From Iron, Blood: A Bismark Assassinated TL

How shall the Spainish issue be covered?

  • The Caudillo Option

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • The Corperate Option

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • The Colonial Option

    Votes: 8 61.5%
  • The Church Option

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • The Catalan Option

    Votes: 5 38.5%

  • Total voters
    13
  • Poll closed .
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Not open for further replies.
Weekly Author Update III
  • Happy for the Habsburgs to be able to expand the Confederations borders in their favor, but I’m sure France is going to be wanting have some words over this.

    Oh, Napoleon III is going to make sure his hand is felt in these affairs. Of course, the question is what he perceives as the course of action that will garner the most personal prestige and international cred; backing self-determination in Schleswig/Slesvig or Venetia, and garnering the favor of Great Britain and Austria or Prussia and Russia, may become mutually exclusive

    Venice being in the German Confederation is really huge for Italian unification. This puts Germany and Italian unification at odds, and makes any effort to unite the peninsula more than just an Austrian issue. The house of Savoy cannot be pleased.

    The aspect of Venice as the only route to the Mediterranean is not accurate, although the Austrian delegation is probably just using it as a rhetorical device. Trieste was already a part of the Confederation and was the main port for the Hapsburg empire.

    It's precisely because Trieste is the main Habsburg port that its not available to act as a joint Confederation port. Austria needs to keep total control in order to pursue her policy as an independent power and especially keep the Prussians out. The risk of a potentially hostile military force in the main base of the Austrian navy in the event of a war with Italy (Even if it only escapes to suppliment the Italians or scuttle themselves to block the harbor) is too much.

    You are right though that the Savoyards are livid, and are going to be asking Uncle Nappy why Austria isent giving them their toy like he promised. The window for mediation is rapidly slamming shut, however, and depending on how harsh Prussian terms are (in the event they win) he may have limits on how much he's willing to see Austria cut down.

    Are Americans in a position to led anything?

    There are only about 30 million of them, many impoverished by the recent war. In those days the US was a borrower not a lender.

    I can say for certain US capital is largely being pumped into enterprises by Carpetbaggers and the Republican infastructure projects and Homestead sales/land speculation for the foreseeable future. There's way too many oppritunities to get rich at home and they've already met their quota on war bonds from Uncle Sam?

    For now his mind is focused in Mexico, but i think that he will try to ask the permission to buy Luxembourg to the Austrians, in exchange of staying neutral and supporting Austria claim during the peace treaty. (or he could try to buy Luxemburg during or after the war ).

    After i don't know how Austria would react, allowing France to buy Luxemburg would have a lot of advantage and a lot of disavantage.

    The fact the fortress is holding a large Prussian garrison would make that matter complicated, to say the least. Of course, since Prussia has suspended her participation in the Confederation (Though not, it should be noted, declared it dissolved as of yet) and Luxembourg Fortress is a Federal Fortress said garrison is now technically illegal, but the matter is still ultimately King William's decision and Prussia could make a counter offer.

    As for Mexico, all I'll say is he still going to have to come with terms with the Americans.
     
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    Chapter VI: A Fortnight of Finance and Forts (Part C)
  • If it comes from another man's pocket,
    what should I care the absurdity of the valet's tip?
    - King Whilhelm I


    The Pri(n)ce of Orange: The Role of the Neatherlands in the Confederation Crisis

    In the wake of Prussia and Holstein's unprecidented withdrawal from the German Confederation, the Anti-Veneta, Pro-Schleswig cause was left with only a single firm supporting voice in the form of the Luxembourg deligation. This voice was being used as often and loudly as possible in an effort to keep the Austrians from exploiting their temporary concensus to force through legsislation to benefit itself at the expense of Northern/Centeralizing interests. On the surface, this may seem to make little sense; after all, what did the Neatherlands or Luxembourg have to gain from strengthening their main commercial rival and the one Great Power that posed a direct military threat? It's important to remember, however, that this policy wasent being directed by the governments of those states but rather as a personal iniative for the benefit of the man sitting on their thrones: William III.

    The King, by insisting on receiving reports and sending out orders as frequently as possible via telegram and keeping the Prussians ambassador always close at hand, had taken direct management of the situation in a way even the most absolute of pre-electronic communication monarchs could only dream of. To him, the looming war wasn't a catastrophy but a golden oppritunity: one where, with the scales of Europe precariously balanced as they were, he could demand a great price by acting as the decisive weight. The most important factor in this wasent the direct power of the Dutch or Luxembourger armies; the costs and loses of fighting in an extended war would outweigh any gains from deploying them, but rather Luxembourg's position both as its ability to act as a highway or roadblock to any potential threat of French intervention and the political precident his actions would set for the rest of the Federal Fortress systems... and thus the use of tens of thousands of soldiers and weeks of time during the critical early weeks of the war.


    The Bundesfestungen , as joint properties of the German Confederation, were points of incredibly high tension during the two weeks prior to the outbreak of the Fraternal War as the withdrawal of Holstein and Prussia put the legal position of their now-forgein garrisons in doubt. The Prussian garrison in Ulm and Maize: which held hostage the key border crossing between Baden and Wurttemburg and the Rhinish province of the Grand Duchy of Hesse, had at that point technically become invading forces which while not currently fighting would, in the event of war, could damage the war effort of three of the key Western Pro-Confederaton states far out of proportion to their size. If combined with Dutch neutrality and a removing the weight from any French threats of a swift intervention in the Rhine, Prussia would be virtually guranteed security of the western third of her country for at least a month, giving her vital breathing space in which to secure the north by knocking out the Austrians still in Altonia, frighten off the Scandinavians, and knock out several of the minor German states. If she could accomplish that any international conference would be obliged to aknowledge the unification of the Eidar Duchies, concede to Berlin's supremacy in Northern Germany, and have every excuse to transfer Venetia to Italy.

    All of this depended, at least if the Prussian court was to get the war they wanted with Austria being cast as the aggressor, on the garrisons having a legal justification for their presence on "forgein" property that Vienna and her allies could use as an excuse to present this as a defensive campaign. From his authority as Grand Duke of Luxembourg, William was more than happy to provide just such a precident by excersing his royal perogative over the Federal Fortress of Luxembourg. Currently housing around Dutch troops and a "Confederation" garrison of 4,000 (made up entirely of Prussians), the William floated the novel idea of a "false flag" operation in which the garrison would formally transfer command from Prussian to Luxembourger officers (All politically reliable agents of his Crown,of course) so they could continue their legitimate task of defending the forts. Whilhelm could then do the same for the other garrisons as a "show of good faith" for international observers and have the men remain inactive and sacrosanct from Confederate attack until the need to placate calls for mediation disappeared with war... at which point the men would hold a staged "mutiny" and become a thorn in the enemy's backside. As for the price of this assistance, the King casually suggested that "As his Majesty no doubt has many demands on his treasury, I would be greatful simply tot see the an ancestoral crown of the House of Orange restored to my person".

    While this could be seen as an outrageous price; an entire nation for what was just a step short of neutrality, the Royal Council knew the whilly Dutchman had them cornered when, on the 24th, the received notice that the Confederation diet presented a motion to call for the expulsion of Prussian forces from the Federal Fortresses. While Thilges was instructed to delay the vote as long as possible; forcing the discussion of the logistics of repatriating the garrisons, the details of their replacement, and related matters, Prussia was presented with yet another ticking clock that she had little time to consider. To help them make their decision, a copy of the agenda was leaked to reveal Von Gablenz and his conspiracy had added several new proposals which would come up once the immediate crisis passed: including one that would stage a practical hostile takeover of the currently vulnerable
    Zollverein (The organization yet another victim of the beheading Bismark's death had brought to so many other executive offices) by creating a customs and monetary union managed by the Assembly headquartered in Vienna and sponsoring a common merchant marine. King Whilhelm, desperate to avoid this geopolitical checkmate (After all, how could anyone insist on transferring the commercial and administrative center of the largest single market in Europe out of that market?), would allow no debate: declaring that the price didn't matter (See the quote at the start of the chapter) and signing off on a gurantee to transfer Nassau to William's personal possession if he'd act immediately and "withhold any comment or action in responses to events in the German States"... thinking specifically of the plot currently being prepared in Hanover.

    The next day's actions: in which in front of the local consuls from various European counteries the commander of the Dutch continent of Luxembourg Fortress accepted the transfer of tge Confederate commisson from his Prussian counterpart, should have been the end of the question to Prussia's favor as Luxembourger officers boarded their trains to repeat the process in the south. As in so many things, however, the meddling of Napoleon III complicated affairs by unintentionally threatening to go over Prussia's head. Well aware of William III's extensive personal debts and believing he had obtained Prussian and Austrian concent for the action, the Emperor had prepared a fund of 4.5 million guilders for the purchase of the province. Also under the impression that in the increasingly likely event of a war breaking out between the German States his neutrality would be compensated, he determined that it would be better for him to make this aquisition now while it would still be seen as relatively minor and thus acceptable to the other powers. So,under the shadow of the clouds looking over the Germanies, he innocently forwarded the offer to The Hauge which quickly found it's way into the Dutch papers on the 26th.

    Sorely tempted by the offer and hearing the rumblings from the States-General, the remaining dissidents in which were eager to use the classical dilemia of royal debts as a means to restore some of their power, William remained silent on the matter despite calls from his Prussian partners to quickly reject it. In his well known biography Nosforatu van Nieuw-Brazilie: The Life and Legacy of William III, the author cites his constant jesting of the poor timing of events, once notably stating "If he'd delayed but 4 more days, he might just have got me." Within the broader context of the Crisis the French monarch; who liked to style himself the diplomatic if not military equal of his illustrious uncle and hoped the world saw him as such, found his wish coming true in the worst way. Prussia and Austria both angerly pulled in the French ambassadors and demanded to know why France was violating his promised neutrality, though for wisely different reasons. Berlin, reasonably enough, saw the move as an attempt to outflank their defences in order to compel Prussia to agree to demobalize and submit to the French-lead Congress of Europe that was Napoleon III's well known dream: one which would inevitably end in Prussia having to beg for readmittance to the Confederation with hat in hand and the plebicite is Slesvig/Schleswig taking place. Austria, on the other hand,fell victim to pressures from her allies in the Confederation: while they were certainly not happy with the prospect of Prussian domination, the minor principalities (particularly those along the Main and Rhine) were just as keen to avoid the return of undue French influence and the prospect of future territories being striped from the Confederation. They demanded then, as a price for supporting Austria's admittedly major reforms, that Vienna openly take a hardline stance on the principal that territory could not be transfered outside the Confederation: a stance Emperor Franz Joseph issued instructions to support in order to further solidify Venetia's new status. Faced with a direct Imperial order, despite his personal misgivings the Austrian deligation agreed to place a motion for such an amendment to the Federal Constiution to take place on the 29th, declaring "The relations between the German States shall henceforth be that of a perpetual and indissolvable Union , from which no component in whole or in part shall be removed except by the approval of over 3/4 of its members"...
     
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    Chapter VI: A Fortnight of Finances and Forts (Part Due)
  • Vienna's Valkyries Ride: The Road to the Last European Congress

    Yet even as these backdoor commitments made war increasingly inevitable; the diplomatic brokers in Frankfurt, Vienna,and Berlin having blindly stumbling into higher and higher stakes, the broader circles of European diplomacy still believed that peace could be sustained through traditional means. These hopes, which from the outside there was ample reasons to hold, were largely staked on the European Congress proposed in late May that the three sponsoring Powers were increasingly in favor of convening. The Russel Government, having grasped upon the Slesving Constiutional Assembly's proposal as the basis for a grand compromise that would meet the primary demand of every party, openly endorsed the Swedish offer to host the event and began reaching out to the other neutrals in hopes of giving it's rulings as much weight as possible. This move found immediate approval from Russia, who needed the platform to voice their support for Prussia if they were to acheive their goal of locking down Berlin and escape their "freezing out" of European affairs, but raised concerns over the venue. The militiant seperatists in Kolding were being led by a Swedish officer, after all, and Stockholm was a hotbed of Scandinavianist sentiments. The German party in the Schleswig/Slesvig Question, which was to headline the event, had no hope of getting a fair hearing there to say nothing of justifiably fearing potential assassination: a threat that still loomed large in the shadow of the great Pan-Germanist's killing. Russia would only endorse and enforce the event, as well as implying that this was the only way Holstein might be coaxed into attending, if it took place in a more neutral venue.

    Here, once again, the direction of Europe was seized by the active forgein policy of Napoleon III. The prospect of restoring France to true power parity with Great Britain; acheiving through concensus the parity his namesake had proven unable to sustain through conflict, was too tempting to resist. There was a great bugbear to that pursuit however: having already pledged himself to neutrality in the current intra-German disputes; arguably encompassing every issue the Congress had grounds to consider (Slesvig's status within the Augustenburg Monarchy and Germany, the terms of Prussia's and Holstein's return to and the reforms of the German Confederation, the integration and governing structure of Venetia, and the sale of Luxembourg), he'd locked himself out of pursuing that power in the traditional fields of Centeral Europe. The outraged rebuked of Prussia and Austria to the mere suggestion of the last issue; while already a months into the crisis and the prospect of backing down becoming politically impossible, only verified that international sympathies were increasingly turning against French influence in the Rhineland. Pressured towards mobalization by the Catholic and Monarchist Right, being told to take a hard line for the Danes and Italians by different factions on the Left, and seeing what might be his last chance to rewrite the treaties of 1815 on his own terms slipping away the Emperor dejectedly withdrew into Tuileries Palace for much of the last week of June; refusing to see any cortiers.

    It was here, isolated from the normal affairs of state,that the influence of his wife could most strongly be fealt. A staunch clericalist and conservative, in normal circumstances Empress Eugenie played a key role in the stability of the regeime both by acting as a personal confidant to bolster him against the harsh attacks from the left, and presenting a counter-voice to his liberal cousins that made Napoleon III appear more moderate and help ease concerns over his reforms. Having her husband to herself in an emotionally compromised state for days on end, however, her henpecking was far more convincing than it ordinarily would be. She chastised him for thinking too small: why should France cosign herself to only seeking influence along the Rhine? Was that all he was capable of doing with so mighty a nation? His uncle and the Bourbons had set sights much further afield, seizing world-spanning domains: would he back down and make his Empire the runt among France's governments?


    Her words, though striking at his pride, drove the Emperor to reason a way out of this dilema. Finally, on the 28th of June, it struck him like a bullet from the blue: just because he'd promised to neutrality of action in the conflict between Prussia and Austria, that wasn't nessicerily the same as expressing only neutral opinions if it was done in a context where the German states werent involved... say at an international conference they weren't attending. Since Russia and Britain weren't aware of his private pledges to the other Great Powers, perhaps he could use the promise of "conceding" to their wishes in Germany in exchange for acceptance and support of French influence elsewhere; maybe even securing the illusive "Crown Jewel" that the British had found in India. With this new burst of energy and inspiration, he set about assembling a laundry list of issues to present to the world; writing like a man possessed an accompanying speech calling for "The better angels of our nature to triumph over the demons of war, bringing the Powers together in a great spirit of Euroean Brotherhood so we might set an example for all future generations who will say '''These are the men who brought the light of civilization to the world' ". In addition to the problems of the Germanies, his Congress would answer the question of the debt and anti-forgein attacks in Nippon, the assult on missionaries in Korea, mediate an end to the violence wracking South America and Mexico and, most saliently, the financial and political crisis currently erupting in Spain...
     
