Keynes' Cruisers Volume 2
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Soryu is fine at the moment.
Junyo was sunk by a US sub during the preliminary movement to contact.
It seems that the IJN had kind of adopted a post Midway tactic here. Following Midway the IJN suddenly remembered that carriers were more important than battleships and had the idea of pushing out heavy ships in front of their carriers to act as a damage sponge and to wear down hostile strikes whilst using the longer range of their aircraft to let their CV's stand off and lob aircraft, theoretically outside of attacking range. At least thats what the KB seems to be willing to sacrifice two battlecruisers and a heavy cruiser group for. The USN did the same thing, but without the massive distance (IIRC the IJN plan was at least 100 odd miles if not more of separation between their CV and their screen) and this really did work at the Mariana's Turkey Shoot.
The RN/USN is forming a gunline to catch the IJN strike and offer them a target as well (as the carriers are the more important ships at the end of the day).
But. This could well lead to a surface clash. The IJN think they've sunk 3 carriers and are sending in the Yamato and Musashi to finish off the survivors etc and any surface assets. Aside from the Yamato and Musashi do we know what ships are with the Main Body? I'd assume at least one of the Nagato's as well (assuming the other had her OTL accident and blew up in port) and a mixbag of cruisers.
Looking at the map -
The Main body is still a ways behind the Carrier, typical IJN thinking of 'distant support' being far too distant, and the Yamato and co are not fast enough to keep up with the KB or the Forwards force (composed seemingly of BatDiv 1 and 2 which is the 4 Kongo class ships).
But..if the IJN think they've got a victory on their hands they could push the main body forwards and down the Makassar Strait and possibly into the Allied gunline or more air strikes.
The IJN's forwards force (again any idea on their strength and numbers?) seems to be doing its job and acting as a damage sponge, but the weak IJN AA is a huge let down here. The RN/USN AA defences are far superior in this regard but there could well be a LOT of aircraft on their way and its going to be up to the Allied fighters to thin them out before the gun line catches them.
Not too unlike OTL Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, the one time OTL the IJN's love of complex battle plans more or less worked.
The suspense is killing me.
Why do I have visions of a night torpedo attack by the FAA wrecking the IJN battleline?
Why do I have visions of a night torpedo attack by the FAA wrecking the IJN battleline?
Ok comrades' let take a small step back and take a look
The IJN KB force started with 6 CV but has lost 1 before contact and 1 during scouting.
The KB committed 4 deck loads against TF-66 and these took moderate losses there.
Importantly we know that the Hiryu was the "guard" carrier and shes gone (fairly catastrophically)
So the KB is down to 4 CVs at less than full strength, though the escort 2 BC, 2 C and 15 DD are untouched.
The IJN Forward force has effectively been destroyed, down to a CA or two and some DDs
The IJN Main Body is untouched but has only 1 CVL as air cover.
It does have 7 BB - 2 modern 18", 2 modernized 16" and 3 older 14" plus 5 cruisers and 12DD.
But on the allied side the battle line is 6BBs ( not 5) , all modern - 3 16" and 3 14" plus 15 cruisers and 22DD.
Given that I'd take a KGV over an Ise or a NC over a Nagato any day or night
and give a Sodak a fair chance versus even a Yamato the IJN has very little margin assuming they can reach so far
Even if the carriers don't intervene or the sub line levy any further toll,
there will be at least one opportunity for a FAA night attack - where all these ships are effectively undefended.
The allied have 9CV (in 3 Task forces of 3 , 2 and 4 respectively) all untouched and with adequate CA and DD.
Their air groups have taken minimal losses spread across the decks
- with one of the largest air groups held back entirely
TF-66 has gone - meaning that a CV or 2 may need to be detached to support the landings
but Somerville can face the KB at odds of better than 2:1 in daylight .
