France Fights On (English Translation) - Thread III - The lost files

october 27, 1943
Colonel Péron, head of the Department of Labor
Buenos-Aires -
Perón's Department of Labor continues its work to improve the daily lives of Argentine workers, a task much appreciated by those concerned. Ah, if only the whole government were so understanding! Unfortunately. The latest rail strikes are above all the result of Ramírez's repressive policies and the arrest of the main union leaders concerned.
But isn't there any way of getting along? Couldn't the unions and the military cooperate? After all, Argentina's working-class milieu is a very special one: while it is of course deeply attached to defending its own battered interests, it is also extremely chauvinistic and hostile to foreign influences.
Ángel Borlenghi made the speech to Colonel Perón. The General Secretary of the powerful Syndicat des Travailleurs du Commerce (of the late second CGT) is accompanied by his counterparts Francisco Pablo Capozzi ("Fraternidad" movement) and Juan Atilio Bramuglia (Union des Chemins de Fer), who obviously approve. As usual, the colonel appears interested, listens attentively, nods, takes notes... An attitude that visitors are not really used to from military men.Behind Perón was (as usual) Colonel Domingo Mercante.Initially, the trade unionists were to be received only by Mercante - they didn't expect to meet the famous head of the Department of Labor so soon.But Perón was quick to respond to the kind offer of his colleague Mercante, who over the months had become a veritable lobbyist at the head of a vast network of influence.After the complaints came the suggestions.Always courteous, the workers' representatives put forward a number of proposals: create a labor secretariat to centralize workers' representation, strengthen the CGT (the first if not the second) while encouraging the renewal of its most ideologically marked cadres, accede to the proletariat's historic and repeated demands through a series of laws on working hours and the minimum wage... Finally, the colonel put away his pen and stood up, not without proAlways courteous, the workers' representatives put forward a number of proposals: create a labor secretariat to centralize workers' representation, strengthen the CGT (the first if not the second) while encouraging the renewal of its most ideologically marked cadres, meet the proletariat's historic and repeated demands through a series of laws on working hours and the minimum wage...
Finally, the colonel puts away his pen and stands up, but not without promising to get back to his interlocutors very soon with a series of measures designed to "dignify work".
The meeting ended in an atmosphere of frank cordiality, and the five allies - for we can now speak of an alliance - went their separate ways. Shortly afterwards, Colonel Perón went to see Ramírez to give him a selective account of the meeting.Uninterested in what appeared to be empty chatter, the General-President decided to get rid of the subject by officially appointing Perón head of the Labor Department, with full powers over social dialogue.The position seemed worthless, yet it was precisely the one the man had come to seek.
The new department head's first move was to remove the government representatives introduced into the Railway Union and the Fraternidad movement, then appoint Mercante in their place. Meanwhile, Ángel Borlenghi proposed to the first CGT that it set up a commission for trade union unity, obviously under his aegis and with Perón's blessing - sorry, the head of the Labor Department, i.e. the government.

November 4, 1943
Spy interception
Trinidad (British West Indies)
- The SS Cabo de Hornos, en route from Buenos Aires, makes a routine stopover en route to Barcelona - an understandable pause before crossing the Atlantic.
However, the ship is no stranger to such crossings, and has little to fear from its neutral flag and destination.What's more, she has had many opportunities to test her transatlantic credentials by convoying... a number of Jewish refugees from Europe to Argentina.However, an unusual incident occurred while the ship was docked. Local policemen, flanked by two men with British accents, appear on the bridge with police letters. The crew show them the cabin of one Osmar Alberto Hellmuth - an officer in the Argentine Navy. The men enter without knocking, seize the individual and disembark him. Hellmuth struggled violently, shouting "No tienen el derecho, es un barco argentino!", but it was no use - he was thrown into a car, which immediately took off.
Allied intelligence services have just pulled off a major coup. Through investigations and radio intercepts, they have identified one of the few remaining "Sargo" networks, of which Hellmuth is one of the contacts. This network was headed by Hans Harnisch ("Boss"), an individual who claimed to represent Himmler in person, and who had numerous contacts both in the Argentine Army and at the highest level of government.
The Argentinian officer's trip was no coincidence - he had just been appointed consul in Barcelona, following a direct meeting between "Boss" and General Ramírez! Once in Europe, his mission was to contact Germany in order to obtain weapons, which would have transited through Sweden before being transported by the oil tanker Buenos Aires. What's more, he was also to inform the Reich that an eventual break in diplomatic relations between Argentina and Germany would in no way mean the end of their relations (at all).
In short, his arrest was a bad deal for the Junta, which nevertheless sent an official protest to the British government. Indeed, it seems that Colonel Alberto Gilbert, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Argentina, had not been informed of the true nature of Hellmuth's mission! And after all, hadn't England just violated the Vienna Convention?

November 27, 1943
Christmas in November
Buenos-Aires -
Colonel Perón, ever active in his defense of the peon, has just obtained from President Ramírez the transformation of his department into a full-fledged Secretariat of Labor and Projections.
The man is now independent, reporting only to the President - not that the latter attaches much importance to the matter; it took Farrell's mediation to get him to deign to look into the matter.
With this unobtrusive framework in place, the colonel was finally able to give full rein to his art and win approval for the demands of his new friends: increased severance pay, higher pensions, the creation of technical schools for workers, a ban on "employment agencies" (private bodies whose main business is to provide temporary work in deplorable conditions), the creation of labour tribunals, Christmas bonuses... The regime is bringing forward the festive season! All this while finally giving real powers of control - and therefore sanction - to labor inspectors, and interfering in social dialogues, which for the first time take the form of collective bargaining. Last but not least, the decree dissolving and controlling trade unions was repealed.
Perón, Mercante and their associates are also beginning to organize a new union which would assume a nationalist workers' identity and occupy the vacant niches in certain industries which are poorly defended (chemicals, electricity, tobacco) or overly (or even poorly) defended by the Communists (meat, construction, textiles, metallurgy).

Washington - Meanwhile, indifferent to Argentina's social progress, Cordell Hull used the Hellmuth affair to step up the pressure on Ramírez: blacklisting Argentine companies "sympathetic to the Axis", restricting the circulation of Argentine newspapers, boycotting certain Argentine exports, embargoing electronics, chemicals and oil... The list is long, and what's more, Hull wasn't content with hitting the economy - he also attacked the Junta's wallet! The U.S. assets of 44 Argentine companies have been seized, and their loans frozen.
The State Department has come to terms with Buenos Aires' sincere cooperation, and now wants to force Ramírez to choose: fall in line or leave! The only thing it will avoid is hitting too hard, so as not to interrupt food shipments to France and England - and even then, this tolerance will not fail to remind the infamous European colonialists when necessary.
All these measures were presented to Allied opinion as the logical consequence of the duplicity of an Argentina that was almost a party to the Axis, soaking up Gualberto Villarroel's conspiracies in Bolivia (1) and receiving arms from Germany. Which is obviously ridiculous - whatever Ramírez's sympathies, Bolivia doesn't need Argentinians to be unstable, and Germany is a long way off.

Buenos-Aires - The Argentine government cannot stand idly by in the face of such a storm.
So... the United Officers Group is convened. With a heavy heart, the General-President could only admit that the situation was untenable, and announced that he would break off relations with Germany on January 26. This drew strong disapproval from the most conservative wing of the GOU, led by Perdinger and West.

(1)On December 20, 1943, these shenanigans finally degenerated into a coup d'état, ousting President Peñaranda from power. Villarroel then became (too !) de facto president of Bolivia.
 
Well, you all seem to have fun. So...

December 17, 1943
Diplomatic acrobatics
London -
The Argentine ambassador enters Anthony Eden's office with the apologetic smile of those who have things to make up for. In this case, his protest at the arrest of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth on November 4. In his most charming guise, the diplomat declared: "Sir Anthony, President Ramírez asks through me for your understanding for the unpleasant consequences of the recent incident in Trinidad. He tells you that he was shocked by the recent revelations about the nature of this sad individual. We really had no idea, please believe us!"
Unperturbed by his British reserve, Eden smiled at least as kindly and replied with false cordiality: "It's obvious, Your Excellency. And now you understand why we acted so swiftly, a little brutally of course, but in no way detracting from the warmth of our relations." Sir Anthony remains silent for a few moments, hinting at a slight unease, as if to illustrate the very relative veracity of the judgment he has just expressed. He finally concludes: "The past is the past, we can hardly change it. Now, Your Excellency, what do you suggest we do with Mister Hellmuth?"
The Argentinian immediately resumes, with calculated spontaneity: "But release him, of course! As consul of the Argentine Republic, he is subject to the Vienna Convention and cannot be detained without serious consequences for the future of our country's relations. However..."
Anthony Eden raises an eyebrow. Something brilliant is coming... The ambassador then adds: "... once released, President Ramírez would obviously not be able to keep such a rabble in the service of Argentina. From now on, his letters patent will be cancelled, and Señor Hellmuth will be at your disposal for any action you may deem necessary." The South American smiles again delicately. The Brit replies in kind. As long as appearances are safe...

January 3, 1944
An isolated president
Buenos-Aires -
As the announced date for severing relations with Germany approached, the growing influence of Colonel Perón and his protector Farrell became unbearable for Ramírez's party, as well as for his deputies Colonels Luis César Perlinger, Enrique P. Gonzalez and Emilio Ramírez. Still committed to reactionary Hispanic-Catholic nationalism, these men are now planning to get rid of Farrell and replace him with the now General Elbio Anaya - a man who can always be counted on. Without his protector, this pitiful Colonel Perón is nothing. The party plans to call on all its friends, including General Juan Sanguinetti - one of the leaders of the Buenos Aires province.
Opposite them, Farrell and Perón's national-popular bloc has its supporters - the trade unions, the political parties (in particular Amadeo Sabattini's uncompromising radicals), part of the army (after all, Farrell is its supervising minister)... and the people. But their best asset is obviously Argentina's difficult international situation, isolated by General Ramírez's blunders - the man can't afford the luxury of risking a possible civil war, which would give England or the United States too good an opportunity to intervene.
And this last, crucial advantage is not likely to escape them - today, General Ramírez has just recognized Gualberto Villarroel's brand-new, reactionary Bolivian government. The latter is already proposing to form a neutral bloc with Chile and Argentina: yet another pipe dream that does nothing to consolidate the junta's power, while in the global conflict, Victory has clearly chosen its champion.

January 15, 1944
On the proper use of earthquakes
San Juan (Argentina) -
In this small town not far from the Chilean border in the north of the country, the earth trembles, as it often does. Today, however, the tectonic tremors are much more violent than usual: the city is completely razed to the ground and the surrounding area devastated. More than 10,000 people were killed.
The stricken population was then greeted by a leading figure who was to devote himself to helping them: Colonel Perón, who coordinated the relief effort with his military efficiency and resources. Unable to criticize such a popular man, especially when the government had so far shown little interest in helping the victims, General Pedro Ramírez finally gave in and entrusted him with the task of raising funds for reconstruction. A true showman, the colonel wasted no time in gathering together almost all the celebrities of Argentine cinema, politicians, etc. Success was immediate, and donations poured in: a giant thermometer hanging from the Buenos-Aires obelisk made it possible to track the increase in the amount collected. Perón's popularity was immeasurable - not to mention the network he built up during the campaign! Of all the faces he met during those dramatic days, a pretty face framed by chestnut-blond hair remained in his memory: a theatrical actress named Eva Duarte...

January 26, 1944
Gunboat politics in the age of the aircraft carrier
Buenos-Aires -
Depending on one's opinion, this historic day is either happy or tragic for Argentina. General President Ramírez had simply reached the end of his wait-and-see foreign policy options: the American embargo was beginning to take effect, Villarroel's "neutral" bloc was obviously going nowhere, and the United States was now applying not just diplomatic, but military pressure on the junta. In fact, an aircraft carrier, the USS Bataan, is currently anchored at the mouth of the Rio de La Plata with its escort! Whether the ship in question is simply an escort aircraft carrier, far more modest than the vessels currently plying the waters of the Pacific, is of little importance - the Argentine navy is no match for it.
As a result, and as he had announced earlier, Ramírez had no choice but to summon the ambassadors of Germany and Japan to serve notice of the severance of diplomatic relations with their countries. A decision that quickly spread throughout the armed forces, triggering a number of... movements.
In Rio de Janeiro, Arturo Rawson can't resist sending his former accomplice an ironic and venomous message of congratulations. But he's the only one.
Indeed, to consolidate his power and in line with his personal sympathies, Ramírez had in recent months relied increasingly on Colonel Gilbert's bloc - who could not let the affront of this imposed break with the Axis countries pass. Resignations followed in rapid succession: Hugo Wast, of course, but also Tomás Casares, Colonel Gonzalez and even Emilio Ramírez, the president's own son!