    Chapter VI: A Fortnight of Finances and Forts (Part E)
  • Könige lassen- Kings Pass
    Kronen bleiben- Crowns Live
    -Credo of Hanover's Regierung der nationalen Rettung

    Operation Cambridge: The Rise of the Government of National Salvation and Eve of War

    Much to his pleasant surprise, Bennigsen found no shortage of co-conspirators among the middle and upper-middle tier of the Hanoverian government and military. Seeing the looming disaster their Monarchs incompetence was about to plunge the nation into, even many dynastic loyalists and beneficiaries of Gudolphic patronage recognized that if the throne was going to survive the any upcoming carving up in Germany (Their isolated state no doubt being the first concession the Confederation would make , as Napoleon had tried to do little more than a half century before) they would need to avoid being at war with Prussian at any cost. Only few of the high-up members among the officers required bribes; the promise of keeping their commissions/positions (that would no doubt disappear in the event of Prussian conquest) or being looked at with favor to replace any vacated by Loyalists (Concentrated into the directly crown-appointed or politically-active upper rungs) being incentive enough for most. Trial balloons to the assemblymen had also come back with extremely posative results, even much of the moderate-right expressing concern that King George was weilding his power responsably if still legally. The preparations didn't seem to be facing any signs of suspicion or resistance either: the officers either moving around on schedule or loyally obeying the instructions from their compromised superiors. With everything going so smoothly many of the plotters believed they'd be able to seize power near-bloodlessly, which would have the huge advantage (both politically for themselves and militarily for their allies) of rendering direct Prussian intervention unessicery.

    At the heart of the coup's effectiveness lay the broad appeal of it's modest, reformist program. While Bennigsen and his core backers were certainly liberals, they were clearly of a moderate patriotic stripe that took great pressures to keep out the radical republicans and socialists. Perfectly content with the idea of constiutional monarchy, sharing power with an assembly elected by a limited wealth-based franchise, they cast their movement as one against the current personal and policy of the government rather than it's principals. Thus, the only group they couldent appeal to were those specifically in favor of George V; who's arbitrary rule had left him with few defenders outside those he'd hand-picked for their posts. With the structural changes so limited, there was only one complication they'd have to sort out as they drafted the declaration which would be presented to the world and people as to their intentions: who did they intended to place on the Hannoverian throne once the kicked off the tyrant who currently occupied it?

    The ideal, and for some only, legal choice would be to simply compel an abdication and elevate the Crown Prince Ernest Augustus. This move carried with it an obvious problem however: the 21 year old Ernest had yet to have children of his own and may not support taking power by extralegal means from his father. If he refused to take the throne, the plot would likely crumble out of a lack of legitimacy as there was no other strong candidates to crown... leaving the disposed monarch likely to find international support for a restoration. A clique of "dynastic Left" assemblymen, after some discussion, quickly found a novel way around any potential princely hang-ups. The Duke of Brunswick: a distant cousion of Augustus' who had come to his current position in the wake of (very similar to their planned) revolution against his brother's autocratic rule, was also unmarried and at age 60 showed no signs of producing a legitimate child. As it so happened his closest male-line relative was Prince Augustus: meaning if they offered the throne to Duke William the House of Hanover could effectively sustain its continuity.

    Receiving Prussian and Brunswickin approval for the plan on the eve of the execution date (Duke William actually happily accepting the offer, as he'd been frustrated by Prussian hesitance to recognize the prospective succession for years prior), the local brokers for the self-labelled "Government of National Salvation" were signaled to make their move. At precisly 6 o'clock communications between the cities of the Kingdom suddenly fell silent: telegram operators either abandioning of being forcefully removed from their posts, engineers finding armed men blocking the doors to their cabins, and postmen's horses "requisitioned" by cavalry in full uniform. Under the shadow of mobalization, few civilans questioned the serious silence not those uninformed rank and file their orders as the unspoken assumption was the shooting war had finally begun. In the capital, the plotters had gathered in the Leineschloss a military-civilian joint council they were calling "The Government of National Salvation": consisting of members of the Estates,high ranking officers, and a handful of city officals. From that centeral location, they could easily dispatch runners with assignments to their various battalions as to what streets or buildings they were to picket: the greatest concentration being sent to baracade the enterances to the armory building in Royal Barraks. By the time the Guard could be roused from bed and organize a counter-move, than,they found themselves outgunned despite locally outmanning the traitor brigades.

    At just under an hour before her normally was awake and dressed for the dat, the King is often described as having been (literally and figuratively) caught with his pants down by the brazen move. The army having been so active and obedient in following his orders to have the best formations shadow Prussian manuvers along their border as well as personally being deep in preparations to join them on their glorious campaigning, the thought of a mass mutiny haven't even crossed his mind. Still, in the early hours of the moarning George tried to take decisive and direct control of events from the Herrenhausen: dispatching couriers towards the Barraks with orders to gather an escourt which could clear out a path to the center of town where he could make a direct showing to his subjects and denounce this treason. Had these men been able to use their usual stallions, this move might have succeeded and, if not shifted the course of history, certainly change the fate of the region by killing the coup (and in all likelihood the last hope for Hannover's independence). With traitor forces manning the wider streets and obviously set to shoot anyone trying to pass at full gallop, discresion and speed were mutually exclusive so by the time the loyal pages could reach the Barraks by trot the big guns had already been trained on the facility throughfares; keeping the Loyalists trapped in their bunkhouses.

    By noon,the G.o.N.S had occupied enough of the key facilities of the capital to openly state their intent. To do so they sent out criers with prepared copies of a speech to pronounce block by block, declaring that "To save our Constiution from usurptions, our Country from pillage, and our Crown from being seized as booty of war" the despot George V would have to step down. They claimed that the Prussians had issued an ultimatium after the King's earlier rejection of demobalizion, saying they still had time to avoid an invasion that would end in annexation if George would abdicate to a sucessor who pledge not to move their army in to attack Austria, and finished off with a call to the monarch to step down for the Duke of Brunswick (who'd already given such a pledge) for the sake of the nation's survival.

    In the intervening hours, detachments of troops, servants with private arms, and elements of the constibles loyal to the regeime had been concentrated into an ad-hoc legion in the gardens of the Royal Palace, prepared to fufill their earlier order of escourting the King to the front of the assembly to remind them and the people who they owed their loyalty to. Here, however, he found his wrathful resolve starting to crack under fear. Not of parading to the Leineschloss; the coup leaders would be signing their own death warrent if news got out they'd killed him in cold blood as the rest of the country rallied to his son, but of what Whilhelm's agents would do if they got their hands on him. Well aware from his updates on the front to plan the campaign he would lead there could be no delusions of what would happen to his army if they were caught in the media blackout that must be accompanying such a move: they'd be picked apart peice by peice until there wasn't enough to fight back even if they did manage to concentrate. It would be easy enough to strike this conspiracy down, but all that would get him was a few more weeks of power and likely prison. Meanwhile, abdication would mean a comfortable exile on pension... perhaps on a nice Carribean island.

    By 2:00 pm, he'd made his decsision and ordered his loyalist legion to escourt him to the assembly assembly hall with all the pomp and ceremony they could muster. Gathering up all the best finery from the palace, ordering in a band from the consert hall, and organizing a procession of nobility and priests, George V insisted on going out not with the appearance of a resigned exile but with the dignity of the Divine monarch he was. This massive impromptu display: referred to as the "Triumph of Tragedy" by some, is reguarded by many as a surprisingly regal swan song of the old medieval understanding of Kings: the final time a major ruler would ride on horseback in full regalia rather than a modern military uniform. Surrounded by his men, the King stood in the courtyard in front of the assembly and, as Benningsen sent forward a balif to remove the symbols of royal office, defiantly ordered the Legion to stand in his way and humbly brought forward the Landesbischof of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church to transfer them to the G.o.N.S.

    Having a signed document of abdication, the coup members at the telegraph office were ordered to reopen the line to Brunswick,the emergency Assembly declaring by acclimation their offer of the throne to the Duke and that new elections would take place a month after the corination. This message to Brunswick could then be forwarded to the Prussians, who had until now been holding back on standing orders to wait for 6 am on the 29th to cross the border (Giving the coup 48 hours). General Falkenstein, commanding the Prussians forces on the Hannoverian front,received the verification by late that evening and altered their orders: commanding a march to the borders of the Free Cities and petty principalities to intimate them in to line. Most fatel among these was the assignment given to von Goeben's 13th division, who was sent south to secure the city of Frankfurt...


     
    Footnote III (Part A)
  • Extract from Politics by Any Other Means Nessicery: Europe's Evolution from Vienna to Verpolitica
    Like most areas of intellectual pursuit in the first half of the 19th century, the fields of military and geopolitical theory were heavily focused on examining the ideas and experiences that came in the wake of the French Revolution. Because of the lack of significant Continental wars due to the success of the Congress System in containing and shortening conflicts via international pressure, developments in grand strategy depended on meticulously picking apart the campaigns of Napoleon to discover the principals behind their successes and failures. Applying these principals to the new oppritunities created by the tactical and technological innovations that had taken place since than: railroads, breech-loading, electronic communication, balloon reconissance, the proliferation of rifled barrels, and the dramatic increase in production brought about by standardized parts and centeralized, partially mechanized factories, the staff collages of Europe had produced a number of doctrines which, each with it's unique operational dictates, gave their members no shortage of discussions to keep them busy over this period of peace. By the 1860's, this debate had become dominated by questions relating to the First French Empire's uniting the posts of Head of Government and Head of the Armed Forces: it's advantages and disadvantages, suitability for acheiving various national goals, and if the changes that had taken place since it's implimentation under Bonaparte made it more or less viable. The answers and the lessons they drew from them; which came down to disagreements over philosophy and methiodology more than anything else, is created the two schools of military-political thought who's struggle for supremacy became the defining mark of the Age of Verpolitica.

    The "French School", also known as the "Cult of Order" by its adherents and "Tragics" by its opponents, originates from the ideas promulgated by Antoine Jomimi Traité des grandes operations militaires (Treaties on Major Military Operations) and epitomized in retired Marshal Francios Bazaine's 1887 masterpeice The Pattern of War in the 19th Century . Taking a systems-focused rationalist perspective it asserted that, though capable of producing impressive tactical victories, the Imperial state had deep structural flaws that limited it's ability to acheive long-term strategic policies and thus was doomed to failure. It's extreme centeralization of authority resulted in neglect and slow breakdown of those fronts and vital systems (such as logistics) behyond his immediate reach, while the removal of the moderating role of the civil state turned war from an extreme to routine tool of forgein policy. This inevitably lead to France becoming trapped in an inescapable cycle of warfare in which her pursuit of an immediate political objective, even if successful, produced unintended side effects in alienating potential allies, placing further strain on limited state resources, and creating areas of overreach for her opponents to meddle in that would nessicitate a focused response; creating an opening for a previously vanquished rival to make another attempt at besting them. The tactics needed to handle the widespread obligations created by such a policy: short, rapid offensive campaigns designed to catch the enemy's main force in a decisive battle so he could be compel his enemy to turns and move on to next crisis, never were able to produce a permanent result: even the "war-winning" battles of Austerlitz and Wagram seeing his enemies return with new and improved field armies to challenge the imposed peace.

    Drawing on his extended commands in Algeria, Crimea, and Mexico as well as observations of and correspondence with partincipants in The American Civil War, Bazaine drew a distinction between "success in peace, that is the realm of staff officers and statesmen and "success in war, that is the realm of soldiers and generals". The former,which preceded followed the actual conflict, was the more important of the two and consisted of creating the best system of "directors" possible: laying out a clear series of objectives for an operation, gathering intelligence, establishing clear and swift lines of supply, communication,and transport, ect. that would insure the presence of superior force at a decesive point at a predictable time. This pre-planning, by minimizing the concerns and miscellaneous work of the army, freed it's generals to use them with maximum efficency in those matters that did need to be left to the immediate conduct of campaign. This made war into a scientific affair by replacing "points of chaos"; factors that couldn't be depended on, with "points of order"; if done correctly producing a plan with the minimum expenditure of resources as possible at any particular odds of success (the ideal odds themselves also being mathematically calculatable)

    This minimization of lose-damage ratios lies at the heart of the French School, as victory is dependent on the degree to which a faction can exhaust the enemy in one of two "vital resources" while protecting and maintaining their own. One can do things such as occupying territory, disrupting normal commerce, and destroying economic assets to leave them without the ability to sustain or rebuild damage done to their means of resistance (Corps), or break their will to resist (Elan) through denying their citizens a sense of security by attacking/besieging/occupying population centers, reducing quality of life by denying access to outside aid and obliging the enemg to divert a greater share of national production to the army, and eliminating hope of the situation improving by frustrating the enemy's iniatives. The degree to which this can be acheived by "success in war" is largely what defines the second aspect of "success in peace", in which it is the job of civil government to best secure the gains on the ground by mediating them with how acceptable they are to the victim (to minimize the desirability of a war of revenge) and the broader international context. Pattern provides two practical historical examples in comparing the successful English diplomacy of the Americans in their civil war with the failed French one during the Napoleonic Wars. In both cases, Britian was practically uninvadable in the short-medium term, primarily held commercial motivations behind her interests, and was immediately concerned with preventing a regional hegemony hostile to those interests. This made the ideal policy to limit any desire to intervene one of limited gains from the pre-war situation, keeping these focused on territory/security and political changes as opposed to economic ones, and not adopting stances such as the disasterious Continental System that raised suspicion of post-war malice. The Americans were successful in convincing the British not to contest their supression of the South by adopting just such measures, while by taking the exact opposite approach the Empire hardened British Elan to the point she would never surrender.

    Tactically, the principal of trying to rationalize and quantify war is continued by establishing a concept called "Operational Mass". This number could be calculated by multiplying a unit's rate of fire in shots per minute by the throw weight of it's weapon, then dividing by its accuracy at a particular range to produce an expected amount of force it force the enemy to endure over a given period. For whatever level or circumstance, it was "the fixed laws of battle that success comes, in a contest of Corps, to the side with the greater applied operational mass, and in a contest of Elan to the better operational mass per man.". Both of these instance placed a premium on artillery: particularly when rifled and concentrated in large batteries under highly-educated gunnery officers, thanks to their heavy throw weight per crewman and ability to shift ammunition types to maximize damage at any distance. Both they and the main infantry arms should prioritize effective range, with the "Canne" ideal being a situation where the main body of troops ,highly drilled and coordinated , can conduct a firing retreat to widdle down and exhaust the enemy before they can close in to they can effectively counterattack. Bayonet charges are treated with a great deal of disdain; claimed to be the final desperate resort of a unit by throwing away it's cohesian in the face of panic or having no other options, though there is much more internal debate on cavalry effectness. Some theorists still hold to the schock value of an organized heavy charge into infantry, or denying the enemy effective security for their artillery, while others cite the ease which those types of attacks are broken by any mass fire: the later thinkers assigning cavalry to a strategic rather than tactical role in raiding the enemy country, gathering information, and trying to cut methods of communication.

    --

    Public Service Announcement: Due to the very large and broad nature of the next main entry (Covering the day that everything finally falls out into Fraternal War), I'm going to be taking my time to make sure I cover all it's aspects to the best of my ability. In the interem, please enjoy a series of mini-enteries on more general topics in this timeline. If you have any suggestions for a "Footnote" topic,don't hesitate to ask, and thank you for your patience.
     
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    Chapter VII: The Day Peace Died (Part A)
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    Do not be like Cain, who belonged to the evil one and murdered his brother. And why did he murder him? Because his own actions were evil and his brother’s were righteous."
    -1st John 3:12


    The Fraternal War, The Confederation Civil War, The Third Slesvig War, or The Ten Weeks War: whichever of it's myriad of names they prefer, historians are in almost universal concensus that the series of conflicts that broke out on June 30th of 1866 were the decisive moment in the history of European Politics. The vastly different poitical results for and writings in responce from the three major Nationalist movements: Italianism,Germanism, and Scandinavianism, would Deeply shake their intellectual foundations and lead to their divergances from the pre-1866 norm of liberal romantic sentiments in an alliance of conveinence with a Conservative dynasty in mutual pursuit of political power. Observation of its battles would finally loosen Napoleon's dead grip on the war plans of the Great Powers; it's dramatic demonstrations of the power of modern weaponry and defenses forcing European nations to confront in their own backyard that until now had been regulated to easilly ignorable, distant shores. Under the strain of the conflict and it's fallout even nations uninvolved were forced to bend or crack,new systems transforming the fundimental relationships between the nation, its parts, and its people. Perhaps most importantly, however, the failure to prevent or mitigate the violence woke Europe from the long dream of artificial peace: reminding them that conflict was the natural state and could only be held back by a strong hegemonic force or the active efforts of great men. Still, even if in agreement that an Austro-Prussian conflict in the era was inevitable the historian concensus is still facinated by the exact, unique series of events that caused the tension; which had been on the cusp of erupting for nearly two months, to erupt simultaneously in so many regions at once.


