From Iron, Blood: A Bismark Assassinated TL

How shall the Spainish issue be covered?

  • The Caudillo Option

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  • The Corperate Option

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  • The Colonial Option

    Votes: 8 61.5%
  • The Church Option

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  • The Catalan Option

    Votes: 5 38.5%

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Chapter VI: A Fortnight of Finances and Forts (Part E)
Könige lassen- Kings Pass
Kronen bleiben- Crowns Live
-Credo of Hanover's Regierung der nationalen Rettung

Operation Cambridge: The Rise of the Government of National Salvation and Eve of War

Much to his pleasant surprise, Bennigsen found no shortage of co-conspirators among the middle and upper-middle tier of the Hanoverian government and military. Seeing the looming disaster their Monarchs incompetence was about to plunge the nation into, even many dynastic loyalists and beneficiaries of Gudolphic patronage recognized that if the throne was going to survive the any upcoming carving up in Germany (Their isolated state no doubt being the first concession the Confederation would make , as Napoleon had tried to do little more than a half century before) they would need to avoid being at war with Prussian at any cost. Only few of the high-up members among the officers required bribes; the promise of keeping their commissions/positions (that would no doubt disappear in the event of Prussian conquest) or being looked at with favor to replace any vacated by Loyalists (Concentrated into the directly crown-appointed or politically-active upper rungs) being incentive enough for most. Trial balloons to the assemblymen had also come back with extremely posative results, even much of the moderate-right expressing concern that King George was weilding his power responsably if still legally. The preparations didn't seem to be facing any signs of suspicion or resistance either: the officers either moving around on schedule or loyally obeying the instructions from their compromised superiors. With everything going so smoothly many of the plotters believed they'd be able to seize power near-bloodlessly, which would have the huge advantage (both politically for themselves and militarily for their allies) of rendering direct Prussian intervention unessicery.

At the heart of the coup's effectiveness lay the broad appeal of it's modest, reformist program. While Bennigsen and his core backers were certainly liberals, they were clearly of a moderate patriotic stripe that took great pressures to keep out the radical republicans and socialists. Perfectly content with the idea of constiutional monarchy, sharing power with an assembly elected by a limited wealth-based franchise, they cast their movement as one against the current personal and policy of the government rather than it's principals. Thus, the only group they couldent appeal to were those specifically in favor of George V; who's arbitrary rule had left him with few defenders outside those he'd hand-picked for their posts. With the structural changes so limited, there was only one complication they'd have to sort out as they drafted the declaration which would be presented to the world and people as to their intentions: who did they intended to place on the Hannoverian throne once the kicked off the tyrant who currently occupied it?

The ideal, and for some only, legal choice would be to simply compel an abdication and elevate the Crown Prince Ernest Augustus. This move carried with it an obvious problem however: the 21 year old Ernest had yet to have children of his own and may not support taking power by extralegal means from his father. If he refused to take the throne, the plot would likely crumble out of a lack of legitimacy as there was no other strong candidates to crown... leaving the disposed monarch likely to find international support for a restoration. A clique of "dynastic Left" assemblymen, after some discussion, quickly found a novel way around any potential princely hang-ups. The Duke of Brunswick: a distant cousion of Augustus' who had come to his current position in the wake of (very similar to their planned) revolution against his brother's autocratic rule, was also unmarried and at age 60 showed no signs of producing a legitimate child. As it so happened his closest male-line relative was Prince Augustus: meaning if they offered the throne to Duke William the House of Hanover could effectively sustain its continuity.

Receiving Prussian and Brunswickin approval for the plan on the eve of the execution date (Duke William actually happily accepting the offer, as he'd been frustrated by Prussian hesitance to recognize the prospective succession for years prior), the local brokers for the self-labelled "Government of National Salvation" were signaled to make their move. At precisly 6 o'clock communications between the cities of the Kingdom suddenly fell silent: telegram operators either abandioning of being forcefully removed from their posts, engineers finding armed men blocking the doors to their cabins, and postmen's horses "requisitioned" by cavalry in full uniform. Under the shadow of mobalization, few civilans questioned the serious silence not those uninformed rank and file their orders as the unspoken assumption was the shooting war had finally begun. In the capital, the plotters had gathered in the Leineschloss a military-civilian joint council they were calling "The Government of National Salvation": consisting of members of the Estates,high ranking officers, and a handful of city officals. From that centeral location, they could easily dispatch runners with assignments to their various battalions as to what streets or buildings they were to picket: the greatest concentration being sent to baracade the enterances to the armory building in Royal Barraks. By the time the Guard could be roused from bed and organize a counter-move, than,they found themselves outgunned despite locally outmanning the traitor brigades.

At just under an hour before her normally was awake and dressed for the dat, the King is often described as having been (literally and figuratively) caught with his pants down by the brazen move. The army having been so active and obedient in following his orders to have the best formations shadow Prussian manuvers along their border as well as personally being deep in preparations to join them on their glorious campaigning, the thought of a mass mutiny haven't even crossed his mind. Still, in the early hours of the moarning George tried to take decisive and direct control of events from the Herrenhausen: dispatching couriers towards the Barraks with orders to gather an escourt which could clear out a path to the center of town where he could make a direct showing to his subjects and denounce this treason. Had these men been able to use their usual stallions, this move might have succeeded and, if not shifted the course of history, certainly change the fate of the region by killing the coup (and in all likelihood the last hope for Hannover's independence). With traitor forces manning the wider streets and obviously set to shoot anyone trying to pass at full gallop, discresion and speed were mutually exclusive so by the time the loyal pages could reach the Barraks by trot the big guns had already been trained on the facility throughfares; keeping the Loyalists trapped in their bunkhouses.

By noon,the G.o.N.S had occupied enough of the key facilities of the capital to openly state their intent. To do so they sent out criers with prepared copies of a speech to pronounce block by block, declaring that "To save our Constiution from usurptions, our Country from pillage, and our Crown from being seized as booty of war" the despot George V would have to step down. They claimed that the Prussians had issued an ultimatium after the King's earlier rejection of demobalizion, saying they still had time to avoid an invasion that would end in annexation if George would abdicate to a sucessor who pledge not to move their army in to attack Austria, and finished off with a call to the monarch to step down for the Duke of Brunswick (who'd already given such a pledge) for the sake of the nation's survival.