January 27, 1944
Institutional crisis
Buenos-Aires -
Colonel Alberto Gilbert quits the government, deepening the institutional crisis shaking the country. Ramírez's power is seriously weakened: his strongest supporters have now left him and form a tightly-knit opposition bloc with numerous contacts in the army. Exactly as in the Castillo era.
Meanwhile, following the government's lead, the Argentine secret police launched a major raid on German espionage circles - as if those concerned were well known to the relevant services. No doubt this hasty roundup had no other purpose than to prevent certain people who knew too much from ending up in American hands... Becker and Franczok nevertheless had time to escape and go underground: what a surprise, really!
The Bolívar network is destroyed. Installed on Spanish ships moored in the Rio de la Plata, clandestine radios sent out messages on the economy and naval movements at an average rate of 15 broadcasts a day! But now the airwaves are mute.

February 22, 1944
Outdated oath
Buenos-Aires -
In the same discreet room in Puerto Madero as a year ago, a few select members of the United Officers Group are studying the implications of Ramírez's "betrayal". From recriminations to curses, almost all of them agree on one thing: the general is no longer fit to be president. He must therefore be persuaded to leave.
"But how can we do that?" raises a Colonel Ramírez, who is nevertheless a little worried about his father. "We swore loyalty to the President in the name of the G.O.U. last June!"
With a scornful pout, Alberto Gilbert simply replies: "We took an oath under different circumstances and in the name of a group that no longer exists, dissolved by betrayals and differences. We are therefore free of this oath. Mass is said.

February 23rd 1944
Threats
Buenos-Aires -
The GOU group assembled the day before requested and obtained an audience at the Casa Rosada. Behind the heavy doors of Ramírez's office, there is no outburst of voices - but the atmosphere is clearly heavy with threats. As he and his accomplices emerge from the room, Gilbert calls out, "We won't leave it at that, General Ramírez! For them, the man is already no longer president.
 
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February 24, 1944
Viva el (nuevo) presidente!
Buenos-Aires -
Desperate to regain the favor of his friends, General Ramírez decides to strike a blow against the "progressive" bloc: he summons Vice-President and Minister of the Army Farrell to demand his resignation. Farrell left his office with less fanfare than Gilbert the day before, and simply replied that he would give his answer that evening.
And indeed, Edelmiro Julián Farrell returned at 7:30 p.m. sharp, accompanied by Perón, the main garrison commanders of the Buenos Aires province (including Juan Pistarini)... and three regiments, which surrounded the Casa Rosada! The officers entered Ramírez's office and demanded - they too! - his resignation. Realizing that he had nothing to look forward to and no one to back him up, and thinking that an accident could happen with all those weapons, Ramírez complied but did not resign. And he declares that he is delegating all his powers to his vice-president for "reasons of fatigue".
Farrell thus becomes de facto interim president (one more!) in a totally legal manner - but one that won't be announced until tomorrow. As for the members of the GOU, they are all kindly detained at their homes or offices by other officers, who take great care to explain to them that it's very hot in February (let's not forget that we're in the southern hemisphere) and that they could catch severe sunstroke if they went out in this weather! What's more, the new President Farrell has already informed them that Argentina cannot commit itself further to the Allies, which is a very good thing, isn't it?

February 25, 1944
Farrell and Péron at the summit
Buenos-Aires (Palacio del Congreso) -
Acting President Farrell is officially inaugurated by ex-President Ramírez, to everyone's surprise. After the usual banalities, Farrell announces from the rostrum that Argentina "will embark on a new path, with the defense of its own interests as its first principle."
The country is therefore not about to declare war... Which should please the GOU, even if it no longer exists! Deprived of Ramírez, they have lost their main contact in the government and the army. As for Alberto Gilbert, his retirement within two months is official - a decree signed by the brand-new Minister of the Army, Juan D. Perón himself! The former insurgents did try to get General Juan Sanguinetti appointed to this strategic post - but Farrell left them no choice.

Washington D.C. - Cordell Hull could only explode with anger: everything had to be redone! But these pitiful gauchos from the Pampas won't get away with it - the US government has already announced that it does not recognize the Farrell government. So we can expect American pressure, already strong, to increase still further.

Buenos-Aires (Casa Rosada) - For the moment, the wrath of the gringos seems far away, and General Farrell is savoring his triumph. He seems to have neutralized all his opponents in the ring of Argentine politics, and has become, against all odds, the country's strong - and popular (1) - man.
Behind him, on the balcony of the Casa Rosada, Juan D. Perón is also all smiles. Between them, they're going to rule the country! One of them has surely forgotten the lesson of Marshal Foch: "To command, one must decide. To decide, you need an odd number. And three is already too many."

February 27, 1944
German agents far from home...
Buenos-Aires -
From his hiding place, "Sargo" finally manages to contact Germany - to continue his mission, the man makes a list of his needs: radios, money and even friendly ink... In a Berlin under Allied bombardment, the Reich's secret services are hard pressed to send anything to Argentina. But they do promise! And during the last weeks of the Reich, the SS, having replaced the Abwehr, mounted Operation Jolle, designed not only to resupply Becker, but also to set up a new network in Central America and even the USA!
In April, agents Hansen ("Cojiba") and Schroell ("Valiente") took supplies to Buenos Aires. Then they will head for Mexico, supposedly to build a transmitter to communicate with the control station in Argentina. Schroell would then have to smuggle the transmitter into the American Southwest (sic!), find work in a war materials factory (re-sic!), and finally send the information gathered to Hansen in Mexico. This plan, perfectly well known to the Allies through their radio intercepts, will not go any further than the pipe dream it was - Hansen and Schroell will learn of the German surrender in the vicinity of Vera Cruz.
(1) Significantly, throughout Argentine historiography, Edelmiro Farrell is never referred to as a dictator!
 
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February 29, 1944
Adios Ramírez
Buenos-Aires -
General Ramírez still hasn't completely relinquished power - in fact, he hasn't even really resigned! And the man to gather no less than twenty-one generals and officers (including Arturo Rawson (!), Manuel Savio and Elbio Anaya) to discuss a possible coup de force. But the plotters are disunited - they've all already betrayed each other. And Farrell's hold on power is far too strong at the moment, not to mention the fact that it doesn't seem worth taking the risk to reinstate a President Ramírez who has become very unpopular. So, everyone hands over...
This sensible decision was unexpected, given the country's instability - and came as a surprise to many. Not least Lieutenant-Colonel Tomás Adolfo Ducó, who was apparently convinced that the meeting of generals would result in forceful action. So, going a little too fast, he mobilized his 3rd Strategic Infantry Regiment and marched on the town of Lomas de Zamora, south of the capital. There, thinking he was expecting reinforcements, he dug in... only to surrender the next day.

March 2, 1944
The Minister for Workers
Buenos-Aires -
In a long-awaited radio address, President Farrell confirms "Argentina's absolute determination to remain neutral in the conflict". He thus officially became the main Allies' target on the South American continent.
Meanwhile, in his brand-new chair as Minister of War, Perón continued his work to improve living conditions for workers. He launched a new series of measures to accompany the creation of a Social Security system (the INPS), while systematically involving the State in ongoing negotiations with "compatible" unions. Unions whose members now enjoy additional social benefits compared to members of other organizations! The soup became very bitter for the big industrial and landowners: improved safety conditions, limited criteria for dismissal, introduction of paid vacations, maximum working hours and minimum wages - all of which were steadily increasing (1) ... A clientelist policy, to be sure, but the Argentine social situation was starting from a very low base. And Perón was beginning to look like a future president - much to the displeasure of industrialists, who were worried that workers were "starting to look their employers in the eye".

March 4th 1944
Rattling boots
Washington D.C. -
Acknowledging Farrell's neutralist stance, the United States announced that it considered the Farrell government illegitimate and broke off diplomatic relations with Argentina. In the following days, the State Department initiated military consultations with the Brazilian authorities, with a view to a joint intervention to bring Buenos Aires to heel - at last. Positively delighted at the idea of being able to take on their old rivals without fear, the Brazilians were quick to detail not only the power of their American-equipped army, serving honorably in Italy, but also that of their air force, which "could raze Buenos Aires to the ground" if Washington would supply them with bombs!
Churchill and De Gaulle, fearing that the Americans were going too far in their anger, intervened personally to express concern about the consequences of the embargo and a possible conflict in European food supplies. Eden and Blum's departments were busy trying to secure these same supplies with a specific trade treaty - to which Hull was, of course, vehemently opposed. Sweeping aside the objections of its allies, the United States decreed the confiscation of all Argentine goods in American ports, a total trade embargo, the suspension of the right of Argentine ships to call in the United States, and a ban on American ships docking in Argentina. Finally, in a very martial and disturbing statement, Cordell Hull denounced Buenos Aires as "the Nazi headquarters in the Western Hemisphere". Are we heading for conflict in this part of the world? After all, large numbers of troops could soon be available in Europe...

(1) These "catch-ups" mainly covered inflation - from 1943 to 1946, real wages rose by just 4%.
 
March 9th 1944
A new page is turned
Buenos-Aires
- More than two weeks after unofficially handing over to President Farrell, General Ramírez officially tendered his resignation as head of state, as promised. As the man who only relinquishes his post under duress, he takes his revenge: his letter of resignation is a long enumeration of past events and "vexations" suffered, clearly intended to put Farrell in a difficult position. This was the ultimate arrow of the Parthian, for the man was to leave public life forever, dying in 1962 in a discreet manner.
The United States took advantage of this scandalous situation to reiterate that it could in no way recognize Farrell as the legal President of Argentina. They also urged other Latin American countries, Britain and France to follow suit.
In his annoyance, Edelmiro Julián Farrell dismissed the last of his accomplices from June 1943: General Pistarini, who had taken over as Minister of Public Works in early 1944. Pistarini withdrew without protest; he would return to the limelight a few years later to carry out an ambitious construction and real estate loan program (1).

May 28, 1944
All is well
Buenos-Aires -
The Farrell-Perón team is now well established in business, and its associates are criss-crossing the state. General Luis César Perlinger, trying to maintain his position and regain the initiative, remarked in the Council of Ministers that the post of vice-president was still vacant. He therefore proposed the appointment of a former member of the G.O.U. The maneuver was crude and, what's more, far too late. Outvoted in the vote on his motion, Perlinger swallows his humiliation.

June 6th 1944
A fine promotion
Buenos-Aires -
New Council of Ministers at the Casa Rosada. Noting that General Perlinger seemed quite detached from his post as Minister of the Interior, President Farrell cordially proposed that he resign for health reasons. Perlinger willingly accepted. Farrell concludes: "Dear General Perlinger, we shall miss your very pertinent remarks. As it happens, I've given a great deal of thought to your proposal of last week, and I believe I have a candidate to propose for the post of Vice-President. Gentlemen, how about Colonel Juan D. Perón, here present?"
Obviously, approval was unanimous. The unknown colonel of the June 1943 golpe is now simultaneously Secretary of State for Labor and Projections, Minister of the Army and Vice-President. Quite a promotion in one year...
Functioning as a constructive, if not close-knit, duo, Farrell and Perón now set about eliminating the last remnants of the reactionary faction: Bonifacio del Carril, Francisco Ramos Mejía, Julio Lagos, Miguel Iñiguez, Juan Carlos Poggi, Celestino Genta - all of whom left in the following months.

