Fall Grun 1938: Are Germany's early-war odds really worse than OTL 1939?

Hence why I reckon on 2-3 months (let's average it out to 75 days) for Czechoslovakia to be completely conquered. I suspect Hungary will join in the action which might shorten the time frame from say 2-3 months to 45-60 days.
Well Hungary after breaking light fortifications which with lack of artillery and ammunition could be challenging itself and sizing lowland will hit foothills itself. Of course railway connection to Romania will be disturbed as railway was especially in eastern part running close to border.

Interesting would be what Romanians would do. They were not very excited about war against Germany but they were not exactly excited about Hungary reclaiming some of former A-H territories either. They even put troops on allert in March 1939 when Hungary started to occupy rest of Ruthenia.

It is quite possible Hungarians would join only where Czechoslovak collaps is imminent. And Hungarians itself were not to excited about war agains France and Britain OTL. Actually did a lot to avoid it till 1941. Heck their PM committed suicide over them joining war against Yugoslavia.
 
1938 Czechoslovakia would not be simply 1939 Poland's substitute. With no doubts Germans would crush Czechoslovakia, but then they'll need to crush Poland too (which they'll surely be able to do also) and only then against France. For Polish military junta alliance with France was crucial, and belief, that Germans are doomed in war against France & UK was strong. So instead of one, Germans would need two campaigns in the East before turning against France. In meantime they'll need to made pact with Stalin to ensure his neutrality.
 
Well Hungary after breaking light fortifications which with lack of artillery and ammunition could be challenging itself and sizing lowland will hit foothills itself. Of course railway connection to Romania will be disturbed as railway was especially in eastern part running close to border.

Interesting would be what Romanians would do. They were not very excited about war against Germany but they were not exactly excited about Hungary reclaiming some of former A-H territories either. They even put troops on allert in March 1939 when Hungary started to occupy rest of Ruthenia.

It is quite possible Hungarians would join only where Czechoslovak collaps is imminent. And Hungarians itself were not to excited about war agains France and Britain OTL. Actually did a lot to avoid it till 1941. Heck their PM committed suicide over them joining war against Yugoslavia.
Most likely Hungarian involvement would be limited to opportunistic land grab, when Czechoslovakia is finished. I'd compare their situation to Lithuanians in 1939. Lithuanians wanted Vilnius, but at the same time they expected France & UK to ultimately win the war, so they have not joined Germans in invasion of Poland.
 
One question I raised, aimed at someone I took to be a French citizen who might know in great detail, but really is out there for everyone--how did the French political leadership of spring and summer 1938 differ in attitude and interests from those in charge in late summer and early Sept 1939? ...
But will capitulation to German rule follow, or will the 1938 government take as much French force that survives to Britain or Algeria and perhaps even ...

Thats a long and complex question. Two items were:

In August 1939 the French leaders were completely convinced the nazi government was completely untrustworthy. Many people forget the German occupation of Prague, and replacement of the Cezch government with a German governorship, was a complete abrogation of the spirit of the Munich agreement, if not the letter. Renaud & his cabinet had zero confidence that any further treaties or agreements with Germany would be of any value.

Ten months had brought France closer to the level of military readiness Gamelin & his peers promised. The government were hearing reassuring reports about progress in rearmament. On of the reasons the French acquiesced in betraying Benes government were the pessimistic report on readiness from Gamelins office in the summer and autumn of 1938. In August 1939 Renaud could look at reports of great things to expect late in 1939, and greater things in 1940.

There were a lot of other factors, but these two appear often in the internal correspondence of the Cabinent, and records of the Deputies.
 
Interesting, because those are the same books from which I have drawn my evidence.

Well, we certainly have very different interpretations

Well, it enabled a French corps to repeatedly repel a Pazer corps, with the support of only a couple small tank battalions. No DCR, DLM, or Mech cavalry were present there."

...

The French formations at Gembloux were largely infantry and artillery. Active and A series formations that existed in 1938.

This is flat out wrong. The French 1st Army, which was dispatched into the Gembloux gap, alone included no less then all three DLM divisions: the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd.

The battle in the Gembloux gap ran from the 15th thru 17th May. The 2d & 3rd DLM along with the corps support group had passed into reserve and did not participate in the repulsion of the 3rd & 4th PzDiv. That they were under operational control of 1st Army is irrelevant to that they played a insignificant role in the inability of the two Pz Div to penetrate the main defense zone of the defending corps.