In the intervening hours, detachments of troops, servants with private arms, and elements of the constibles loyal to the regeime had been concentrated into an ad-hoc legion in the gardens of the Royal Palace, prepared to fufill their earlier order of escourting the King to the front of the assembly to remind them and the people who they owed their loyalty to. Here, however, he found his wrathful resolve starting to crack under fear. Not of parading to the Leineschloss; the coup leaders would be signing their own death warrent if news got out they'd killed him in cold blood as the rest of the country rallied to his son, but of what Whilhelm's agents would do if they got their hands on him. Well aware from his updates on the front to plan the campaign he would lead there could be no delusions of what would happen to his army if they were caught in the media blackout that must be accompanying such a move: they'd be picked apart peice by peice until there wasn't enough to fight back even if they did manage to concentrate. It would be easy enough to strike this conspiracy down, but all that would get him was a few more weeks of power and likely prison. Meanwhile, abdication would mean a comfortable exile on pension... perhaps on a nice Carribean island.

By 2:00 pm, he'd made his decsision and ordered his loyalist legion to escourt him to the assembly assembly hall with all the pomp and ceremony they could muster. Gathering up all the best finery from the palace, ordering in a band from the consert hall, and organizing a procession of nobility and priests, George V insisted on going out not with the appearance of a resigned exile but with the dignity of the Divine monarch he was. This massive impromptu display: referred to as the "Triumph of Tragedy" by some, is reguarded by many as a surprisingly regal swan song of the old medieval understanding of Kings: the final time a major ruler would ride on horseback in full regalia rather than a modern military uniform. Surrounded by his men, the King stood in the courtyard in front of the assembly and, as Benningsen sent forward a balif to remove the symbols of royal office, defiantly ordered the Legion to stand in his way and humbly brought forward the Landesbischof of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church to transfer them to the G.o.N.S.

Having a signed document of abdication, the coup members at the telegraph office were ordered to reopen the line to Brunswick,the emergency Assembly declaring by acclimation their offer of the throne to the Duke and that new elections would take place a month after the corination. This message to Brunswick could then be forwarded to the Prussians, who had until now been holding back on standing orders to wait for 6 am on the 29th to cross the border (Giving the coup 48 hours). General Falkenstein, commanding the Prussians forces on the Hannoverian front,received the verification by late that evening and altered their orders: commanding a march to the borders of the Free Cities and petty principalities to intimate them in to line. Most fatel among these was the assignment given to von Goeben's 13th division, who was sent south to secure the city of Frankfurt...


 
Footnote III (Part A)
Extract from Politics by Any Other Means Nessicery: Europe's Evolution from Vienna to Verpolitica
Like most areas of intellectual pursuit in the first half of the 19th century, the fields of military and geopolitical theory were heavily focused on examining the ideas and experiences that came in the wake of the French Revolution. Because of the lack of significant Continental wars due to the success of the Congress System in containing and shortening conflicts via international pressure, developments in grand strategy depended on meticulously picking apart the campaigns of Napoleon to discover the principals behind their successes and failures. Applying these principals to the new oppritunities created by the tactical and technological innovations that had taken place since than: railroads, breech-loading, electronic communication, balloon reconissance, the proliferation of rifled barrels, and the dramatic increase in production brought about by standardized parts and centeralized, partially mechanized factories, the staff collages of Europe had produced a number of doctrines which, each with it's unique operational dictates, gave their members no shortage of discussions to keep them busy over this period of peace. By the 1860's, this debate had become dominated by questions relating to the First French Empire's uniting the posts of Head of Government and Head of the Armed Forces: it's advantages and disadvantages, suitability for acheiving various national goals, and if the changes that had taken place since it's implimentation under Bonaparte made it more or less viable. The answers and the lessons they drew from them; which came down to disagreements over philosophy and methiodology more than anything else, is created the two schools of military-political thought who's struggle for supremacy became the defining mark of the Age of Verpolitica.

The "French School", also known as the "Cult of Order" by its adherents and "Tragics" by its opponents, originates from the ideas promulgated by Antoine Jomimi Traité des grandes operations militaires (Treaties on Major Military Operations) and epitomized in retired Marshal Francios Bazaine's 1887 masterpeice The Pattern of War in the 19th Century . Taking a systems-focused rationalist perspective it asserted that, though capable of producing impressive tactical victories, the Imperial state had deep structural flaws that limited it's ability to acheive long-term strategic policies and thus was doomed to failure. It's extreme centeralization of authority resulted in neglect and slow breakdown of those fronts and vital systems (such as logistics) behyond his immediate reach, while the removal of the moderating role of the civil state turned war from an extreme to routine tool of forgein policy. This inevitably lead to France becoming trapped in an inescapable cycle of warfare in which her pursuit of an immediate political objective, even if successful, produced unintended side effects in alienating potential allies, placing further strain on limited state resources, and creating areas of overreach for her opponents to meddle in that would nessicitate a focused response; creating an opening for a previously vanquished rival to make another attempt at besting them. The tactics needed to handle the widespread obligations created by such a policy: short, rapid offensive campaigns designed to catch the enemy's main force in a decisive battle so he could be compel his enemy to turns and move on to next crisis, never were able to produce a permanent result: even the "war-winning" battles of Austerlitz and Wagram seeing his enemies return with new and improved field armies to challenge the imposed peace.

Drawing on his extended commands in Algeria, Crimea, and Mexico as well as observations of and correspondence with partincipants in The American Civil War, Bazaine drew a distinction between "success in peace, that is the realm of staff officers and statesmen and "success in war, that is the realm of soldiers and generals". The former,which preceded followed the actual conflict, was the more important of the two and consisted of creating the best system of "directors" possible: laying out a clear series of objectives for an operation, gathering intelligence, establishing clear and swift lines of supply, communication,and transport, ect. that would insure the presence of superior force at a decesive point at a predictable time. This pre-planning, by minimizing the concerns and miscellaneous work of the army, freed it's generals to use them with maximum efficency in those matters that did need to be left to the immediate conduct of campaign. This made war into a scientific affair by replacing "points of chaos"; factors that couldn't be depended on, with "points of order"; if done correctly producing a plan with the minimum expenditure of resources as possible at any particular odds of success (the ideal odds themselves also being mathematically calculatable)

