Please explain how the allies where weaker still than the Germans in 1938.
Perhaps, it would be worth it to read my other posts in this thread. I have already gone over this extensively.
IMO the big beasts are Germany and France. France has had unbroken conscription and armaments production since WW1. Germany has not. The biggest year of German rearmament pre WW2 was 1939.
What matters is how the relative production between France and Germany changed over time, not how German production in and of itself changed over time. French armament production, while it had never ceased, had languished pretty badly during the late-20s and early-30s and this was only starting to be dealt with by the time of Munich. What's more, much of those armaments were obsolescent (as I've repeatedly observed almost all the French tank park were still WW1 FT-17s). By comparison, Germany had several years of all out rearmament and it showed in the balance of power, with Germany having not just much more weaponry but much more modern weaponry. In 1938, German arms production outstripped French massively. In 1939 they were neck-in-neck. By early-1940, the French had clearly pulled ahead. And the weapons produced in 1939 and 1940 were vastly more modern then the obsolescent designs that dominated the production lines as late as 1937. As for conscription... well, after their conscription term, French soldiers went into the ready reserve from which they would be called back to service in times of war. This happened in 1938 during the Munich crisis and obviously in 1939 after France declared war. The French plan was always to use the peacetime army as the seed for a massive expansion, which was unfortunately part of the problem as it meant the French army would be a defensive force with no immediate offensive capability. This is why France was unable to intervene in the Rhineland in 1936, greatly restricted her options at Munich in 1938, and prevented her from taking offensive action to relieve the Poles in 1939.
Here's what Robert Doughty has to say about the laws in "The Seeds of Disaster, the development of French Army doctrine, 1919-1939":
"In June 1920, the council unanimously adopted a resolution stating that the army required forty-one active French divisions, six as part of the army of occupation in Germany and thirty-five on the national territory if it were to ensure France's security. This figure did not include the five Algerian and three colonial divisions, and it assumed the French would eventually mobilize to 80 divisions if there was a war. In December 1920, the government forced the council to accept thirty-two active French divisions, but discussions continued through 1922. In May 1926, the Superior Council reluctantly accepted twenty active divisions, but it added the qualification that 106,000 career military were necessary." [Doughty, p.30]
These reductions corresponded in reductions of conscript service from two years in 1921, to 18 months in 1923, and finally one year in 1928. These reductions drastically slashed the number of French soldiers that could be considered available for combat. By 1933 France had only 226,000 soldiers rated capable of being used to defend the country (out of 320,000 stationed in France), just barely half Germany's treaty-mandated 100,000 force. Except the German force was highly trained and relentlessly professional due to its long service, and most of the French force was made up of short term one-year conscripts suitable for nothing beyond defense.
The French adoption of less flexible and more static infantry doctrine was directly related to the declining quality of their soldiers. Realizing that their army would be weak on even basic soldier skills, the French sought to minimize the manuevers it would be asked to conduct. Unfortunately this simplicity was then permanently written into doctrine, and became very hard to break out of once the French started fielding more capable, better trained formations. France did still have 100,000 active duty soldiers (significantly lower than the 150,000 figure the Superior Council had initially wanted), but these were intended to be the cadre around which the larger army formed. Using them to fight a war would risk France's ability to conduct her planned mobilization.
With the adoption of the one year conscription term, rigid limits were placed on French training of reserves after they left their active duty term, and these limits persisted after the two-year term was reinstated in 1935. These restricted training to just two three weeks periods over sixteen years while in the first active reserve. This would not have been adequate even to refresh basic soldier skills, never mind train for complex combat conditions. By the eve of war the army had managed to extend this somewhat, and French reserve officers received three weeks of training every two years, which was only marginally less aberrant. These were the troops who would make up the mass of the French army come a major war but the sharply limited amount of reserve training meant they would be virtually useless when first called back to service, and their effectiveness would very much depend on the training they were able to conduct once called up.
With the Munich crisis, some 750,000 reserve soldiers and 25,000 reserve officers were called back to service. At this point the French realized things were getting serious and war with Germany was a very real possibility, so reserve training became more frequent and more focused. The effect is debated (some formations benefited more than others) but it did give the French an extra year of preparations before the hammer fell on Poland.
You must admit that this was influenced by the capture of the significant Czech industries and resources.
Some of it. And some of the Czech industries and resources may still be captured intact. But then Germany didn't capture Poland perfectly intact and still had enough left under it to turn around and knock out what were by then much stronger Anglo-French forces.
This is markedly difference to the growth of the German Army which would struggle to expand without the 1938/9 conscripts and the equipment of the 39 well armed Czech divisions that layer down their arms without a fight.
While the quantity of captured, there will still likely be a substantial number given that many Czech formations would still be trapped in the border fortifications and forced to surrender much as the French or Polish divisions who were encircled and had to surrender did. I don't see why the German Army wouldn't get the conscripts they did in 1938/39, given that those were raised overwhelmingly in German territory.
It is only in the organisation of tanks and the strength of the luftwaffe that the germans have a clear advantage.
A totally unsubstantiated post. The German army constituted 65 divisions combat-ready divisions in 1938. The French had around 40 total, of which only 22-23 were combat-ready. The British had two, none of which were combat-ready. The preponderance of conventional power clearly favored the Germans.
I am also not convinced as I have posted above that a weaker France would make the same mistakes as in 1940. They are unlikely to rush into Belgium which make sure the Sickle Cut (again by no means likely) would be fought very differently.
Perhaps, perhaps not. That's where things hinge, rather more then anything which happens in Czechoslovakia.
I would also point out the German generals where so appalled by the possibility of war with France in 1938 they considered a coup against Hitler and the Nazis in an attempt to save Germany from certain defeat. Admittedly I think a good pinch of salt should be sprinkled about such claims as they where made after the war by officers who where desperate to appear to be "good germans". But as the saying goes there's no smoke without fire.
A minority of German generals were so appalled by the possibility of war and considered a coup, but even at the time they acknowledged such a move would be unpopular and unlikely to succeed. Given that many of them flinched from later coup attempts. Most of the German generals were nervous about the prospect of war, but they didn't.
OTL the battle for France was so implausable if I was to write a time line with one side getting so much luck I would be accused of w##king and probably asked to move it to ASB. Here we can only go by reasonable assumptions and the situation is very different in 1938 than the perfect storm of 1940.
Given the relative strengths and weaknesses of each army, by the time the battle had started on May 10th the German victory didn't require luck at all and indeed was entirely predictable. The Germans only got "lucky" in the run-up to that battle, in that they chose a good plan and the French chose a plan that very much played into that. IATL, the French may not be so hasty, but then the Germans headstart in armaments and training/doctrine still leaves them with a bit of extra leeway so it's still a bit up in the air how the chips fall.