The 1st DLM had been part of the 7th Army & raced off the Breda Holland. It and its paired mortar infantry division were detached later. they had not moved to 1st Army zone by the 15th, and were not involved in any significant fighting until after the 17th, further east and to the rear of the 1st Army flank. Nowhere near the Gembloux battle.

The 1st and 2nd would go on to engage the Germans in a major tank battle at Hannut, ...

"Go on to" ? The time line is not right here. That battle at Hanaut, fought on the 12th & 13th May, before the Gembloux battle, was over 70 kilometers east of Gembloux, involved none of the other formations of the 1st Army. This battle had a different date and location the fight of the French corps vs the 3rd & 4th Pz Div

Thanks for the following. I've been away from my library & unable to provide these numbers.

I am curious where you get the figure for only 100 modern tanks in the French arsenal in 1938. Not counting the proliferation of FT's (most if not all where produced post WW1 by the way) which although better armoured was inferior to the Pz 1 the French had a number of modern types either produced, in production or entertainment production in 1938.

After some simple serching online including tank_encyclopaedia.com and with mild embarisment wikipedia (have started my letter to Santa asking for some proper books about the French army pre WW2) I have come up with some rough numbers of French tanks in 1938.

R35 580+ (unlikely all completed by Jan 1938)
H35 100+ (100 in service in 1937)
D2 50
AMR35 in production (187 built between 1936 and 1939)
B1 in production from 1935
S35 in production from 1936 (very slow tank production with 430 built before the war)
Limited production runs of very light tanks.

I suppose if one considers all these obsolete tanks. Not like the ultra modern MkI which was designed after most of the French models listed above. IIRC Germany had all of 250 of the MkIII & MkIV models operating in the autumn of 1938. Leaving the bulk of its Pz waffle as MkII

All of these tanks have their strengths and limitations particularly the one man turrets and the poor armour penetration of the short 37mm canons on the R35's and H35's (although not such a problem when going up against Panzer 1's and 2's)

Rommels command tank was knocked out on 14 May by a lowly 25mm AT gun, (His testimony). a look at the actual armor of the MkII & MkIII models in 1938 shows the French 37mm cannon was not so inferior.

Another reason armour penetration wasn't seen as such an issue by the French was that the majority of these tanks where designed to support the infantry in the attack against heavily fortified defenses. It seams incomprehensible that an army that is as passive as you state would develop tanks with such an offencive funcion. Surely if they where only preparing for a linear defence they should have developed heavy tanks with big high velocity guns to destroy attacking armour at a distance like the germans did after 1942.

The above underscores the fact that no one was expecting the campaign to revolve around battles between tanks. The Germans planned on stunning and dodging around defenses to disrupt and demoralize. The French in 1938 expected a artillery weighted combined arms battle of bite and chew attacks to neutralize or destroy the defense.

...Surely if they where only preparing for a linear defence they should have developed heavy tanks with big high velocity guns to destroy attacking armour at a distance like the germans did after 1942.

Beyond that their doctrine made use of the plentiful 75mm guns to reinforce the regimental AT guns. One of the most misunderstood items in French doctrine was the use of a portion of the divisions artillery to provide direct fire support to the clusters of AT guns. One or two battalion groups of 75mm guns were placed between 500 & 1000 meters behind the AT gun nests. From there they could either do their usual indirect fire missions against distant targets, or make short ranged supporting fires against the targets of the AT guns. The French expected the primary engagement zone of the AT guns to be between 200 & 500 meters, with any supporting 75mm guns attacking from 500 to 1500 meters range. Against a 1938 MkII, III, or Mk IV either in penetration or Joules energy on impact of a 75mm projectile, the hit is effective.[/QUOTE]
 
IIRC Germany had all of 250 of the MkIII & MkIV models operating in the autumn of 1938. Leaving the bulk of its Pz waffle as MkII

Only 30 Panzer III A,B, C, by Fall 1938 and and 40 D models were built before October 1939, they were desperately looking for a suspension solution before the 'E' Model and Torsion bars were developed enough to be considered reliable in 1939 with the 'E' model. the first three models only had 16mm armor maximum, and 30mm with the 'D', and had suspension setup similar to the 6 Tonner.