This minimization of lose-damage ratios lies at the heart of the French School, as victory is dependent on the degree to which a faction can exhaust the enemy in one of two "vital resources" while protecting and maintaining their own. One can do things such as occupying territory, disrupting normal commerce, and destroying economic assets to leave them without the ability to sustain or rebuild damage done to their means of resistance (Corps), or break their will to resist (Elan) through denying their citizens a sense of security by attacking/besieging/occupying population centers, reducing quality of life by denying access to outside aid and obliging the enemg to divert a greater share of national production to the army, and eliminating hope of the situation improving by frustrating the enemy's iniatives. The degree to which this can be acheived by "success in war" is largely what defines the second aspect of "success in peace", in which it is the job of civil government to best secure the gains on the ground by mediating them with how acceptable they are to the victim (to minimize the desirability of a war of revenge) and the broader international context. Pattern provides two practical historical examples in comparing the successful English diplomacy of the Americans in their civil war with the failed French one during the Napoleonic Wars. In both cases, Britian was practically uninvadable in the short-medium term, primarily held commercial motivations behind her interests, and was immediately concerned with preventing a regional hegemony hostile to those interests. This made the ideal policy to limit any desire to intervene one of limited gains from the pre-war situation, keeping these focused on territory/security and political changes as opposed to economic ones, and not adopting stances such as the disasterious Continental System that raised suspicion of post-war malice. The Americans were successful in convincing the British not to contest their supression of the South by adopting just such measures, while by taking the exact opposite approach the Empire hardened British Elan to the point she would never surrender.

Tactically, the principal of trying to rationalize and quantify war is continued by establishing a concept called "Operational Mass". This number could be calculated by multiplying a unit's rate of fire in shots per minute by the throw weight of it's weapon, then dividing by its accuracy at a particular range to produce an expected amount of force it force the enemy to endure over a given period. For whatever level or circumstance, it was "the fixed laws of battle that success comes, in a contest of Corps, to the side with the greater applied operational mass, and in a contest of Elan to the better operational mass per man.". Both of these instance placed a premium on artillery: particularly when rifled and concentrated in large batteries under highly-educated gunnery officers, thanks to their heavy throw weight per crewman and ability to shift ammunition types to maximize damage at any distance. Both they and the main infantry arms should prioritize effective range, with the "Canne" ideal being a situation where the main body of troops ,highly drilled and coordinated , can conduct a firing retreat to widdle down and exhaust the enemy before they can close in to they can effectively counterattack. Bayonet charges are treated with a great deal of disdain; claimed to be the final desperate resort of a unit by throwing away it's cohesian in the face of panic or having no other options, though there is much more internal debate on cavalry effectness. Some theorists still hold to the schock value of an organized heavy charge into infantry, or denying the enemy effective security for their artillery, while others cite the ease which those types of attacks are broken by any mass fire: the later thinkers assigning cavalry to a strategic rather than tactical role in raiding the enemy country, gathering information, and trying to cut methods of communication.

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Public Service Announcement: Due to the very large and broad nature of the next main entry (Covering the day that everything finally falls out into Fraternal War), I'm going to be taking my time to make sure I cover all it's aspects to the best of my ability. In the interem, please enjoy a series of mini-enteries on more general topics in this timeline. If you have any suggestions for a "Footnote" topic,don't hesitate to ask, and thank you for your patience.
 
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I guess the other school is the Prussian one, which is kinda putting emphasis on quick and decisive victory.
Also, since Bazaine is mentionned to have retired and his writing has some theoretical influence, I guess France's military fortunes are better than IOTL.
 
Yes, but what i wanted to mean is that Napoleon III seeing that Austria have the upper hand, they will surely win the war and he would try to take profit of this war to get territory easily, like OTL he would try to buy Luxemburg, but now Austria seems to become the next German leader so he need their agreement to get Luxemburg, but in the same time Prussia still have a garrison here, so for me it seems likely that he would try to negociate with the Austrian, by example we stay neutral and we will support your claim in the next peace treaty and in exchange you would ask to the Prussian to give up their claim on the Luxemburg and to remove their garrisons.

Don't count the Prussians out just yet. They still have the superiority in internal infastructure and small arms, after all, and Italy limits the ability of Austria to send large numbers of men rapidly to contest their opponents, at least in the early stages. Unless and until they can neutralize the southern front, they'll be dependent on the Confederation armies of the Hesses, Nausau, Baden, Bavaria, and Wurttembourg for actions in the Main and can only provided limited assistance to the Saxons. Besides, the Grand Duke/King William has shown favor to Prussia and the sale is ultimately his decision.

Whoops. Looks like all four powers have really gotten themselves into a pickle. It will be fascinating to see how it resolves.

Blood for the Blood God and Skulls for the Skull Throne!

I guess the other school is the Prussian one, which is kinda putting emphasis on quick and decisive victory.
Also, since Bazaine is mentionned to have retired and his writing has some theoretical influence, I guess France's military fortunes are better than IOTL.

I won't spoil with details, but I will say Bazaine's name ITTL is spoken of the same contexts as Von Moltke and has a far more successful late career. Just how much that panned out into French gains on the ground directly is up to your imagination. Though, I open up discussion for anyone who wants to speculate.

Certainly, things are going to at least differ from OTL in Mexico and Italy to some extent. If not in other places as well

Also, here's a little teaser map showing the alignments at the outbreak of the Fraternal War.

Fraternal.png
 
Don't count the Prussians out just yet. They still have the superiority in internal infastructure and small arms, after all, and Italy limits the ability of Austria to send large numbers of men rapidly to contest their opponents, at least in the early stages.

I agree with you, i talked about my opinion about Napoleon III behavior ITTL, that's not going to say that he's right.
 
Well, you folks really do seem to like the colonial option. Looks Isabella and her ministers are going to morgage part of the Empire to service the debt. Now, they just need to find lenders...
 