June 22nd 1944
Persona non grata
Buenos-Aires -
The United States, followed by all Latin American countries, expels the Argentine ambassador. Great Britain and France, on the other hand, did not bend to the American diktat - in this period of reconstruction and famine, necessity is the law on the other side of the Atlantic. And the other major Allies were well aware that Cordell Hull's decision was aimed less at embarrassing a moribund Reich than at securing solid economic control of Argentina through a government at its beck and call. However, Hull tried to get them to let go, and several times asked President Roosevelt to intervene directly on the matter! The end of the conflict prevents the situation from escalating.
.........
Argentina finally declared war on Germany three days before the armistice. The Allied powers that had broken off relations immediately re-established them. As for the German spies of the Bolívar network still present in the country, they had all been captured before the end of the conflict - difficult, in these conditions, to speak of real support from the Reich for the Buenos Aires factionalists. On the other hand, American ambassador Spruille Braden spent a considerable amount of time trying to build up opposition to Farrell - an unfriendly act, to say the least. But whatever he may have said in Washington, the announcement of the Reich's defeat provoked demonstrations of joy in Argentina, as in most of the world.

(1) The international airport opened in 1949 in Ezeiza was named in his honor Ministro Pistarini.
 
1945-1946
The end of the crisis
Buenos-Aires -
Of course, the pressure didn't stop when the war ended in Europe. Obsessed with "the danger to democracy posed by Farrell", John Victor Perowne, head of the Foreign Office's South American Department, wrote: "If Argentina can be effectively subdued, the State Department's control of the Western Hemisphere will be complete. This will help to mitigate the potential dangers of Russian and European influence [the Hon. Perowne refers to continental Europe...] on Latin America while at the same time taking Argentina out of what is supposed to be our orbit."
The economic sanctions thus continued for some time, with the US armed forces carrying out numerous maneuvers and simulated offensives in conjunction with the Brazilian army of Getúlio Vargas, who everyone knows was a true democrat - some still debate whether Truman's appointment of another Secretary of State in place of Hull might have finally improved US-Argentine relations.
Despite these troubled waters, Argentina was finally moving towards a phase of stability, after more than a year of coups d'état, betrayals and various reversals. By its very existence, and without even meaning to, Nazi Germany had succeeded in destabilizing a nation and shattering many lives. The butterfly effect...
The Farrell regime continued on its baroque path - it was paradoxical, after all, that a so-called authoritarian regime should have overthrown a so-called socialist government with the support of Western powers, all in order to pursue a left-wing policy! As everyone knows, beyond the equator, everything is reversed. However, this path was not without its pitfalls.
Over the course of 1945, Argentine civil society became tense once again, for what were now exclusively political reasons - supporters of "democracy" on the one hand, and advocates of "social justice" on the other. The latter were obviously gathered around Juan Péron. Taking advantage of the situation, Rawson unsuccessfully attempted his first coup d'état. In the end, however, it was General Ávalos (then commander of the Campo de Mayo...) who succeeded in ousting the colonel from power and deporting him on October 12, with the complicity of a President Farell seeking to save his position.
The sudden absence of the "protector of the people" soon led to a return to bad business practices. Thus, workers protesting the fact that October 12 (a public holiday in Argentina) was not paid - contrary to the law - were told to "Go and ask Perón for it!"
This led to major popular demonstrations, including the one on October 17, organized under the leadership of Eva Duarte and attended by 300,000 people. The demonstrations led to Péron's recall. Since then, October 17 has been known as "Loyalty Day" in Argentina, even though a particularly gracious Juan married Eva on the 22nd of the same month... Ávalos, isolated and discredited, was forced to retire.
A few months later, under renewed popular pressure, Edelmiro Farrell had to announce democratic elections - Perón was elected, of course, and officially enthroned on June 4, 1946. The generous, clientelist policies of the little Sardinian from Patagonia had paid off: the end of the quasi-feudal status of the peons and the thirteenth month aguinaldo were surely not to blame for the votes cast for him. Of course, Mercante was his running mate - but he was simply appointed governor of Buenos Aires, apparently at his request.
Thanks to orders from European nations, Argentina was able to develop its economy and create its "Labor nationalism" - which would later take the name Peronism. This is still well represented in the Argentine political landscape under the name of the Justice Party.
"History will judge all nations by their role in war, belligerents as well as neutrals" Winston Churchill. - Winston Churchill.
 
That's all folks ! (Looney's Tunes theme, for this tragi-comic story, when surprisingly few events are invented). You liked it ? Some wish on theme for next story ?
 
The French Air Force after the "Grand Déménagement'

1 - The Fighters : the D'Harcourt report (August 6, 1940)

Editor's note This document, from the SHAA (Service historique de l'Armée de l'Air) Fonds 1940/14 EMGAA, is the report drafted by General D'Harcourt. d'Harcourt, then Inspecteur Général de la Chasse, to the EMGAA (Etat-Major Général de l'Armée de l'Air), with the help of memorandums from General D.-P. Bloch ("Besoins des unités de DCA et pour la protection des bases aériennes", SHAA, Fonds 1940/13), General D'Astier de la Vigerie ("La défense de la zone de Toulouse") and General Bouscat ("Protection de la zone d'évacuation Marseille-Cannes"), as well as reports written by the officers commanding GC II/4 (Captain Rozanoff), II/5 (Captain Hugues), III/6 and II/7. General d'Harcourt had also held talks with the heads of other units, either in early July or between July 30 and August 3.
This report was circulated on a restricted basis from August 6. Copies were sent to Minister of War (General Charles de Gaulle) and to the Secretary of the Comité de Défense Nationale (Mr. Philippe Serre). An abridged version of this text was presented by General Houdemon, Chief of Staff of the French Air Force, at the August 9 meeting of the Conseil de Défense Nationale.
This abridged version was sent to the British authorities on August 14th authorities at their request, and is now in the Imperial War Archives. The vChapters II and III were forwarded to the USAAC Chief of Staff by the French military attaché in Washington, without, of course, references to the future C1-A40 specification, which was not issued until October 1, 1940. Some elements of the D'Harcourt report were taken up in General D'Astier de la Vigerie Jusqu'au Dernier (Paris, 1947), others in Pierre Clostermann's book Feux du Ciel (Paris, 1951).
 
French fighters at the end of the Campagne de France
This report has been compiled from information gathered by the French Fighters Staff during the last phase of the French Campaign (June 20 to August 5). It reflects
operational experience accumulated during these weeks, but also since May 10 . For the most part, operations against Italian forces in North Africa have been omitted ; they will be described in another report.
This document shows that the officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the Chasse spared neither blood nor sweat to protect and cover our forces. Our losses have been heavy and are still incompletely counted, but the losses inflicted on the inflicted on the enemy were even heavier. Our armed forces and the French people can be proud of what our fighter pilots and their ground crews have done. . The Fighter Division emerges from these terrible weeks as a force that has stood the test of fire and remains capable of fulfilling its duty.
This report consists of four parts:
- The first covers the structure of the Chasse on the eve of the final phase of the Campagne de France and describes its evolution right up to the final days. This part draws heavily on the testimonies of officers commanding various units.
- The second analyses the lessons learned and their implications for future future reorganization.
- The third analyzes the situation of the Chasse in terms of personnel and equipment. equipment.
- The fourth briefly describes the operational deployment of Chasse units on August 5 in the Mediterranean theater of operations.

(signed) General de l'Armée de l'Air d'Harcourt
Inspecteur Général de la Chasse
 
I. The Figthers Command on June 25
The Air Force Fighter Command began to modify its posture from June 11, in accordance with orders from the High Command. According to the new priorities,
the Chasse's task became to protect the orderly withdrawal of our troops to the Atlantic and Mediterranean ports, and to protect their evacuation from these ports. This task had to be carried out with limited forces, since at the same time, as many units and aircraft as possible had to be deployed. Units and aircraft had to be transferred to North Africa to prepare its defense against the defense against the Italian threat. This dual mission was extremely difficult, but the but the officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the operational units gladly accepted with joy, as it enabled them to continue fighting. This reorganization, however, was only possible thanks to the admirable dedication and sense of duty of the crews and ground and ground staff of the EAA-301 depots, who were responsible for sending the maximum number of wartime aircraft in the shortest possible time to the units maintained in mainland France and those raised to operational status in North Africa.
From June 25, as the front stabilized for a while, the situation for the Chasse was as follows. :
- In mainland France, four Zones Opérationnelles had been formed following the creation of the ZOAC and merger of the ZOA-Sud and ZOA-Alpes. They deployed 578 fighters, including 425 fitted for War.
- All other units previously operational in mainland France had been transferred (or were in the process of being transferred) to North Africa. We will examine the situation of the Chasse in mainland France, North Africa and the Middle East separately below.
 
A. Situation in mainland France (June 25, 00:00)
The deployment of the Chasse in mainland France was dictated both by the new strategy and by the availability of machines. The Chasse was to cover the orderly withdrawal of our troops to main and secondary evacuation points (Bordeaux, Biarritz and Saint-Jean-de-Luz on the Marseille, Toulon, La Ciotat and Cannes on the Côte d'Azur, Sète, Port-la-Nouvelle, Collioure and Port-Vendres on the Gulf of Lion). At the same time, it was important to protect what remained of the aeronautical factories and depots.
The loss of Paris and its industries had been a severe blow. However, by June 14, assembly lines and depots in Bourges and Châteauroux were being evacuated to the Toulouse region. This region was home to a considerable number of plants (SNCAM and SNCASE) and depots. Other plants (SNCASO) and depots were in Bordeaux (Cazeaux, Mérignac), Bayonne, Biscarrosse and Bagnères-de-Bigorre. In the South-East, Cannes was still a production center (SNCASE), but above all, the region had been chosen in 1939 to be the Air Force's main reserve zone, and a large number of depots and processing centers were located between Istres, Le Luc, Marignane and Cannes.
It was important to protect production centers and depots to ensure that :
(i) maintain production of the most important equipment (fighters) for as long as possible;
(ii) evacuate to North Africa as many new or overhauled aircraft, spare parts and industrial equipment as possible, to maintain some operational capabilities on site;
(iii) the regular supply of units remaining in France to enable them to fight as long as possible.

1. ZOAN
From the English Channel to Orléans, what remained of General d'Astier de la Vigerie's Zone d'Opérations Aériennes Nord d'Astier de la Vigerie) still had 147 aircraft (110 of them operational).
- Bloch MB-152 GC II/8, at Bordeaux-Mérignac, from Saint-Brieuc, with 24 aircraft (17 operational), including 3 new MB-155s (3). This group was tasked with supporting the forces retreating to Brest, then to defend Brest during the evacuation phase, before being entrusted with the same mission in the Gironde.
Groupement 21, with 90 aircraft (74) deployed at Angers and Tours with : GC I/1, 28 aircraft (24), including 6 new MB-155s (3); GC II/1, 20 aircraft (17); GC II/10, 21 aircraft (17) redeployed to Cazaux and Agen from the 19th; GC III/10, 21 aircraft (16) installed at Bergerac.
- Morane MS-406
GMO (Groupe de Marche Ouest), with 11 MS-406s (7 operational) and a reserve of 4 MB151s (2), formed from ELDs at Nantes, Orléans, Etampes and Cognac and deployed to cover Lorient. They will be deployed to Périgueux.
- Potez 631
ECN I/13 with 8 aircraft (4) at Brest-Guipavas. Arrives at Nîmes-Garons with 7 aircraft.
ECN II/13 with 10 aircraft (6) at Vannes-Meuçon. Arrives at Nîmes-Garons with 5 aircraft.