Panzer IV was more reliable and numerous at this time, and 77 'A' and 'B' built by the introduction of the 'C' model in October 1938, and had 30mm from the start.

The Panzer III was really lackluster for the first models, only saving grace was decent radio gear, and was roomy for its 5 man crew. Other than that, a bad tank for late 1930s.
 
The French expected the primary engagement zone of the AT guns to be between 200 & 500 meters, with any supporting 75mm guns attacking from 500 to 1500 meters range. Against a 1938 MkII, III, or Mk IV either in penetration or Joules energy on impact of a 75mm projectile, the hit is effective

Ammunition :
Obus de rupture Mle1910M (APHE)
Caliber : 75x350R mm
Weight of projectile : 6.400 kg (90g explosive)
Length of projectile : 239.5mm
V° = 580 m/s
Practical AT range : 800-1000m
Penetration : 71.5mm /0° at 100m and 61.5mm /0° at 500m

Obus perforant AL (Allongé Lefèvre) Mle 1916 (APHE)
Caliber : 75x350R mm
Weight of projectile : 7.445 kg (350g explosive)
Length of projectile : 348mm
V° = 575 m/s
Practical AT range : 800m
Maximum range : 9500m
Penetration : 40mm /30° at 400m

Obus perforant AL (Allongé Lefèvre) Mle 1918 (APHE)
Caliber : 75x350R mm
Weight of projectile : 7.320 kg (325g explosive)
Length of projectile : 297mm
V° = 575 m/s
Practical AT range : 800m
Maximum range : 9500m
Penetration : 40mm /30° at 400m
 
Thats a long and complex question. Two items were:

In August 1939 the French leaders were completely convinced the nazi government was completely untrustworthy. Many people forget the German occupation of Prague, and replacement of the Cezch government with a German governorship, was a complete abrogation of the spirit of the Munich agreement, if not the letter. Renaud & his cabinet had zero confidence that any further treaties or agreements with Germany would be of any value.

Ten months had brought France closer to the level of military readiness Gamelin & his peers promised. The government were hearing reassuring reports about progress in rearmament. On of the reasons the French acquiesced in betraying Benes government were the pessimistic report on readiness from Gamelins office in the summer and autumn of 1938. In August 1939 Renaud could look at reports of great things to expect late in 1939, and greater things in 1940.

There were a lot of other factors, but these two appear often in the internal correspondence of the Cabinent, and records of the Deputies.

Thanks for paying some attention, but the core issues I was hoping someone knowledgeable about late 1930s French politics are still not being addressed. This is all entirely in the question of semi-technical responses to Hitler's actions, relating to politics indeed in the sense of people knowing Hitler cannot be bargained with.

On the other hand, it is my perception that a great deal of French defeatism came from a place of political conservatism--to wit, a big segment of French public opinion, particularly within the conservative faction of the military, that more or less fascist authoritarianism was actually a good thing. Post-capitulation these politicians, most notoriously Laval, and more tragically Petain, were naturally elevated by Hitler to power and were left with some freedom to pursue a reactionary agenda insofar as it met with Nazi approval. That some French officers of high rank were in these circles, including of course General Petain, is quite notorious. Similarly the Czechoslovak regime was, per Munich terms, purged of the perhaps somewhat counterproductive but definitely resolved in patriotism Benes, who had to flee into exile before Hitler ended the drama by overt invasion--at that point the reduced defenses were quite incapable of repelling the Wehrmacht in any meaningful sense, quite aside from issues of defeatism, but it is also true that the regime in Prague was handpicked by German approval to favor rolling over for him.

Fascism is a funny thing of course, as might be expected of something so very perverse. Its logic, such as it is, is premised on ultranationalism, so that one might suppose that the most resolute enemy of German fascism in France would be French fascists. But in fact despite the fundamental logic of ultranationalism, Hitler's Naziism, expressed in purest form in the SS, was flexible enough to incorporate a backdoor form of internationalism via the Aryan ideology, which dismissed democratic norms categorically but substituted a scientifically as well as morally insane racism that could be held, by people flexible enough, to allow for cherry-picking an elite minority within any nation as sufficiently racially "pure" enough to serve as privileged subjects of the greater Reich. The SS thus went about recruiting people of all their conquered territories as "hidden Aryans" and inducting them into military groups as the Waffen-SS, and promoting "volunteers" (and I do suppose most of them were volunteers in the ordinary sense) for their crusade against the Soviets--even ethnic Russians could be so recruited as Vlasov's infamous corps demonstrates.