    The Austro-Italian Front

    Vox populi, vox Dei, Deus Vult!
    -King Victor Emmanuel II, immediately preceding his declaration of war.

    Though set up, decided by, and popularly associated with events and trends in the Germanies, the actual start of the war took place on the Austro-Italina Border. Having dithered too long in waiting for the nod from either Paris or Berlin, patience with the Marmora Ministry finally ran out when Rome awoke to headlines screeming of a "Pronunciamiento from the Po"; signed not by Garibaldi and his semi-regular Redshirts but far more alarmingly the Duke of Gaeta and nearly 2/3rds of his staff: representing two out of every Italian soliders in the region. Borrowing heavily from the language used in similar manifestos by the opposition generals from the Progressive edge of tolerable politics in Isabella''s Spain, the statement suggested that "Having failed to act on the clearly proclaimed National Will of the Italians from which its power derives, the current government has lost the trust of the Army who I find myself compelled to fufill that mandate in their stead." As the highest ranking officer on the front line General Cialdini was duely informing them of his intentions to order an advance to Mantua and was publically calling on the Crown for either approval or, failing that, explicent instructions otherwise.

    While dramatized heavily in the press coverage and generating no shortage of popular buzz, a careful reading of the document strongly hinted towards it's actual purpose. Well aware of their monarch's desire to declare war and Garibaldi''s agitations amongest the rank and file to launch one of his infamous unauthorized Expeditions, the firmly Royalist Cialdini staff were deeply worried that such a move would not only undermine the authority of the monarchy but lead to the different parts of the army attacking peicemeal to disasterious results. The publishing of the Pronunciamiento was meant an act of political theater to compel Marmora into finally appointing a commander and timetable to the main Italian army or, failing that, provide King Emmanual a face-saving measure to dismiss of declare war over the head of the national hero "under duress" without envoking a popular backlash. As an added bonus for the Duke he could also sweep the rug out from under his bitter rival; coopting one of the Republican policy pillars for himself and the Savoyards.

    The King had of course been told of the nature of the charade well beforehand and well prepared to express its "shock" at the implications of the manefesto while still declaring him in sympathy with the jingoistic sentiments being expressed in the salons and plazas of Turin, Florence, and Milan. Having already been in search of any excuse to force information out of the secrative, jealious Mamora and get a compliant government for his international ambitions continued that public address to say this was a clear call to action from his subjects, and after a long poetic speech from the balcony (publized and mythologized as improvised on the spot, though records declassified in later years would reveal he'd merely memorized it off a sheet prepared for him beforehand) issued his own proclaimation authorizing the march and declaring war on Vienna.

    Take heart, Italians, for the day of retribution has come! Our enemies, in declaring the soil of your countrymen as forgien to us, seek to bring us to despair. But shall they? No! A thousand times no! The revolution of your fathers and brothers is as alive as before, it's nessecity the same. Will you finish the work they began and strike this blow for it's final triumph? Yes! A thousand times yes! Today, I open this campaign for the people, for the nation that shall never die,for the seizing of the rotten cord that will draw back the curtains and bring the light of a ancient halls of that great preserver of elected government. Let this be a crusade for liberty! Vox Polpuli Vox Deu, Deus Vult!

    Nobody had seen fit to inform the cabinet, though, so like the rest of the population took the claims of intention to mutiny on their face. The hystaria only magnified by emergency reports of the G.o.N.S's actions in Hanover,the Prime Minister was adamant about nipping this potential power grab in the bud before the rumors of instability spread: potentially triggering a revival of violence in the South or Papal action while the army was busy fighting both itself and the Austrians. So, beforing answering the summons to attend that day's session of the Chamber of Deputies in order to provide the Government's official response to the pronouncement, he took the proative step many would later site as the primary reason behind the absolute disaster that was the Venetian Front.

    Using only the most venimous language, Mamora denounced the "Ceasers" of nothing short of high treason by denying the legitimate authority of the duely elected government. Clearly, spending so much time employing marshal law in the south and among the former Dictator Garibaldi had given Cialdini deusions of grandeur and accused him of trying to take the army into Venice without Royal approval so he could establish his own petty despotic estate. Italy was a unified,modern nation and would have to be secured as such... which was why he was discharging the Duke and had already issued warrants for the arrest of all the signatures of the Pronunciamiento from the Po via telegram to all the regional authorities and loyal officers of the man he'd just sent out an appointment of unified command for all forces on the Venetian Front, Raffaele Cadorna, with instructions to attack the Austrian Quadrilatero forts before they could be renforced; intending to avoid the financial problem of a long war by making adopting the Clausewitzian mindset. Convinced that the superior "national army" would triumph over the "mercenary army" (to use Machiavelli's terms that would later be employed into the definitive Clausewitzian-Moltkeian text A Mirror For Large Unit Commanders ), he had full confidence that the war would be short, confined to a narrow front and the Austrians could be driven to the table by a single blow if delivered sharply and swiftly enough...
     
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    The Day Peace Died (Part B)
  • The Baltic Front

    Let the world know that today we invoke the natural rights of the Nordbo, as acknowledged by Christian in his entreat to the Estates in ancient days: that he had been made Duke of Slesvig not by God but by the good-will of the electors, and that his decendents by succeed him only in the virtue of a similar election. And that we, forever free to thus choose our Princes, do withhold the crown from the Tyrant Augustenburg and place it in the hands of the people.

    -The Slesvig Declaration of Independence

    It wasen't only the Austrian side who would pay for the ambitions of Pan-Germanism, however. On the opposite side of the continent the figure at the center of so mahy of the recent controversies was facing an eerily similar challenge to his territorial claims from a declaration delivered from a rival, peninsula based ethno-nationalist movement. Despite his isolation from Confederation support, Duke Fredrick had (partially as a result of Prussian encouragement) only only doubled-down on his efforts to merge the governments of the Eider Duchies. This was being done under the belief that, by integrating Schleswig while the suspension was in effect, he could circumvent the need for Austrian approval entirely by erasing any legal distinction between it and Holstien (who's permanent exclusion from the Diet would be unthinkable). So, despite the fact it was being actively boycotted by half his nobility, his "Authorized Constitutional Convention" continued uninterrupted in Kiel. Still rhetorically dedicated to drafting a modern, liberal Constitution that would provide equal rights to all men, they 'dealt' with the troublesome question of their rival in Kolding by adopting an unspoken policy of pretending it diden't exist; the legal language they used implying they were representing an already-singular state.

    The position of the attendees; though Germans to the man, was a very apathetic one both with reguards to their monarch and his task for them. As the primary beneficiaries of the semi-feudal order that had flourished in the province as a result of its extended neglect by Copenhagen they were very cool towards the prospect of granting power to either the Duke or the population at large which could only come at their expense. Like most low-tier or old elites throughout the ages, they held class in much higher reguard than country: sharing a closer ideological and actual kinship with the Danish families they'd been co-ruling and intermarrying with for half a millennium than some peasent who happened to speak the same mother tounge. In terms of the substance of their arguements, most saw little wrong with the Slesvigers' attempts to defend their autonomy and would have preferred a document that did just as little to undermine the privilege of the Estates themselves. Debate over two potential drafts: one very similar to the Slesvig Constution minus the assertion of duel status for the Duchies and special endorsement for Danish, the other creating a far more powerful Ducial office in the vein of the Luxembourgers endorsed by vocal minority of Schleswig Loyalists and a handful of new nobility whod made their fortunes from bussiness with the Hanseatic Cities and Prussia, was kept vibrant however so long as Fredrick remained silent on weather he'd accept the majority opinion.

    Unfortunately for the former party, the imminant threat of forgein intervention in the region in response to the G.o.N.S coup, S.C.A's call for mediation on it's independent-minded proposition, and approaching vote in the Confederation Diet to divest it's members of the right to gain or surrender territory lead him to take a decisive move in favor of autocracy. With challenges to his authority on every side, the Duke made a series of public demonstration of his refusal to yeild to any of them: firmly rejecting an invitation from the British and Russian ambassadors to endorse the proposed Conference, promulgating an executive action stating that Holstein was not bound by acts of the Confederation passed during her absence, ànd most ominiously took the final step of declaring Slesvig in a "State of avowed hosility and treason to her Sovergein, under the authors of the document preaching virtual secession, and that all our friends forgein and domestic are hereby called to deliver justice upon them." Such an open statement, with the "authors" being on the opposite side of the Danish border, carried with it the very real risk of monarchal huberious dragging the nation into war. Unlike their counterparts in Hannover though the Estates found themselves without the means to resist royal policy or it's demands on near-dictitorial powers: the technical legal authority, sympathy of the population and military might ofothe realm virtually entirely in the hands of the Crown and it's Prussians patrons. Their new reality, the Estates were obliged to recognize by delivering the pro-executive version of the draft Constiution to the palace, would be that of an "automatic signing machine" to provide the trappings of legitimacy to the actions of Royal apointees.

    The response in Kolding would be anything but that meek surrender. Word of the extremity of the Ducial reaction threw the patriotic crowds into what the British council sent to discuss the details of the Slesvig nobility's offer of mediation artfully described as a ber-serkr rage. "Virtually overnight," he wrote in his debreifing of the mission "The sentiment of the mob, which until than had spared more thought to the romantic notion of storming the beaches than the details of statecraft, had turned the table talk of a handful of landowners into a defient cry of Nordic freedom. These were not an Assembly of Notables, demanding their corperate privlages from a Christian King, but the free landholders of the sagas forming an Althing". The Assembly in turn, had every reason the embrace the reputation; quietly slipping bribes alongside letters to the publishers of the papers to present the impression theyd always had near-republican intents, citing the recent moves towards representative reform in Sweden and Denmark as proof that Pan-Scandinavianism was truely a "bottom up" nationalism and contrasting it with the continued resistance and shallow roots among the "top down" intelligencia-based Italianism and "middle out" bougious German nationalism. No sooner had they next convened,in fact, that they prounounced they were stripping the explicent offer of the throne to the Augustenburgs: instead suggesting a popular plebiscite on the nature of the executive branch if independence was approved of by the international community.

    Taking this intransigent stance; though less out of choice than being forced into it by Frederick's outlawing, played surprisingly well with virtually everyone. The British were greatful to have an easily justifiable reason to support their sympathetic and strategic interests in the region and vindicate their proposed Conference. France saw her diplomatic reach validated by her plebecite finally coming into being, as well as gaining a cause on which she support London in her grand game of fishing for colonial influence without actually harming their interests. The Swedes and Danes of course supported their brother-peoples and anything that would hinder German naval developments in the Baltic that could threaten their policy independence, and even most of the German states: still hoping to avoid a wider war and popularly perceiving Schleswig as only arguably German, hoped the ultimatium would get Kiel to back down and save the region a major bloodletting. The one power who disagreed however, was also the only one who immediately mattered: King Whilhelm answering his prospective Minister's call and declaring "police action" against Slesving. Without an army on the mainland to oppose them,the Assembly could only watch the violent crackdown by Prussian troops on the civilian population, though photographs and reports would quickly find their way to the major European cities...
     
    The Day Peace Died (Part C)
  • The Main Front

    Just as, with a firm place to stand and a long enough lever Archemedies could have shifted the whole Earth, the commander of a lesser force might deflect even great strength simply used if they make wise use of the proper tools.
    -Exert from The Pattern of Modern War in the 19th Century, referencing the role of the preparatory field works in the famous Battle of Laufach

    As the Prussians and Holsteiners sought to establish their answer to the Schleswig-Slesvig debate as the final, correct one through force of arms, their southern rivals continued their pursuit of a competing, legalistic path to victory as the June 30th session of the Bundestag convened. The quiet conviction of the city had darkened quite considerably since the 15th as the shadow of Prussians colums streched over them, most notable by the procurement agents moving with their wagons through the streets wearing the uniforms of either the 8th Federal Corps or the Royal Bavarian Army. The former having based itself just outside the city and the later further down the Main at Schweinfurt, they had over the past couple of weeks consolidated their positions along the river in response to the Prussian movements in the Rhineland to serve as a protective line for both the states along the river who provided the manpower and supplies for the combined Federal units and avoid having the take the embarrassing step of removing the Diet from it's seat at Frankfurt. In addition to the need to show conviction in the face of northern attempts at intimidation to keep the petty Duchies from jumping ship, the Southern German states had insisted on the move as the price for their continued support of the Gablenz Conspiracy''s goals; fearing that leaving the west open to concentrate in Saxony and Thrungia (as the Austrian army had initially proposed) would mean leaving their homelands open to invasion.

    This case of military-political horsetrading perfect encapsulated the way the past two weeks and increasing acceptance of the possability of war by the deligates had altered the relationship between the members of the Confederation. While the conflict had been purely political, and the gains of united action gotten without risk and at mainly Prussians expense, taking dramatic actions had been simple enough and faced no real resistance from their capitals. Now that their bluff was on the verge of being called the parochial interests of their counteries had begun to rear their ugly head: demands coming from their governments to refuse any measures that would leave them open to occupation and pillage. Already this had resulted in the Hanseatic Cities and Mecklenburg Duchies; hopelessly surrounded and dependent on their connections to Prussia and Holstein for their security and prosperity, explicently instructing their deligates to similarly "suspend" their participation in the Frankfurt Diet. Instead, they were reassigned to attend a similar assembly the Prussians had invited them to at Lauenburg: nominally to further discuss and draft a comprehensive new governing document for the Confederation on the grounds of her previously-proposed reforms, alongside pro-Prussian minors. With news of the coup in Hannover demonstrating the risks to a monarch who defied Prussia without attiqute security combined with the fact the Landtags of the Electorate of Hesse and Saxe-Coburg had voted to petition their monarchs to declare neutrality and keep observers at both diets this necessitated the spreading out of Confederation resources across the whole border despite the strategic consquences.

    Obliged to keep a reactionary stance rather than being able to advance and exploit the division of the Prussians forces, Ludwig Gablenz (Who, being the highest ranking officer present had been voted into high command of the improvised "Army of the West") still nursed a vain hope that his brother could convince the Prussians to back down if the Confederation forces could prevent them from making any major gains before the Three Power Congress could convene. As such he'd wasted no time in making his position as defensable as he could; requesting as much artillery and munitions to be shipped up from the Main Duchies as could spare, triggering rockslides to block the smoothest paths through the Hohe-Rhon Mountains, and building a series of pallasades in the pass of Laufach which resembled more than anything else the improvised, ramshackled design of barracades of the assorted revolutions in Paris. When coordinated with the efforts of Prince Karl's Bavarians, who had been set to blowing the bridges across the Saale and preparing a stock of pontoon replacements, The Baron hoped to draw the Prussians in the North into a "Hammer and Anvil": while the Prussians were caught in a battle either trying to ford the river or break the barricades sending the other force to hit them in the rear while the mountains and Main cut off any good route of retreat.

    It was in this climate that the Bundestag came together to discuss the issue of the day. While initially this had been the "Motion of Federal Indivisability", the legislative plans were just as much disrupted as the military ones by the success of Operation Cambridge and the resulting disposition of King George V. As the assemblymen were representatives of their monarch, the question of the legitimacy of the turnover of power to the Duke of Brunswick: who's representative had in private revealed to his personal friends the breif "Hanover Porfolio" telegramed from Braunschweig commanding him to vote against any anti-Prussian measure, was the difference between getting a unanimous vote to treat suspension of the Confederation as de-facto withdrawal or not. As getting such a showing would be a major diplomatic card to play in extracting concessions from Prussia as a price for readmission and could serve to gurantee Hannoverian neutrality, the other voting members had been pushing hard to get a majority of the minor states to sign on to get their "collective votes" to the affirmative... only just having succeeded when the transfer of Hannover's voting authority had taken place.

