Fall Grun 1938: Are Germany's early-war odds really worse than OTL 1939?

[Shevek23]

I think that if we can show the OTL belligerents are a push, Germany having some hot but still buggy new high tech stuff but in small numbers, Britain and France have relatively backward kit but in very large numbers, and don't forget that time bought by the OTL delay favored not only German technology shaking down but also the training and seasoning, as much as possible in quasi-peacetime (but don't forget here the exercise green Germans got in locking down former Czechoslovakia), then when we factor in that Hitler has not already conquered Czechoslovakia, we have to favor the Allies overall.

Doubly--as observed above, Hitler does not possess Czech munitions works and has not had a year to work them and appropriate pre-Munich accord stocks on hand.

And forgotten by all--Czechoslovakia can fight. It seems to be assumed this will be a brave but pathetic show, but the Central European federal republic had some real assets on its side, including the defensible Sudetenland frontier. Yes, that might be somewhat subverted by Sudenten-German treason, but I think in the crisis the Czech security apparatus will be at least somewhat prepared to take countermeasures, enough that while there might be some unfortunate easy penetrations of the fortified frontier here or there, on the whole the border will hold and the few German early breakthroughs due to fifth columnist German citizens of CZ will be limited and dealt with by CZ reserves. There is also the question of whether Slovaks would prove treacherous too, but I think that in the situation that at least France honors the long time defensive alliance instead of chickening out as OTL, Czecho-Slovak morale will be high and they will fight near the peak of their potential. They know what Hitler is like, they are fighting for their Slavic lives!

If they think France will honor her commitment and strike at Germany's southwest border, either the French punch through and overrun south Germany and discredit Hitler that way, or he has to deploy a lot of what force he has to try to parry them there.

Furthermore the OP seems to take as given that the less formally committed British also get off the fence and back Czechoslovakia and France; again there is little Britain can do to directly relieve the Czecho-Slovaks but a lot they can do to shut down German commerce.

Other countervailing soft factors to the view that the war is equivalent to waiting year include that in this ATL, Britain and France have not used not only the assurances France made previously to Czechoslovakia as toilet paper, but also the League of Nations as well...with Germany acting in a plainly rouge fashion, and the two most dominant nations in the League united in DOW on Germany I think there is a real chance the League might show some real backbone as a collective security agency. The revived Entente will want the legitimization of acting in a peace-keeping League mandate, and the momentum might not be sufficient to get Netherlands, Belgium and who knows maybe even Denmark to declare actual war, still these nations (maybe not vulnerable Denmark..but then again, when ever will the Danes have a better chance to catch Hitler with his pants down?) might at least in compliance with League resolutions become very unfriendly neutrals, mobilizing their armies and not inconsiderable navies, sealing their borders against all trade or travel, and the noose of strategic isolation closes tight around the Reich.

By this late date, Mussolini was beginning to come around to Hitler's side but that relationship has a year less to mature; might he be waved off and close his border with former Austria too? Perhaps in consideration of crass concessions such as a freer, League approved hand in Ethiopia? Maybe even a reluctant but resigned League green light for his desired Albanian imperialism?

Can Poland be asked, if not to actually declare war on behalf of the League which is now an Anglo-French sock puppet, to like the Lowland kingdoms mobilize and close the borders, and perhaps be so bold as to be the League's agent in securing the League Mandate "free city" of Danzig, which had a strongly pro-Reich population to be sure.

Might League auspices lubricate the passage of RN battle groups through the Danish straits to harry north German shores? Perhaps this is where the RN learns a costly lesson about German airpower but unless the Germans want to trigger Danish involvement they can't bomb RN units in inner Danish waters, so the RN foray could at least retreat to probable safety there, and if Hitler violates Denmark then they can assist Danish forces while Britain and France send more help to reinforce and strike at Germany from yet another direction. German force collapse seems more a matter of "when" than "if" to me!

Now vice versa the Entente probably does not have the stomach to invade Germany wholesale and be forced to unconditional surrender; Hitler can probably talk his way out of being deposed, but I think one term would be to disgorge any conquests in Czechoslovakia, and just maybe perhaps to detach Austria as well.