My question about 1938 versus 1939 stems from the OP premise--I can't be arsed to read it again right now and the widespread assumption Britain too is in the anti-Reich alliance might be unwarranted, but the entire premise of this thread is that for whatever unexplained reason, the French government of 1938 stands by their treaty with CZ rather trying to weasel out. We can agree to disagree about how wise or unwise it was for the two dominant western "satisfied" colonial superpowers to defer conflict by more than a year (or at least a year, if we take to the widespread but not OP mandated assumption Hitler waits until inconclusive negotiations fail, until September or October, rather than simply attacking in May with no warning as I think he would have done if he had been as confident as some here he enjoyed real superiority so early). But certainly France had a clear treaty obligation, and while shrewd and cold-blooded studies of the subjective preparedness of German versus Western and CZ soldiers to fight, and the respective kit and doctrine in hand, might show the western alliance as much weaker than they looked on paper, certainly France still had a massive paper strength that it would hardly be reasonable to expect Hitler to be able to overturn as handily as he did OTL. So the OP has some homework to do accounting for an ATL French decision not to be daunted and declare that Hitler had already done plenty to demonstrate untrustworthiness and an insane aggression that needed to be sharply checked--but certainly these things were already facts, Munich or no Munich. The occupation of the Rhineland, the Anschluss involving as it did the assassination of the established ruler of Austria and violation of the Versailles imposed strategic separation of German lands into two nations, along with repudiation of Versailles itself, the military buildup itself far past levels of reasonable capacity for self defense (not disputing that Versailles levels were insufficient for that--that was kind of the point after all!) and the expressed principle of Germans needing to be brought into the Reich, which had deeply ominous implications for all nations of southeastern Europe (for ethnically and culturally German population centers were scattered all through the southeast of the entire continent, indeed even deep in Soviet territory as far east as the Volga)--were all ample for someone who regarded the fascist way as repugnant and inhumane and inimical to Enlightenment civilization, and should also be ample for the most pragmatic patriot with no regard for such lofty ivory tower ideals but with a shrewd eye on strategic balance of power. France depended in part on massive self-armament in the form of the universal levy en masse of the male citizenry as trained conscripts who had all done some years service in the national army, but also on a system of alliances with numerous Eastern European nations, notably Poland and Romania, not just against the rise of German power but originally as a mutual interest buffer against Soviet power. The alliance with Czechoslovakia was key; however much one might prove the improvement of real French capacity in terms of training, doctrine, and arms over the year that France bought with sacrificing that, the fact remains that France was ignominiously defeated in detail once German power turned west. We have a much harder time measuring the effect of morale, but certainly it cost France a great deal of self-respect to trade off the fate of the people of Czechia and Slovakia, and shook the confidence of all her other client states in the east. I think we cannot set morale at naught.

Concretely in France, we see in OTL's failed resistance a lot of evidence of inflexible thinking along with defeatist panic, and much of that is the fish rotting from the head down, as is proverbially generally the case. There is some plausibility to the argument that in 1938, thinking would be still more rigid and flexible, innovative response might have been still harder to come by--but no matter how impressively we enumerate what arms the Germans do have in hand, the fact remains that in all of the categories mass of arms, technical development of same, battlefield experience, and sheer numbers of men the Wehrmacht too is weaker in May or even September 1938 than a year later. They must first go through the meat grinder of attacking the Czechoslovakian defenses and it is by no means a slam dunk they get the help of Hungarian forces to do that, not at least until the turning point is reached and CZ is clearly already collapsing. This will put some conquered resources at their disposal but not nearly as effectively as OTL where they have a whole year to assimilate undamaged, intact Czech supplies as well as production facilities; a stiff CZ resistance will deplete these and damage what is left. It seems dubious to assume that Poland just sits it out, in view of Poland's deep commitment to the French alliance--an alliance that is not cast into the mud of Munich as in OTL. At the very least Hitler must deploy some forces to screen his long frontiers with Poland, assuming that the Poles in fact betray their alliance and do not help France as promised. More realistically, Hitler must settle the question of Poland forcefully. Any benefit he gets from plundering either Czechia or territories taken from Poland is far offset, in the short run, by losses the Wehrmacht suffers doing so--that in turn offsets the argument that the Wehrmacht is green, if they can put paid to both Czech and Polish resistance they will not be green anymore...but they will be decimated.

