Keynes' Cruisers Volume 2

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Story 2156
July 27, 1943 Stalingrad

The birds chirped. The old man smiled as he tore a small corner of his bread off. The milled flour mixed with water and a tiny bit of salt and yeast became dust as he ground the bite down between his thumb and forefinger. A flick of his wrist and crumbs scattered near the park bench. This was his bench. Every day after his shift at the tank factory he walked out. His hands were stiff, his wrists strong and sore, his forearms were braided muscles as he had spent the entire day making fine movements with his tools. Today they had met their quota. Another company would see brand new tanks once the inspectors had approved yesterday and today's work. No matter if he met his quota or not, exhaustion was his friend by the end of the shift. Half an hour sitting on his bench near the river was his reprieve. The birds, by now, expected him, and they waited for their sustenance torn from a partial loaf he kept in his lunch pail. They pecked and picked at the ground. They yelled and postured at each other. The old man smiled at his entertainment, cheaply bought for only fifteen grams worth of bread.

Feeling stronger, he rose and began to walk home to see his daughter and grandchildren.
 
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The birds, by now, expected him, and they waited for their sustenance torn from a partial loaf he kept in his lunch pail. They pecked and picked at the ground. They yelled and postured at each other. The old man smiled at his entertainment, cheaply bought for only fifteen grams worth of bread.

Ha ha. Good one. :)
 
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Does rather imply that bread at least is not that tight unlike OTL or he might prioritize the grandchildren. :cool:
He is a skilled worker in a heavy, war critical industry. He is not getting an infantryman's ration, but he is getting several hundred grams of bread a day. He is a strong, wiry man who weighs less than the typical Russian male, so he can stretch his ration a bit further than most while holding his strength and weight constant.
 
He is a skilled worker in a heavy, war critical industry. He is not getting an infantryman's ration, but he is getting several hundred grams of bread a day. He is a strong, wiry man who weighs less than the typical Russian male, so he can stretch his ration a bit further than most while holding his strength and weight constant.
If his grandchildren are like OTL slowly starving to death or even just desperately hungry on the civil none workers rations, I think they would get any spare food he can spare from his ration?
 
Kamikaze? Catch the fleet in a bathtub and hammer away with suicide attacks. Worst nightmare of a CTF is a cruise missile multi-axis attack.

PS. I want to court martial that Allied admiral (James Somerville)! Those kinds of losses are not necessary in an air sea battle.

Court martial the man who destroyed the Japanese Navy? Good luck!!
 
Nelson let Villanueva cross his T. And Villanueva had correctly guessed Nelson's tactics and laid out a battle plan to counter them. Had he maintained firmer control of his fleet, Nelson should have gotten his ass handed to him on a silver platter.

Getting a bit far astray, but this is false - British training and morale vastly overmatched the poor gunnery, seamanship, and morale of the French/Spanish fleet that had spent years almost entirely at port. The combined fleet was much slower firing, far less accurate, and broke more easily when hit hard. Also, the French and Spanish ships were materially in poorer shape, even if their designs were adequate (even very good, in the case of the French 74s). The Spanish were in especially bad shape.

Nelson "got his T crossed" entirely on purpose - the point was to catch (thus head straight at in line) and then break the French/Spanish line, and it wound up happening in two places, allowing the British to singly outclass or double up on allied ships one after another and work their way north along the scattered & shattered enemy formation (which didn't deserve the title "line" for long after the shooting started).

There was absolutely no luck involved, and no plan by Villaneuve besides "run for Cadiz" could have succeeded ... and that's what he tried anyways.
 
By the way, I was reading the thread about the French Navy https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...eet-join-the-british-free-french-navy.479018/
so I got to ask: @fester what has been decided for the Jean Bart?

Jean Bart is being used as an accommodation and school ship at this time. She is also a source of spares for the three fast French capital ships. No one could justify the yard slot to complete her nor find enough qualified men to crew her.