2. ZOAC
From Orléans to Nevers, the Zone d'Opérations Aériennes Centre, created on June 5, deployed 113 aircraft (80 of which were operational).
- Bloch MB-152
ELD-Romorantin: 5 aircraft (3) at Romorantin. Rallied to Groupement 21.
- Curtiss H-75
GM Haegelen with 13 aircraft (11) at Bourges (GM formed from ELDs to defend the Bourges factories and led by Lt-Colonel Haegelen, a First World War ace who was wounded on June 5). This unit played an important role in protecting the H75 assembly line at SNCAC, until most of the line was moved to Toulouse, then Casablanca.
- Morane MS-406
GC I/6, 24 aircraft (19) at Salbris. Redeployed to Bergerac on June 19.
- Potez 631
ECN III/13: 12 aircraft (7) at Châteauroux. Offloaded to Mont-de-Marsan with 7 aircraft.
ECN IV/13: 8 aircraft (4) at Châtellerault. Offloaded to Mont-de-Marsan with 2 aircraft.
- Mixed units
ELD Salbris with 4 (2) MS-406s and 5 (3) D-510s at Salbris.
GM Centre, formed with aircraft and pilots from the Tours training centers,
Chartres and Clermont-Ferrand. This GM was deployed at Vierzon with 6 MB-151s (4), 5 MS-406s (3), 5 D-510s (3); it was redeployed to Bergerac and Périgueux.
- Dewoitine 520
GC II/7, 26 aircraft (21) in Toulouse, being reconstituted for the defense of the city, where the government had relocated from June 16 and where the SNCAM D-520 factory continued to operate, using the stock components accumulated in April and May. This Group was to receive aircraft used by local defense squadrons such as the DAT-Toulouse squadron and the one formed by SNCAM pilots at Saint-Martin du Touch. Pilots from these squadrons were used to transfer newly manufactured D520s to North Africa.

3. ZOAE
General Bouscat's Zone d'Opérations Aérienne Est (Eastern Air Operations Zone) was tasked with the all-important defense of Burgundy and the upper Rhône valley. It covered the region from Nevers to Belfort and the Swiss border. By June 25, it had deployed 197 aircraft (152 of which were operational). This meant that the ZOAE had the largest number of fighters.
- Bloch MB-152
GC I/8, 24 aircraft (18) at Lyon-Bron
GC II/9, 22 aircraft (17) at Roanne. This group was not to be operational until June 23: severely affected by the air battles between June 3 and 11, it had to be reconstituted in Toulouse until June 21.
GC III/9, 22 aircraft (19) at Bourg-en-Bresse. This group was to be re-equipped with D-520s, without the decision to reinforce the immediate capabilities of the ZOAE. Redeployed to Le Luc.
- Curtiss H-75
GC II/5, 26 aircraft (23) at Lyon-Bron.
- Morane MS-406
GC I/2, 23 aircraft (17) + 2 VG-33 at Bourg-en-Bresse Redeployed to Orange-Caritat.
GC II/2, 24 aircraft (19) at Lons-le-Saulnier. Redeployed to Orange-Caritat.
- Potez 631
ECN V/13, with 14 aircraft (9) at Lyon-Bron. Evacuated to Marignane with 10 aircraft.
- Mixed units
GC I/145, formed with pilots from the Polish Aviation Training Division
(DIAP): 18 MB-152s (11) and 22 MS-406s (17) at Lyon-Bron.
4. ZOA-Alpes
This zone covered the Alps and the southeast Mediterranean coast, including Corsica. It deployed 121 fighters (not to mention the old Br.27 observation aircraft), 83 of which were operational.
- Morane MS-406
GC III/1, 29 aircraft (24). This unit, initially deployed at Avignon-Pujaud and comprising MS-406s previously used by units being converted to D-520s, was to be deployed to Calvi and Ajaccio from June 25 to protect the island from attacks by Italian forces from Sardinia.
ELD Grenoble, 4 aircraft (2).
GM Corse, 9 aircraft (6) at Solenzara (unit formed with instructors from the Académie Aérienne de Salon-de-Provence).
- Potez 631
GC I/16, 38 aircraft (20) at Avignon-Pujaud and Sisteron.
- Dewoitine 520
GC III/6, 29 aircraft (24) at Le Luc and Cuers.
- Mixed units
GAM 550 with 7 Potez 631 (4), 5 MS-406 (3) and 6 Breguet 27 (4), at Calvi and Ghisonaccia
(Corsica).
 
B. Situation in North Africa (June 25, 00:00)
On June 25, the French Air Force had 578 fighters in North Africa, 468 of which were operational. Of these, 516 were modern aircraft (415 operational). Of these, 253 aircraft (234 operational) had been deployed in operational units facing, or ready to face, the Italian forces in Libya. In addition, the Aéronavale 57 aircraft (53 operational) and deployed 40 fighters in front-line units.
1. The breakdown by type was as follows.
- Curtiss H-75: 161 aircraft, of which 114 were operational (including 8 H-751s).
Four groups totaled 99 aircraft (all operational):
GC I/4: 21 aircraft
GC II/4: 22 aircraft
GC I/5: 30 aircraft (including 3 H-75A4/H-751)
GC III/2: 26 aircraft.

To these must be added 62 aircraft assigned to depots, 35 of them in need of repair and 12 irreparably damaged beyond repair during transfer.
The four operational GCs were deployed in Tunisia, against Italian forces.
- Dewoitine 520: 119 aircraft transferred between June 12 and 25 by Air Force and SNCAM/EAA-301 pilots, of which 108 were operational. To these must be added 40 aircraft belonging to the Aéronavale, 39 of them operational.
Three Fighter Groups with a total of 65 aircraft (63 of them operational) were transferred to North Africa: GC I/3, 25 aircraft (24), GC II/3, 18 aircraft, GC III/3, 22 aircraft (21). These three units were deployed to Oran and Rabat, and were to remain in reserve until the start of offensive operations against the Italians. Only the III/3 was to remain on alert to protect Oran and Mers-el-Kébir.
GC II/6 and III/7 were in the process of being converted to D-520s, and were used to transfer as many D-520s as possible to North Africa.
Aéronavale aircraft were at that time the only ones used in operations, by the AC1 squadron (13 aircraft). With the Aéronavale soon to receive its own fighters (B-339s from Belgian contracts), the additional D-520s it received were used to reinforce the AC1. The AC1 squadron has been partly redeployed to Malta under the terms of the Franco-British naval agreement of June 14, but it must also maintain a double patrol (6 aircraft) in Tunis to help protect Bizerte.
- Morane MS-406: 203 aircraft in North Africa, 179 operational. In accordance with instructions from the General Air Staff, received on June 12 and confirmed on June 14, the two GCs operating in North Africa on this type of aircraft were reinforced by two more from the ERCs between June 14 and June 25, and two more were created using pilots from the CIC and the general reserve.
By June 25, 142 MS-406s (126 operational) were in the Air Force's front-line units in Africa:
GC I/9: 29 aircraft (26)
GC I/10: 26 aircraft (24)
GC III/4: 24 aircraft (22) (GC created from ERC 571 and 573 equipped with MS-406 and D510)
GC III/5: 22 aircraft (20) (GC created from ERC 572 and 574 equipped with MS-406)
GC III/8: 22 aircraft (19)
GC II/16: 19 aircraft (15).
The last two GCs, made up of pilots from the CIC and the general reserve, who were in training and could not be considered operational until early August. The other GCs were deployed in Tunisia or eastern Algeria before June 20 and were ready to engage the enemy.
- Bloch MB-152/155: as of June 25, no Bloch fighters had been transferred to North Africa. Most of these aircraft, which were heavily armed but had a limited range, were kept in France.
- Potez 631: a total of 40 Potez 630s and 631s were in North Africa.
Of these, 17 belonged to the Aéronavale (12 aircraft for the AC2). The "naval" Potezes were to be deployed in Malta. The Armée de l'Air had 23 aircraft (13 of which were operational). It had formed an ELCN (Escadrille Légère de Chasse de Nuit) to defend Tunis and Bizerte, with 12 aircraft (9 operational).
- Other fighters
Conversion to the MS-406 released 34 D-510s (27 airworthy) and 4 Spad-510s (3). Local EAA-301 depots held 8 D-501s (4 airworthy) and 6 Spad-510s (4). More interestingly, by June 18, 8 Koolhoven FK-58s had been transferred, along with 5 Belgian Fiat CR-42s. This gave a total of 62 aircraft (53).
2. From June 29, three new ZOAs were created to take charge of the North African air forces and continue offensive operations against the Italians in Libya.
- ZOA-ANO (ZOA-Afrique du Nord Orientale), HQ in Tunis, actually covering both Tunisia and eastern Algeria up to a line running from Bône to Djanet (in the Sahara). This ZOA was the first to be created, with the mission of supporting offensive operations against Italian forces. General Pennes, former commander of the French Air Force in North Africa, was appointed head of the ZOA-ANO.
- ZOA-Algérie, HQ in Algiers. It is responsible for coastal defense in Algeria. This ZOA was created on July 2, under the command of General Odic.
- ZOA-Morocco, HQ in Meknes. Its main mission is the training and reconstitution of air units. Its units must, however, retain certain operational capabilities, should operations against Spanish Morocco prove necessary. To a large extent, this mission was similar to that of the former ZOA-Alpes until June 10.
It was created on July 11, under the command of General Laurens.
- South of the 30° parallel and west of the Bône-Djanet line, the Sahara Command was maintained.
3. The Chasse units were deployed as follows:
- ZOA-ANO
H-75
GC I/4: 15 aircraft (12). At Bône, partially ready.
GC II/4: 24 aircraft (21)
GC I/5: 26 aircraft (24). One squadron on H-751.
GC III/2: 24 aircraft (22).
MS-406
GC I/9: 29 aircraft (26)
GC I/10: 26 aircraft (24)
GC III/4: 24 aircraft (22).
Potez-631
ELCN-Tunis: 12 aircraft (9).
Total: 180 fighters (160 operational).
Naval Aviation units deployed in Malta (AC1 and AC2) are attached to the ZOA-ANO.
- ZOA-Algeria
D-520
GC III/3: 22 aircraft (21), defending Mers-el-Kébir.
MS-406
GC III/5: 22 aircraft (20) at Algiers Maison-Blanche, preparing to transfer to ZOA-ANO (the transfer was effective on July 5, adding 22 aircraft to the ZOA-ANO).
- ZOA-Morocco
D-520
GC I/3 25 aircraft (25)
GC II/3 18 aircraft (17).
These two GCs were in reserve at Rabat-Salé, but could have been upgraded to operational status if necessary.
GC II/6 and GC III/7: groups being converted to D-520s at Rabat-Salé. Their pilots were used to transfer D-520s manufactured in Toulouse to North Africa. These groups were not expected to be operational until mid-August.
MS-406
GC III/8: 22 aircraft (19)
GC II/16: 19 aircraft (15)
These two GCs trained at Meknes and Rabat-Salé. They were to be transferred to Algiers Maison-Blanche on July 15 for operational training, then to the ZOA-ANO on August 3.

C. Situation in the Middle East
GC I/7 had 26 MS-406s (23 of them operational) at Rayak airfield. At the Franco-British conference on June 13, it was decided to deploy a squadron (12 aircraft) to Egypt to reinforce the RAF, which was short of modern fighters in the region.
Other fighters could be deployed to Egypt using the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle, used as a ferry. General Jeaunaud's aim is to gradually increase the strength of GC I/7, enabling the unit to protect vital points and take part in offensive operations against Italian forces from Egypt.
 
II. Fighting in mainland France from June 20 to August 5
This section is devoted to events in mainland France.
In mainland France, within the limits and constraints of the General Staff's new strategy the new Chasse deployment produced relatively satisfactory results.
It enabled the Chasse to maintain an effective presence over the battlefield and the main ports of evacuation until early August. However, after the enormous efforts made between June 10 and 20 by the EAA-301 to bring as many units as possible back to operational level, the availability of good warplanes declined rapidly from early July onwards.
During the same period and thereafter, fighter units deployed in North Africa and Corsica engaged Italian aircraft on a number of occasions, making a major contribution to the success of the ground operations underway in France. ground operations underway in Libya. These operations will be covered in a separate separate report. However, we can already say that the initial lessons from these operations do not contradict those of the French Campaign.
 