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Chapter VII: The Day Peace Died (Part A)
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Do not be like Cain, who belonged to the evil one and murdered his brother. And why did he murder him? Because his own actions were evil and his brother’s were righteous."
-1st John 3:12


The Fraternal War, The Confederation Civil War, The Third Slesvig War, or The Ten Weeks War: whichever of it's myriad of names they prefer, historians are in almost universal concensus that the series of conflicts that broke out on June 30th of 1866 were the decisive moment in the history of European Politics. The vastly different poitical results for and writings in responce from the three major Nationalist movements: Italianism,Germanism, and Scandinavianism, would Deeply shake their intellectual foundations and lead to their divergances from the pre-1866 norm of liberal romantic sentiments in an alliance of conveinence with a Conservative dynasty in mutual pursuit of political power. Observation of its battles would finally loosen Napoleon's dead grip on the war plans of the Great Powers; it's dramatic demonstrations of the power of modern weaponry and defenses forcing European nations to confront in their own backyard that until now had been regulated to easilly ignorable, distant shores. Under the strain of the conflict and it's fallout even nations uninvolved were forced to bend or crack,new systems transforming the fundimental relationships between the nation, its parts, and its people. Perhaps most importantly, however, the failure to prevent or mitigate the violence woke Europe from the long dream of artificial peace: reminding them that conflict was the natural state and could only be held back by a strong hegemonic force or the active efforts of great men. Still, even if in agreement that an Austro-Prussian conflict in the era was inevitable the historian concensus is still facinated by the exact, unique series of events that caused the tension; which had been on the cusp of erupting for nearly two months, to erupt simultaneously in so many regions at once.


The Austro-Italian Front

Vox populi, vox Dei, Deus Vult!
-King Victor Emmanuel II, immediately preceding his declaration of war.

Though set up, decided by, and popularly associated with events and trends in the Germanies, the actual start of the war took place on the Austro-Italina Border. Having dithered too long in waiting for the nod from either Paris or Berlin, patience with the Marmora Ministry finally ran out when Rome awoke to headlines screeming of a "Pronunciamiento from the Po"; signed not by Garibaldi and his semi-regular Redshirts but far more alarmingly the Duke of Gaeta and nearly 2/3rds of his staff: representing two out of every Italian soliders in the region. Borrowing heavily from the language used in similar manifestos by the opposition generals from the Progressive edge of tolerable politics in Isabella''s Spain, the statement suggested that "Having failed to act on the clearly proclaimed National Will of the Italians from which its power derives, the current government has lost the trust of the Army who I find myself compelled to fufill that mandate in their stead." As the highest ranking officer on the front line General Cialdini was duely informing them of his intentions to order an advance to Mantua and was publically calling on the Crown for either approval or, failing that, explicent instructions otherwise.

While dramatized heavily in the press coverage and generating no shortage of popular buzz, a careful reading of the document strongly hinted towards it's actual purpose. Well aware of their monarch's desire to declare war and Garibaldi''s agitations amongest the rank and file to launch one of his infamous unauthorized Expeditions, the firmly Royalist Cialdini staff were deeply worried that such a move would not only undermine the authority of the monarchy but lead to the different parts of the army attacking peicemeal to disasterious results. The publishing of the Pronunciamiento was meant an act of political theater to compel Marmora into finally appointing a commander and timetable to the main Italian army or, failing that, provide King Emmanual a face-saving measure to dismiss of declare war over the head of the national hero "under duress" without envoking a popular backlash. As an added bonus for the Duke he could also sweep the rug out from under his bitter rival; coopting one of the Republican policy pillars for himself and the Savoyards.

The King had of course been told of the nature of the charade well beforehand and well prepared to express its "shock" at the implications of the manefesto while still declaring him in sympathy with the jingoistic sentiments being expressed in the salons and plazas of Turin, Florence, and Milan. Having already been in search of any excuse to force information out of the secrative, jealious Mamora and get a compliant government for his international ambitions continued that public address to say this was a clear call to action from his subjects, and after a long poetic speech from the balcony (publized and mythologized as improvised on the spot, though records declassified in later years would reveal he'd merely memorized it off a sheet prepared for him beforehand) issued his own proclaimation authorizing the march and declaring war on Vienna.

Take heart, Italians, for the day of retribution has come! Our enemies, in declaring the soil of your countrymen as forgien to us, seek to bring us to despair. But shall they? No! A thousand times no! The revolution of your fathers and brothers is as alive as before, it's nessecity the same. Will you finish the work they began and strike this blow for it's final triumph? Yes! A thousand times yes! Today, I open this campaign for the people, for the nation that shall never die,for the seizing of the rotten cord that will draw back the curtains and bring the light of a ancient halls of that great preserver of elected government. Let this be a crusade for liberty! Vox Polpuli Vox Deu, Deus Vult!

Nobody had seen fit to inform the cabinet, though, so like the rest of the population took the claims of intention to mutiny on their face. The hystaria only magnified by emergency reports of the G.o.N.S's actions in Hanover,the Prime Minister was adamant about nipping this potential power grab in the bud before the rumors of instability spread: potentially triggering a revival of violence in the South or Papal action while the army was busy fighting both itself and the Austrians. So, beforing answering the summons to attend that day's session of the Chamber of Deputies in order to provide the Government's official response to the pronouncement, he took the proative step many would later site as the primary reason behind the absolute disaster that was the Venetian Front.

Using only the most venimous language, Mamora denounced the "Ceasers" of nothing short of high treason by denying the legitimate authority of the duely elected government. Clearly, spending so much time employing marshal law in the south and among the former Dictator Garibaldi had given Cialdini deusions of grandeur and accused him of trying to take the army into Venice without Royal approval so he could establish his own petty despotic estate. Italy was a unified,modern nation and would have to be secured as such... which was why he was discharging the Duke and had already issued warrants for the arrest of all the signatures of the Pronunciamiento from the Po via telegram to all the regional authorities and loyal officers of the man he'd just sent out an appointment of unified command for all forces on the Venetian Front, Raffaele Cadorna, with instructions to attack the Austrian Quadrilatero forts before they could be renforced; intending to avoid the financial problem of a long war by making adopting the Clausewitzian mindset. Convinced that the superior "national army" would triumph over the "mercenary army" (to use Machiavelli's terms that would later be employed into the definitive Clausewitzian-Moltkeian text A Mirror For Large Unit Commanders ), he had full confidence that the war would be short, confined to a narrow front and the Austrians could be driven to the table by a single blow if delivered sharply and swiftly enough...
 
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The Day Peace Died (Part B)
The Baltic Front

Let the world know that today we invoke the natural rights of the Nordbo, as acknowledged by Christian in his entreat to the Estates in ancient days: that he had been made Duke of Slesvig not by God but by the good-will of the electors, and that his decendents by succeed him only in the virtue of a similar election. And that we, forever free to thus choose our Princes, do withhold the crown from the Tyrant Augustenburg and place it in the hands of the people.