She is being kept in condition for maximum post-war optionality though.
 

McPherson

Banned
Court martial the man who destroyed the Japanese Navy? Good luck!!

I want to put this one to bed, once and for all.

Sir Winston Churchill sent a special investigator to look into the Battle of Cape Spartivento Cape^1; specifically the British commanding officer on the British side of that mishandled affair.

^1 O'Hara, Vincent P.: Struggle for the Middle Sea, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2009 (pp72) and
^1 Heathcote, Tony (2002). The British Admirals of the Fleet 1734 – 1995. Pen & Sword Ltd (pp23)


The man sent to look over Somerville's shoulder was Admiral of the fleet William Henry Dudley Boyle, 12th Earl of Cork, 12th Earl of Orrery. He was the RN admiral who may have mismanaged the British naval side of things at Narvik. (His idea, not successfully carried out. Also the author of a lunatic operation called Operation Catherine; so not the first guy, I would send out to second guess anybody. McP.). Despite the investigation; Somerville's fellow admirals (especially Lancelot Holland commanding the cruiser screen), supported their commander's decision to break off, when the Italians let go of them. Note that Commando Supremo promptly SACKED Admiral Campioni on the Italian side, who faithfully followed their mandated orders to him to not risk decisive battle if he thought the odds were too even?

=================================================================

Now let us take a look at the victor of Santa Cruz?

Part TWO of that little exercise.

Fletcher was sent to the Aleutians.


Quoting Halsey, concerning lessons learned, about Fletcher's dilemma and decision to not intervene under the utterly ridiculous circumstances that Richmond Kelly Turner's incompetence and Ghormley's waffling had created;

It is interesting how Fletcher's old adversaries, the naval aviators, view his actions off Guada1canal. Rear Admiral John H. Towers noted in his diary, "He ran away!" Others who took the time to understand the situation sympathized with Fletcher's dilemma. They knew it was best for the carriers to run in to the objective, strike, and immediately get clear. On 9 October 1942 Halsey cogently commented upon a lengthy letter of tactical lessons compiled by Fletcher. "Land plane bases and the operating units thereon should be available in supporting positions before the operation is undertaken at all. It is only by this provision in advance that the risking of carriers in restricted covering positions can be avoided."

Note that it was TURNER who goofed up Tulagi and subsequently the Santa Cruz operation, part of WATCHTOWER, that would have secured that forward air base?

Let me quote John Lundstrom about that "genius" John Towers (INTENSE SARCASM), who was instrumental in getting one of the USN's two best tactical admirals of the time sent to the Aleutians, because he was "a coward" about his, Tower's, view of OPERATION GALVANIC, led by the other great op-art tactician, Raymond Spruance and pad with John Lundstrom's own observations.,. again from the Lundstrom article:

Yet listen to Towers, then Commander Air Pacific, scream about the employment of the carriers. Turner, the amphibious force leader, again wanted all of the carriers tied down in "defensive cruising sectors" off the invasion beaches. Towers vigorously disagreed, stressing that the flattops would be "sitting ducks for enemy planes, submarines." On D-Day, 20 November 1943, Towers saw his "worst fears" come to pass, with the carriers "immobilized off shore" in "very limited areas." He forecast the "likelihood of great damage from submarine and aircraft attack." In the first six days, the Japanese managed one air strike of consequence, but on D+4 the escort Liscome Bay (CVE-56) was sunk with great loss of life by a submarine off Makin. The Army troops on Makin received the blame for not prosecuting their offensive swiftly enough, although they were on schedule. If Towers was justified for all his criticism of Galvanic, how much more so was Fletcher in 1942 for Guadalcanal. Towers and others of his generation who enjoyed such terrific materiel superiority never realized what it was like for those who fought in 1942.

I note with SARCASM, that Fletcher would never have lost WASP the way Ghormley lost her, by cutting circles in a stationary patrol sector.