Obviously then I am on Team Hitler-Gets-Pwned, but one thing I was never on board with in that fusty consensus was, the certainty so many had that Hitler therefore goes down. On one hand his credibility, as either a trustworthy negotiator or a conquering genius, is shot to hell and stomped on. On the other as OP observed he was a wily and uncannily lucky snake, remarkably hard to shake off. His domestic credibility with the upper classes is shot, but by 1938 I suppose the Party is blindly loyal already and he has enough SS and SA remnants, plus the tendency of Gestapo cops to prefer him and his blessing of what they called "positive justice" that barring some swift and coordinated and unlike OTL actually successful Valkyrie operation the Generals were never near capable of pulling off OTL, which the consensus OP protests just assumes happens as a matter of course, he remains Leader until some invaders come and pry the title out of his stiff cold hands. So it is entirely possible this whole war covers the Entente and League in rose colored glory and yet several years later Hitler strikes and conquers.

A note on allegedly obsolete aircraft by the way...Biplane does not mean useless. In this year the overwhelming majority of the Luftwaffe has typical mid-30s biplanes with streamlined bodies too. So does Britain with the Gladiator, though the Hurricane is just around the corner. Czechslovkia's Avia made some of the very best of these types and OTL the Reich deployed them in loads of secondary fronts. Perhaps the Messerschmitts might have eaten these for lunch--but as noted, the good Me-119s are still down the road a bit. Anyway the Allies have loads of these biplanes. The Republican/Loyalist side of the Spanish Civil War used largely Soviet built fighters--and IIRC, the monoplane version was superseded by a better biplane which contended with the vaunted Condor legion quite well.

Man do I miss Just Leo, he could have straightened all this out.

The point being, don't dismiss the aircraft Britain and even France had in '38 or assume they are made of candy. Many a Condor Legionaire regretted that assumption I am sure.

 

[Anchises]

Mays analysis the evolution of the German plans in 'Strange Victory' is probably the best source for all this. He notes that well before October 1939 no one was happy with the current attack plan. They had been testing it in map and field exercises, from army up to the top at Zossen & the results of those exercises were indecisive at best. Everyone had a opinion and a variety of vague proposals were floated. When the October attack was canceled and the November date postponed as well Halder ordered another map exercise at Zossen in early November. He directed three basic plans be tested. One would be with the schweherpunckt or mass of maneuver be on the Belgian plain. The second with the schwehrpunckt in the Ardennes, The third with the mass of maneuver uncommitted, to be sent where success developed as the battle progressed. the Army group commanders, A & B were directed to prepare or up date their plans and studies on how they would execute their role in these three options.

Manstein as Rundsteadts CoS was responsible for the detail work in this planning. He took the Ardenne option very seriously, He also took the presence of two armored corps in AG A for the Ardennes option seriously. The plan he outlined had those two corps advance ahead to disrupt the Belgian screening forces in the Ardennes and seize crossings on the Meuse River before the Belgians and French reinforcements could consolidate on the river.

When tested at the early November map ex. none of the plans produced anything decisive. The plan that kept the mass of maneuver in reserve failed the most completely. It strongly suggested the attack had to succeed early or not at all. The other two showed more promise. Mansteins idea for sending the armored corps rapidly ahead to the Meause river was noted, and some generals present thought it too risky. Others objected that control of the armored corps was separated from the local army commanders. Hitler kept a close eye on the exercises and was intrigued by the Ardennes variant that week. In later discussions with Halder & others he went back to the north or Belgian Plain option. Later in November Hitler met Manstein at a scheduled dinner introducing him to several newly appointed corps commanders. man stein claimed he inspired Hitler at this meeting. Hitler did not seem to remember it, however he Halder, Rundstedt, and others had been discussing the entire question at weekly and twice weekly conferences since the Zossen wargame in early November.

Halder, the AG commanders, and the army commanders continued testing variants in both field and map exercises through into January. Hitler waffled from meeting to meeting on which option to support. There were variants where the Netherlands were not attacked. Variants with the armored corps spread out, and concentrated. By January its was becoming clear that Guderians arguments for concentrating the panzer arm, into a focused striking force had much better results than with the corps parceled out to local army commanders.