-The Slesvig Declaration of Independence

It wasen't only the Austrian side who would pay for the ambitions of Pan-Germanism, however. On the opposite side of the continent the figure at the center of so mahy of the recent controversies was facing an eerily similar challenge to his territorial claims from a declaration delivered from a rival, peninsula based ethno-nationalist movement. Despite his isolation from Confederation support, Duke Fredrick had (partially as a result of Prussian encouragement) only only doubled-down on his efforts to merge the governments of the Eider Duchies. This was being done under the belief that, by integrating Schleswig while the suspension was in effect, he could circumvent the need for Austrian approval entirely by erasing any legal distinction between it and Holstien (who's permanent exclusion from the Diet would be unthinkable). So, despite the fact it was being actively boycotted by half his nobility, his "Authorized Constitutional Convention" continued uninterrupted in Kiel. Still rhetorically dedicated to drafting a modern, liberal Constitution that would provide equal rights to all men, they 'dealt' with the troublesome question of their rival in Kolding by adopting an unspoken policy of pretending it diden't exist; the legal language they used implying they were representing an already-singular state.

The position of the attendees; though Germans to the man, was a very apathetic one both with reguards to their monarch and his task for them. As the primary beneficiaries of the semi-feudal order that had flourished in the province as a result of its extended neglect by Copenhagen they were very cool towards the prospect of granting power to either the Duke or the population at large which could only come at their expense. Like most low-tier or old elites throughout the ages, they held class in much higher reguard than country: sharing a closer ideological and actual kinship with the Danish families they'd been co-ruling and intermarrying with for half a millennium than some peasent who happened to speak the same mother tounge. In terms of the substance of their arguements, most saw little wrong with the Slesvigers' attempts to defend their autonomy and would have preferred a document that did just as little to undermine the privilege of the Estates themselves. Debate over two potential drafts: one very similar to the Slesvig Constution minus the assertion of duel status for the Duchies and special endorsement for Danish, the other creating a far more powerful Ducial office in the vein of the Luxembourgers endorsed by vocal minority of Schleswig Loyalists and a handful of new nobility whod made their fortunes from bussiness with the Hanseatic Cities and Prussia, was kept vibrant however so long as Fredrick remained silent on weather he'd accept the majority opinion.

Unfortunately for the former party, the imminant threat of forgein intervention in the region in response to the G.o.N.S coup, S.C.A's call for mediation on it's independent-minded proposition, and approaching vote in the Confederation Diet to divest it's members of the right to gain or surrender territory lead him to take a decisive move in favor of autocracy. With challenges to his authority on every side, the Duke made a series of public demonstration of his refusal to yeild to any of them: firmly rejecting an invitation from the British and Russian ambassadors to endorse the proposed Conference, promulgating an executive action stating that Holstein was not bound by acts of the Confederation passed during her absence, ànd most ominiously took the final step of declaring Slesvig in a "State of avowed hosility and treason to her Sovergein, under the authors of the document preaching virtual secession, and that all our friends forgein and domestic are hereby called to deliver justice upon them." Such an open statement, with the "authors" being on the opposite side of the Danish border, carried with it the very real risk of monarchal huberious dragging the nation into war. Unlike their counterparts in Hannover though the Estates found themselves without the means to resist royal policy or it's demands on near-dictitorial powers: the technical legal authority, sympathy of the population and military might ofothe realm virtually entirely in the hands of the Crown and it's Prussians patrons. Their new reality, the Estates were obliged to recognize by delivering the pro-executive version of the draft Constiution to the palace, would be that of an "automatic signing machine" to provide the trappings of legitimacy to the actions of Royal apointees.

The response in Kolding would be anything but that meek surrender. Word of the extremity of the Ducial reaction threw the patriotic crowds into what the British council sent to discuss the details of the Slesvig nobility's offer of mediation artfully described as a ber-serkr rage. "Virtually overnight," he wrote in his debreifing of the mission "The sentiment of the mob, which until than had spared more thought to the romantic notion of storming the beaches than the details of statecraft, had turned the table talk of a handful of landowners into a defient cry of Nordic freedom. These were not an Assembly of Notables, demanding their corperate privlages from a Christian King, but the free landholders of the sagas forming an Althing". The Assembly in turn, had every reason the embrace the reputation; quietly slipping bribes alongside letters to the publishers of the papers to present the impression theyd always had near-republican intents, citing the recent moves towards representative reform in Sweden and Denmark as proof that Pan-Scandinavianism was truely a "bottom up" nationalism and contrasting it with the continued resistance and shallow roots among the "top down" intelligencia-based Italianism and "middle out" bougious German nationalism. No sooner had they next convened,in fact, that they prounounced they were stripping the explicent offer of the throne to the Augustenburgs: instead suggesting a popular plebiscite on the nature of the executive branch if independence was approved of by the international community.

Taking this intransigent stance; though less out of choice than being forced into it by Frederick's outlawing, played surprisingly well with virtually everyone. The British were greatful to have an easily justifiable reason to support their sympathetic and strategic interests in the region and vindicate their proposed Conference. France saw her diplomatic reach validated by her plebecite finally coming into being, as well as gaining a cause on which she support London in her grand game of fishing for colonial influence without actually harming their interests. The Swedes and Danes of course supported their brother-peoples and anything that would hinder German naval developments in the Baltic that could threaten their policy independence, and even most of the German states: still hoping to avoid a wider war and popularly perceiving Schleswig as only arguably German, hoped the ultimatium would get Kiel to back down and save the region a major bloodletting. The one power who disagreed however, was also the only one who immediately mattered: King Whilhelm answering his prospective Minister's call and declaring "police action" against Slesving. Without an army on the mainland to oppose them,the Assembly could only watch the violent crackdown by Prussian troops on the civilian population, though photographs and reports would quickly find their way to the major European cities...
 
The Day Peace Died (Part C)
The Main Front

Just as, with a firm place to stand and a long enough lever Archemedies could have shifted the whole Earth, the commander of a lesser force might deflect even great strength simply used if they make wise use of the proper tools.
-Exert from The Pattern of Modern War in the 19th Century, referencing the role of the preparatory field works in the famous Battle of Laufach

As the Prussians and Holsteiners sought to establish their answer to the Schleswig-Slesvig debate as the final, correct one through force of arms, their southern rivals continued their pursuit of a competing, legalistic path to victory as the June 30th session of the Bundestag convened. The quiet conviction of the city had darkened quite considerably since the 15th as the shadow of Prussians colums streched over them, most notable by the procurement agents moving with their wagons through the streets wearing the uniforms of either the 8th Federal Corps or the Royal Bavarian Army. The former having based itself just outside the city and the later further down the Main at Schweinfurt, they had over the past couple of weeks consolidated their positions along the river in response to the Prussian movements in the Rhineland to serve as a protective line for both the states along the river who provided the manpower and supplies for the combined Federal units and avoid having the take the embarrassing step of removing the Diet from it's seat at Frankfurt. In addition to the need to show conviction in the face of northern attempts at intimidation to keep the petty Duchies from jumping ship, the Southern German states had insisted on the move as the price for their continued support of the Gablenz Conspiracy''s goals; fearing that leaving the west open to concentrate in Saxony and Thrungia (as the Austrian army had initially proposed) would mean leaving their homelands open to invasion.