And so, while France might be at a worse disadvantage both in paper terms of the shrewdly evaluated worth of what arms and men they have standing ready, and arguably as well even less prepared to deal intelligently and flexibly with the new military thinking the Wehrmacht has been drilled in, there remains another dimension of morale to consider, which is the cohesion of France on a political level. That is what I have asked for further insight into and which has not been responded to.

My reason for believing the 1938 government rested more firmly on the left and leftish liberal center of French public opinion has for its main concrete basis the fact France was in fact openly aiding the Republicans in Spain. French conservatives would be quite upset by this, for of course the Loyalists included factions that were infamously left-radical and viciously anti-clerical, whereas French conservatism includes much lip service (we won't get far discussing how deeply sincere their sense of religion would be in terms of passionate Christianity, but there is no doubt they tended, with I suppose some atheist but otherwise right wing exceptions, to hold that as a secular institution the Catholic Church was crucial in anchoring a suitably "orderly" public mentality) to the vital role of the Roman Catholic Church, the enemy of many a Loyalist and perhaps many of the French volunteers as well. But unlike Britain, which I gather basically made it easier for the developing Axis side to aid the Nationalists, France as a state was nevertheless firmly on the Republican side.

By extension, I thus imagine that the particular constellation of French leadership in the top positions in 1938 were also opposed to Nazi Germany not just on patriotic and strategic grounds but on the ideological grounds of the spectrum from liberalism to left-radicalism that despised Nazi ultra-rightist highhanded methods, the so-called "positive justice" much embraced by German police and perhaps envied by many a cop in more liberal nations that permitted authorities go snipe-hunting for people they had always disliked as dubious social elements, round them up and imprison them (perhaps in the West it was not generally understood how much worse than that it had already gotten and would become; surely to any fair-minded person just sequestering the "undesirables" in camps on mere suspicion they might make trouble ought to be outrageous enough); the raw militarism mocking the painful lessons of the Great War in the horror and futility of war; all this atop French chauvinism against the dreaded "Boche" and the simple and straightforward legalism that observed Germany had been behaving quite badly by the standards of post-war civility, having defecated all over the generosity of "Locarno," and the hopes of an age of peace founded on peaceful negotiation in the League of Nations--all this adds up to plausible ground on which the right French leadership might have dug in its heels and decided they would fight with whatever they had on hand rather than tolerate another step in this pathological evolution.

We have as well the imponderable element of possible Soviet aid, which was being pursued OTL quite actively with Litvinov as the face of Soviet foreign policy pursuing a common front of Soviet and liberal powers against the rising tide of fascism. I leave the Russian factor out generally because it is so hard to see in logistic and strategic terms how Soviet power comes face to face with that of the Reich, which was accomplished OTL by the betrayal of the Popular Front line and of Poland.

But it remains on the OP to flesh out better just how resolve to fight happens in Paris, given political facts on the ground that OTL led to a year of appeasement with all the moral costs it incurred, however technically advantageous (and yet OTL, ultimately vain!) buying a year's time for arming up actually was. How does it happen? Do we most conservatively suppose the same leaders who OTL backed the Loyalists in Spain change their minds? Do we instead judiciously prune and rearrange French politics over the year or two preceeding to lay groundwork for a different mentality? Indeed while I have been lauding the French Left, I am aware that both broad ends of the traditional Left-Right spectrum in France were somewhat splintered--on the Right while OTL Vichy identifies large numbers of French rightists quite willing to collaborate with Nazi power, and in hindsight points some finger of guilt at their possible collusion via defeatism in the conquest, other French Rightists of the DeGaulle type would never surrender their patriotism to any foreign power, certainly not German. And on the left we have both the strong Communist bloc which proved so dangerously defeatist on orders from Moscow and the softer pacifist tendency that came out of the Great War quite pummeled. But OTL similar levels of the latter sentiment in Britain were dissolved quickly enough, are the French going to be that different? And here it would take a further OP presumption of Wayback Machine operation to bring Stalin around to a Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact a year or more earlier. By no means impossible as only Stalin's character governs there, but will Stalin turn away from the on-paper much stronger Western powers, if they reach out to him less ambiguously and beg his help in return for considerations such as consolidating the status of the Soviet Union as a legitimate global power these superpowers treat respectfully with as legitimate heir to Russian power?