    Before anything else, the Diet raised a motion as to weather or not they recognized William Brunswick-Brevren as the legitimate King of Hanover... through the carefully selected language of "weather or not an elected Legislature,who draws it's power from a granted Constiution, has the right to dispose of the divine mandate of the monarchy from which that Constiution gains it's legitimacy". This vote, which was voted on unanimously to the negative, cleverly carried within it a statement to placate the concerns of the threatened statelets's nobility: that the Confederation was legally binding itself not to recognize any other government that might be imposed on or try to take power in the war that they didn't unambiguously and peacefully surrendered authority to. Emboldened by this pledge and with the Hannover vote still still secure in the hands of the old envoy the backlog of motions were quickly pushed through with zero offical votes in opposition: resurrecting the Schleswig integration bill Holstein had left abandoned on the table to strike it down, declaring self-suspension to be senonimous with withdrawal, establishing the Confederate commercial depot and Custom's Union office in Venice, and officially agreeing to the former French, British, and Russian calls for mediation "With the precondition the territorial integrity of the Confederation shall not be infinged upon".

    Finally, and most fatefully, the Diet voted to reitterate an obvious,but very important point: that any forgein violation of the territory of any member state was the equivalent of a declaration of war on all of them. This would prove critical as, barely an hour after the vote, messangers from the borders of the Frankfurt territory burst into the Thurn and Taxis Palace to inform them the cavalry pickets had spotted the marching colums of von Goeben's division approaching...
     
    Chapter VII: The Day Peace Died (Part D)
  • It is even better to act quickly and err than to hesitate until the time of action is past.
    -von Clauswitz

    The Silesian-Bohemian Front

    Though seemingly getting the jump on the Confederates at every turn, there was one front on which the Prussians utterly failed to seize the iniative. Much to Moltke's dismay however that region along the borders of Saxony was precisely where he'd spent so much time and effort preparing to deliver his decisive blow, only to watch helplessly as the sands of numerical superiority slipped more and more downward on the map with every day the war was delayed. Operating on the timetable set up to support the "intervention" in Holstein, the Prussian forces in the region pp ,jus over a quarter of a million strong, had successfully met their predicted date of full mobalization and regional concentration by June 2nd by their novel use of rail transit to deliver units to the heads at Breslau and Senftenberg. Based on that schedule, he'd requested authorization for an invasion date into Saxony and Austrian Silesia as early as June 5th to capture Dresden and smash the Austrian North Army into route while it was still unprepared. Denied the capacity to defend Vienna and needing to rescue what it was publically known they perceived as the custodian of the current centeralizing policies, the Habsburgs would have no choice but to throw themselves to his mercies and accept whatever settlement in the rest of the Germanies his monarch wished.

    Like virtually everyone involved in the events leading up to the war the Marshal found his plans disrupted by the political chaos Mr. Cohen-Blind's gesture had left in it's wake. His request had arrived in the capital only hours too late for the Minister-President had been alive to approve it, and since then efforts to get Wilhelm to sign off on the offensive had been frustrated by the King's vigerious resistance to any action until the diplomatic and domestic situations could be handled. While accepted by the rest of the Privy Council as a nessicery evil, three and a half weeks' delay had left Moltke holding the bag as the various advantages he'd been counting on melted away one by one in the face of steady organization and reinforcement taking place under his counterpart Feldmarschallleutnant von Benedek. A distguished veteren of Austria's mid-century Italian campaigns, Benedek knew his attention to detail and cautious nature, while making him highly effective at defensive and surpressive operations, was a temper poorly suited for the conventional mass offensive he determined was nessucery for victory. This, at least in the first half of the month, had been a self-fufilling prophesy as his tardiness in arriving at and establishing his HQ and supply base around Olmuetz was matched only by the slow speed of his troop massing as reserves from the depths of the Empire were obliged to either make the traditional "long march" or arrive in small batches on the handful of rails that ran into Moravia. While this position allowed him to pose a threat to Silesia: an objective the Emperor insisted he prioritize in hopes of being able to regain the lost, industrially rich province in the peace, left flank and route of communication back to Bohemia proper covered only by Saxony: a Kingdom who's entire army Moltke outnumbered 10:1.

    Given these facts, it was almost a forgone conclusion (demonstrated in endless wargames over the following decades) that a Prussian campaign launched on schedule would have easily crushed or driven the Saxons into their fortifications, captured Prague and the Upper Eidar basin, and formed a pincer around Benedek's half-mobalized force in tandem with Leonhard Blumenhaul's II Army defending Silesia. With the over half-month repraive however his dithering ended up a source of strength rather than vulnerability: allowing him to write a strong report vindicating himself to the Emperor against the constant urgings of his aide-de-camp to attack. Not only had he been able to bring his divisions up to full strength: now boasting nearly 300,000 men with a substantial compliment of artillery and shells but in the interium the eastern half of the Bavarian army had arrived to bolster the Saxons. With the new flank guard of 50,000 men outnumbering the Prussian Army of the Elbe (46,000) and so able to comfortably pin them down stratrgically, Benedeck could finally feel secure enough to consider his route of attack without risking an attack from converging forces. Here, he had a choice of two options: either he could break off the majority of his command while leaving a holding force in Moravia to advance into Saxony and face down the combined Elbe and Prussian I Army (Which would protect the lands and secure the good will of his Confederation allies and flip the script on the Prussians by threatening Brandenburg) or send just enough forces north to Theresienstadt to, alongside the Saxons and Bavarians, hold the Sudete passes while the main body occupied Silesia and destroyed the II Army.

    Making a minor concession to his government's call for movement while not committing himself to either approach, the Feldmarschalll sent a detachment of 80,000 under the Count of Clam-Gallas to join forces with Prince Albert of Saxony and Von Hartmann of Bavaria with the simple orders to "Oppose the Prussians,and make sure they reach no further than Theresienstad". The remaining 200,000: remaining massed and ready to march at short notice if direction from Vienna or reports of enemy intrusion presented themselves, was similarly set to dissuade Prussia's eastern forces from action. This defensive, mutually protective posturing was enough to drive Moltke mad ashis wish to be able to control the relative positions of the front through aggressive movements twisted into that of a chess stalemate: obligated to take action but every viable option checked by the risk of counterattack. The one route that was likely to produce the crushing blow he needed to insure victory whatever the results on the other fronts: a "Canne of Convergence" where he could bring all three Prussians armies to bare simutantiously, was frustrated by demands of domestic politics.King Whilhelm and Crown Prince Fredrick ; well aware of Austrian ambitions, the agitated state of the Poles created by the Liberals,and Russian desires to avoid direct friction, had declared it a nessecity that Silesia be protected, which due to the impracticality of creating a new command and control structure on such short notice meant the II Army was stuck in its origional position.

    This left him, even if he left nothing behind to invest forts or hedge against activity from Thrungia/the Saxe Duchies, with only numerical parity for an advance on the salient that was Saxony... assuming the Confederation forces even moved forward to contest it. If he couldn't eliminate the enemy from the field there, and with the rails from the north stopping just south of Dresden, then further advance would be next to impossible as there'd be no way to get around a head-on attack against strong positions in the Passes; battles his men would either lose or emerge from with only phyric victories.

    "To face such a tortuse: to slow to affect real damage upon you but immune to being rendered helpless so long as he is tucked in his shell, requires patience that can only come from incompetence" Moltke would later reflect on the experience in Mirrors. "It is the bane of true military genius, against which his courage, speed, and secrecy can do nothing. To make him weak, than, one must compel him to stick out his neck". This insight; a primary feature of Northern German military culture, lead to the infamious tactic that would trigger the direct war between Austria and Prussia. Upon receiving the paper on June 30th reporting the Italian Declaration of War: trigger as he knew the secret alliance treaty, Prince Friedrich Charles was contacted by Moltke with an order (countersigned by his former tutor Von Roon to give the move the stamp of Berlin's approval) to launch his troops in a wide Arc across the eastern Saxon border while their army was gathering in Bohemia. As the first true movement on to forgein soil during the war, it would set a disturbing precident for brutality for the other theatures: echoing the rampages of the armies of the 30 Years War as the Prussians were actively instructed to requisition as much as possible, crack down brutally on any sign of resistance or potential hositility (in some cases going as far as simply showing disrespect), and "live off the land". Marching in defused colum and detaching cavalry "scavanging parties", the Prince forwarded an ultimatium from the Prussians Staff to Dresden.

    "Until our terms of Unconditional and Immediate surrender are accepted, we shall not relent"...
     
    Chapter VII: Italia Irredimibile (Part A)
  • 161369.JPG.resize.710x399.jpg


    Deus, Legione Redde!

    -Final Words, Giuseppe Garibaldi (Disputed)
    Hearts and Minds: Initial Positions and Tactics of the Venetia Front

    Any analysis of Italian preformance in The Ten Weeks War can not help but focus on its improvised nature. Unlike the mobile flexibility and close command from headquarters practiced by the Prussian armies, or the careful exploitation of the advantages of interior lines and the extended window for preparation by the Habsburgs staff, Italy began the conflict with virtually all her pre-war plans and harmony in command thrown into chaos by the purging of the signatures of the Pronunciamiento. Left with only a rump, top-light officer corps and general orders from their new supreme commander (Who himself was out of communication while en-route to the headquarters with the larger Mincio Army),the forces on the Porch found coordination between her lower-echelon units breaking down as they rushed to fufill their orders to assult the Austrians. The Duke of Gaeta; the one man who might have been able to maintain some semblence of order in these critical early days if he'd resisted his discharge, chose instead to step aside and rush to organize a legal defence to salvage his career and liberties. Within a day of losing his commands, he was rushing south on a train to Rome... exactly the opposite direction of the brace and foolish men making the first crossings into Habsburg territory. Lacking any other locus of command
    , the lesser officers found themselves gravitating towards the most illustrious and experienced (in high command at least) figure in the area; Giuseppe Garibaldi.

    Despite holding no official commission, the hero of Italy nevertheless took on a great deal of
    de facto authority as a result of his personal charisma and the inspiring appeal of his "calls to action". Riding from camp to camp, carrying the words of the King's speech with him, Garibaldi would whip the men into a patriotic fervor in a manner many forgein observers in the army took to comparing to the Revivalist religious meetings they'd heard so much about in their previous postings in the War Between the States. The parallels of these addresses to fundimentalist preaching: vague promises of a glorious future, entreatments to depend on purity of faith in the cause, denouncement of the opposition as fundimentally and irrdeemably evil, and a lack of substantive specific suggestions did not go unnoticed by the army chaplains: who already under pressure from the papacy to try to moderate secular nationalism took to issuing counter-sermons once the general passed on. Rapid exposure to the counter narratives only served to agitate the deep ideological divisons between units: those made up of men from the south or rural regions who still placed a high value on piety resenting the intruder's hamfisted attempts to usurp authority. Heaped on top of a system who's integration between parts was already in shambles, this inconsistent aknowledgement of Garibaldi's direction is cited as one of the primary reasons for the Italians inability to react to turning fortunes in the field: different elements of the army acting as they saw fit based on two entirely different approaches.

    By the end of the first week, this campaingn left Italy with essentially three completely separate command structures at warplans. At over 130,000 men and headed by the state-appointed Supreme Commander Raffaele Cadorna, the Mincio Army was theoretically the most effective force. In pre-war plans it was to serve as the spearhead of the offensive by making a quick advance on Pischera; blowing up the route to the regional logistical base of Verona and obliging the Austrians to draw their forces away from the Po before launching the second wave from the south, and while the timing of the advance faced severe delays due to instructions to stand firm until Cadorna could arrive with new instructions they would end up sticking to the substance of the plan. The Army of the Po, in contrast, had actually begun to attritiate away before even taking actions due to dissertations in the wave of arrested officers and defections to the Garibaldi Legion leaving barely 60,000 dispersed along the main southern front. What commanders remained; highly sensitive to accusations of duplicity from the Royalists and cowardliness from the Nationalists, understandably showed no resistance to the new orders to advance with all haste on their war goals despite their weakened state: three of their divisions moving on Mantua and two on Rogina. Finally, Garibaldi's Legion, which was meant to serve as a "reserve" to occupy regions or to exploit gaps in the Austrian position, had assembled battalions from the offical army number around 10,000 to suppliment Legionaries twice their number in pursuit on an independent poliy. Eager for a fight, the volunteers sought to make a name for themselves in the campaign with a dramatic show of force to shake the Austrian moral. If the soldiers could be show the vulnerability of their oppressors, they reasoned, than surely the minority peasents would abandon the Germans and leave the route to Vienna a virtual victory parade: or so they had fooled themselves into believing. Following the direction of Garibaldi's tour, they eventually settled on the fortress of Borgoforte on the extreme left of the their front: not only symbolic as one of the last Austrian possessions south of the Po but, from that position, a potential point of indiction for communications between the armies and as a base for Austrian cavalry raids.

    Their principal adversary meanwhile; the Archduke Albrecht, watched with utter astonishment at this disreguard for the common military maximum of "Concentrate for Battle"; faced with a plethora of tempting targets for his field army. Trusting in the endurance of the western forts, however, he would march south from Veronia with the intent of relieving Mantua and then crossing into Italian territory. While the other armies were pinned against the troops manning the fortress lines, he could exploit this centeral rupture (a classical Napoleonic coup de main) to swing around into the rear of either Garbibaldi's or the Eastern Po forces. If further offensives were nessicery to drive Italy to surrender, he could easily pivot into the second one and leave the Micino force not only alone but with a hostile army between them and the resentful south. He would,by July 5th, have 80,000 men moving forward; being careful to lay down lines of communication to keep them in direct contact with the Headquarters so the force could receive instructions based on the latest reconissance or information from other fronts in case they would need shoring up
     
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    Chapter VII: Italia Irredimibile (Part B)
  • The Battle of Mantua


    Background and Bombardment

    During the previous Savoyard-Habsburg conflicts, the southern sections of the Quadrilatero had been considered of mere peripheral importance in both side's military doctrine. With the main fields of contention being Lombardy and Piedmont the crossings at Pischera; not only much narrower and closer to the battlefields but able to use Lake Garda as a route of supply and defensive anchor for forces, were understood to be the key to Austrian ability to project power into the region. Following the annexation of Tuscany and the Trans-Po in 1860, however, Mantua suddenly became the center of gravity with the expansion of the borders to the entire Venetian perimeter. Its position astride the Mincio and a mere 13 kilometers north of the Po the fortress-complex not only gave the owner control over the vital river traffic, but guarded the quickest routes to the Adige and Apennine Gap: absolutely vital lifelines between the theater and old heartlands. It was in recognition of that fact that Mamora had insisted on making the fortress the ordered target for the southern offensive: confident that it's lose alongside a (presumed) successful push in the North would cause Austria to realize her position in Venetia was untenable and so leave it to her rightful owner.

    Cialdini's preparations for the campaign had them set up to pursue a completely different course. Taking a fundimentally different view than his rival, who's extended time in the Lombard plains and Crimea lead him to see a map as a series of fortresses, roads, and armies, the Duke's experience fighting Carlist and Sicilian insurgents meant he focused much more closely on topography. Despite how beneficial seizing the city maybe to Italy's broader strategic position, a closer look revealed that any sizable force wanting to directly attack from the south could only ford the Po with great effort at the shallows around the willow swamps. This would leave no quick route of retreat if the assult was repelled, potentially allowing the Austrian field army to catch them trapped and isolated. To avoid this fate Cialidini had arrayed his guns and men to focus on an invasion where he could take control of crossings a safe distance from the Austrian army and, while the Army of the Mincio obliged them to remain in the West, cut around the main forts entirely and take the Verona-Vencia highway. As any potential releif forces would be tied down fighting Prussia, the Austrians would be be obliged to either fight out in the open or wither on the vines behind their defences... either way, making sure the Austrians could be neutralized on both fronts and insuring both partners got what they wanted.