So what happened to Fletcher and why?

Commander, United States Pacific Fleet . . ." during the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway.

In November 1942, he became Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District, Seattle, Washington, and Commander Northwestern Sea Frontier. In October 1943 became Commander, Alaskan Sea Frontier, with additional duty as Commander North Pacific Force and North Pacific Ocean Area. This is one of the three ocean areas under Nimitz. A task force under his overall command on 4 February 1944 made the first sea bombardment of the Kurile Islands. Determining the Kuriles were in a defensive posture, he felt free to interdict shipping in the whole northern Pacific. He returned to bombard the Kurils in January 1945 claiming 30 ships destroyed. The same task force made the first penetration through the Kurile Islands into the Sea of Okhtoskon 3-4 March 1945. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal by the War Department for ". . . his professional ability and able leadership in the vast wartime expansion and organization of naval installations in the North Pacific Area . . . between October 1943 and August 1945.

The Americans, it is joked, "send people to the Aleutians to count penguins" (There are no penguins in the Aleutians, McP.), when they have FUBARED. As a matter of historical record, Fletcher was concussed and badly injured when USS Saratoga was torpedoed in one of those "circle jerk" station keeping exercises Ghormley and Turner mandated during WATCHTOWER. He was sent to Pearl Harbor for treatment and then Admiral Ernest King, who was screwing up his end of the Battle of the North Atlantic, needed someone in a hurry to straighten out the absolute naval fluster cluck that was the 13th Naval District and who could somehow get along with the idiots on the army FUBAR side of things in Alaska. IT was as much a matter of bad timing, as well as the conniving of Towers, Turner, and a host of other PACFLT eff you alibi Als, who had to explain WATCHTOWER to Nimitz and to King and thence to Knox and FDR, that results in Fletcher's new posting as naval area commander. Now to King's credit, he did not hang Fletcher out to dry, when he did this, as in making Fletcher the scapegoat for the cumulative poor performance the USN showed in the early Solomon Islands campaign, but you know how popular historians love to finger point?

King criticized Fletcher repeatedly and savagely for caution at Wake Island, Coral Sea, Midway, and Santa Cruz. King was not there. He listened to people(Pye, Tower, Ghormley, especially TURNER), who were not qualified to lead a division of opey dopes in a rowboat drill. Fletcher, from what we know now, was a remarkably aggressive and capable admiral, who picked and chose his spots with amazing skill, who fought BLIND with inadequate information, under vacillating and incompetent superiors during WATCHTOWER. He was wounded, recovered and assigned to a command in absolute crisis that needed an able administrator and a STRONG capable leader to straighten it out. From that record, historians (like Samual Eliot Morrison) created the myth of the "timid admiral".

……………………………………………………………………………………………………..

If there might have been a "cautious" admiral who needed career counseling, it was Somerville. That appears to be his record. Churchill, a man of intense passion and belief, was prepared to sack him. HE, Churchill, CHOSE the most aggressive RN admiral he knew, to research the case on Somerville. If not for colleagues like Lancelot Holland (A most aggressive man, McP.), Somerville WOULD have been court-martialed or sacked after Spartivento. The representation of the man, based on Mers al Kabir and what the Italians thought of his actions after what they call the Battle of Teucreda, shows me enough to formulate, that such an opinion of his activity would be justified in the RN admiralty at that time. I am reading closely Somerville's actions off Sri Lanka to see HOW he used his aircraft carriers and what information he had available to him in his aircraft carrier battle with Nagumo's First Mobile Fleet. I have Andrew Boyd, of course, and I am crosschecking that account with the USNWC op-art analysis. Up to now, I was and am still prepared to assert that Somerville's actions in the confusion prevalent at sea and ashore at Trincomalee, might explain his caution and "mixed" results. The Battle of Makassar Strait, in this fiction, certainly does not justify his continued tenure in command or possible exculpation after this "fictional" outcome no matter how successful, however. (In an RTL example, some were calling for ADM Halsey's head on a pike after his own monumental screwup and Kincaid's 7th Fleet subsequent "destruction" of the Combined Fleet SAGs at Leyte Gulf.). Such a blatant mishandling of aircraft carriers and of their gunship shield would make me wonder if he was the man we know of the historical record. I mean he, Somerville, did mishandle his aircraft carrier at Spartivento, but he seemed to have learned subsequently how to dodge and weave and know the importance of maneuver room for such ships. (The Indian Ocean Raid: Bay of Bengal and Trincomalee ...)