So, does France decide to stand with Czechoslovakia, as this whole thread presumes it does, by just the existing OTL leadership changing its mind, or would it require we rotate some of those OTL leaders out earlier to present Hitler with a stronger, more resolved French leadership? Would France stand by CZ more firmly if its leadership shifts to the patriotic right, or is it more plausible the patriotic left of France is what is needed?

My preferences are plain, but I am asking people who know a fair amount about French politics in the mid and late Depression years to weigh in here.

On the battlefield, the relevant question is, would a different mentality in the ruling circles of the French government change the mindsets of OTL generals and field officers who might have been daunted OTL, to refuse to give up so easily? To this we add the observed fact that Hitler OTL got quite lucky in several ways in his victory over France--what are the odds the same rolls of the dice benefit him in the same or effectively equivalent ways, versus France doing better within the range of plausibility? But here I focus on the political variable as it supports morale. Will it make a difference in the fighting resolve of French forces that their country is acting honorably, in a plainly just cause, and not merely out of self-interest alone? Will the central government promote different generals, and remove others, with a less clouded mentality? And if defeat is still in the cards, will it be as abject as OTL or will France fight on in exile?

Clearly Hitler cannot defeat France without attacking Belgium and doing that ought to bring Britain in for sure, perhaps not in terms that provide risking British skimpy ground and air forces embarked to the Continent, but at any rate Germany will lose access to the seas outside the Baltic, and that harassed by RN submarines. Getting access to the Med involves bringing in Italy which will require the demonstrated collapse of France (which also of course gives direct access to the Med). If France does not fall, Hitler is seriously confined and if Poland is eliminated as a threat then unless this is accomplished by "Finlandizing" Poland, that is so intimidating its leadership the Poles dare not take action against him, it brings Reich forces up against Soviet ones. This is Hitler's ultimate intention of course, but dare he do it in this ATL without having the benefit of about two years of Soviet imported goods along with his looting the continent starting with Czechia? I believe starting a year earlier he cannot fold Norway into his conquests and so Sweden too is much more in play than OTL. There are factions in Sweden, more than other Scandinavian nations I think, that might go for a Nazi alliance spontaneously, but I still think they are overwhelmed by others who would prefer not to do this and so hold the country firmly neutral.

All that is a digression from the focus of this comment but it is somewhat relevant to the question--how would the politics of a French regime that stands by Czechoslovakia change the military strategic equation? My belief is that it would help France stand more strongly, especially if it is a left-center regime opposed to Nazi rule on deeply ideological as well as patriotic grounds, and has the asset of a sympathetic Loyalist Spain at her back. In such a TL the narrative of liberalism standing firm against pathological right wing extremism in solidarity is much stronger, and the possibility the Russians come in a generally helpful way is strengthened in the longer run. In this context I think Hitler is overall clearly weaker.

And that I think is exactly why OTL Hitler did not in fact simply go ahead and move to crush Czechoslovakia OTL in spring 1938, without stopping to play "Mother, May I?" with France and Britain first. The possibility exists that OTL, Hitler was prepared to fight if the Western powers did not capitulate diplomatically, I suppose; in that limited sense Hitler judged himself ready enough. But clearly it was a limited and not very confidence-inspiring sense, because at other phases of his career before and after he did not turn to diplomatic negotiations except after the fact of some bold move of his to defy the powers from a position of fait accompli. Here, and only here, he allowed talk and diplomatic to and fro to process through spring, through summer and into fall, gambling that pure intimidation would win him his goals without a shot fired. Why?

I think Hitler judged he would be better off fighting a year later.
 
...
On the other hand, it is my perception that a great deal of French defeatism came from a place of political conservatism--to wit, a big segment of French public opinion, particularly within the conservative faction of the military, that more or less fascist authoritarianism was actually a good thing. ...

Circa 1980 I sat through a series of lectures on precisely this in Kline-Albrandts course on interwar European politics that led to WWII. I don't have my notes and don't trust my memory much, a couple things I do remember were:

Kline-Albrandt emphasized how the French and British military leaders strongly advised their governments their militaries were not ready for a war with Germany. He did not seem to be subscribing that certain Marshals were outright lying about their readiness or German capabilities, as some historians claimed . He did make the point how particularly the air marshals on both sides of the Channel warned of London and Paris in flames and the streets littered with the corpses of children killed by mega bombers like the He111 or Do17. Chamberlain, Daladier, & others in their cabinets genuinely thought they were buying time. A line of justification that is still en vogue.