This case of military-political horsetrading perfect encapsulated the way the past two weeks and increasing acceptance of the possability of war by the deligates had altered the relationship between the members of the Confederation. While the conflict had been purely political, and the gains of united action gotten without risk and at mainly Prussians expense, taking dramatic actions had been simple enough and faced no real resistance from their capitals. Now that their bluff was on the verge of being called the parochial interests of their counteries had begun to rear their ugly head: demands coming from their governments to refuse any measures that would leave them open to occupation and pillage. Already this had resulted in the Hanseatic Cities and Mecklenburg Duchies; hopelessly surrounded and dependent on their connections to Prussia and Holstein for their security and prosperity, explicently instructing their deligates to similarly "suspend" their participation in the Frankfurt Diet. Instead, they were reassigned to attend a similar assembly the Prussians had invited them to at Lauenburg: nominally to further discuss and draft a comprehensive new governing document for the Confederation on the grounds of her previously-proposed reforms, alongside pro-Prussian minors. With news of the coup in Hannover demonstrating the risks to a monarch who defied Prussia without attiqute security combined with the fact the Landtags of the Electorate of Hesse and Saxe-Coburg had voted to petition their monarchs to declare neutrality and keep observers at both diets this necessitated the spreading out of Confederation resources across the whole border despite the strategic consquences.

Obliged to keep a reactionary stance rather than being able to advance and exploit the division of the Prussians forces, Ludwig Gablenz (Who, being the highest ranking officer present had been voted into high command of the improvised "Army of the West") still nursed a vain hope that his brother could convince the Prussians to back down if the Confederation forces could prevent them from making any major gains before the Three Power Congress could convene. As such he'd wasted no time in making his position as defensable as he could; requesting as much artillery and munitions to be shipped up from the Main Duchies as could spare, triggering rockslides to block the smoothest paths through the Hohe-Rhon Mountains, and building a series of pallasades in the pass of Laufach which resembled more than anything else the improvised, ramshackled design of barracades of the assorted revolutions in Paris. When coordinated with the efforts of Prince Karl's Bavarians, who had been set to blowing the bridges across the Saale and preparing a stock of pontoon replacements, The Baron hoped to draw the Prussians in the North into a "Hammer and Anvil": while the Prussians were caught in a battle either trying to ford the river or break the barricades sending the other force to hit them in the rear while the mountains and Main cut off any good route of retreat.

It was in this climate that the Bundestag came together to discuss the issue of the day. While initially this had been the "Motion of Federal Indivisability", the legislative plans were just as much disrupted as the military ones by the success of Operation Cambridge and the resulting disposition of King George V. As the assemblymen were representatives of their monarch, the question of the legitimacy of the turnover of power to the Duke of Brunswick: who's representative had in private revealed to his personal friends the breif "Hanover Porfolio" telegramed from Braunschweig commanding him to vote against any anti-Prussian measure, was the difference between getting a unanimous vote to treat suspension of the Confederation as de-facto withdrawal or not. As getting such a showing would be a major diplomatic card to play in extracting concessions from Prussia as a price for readmission and could serve to gurantee Hannoverian neutrality, the other voting members had been pushing hard to get a majority of the minor states to sign on to get their "collective votes" to the affirmative... only just having succeeded when the transfer of Hannover's voting authority had taken place.

Before anything else, the Diet raised a motion as to weather or not they recognized William Brunswick-Brevren as the legitimate King of Hanover... through the carefully selected language of "weather or not an elected Legislature,who draws it's power from a granted Constiution, has the right to dispose of the divine mandate of the monarchy from which that Constiution gains it's legitimacy". This vote, which was voted on unanimously to the negative, cleverly carried within it a statement to placate the concerns of the threatened statelets's nobility: that the Confederation was legally binding itself not to recognize any other government that might be imposed on or try to take power in the war that they didn't unambiguously and peacefully surrendered authority to. Emboldened by this pledge and with the Hannover vote still still secure in the hands of the old envoy the backlog of motions were quickly pushed through with zero offical votes in opposition: resurrecting the Schleswig integration bill Holstein had left abandoned on the table to strike it down, declaring self-suspension to be senonimous with withdrawal, establishing the Confederate commercial depot and Custom's Union office in Venice, and officially agreeing to the former French, British, and Russian calls for mediation "With the precondition the territorial integrity of the Confederation shall not be infinged upon".

Finally, and most fatefully, the Diet voted to reitterate an obvious,but very important point: that any forgein violation of the territory of any member state was the equivalent of a declaration of war on all of them. This would prove critical as, barely an hour after the vote, messangers from the borders of the Frankfurt territory burst into the Thurn and Taxis Palace to inform them the cavalry pickets had spotted the marching colums of von Goeben's division approaching...
 
If the Austrians fail to stop the Prussians they will roll over the rest of the Confederation, kick Austria out and proclaim Germany years in advance.
 
Oh no. This could be the end of the Deutscher Bund as we know it.

If the Austrians fail to stop the Prussians they will roll over the rest of the Confederation, kick Austria out and proclaim Germany years in advance.

Dont count the Confederation out jusy yet. Even should they lose in the end on field, there's the very real question of just how much Europe will tolerate being taken out of Habsburg power in one bite. Wilhelm would only have so much metaphorical war score.
 
Dont count the Confederation out jusy yet. Even should they lose in the end on field, there's the very real question of just how much Europe will tolerate being taken out of Habsburg power in one bite. Wilhelm would only have so much metaphorical war score.

Well the OTL Battle of Königgrätz (Hradec Králové/Sadowa) was a knock out blow for Austria.
It was especially french influence which prevented the annexation of Saxony and the formation of "just" a North-German Confederation.
 