It was this constant testing and variant trials that was the actual synthesis of the Sickle Cut maneuver. Gaming out battle plans had been a Prussian Army habit since the early 19th Century & their inheritors in the Imperial German Army, the Reichwehr, and the Wehrmacht took the testing of plans with map and field exercises very seriously. Nothing certain here, but whatever the variants in dates ect... its possible the German army will improve its campaign plans as far as time allows.

You fail to take into account something really important. The genius plan of the Battle of France was an improvised plan. It only happened because Germany lost the original plans.

A war in 38 moves things so much, that the very small, almost lottery jackpot winning butterfly of losing the original plans, does not happen. Which means Germany not only gets the bloody nose in 38, but also has way worse plans to invade France.

@CarlSchwamberger showed that the plane crash was not the decisive factor. The Wehrmacht was aware that the conservative "Schlieffen MK II" played to British and French strenghts. Halder and others were pessimistic and regarded Mannstein's proposal as to risky but I really doubt that the Halder-Plan would be launched, even if the plans are not lost.

 

[KACKO]

And forgotten by all--Czechoslovakia can fight. It seems to be assumed this will be a brave but pathetic show, but the Central European federal republic had some real assets on its side, including the defensible Sudetenland frontier. Yes, that might be somewhat subverted by Sudenten-German treason, but I think in the crisis the Czech security apparatus will be at least somewhat prepared to take countermeasures, enough that while there might be some unfortunate easy penetrations of the fortified frontier here or there.


There is also the question of whether Slovaks would prove treacherous too, but I think that in the situation that at least France honors the long time defensive alliance instead of chickening out as OTL, Czecho-Slovak morale will be high and they will fight near the peak of their potential. They know what Hitler is like, they are fighting for their Slavic lives!

Well Czechoslovaks were anle to defeat first Sudetenland insurrection once police was reinforced by army. How it would go later is question.

As to Slovaks, historical records ahows Slovaks mobilized without problems and even chronicles from Slovak towns and villages are showing support for mobilization.
Interestingly as far as I know even Slovak political leader Andrej Hlinka from Slovak People Party called from his death bed for defense of Czechoslovakia and called Hitler for what he was - crook. In his talk to Sidor he called Hitler “cultural animal”.

Of course once Czechoslovak defeat was clear very likely there would be fractions which would collaborate with Nazis.

 

[Anti-GrammarNazi]

@CarlSchwamberger showed that the plane crash was not the decisive factor. The Wehrmacht was aware that the conservative "Schlieffen MK II" played to British and French strenghts. Halder and others were pessimistic and regarded Mannstein's proposal as to risky but I really doubt that the Halder-Plan would be launched, even if the plans are not lost.

Even if Halder is not launched, anything else than Mannstein's genius plan is going to be a tremendous downgrade.

 

[Anchises]

Even if Halder is not launched, anything else than Mannstein's genius plan is going to be a tremendous downgrade.

True, but I would argue that Mannstein's plan had Rundstedt's backing and thus was the likely go-to alternative.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

True, but I would argue that Mannstein's plan had Rundstedt's backing and thus was the likely go-to alternative.

Rundsteadt backed the idea of his army group being the schweherpunckt, the main effort. He was only mildly ethusiactic about Mansteins or Guderians ideas for execution. Like most senior leaders he thought the Sickle Cut would fail, but no one had a viable alternative. Everything else proposed looked worse when tested.

 

[Shevek23]

...Of course once Czechoslovak defeat was clear very likely there would be fractions which would collaborate with Nazis.

But I think there would be less of this, a lot less, if by the time CZ military resistance is worn down and collapses, their stubborness has bought time for France to penetrate deep into Germany, Britain to sweep German commerce from the seas, the League to seal off the borders where they can't actually mobilize some bordering countries who were OTL Allies such as Poland to actually join in the war. OTL Poland shortsightedly invaded to seize a fort town, at Hitler's instigation, but if the League of Nations seems to be standing firm instead of being discarded, I think they'll think twice about that and consider what they might gain from League favor with Germany very very disfavored, especially if they choose to keep Hitler.