No more on this sidebar topic.
 
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I want to put this one to bed, once and for all.

Sir Winston Churchill sent a special investigator to look into the Battle of Cape Spartivento Cape^1; specifically the British commanding officer on the British side of that mishandled affair.

^1 O'Hara, Vincent P.: Struggle for the Middle Sea, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2009 (pp72) and
^1 Heathcote, Tony (2002). The British Admirals of the Fleet 1734 – 1995. Pen & Sword Ltd (pp23)


The man sent to look over Somerville's shoulder was Admiral of the fleet William Henry Dudley Boyle, 12th Earl of Cork, 12th Earl of Orrery. He was the RN admiral who may have mismanaged the British naval side of things at Narvik. (His idea, not successfully carried out. Also the author of a lunatic operation called Operation Catherine; so not the first guy, I would send out to second guess anybody. McP.). Despite the investigation; Somerville's fellow admirals (especially Lancelot Holland commanding the cruiser screen), supported their commander's decision to break off, when the Italians let go of them. Note that Commando Supremo promptly SACKED Admiral Campioni on the Italian side, who faithfully followed their mandated orders to him to not risk decisive battle if he thought the odds were too even?

=================================================================

Now let us take a look at the victor of Santa Cruz?

Part TWO of that little exercise.

Fletcher was sent to the Aleutians.




Note that it was TURNER who goofed up Tulagi and subsequently the Santa Cruz operation, part of WATCHTOWER, that would have secured that forward air base?

Let me quote John Lundstrom about that "genius" John Towers (INTENSE SARCASM), who was instrumental in getting one of the USN's two best tactical admirals of the time sent to the Aleutians, because he was "a coward" about his, Tower's, view of OPERATION GALVANIC, led by the other great op-art tactician, Raymond Spruance and pad with John Lundstrom's own observations.,. again from the Lundstrom article:



I note with SARCASM, that Fletcher would never have lost WASP the way Ghormley lost her, by cutting circles in a stationary patrol sector.

So what happened to Fletcher and why?



The Americans, it is joked, "send people to the Aleutians to count penguins" (There are no penguins in the Aleutians, McP.), when they have FUBARED. As a matter of historical record, Fletcher was concussed and badly injured when USS Saratoga was torpedoed in one of those "circle jerk" station keeping exercises Ghormley and Turner mandated during WATCHTOWER. He was sent to Pearl Harbor for treatment and then Admiral Ernest King, who was screwing up his end of the Battle of the North Atlantic, needed someone in a hurry to straighten out the absolute naval fluster cluck that was the 13th Naval District and who could somehow get along with the idiots on the army FUBAR side of things in Alaska. IT was as much a matter of bad timing, as well as the conniving of Towers, Turner, and a host of other PACFLT eff you alibi Als, who had to explain WATCHTOWER to Nimitz and to King and thence to Knox and FDR, that results in Fletcher's new posting as naval area commander. Now to King's credit, he did not hang Fletcher out to dry, when he did this, as in making Fletcher the scapegoat for the cumulative poor performance the USN showed in the early Solomon Islands campaign, but you know how popular historians love to finger point?