A. Situation and activity of fighters units in ZOAN and ZOAC
1. ZOAN

On July 3, the last aircraft of the Zone d'Opérations Aériennes Nord were based at Bordeaux-Mérignac and Marmande.
All surviving MB-152s had been regrouped. Groupement 21, withdrawn to Toulouse, had 45 aircraft (including 31 operational), including 2 survivors from ELD Romorantin, and operated as a large GC. GC II/8, whose survivors had evacuated to Brest-Guipavas on June 22, had received 2 MB-152s from the GMO and could field 15 aircraft (including 9 operational). operational).
On June 17, the Châteauroux-Déols plant, which housed SNCASO's reception area, had been evacuated to Mérignac, where the second MB-152/5 assembly line had been installed since orders began to rise in 1938/39. The Châteauroux evacuees reached Mérignac 5 days later. Thanks to the tireless efforts of SNCASO workers, EAA-301 was still able to record the delivery of 7 MB-152s (sometimes finished with MB-155 parts, notably the wings, which were interchangeable) and 8 MB-155s (6 for Groupement 21 and 2 for GC II/8). A further six MB-155s were delivered directly to GC II/8 without being registered by EAA-301, the Group "serving itself" directly on site with the assistance of SNCASO personnel and receiving pilots. Total production of MB-155s eventually amounted to 23 aircraft. Of this total, 12 went to Groupement 21 and 11 to GC II/8.
The GMO, temporarily based at Périgueux, was reduced to 4 MS-406s (3 operational).
Night Fighter Groups I/13 and II/13, whose Potez 631s had mainly been used as ground support aircraft, were reduced to 7 aircraft (4 operational).

2. ZOAC
At the same time, the situation in the Central Air Operations Zone was no better.
no better. The GM Centre had to be disbanded.
By July 3, the Groupe de Marche Haegelen had been reduced to 9 Curtiss H-75s (6 operational) deployed at Cahors. Within 48 hours, the SNCAC in Toulouse delivered 4 Curtiss H-75s and 2 H-751s, before the group was redeployed to Toulouse.
GC I/6 had absorbed aircraft and pilots from ELD Salbris, and had 15 MS-406s (11 operational) based at Aurillac.
SNCAM workers in Toulouse repaired up to 3 MS-406s a day between June 30 and July 3, and delivered them to GC I/6 by July 6. The two night fighter squadrons (ECN III/13 and IV/13), used for ground attack, were reduced to 9 Potez 631s (5 operational), also based at Aurillac.
Only GC II/7, responsible for the defense of Toulouse and benefiting from the proximity of the SNCAM factory, manufacturer of the Dewoitine, had actually increased its forces with 28 D-520s (24 operational).

3. The creation of ZOAS
The situation of the ZOAN and the ZOAC was such that they had to be merged to form the ZOA-Sud-Ouest or ZOAS, under General d'Astier de la Vigerie. When the enemy broke through the Dordogne defense line on July 16 after intense fighting, it was decided that GC II/8 would withdraw to cover the Atlantic coast, while the other ex-ZOAN units would defend Toulouse along the Garonne and Lot rivers.
- On July 19, the GC II/8 moved towards Mont-de-Marsan. On the same day, the Mérignac factory was dynamited, after a column had left for Mont-de-Marsan, then Biarritz, and another for Pau, with salvageable equipment and spare parts, as well as airframes in the process of being finished, to be used as spare parts stores or decoys on false airfields. Bordeaux fell on the 21st. Over the following two weeks, GC II/8 often had more aircraft than pilots, enabling them to multiply their missions, albeit at the cost of exhaustion. Some pilots from ECN III/13 and IV/13 were integrated, as well as reserve pilots from Groupement 21. The use of MB-152/155 hybrids increased thanks to the presence of SNCASO workers and technicians, who took complete sub-assemblies from some aircraft to repair others. The group retreated to Pau and Biarritz, where its last two operational aircraft were lost in combat on August 4. Its last two aircraft (under repair) were then set on fire by their mechanics. Pilots and ground echelons were able to escape from Saint-Jean-de-Luz thanks to a British destroyer on the night of August 5-6.
- Meanwhile, Groupement 21 had suffered heavy losses when its aircraft were engaged to support the troops defending the Dordogne line. In early July, the MB-152s did their best to support the units fighting in the Brive-Sarlat area, then attacked the enemy columns that had broken through the front line. These fighters from Groupement 21 operated as ground attack aircraft, alongside specialized aircraft from Groupement 18 (GB I/54 and II/54) and a few GAO aircraft (Potez 63-11). These successful, seriously delaying the enemy's motorized units that had crossed the who had crossed the Dordogne, giving our forces time to reconstitute defensive positions on the Lot and Aveyron rivers. But in five days, Groupement 21 lost 17 of its MB-152s to flak.
- The defense of Toulouse was initially a success. The Luftwaffe launched a major raid against the provisional capital on July 6. However, the German bombers were flying unescorted and the raid was a disaster for the enemy. A formation of over 60 Heinkel-111s was detected and attacked first by the MS-406s of GC I/6 and then, north of the city, by three double patrols (18 D-520s) of GC II/7 and one double patrol (6 H-75s) of GM Haegelen, plus the six Belgian Fiat CR.42s! Our pilots claimed no fewer than 25 Heinkel-111s shot down (including 3 by GC I/6), plus 18 "probables" (including 5 by GC I/6).
The enemy had to suspend its daylight raids until July 17, when a formation of Heinkel 111s attacked Toulouse, escorted by Bf-110s taking off from Limoges. These inflicted severe losses on the Morane 406s of GC I/6 (4 MS-406s shot down for one Bf-110), preventing them from reaching the bombers, but the Dewoitine 520s of GC II/7 claimed 8 bombers and 5 escort fighters for the loss of just two D-520s. The Luftwaffe again interrupted its daytime raids on Toulouse until the deployment of its Bf-109s at Brive, from July 20.
Similar events took place in the ZOAE and ZOA-Alps in early July, revealing what appears to have been Luftwaffe tactics. The enemy believed either that they had wiped out our Chasse, or that their twin-engine fighters would be sufficient to escort the bombers until their single-engine fighters were redeployed to the front. Whatever the reason, in early July the enemy tried to hit targets beyond the range of its own fighters, and paid a very high price for it. The intensity of air operations dropped for a while, until the enemy redeployed its best fighters to the front. For a few days, our forces benefited from an exceptionally favorable situation and enjoyed a desperately needed desperately needed respite from the fierce fighting of late June.

4. Evacuating the D-520s and taking stock of the fighting
The defense of Toulouse enabled the SNCAM factory producing the D-520 to produce a further 100 aircraft (and another 20 for parts) until July 19, when the last aircraft left the production line and the evacuation of machine tools and personnel began. These aircraft were transferred to Algeria between June 20 and July 22 by SNCAM pilots from the CIC, and by pilots from D-520-equipped Groups in North Africa.
The latter were flown to Toulouse by Air France D-338s, returning to Algiers via Perpignan-La Salanque in formations of 8 to 12 aircraft, before being flown back to Toulouse by Air France aircraft. The last such shuttle took place on July 20, and the last D520 left Toulouse-Francazal on July 22.
That same day, the operational units of the ZOA-SO evacuated the Toulouse region, where the terrain was far too exposed to enemy attack, and retreated to Lézignan-Corbières, Béziers and Perpignan, from where the last surviving aircraft took off for North Africa on August 2.
That day, GC II/7 evacuated 13 D-520s from Perpignan-La Salanque, 12 of which landed without incident in North Africa. From June 20 to August 2, this formation claimed 41 victories, plus 14 "probables", in addition to 17 victories and 12 "probables" won from September to April on MS-406s and 12 and 4 won from April to June 20 after re-equipment with D-520s, for a total of 100 victories (70 sure and 30 probable). Between June 20 and August 3, the Group lost 26 aircraft (i.e. two-thirds of those put on the line during this period), of which 11 in combat (with 4 pilots killed and 5 wounded), 4 destroyed by bombing raids, 5 in accidents and 6 set on fire by their pilots during retreat.
On the same August 2, GM Haegelen took the same route. It was now down to 2 H-75s and 1 H751. Over the period June 20-August 3, this improvised unit could claim 14 victories and 6 "probables" for the loss of 8 aircraft in combat (3 pilots killed and 4 wounded, including Lt-Colonel Haegelen himself, on June 5).
Due to the grouping of aircraft and pilots, it is impossible to provide precise data on the individual units making up Groupement 21. Overall, however, Groupement 21 claimed 53 victories and 24 "probable" victories, as well as the destruction of over 300 enemy vehicles, including several tanks and self-propelled guns. Only 5 MB-152s and 3 MB155s, guided by a Potez 63-11, escaped from Perpignan-La Salanque towards Ajaccio Campo dell'Oro on August 3. Nine other aircraft, damaged and unable to take off, were destroyed by their pilots.
Three Potez 631s from ECN III and IV/13 managed to reach Algeria.
By contrast, none of the MS-406s of the ZOA-SO survived. The last operational aircraft was destroyed on August 4, while operating from a makeshift airfield near Banyuls. The pilot, then commanding GC I/6, took off to intercept Ju-88s attacking ships involved in evacuation operations in the port of Collioure. He was shot down by Bf-110s after damaging a bomber. The pilot does not appear to have survived.

B. Situation and activity of hunting units in the ZOAE and ZOA-Alpes
1. Operations up to July 9

Operations in the Eastern Air Operations Zone were not very different from those in the NAZ and CAZ.
From June 20 to 25, Chasse units covered the troops defending the upper Saône line, which had stabilized after the fighting at Langres and Chaumont.
When German forces crossed the Saône in force on June 26, ZOAE fighters covered the retreat of our troops and made their presence felt in the fighting north of Lyon on the 28th and 29th. The areas north of Lyon had been evacuated on the 26th; Bron was evacuated on the 27th and 28th. However, German advances were not contained until the Isère, whose bridges had been carefully destroyed and which was now in flood. This new line was to hold until July 10, when our defenses were again broken and our troops driven back towards Avignon and the Durance.
During these difficult days, Curtiss and Morane-equipped units handled most of the interception and air superiority missions, while Bloch and Potez-equipped units were engaged in ground support.
interception and air superiority missions, while units equipped with Bloch and Potez aircraft provided ground support. The complete destruction of the railroads during the retreat between Dijon and Lyon forced the leading enemy units to use trucks for supplies between the Saône and Isère rivers. ZOAE fighters assisted our Groupement 19 bombers and ground attack aircraft as they attacked German truck convoys between July 1 and 10. These attacks were costly due to the intense enemy flak, but they did somewhat disrupt the German logistical train and contributed to the resistance of the Isère line.
On July 9, on the eve of the new German thrust, ZOAE units were already decimated. Those based north of Lyon had been evacuated to Saint-Etienne and Valence, then to Orange-Caritat and Avignon-Pujaud.
GC II/5, equipped with Curtiss H-75s and based at Avignon-Pujaud, was down to 19 aircraft (15 operational), despite the transfer of 11 aircraft from EAA-301 depots.
The large GC I/145, manned by Polish pilots, had been split in two on July 2. The new I/145 flew the MS-406 and the II/145 the MB-152. The latter then joined the other MB-152-equipped units (GC I/8, II/9 and III/9) to form the Groupement de Marche Viguier, with a total of 48 MB-151/152s, 39 of which were operational (these formations had received 22 aircraft left at Avignon-Pujaud by GC II/6, which was re-equipping with D-520s). GM Viguier was based at Valence. Its Bloch fighters were used to challenge air control over the battlefield, as well as for ground attack. In all, they claimed more than 30 enemy aircraft destroyed, with Captain Delfino bringing his total to 13 victories and 4 "probables", and Captain Challe to 11 victories and 5 "probables". Unfortunately, Flak losses on ground attack missions were heavy.
GC I/145 and the other MS-406-equipped units, GC I and II/2, had received the MS-406s abandoned by GC III/7. These three groups formed the Groupement de Marche Dumèmes at Orange-Caritat, with a total of 34 MS-406s (27 of which were operational).
The two VG-33s assigned to GC I/2 for operational evaluation had by then been lost, one in a landing accident, the second set on fire at Lyon-Bron in a fuel pump accident. It is reported that Commandant Daru, piloting one of these aircraft, claimed 2 Bf-109s. Two other VG-33s were administratively allocated to this Group, but the ZOAE and then ZOA-SE commanders, considering the maintenance difficulties of these new aircraft, decided to base them at Istres and then Le Luc, after transforming them into fast reconnaissance aircraft. They were equipped with a Gallus-type motorized camera. Staff pilots flew several missions on these two aircraft to assess the German advance.
The Potez-equipped ECN V/13, now down to 6 aircraft (4 operational), was also based at Avignon-Pujaud, and merged with the similarly equipped GC I/16.