Hey, it just occurred to me...I don't think even puffed up as "The League of Nations!" the Entente will dare to systematically occupy all of Germany--I do think the French might resume occupation of the Rhineland, not so raw as to annex it but the new treaty might restore disarmament of the borders with permanent League occupation to enforce it. Now, what might Poland want out of Germany, if they step up and join the two superpowers? Danzig comes to mind, also there are provinces of Germany bordering Poland with large Polish populations--I've never heard how they fared in the 6 years since Hitler took over, so I don't think they've been given the complete persecution treatment yet--probably just keeping their heads down. So, Danzig and those, the latter based on a plebiscite, on the table.

But perhaps we have an opportunity for a bit of carrot and stick here. The League will enforce such border annexations (oh and @KACKO and any other Czechs or Slovaks following, what would Czecho-Slovakia want? A bite out of Austria perhaps?)...but only if the Germans insist on keeping Hitler. If they will remand the Nazi leadership over to League judgement, presumably at the Hague, and put in a more reasonable new regime, stop persecuting Jews and release those in the camps, and forget this Nazi nonsense, then the borders remain intact and Danzig becomes part of Germany outright...one would not bother with a plebiscite there, the city was always keen on reunion with Germany and was run by Nazis before Hitler annexed it. The League cannot conquer and reconstruct all Germany--well they could but I think will lack the will to pay the price of doing that.

Anyway, even without such high flown assumptions, assuming only that the two Entente superpowers alone actively support Czechoslovakia, and that Britain can accomplish little toward direct defeat of Germany, France alone should be able to seriously decimate the German forces provided they are pinned down trying to invade Czechoslovakia, which would be a tough nut to crack. Surely the Reich will prevail in that eventually--if absolutely no one else intervened, as OTL! But the OP assumes France at least is on board, and that makes me wonder if in fact the Reich can break Czechoslovakia at all, considering how they'd have to treat the French front as the primary war front. Is Germany, in 1938, really so big and advanced that they can beat CZ resistance with an arm tied behind their backs?

I haven't mentioned the Soviets because as noted, geographically speaking they have no way to come to CZ assistance directly. I do think if the Soviets are regarded as regular League members instead of being feared as as bad as Hitler, in addition to French forces coming into Spain to tip the balance against any Germans there, all the obstacles put in the way of Soviet aid to the Loyalist side will melt away and the Russians can at least double down in Spain too, assuming the French intervention does not collapse the Nationalist side so fast the new contingent of reinforcements has no time to get there before the war is settled.

Might not Poland be persuaded to allow Soviet forces to transit Poland to reach Czechoslovakia directly, again with the war under League auspices? If the numbers are small enough the Red Army can't break out and suddenly overwhelm the Poles after all, so bearing in mind Stalin is playing along with the League and does not want to blow it, gradual build up of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia is surely possible if the Poles choose to allow it. And if they do that of course it means direct war with Germany, maybe Polish annexation of East Prussia might be on the table?

So--one way or another, I think when we factor in Czechoslovakian resistance, the Reich is doomed, and perhaps with France taking the war seriously Hitler cannot conquer Czechoslovakia at all. No collaborators at all then. Or they can but it so diverts force from the defense against France that by the time it happens and Germans at last occupy Prague, they are collapsing irrevocably in the west, losing the Ruhr and Rhineland and Baden, and the writing is on the wall--even if Germans fight to the bitter end the British are coming in to reinforce the French, RN subs in the Baltic will have totally cut off all German trade with say Sweden, the Reich has no allies, Poland is on the verge of jumping in for spoils and last minute glory; so are the Dutch under heavy urging and with humanitarian pleas about those Hitler persecutes being weighed in...the writing is on the wall. Any collaboration in conquered Czechia would be of the form of individuals caving in to immediate threats, to buy their lives, on a day by day basis--no one looks forward to a future under German patronage, the Reich is on the way out and the sooner Hitler throws in the towel the more likely he is to retain more of Germany and remain in power himself. Time is not on the Reich's side.