King criticized Fletcher repeatedly and savagely for caution at Wake Island, Coral Sea, Midway, and Santa Cruz. King was not there. He listened to people(Pye, Tower, Ghormley, especially TURNER), who were not qualified to lead a division of opey dopes in a rowboat drill. Fletcher, from what we know now, was a remarkably aggressive and capable admiral, who picked and chose his spots with amazing skill, who fought BLIND with inadequate information, under vacillating and incompetent superiors during WATCHTOWER. He was wounded, recovered and assigned to a command in absolute crisis that needed an able administrator and a STRONG capable leader to straighten it out. From that record, historians (like Samual Eliot Morrison) created the myth of the "timid admiral".

……………………………………………………………………………………………………..

If there might have been a "cautious" admiral who needed career counseling, it was Somerville. That appears to be his record. Churchill, a man of intense passion and belief, was prepared to sack him. HE, Churchill, CHOSE the most aggressive RN admiral he knew, to research the case on Somerville. If not for colleagues like Lancelot Holland (A most aggressive man, McP.), Somerville WOULD have been court-martialed or sacked after Spartivento. The representation of the man, based on Mers al Kabir and what the Italians thought of his actions after what they call the Battle of Teucreda, shows me enough to formulate, that such an opinion of his activity would be justified in the RN admiralty at that time. I am reading closely Somerville's actions off Sri Lanka to see HOW he used his aircraft carriers and what information he had available to him in his aircraft carrier battle with Nagumo's First Mobile Fleet. I have Andrew Boyd, of course, and I am crosschecking that account with the USNWC op-art analysis. Up to now, I was and am still prepared to assert that Somerville's actions in the confusion prevalent at sea and ashore at Trincomalee, might explain his caution and "mixed" results. The Battle of Makassar Strait, in this fiction, certainly does not justify his continued tenure in command or possible exculpation after this "fictional" outcome no matter how successful, however. (In an RTL example, some were calling for ADM Halsey's head on a pike after his own monumental screwup and Kincaid's 7th Fleet subsequent "destruction" of the Combined Fleet SAGs at Leyte Gulf.). Such a blatant mishandling of aircraft carriers and of their gunship shield would make me wonder if he was the man we know of the historical record. I mean he, Somerville, did mishandle his aircraft carrier at Spartivento, but he seemed to have learned subsequently how to dodge and weave and know the importance of maneuver room for such ships. (The Indian Ocean Raid: Bay of Bengal and Trincomalee ...)

No more on this sidebar topic.

Churchill was an enthusiastic amateur - at Spartivento the book on using carriers in combat was still being written - and he has a reputation for pushing leaders before their forces were ready often with serious repercussions

It took leaders like ABC and Monty who were quite prepared to remind Winston that he was only the Prime Minister - before 2nd El Alemain for example during his visit he wasn't happy with Gen Horrocks and suggested that Monty should replace him - Monty quite rightly told him to mind his own business.

When Pound had to stand down Churchill wanted to replace him with some one more maliable (Pound was able to out maneuver Churchills madder schemes) but the Navy knew who needed to be 1st Sea Lord - and the Admirals Churchill approached all refused the appointment.

So I would take his critique of Admirals and Generals etc with this in mind

I would add that the 6 Italian heavy cruisers 8" guns all out ranged the Cruisers and un-modernized battleship HMS Ramillies of the British SAG and only Renown with her modernized Twin 15" gun turrets out ranged them

And she was then over matched in firepower by the modern BB Vittorio Veneto when she arrived and then Campioni still picked up his ball and went home as per his direction from his boss

So if anyone should be censured for the British results of Spartivento its the one person in the mix responsible for the RN entering battle under equipped - the man partially responsible for maintaining the 10 year rule long after it should have ended.

But that man was Winston Churchill but he 'was' prodder in chief and beyond reproach.
 