2. Enemy losses
If the ZOAE fighter formations had suffered severe losses, they had also inflicted significant losses on the enemy. As at Toulouse, the Luftwaffe launched several raids against Marseille and Toulon between July 3 and 7, either unescorted or escorted only by Bf-110s. These raids were obviously intended to disrupt evacuation operations and prevent our air forces from reinforcing themselves from the large bases at Istres and Marignane. However, the German bombers had to contend not only with the fighters of the ZOAE, but also with those of the ZOA-Alpes. They suffered heavy losses over the five days. We counted 46 Heinkel-111s, 19 Dornier-17s and 7 Ju-88s destroyed between Montélimar and Toulon, as well as 11 Bf-110s. Doubtless as a result of these losses, raids were suspended until July 19, when the German single-engine fighters began to be redeployed to Valence.
As over Toulouse, we don't know why the Luftwaffe launched such unsupervised or poorly escorted raids. Perhaps the enemy underestimated our losses, or overestimated the capabilities of their twin-engine fighters. Perhaps, too, the Luftwaffe was in a hurry to act against our ports after the Italian air force had failed to hinder our evacuation operations.
Indeed, the Regia Aeronautica had launched several raids against Cannes, Toulon and Sisteron between June 25 and July 1, but these attacks had suffered heavy losses. The attackers generally comprised SM-79 and Fiat BR-20 bombers, escorted by Fiat G-50s and CR-42s. They were regularly intercepted by the D-520s of GC III/6, as well as by the Potez 631s of GC I/16 (especially those based at Sisteron). In seven days, GC III/6 claimed 39 victories and 19 "probables" against the Italians, in exchange for only 5 aircraft lost (1 pilot killed, 2 wounded).

3. The creation of the ZOA-SE and the final battles in mainland France
In view of the losses suffered and the situation on the ground, the ZOAE and ZOA-Alpes were merged at 00:00 on July 10 to form the ZOA-SE (ZOA Sud-Est), under General Bouscat (former commander of the ZOAE).
From July 14 to August 1, what remained of the ZOASE fighter units devoted all their efforts to defending Marseille, La Ciotat and Toulon, operating from Istres, Marignane, Le Luc, Cuers and Cannes. Due to the dramatic conditions, it was very difficult to obtain a full tally of air combat victories. However, GC III/6 claimed 51 victories (and 24 "probable") for the period from July 2 to August 1. GC II/5, equipped with Curtiss H-75s, claimed 39 victories and 17 "probable" for the same period.
The Bloch fighters of the Groupement de Marche Viguier (which had recovered aircraft of the same type previously used for training by the Aéronavale at Cuers) continued to play their dual role as air superiority and ground attack fighters. In the process, they destroyed 25 enemy aircraft and several hundred trucks and vehicles of all types. The lack of Potez 631s led GC I/16 (which had more crews than war-good aircraft) to employ Potez 63-11s, a number of which were in depots at the time. These aircraft had been modified with machine-gun gondolas, ordered at the end of May and delivered in twelve days, which added six MAC forward-firing machine guns to the aircraft's armament. In addition, the Potez used Mouriaque incendiary bombs, which had proved effective against German mechanized units.
GC III/6 was certainly the most effective fighter group in the entire ZOA-SE, with a total of 118 victories and 51 "probables", including 18 victories and 8 "probables" before June 25 (and 11 victories plus 8 "probables" with MS-406s, before the group's conversion to D-520s). The Group's number-one ace was Warrant Officer Pierre Le Gloan, with 25.5 victories and 8 "probable" wins.
On August 1, the decision was taken to evacuate all surviving fighters to North Africa. Including aircraft already in Corsica, 34 operational MS-406s of the ZOA-SE were able to leave France. Only 10 D-520s from GC III/6 reached Algiers (another had to land at Calvi and was irreparably damaged). GC II/5 withdrew to Africa with 8 H-75s.
GC I/16 made the trip with 10 Potez 631s (including 2 from ECN V/13) and 6 Potez 63.11s it had used for ground attack.
used for ground attack. The Groupement de Marche Viguier arrived in Algeria with 2 MB-152s and 1 MB-155 (after a stopover in Corsica); all the other surviving Bloch fighters, which were non-operational, were destroyed at the Cannes airfields.
The VG-33s used for reconnaissance were evacuated to Algiers along with a third aircraft of the same type, which was based at Istres.

C. General assessment
The Chasse units, whatever their status (regular GC, ELD or improvised GM), fought with great bravery and total devotion to duty right up to the final days of the campaign. They performed remarkably well, and claim to have destroyed more than 430 enemy aircraft (around 350 German and 80 Italian) between June 20 and August 2.
By June 20, 578 fighters (including 425 operational) were operating in mainland France. Between June 20 and July 31, 45 to 50 aircraft from EAA-301 depots, maintenance departments or factories still in operation were delivered to units engaged on the home front. At least 280 fighters were lost in combat, around 70 of them to enemy flak. Only 94 aircraft escaped to North Africa or Corsica (34 MS-406, 11 MB-152/55, 11 H-75/751, 22 D-520, 3 VG-33 and 13 Potez 631). The others were destroyed by accident, enemy bombing or set on fire by their crews when they were unable to evacuate airfields threatened by enemy ground forces. Seventy-two pilots and gunners were killed, seventy-five wounded, eighteen taken prisoner and twelve missing.
Until July 15, our fighters effectively protected strategic objectives and evacuation sites. However, overwhelmed by vastly superior forces and exhausted by three months of continuous combat, their effectiveness declined from July 20 onwards. They did, however, manage to maintain some cover over the ports used for evacuation, both on the Atlantic coast (Biarritz and Saint-Jean-de-Luz) and on the Mediterranean coast. The protection of Marseille and Toulon remained very effective until July 21; to a large extent, the Royal Navy's decision to base an anti-aircraft cruiser (HMS Carlisle) in Marseille from June 28 greatly facilitated the defense by providing early warnings.
Despite all their efforts, our last fighter units were unable to avoid heavy losses among the civilian population, either when refugee columns were ignobly attacked (notably when the enemy crossed the Loire from July 21 to 23), or when towns in the south of France were bombed.
Toulouse was hard hit between July 16 and 22; civilian authorities estimate that 3,500 people were killed or wounded during these seven days.
Marseille, Toulon and Perpignan were systematically attacked by the enemy, no doubt in the hope of disrupting evacuation operations. Most of the damage was inflicted after July 20, when enemy single-engine fighters were able to escort the bombers.
Due to the confusion of the last few days and the fighting in the northern suburbs of Marseille, it is difficult to assess the losses suffered by the Marseilles population, but they probably exceeded 4,500 dead and wounded.
The port of Toulon, which continued to operate almost to the end, was attacked from July 26 to August 4. The city was then full of refugees and troops awaiting evacuation. From August 1 onwards, the numerous fires attracted Italian aircraft during the night, which oriented themselves on the glow of the flames. On August 3, an estimate by the Préfet Maritime put the number of dead and wounded from the bombardments at over ten thousand.
Between July 30 and August 4, the coast between Perpignan and Port-Vendres was also crowded with refugees and troops awaiting evacuation. Our air defense was collapsing, as we were down to a handful of GC I/6 MS-406s, operating from a makeshift airfield at Banyuls. German bombers and dive-bombers systematically attacked the ports (Collioure, Banyuls, Port-Vendres) and roads, undoubtedly claiming several thousand victims. The fires raging in Port-Vendres and Banyuls could be seen from far offshore by ships on the last night of evacuation.
 
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III. Lessons from the French Campaign
The Air Force's Fighter Command was subjected to the harshest of tests from May 10 to August 4, 1940. Some very important lessons have been learned and will be studied to prepare the Chasse for the battles ahead.
A. Basic tactics
The French Campaign has revealed some worrying flaws in the basic tactics developed developed since the late 20s. The Chasse staff had been alerted to these shortcomings winter of 1939-1940, and modifications would have been implemented as early as the summer had the situation on the ground not deteriorated so dramatically.
1. Flight formations
Until May 1940, Chasse tactics were based on flying in "single patrols" (3 aircraft), articulated at squadron level into double patrols (6 aircraft, the most frequently used formation) or triple patrols (9 aircraft). A squadron would engage 12 to 18 aircraft staggered at different altitudes. Fighter Groups were deployed in Groupements, the size of which varied according to requirements. It should be noted here that Plan VI provided for squadrons to be extended to 15 aircraft (5 single patrols), giving a group a theoretical allocation of 30 aircraft, plus 2 for the group leader and second-in-command.
These formations have clearly shown their shortcomings. German fighters use a section similar to our "light patrol" (2 aircraft), articulated in a two-section formation (4 aircraft). This formation is the standard tactical unit, and German fighter squadrons operate in formations with a multiple of four aircraft (from 16 to 24). At the start of the war, our 3-plane patrols didn't seem to pose any major problems, as our pilots seem to have been better trained on average than those of the enemy. However, from late May or early June onwards, as our fighters were increasingly outnumbered, the 3-plane patrol became a cause of vulnerability, with each plane finding itself isolated at the end of the fight: it is indeed difficult for one of the wingmen of a triangle formation to hold his position during a series of turns, whereas the wingman of a two-plane formation need not worry about staying to the right or left of the patrol leader.
From early June onwards, some units - mostly, but not exclusively, Curtiss-equipped Groups - began systematically using the "light patrol", transforming the usual double patrol (2 x 3 aircraft) into a triple light patrol (3 x 2 aircraft). According to unit commanders, this formation seems to have given good results, ensuring both flexibility and mutual protection. Captain Delfino (GC II/9, on MB-152) emphasizes that a unit equipped with aircraft whose performance is inferior to that of enemy fighters can only hope to maintain its effectiveness without suffering excessive losses through teamwork; in this spirit, he affirms the value of the 2-plane light patrol as a basic tactical element.
Some unit leaders (Captain Hugues, Captain Rozanoff) even consider that the German
system would be preferable. They strongly support the idea of using a double light patrol (2 x 2 aircraft) as a basic tactical unit, with each squadron lining up three of these patrols (12 aircraft) and a Group 24 aircraft (+2). This avenue needs to be seriously explored.
It should also be noted that Italian fighters still use the three-plane element, and we have found their pilots to be highly disciplined and generally better trained than the Germans. Finally, the RAF also uses a three-plane element as its basic tactical unit.
So, until the results of a more in-depth evaluation are available, we recommend switching to the systematic use of light patrol (2 aircraft), particularly if the proportion of inexperienced pilots in the unit is high. The choice between triple light patrol (3 x 2 aircraft) or double light patrol (2 x 2) is currently left to the discretion of the unit commander.