It was OTL when the war was delayed a year. It is myopic to just look at the rival buildups in Germany versus France and Britain, we have to consider that versus the non-moving target of Czechoslovakian resistance being factored in on the Allied side a year earlier, the Germans are considerably weaker agains the Allies when we do that. Hitler needed more than just time, he also needed to acquire Czechia without firing many shots and be left in peace in the time it took to flip Czech resources from liability to assets.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I think that if we can show the OTL belligerents are a push, Germany having some hot but still buggy new high tech stuff but in small numbers, Britain and France have relatively backward kit but in very large numbers, and don't forget that time bought by the OTL delay favored not only German technology shaking down but also the training and seasoning, as much as possible in quasi-peacetime (but don't forget here the exercise green Germans got in locking down former Czechoslovakia), then when we factor in that Hitler has not already conquered Czechoslovakia, we have to favor the Allies overall.

I'm not sure I follow the logic. The ratios in terms of equipment is actually even more favorable for the Germans in 1938-1939 then in 1939-1940 when the WAllies were able to produce a massive amount of additional gear while the German economy began to lag. While the Germans got some experience out of occupying Czechoslovakia, most of it came from peacetime exercises well predating Munich and then the big war in Poland. IATL, Czechoslovakia probably substitutes for Poland.

And the difference between the skill of French and Germans soldiers was far greater than just that that one had combat experience and one had not. The greatest deficiency is that due to intense, realistic large scale training, the Germans had a lot of experience with maneuvering brigades, divisions and corps. This is something that cannot be taught in a classroom, and has to be learned by actually handling real forces in the field. The French had run far fewer large-scale manuevers, in the interwar years, and only really got started with them in 1937. They were still sorting largescale manuevers by multiple combined arms formations out by 1940. In this they were hindered by the fact that until 1940 many of their vital formations were still not truly combined arms. Their tank brigades lacked all arms support and many of their infantry divisions only received vital elements like anti-tank and engineers after mobilization in 1939 and had limited time to exercise with them. The invasion of Poland on the other hand shows that by 1939 the Germans had a very good handle on this kind of thing and their plans for invading Czechoslovakia in 1938 also show that they expected their army to be able to execute largescale combined arms operations with confidence. But then the Germans had had their first panzer divisions formed since 1935 and had practiced extensively over the years.

And forgotten by all--Czechoslovakia can fight.

Sure. So could the Poles. Didn't help them in the end. The only place I can see the Czechs doing better then the Poles is in the air.

It seems to be assumed this will be a brave but pathetic show, but the Central European federal republic had some real assets on its side, including the defensible Sudetenland frontier. Yes, that might be somewhat subverted by Sudenten-German treason, but I think in the crisis the Czech security apparatus will be at least somewhat prepared to take countermeasures, enough that while there might be some unfortunate easy penetrations of the fortified frontier here or there, on the whole the border will hold and the few German early breakthroughs due to fifth columnist German citizens of CZ will be limited and dealt with by CZ reserves. There is also the question of whether Slovaks would prove treacherous too, but I think that in the situation that at least France honors the long time defensive alliance instead of chickening out as OTL, Czecho-Slovak morale will be high and they will fight near the peak of their potential. They know what Hitler is like, they are fighting for their Slavic lives!

The German plan for Czechoslovakia envisaged two pincers closing from the north and south, with massive paratrooper drops being dropped to cut internal Czech lines of communication. The Czechs themselves didn't envision the defenses lasting more then a few months. The fortified frontier was found by German examinations to be poorly suited to stop the exact sort of massed armored assault assisted by dive-bombers and artillery the Germans envisioned.

If they think France will honor her commitment and strike at Germany's southwest border, either the French punch through and overrun south Germany and discredit Hitler that way, or he has to deploy a lot of what force he has to try to parry them there.

They couldn't in 1939. Why would they suddenly be able to in 1938 despite being grossly less prepared and actually smaller then the German army?