He may have to ride out a IJN attack,
given they are both ahead in their cycle and (probably) faster to ready a second strike,
but he has more and better defences (especially if the KB fall for his flak trap)
If there is time today, his counter will be a day strike, heavy with USN dive bombers
or if not the FAA night strike with torpedoes will sink CVs rather than cripple BBs.
By Dawn tomorrow, we will be waiting to see if Yamamoto is ready for the naval equivalent of a banzai charge.
The IJN KB force started with 6 CV but has lost 1 before contact and 1 during scouting.
The KB committed 4 deck loads against TF-66 and these took moderate losses there.
Importantly we know that the Hiryu was the "guard" carrier and shes gone (fairly catastrophically)
So the KB is down to 4 CVs at less than full strength, though the escort 2 BC, 2 C and 15 DD are untouched.
The IJN Forward force has effectively been destroyed, down to a CA or two and some DDs
The IJN Main Body is untouched but has only 1 CVL as air cover.
It does have 7 BB - 2 modern 18", 2 modernized 16" and 3 older 14" plus 5 cruisers and 12DD.
But on the allied side the battle line is 6BBs ( not 5) , all modern - 3 16" and 3 14" plus 15 cruisers and 22DD.
Given that I'd take a KGV over an Ise or a NC over a Nagato any day or night
and give a Sodak a fair chance versus even a Yamato the IJN has very little margin assuming they can reach so far
Even if the carriers don't intervene or the sub line levy any further toll,
there will be at least one opportunity for a FAA night attack - where all these ships are effectively undefended.
The allied have 9CV (in 3 Task forces of 3 , 2 and 4 respectively) all untouched and with adequate CA and DD.
Their air groups have taken minimal losses spread across the decks
- with one of the largest air groups held back entirely
TF-66 has gone - meaning that a CV or 2 may need to be detached to support the landings
but Somerville can face the KB at odds of better than 2:1 in daylight .
He may have to ride out a IJN attack,
given they are both ahead in their cycle and (probably) faster to ready a second strike,
but he has more and better defences (especially if the KB fall for his flak trap)
If there is time today, his counter will be a day strike, heavy with USN dive bombers
or if not the FAA night strike with torpedoes will sink CVs rather than cripple BBs.
By Dawn tomorrow, we will be waiting to see if Yamamoto is ready for the naval equivalent of a banzai charge.
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But with radar controlled gunnery, the Allies can stay at extreme range and score more hits. If the ijn force is that much slower, that makes it easier. Retreat when the Japanese are advancing, advance when they withdraw. Meantime, the FAA clobbers them hard at night.
formion
Banned
Indeed. Specifically, 1 damaged (torpedo hit) CA (Kinugasa) and 8 destroyers. 2 out of the original 10 destroyers seem to be goners.
Couldn't agree more. The effective loss of Hiryu at the specific moment of the attack hurt perhaps more than any other CV in KB.
That was my question as well. Surabaya to Balikpapan is 530miles. Definitely in the range of Privateers and I think also torpedo carrying B-26s, B-25s and Beaufighters. What do the naval oriented members think on the use of land based twin-engine and four-engine bombers ?
I'm not sure any Allied BB can tank damage from 18" guns...the question is, can those guns get hits?
Driftless
Donor
If they're employed, would they be used to keep up suppressing the Japanese airbases in Balikpapan and Kendari, or used offensively against any Japanese fleet that comes into their range, or as goalkeepers in case of a Japanese breakthrough to the landing zone?
formion
Banned
I would guess that it would be difficult to be used as goalkeepers of the landing zone due to the sheer distance from their bases in eastern Java.
Regarding the anti-ship use of the bombers, I don't have the expertise to answer. However, an educated guess would be that the torpedo-carrying bombers would have received different training than the regular ones. It would be less than stellar to load torpedos in bombers whose crews have not trained in anti-shipping missions and similarly, to have specialized anti-ship crews invested in land base suppresion. Therefore, I would guess that there would be different squadrons for these 2 roles, although I m not sure about the validity of my argument.
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