2. Combat instructions

Until May 1940, enemy fighters were to be attacked in circling combat.
Bombers were to be attacked abeam, to reduce the threat from their defensive and increase the size of the target for the attacker. Weapons were set to deliver the highest projectile density at 300m.
In combat, attacking abeam proved impractical, as our fighters regularly lacked the necessary warning time. Bombers were most often attacked from behind after prolonged pursuit, subjecting our fighters to defensive fire for far too long. Several pilots were killed or seriously wounded. It was only during the defense of Toulouse (twice) and during interceptions in the Marseille area carried out on the basis of alerts given by the long-range detection system of the cruiser HMS Carlisle, that our fighters found themselves in a position to flank the enemy formation. Attacking abeam appeared effective, but it was too dependent on tactical conditions.
Some unit leaders (from GC II/7 and III/6 in particular) suggested that a frontal attack would be a better choice. If enemy bombers can be detected at long range, enabling our fighters (in both Groups, D-520s) to gain altitude advantage, a steep dive allows a frontal attack before the escort fighters can intercept our aircraft. Our aircraft can then break off the fight by climbing, using the energy accumulated during the dive, then loop around and attack again, this time from behind and still diving (to spend less time in the zone of effectiveness of the bombers' defences), before swooping away.
This tactic was used in combat twice, on July 1 by GCII/8 pilots against Heinkel 111s arriving unescorted over Bordeaux, then on July 24 by 6 D-520s of GC III/6 defending Toulon, against an enemy formation of 30 Heinkel bombers and probably 24 escort fighters. At Toulon, despite this considerable numerical inferiority, our aircraft claimed the destruction of 5 bombers, and ground observers reported that four others had been seen severely damaged, fleeing and losing altitude towards Aix-en-Provence. None of our aircraft were hit during the attack.
The fact that German bomber crews are usually grouped together in the nose of the aircraft is a very strong argument in favor of this tactic. Nevertheless, the frontal attack we've just described was only so successful because the D-520 appears to be as fast, or even faster, in a dive than the Messerschmitt 109. Curtiss or Bloch fighters would not have been able to dive out of the way.
The tactics developed by the Chasse before June 1940 did not include ground attack (even though all fighters deployed in units were capable of carrying light bombs). However, the needs of the time sometimes led our fighters to be used for ground attack, both in mainland France and in Africa. When attacking a column of enemy vehicles, all reports stress several important points:
(i) The attack must be pronounced in a 30° to 40° dive coming from the direction of the sun. The 20 mm HS gun is effective even against many armored vehicles when the fire is concentrated on the rear engine hood. Italian light tanks (or tankettes) are extremely vulnerable.
(ii) After the attack, aircraft must clear at low altitude and maximum power. They must never attempt to climb, at least for the first minute. Aircraft with a relatively low rate of climb (such as the MB-152) are safer staying low to the ground than trying to gain altitude.
(iii) Never attack the same column twice, nor attack a column that has been
been the target of another formation a few minutes earlier. Once on the alert, Flak gunners are extremely effective.

3. Armament
Our fighters do not seem to have been adequately armed for all their missions. The 7.5 mm machine gun is effective against fighters, but much less so against bombers, especially if you have to attack them from behind in pursuit. The 20 mm cannon (HS-9 or HS-404) is a powerful, high-quality weapon. Unfortunately, its 60-round magazine doesn't give it enough firing time and, on the MB-152 (where it's not nested in the engine), it readily freezes at high altitude.
The introduction of new American fighters armed with heavy machine guns [NDE -
The author refers to the Curtiss H-81 armed with 2 x 12.7 mm and 4 x 7.5 mm, to be delivered from September 1940] should improve the situation to some extent. The Browning heavy machine gun does indeed seem to be a good weapon. We had originally hoped that 13.2 mm weapons could be obtained from the Belgian company FN. With the fall of Belgium, our forces will have to make do with the Browning.
Nevertheless, a 12.7 mm weapon should only be a temporary remedy. We plan to launch licensed production in the USA of a strip-fed variant of the HS404, developed at Châtellerault last spring. La Chasse continues to believe that ground attack should not be a priority mission for our fighters. Training and preparation for aerial combat must come first.
Nevertheless, one of the lessons of the start of this war is that a fighter unit may find itself in a situation where a ground attack capability will prove useful. SNCASO's proposal to equip MB-152s with bomb-launching forks
for dive-bombing had been rejected in 1939 as unnecessary and threatening to further delay MB-152 deliveries. All fighters manufactured in the USA have bomb launchers for light bombs, which could be adapted to carry heavier projectiles. This possibility needs to be seriously evaluated. French-built fighters all have small bomb launchers designed for the Michelin flare bomb, but which could be used for light explosive or incendiary bombs.
For the time being, we need a good armour-piercing shell for the 20 mm HS gun, and existing bomb launchers need to be modified to accept, if possible, the Mouriaque incendiary bomb, which has proved very useful against armoured vehicles.

B. Communications, detection and warning
In this area, our standard organization was seriously flawed. As far as communications were concerned, it should be remembered that in mainland France, 95% of the Air Force's communications were via the civilian telephone network. While the radio transceivers installed on our fighters were generally satisfactory, communications with the airfields were a weak point.
As for detection, this relied essentially on a system of ground observers, which was far too dependent on the weather. The brand-new radio system developed during the winter of 1939-40 by CSF-SFR teams was very promising, but was only just being tested, notably at Sannois, near Paris. The defense of Marseille and Toulon in July, with the help of the British anti-aircraft cruiser Carlisle, demonstrated the contribution that a reliable radio-location system could make to air defense. It is a real force multiplier, provided that communications between air combat command centers, airfields and fighters in flight are fast and reliable.

1. Improved communications
One of the most important improvements the Fighter needs is the establishment of a reliable communications system between command posts and airfields, and between command posts and aircraft in flight. There is no substitute for a considerable improvement in our radio network and the development of an encrypted teletype system.
The number of transceivers assigned to Army units and able to communicate with those
communicate with those equipping our fighters. These devices must form a network that enables orders to be transmitted quickly and reliably. Too often, during the fighting in June and July, our troops were attacked by enemy dive bombers while we had fighters on patrol nearby, without our ground forces being able to alert our fighters in time to obtain their intervention and the destruction of the enemy bombers.
Even more important, if possible, is the quality of communications between air battle command centers and fighter unit airfields. What would be the point of developing an early warning system if the information obtained could not be transmitted reliably and on time!

2. Improved detection and early warning

The other area where we need to make significant improvements is in the development of a complete detection system, combining a visual detection network and an electrical radio-location system. The RAF uses such a radio-location system in Great Britain, under the acronym RDF (Radio Direction Finding). Royal Navy ships specializing in anti-aircraft warfare also use this type of equipment.
In fact, our fighter aircraft need two different RDF systems.
(a) An early warning system to cover each ZOA to detect approaching enemy raids. Such a system must have a long range. The system on the HMS Carlisle, anchored in the port of Marseille, proved capable of detecting German raids up to 75 km away. A land-based system, whose antennae could be built on the escarpments of the Algerian coast, could have a detection capability of up to 100 or 120 km.
(b) A hunting direction system, capable of accurately indicating the altitude and azimuth of the raid.
azimuth of the enemy raid, is then needed to control the air battle. We now know that the idea, in vogue until recently, of using aircraft specialized in in-flight command is impracticable.
Some French scientists are currently working on RDF systems whose capabilities would
far exceed those of current British systems. It would be possible to have them built by American industry within a year or so. The Americans are also working on RDF systems, which they call RADAR (RAdio Detection And Ranging). The US Navy and the US Army seem to have developed effective "RADARS", and we'll have to seek cooperation with their services.
In the meantime, we strongly recommend the purchase from the UK of several RDF systems of the type in service with the Royal Navy, so as to have at least one early warning system usable for the air defense of Tunis, Algiers and Oran.
This system will be usefully supplemented by the creation of a network of ground observers in Tunisia and around Algiers. The predominance of favorable weather conditions in North Africa will give this network a reasonable degree of effectiveness, provided the observers are linked to a reliable communications system.
In addition, reports from the 2nd Bureau-Air confirm that the Royal Air Force is experimenting with RDF on bombers converted into fighters for interception and night hunting. One of the main shortcomings of our own night fighter is the absence of such a system. It would therefore be a good idea to acquire on-board RDFs of the type used by the RAF.

C. Airfield protection
The effectiveness of the hunt depends to a large extent on the protection of airfields. Fighters are particularly vulnerable on the ground, when they are being serviced or supplied with fuel and ammunition. The need for good airfield protection has been well perceived by commanders. Unfortunately, the situation last spring was still unsatisfactory.
The airfields used until May were generally well camouflaged, but their anti-aircraft defense was weak: usually four 25 mm cannons and a few light machine guns. German air interdiction attacks were only moderately successful, thanks to the effectiveness of the camouflage, but as the situation evolved and our squadrons were forced to operate from less well-prepared airfields, the vulnerability of our fighters on the ground became much greater.

1. Improving airfield flak

In a war of movement, we cannot expect our fighter units to operate regularly from well-prepared, well-camouflaged terrain. While the use of camouflage techniques remains an important element of airfield defense, they are no substitute for good flak. After discussions with the Inspector General of Anti-Aircraft Artillery (General Darius-Paul Bloch), three levels of flak were defined.
(i) Rear bases and depots, or maintenance units, must be protected by a full AA regiment, consisting of one or two
AA regiment, consisting of one or two "Groups" of 12 medium to heavy anti-aircraft guns (75 mm or 76 mm American type) and one "Group" of 12 medium to light anti-aircraft guns (40 mm and 25 mm).
(ii) Main fighter unit bases must be protected by a mixed anti-aircraft
of automatic anti-aircraft guns (8 x 40 mm Bofors and 4 x 25 mm twin guns) and a "Group" of heavy machine guns (12 x 13.2 mm or 12.7 mm twin guns).
(iii) Forward airfields and "satellite" runways of the main bases must be protected by a mixed "Group" with 4 x 25 mm and 8 x heavy machine guns.
Part of the ground staff of each GC should be trained in the use of anti-aircraft weapons until such time as the Air Force can create specialized airfield anti-aircraft defense units. Making flak an organic component of a CG structure should provide flexibility when our units are called upon to move without notice from one field to another.

2. Improving terrain preparation

To sustain operations at a high tempo, the terrain used by the Fighter must be adequately prepared and well maintained, even after enemy bombardment. Buried fuel tanks have been shown to be safe and extremely useful.
Bombing, especially dive-bombing, can damage runways and dispersal areas. Land must be restored as quickly as possible. Air Force engineering units, trained and equipped to rebuild runways and quickly dig pits for fuel tanks, must be set up with civil engineering equipment acquired in the USA to prepare and repair front-line terrain.

D. Maintenance and general organization
Maintenance was another sensitive point in our organization during the three months of battle. Damaged aircraft were supposed to be sent to rear depots, and new ones transferred from local EAA-301 units. This was a long and complicated process, absolutely impractical in a very changing and demanding environment.
EAA-301 procedures were slow and cumbersome, and operational units were often
units were forced to bypass rules and procedures to procure new aircraft. As for repairs, only Herculean efforts enabled GC maintenance teams to keep their units at a reasonable operational level. Nevertheless, the GCs didn't have the personnel or tools required for major repairs. As a result, a large number of damaged but repairable aircraft were lost, usually destroyed by their own pilots because they couldn't take off to retreat.
One solution could be the creation of vast tactical depots, capable of supplying new aircraft as and when required. However, this would imply an unrealistic ratio between reserve and operational aircraft.
Another solution would be to increase the number of GC maintenance personnel. But this does not appear to be any more realistic.
The operational unit managers proposed a third solution. The Wing level (corresponding to the Wing of the British) should be reintroduced, having hitherto been regarded only as a peacetime administrative level. Fighter units would be organized into Wings of three Groups each. The Wing structure would bring together administrative and maintenance personnel, who could carry out major repairs. Aircraft would be grouped and distributed by this structure. Naturally, Groups belonging to the same Wing would use the same type of aircraft. In fact, this solution has been successfully put into practice in the ZOAN by Groupement 21 and in the ZOAE by Groupements de Marche Viguier and Dumèmes.
A unit with 2 to 4 CGs would be lighter than the large Groupements used up to June 5, yet would be able to economically and efficiently concentrate the support units needed to maintain operational readiness under the very demanding conditions of combat. With 3 CGs, the Wing could have 2 fully operational CGs and one at rest each day, whose aircraft would benefit from maintenance work in the Wing's workshops.
With such a system, each GC would have one day of rest for every two days of operational activity.
According to the criteria of Plan VI, the size of the GC should be increased to 32 aircraft, but this development seems difficult under current conditions.
A GC currently deploys 24 to 26 aircraft. If, as explained above, our GCs are to use the triple light patrol (3 x 2 aircraft) as their standard formation, each squadron of a GC could have 12 aircraft and the GC would have 24 (plus 2 if the command aircraft are retained).
A Wing of three Groups would have 72 aircraft (plus a possible reserve of 10); it would have the personnel and equipment needed to maintain them, without the need to constantly transfer damaged aircraft to depots and repaired or new aircraft to operational units. It would be possible to set up large depots deep in the rear, better protected against possible attacks.
Concentrating command and maintenance structures at Wing level would also facilitate communications. In June and July, CGs deployed in March Groups received their orders more quickly than CGs operating in isolation. The very fact that the Groupements de Marche lined up the same type of aircraft enabled the command to better organize its forces and react more quickly to events.
It goes without saying that the French Air Force will study the lessons of the French Campaign with the utmost care, at both tactical and strategic levels. The effectiveness of the Chasse could be significantly improved in the coming weeks if some of the measures described above are effectively implemented.
 