Can Poland be asked, if not to actually declare war on behalf of the League which is now an Anglo-French sock puppet, to like the Lowland kingdoms mobilize and close the borders, and perhaps be so bold as to be the League's agent in securing the League Mandate "free city" of Danzig, which had a strongly pro-Reich population to be sure.

The Poles made it clear to the Allies they had no intention of joining a fight against Germany over Czechoslovakia and made it extra clear to the Soviets that if they attempted to pass through Polish territory to assist the Czechs it would mean war. Depending on how things develop, Poland could end up effectively allied with Germany, facing down the Soviets. While that would screw the Germans in the longer run, due to need to divert forces to assist the Poles and lack of imports in 1939-1941... it isn't going to insta-cause a collapse and would leave the Soviets in a dominating position in Eastern Europe as per OTL, except with far less death and destruction on their home soil making them a whole lot more powerful.

Furthermore the OP seems to take as given that the less formally committed British also get off the fence and back Czechoslovakia and France; again there is little Britain can do to directly relieve the Czecho-Slovaks but a lot they can do to shut down German commerce.

Again, not that different from 1939...

The point being, don't dismiss the aircraft Britain and even France had in '38 or assume they are made of candy. Many a Condor Legionaire regretted that assumption I am sure.

Given the excruciatingly poor performance of the French Air Forces in '38, I think we can dismiss them on the basis that the air forces they belonged too weren't very good rather then anything about the equipment.

 

[Derwit]

I'm with Shevek on this one it's going to be a bloody German defeat in the long term. I will try to address this with a quick look at the various belligerents starting with Germany.

Germany was expanding its armaments industries form a very limited state. Each year from 1933 this industry grew and grew until in 1938/39 it was close to total war levels. So starting the war a year early doesn't mean that the Germans get one year less of six years worth of toys it probably means they more like 30% less. Also factor in the Czech industrial contribution to German rearmament in 1938/39 not just the tanks and guns of the Skoda works but the iron and coal and manufactured goods and vehicles that ITTL are lost to the Germans intitially and would require significant resources to repair and get back into full scale production.

Also the German army only started conscription in 1935 so one less years conscription equates to over 200,000 less soldiers available at the out break of war. So down form 100 divisions both active and reserve in September 1939 to less than 90 in 1938. Of these 90 ish divisions how many would be fully equipped. Arguably it was the equipment from the 30 well equipped Czech divisions that allowed the German army to field such a large army so quickly. OTL the Germans also used the phoney war to make good deficiencies in equipment using a more developed industrial base and Czech resources. The German army is also very short of gun tanks. If rushing the Pz 3 and 4 into greater production earlier was an option than I would have expected to have seen it done OTL. Best case senario is they rush it and end up with a German version of the British Covenater. Although the Germans did prefere to fight opposition tanks with anti tank guns when you do need to advance against stubern opposition having a tank that can lob HE at the enemy is a must.

The Luftwaffe is also like the other major airforces transitioning from biplanes to monoplanes and although larger than the ADA and RAF doesn't have as significant edge it would in OTL 1940. Also it's best pilots are on the wrong side of the continent and face an interesting journey home. As to the German navy even more than 1939 the answer is what navy. With few subs it's unlikely that the battle of the Atlantic would be fought with the same level of sophistication and intensity. This has major butterflies for any alternative WW2.

In short the Germans have significantly less resources than September 1939. At a rough guess perhaps 100 divisions to fight a war in the west in the spring of 1939 as a posed to over 120 in summer 1940 OTL. But surly the same is true of the Germans main ground war adversary the French!