Churchill was an enthusiastic amateur - at Spartivento the book on using carriers in combat was still being written - and he has a reputation for pushing leaders before their forces were ready often with serious repercussions

It took leaders like ABC and Monty who were quite prepared to remind Winston that he was only the Prime Minister - before 2nd El Alemain for example during his visit he wasn't happy with Gen Horrocks and suggested that Monty should replace him - Monty quite rightly told him to mind his own business.

When Pound had to stand down Churchill wanted to replace him with some one more maliable (Pound was able to out maneuver Churchills madder schemes) but the Navy knew who needed to be 1st Sea Lord - and the Admirals Churchill approached all refused the appointment.

So I would take his critique of Admirals and Generals etc with this in mind

I would add that the 6 Italian heavy cruisers 8" guns all out ranged the Cruisers and un-modernized battleship HMS Ramillies of the British SAG and only Renown with her modernized Twin 15" gun turrets out ranged them

And she was then over matched in firepower by the modern BB Vittorio Veneto when she arrived and then Campioni still picked up his ball and went home as per his direction from his boss

So if anyone should be censured for the British results of Spartivento its the one person in the mix responsible for the RN entering battle under equipped - the man partially responsible for maintaining the 10 year rule long after it should have ended.

But that man was Winston Churchill but he 'was' prodder in chief and beyond reproach.

There is also the fact that Somerville was successful at Spartivento. His mission was to see the convoy safely to Malta, not go gallivanting off after the Italian fleet, and he accomplished his mission. That Churchill was unhappy with is peformance says more about Churchilll than it does about Somerville. This is also why the board of inquiry from the Admiralty exonerrated him.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
I want to put this one to bed, once and for all.

Sir Winston Churchill sent a special investigator to look into the Battle of Cape Spartivento Cape^1; specifically the British commanding officer on the British side of that mishandled affair.

^1 O'Hara, Vincent P.: Struggle for the Middle Sea, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2009 (pp72) and
^1 Heathcote, Tony (2002). The British Admirals of the Fleet 1734 – 1995. Pen & Sword Ltd (pp23)


The man sent to look over Somerville's shoulder was Admiral of the fleet William Henry Dudley Boyle, 12th Earl of Cork, 12th Earl of Orrery. He was the RN admiral who may have mismanaged the British naval side of things at Narvik. (His idea, not successfully carried out. Also the author of a lunatic operation called Operation Catherine; so not the first guy, I would send out to second guess anybody. McP.). Despite the investigation; Somerville's fellow admirals (especially Lancelot Holland commanding the cruiser screen), supported their commander's decision to break off, when the Italians let go of them. Note that Commando Supremo promptly SACKED Admiral Campioni on the Italian side, who faithfully followed their mandated orders to him to not risk decisive battle if he thought the odds were too even?

=================================================================

Now let us take a look at the victor of Santa Cruz?

Part TWO of that little exercise.

Fletcher was sent to the Aleutians.




Note that it was TURNER who goofed up Tulagi and subsequently the Santa Cruz operation, part of WATCHTOWER, that would have secured that forward air base?

Let me quote John Lundstrom about that "genius" John Towers (INTENSE SARCASM), who was instrumental in getting one of the USN's two best tactical admirals of the time sent to the Aleutians, because he was "a coward" about his, Tower's, view of OPERATION GALVANIC, led by the other great op-art tactician, Raymond Spruance and pad with John Lundstrom's own observations.,. again from the Lundstrom article:



I note with SARCASM, that Fletcher would never have lost WASP the way Ghormley lost her, by cutting circles in a stationary patrol sector.

So what happened to Fletcher and why?