IV. Air Force personnel and equipment on August 5
The continuation of operations from North Africa is seriously hampered by the fact that that the Armée de l'Air had not only lost its industrial and technical base, but also its reserve of human reserve of human potential. If we can buy the equipment we need from the United States the question of personnel is certainly more difficult to resolve, especially as a serious problem was already a serious problem in early 1940. Nevertheless, the evacuation of schools and will make things easier at least until 1941.
Here, we will discuss personnel and material issues as they have arisen and will continue to arise in the months to come. in the months to come.
A. The question of personnel renewal
As early as January 1940, the EMGAA (Etat-Major Général de l'Armée de l'Air - General Staff of the Air Force) was already pointing to the risk of a worrying shortage of personnel if the Air Force was to comply with its planned expansion, taking into account the losses to be expected. At that time, there were 95,959 men (officers, non-commissioned officers, enlisted men) in front-line units and 58,220 in other units (for a total of 153,179), whereas the figures should have been 115,857 men in front-line units and 71,538 in other units (total, 187,395).
We were therefore 18.3% short of the planned figures.
The current situation means that the Air Force will be short-staffed from the end of 1942 or the spring of 1943, depending on its size and the losses incurred between now and then. It's important to understand that we're about to move from a situation where we had more trained personnel than aircraft to one where we won't have enough trained personnel to use all available aircraft in the next 24 months. It is therefore of the utmost importance to preserve trained personnel and build up reserves from all possible sources.

1. Evacuation of trained personnel
In January, we had 2,070 officers and 7,500 non-commissioned officers in training at the schools and training centers where they entered in 1938 or 1939. To make up for the shortfall in personnel mentioned above, 9,250 officers were admitted to these establishments at the start of the year (4,350 as pilots and 4,900 as observers), along with 33,000 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men (some of whom attended technical schools for mechanics).
Of the 9,570 men whose training was well advanced, 8,135 were evacuated to North Africa. One hundred new pilots were sent to units by the Centres d'Instruction à la Chasse between May 1 and June 1, and a further 59 between June 1 and July 1 in mainland France. We have no figures for July, but the reconstituted Centres d'Instruction à la Chasse in Morocco expect 96 pilots to be available for operational units in August, and a further 127 in September.
Of the 42,250 men admitted to Air Force training centers at the end of the winter of 1939-40, over 37,000 were safely evacuated to North Africa.
Schools and training centers are being reconstituted in North Africa.
Primary training is to be concentrated around Rabat and Fez, fighter training in Meknes and mechanic training in Casablanca. Considering the number of aircraft we should receive (see section B, part 3), the number of evacuated personnel should be sufficient until the end of 1941. Depending on the number of training aircraft available, schools and centers should be training 110 to 120 pilots per month from next autumn.

2. Assessment of local human potential
The population of North Africa and the Empire can be divided into Europeans and locals. Europeans alone, or nearly so, have the primary and secondary education required to enter the Air Force training curriculum. Given the pressing needs of the other services (Army and Navy), annual recruitment will probably be less than 10,000 men. The biggest problem will concern non-commissioned officers and specialists.
It would appear essential to work with the civilian authorities to launch an appropriate training program, so as to enable the Air Force to recruit local staff for its ground staff (mechanics, DCA gunners, etc.).

3. Foreigners in the French Air Force
As far as the Fighter Wing was concerned, personnel problems were alleviated to some extent by the participation of foreigners.
(a) Czech personnel
The participation of Czech pilots is very important. Most of these highly-trained pilots and crew had arrived in France before the war, between March and August 1939.
They are now fluent in French and well integrated into our Groups. We hope to retain these excellent pilots, several of whom achieved Ace status during the French Campaign (the best is S/c Svetlik, of GC II/5, with 13 confirmed and 4 probable victories).

(b) Polish personnel
After the fall of Poland, a significant number of Polish pilots managed to reach France. In June 1940, there were 6,855 men in the DIAP (Polish Aviation Training Division), plus 1,103 in the DCA and 385 communications specialists. By this date, 31 Polish pilots had already been integrated into the Fighter Division (most of them in GC I/145).
These men are highly motivated, and some are very well trained. However, their command of French is still limited, if not worse. Given the number of aircraft that the Air Force will be able to bring online in the next few months, it seems difficult to create more than two or three Polish operational units (2 GCs and probably a bomber unit).
We know that the RAF currently has more aircraft than trained pilots. As the Polish government is anxious to reconstitute combat air units as quickly as possible, sending some Polish personnel to Great Britain could be the best solution.

(c) Belgian personnel
A large number of Belgian pilots, crew and ground personnel were evacuated to France in May. Flying personnel alone numbered over 600, a considerable number given the importance of air operations in the coming months of the conflict. Most of the Belgian personnel were transferred to England at the end of June, with the exception of the Ecole de Pilotage, which moved to the Oujda base in Morocco, and a few scattered units in North Africa. A certain number were still in Lyon and Bordeaux on June 20, but they were not assigned to French units (a) because they did not always have experience of modern aircraft;
(b) because the doctrine and training of Belgian crews are far removed from French practices, and in fact much closer to those of the RAF;
finally
(c) because there was a possibility that they might find themselves engaged against Italian aircraft, even though Belgium was not in a state of war with Italy. Belgium's uncomfortable political position regarding hostilities with Italy was resolved in mid-July.
Given these factors, the Belgian government-in-exile is currently studying the optimal distribution of its air forces between the various theaters of operation. It is anxious to rapidly reconstitute at least one fighter unit in North Africa, while a small LeO-451 bomber unit has already returned to operations against the Italians. Negotiations are also underway to create the equivalent of a Groupement de Marche using relatively outdated aircraft, to be sent to the Belgian Congo and then to Sudan and Kenya against Italian forces in East Africa.
The EMGAA felt that Belgian pilots could be integrated into French units as soon as they were properly trained on modern aircraft, since there was no language barrier. However, the Belgian government's aim is to recreate national units, with the allocation of aircraft for this purpose to be decided at government level.
On a provisional basis, we have agreed to admit Belgian pilots to the Ecole de Chasse which has been reconstituted at Meknes. Pilots trained on biplanes (Fiat CR-42 or Fairey Fox) could be converted to modern monoplanes after 25 to 35 hours on transitional aircraft (NAA training aircraft and Caudron Simoun) and 25 hours on modern fighters. Basic training will continue to be provided in Oujda by the Ecole de Pilotage de l'Aéronautique Militaire Belge, which has been able to transfer most of its training fleet to North Africa.
The Aéronavale received authorization to use the Brewster B-339s purchased by the Belgians. These fighters are to be bought back by France. However, they will become redundant once the Grumman G-36As are delivered. The question of which B-339s will remain operational at that time will be decided at the end of this year.

(d) The case of the Spanish Republicans
Several dozen Spanish Republic fighter pilots were interned in France in February-March 1939. In May 1939, General Vuillemin had requested a census of all trained Spanish air force personnel in France. This census was not followed up, but the EMGAA was able to refer to it at the end of June, when the government decided to enroll Republican soldiers en masse in the Foreign Legion.
In early July, a former Spanish officer, Captain José Falco Sanmartin, who had emigrated to Algiers, contacted the French authorities and offered to identify all former Republican army soldiers with flying experience evacuated to North Africa. To date, Captain Falco (with 8 confirmed and 3 probable victories in Spain) has joined the Légion Etrangère, thereby acquiring French nationality.
He has already identified 9 fighter, 7 bomber and 5 reconnaissance pilots, as well as 15 spotters and gunners. It is likely that there will be a total of 30 experienced Republican Air Force fighter pilots, who could very quickly be re-trained on modern aircraft. The Armée de l'Air has offered to recruit these men as soon as possible through the Légion Etrangère, because they have learned French, are highly motivated and have valuable air combat experience.

(e) American citizens
In June and July, a number of American citizens approached French consulates in the United States to join the French Air Force. This raises a serious political issue.
On the one hand, the EMGAA would be very much in favor of setting up an Escadrille, or even a Groupe
Group made up of American volunteers, as in the 1914-1918 war. Hiring these personnel through the Foreign Legion would resolve the legal issue.

NdA :
At the time General d'Harcourt was writing this report, Eugène Jacques Bullard, an American citizen who had already distinguished himself during the First World War in the Lafayette Escadrille and had managed to flee Paris before the Germans arrived, had just re-enlisted in the Légion Etrangère, aged 46. He was about to ask for - and receive - a posting to the French Air Force, but to his great sadness, the latter would only offer him the stick of a transport aircraft. E.J. Bullard served with the 64th Transport Wing until the end of the war - he was then 50 years old, but officially only 40, thanks to an opportune transcription error on his enlistment papers. He goes down in American aviation history as the first "African-American" fighter pilot - in fact, his father was black and his mother Cree Indian.
On the other hand, we know that the US government is very sensitive on this subject, due to domestic political issues (as at the start of WWI), but also because the USAAC and US Navy fear losing experienced cadres in this way at a time when the US government has launched a massive expansion of its own air forces.

On the other hand, we know that the US government is very sensitive on this subject, not only because of domestic political problems (as at the start of the First World War), but also because the USAAC and the US Navy fear losing experienced personnel in this way at a time when the US government has launched a massive expansion of its own air forces.
The possibility of recruiting US citizens into the Air Force, and their possible status, will therefore have to be studied at the highest political level. Nevertheless, the Chasse wishes to emphasize that it is ready to share the combat experience and tactical lessons learned during the recent campaign with the USAAC. American officers from Pursuit Command have already been invited to North Africa to visit our training centers.
In short, the Armée de l'Air will have enough trained personnel to fill the ranks of the Chasse units until the end of 1941, considering the planned aircraft deliveries and the number of students evacuated to North Africa. However, by late 1942 or early 1943, a shortage of experienced European personnel will become apparent. It is therefore of the utmost importance to develop a training and recruitment program among the local population, in order to make up for this shortfall as far as possible.

B. Current equipment
The Fighter Division, like the other branches of the Air Force, will have to fight without the support of the national industrial base.
support of the national industrial base. Although several hundred fighters have been successfully evacuated to North Africa, their simple maintenance raises serious problems, especially for aircraft manufactured by the now-destroyed national industry, even though repair and maintenance workshops are being set up in AFN.
To date, the Chasse's equipment comprises four main types of fighter: the MS406, D-520 and Potez 631, all French-built, and the Curtiss H-75/751, built in the USA. Other types exist in smaller numbers, such as the MB-152/155 evacuated in the final days, or the D-501/510 and Spad 510, outdated aircraft that equipped the ERCs based in North Africa until June.
During the evacuation, a number of engines and spare parts were secured. SNCAM personnel evacuated the machine tools and plans needed to keep the D-520s operational for some time. However, stocks of Hispano-Suiza 12Y engines in North Africa are very low. The question does not concern the MS-406, because even before June, several dozen HS 12Y-31 engines intended for this aircraft had been sent to North Africa, and others could have been transported there in June-July. Today, however, we have too few HS 12Y-45 or 12Y-49 engines for the D-520. The only solution would be to purchase, via neutral but friendly countries (Yugoslavia or Greece), similar engines built in Switzerland by the Saurer company. This company is also due to start production of the 12Y-51, which was to power the D-523. Prior to the evacuation, D-520 no. 45 had tested the 12Y-51 engine, and the definition of the D-523 has now been finalized.
If we can procure a sufficient number of Saurer-built 12Y-51s, it would be possible to convert some of the evacuated D-520s into D-523s, thus recovering 12Y-49s to extend the operational life of the unconverted D-520s.
The situation is, of course, better for the Curtiss H-75s. Assembly equipment was moved, first from Bourges to Toulouse, then to North Africa. Assembly of the newly-arrived Curtiss H-75 and H-751 was able to resume in Casablanca on July 26.
We also expect deliveries of the new Allison-powered Curtiss H-81 to start in the coming weeks.
We will now examine the situation by aircraft type.
 
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