    This contradiction between their pre-war breifings and schedules and direct Ministerial and General Staff orders ultimately lead to the split actions by the Army of the Po. Heading the last minute organization of the move on Mantua was Nino Bixio who, due to his close proffesional history with the Redshirts, had been one of the few higher ranking officers kept out of the Pronunciamiento. In addition to a normal, ingrained obedience to the chain of command General Bixio moved quickly to keep the campaign to the west partially out of a worry for the fate of his former commander's assult on Borgoforte. The march, which began on July 3rd, just as rapidly found itself falling into shambles as the flaws in its improvised nature showed themselves. With Garibaldi's barn-burning sweep having carried off what carts and wagons had been assigned to the front, much of the baggage had to be carried by the men who would often abandon excess weight on the roadside; one of the most frequent cases being the ammunition chests for the artillery. While it had been easy enough to transport the rations that were stockpiled at their garrisons for food , a want of casks and extra canteens meant water had to be collected on-march from the river. This not only lead to a breakdown in marching order as foraging parties were constantly breaking off, but meant what the men were drinking was from stagnent marshes exposed to the warm summer suns: thick with sediment and disease-causing bacteria that frequently brought down men with digestive distress. This would only compound the transport problem as time went on: baggage needing to be unloaded onto still-fit men in order to carry the indisposed, which would prove to be a major problem when they finally had to cross the river as overloaded wagons and horses sunk into the muck, obliging them to abandon yet more of their equipment as it was damaged behyond repair.

    By the time Italians got their first sight of the Austrian defenders they were already something of a ragged and sorry sight, marching in loose unorganized colums with frequent stragglers. With nearly a fifth of the men rendered ineffective from dysentery and many of the dragoon mounts reassigned to the baggage train, reconissance efforts were completely inattiquette with the teams frequently falling victim to cavalry patrols. From the spotty reports, they could only make a rough estimate of 3-5 thousand men spread between the garrisons of Mantua proper and it's fortified northern and eastern suburbs. The redoubts guarding the town from any fancy manuvers involving crossing the river outside gun range and setting up batteries on the high ground and the walls too high to immediately storm, the Italians moved into the suburb of Cerese and happily billeted themselves in the civilian homes while setting up their guns for a bombardment of the outer works: waiting for late morning on the next day (The 7th) so the sun wouldent be directly in their face as they found their range.

    Ritter von Hartung, the Austrian commander, found these early bombardments relatively ineffectual. Having lost a greater share of their higher caliber guns to the crossing and forced to aim upwards from their position in the half-flooded flatlands,few of the shots both made contact and had the strength to seriously impact the stonework and harm his men, while misses rather than bouncing simply plunged harmlessly into the mud. Contrasting this his counter-fire was being directed at a known distance from fixed positions, producing heavy casulties among crews who's only entrenchments were hastily dug earthen bulwarks. Reports from the headquarters note that Hartung's primary worry, after properly contuering the enemy position and finding only a fraction of the suspected forces were present, was that the shockwaves of the hits might lead to dishes falling from shelves in the mess. This didn't mean he was entirely inactive though: as the planned springboard for operations into Italy, the city had received several coded telegraphs from the Field Army updating them on the progress of the march and informed them in kind of the Italian point force. To keep them pinned in position until the Archduke arrived, Hartung made every effort to appear to be taking the attack seriously and disuade any retreat. Skirmisher companies were dispatched to the bridge east of the village of Pictole to harass any Italian observers and camp pickets,while the guns of the Cittadella and San Giorgio were transferred to the near side of the river and sighted to the fields just behind the surburbs: preparing withering vollies to break up attempts at organized retreat.

    Then, at 3pm, the yellow and black banners appeared over the hills...
     
    Chapter VII: Italia Irredimibile (Part C)
  • The Battle of Mantua

    Engagement and Aftermath

    The site the Italians had chosen for the siege camp was, from a tactical standpoint, well suited for repelling an attack from the Austrians. The wide bend in the Mincio; with what few major crossings their were funneled through the urban center of Mantua proper, served as a natural bottleneck which drastically shrunk the depth and breath of the potential battlefield and so neutralized the Austrians ability to exploit their superior numbers for either an encircling maneuver or line-shattering charge. The suburb itself had no shortage of buildings that could serve as hardpoints and cover in the event of a small arms duel, while its position in a low valley with the fortress-city imposed between them and the heights to the north and east of town would frustrate any attempts to reduce them with artillery. Even the regional population served as an asset; the peasantry in the surrounding villages, having a proud tradition of passively resistance to Austrian authority, being more than willing to provide material for additional field-works and beds for their sick countrymen. There simply wasn't a better position on this side of the Po where they'd stand a better chance of fighting a successful battle: a fact the command staff, meeting in Cerese's church, quickly recognized as they weighed their options for what to do next. No matter how good of a place to take a stand, however, there were those who suggested using the delay created by the Austrian need to get their men across the river in fighting order to stage a quick withdrawal while they could still avoid it being contested. Such a plan would require abandoning a solid chunk of the heavier artillery and the illness casulties dispersed into civilian care, if they were to move out fast enough to reach the marsh ford before the Austrians could head them off, but this could be seen as a nessicery sacrifice if it saved the Po Army from destruction.

    General Bixio ultimately rejected this proposal, choosing instead to use the precious few hours to prepare a loose network of dikes and shallow trenches to close off the outer streets and allyways of the town and provide cover for troops needing to reload. In later debreifings defending the iniative he asserted that they'd simply been operating under the official campaign plan, where the Northern army ought to already be storming past Pischera without any major Austrian field army to blunt their advance. In those conditions, it was obvious they'd only need to hold their ground for a day or two before the Archduke would turn around to find his nation's position in Western Venetia hopelessly compromised and HE'D be the one forced to retreat in poor order and run a losing race to avoid getting surrounded. Wether or not this was his actual motivation or a wise decision, the man ordered his men to disperse into loose formations in the rooftops, windows, and secured alleys of the eastern outskirts of town and the gaps between the northern batteries. While this meant his officers were spread relatively thin, the simplicity of the approach made him believe this wouldn't be a real weakness: they were to hold every building as long as feesable so long as it wasn't struck by heavy artillery, turning to fire into the interior streets if a barracade was overrun and the Habsburgs tried to break in.

    What this sacrificed was any possability of harassing the Austrian deployment, and Hartung wasted no time in informing his superior of this golden opportunity. Having marched only a few days along good roads and country, the Austrian soldiers were much fresher and in better spirits than their Italian counterparts and so could conduct a hasty advance if ordered. The field guns were hauled ahead of the main troop body; screened by the cavalry and skirmishers who'd driven away any threat from the Pictole Bridge, to set up a line against the fortifying infantry. This was followed up by the cavalry, who rode out of shot range and towards the southward facing roads. While Albrecht's men took up their position, the city garrison kept up a steady, low intensity bombardment that, while dealing only negligible damage, kept the civilian work teams too skittish to approach the already deployed guns and so keeping them locked in engaging the fortress rather than being redirected to counter the new threat.

    By around 6, the Italian morale was already slipping as the colums of camp smoke rising from the south and the scarcity of orders and absence of organized allies around them made it clear the window for a general retreat had closed. It was at that time that the Southern Army began it's assult: beginning with a coordinated, high density, ten minute barrage now that thered been oppritunities to get all the guns layed. The small squads: isolated and only able to hear the crashing and snapping of iron smashing into wood and stone and the muffled screams of comrades falling beneath the rubble, were absolutely terrified and many of fresher recruits firing off into the smoke and dust. Those that managed to keep their nerve found they still had suitable cover by the time the hellish rain ended, croaching behind their new hiding places to prepare for the inevitable Austrian assult. This would come soon after as the field commanders, following classical military doctrine, conducted a main line advance against what they assumed would be an exposed position. If the Po forces had been able to close ranks and conduct a proper rotating volley,this could have been a disaster, but faced with relative stroms of fire from the larger Austrian formations the isolated pockets of Italians quickly broke under the pressure.

    The cascading collapse of the thin outer shell of the invader's position; each building or strech of road lost opening up it's neighbor to unexpected flanking fire, lead to rapidly mounting casulty and prisoner counts; the later often throwing themselves on a common Catholic piety to beg for merciful captivity rather than death. This only lead to further breakdown in command as routs and surrenders lead to more and more of those formations brace or foolhardy enough to hold their strong points as ordered fell behind Austrian lines to be engulfed by steadily arriving renforcements. The artillery and men facing Mantua, though wanting to aid their brothers, were held by the threat of Hartung's garrison who menaced them from the slope above; the commander having assembled his crack infantry into an assult formation and making a very loud show of demonstrating they were ready to be committed if the siege line tried to redeploy. Those men who didn't willingly yeild,by most accounts, did fight as bravely and compitently as any other nation's regulars (despite the infamious reputation commonly associated with them), but quickly lost their ability to resist either to enemy bullets or a shortage of their own.

    Those who had shed ammunition on the hard march, suffice to say, must have regretted their decision.

    The big breathrough came as night fell over the wreckage of dissident suburb, most of the small units who still had an opening falling victim to the temptation and using the cover of darkness to sneak away from the main battfield through the rubble. The latest wave of Austrian troops arriving from across the Mincio: stepping in to replace their tired comrades who'd been fighting earlier in the evening, finally pushed through the last organized resistance of the north-eastern corner of the suburbs thus splitting off the reserves in the town center from the artillery lines. Bixio, facing the threat of his front losing coherence and the enemy fortress guns being freed up to bombard their fallback position around the field command before he could salvage some kind of evacuation from there,ordered his veteren guard forces forward to try to plug the gap. With only a small stockpile of munitions this small body could only counter the march with a bayonet charge against the flank of the advance with the hope of breaking their moral. But it was already too late; the field artillery had been dispersed back into the smaller units and as the men concentrated into a dense block for the attack they faced a withering strike from a cannister shell, wounding so many that the remainder quickly broke against the dense Austrian rectangles. The noise of the clash drew in more of the enemy which quickly lead to the cream of the Savoyards being cut down as they were given no space in which to yield.

    While not able to respond with an official capitulation until the next mourning, the Battle effectively ended with the capture of the rear of the Italian gun line. In addition to the many bands of deserters who's fall into the hands of local farmers of Austrian cavalry patrols over the next couple of days and the formations who'd formally conceded in the field, Albrecht also found himself in possession of thousands of intestinally-troubled prisoners and just over 100 pieces of artillery. The greater half of the Army of the Poor had effectively been removed from the board with Bixio and his staff transfered to Verona for comfortable captivity. Most importantly for the Archduke, however, was the fact the path into Italy proper had been left wide open, giving him the tempting offers of striking at either the remaining Royal forces to his east or the radicals of the troublesome Republicans in their rears. Not wanting to make a foolish decision and needing time to process this POW's and restock on supplies, he decided to have his men make camp to the north, carefully considering which way he should go...
     
    Chapter VII: Italia Irredimibile (Part D)
  • The Battle of Rovigo


    Background


    Those forces who remained at the main regional encampment in Bologna,chosing to abide by the pre-war plans rather than the more recent orders, found their actions never the less dictated by the consequences of the wholesale pursuit of Mamora's western-focused strategy. This corps: headed by Giacomo Durando as the most senior of the remnants of Cialidini's staff, was made up largely of veteran formations seasoned by the conquest and suppression of the Papal and Neopolitan territories to the south and so arguably was the most gifted among the Italian armies in terms of human capital. A shortage of equipment, brought on by a combination of passivity and low official priority in the face of Nixio and Garibaldi passing through to gather up mobile transport and artillery for their offensives, placed some severe practical restrictions on how that quality could be exploited. Looking for an opportunity to compel the Austrians into a Napoleonic field engagement,, they'd concluded it would be much too difficult to break through the double ring of fortresses surrounding Verona. Unable to access the most logical target the Southern Army would be obliged to defend, Durando cautiously held his men back in a policy of "reconnaissance in force": sending his cavalry and small groups of raiders to gather information on the enemy presence from the locals and searching for any openings in their defenses. This discretion proved to be well-founded as after two weeks of probing it was clear the territories inside the Quadrilateral were beyond their reach. So long as the South Army remained close enough to retire onto the forts, any attempt to pursue them would not only be fruitless but leave their rear and line of retreat exposed to any forces that might arrive from the direction of Venice.

    Giacomo would have happily continued this approach; acting as a deterrent to Albrechet advancing too far from his protective base and ready to react to any unexpected reinforcements from Vienna, were it not for the arrival of news of the defeat and Mantua and the rebasing of the Archduke's mobile army there. This unexpected development, running counter to what Mamora had long argued in that the Mincio offensive would oblige the Austrian army to remain rooted around Verona, lead to a deep sense of unease among the men as they began to question the other assumptions they'd been making about how the war would unfold. Clearly there was no guarantee anybody had a clear picture of just what actions their counterparts on other sections of the front were taking at any given time, and now that the Austrians were poised to advance into the gap between them there was little hope of restablishing the nessicery communication to realign their action. Continuing to stand idle was no longer an option either, as if allowed to act without concern the enemy field army would destroy the Legion, wreck havoc in Tuscany, and would be free to wheel around and catch the northern force either pulling back from or engaged with Pischera without any route of retreat.

    To make this weighty decision, General Durando looked to documents his predicessor left behind to try to gleen some better-informed insight on the region. As it turned out, Cialidini's notes provided him just what he was looking for: a fully fleshed out plan for an invasion that would deal a critical blow to Habsburg control of Venetia without having to engage in a bloody slog with the main Austrian fortification. Having conducted a detailed topeographic survey of the winding streams that made up the southern parts of the province, he'd determined that while most of the lower Po was unsuited for large scale troop crossings (either due to it's breth or fortress cover) there was a strech of a few dozen kilometers just east of Castagnaro where if unopposed one could cross and get into the rear of the western defenses. From there, only a few small fortifications at Vincentia and Padua would stand between them and the main highways to and from Venice itself where co-operation from local partisans and the Italian navy could cut the entire region west of the Tyrol off from the rest of the Empire.

    To a man under extensive pressure to complete the campaign as soon as possible: the Italian war instructions making it very clear state finances couldn't afford either an extended mobalization or the costs of repairing the damage an Austrian army running amuck in her richest provinces should the army try to fight a defensive delaying campaign, this option seemed like Mana from heaven. His advisors, also well aware their reputations and careers were subject to accusations of treason or cowardness at the hands of a jingoistic public already suspicious of the Po Army, gave their assent to the plan on July 17th and turned their "reconissance in force" into a full on point offensive: making a limited advance with a few thousand light troops from a separate base in Ferrara to draw attention towards the Po Delta.

    Archduke Albrecht, in turn,had been writing up his own plans for further advance from the comfort of his forward Headquarters in the Castle of St. George. Though initially dreaming of a direct march to the southwest, a curtosy inspection of the huge percentage of his Italian prisoners who'd been struck by wetland diseses had quickly disuaded him. Naturally lose averse, he confidently predicted that the geography and reinforced defensive lines of the Quadrilatero would protect him from any moves by the Italian mobs massing on west banks. After all, THEY were clearly intimidated as despite all the shouting and bluster coming out of the Italian press and in propaganda leaflets had yet to make any agressive moves. Time could easily be spared to march his men to the easier and less misqueto-ridden crossing south of Rovigo and make his main thrust into the former Papal legations. With the Imperial Fleet facilitating supply and only a thin garrison covering that interior front, a small detachment could rally Papal Loyalist and advance rapidly down the Adriatic coast and so create the conditions where Napoleon III would compel the Italians to surrender to modest terms without having to risk a major battle: keeping the Southern Army intact to bolster their position in the German theater.

    This plane required support from the homefront, however, in order to time the shipments and diplomatic moves,meaning it had to be delayed until a response was received from Vienna. The Emperor and General Staff thankfully thought it strategically sound: signing off on the military portion so the Southern Army could set out marching on the 15th. The court factions, seeking a more general gain and looking to the long-term solution to the "Italian Problem" added their own ripple to it's political portion. They were well aware that the Kingdom by no means had the universal spirit of national identity the Party of Action and the intellectuals would claim: their hold on the island of Sicily and the rural regions of Naples particularly tenious as peasent brigande constantly undermining the security of the roads and villages in opposition to the confiscation of wealth and betrayal of land reforms that had been promised by Garibaldi and the stillborn Bourbon Constiution of 61' by the agents and oppritunists of the northern Savoyards. Though over time they might be intgrated forcefully, the war had obliged Turin to pull the troops garrisoning the region north to bolster their armies leaving the proverbial henhouse unguarded. Already, there were reports of conscription riots flaring up in Palermu in the face of demand for new troops, and as it so happened there were no fewer than three men in the same city who had a vested interest in potentially seeing this powder keg explode.