The Americans, it is joked, "send people to the Aleutians to count penguins" (There are no penguins in the Aleutians, McP.), when they have FUBARED. As a matter of historical record, Fletcher was concussed and badly injured when USS Saratoga was torpedoed in one of those "circle jerk" station keeping exercises Ghormley and Turner mandated during WATCHTOWER. He was sent to Pearl Harbor for treatment and then Admiral Ernest King, who was screwing up his end of the Battle of the North Atlantic, needed someone in a hurry to straighten out the absolute naval fluster cluck that was the 13th Naval District and who could somehow get along with the idiots on the army FUBAR side of things in Alaska. IT was as much a matter of bad timing, as well as the conniving of Towers, Turner, and a host of other PACFLT eff you alibi Als, who had to explain WATCHTOWER to Nimitz and to King and thence to Knox and FDR, that results in Fletcher's new posting as naval area commander. Now to King's credit, he did not hang Fletcher out to dry, when he did this, as in making Fletcher the scapegoat for the cumulative poor performance the USN showed in the early Solomon Islands campaign, but you know how popular historians love to finger point?

King criticized Fletcher repeatedly and savagely for caution at Wake Island, Coral Sea, Midway, and Santa Cruz. King was not there. He listened to people(Pye, Tower, Ghormley, especially TURNER), who were not qualified to lead a division of opey dopes in a rowboat drill. Fletcher, from what we know now, was a remarkably aggressive and capable admiral, who picked and chose his spots with amazing skill, who fought BLIND with inadequate information, under vacillating and incompetent superiors during WATCHTOWER. He was wounded, recovered and assigned to a command in absolute crisis that needed an able administrator and a STRONG capable leader to straighten it out. From that record, historians (like Samual Eliot Morrison) created the myth of the "timid admiral".

……………………………………………………………………………………………………..

If there might have been a "cautious" admiral who needed career counseling, it was Somerville. That appears to be his record. Churchill, a man of intense passion and belief, was prepared to sack him. HE, Churchill, CHOSE the most aggressive RN admiral he knew, to research the case on Somerville. If not for colleagues like Lancelot Holland (A most aggressive man, McP.), Somerville WOULD have been court-martialed or sacked after Spartivento. The representation of the man, based on Mers al Kabir and what the Italians thought of his actions after what they call the Battle of Teucreda, shows me enough to formulate, that such an opinion of his activity would be justified in the RN admiralty at that time. I am reading closely Somerville's actions off Sri Lanka to see HOW he used his aircraft carriers and what information he had available to him in his aircraft carrier battle with Nagumo's First Mobile Fleet. I have Andrew Boyd, of course, and I am crosschecking that account with the USNWC op-art analysis. Up to now, I was and am still prepared to assert that Somerville's actions in the confusion prevalent at sea and ashore at Trincomalee, might explain his caution and "mixed" results. The Battle of Makassar Strait, in this fiction, certainly does not justify his continued tenure in command or possible exculpation after this "fictional" outcome no matter how successful, however. (In an RTL example, some were calling for ADM Halsey's head on a pike after his own monumental screwup and Kincaid's 7th Fleet subsequent "destruction" of the Combined Fleet SAGs at Leyte Gulf.). Such a blatant mishandling of aircraft carriers and of their gunship shield would make me wonder if he was the man we know of the historical record. I mean he, Somerville, did mishandle his aircraft carrier at Spartivento, but he seemed to have learned subsequently how to dodge and weave and know the importance of maneuver room for such ships. (The Indian Ocean Raid: Bay of Bengal and Trincomalee ...)

No more on this sidebar topic.
You ARE going to stop this personal hobby horsing on sidebar, semi but just barely related, derailing of threads for pages. The number of reports you generate with this crap is exhausting and it stops now.

No one, except you seems to care to debate Somerville's qualifications (and just to be clear and to nip it in the bud, they also do not need half a dozen pages on torpedoes and the USS Pennsylvania's stern).
 
You ARE going to stop this personal hobby horsing on sidebar, semi but just barely related, derailing of threads for pages. The number of reports you generate with this crap is exhausting and it stops now.

No one, except you seems to care to debate Somerville's qualifications (and just to be clear and to nip it in the bud, they also do not need half a dozen pages on torpedoes and the USS Pennsylvania's stern).
Thank you
 
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