A second thing I remember is how Kline-Albrandt emphasized the influence on Chamberlain of anticommunists in his cabinet. K-A like several other historians think this group colored Chamberlains thinking. That seems to touch on a great deal in your question concerning the conservative or right wing nature of the French and German governments of 1938.

I think Hitler judged he would be better off fighting a year later.

I wonder why there was no crisis five months later when Germany actually invaded Czech territory and dissolved the government and army? The event seems to have cast a pall across the landscape in the spring. Underlining as it were the German government could not be trusted with any agreement. But, there were no threats, mobilizations, Prime ministers flying to and fro...
 
Circa 1980 I sat through a series of lectures on precisely this in Kline-Albrandts course on interwar European politics that led to WWII. I don't have my notes and don't trust my memory much, a couple things I do remember were:

Kline-Albrandt emphasized how the French and British military leaders strongly advised their governments their militaries were not ready for a war with Germany. He did not seem to be subscribing that certain Marshals were outright lying about their readiness or German capabilities, as some historians claimed . He did make the point how particularly the air marshals on both sides of the Channel warned of London and Paris in flames and the streets littered with the corpses of children killed by mega bombers like the He111 or Do17. Chamberlain, Daladier, & others in their cabinets genuinely thought they were buying time. A line of justification that is still en vogue.

A second thing I remember is how Kline-Albrandt emphasized the influence on Chamberlain of anticommunists in his cabinet. K-A like several other historians think this group colored Chamberlains thinking. That seems to touch on a great deal in your question concerning the conservative or right wing nature of the French and German governments of 1938.



I wonder why there was no crisis five months later when Germany actually invaded Czech territory and dissolved the government and army? The event seems to have cast a pall across the landscape in the spring. Underlining as it were the German government could not be trusted with any agreement. But, there were no threats, mobilizations, Prime ministers flying to and fro...

If I can asnswer both Carl and Shevek in the same post.

My understanding and I have not read nearly enough about France in the 1930's to really have an informed opinion is that the French Popular Front government 36-40 was a highly unstable socialist coalition. The left and far left did manage to get some serious social and employment reform done but where constrained in what they could and couldn't do especially in Spain by the centre left. They also nationalised the aviation and armaments industries which has a services knock on effect to rearmament. The leftist coalition was still in power during the fall of France although was more inclusive due to the war. So the idea that the French government was right wing and this effected the civilian moral at the time of the fal of France is inaccurate. As I mentioned the only real change was the communists where not so on side (with notable exceptions) as I have mentioned previously.

The British where much more right wing and anti left/communist in the lead up to war. I have never seen any evidence that anti-communist feeling effected the decisions on western european foreign policy. However I find it highly likely and indeed it would explain a lot. That's why I spend so much time on this forum. I learn new things every day. Thanks Carl. One thing that I have noticed reading letters and writings a the time is a common conception that the far right and left where regarded as the same thing. Certainly the right leaning Conservative Party in the UK saw very little in common with fascism as exhibited in Germany and Italy. There was of course Oswalds Mosely's Black Shirts but it's interesting to note Mosely served first as a Conservative and then Labour MP before founding the BUF.

I think there is a common misconception that appeasement was a separate policy to rearmament. The truth is thy went hand in hand. Yes the military's used what would swiftly be proved false arguemets like "The knock out blow", but I feel in some ways this is understandable given the very rapid advancement in a number of key technologies especially aviation. This combines with the only modern war fought at the time/recently in Spain. Looking at the damage done to Guernica it wasn't difficult at the time to imagine the effects of a similar terror raid against a major city using a lot more bombers and bombs causing huge civilian casualties and widespread panic. However the reason for appeasement and rearmament is the simple economic realities that in the late 1930's Britian and France combined have significantly more industrial and financial resources than Germany. Given time the Wallies could out produce Germany in all areas including; industry, science, manpower and raw resources. Appeasement was to allow the democracies the time to initially repair their military capacity after a decade of real active neglect and then build an uncatchable lead over the Germans before if nessessary putting the boot in sometime after 1941.