    A Priest, a Prince, and a Pauper...
     
    Chapter VII: Italia Irredimibile (Part E)
  • The Battle of Rovigo

    Engagement

    The 21st saw the first contact between the Austrian and Italian lines along the rive line. At the start of the day the Eastern Po Army, from their deployment in Baruchella just south of the river, sent out their first detachments to protect engineers who were working to repair the bridges which had been partially demolished at the start of the war. They had not taken into account, however, that since Cialidini's reconnoitring the Austrians had established outposts across the river to keep this section of the front under observation: made up of a brigade of forces restationed from minor regional forts and local reservists. These 2nd string troops, hardly prepared for the appearance of tens of thousands of Italian professionals, diden't even try to contest the crossing and instead retreated towards Castagriaro where the nearest post office and railway spur. While this did leave the narrow ford undefended: insuring the Italians could meet the requirements of their plan in terms of establishing a bridgehead, this had the critical impact of allowing them to dispatch a formal request for instruction to Rovigo. Regional military attention, which up until than had been divided between the eastern and western poritions of the southern front, was thus definantively focused towards the later with Albrechet's marching forces receiving word for the fort HQ of where Giacamo's men intended to cross the Po.

    Had he received the dispatch before Mantua, the Archduke probably woulden't have made any change to his movements. Jumpy conscripts were liable to see enemy armies on every horizon after all, and military orthodoxy was clear that he shouldn't risk venturing too far from his defensable position unless the rear was absolutely secure. Growing suspicion that the the Italians had perhaps adopted a southern strategy; bolstered by the information he'd gained interrogating captured officers of the Western Po Army, the sheer size of the force he'd faced, news that a force under Garibaldi was investing Borgoforte, and the deafening silence from the route of invasion in the past two wars lended the report a deal of credibility. The commander of the Rivogina forces was counciled not to counterattack the foothold being established but rather blow the bridges to the south and check their advance only if the Italians attempted to circumvent the fortress. Cavalry could then be streched over their one route of retreat while the main mass pursued them into either exhaustion or an inescapable battle bagging a second full Italian force without venturing too far off the route Vienna had already approved.

    Thanks to a dedicated and full bore effort by their pioneers, the Italian armies had fulled crossed out of Romagna by the 24th. With the Austrians withdrawing before them and the men treating the locals respectfully and keeping displine in terms of paying for services and supplies, they were able to gather excellent intelligence as to the location of the Austrian forces in the area; namely that they were widely seperated with the sole exception of the garrison at Rivogina. News on the whereabouts of the field army was much more sparse aside from a few folks with relatives in Legnago reporting they haden't seen anything, but this was largely seen by Giacamo as promising. In the worst case scenario, this meant his force still had a number of days head start before the enemy turned eastward, while in the best case the threat from the Mincio was actually working as planned and diverted the threat to his rear entirely. In either case, he was determined to make a rapid move to Rovigo in order to capture the northward rail and allow the addition of the Ferra-based crossings their supply system. As there were no reinforcements to wait for, nor any need to establish guarded depots any delay would only allow the Austrians time to respond and so a march was ordered to take place as quickly as possible. From the beginning this rate of advance was severely curtailed by the weather with unusually intense heat, even for July in the Mediterranean, beating down on the largely featureless landscape. To avoid exposing their men to the risk of heat exhaustion, sunburn, or other conditions that would affect their ability to conduct the storming of Rovigo and the follow up sweep north the officers coordinated new schedules so the army would move in from the evening to early morning rather than sunrise to sunset.

    While successful in its intention, the Italian night movement had two big problems it failed to overcome. While the complaints were largely muffled behind pride: men chosing to "soldier through" the disruption to their sleep patterns, the shock to their internal clocks lead to a noticable drop in manual dexterity and focus. Far more ominously however, the need to light their way and the dispersal created as normal systems of signalling failed insured a constant flow of Intel to Albrecht's approaching force. Once privy to his enemy's vulnerable formation, the Austrian marshal countered it with a unique blend of early century thinking and mid century technology. Calling in rail cars from Verona that he'd been using to supply the forts and to move around small reserves, he loaded in as much cavalry as he could fit and shipped them via Padua to let of near the town of Mantagnana. From their bivouacks there they fell upon the loosely formed outer sections of the (generiously called) colums on the first night, easily locating and identifying them by their fires beforing scattering or capturing a few thousand in a series of hit and run ambushes.

    Suffice to say, Giacamo was obliged by his startled men to keep his forces far tighter so they'd be able to repel any further raiding attempts: his own dearth of cavalry preventing him from hunting down or keeping under watch the source of the attacks. Slowdown in the advance from a combination of traffic and the need to keep units from straying off meant that, instead of the three days march he'd expected, it was nearly four and a half days before his troops got within range of the fortress Rivogina. With just over 2,000 men and a couple of dozen guns guarding its only semi-modern walls,the city would have could have been taken in a matter of hours if it didn't surrender when called upon. Unfortunately for the Po Army the Austrians had been pushing just as hard and, unspoiled by the tension of raids and kept in much more regular supply and rest, had closed the gap so those few hours were all they needed.

    At 10 AM, the first skirmishers began spreading across the field to harry the Italians: obliging them to form up and stand in the miday sun just when their bodies had gotten used to settling into bed. The farmsteads surrounding the town were the site of most of the fighting, changing hands several times of the course of the mourning as the edge in drill the Italians enjoyed was dulled by their slow reflexes and lack of endurance. By noon, General Durando had managed to mass his limited artillery and tried lauch a breaking bombardment on the point of the Austrian offensive. Despite the skill and coordination of his gunners, however, they simply couldn't through up enough shot to beat back an Austrian bayonet charge by a core of fresh Magyar veterans. To avoid buckling the south of the line had to be thinned in order to bolster the center, leaving their flank vulnerable to turning had Albrecht"s subordinated had been left any fast cavalry to commit

    Throughout the early afternoon the Italians were being pushed in on themselves across the front, but as they did it made further advances slower and more costly. Fueled by adrenaline and able to support one another in the melee, the seasoned been stubbornly formed into a defensive squares that acted as human redoubts for their guns. While a commitment of the heavy artillery to these easy targets could have potentially broken the line at several points during the day, Albrecht or his subordinates proved hesitant to unleash their full power while they men were mixed into close combat. Unwilling to conduct that killing blow; a choice the Austrians would be critiqued on in most analysis of Rovigo, the fight devolved into a bitter struggle for every point along the Italian lines. Neither side showed any mercy into the virtually medieval form of combat, few oppritunities for taking prisoners or surrendering coming about as cohesian of command broke down.

    Pressure on the front so occupied the PO Army, drawing in reimforcement from the wings to the center that they failed to see until too late the arrival of the Austrian cavalry from the north. Having "marched to the sound of guns", their attack drove the thin line still watching the rear from the field as the men broke under stress. Though Giacamo made a wholehearted attempt to transfer men to plug the gap, he quickly found that any group that tried to disengage drew overwhelming fire from the Austrian batteries on the rises. Left without any other options, he ordered a fighting uniform retreat southward down the only road available towards the bridges at Canaro. Seven thousand men had to be left behind as a rear guard to ward the withdrawal, who would be annihlated but manage to allow around 11,000 of their comrades to make their way back into Italy
     
    Chapter VIII: Trinity of Trinities (Part A)


  • "Those who love their country with not just their lips, but their hearts, have followed me into the fires of hell. I have given to them only hunger, thirst, forced marches, battle, and death. Today, let the Lord judge me, and tommorow have history do the same"
    -Giuseppe Garabaldi,eve of the Battle of Bologna


    The Priest, Part I: The Buildup to The Battle of Bologana

    Though hesitation by his pursuers at this key moment allowed Giacamo to transport his men back into Italian territory uncontested, the two rapid defeats at Mantua and Rovigo came as a deep shock to the Italian government and population. In stark contrast to a month prior, when they'd sent the men off to the frontier with expectations of a later-day Roman Triumph through the streets of a liberated Venice, the survivors of the disastrous expedition returned to hard hearts and a newspaper articles lambasting them with accusations of cowardliness and having been tainted by the disloyal spirit of their officers. Mamora's ministeries eagerly fanned the flames of this scapegoating with the government press and highly public assurances that the Po army was still under orders to resume their offensive without delay, well aware that without an alternate target the popular outrage the large casualty figures alongside the speed and ease with which the Austrians had swatted away their invasion would fall on the regime or, worse, turn against the war effort entirely.. Without maintaining the public facade that a quick and dramatic turn-around was just over the horizon, it was feared, the chance of garnering sufficent funds from a warry international market to maintain full moablization was minimal, and the failing fortunes of the Lira; the intial cautious bump in its value from the surge of first-week patriotic subscriptions having transformed into a dip of 15% from pre-war value on the Paris Bourse a mere two days after Mantua, forshadowed the prospects of the nation if they were unable to pay to rebuild their shattered forces.
    As might be expected, the soldiers of the Po army took deep offense to these measures. Knowing the harsh reality; that despite the grueling hardships of the march, cannibalizing of their supplies, and being outnumbered and outgunned they'd never the less been have to distinguish themselves with a steady and courageous preformance especially when compared to the Garibaldi's Legion and the Mantua expedition, the ignorance of the armchair strategists and firebrands being peddled to the public struck deeply at their regimental pride. Instead, they associated their lack of success with the political machinations and unresponsiveness of the centeral command. The combination of the removal of the army's favorite sons in Cialidini and other southern and eastern commanders, the failure of the Lombardy forces to take any action to support their offensive despite the strict orders to pursue it, and the constant silence in the face of petition for additional supplies fed into one another to produce rumors of a conspiracy on the part of Mamora and his Piedmontese clients to undercut their rivals and seize all the glory for themselves by hurling the southern army into a suicidal offensive and swooping in once the Austrian army was weakened and exposed. In this toxic environment, the officers found it increasingly difficult to command the respect or discipline from their men: the rank and file threatening to outright desert and insisting they be moved out of the shadow of the immediate Austrian threat looming just across the river, compelling Giacamo to call together his brass yet again to discuss which of the disagreeable options they'd have to take. Everyone was in grim agreement that to turn face and attempt to repel the Austrians as they tried to cross the river: as the orders obliged them to do, would require spreading their few remaining forces dangerously thin and could only result in them being overrun entirely. Concentrating their defense in Ferra would be equally fruitless, as the city was unfortified and had no defensable route of retreat, meaning the Austrians could simply march around them and physically cut them off from the railways that might bring in the men or material they'd need to close the numerical gap. Given the circumstances it was decided the whole available force would stage a retreat to the depot and regional army headquarters in Bologna, where it was hoped they could stage a delaying defense long enough either for events on other fronts to compel Albrecht to pull back or sufficent reinforcement and resupply to arrive from the Mincio or Bogoforte forces to replenish their ranks and allow for an organized counterattack.
    Despite the indispline otherwise plaguing the lines, the August 2nd withdrawel went off relatively smoothly as the promise of camp comforts and relative protection was more than a sufficent lure even for the tired. But the reality of the situation was somewhat more troublesome than their sense of security caused them to feel. Bologna was designed to serve as a mustering and training center for offensives into Veneto rather than withstand assaults from armies itself. Unlike its counterparts on the border, the stockade was situated among the low lying croplands of the Emilian plains where there was sufficent space to enclose the several required acres of barracks and warehouses and protect the Florence Line and, thus, their connection to the west. While this carried with it some advantages: the turret-based batteries of heavy guns commanding a virtually unobstructed field of fire nearly two miles in every direction, in practice its biggest effect was dramatically limited the army's ability to expand those basic defenses with a proper trench network. The munitions dumps had also been neglected in favor of the expeditions, leaving little ammunition of the proper caliber for the artillery and the power magazine insufficent for multiple days of battle. Despite these inadequate conditions, few among the army argued for further retreat and instead did the best they could to strengthen their position by digging themselves in on what open land was available. This was not only the result of strong personal motivations; wanting to defend their pride and hometowns in the face of the hated Austrians, but a political nessecity in the face of word coming in from Turin. In an attempt to assure a nation facing the threat of Austrian invasion, King Emmanual had declared Bologna "The vital lynchpin binding together our old and new countrymen, from which we will take not one step back", making retreat tantamount to treason. Though nearly a quarter of the force would end up outright deserting, those that remained took on the grim determination of men for whom victory was the only alternative to death.
    As the Italians prepared to make their final stand, the Austrians completed their landings on the Italian side of the river to little resistance. With the political leadership, wealthy, and military having all decamped upon learning of the enemy approach, local governance had largely fallen into the hands of the Church as the one of the few organizations with widely recognized legitimacy. Bishop Luigi Casolini, having been administering the diocese for over a decade more than the recently-evacuated secular officials, accepted the request to manage the distribution of local stocks that haden't been carried off and to negotiate terms of occupation with the Archduke in direct defiance of the Royal Decree. French, Swiss, and British journalists who'd been steadily trickling to the war fronts gave glowing reports on both the merits of his administration and the admiration shown to him by the peasant masses, regaling their public with his "Christlike temperance and Solomanic Wisdom" and willingness to endure alongside his flock rather than escape: giving a sympathetic light to the clerical perspective as readers were re-introduced to the background of Italy's seizure of the Legation territories five years prior. These reports starkly contrasted with stories of the furious backlash being shown in the cities of Piedmont upon their hearing of this "turning of the other cheek" where dissent was being channeled into harassment and vandalism against the people and property of the Church and southern German-speakers, including a particularly embarrassing case where a pair of befuddled Swiss watchmakers found their workshop burned down. Encouraged by the papers, which he made a effort to read every mourning to keep a good barometer of international opinion, the Archduke kept an orderly march and arrived on the outskirts of Ferra just before dawn on August 8th: welcomed by an envoy of the Bishop with a propsal for the dicussion of surrender terms.

    Back came a reply that turned the diplomatic situation upside down. Rather than the usual demands for the establishment of a military administration, Luigi received a notice co-signed by both Albrechet and the Papal Nuncio to Vienna explaining in blunt terms that this was not, in fact, a hostile action and so surrender woulden't be nessicery. Citing the terms of agreements made at the Congress of Vienna as well as the Concordant between the Empire and Church, Austria was simply excersising it's standing invitation to intervene on behalf of the Papacy to secure her territory from "disloyal elements": renouncing even the thought of robbing legitmat authority from the "Legation" government even temporarily. Indeed, a very public statement: mirroring that of the Prussians in their own international showmanship in Kiel that had set the onset of this war in motion,the Austrian forces were lead by their Chaplins to swear a civil and religious oath to restore all territory "Recognized as the Patramony of St.Peter" and sheparded the former Papal administrators back into their pre-1860 offices...
     
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    Chapter VIII: Trinity of Trinities (Part B)
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    “What is the Fourth Estate? It is at once the whole of the nation and none at all. It is, in truth, the instrument by which the aggregate intelligence of the other three criticize and control the excesses of the individual divisions of the other three. As the First Napoleon feared the hostility of four printers more than a thousand bayonets, and the late Earl of Abderdeen admitted that a Minister must first please the newspapers, it has become clear that the era of the Dynastic War is fading away, and the War of Public Opinion entering into its dawn.”