Chapter VII: The Day Peace Died (Part D)
It is even better to act quickly and err than to hesitate until the time of action is past.
-von Clauswitz

The Silesian-Bohemian Front

Though seemingly getting the jump on the Confederates at every turn, there was one front on which the Prussians utterly failed to seize the iniative. Much to Moltke's dismay however that region along the borders of Saxony was precisely where he'd spent so much time and effort preparing to deliver his decisive blow, only to watch helplessly as the sands of numerical superiority slipped more and more downward on the map with every day the war was delayed. Operating on the timetable set up to support the "intervention" in Holstein, the Prussian forces in the region pp ,jus over a quarter of a million strong, had successfully met their predicted date of full mobalization and regional concentration by June 2nd by their novel use of rail transit to deliver units to the heads at Breslau and Senftenberg. Based on that schedule, he'd requested authorization for an invasion date into Saxony and Austrian Silesia as early as June 5th to capture Dresden and smash the Austrian North Army into route while it was still unprepared. Denied the capacity to defend Vienna and needing to rescue what it was publically known they perceived as the custodian of the current centeralizing policies, the Habsburgs would have no choice but to throw themselves to his mercies and accept whatever settlement in the rest of the Germanies his monarch wished.

Like virtually everyone involved in the events leading up to the war the Marshal found his plans disrupted by the political chaos Mr. Cohen-Blind's gesture had left in it's wake. His request had arrived in the capital only hours too late for the Minister-President had been alive to approve it, and since then efforts to get Wilhelm to sign off on the offensive had been frustrated by the King's vigerious resistance to any action until the diplomatic and domestic situations could be handled. While accepted by the rest of the Privy Council as a nessicery evil, three and a half weeks' delay had left Moltke holding the bag as the various advantages he'd been counting on melted away one by one in the face of steady organization and reinforcement taking place under his counterpart Feldmarschallleutnant von Benedek. A distguished veteren of Austria's mid-century Italian campaigns, Benedek knew his attention to detail and cautious nature, while making him highly effective at defensive and surpressive operations, was a temper poorly suited for the conventional mass offensive he determined was nessucery for victory. This, at least in the first half of the month, had been a self-fufilling prophesy as his tardiness in arriving at and establishing his HQ and supply base around Olmuetz was matched only by the slow speed of his troop massing as reserves from the depths of the Empire were obliged to either make the traditional "long march" or arrive in small batches on the handful of rails that ran into Moravia. While this position allowed him to pose a threat to Silesia: an objective the Emperor insisted he prioritize in hopes of being able to regain the lost, industrially rich province in the peace, left flank and route of communication back to Bohemia proper covered only by Saxony: a Kingdom who's entire army Moltke outnumbered 10:1.

Given these facts, it was almost a forgone conclusion (demonstrated in endless wargames over the following decades) that a Prussian campaign launched on schedule would have easily crushed or driven the Saxons into their fortifications, captured Prague and the Upper Eidar basin, and formed a pincer around Benedek's half-mobalized force in tandem with Leonhard Blumenhaul's II Army defending Silesia. With the over half-month repraive however his dithering ended up a source of strength rather than vulnerability: allowing him to write a strong report vindicating himself to the Emperor against the constant urgings of his aide-de-camp to attack. Not only had he been able to bring his divisions up to full strength: now boasting nearly 300,000 men with a substantial compliment of artillery and shells but in the interium the eastern half of the Bavarian army had arrived to bolster the Saxons. With the new flank guard of 50,000 men outnumbering the Prussian Army of the Elbe (46,000) and so able to comfortably pin them down stratrgically, Benedeck could finally feel secure enough to consider his route of attack without risking an attack from converging forces. Here, he had a choice of two options: either he could break off the majority of his command while leaving a holding force in Moravia to advance into Saxony and face down the combined Elbe and Prussian I Army (Which would protect the lands and secure the good will of his Confederation allies and flip the script on the Prussians by threatening Brandenburg) or send just enough forces north to Theresienstadt to, alongside the Saxons and Bavarians, hold the Sudete passes while the main body occupied Silesia and destroyed the II Army.

Making a minor concession to his government's call for movement while not committing himself to either approach, the Feldmarschalll sent a detachment of 80,000 under the Count of Clam-Gallas to join forces with Prince Albert of Saxony and Von Hartmann of Bavaria with the simple orders to "Oppose the Prussians,and make sure they reach no further than Theresienstad". The remaining 200,000: remaining massed and ready to march at short notice if direction from Vienna or reports of enemy intrusion presented themselves, was similarly set to dissuade Prussia's eastern forces from action. This defensive, mutually protective posturing was enough to drive Moltke mad ashis wish to be able to control the relative positions of the front through aggressive movements twisted into that of a chess stalemate: obligated to take action but every viable option checked by the risk of counterattack. The one route that was likely to produce the crushing blow he needed to insure victory whatever the results on the other fronts: a "Canne of Convergence" where he could bring all three Prussians armies to bare simutantiously, was frustrated by demands of domestic politics.King Whilhelm and Crown Prince Fredrick ; well aware of Austrian ambitions, the agitated state of the Poles created by the Liberals,and Russian desires to avoid direct friction, had declared it a nessecity that Silesia be protected, which due to the impracticality of creating a new command and control structure on such short notice meant the II Army was stuck in its origional position.

This left him, even if he left nothing behind to invest forts or hedge against activity from Thrungia/the Saxe Duchies, with only numerical parity for an advance on the salient that was Saxony... assuming the Confederation forces even moved forward to contest it. If he couldn't eliminate the enemy from the field there, and with the rails from the north stopping just south of Dresden, then further advance would be next to impossible as there'd be no way to get around a head-on attack against strong positions in the Passes; battles his men would either lose or emerge from with only phyric victories.

"To face such a tortuse: to slow to affect real damage upon you but immune to being rendered helpless so long as he is tucked in his shell, requires patience that can only come from incompetence" Moltke would later reflect on the experience in Mirrors. "It is the bane of true military genius, against which his courage, speed, and secrecy can do nothing. To make him weak, than, one must compel him to stick out his neck". This insight; a primary feature of Northern German military culture, lead to the infamious tactic that would trigger the direct war between Austria and Prussia. Upon receiving the paper on June 30th reporting the Italian Declaration of War: trigger as he knew the secret alliance treaty, Prince Friedrich Charles was contacted by Moltke with an order (countersigned by his former tutor Von Roon to give the move the stamp of Berlin's approval) to launch his troops in a wide Arc across the eastern Saxon border while their army was gathering in Bohemia. As the first true movement on to forgein soil during the war, it would set a disturbing precident for brutality for the other theatures: echoing the rampages of the armies of the 30 Years War as the Prussians were actively instructed to requisition as much as possible, crack down brutally on any sign of resistance or potential hositility (in some cases going as far as simply showing disrespect), and "live off the land". Marching in defused colum and detaching cavalry "scavanging parties", the Prince forwarded an ultimatium from the Prussians Staff to Dresden.