In this context the earlier the Germans go to the war the better, much as in 1914 when the German view was clouded by the slow but real increase of potential power exhibited by Russia which led to the decision to fight now than later. However unlike 1914 the German nation is is much less prepaired to take on 2 major powers in 1938. They have no significant allies, their rearmament is not complete and they have limited resources and finances. In my opinion Hitler had the devils on luck in picking the best possible time to go to war. To early and the German military has no clear advantage over the Franch as the majority of posts on this thread have attained and to late and the brief period of superiority (in leadership more than material) would be eroded by Wallie rearmament.
 
My question about 1938 versus 1939 stems from the OP premise--I can't be arsed to read it again right now and the widespread assumption Britain too is in the anti-Reich alliance might be unwarranted, but the entire premise of this thread is that for whatever unexplained reason, the French government of 1938 stands by their treaty with CZ rather trying to weasel out. We can agree to disagree about how wise or unwise it was for the two dominant western "satisfied" colonial superpowers to defer conflict by more than a year (or at least a year, if we take to the widespread but not OP mandated assumption Hitler waits until inconclusive negotiations fail, until September or October, rather than simply attacking in May with no warning as I think he would have done if he had been as confident as some here he enjoyed real superiority so early). But certainly France had a clear treaty obligation, and while shrewd and cold-blooded studies of the subjective preparedness of German versus Western and CZ soldiers to fight, and the respective kit and doctrine in hand, might show the western alliance as much weaker than they looked on paper, certainly France still had a massive paper strength that it would hardly be reasonable to expect Hitler to be able to overturn as handily as he did OTL. So the OP has some homework to do accounting for an ATL French decision not to be daunted and declare that Hitler had already done plenty to demonstrate untrustworthiness and an insane aggression that needed to be sharply checked--but certainly these things were already facts, Munich or no Munich. The occupation of the Rhineland, the Anschluss involving as it did the assassination of the established ruler of Austria and violation of the Versailles imposed strategic separation of German lands into two nations, along with repudiation of Versailles itself, the military buildup itself far past levels of reasonable capacity for self defense (not disputing that Versailles levels were insufficient for that--that was kind of the point after all!) and the expressed principle of Germans needing to be brought into the Reich, which had deeply ominous implications for all nations of southeastern Europe (for ethnically and culturally German population centers were scattered all through the southeast of the entire continent, indeed even deep in Soviet territory as far east as the Volga)--were all ample for someone who regarded the fascist way as repugnant and inhumane and inimical to Enlightenment civilization, and should also be ample for the most pragmatic patriot with no regard for such lofty ivory tower ideals but with a shrewd eye on strategic balance of power. France depended in part on massive self-armament in the form of the universal levy en masse of the male citizenry as trained conscripts who had all done some years service in the national army, but also on a system of alliances with numerous Eastern European nations, notably Poland and Romania, not just against the rise of German power but originally as a mutual interest buffer against Soviet power. The alliance with Czechoslovakia was key; however much one might prove the improvement of real French capacity in terms of training, doctrine, and arms over the year that France bought with sacrificing that, the fact remains that France was ignominiously defeated in detail once German power turned west. We have a much harder time measuring the effect of morale, but certainly it cost France a great deal of self-respect to trade off the fate of the people of Czechia and Slovakia, and shook the confidence of all her other client states in the east. I think we cannot set morale at naught.

Before I reply, going to give everyone a shoutout for the great posts I've seen on this thread so far! :)

As for the scenario, I had imagined it as a failing in the Munich negotiations themselves in September causing the conference to be abandoned and Fall Grun to proceed as it was planned to on October 1, France (and maybe Britain) coming to the defense of CZE as part of their treaty obligations. Which could be achieved by Chamberlain refusing Hitler's demands on September 23 for all of CZE to be totally dissolved, and Hitler not backing down from that position as he did IOTL. If Chamberlain and Daladier walk out of Munich at that point, the war will happen when the month ends. OTL French attitudes towards the Czechs and the Little Entente in 9/38 would carry into the war (that is, those opposed to the Munich handover will be enthusiastically supporting the war) and Hitler's reputation would be something of "a man who tried to do the right thing (diplomatically at least) but got greedy" more than "jerk who breaks deals consistently and can't be trusted with twenty cents". A hostile takeover is still a hostile takeover, but the French weren't exactly rushing to help Poland out either.

- BNC
 
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