    -Post-war Editorial in the “The Times”: What is the Fourth Estate?, reflecting on the impact of mass media on The Ten Weeks War


    The Prince, Part I: The Buildup to French involvement


    As Vienna had been hoping, their endorsement of a pro-Papal reorganization of the Peninsula to a scandal-primed media produced an explosion in popular coverage and political agitation among the French citizenry. The official government position- a tepid endorsement of placing the “Italian Question: under the jurisdiction of the upcoming European Conference, was nearly drowned out by a chorus of calls to action in the press from all sides of society, though not exactly the same in sentiment. As might be expected, the Ultramontane and Catholic provincial press loudly backed this show of religious unity: amplifying the “outrage of the French Public” at continued neglect by their government to honor its claimed position as defender of the Faith abroad she had made during the Crimean War. Developing concepts pioneered during the American Civil War, the clerical lobby managed to tap into a previously untapped source of popular support: the illiterate country population, by introducing the “Political Cartoon” in a wonderful piece of propaganda: the Histoire Pittoresque dramatique et Sainte Peter an le Italian. Depicting a highly slanted history of the relations between secular powers in Italy and the Church: invoking images such as the 4th Crusade, Trial of Saint Peter, and corruption that had driven the Pope to Avigonon (As well as shoving some of the excesses of the Revolutionary Republicans on the influence of “The worst radicals of the Renaissance”… who were Italians), the simple picture-book style and language made it easy to publicly depict the armies of Italy as radical barbarians and invoke an idealic image of societies in which the Church played a central role in daily life: something the average French peasent was familiar with and supported. For them, the call for a holy crusade in defense of their religious heritage promised the security of that exact view of civilization against the constant expansion of the influence of revolutionary Liberals in Paris and their calls for enforcement of a market economy and increasing the authority of the central government over local affairs. Backed and facilitated by provincial governors, this combination of top-down coordination and bottom-up sentiments represented allowed for the divide in French society that dated back to the Revolution to finally take on a political dimension: the silent majoirty who stood “before the barracades” finally having the means to overcome the organizational advantage of those urbanites who’d stood “behind the barricades”


    This groundswell of conservative political activity was an astonishment to many in the political establishment, who had long considered the rustic poor a mostly uninterested in national politics. Most of the Emperor’s political allies, however, took it as a positive surprise: seeing in this constituency the perfect tool to counter the myth being pushed by the reformists that liberalization of the regime really was a demand of the full swath of French society rather than their own suspicion that it was project mainly for upper middle class intellectuals who’d previously been ascendant under the July Monarchy. This resulted in a steady increase in, though not to the extent of pro-war, certainly interventionist voice in both the assembly and state councils. These were not limited to just pro-Church and pro-Habsburg politicians who wanted to use the situation as a way to chastise Italy for running off on forgien adventures that required French assistance to bail them out, but even many moderate statesmen who feared that the progressively worsening series of defeats and rising stakes would result in the Italian situation breaking down to the point the final settlement would go against French interests and critically undermine the large investments they’d made in the country. As factors in the North made the prospect of peace on both fronts being negotiated simultaneously to create a fair and balanced peace seem increasingly distant, the sense grew that the moment where France could make a decisive move that could maintain the status quo in Italy was rapidly slipping away: if not to Austria, than to regional revolts and Republicans.

    It was a stark contrast to previous war debates of the 2nd Empire that the main indifferent party was the Emperor himself. Napoleon III’s, so often attracted to the possibility swift glorious wars gave to bolstering his regeime was oddly seen to be suddenly hesitant just as his support base seemed to be calling him to action. Some would attribute this to medical concerns: having expectations that as a “popular autocrat” he’d have an obligation to lead any expeditionary force in person and that rigors of campaigning would only harm any attempts to treat his ever-worsening kidney stones. A more popular school, however, places ideological and political concerns on the forefront: with Napoleon considering the project of Italian Unification a personal priority and desiring to complete it both for moral reasons and to keep Italy as a solid French ally. To avoid dissent towards his person, however, he coached these objections in the form of diplomatic and military concerns. The army was not set for mobilization, so he claimed, as it was caught up in the early stages of reorganization and the credit crisis and early bond-sales by the Germanic states meant there was little prospect of raising a war chest anyways. The move would also undermine France’s position as a honest broker in the Prussian-Austrian disagreements, which in practical terms was far more salient to French interests than minor territorial ships in Italy. These statements, however, did little to somber public opinion, which even on the left was increasingly calling for accommodation with Austria on the terms that they agree not to press for either annexing any territory or restoring any to the Papal States: which would inevitably render Italy indefensible.


    Ultimately, it was that stance of “diplomatic settlement with pre-conditions” that would end up triumphing: not only as sermons from the village pulpits only added to the “Church Choir” but news of the situation in Sicily and the Bogoforte Expedition make it look increasingly like there may not be a unified Italy left to save if he dallied any longer. In the end, France needed Italy to favor them over the Prussians if she wanted to prevent a Berlin-dominated alliance from forming a permanent bulwark against any expansion of her influence on the continent (Possibly even prying the Ottomans out of their and Britain’s orbit), and feared she’d miss out on any voice in the final terms if he did not join in this war for the fate of the entire Central European world. By the end of August the conditions had been agreed upon and, with varying degrees of support, the Emperor and representatives of all the major political factions announced the offer to broker a cease-fire between the waring powers on the expectations of “No territorial gains for either belligerent”. While it was clear the exact terms would largely be an ultimatum dictated by Paris: Vienna and Italy both in too hard pressed a position to demand much of a say, they never the less accepted the mediation with expectations of their arguments being taken more seriously at the conference: Austria having the luxury of being able to pull the South Army back into a reserve position to serve as a backup in case conditions turned against them in the careful balance of the Bohemian Front.
     
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    Chapter VIII: Trinity of Trinities (Part C)
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    The Bourbon government had the great
    merit of preserving our lives and subsistence,
    a merit the present government can not claim.
    We have neither personal nor political liberties.
    -Neopolitan Deligate to the Italian Parlament, 1863

    The Pauper: The Buildup to the Palermo Revolution

    Mezzogiorini resistance to North Italian encroachment began essentially when Francis II surrendered his armies to Cialdini in Feburary of 1861. Physically isolated from the cutthroat commercial and military contests of Northern Italy by oceans and mountains and dominated together by a series of foreign overlords, the south of the Peninsula possessed a culture entirely alien to an intelligentsia raised in the mercantile traditions of Milan, Genoa, and Florence. Modest landowning elite, instead of being replaced by salaried bureaucrats appointed from the capital , were largely left to their own devises in dispensing justice and providing security provided the taxes came in on time in a continuation of centuries-old feudal relations with their distant sovereign. With little oversight or instruction from the political center, this system resulted in a series of unaffiliated and unofficial private police forces; appointed by the local authorities to enforce their local laws under their unique local methods and codes of honors. These same communities had developed a deep dependency on the Church a source of education and civil services that would be provide by the State in many other parts of Europe: driven in part by regional nobles, pleading poverty, unloading the responsibility and the fact the churchs were largely stocked by local sons who cared deeply for their neighbors and childhood home. Most often compared to the charitable presentations of the Antebellum American South, the gap between this Southern paternalism and Northern dynamism had resulted in a similar difference in economic development by the time the region was integrated into a United Italy. In most of the major measures of industrialization and move into the market economy; railway and road millage, iron and steel production, capital saved up in banks, the regions north of Rome outpaced the regions south of it over 10 to 1, adding a material dimension to the yawning moral gap that existed between the two populations. While the half-century since the abolition of journalism had planted the seeds of change into the system: raising high customs barriers and state capital being loaned to prospective merchants and manufacturers who previously couldn’t find starting funds, the preservation and continued growth of the infant industries was still dependent on the protection of the Bourbon regeime from competition from the much better established forgien firms.

    The conquest of the region by the Kingdom of Sardinia provided a devastating blow to this gradual adaption of society. Suddenly awoken from their sleepy isolation and dream of land reform, few peasants could have imagined what life really would be like under the dictates of Turin and had no way of any idea of how to integrate into their new reality. Virtually overnight, through the signing of a few papers, their markets were thrown wide open to constant trade with the better-capitalized northern firms. Cheap goods came flooding into port cities, undercutting the price of local workshops just as the Bourbon assets they might have turned to for their investment or liquidity loans disappeared into the new central treasury. The resulting downsizing and closures produced a flood of newly-minted vagabonds who, squeezed by rising food prices just as they saw those same ships carrying away grain for consumption by the very workers who’d stolen their jobs, naturally took to blaming the Italian administrators and upper-class migrants coming down to make personal fortunes for their situation. With no work to be had in the larger towns and the municipal sources of charity and support being transferred from the church and sympathetic local nobles to political appointees indifferent to local suffering, these former apprentices and artisans scattered over the countryside to try to make new lives for themselves: often forming gangs with former co-workers for the sake of mutual security and support.

    Here, these urban dissidents found a similar simmering unrest among the farmers. Under the light hand of the Bourbon regime, the right to the use of common land and practice of small-holding had survived the death of de juro feudalism as a result of informal understandings between the peasentry and gentry. With the proceeds of their land being too low to afford to become absentee landlords or invest in a diversified income, the later had a material position that differed from their tendents only in scale rather than substance: living on, directly working with, and dependent on their estates. With that much more work to do and a greater trust in (and ability to verify) the locals, along with the fact that its simply harder to ignore the suffering of people you see every day, this produced a system of co-operative management that, while limiting the ability to shift from subsistence to commercial farming, had in a way acted as a guarantee of work, food, and shelter from the vagaries of markets. With annexation into the Kingdom of Italy, however, came the consolidation of these estates as a combination of rising taxes and divestment of Bourbon loyalists opened up previously divided landholdings for purchase by Northern speculators and a handful of already established large-estate owners. With this change had come a rapid shift for the spirit of the agreement to enforcement only by the letter, the prospect of profit by providing their new internal markets with raw material at much higher than pre-annexation prices driving the rapid enclosure of land and the removal of tolerance for indebtedness. Far from shrinking in the face of these strict physical boundaries, however, the peasantry responded with roiling anger to what they perceived as “robbery” of their long-standing rights without compensation.

    Less apparent, but no less difficult to live with changes, affected the region across these class and ideological lines. Under the terms of the 1859 Casati Act, Mezzogiorini children, were forced off the fields of families, in desperate need of the free labor to help weather the imposition of new taxes and servicing of back-rent. Unlike the parochial schools of the prior era; who were sensitive to the seasonal agricultural needs and spoke fluently in the regional dialects, the superintendents placed in charge by the new regime were selected from those locals who could curry favor with the Piedmontese educational establishment and, thus, get their license validated. Adherents the policy of assimilation, which believed the creation of a united Italy required crushing independent regional identities by removing them from the youth, were deaf to protests against the hard-handed methods used in pursuit of this greater good. Physical punishment was meted out for speaking in Naplese or Sicilian rather than the Florentine dialect all lessons were held in, including the kinds of forced marches usually reserved for military discipline, and the removal of theological courses and prayer breaks left many parents objecting for the fate of their family’s souls. More agrecious, however, was the transfer of land grants held by the Church for the operation and building of schools to provincial authorities approved of by the Savoyards. Whereas in the past the excess profits of these lands would go back into the community in the form of charity and social services, now (like every other tax) the revenues went not to the needs of the poor but the priorities of the Turin government; removing a vital safety net for the poor farmers.

    At first, this unrest only simmered as the two tracts of resistance competed rather than cooperated with one another. Bourbon loyalists, clericals, and cottagers who’d been kicked off their land by enclosure retreated into the hills to engage in the time-honored tradition of briganda. A fact of life in most regions throughout the south, the Briganda was the practice of young men lashing out against perceived injustice (weather political or simply from poverty) by engaging in raids on the estates of the elites and waylaying of overland trade. While in times of peace the views of these figures by peasant communities was mixed, during occupation they took on a celebrity status as the keepers of the fires of resistance by filling for the Italians the trope of the “Peasent Folk Hero” for the locals that figures like Robin Hood, Joan of Arc, the Minutemen held in other countries. The generals occupying the region, realizing the job of surpressing so many bandit parties would be extremely expensive, had enlisted the large landowners and merchantile bougious to enforce marshal law. As the few benefitiaries of the Savoyard reforms, they were only too happy to lend a hand in maintaining law and order in the countryside while the Italian authorities and their regular garrisons stayed in the cities. To carry out their authority, they recruited the rowdy bands of migrant urbanites as rural police: providing these potential recruits for the resistance with a legal way to earn and living and vent their frustrations in a way that dident undermine the status quo. During the early years of occupation, this practice of putting these two factions of marshal dissent against one another while maintaining the privlages (and thus loyalty) of the wealthy elite was successful in preventing the formation of a proper popular uprising. By the outbreak of the Fraternal War, while there remained deep and broad ideological and material distaste with the policies established by the unification and no small amount of nostalgia for the days of independence, the lack of resources and a leader who could bridge the gaps between the mixture of agrarian, clerical, protectionist-provencial , reformer, and Legitimatist factions which made up the anti-government forces had reduced violent resistance to the occasional show of force against villages suspected of aiding and supplying the brigandi or an exchange of gunfire between supply colums and ambushers trying to secure ammunition.

    Crucial events occurred during the summer of 1866 which would lead to these tensions finally boiling over. The first was the passage of marshal law at the outbreak of the war, obliging the local garrisons to take direct control of enforcing the Legge Pica legislation of 1863 which mandated the death penelty to relatives and supporters of the briganda . Until then the lands outside the patrol zones of each city were managed as they'd always been by the landlord,who was often willing to accept bribes in exchange for leiency and jealiously guarded his perogative against agents of the occupation.Post-Pronunciamiento paranoia against former clients of Cialidini disrupted this delicate balance the Duke had set in place by raising suspicion against any armed faction outside Royal control which might attempt a coup against the Prime Minister in favor of their patron. Immediately upon the transfer of juristiction of the region to the Inspector-Generals from civilan administrators, an ultimatium was sent out to the companies at arms demanding they turn in their rifles or report fot integration into "official" Italian police and military units manned and lead by Northern officers. Within days, over 15,000 troops were in the field, declaring any man who refused to surrender his firearm a brigand and thus subject to immediate execution.

    If the intent of the military was to head off unrest in the region, they failed utterly. Infantry colums; largely made up of aged reservists as the veterans of the surpression and young patriotic conscripts had largely been transferred to the front, were ill suited to combating gureillas in the maze of narrow country lanes and shallow vallies of the Mezzogiorino landscape, which provided perfect hiding places for brigandi who'd been operating in them for years. Wherever the army appeared in strength, arms could simply be buried underground or in secret nooks of sympathetic locals; often in the graveyards and crypts of churches or old noble estates even the most secular commanders dident dare order their men to desicrate. Where troops were fewer, companies would openly resist efforts to confiscate their weapons or press them into service, often with the tact silent support of their employer. The fallout of losing the loyalty of the Gentry, who found the prospect of losing their own private police and thus independent authority unacceptable, deeply undermined the position of the military as they lost a previously vital source of trusted information: minor commanders now operating out of blind fear once stories of false leads directing units into traps started spreading.

    Second was the fallout of a second, genuine Pronunciamiento in Spain. An insurection on June 22 by troops in Madrid itself, lead by several high profile figures in the military, had only barely been surpressed by swift and direct action on the part of Prime Minister O'Donnell. Far from being rewarded for his loyalty to the regeime, however, Queen Isabella had reacted to the revolt by turning against both the liberals and moderates in her regeime: dismissing O'Donnell due to his perceived threat as head of the left-center Union-Liberal and replacing him with the stauch conservative Duke of Valencia. Disgusted by this betrayal, the commander was preparing to join the coup plotters such as John Prim (Hero of the Spainish-Moroccan War and commander of the Spainish expedition to Mexico in 62') in a self-imposed exile in France, having finally lost faith in the Queen's willingness to adopt needed financial and political reforms. Then, however, came a message from the Austrians and a figure with the Spainish court: a man who's very name carried the echo of liberal refining of Bourbon Absolutism with a promise of funds and a place of power in a prospective state if he could lend his and his supporter's expertice to a plan...

    Antoine de Orlean
     
    Chapter VIII: Trinity of Trinities (Part D)
  • The Priest Part II: The Eruption of the Battle of Bologana.


