishment to create operating plans, i.e. the O-1 plan for PacFlt which is WPPac-46:

CinCAF (O-2 plan):

CinCLANT (O-3 plan), with subset plans:

Now CinCLANT is an interesting case. I don't believe an O-3 plan was ever created. As the Atlantic actually became a hot theater, events moved quickly. FDR directed Stark to create Hemispheric Defense Plans (WPL-49 to 52) from April to September and these were built for a quick transition to WPL-46. Operationally, CinCLANT was forced to pump out a series of operating plans, with 7-41 rev C in effect once the WPL-46 execute order for LantFLT was broadcast on 11 Dec.

Coastal Frontiers (O-4 plans) which become Sea Frontiers - for example, the NANCF was redesignated the Eastern Sea Frontier in Feb 42 -
and Naval Districts (O-5 plans).

ALNAV messages are sent by CNO to execute the plan:

Copy of the execute order from SECNAV/CNO to PacFlt in the Nimitz Gray Book:

So, while RAINBOW-5 from the JB in 1939 may have started as conceptual, as it flowed down to lower levels it was the basis for all plans that were to be executed on entry into the war. Of course, the strategic concepts and revisions changed plans as circumstances dictate, but WPL-46 is the basic plan which the Navy executed.

 

[GarethC]

When do Mauritius, Isis and Vendetta become operational again?

 

[Driftless]

2nd Motor Torpedo Boat Flotilla – Lt Cmdr GH Gandy
(Transfers from Hong Kong Feb-May 1941)
MTB 7 – 22t, 33 kts, Lt R. R. W. Ashby, 2x1 18in torpedoes, 2x2 MGs, crew 9
MTB 8 – 22t, 33 kts, Lt L. D. Kilbee, 2x1 18in torpedoes, 2x2 MGs, crew 9
MTB 9 – 22t, 33 kts, Lt A. Kennedy, 2x1 18in torpedoes, 2x2 MGs, crew 9
MTB 10 (F) – 22t, 33 kts, Lt Cmdr G.H. Gandy, 2x1 18in torpedoes, 2x2 MGs, crew 9
MTB 11 – 22t, 33 kts, Lt C. J. Collingwood, 2x1 18in torpedoes, 2x2 MGs, crew 9
MTB 12 – 22t, 33 kts, Lt J. B. Colls, 2x1 18in torpedoes, 2x2 MGs, crew 9
MTB 26 – 14t, 40 kts, Lt D. W. Wagstaff, 2x1 18in torpedoes, 2x2 MGs, crew 5
MTB 27 – 14t, 40 kts, Lt T. M. Parsons, 2x1 18in torpedoes, 2x2 MGs, crew 5
HMS Siang Wo, 2,595t, b1926, r1940 – Ty/Lt Cmdr A Woodley RNR, Yangtze River boat converted to MTB base depot ship, 1x12pdr HA, 1x2pdr AA PomPom, 2x1 Lewis MGs

I believe these boats were mentioned much earlier, but I don't remember if there was an intended purpose for them in Singapore/Malaya. What is their intended use?