"Until our terms of Unconditional and Immediate surrender are accepted, we shall not relent"...
 
Well the OTL Battle of Königgrätz (Hradec Králové/Sadowa) was a knock out blow for Austria.
It was especially french influence which prevented the annexation of Saxony and the formation of "just" a North-German Confederation.

Correct. However, even assuming an identical military result; which can hardly be taken for granted... though I'll readily aknowledge Prussia still has a distinct tactical edge even if they've lost much of their strategic one thanks to better junior officers and of course superior rate of infantry fire in open field combat due to the needle gun, the delay and increased forgein interests will certainly shape the specifics of the peace
 
Chapter VII: Italia Irredimibile (Part A)
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Deus, Legione Redde!

-Final Words, Giuseppe Garibaldi (Disputed)
Hearts and Minds: Initial Positions and Tactics of the Venetia Front

Any analysis of Italian preformance in The Ten Weeks War can not help but focus on its improvised nature. Unlike the mobile flexibility and close command from headquarters practiced by the Prussian armies, or the careful exploitation of the advantages of interior lines and the extended window for preparation by the Habsburgs staff, Italy began the conflict with virtually all her pre-war plans and harmony in command thrown into chaos by the purging of the signatures of the Pronunciamiento. Left with only a rump, top-light officer corps and general orders from their new supreme commander (Who himself was out of communication while en-route to the headquarters with the larger Mincio Army),the forces on the Porch found coordination between her lower-echelon units breaking down as they rushed to fufill their orders to assult the Austrians. The Duke of Gaeta; the one man who might have been able to maintain some semblence of order in these critical early days if he'd resisted his discharge, chose instead to step aside and rush to organize a legal defence to salvage his career and liberties. Within a day of losing his commands, he was rushing south on a train to Rome... exactly the opposite direction of the brace and foolish men making the first crossings into Habsburg territory. Lacking any other locus of command
, the lesser officers found themselves gravitating towards the most illustrious and experienced (in high command at least) figure in the area; Giuseppe Garibaldi.

Despite holding no official commission, the hero of Italy nevertheless took on a great deal of
de facto authority as a result of his personal charisma and the inspiring appeal of his "calls to action". Riding from camp to camp, carrying the words of the King's speech with him, Garibaldi would whip the men into a patriotic fervor in a manner many forgein observers in the army took to comparing to the Revivalist religious meetings they'd heard so much about in their previous postings in the War Between the States. The parallels of these addresses to fundimentalist preaching: vague promises of a glorious future, entreatments to depend on purity of faith in the cause, denouncement of the opposition as fundimentally and irrdeemably evil, and a lack of substantive specific suggestions did not go unnoticed by the army chaplains: who already under pressure from the papacy to try to moderate secular nationalism took to issuing counter-sermons once the general passed on. Rapid exposure to the counter narratives only served to agitate the deep ideological divisons between units: those made up of men from the south or rural regions who still placed a high value on piety resenting the intruder's hamfisted attempts to usurp authority. Heaped on top of a system who's integration between parts was already in shambles, this inconsistent aknowledgement of Garibaldi's direction is cited as one of the primary reasons for the Italians inability to react to turning fortunes in the field: different elements of the army acting as they saw fit based on two entirely different approaches.

By the end of the first week, this campaingn left Italy with essentially three completely separate command structures at warplans. At over 130,000 men and headed by the state-appointed Supreme Commander Raffaele Cadorna, the Mincio Army was theoretically the most effective force. In pre-war plans it was to serve as the spearhead of the offensive by making a quick advance on Pischera; blowing up the route to the regional logistical base of Verona and obliging the Austrians to draw their forces away from the Po before launching the second wave from the south, and while the timing of the advance faced severe delays due to instructions to stand firm until Cadorna could arrive with new instructions they would end up sticking to the substance of the plan. The Army of the Po, in contrast, had actually begun to attritiate away before even taking actions due to dissertations in the wave of arrested officers and defections to the Garibaldi Legion leaving barely 60,000 dispersed along the main southern front. What commanders remained; highly sensitive to accusations of duplicity from the Royalists and cowardliness from the Nationalists, understandably showed no resistance to the new orders to advance with all haste on their war goals despite their weakened state: three of their divisions moving on Mantua and two on Rogina. Finally, Garibaldi's Legion, which was meant to serve as a "reserve" to occupy regions or to exploit gaps in the Austrian position, had assembled battalions from the offical army number around 10,000 to suppliment Legionaries twice their number in pursuit on an independent poliy. Eager for a fight, the volunteers sought to make a name for themselves in the campaign with a dramatic show of force to shake the Austrian moral. If the soldiers could be show the vulnerability of their oppressors, they reasoned, than surely the minority peasents would abandon the Germans and leave the route to Vienna a virtual victory parade: or so they had fooled themselves into believing. Following the direction of Garibaldi's tour, they eventually settled on the fortress of Borgoforte on the extreme left of the their front: not only symbolic as one of the last Austrian possessions south of the Po but, from that position, a potential point of indiction for communications between the armies and as a base for Austrian cavalry raids.

Their principal adversary meanwhile; the Archduke Albrecht, watched with utter astonishment at this disreguard for the common military maximum of "Concentrate for Battle"; faced with a plethora of tempting targets for his field army. Trusting in the endurance of the western forts, however, he would march south from Veronia with the intent of relieving Mantua and then crossing into Italian territory. While the other armies were pinned against the troops manning the fortress lines, he could exploit this centeral rupture (a classical Napoleonic coup de main) to swing around into the rear of either Garbibaldi's or the Eastern Po forces. If further offensives were nessicery to drive Italy to surrender, he could easily pivot into the second one and leave the Micino force not only alone but with a hostile army between them and the resentful south. He would,by July 5th, have 80,000 men moving forward; being careful to lay down lines of communication to keep them in direct contact with the Headquarters so the force could receive instructions based on the latest reconissance or information from other fronts in case they would need shoring up
 
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