    After failing to contest the Austrian seizure of Ferra or their restoration of the church administration, Italian public opinion turned hard against General Giacamo. Subject to what were now becoming the usual charges of incompetence, cowardness, and passive acceptance of treasonous sentiments in his ranks, calls to replace him with a commander who would march towards rather than away from the enemy were rising from prominent PM’s. Giacamo, fully occupied by the tedious task of trying to turn his barely fortified rail junction and shanty-town into a defensible strongpoint, had no time to reply to politics, leaving his reputation to bleed out from a thousand paper cuts from hostile papers and correspondences. While such criticism were not entirely without merit: rightfully pointing out that withdrawal from the coast was allowing the Austrian army to ease the burden on its baggage train by shipping in supplies via the Adriatic and opened the rivers to uncontested traffic by enemy gunboats, but the strategic reality was such that the defense of Boglogna was essential for the security of the southern two thirds of the nation. This broader view, however, didn’t resonate with follower of Mamora’s school of thought: asserting that the war would be won or lost by who was in possession of Veneto when the terms were negotiated, which required putting constant pressure on Albrecht’s army to compel the cautious marshal to withdraw into his fortress zones where he could be crushed between the two converging advances. Far too ambitious for professional soldiers with an accurate view of the situation to believe possible, this plan of counter-invasion never the less captured the imagination of a population still eager for a victory. Unswayed by calm by depressing realism, they demanded the Po Army be placed under the control of the classical “hero on a white horse”, who would boldly and romantically ride in to redeem the sullied honor of Italia. And everybody had the same hero in mind.

    Unlike the rest of the field forces, who were either forcefully imprisoned behind in Austrian camps or self-imprisoned behind their own, Garibaldi retained his usual bold stance. Holding the metaphorical and physical center of the far front, his Legion refused to call off their attack on Borgoforte despite news of the humiliations at Mantua and Rivogina and thus the exposure of his flanks. Continuing to invest the fortress despite the shifting fortunes elsewhere along the front had been something of a gamble, pitting assumptions of Italian bravery against those of the Archduke’s caution, but in this case that risked paid off. While it was true the Austrians were now between him and his nominal source of supply and command, the unofficial status and slapdash nature of the expanded Legion gave it a unique freedom to adapt in the face of shortages. The veteran legionaries, having plenty of experience at improvisation and rationing from their many campaigns fighting for underfunded revolutionary causes throughout Europe and South America, taught their amateur volunteers techniques for maintaining their weapons and avoiding wasting ammunition or powder, while bread was begged, borrowed, and bought via informal networks built up on Garibaldi’s personal reputation. Supplimented with the large stockpiles they’d carried off on their initial march and slow trickle of arrivals from the north, the siege lines diden’t have any looming deficiencies I anything except artillery munitions: Cardonia insisting his men keep a tight lock on the aresenals to retain them for his own forces. Unfortunately for the prospects of the siege, this meant they unable to effectively force a breach and storm the Austrian walls, while the garrision could be resupplied effectively indefinately with ammunition, rations, replacements, and supplies to repair the fortifications so long as the other Italian forces couldn’t wrestle away control of the Miacio.

    Taking the fortress ceased to be their priority though as word of the Po Army’s retreat and Sudarmee’s advance arrived at the position via their line with the northern HQ. Always a man of energy and vision, Garibaldi quickly spotted the opportunity opened up by his new position behind the enemy lines. From his perspective, Albrechet haden’t cut them off from any vital source of support but rather made a fatal error by leaving an unmolested enemy in his rear. It would be all too simply to lift the siege, sweep away the Catholic gendarmes that were being used to maintain order in the rear, and send the invaders scattering with a surprise attack to the rear. With their field army in disarray, the Austrians would never be able to assemble a response in time to respond to Cadorna’s offensive to redeem Venice, and Italy would see it was the patriotic nationalists, not the legacy officers of the court of King Emmanual, who were the true fathers of the Italian nation.


    Without tolerance for the kind of delay that had doomed the former expeditions, on the afternoon of August 7th the men were set for march to relieve the main body of the Po Army with all due haste. While the orders themselves were simple and suited for his enthusiastic followers, the impromptu nature of his logistics system and unbalanced mixed of staff officers that had served them so well in self-sufficency turned the advance into a untrackable nightmare. With no formal quartermaster’s record, organization table creating uniform dispersal of supply, or even a fully briefed signal corps, the men when packing up the line simply took possession of whatever wagons and artillery hey happened to get their hands on. Driven by the rousing speeches of their “officers”; usually informally elected “good old boys” rather than disciplinarians, the road were a soon littered with divisions trying to pass and maneuver around one another as the march lost a uniform pace: this spirit only encouraged by a population which cheered them on as they went by in their charming, personable way and mingled with the local ladies. Though professional Legionaries, veterans of many campaigns, were dismissive of this carefree display of confidence by green troops who’d yet to see proper field battle, they couldn’t complain about the pace of advance despite the cost of organization. The festive parade atmosphere, alongside the draw of sob stories of martial atrocities and clerical abuse, kept the men motivated to continue their full day’s marches, receiving fresh fortifications and provisions in most of the settlements they passed by. Within four days, they reached Bologana; Garibaldi riding at the front and through personally dispatching riders trying to organize the men into something resembling battle lines

    What they found was the city already under siege. Albhrecht, confident in the security of his position and believing the forces hunkered down in front of him were the last major body in the south, was practicing a policy of offensive entrenchment to slowly work his men towards the main wall. A three lines of fortified positions, covered by a dense network of picket posts and frequent patrols set to watch for any Italian forreys, stretched out in arcs about a mile long to the north of the city. Unlike the self-confidence that had come to define his Italian counterparts in the war, Albrecht retained the overly cautious tempermemnt of a drill-based Fredrickian officer that had only been vindicated by seeing the failures of his opponent’s overambitions during their invasion. Despite already having an extensive line, he had not yet brought forward his heavy guns, insisting that the earthwork bastions meant to hold them were built up enough to the point an Italian bombardment woulden’t surpress the crew before he placed the valuable pieces within their range. This overestimating of the enemy, while hardly playing well with political officers who wanted to bring about a decisive victory as soon as possible to help bolster the war effort in the north, was much appreciate by the infantry who were happy to not have their lives thrown away in an attempted breakthourgh and get a chance to rest and recover on food and wine brought forward from communities that had been placed under Church governance; having been guranteeded that the prayers of every pious Catholic were being sent up for their success by locals who had been spared the expected privations of a military occupation. Safe behind their defensive lines and with a safe path for supplies too and from both the coast and Ventia, they were more than prepared to hold their posts until the Italian palasades and blockhouses had been reduced to splinters.

    What they had not prepared for was reports of massive Italian activity being brought in from riders sent to the west, mentioning tens of thousands of fresh, singing troops flowing over the countryside. Keeping his cool and courage, however, Albrecht took the threat to heart and ordered the digging of an additional line facing in that direction, making use of the irrigation ditches as a base. This move to cover his flank would be decisive when, the next mourning, the low-tier Austrian rearguard had a secured position to bolster their moral when the Italians came screaming down the hill in a textbook cavalry charge… one American observers would compared to nothing more than General Picket’s fateful advance. The Habsburg infantry, having been well stocked with ammunition and with the camp’s artillery preaimed at the main route of enemy advance, showed the Italians not the unfinished opening they’d expected but a strongpoint in the defense network. While they did have some initial successes; the sheer weight of the Italian charge breaking the formations and briefing turning the affair into a melee struggle in the center of the new line where the enemy had the advantage, the tide quickly turned when, aware what needed to be done, Albrecht ordered his batteries to fire into the thick of the line. The Austrian stragglers, managing to hold fast in their pits, suffered staggering loses under the friendly fire alongside their enemies, but in the chaos a lucky shell managed to strike just at the feet of one prime white charger, blowing the legs out from under its rider and blasting a hole in the center of the mob for the Austrian reserves to push into: falling on the shocked Italians with their own, fresh sabers.

    Weather or not he’d died from blood lose by the shell, trampling, or being cut down is unknown, but inspection after the battle revealed this one stark fact: Garibaldi, savior of Italy, had died, shirt stained red with the blood of a martyer.

    *The question of ownership of Garibaldi's lost limbs is one of intense debate between the Church, Habsburgs, and Italian government. The only recovered part who's validity is fully agreed upon; a left thighbone, is displayed in the Cathedral in Venesia on permanent grant to the Church, Italian nationalists claim the remains are the property of the Italian state by virtue of Garibaldi's position in the Italian Army at the time of the conflict and the terms of the Treaty of Avignon as the repatriation of the dead soldiers. As the man's offical position in military at the time was dubious, however, there is no internationally agreed upon legal opinion, meaning the bone remains the technical legal property of the House of Habsburg.
     
    Chapter VIII: Trinity of Trinities (Part E)

  • Help your neighbor, and Heaven will help you
    -Motto of the Fish and Loaf Society


    The Prince, Part II: The Struggle for (Sacred) Hearts and Minds



    Despite the dedication the clerical lobby and sensational coverage of events by the conservative propaganda mill, it was clear from almost the very beginning that efforts to get an official denunciation of the Italians and direct invention were a lost cause. Though there were no shortage of atrocities to provoke popular outrage, especially with the proper embellishments, any move in the Assembly provoked immediate resistance from liberal, pacifist, and Italophile deputies. Their parliamentary opponents proved more than capable of maneuvering through the minefield of public opinion: using their positions in government to delay debates and fact-finding missions while fanning the flames of more mundane, uninteresting policy disputes such as the continued issuing of contracts for the reconstruction of Paris and efforts to stabilize currency and credit availability in the face of the British banking crisis and flood of securities on the market until any individual event receded into the general haze of negative stories coming out of the violence engulfing central Europe. With the tact backing of the firmly Bonaparist civil service and Senate majorities, these efforts denied the Conservatives the stable, emotionally powerful point they needed to organize the full might of their only recently politically-awakened base for any action more specific than producing a general climate of hostility that chilled the few suggestions of pro-Italian action. Denied access to the levers of civil authority, the battle was increasingly shifted to the field of culture with the moralists encouraging private individuals to partake in private group actions that supported their co-religionists.

    This brand of Catholic activism, however, would bare little resemblance to the traditionally localized focus of the Church’s leadership. At its head was a new generation of clergy; men who’d served their careers under the reformed doctrines of Pope Pius IX and the dangerously excessive focus on the individualism and growing inequality between the financial and the ever-widening moral and economic gulf between the middle and working class embodied in the Revolutions of 1848. Seeking to reconcile the growing popularity of socialist ideas and the desire for a larger group identity that emerged for the technological and social develops of the first half of the 19th century with offical church doctrines of strict hierarchy and refusal to submit to the authority of the state, these young priests ended up pushing an interpretation of Catholic values that that placed a focus on salvation through works and encouraging the formation of “parallel institutions” to avoid the imposition of confessional laws. Deploying rhetoric that focused on the charitable actions and non-confrontational language of Jesus (“Render onto Ceaser what belongs to Ceaser, and render onto God what belongs to God” and “Whatever you to do the least among them, you do to me” being their mainstay) this populist revivalism asserted that those who were blessed with good fortune had a responsibility to provide for the poor and meek of “The Family of the Faithful” both material and moral terms. By neglecting those obligations, this paternialistic model asserted, the nobility had allowed the liberals to exploit the masses as a tool of godless revolution by promising to provide them with their daily bread by forcefully extracting what had previously been given in the spirit of charity. Since than , these professionals had fallen victim to the same temptations of the pre-French Revolution church and nobility: possibly by having their hearts hardened like Pharaoh, providing the servants of God a chance to redeem themselves and return society to the righteous path. This transformation, however, would require extra penance and sacrifice by the rich and a willingness to accept tutelage in the poor via private mutual aid societies in order to isolate the influence of the secularists in offical institutions, where at a later date it could be purged after the power of the ballot box allowed Catholic parties to gain control of the government.


    This school of thought proved far more capable of making inroads will the layity than the ultramonatism that had previously been on track to dominate Catholic theology. Instead of focusing on maximizing the benefit of particular elite individuals and the uncaring application of pure principals: which according to it's proponents bent any system that adopted it to the benefit of one class at the expense of everybody else, they sought to harness the traditional values of Property, Family, and Religion to provide at least some benefit to as many groups with society as possible. For the working class it offered some basic security from annincreasingly globalized market, where prices and wages were subject to unknowable forces and events possibly thousands of miles away, through noblus obligesse on the part of those who profited from those systems far behyond their personal needs through the morally responsible organ of the Church. Those pious philanthropists could feel secure not only in the fate of their immortal souls, but would have to be given authority over the laws and means of production in order to gurantee their ability to provide and protect the flock as well as propagate those values that encouraged their success and sense of social responsibilty: a prospect that was highly appealing to those who valued ideals and influence over the diminishing returns of an ever-growing bank account. Community leaders and State employees celebrated the promotion of values that encouraged lawful behavior and social harmony that would reduce the amount of tensions and ills they'd have to deal with, while further benefiting their juristictions through neighborhood level productive Iniatives.

    To those from a Protestant, Anglo-Saxon tradition, this system smelled suspiciously like the "Machine politics" utalized by the politicans in American cities: ignorant and lazy men unloading both their rights and responsibilities in exchange for a perpetual mediocre life rather than engaging in the "pursuit of happiness". While it was true the public kitchens and free flophouses popping up attached to churches throughout the provincial towns and slums often doubled as vechiles for the political ambitions of the men who raised funds for them; the priests expected to serve public prayers for their patrons alongside their warm soup, such accusations don't tell the whole story. Besides downplaying the genuinely pious motivations of the majority of the these instiutions; most of these prospective politicians seeing no sin in pursuing power or wealth with the intention of putting it in service of Christ and the Nation, they ignore the vastly different conditions between Northwestern and Southern Europe that made appeals to "pull yourself up by your bootstraps" ring hollow. In a climate of much more restricted access to credit, concentrated landownership, poor quality and access to education, little in the way of urbanization and mechanization, and the continued economic compedativeness and political privlages of the petty nobility over the peasent and merchant classes meant oppritunities for social advancement were fewer and further between in the rural expanses of Catholic Europe. Lacking the traditional routes of self-government and self-improvement, their experiences with political reform restricted to bloodshed and confiscations that resulted in little more than a few thousand more professionals getting the right to vote, removing restrictions on publications they couldn't read to begin with, and a change in who would ultimately receive their rents without any actual change in what they paid. In a world where "liberty" only had a use to a narrow segment of society, with the rest having little time or access to resources on which to shape an educated political view, it was hardly surprising most people preferred to entrust their vote to an educated authority who's teachings and principals they found agreeable.

    This policy of creating a "divison of labor" within society; where the general interest was best served by having different matters of local, provencial, and national policy into the hands of groups most interested in and suited for the task under the absolute primacy of a single,sacrosanct leader who could serve as a living, evolving alternative to a paper Constiution for protecting, would be known as Etatism . Derived from the term for the old divisions of French society, this romaticized "neo-Fedualism" would characterize the Right wing of Continental politics for decades to come, combining authoritarianism with a pecular French perception of "popular will" and the principaled over the purely pragmatic. "Reactionary" in the sense that it was responding to the excesses of modernism and liberalization on the immense section of the body politic being left behind, its sentiment is ironically perhaps best represented by its greatest critic,Karl Marx, in his The Lumpen Reactions thusly...

    It is vital to remember that, just as the Communist Revolution will produce a counterevolutionary response from the bourgeois it is deposing,when the bourgeois stage their revolution against the feudal mode of production it will find the forces of tradition arrayed against it. Etatism represents not the spirit of the true Proletariat merely because it opposes the bourgeois. It is the cause of the the conservative peasent who, contrary to the desire of the class-conscious industrial worker who wishes to step into the light of a new order, wishes to retreat into the catacombs and resurrect the ghosts of the old order. It is the philosophy of the greaving and superstitious who, when faced with the death of their way of life brought about by the imposition of capitalist modes of production, place their faith in superstition and charletans who promise the dead indeed live again in a place of great honor if only they surrender their wills. It is, I a way,the highest stage of oppression; as it turns the masses into their own Cossaks, preventing the evolution of the conditions for the final triumph of the people by never allowing the bourgeois to become an exploiting class by the constant application of the bayonet.
     
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