The French army has had no disruption to its armaments or conscription since WW1. The weakness for the French was the disarray its industry suffered in the inter war period but there is still significant room for expansion once war is declared. They will also do as OTL and order from the USA to make up any shortfalls. An option less open to the Germans due to the Royal Navy sitting in the way of any sea born trade. Some of its military equipment is old and other elements poor (as was some german kit). Its doctorine especially with regards to armour was also unsuited to modern war. It has no mass tank formations (although these didn't save them in 1940) although in 1938 it's tanks are much more competitive than they would be in 1940 as the German tanks are significantly inferior (indeed the limitations of a one man turret are less when you machine gun armed adversary can't hurt you). The French army was also smaller than in 1938 but thanks to unbroken conscription the trained man power is present so the army can be enlarged relatively quickly (in some ways this lack of middle aged conscripts a smaller army is a boon to the fighting efficiency of the French Army). The ADA is also like the German Luftwaffe transitioning towards monoplanes. Although smaller than the Luftwaffe it would still be These would be inferior to the Luftwaffe in 1940 but this inferiority is not as marked as it would later become. I feel that these strengths and increased German weaknesses would make a condrontatio between Germany and France more in Frances favour than OTL.

There is no way this senario is possible without the British standing by the French in a DOW with Germany. France won't do it without a solid alliance with the British. The British will be able to improvise some forces initially and more will follow before the spring offensive The British, Dutch and Belgian armies and air forces are also inferior to what they would be in 1940. However it was a lack of modern equipment especially tanks and anti tank weapons. However with the Germans having less tanks and especially less effective tanks these limitations are less of a hinderance than they would prove to be in OTL. I wthink it is reasonable to think that this could be considered a small increase in comparative advantage in the potential Wallies favour.

So if the Germans go for a Sickle Cut style offensive in 1939 I think that the advantage would be a little more in the favour of the Wallies than would be the case OTL in 1940. The Germans have less effective close air support and less effective tanks which makes this offensive les likely to succeed. Although conventional wisdom would say the same for the OTL German victory in 1940. The big difference between 1938/9 and 1939/40 in this senario is not between the opposing forces but the general political and diplomatic situation. Here Poland is still sitting in the way of a common boarder between Germany and Russia. The Poles are not going to be particularly happy with the Germans claiming that all German folk should be a part of the Greater German Reik and then invading the Czechs to make this a reality. They would mobilise some of their forces to stand guard on their frontiers. This causes the Germans to have to leave forces to cover a potential Polish attack. Certainly a big part of the Wallies foreign policy is going to be to encourage the Poles to do just that. As Shevek mentions the Italians are far less likely to side with Germany than a year latter. OTL Benny felt the Austria was a part of the Italian sphere of influence and it took him some time to get over the German annexation. In this senario he would sit quietly making money supplying everyone with hard currency and resources waiting for the best moment to strike whoever is clearly going to loose as OTL. However here his quiet support isn't a given so the Germans are going to have to leave some forces along the Italian border just in case. The biggest difference however is not having the alliance with the Soviet Union. All the raw resources (especially oil) that flowed into Germany over the winter of 39/40 will be a big loss to the German war machine. Indeed I find it difficult to see how the Germans can fight a major war for long without these resources or the resources of conquered countries. It also doesn't have the negative effect on the contribution of communists in France it had OTL and the corrisponding reduction in moral on the French home front.

To conclude I feel that OTL the Germans rolled sixes consistently in the battle of France in this senario they would need to roll sevens! The reality that when the German attack stalls possibly along the Meus or further on the northern French plains. Then it's just a matter of time for the Wallies to become ever stronger while Germany faces ever increasing economic hardship and military scarcity compared to her opponents. Sooner or later in such a situation someone is going to succeed in some robust regime change as here Hitler hasn't been credited with years of success and therefore isn't nearly so bullet prof as he would become OTL.

sorry for waffling on.

 

[nbcman]

The Soviets don't need to invade / be invited into either Poland or Rumania to make a serious impact on the Nazis. The Soviets would not be trading with the Nazis if there was a war in 1938 as this was before their first significant trade agreement in 1939 as well as the much more significant trade agreements in 1940/1941. So no Soviet oil, grain, or other trade goods. Germany's economy would be sputtering out of resources within a year or two. Overall, this is the dream war that France and Britain were set up to fight.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

In short the Germans have significantly less resources than September 1939. At a rough guess perhaps 100 divisions to fight a war in the west in the spring of 1939 as a posed to over 120 in summer 1940 OTL. But surly the same is true of the Germans main ground war adversary the French!

The French army has had no disruption to its armaments or conscription since WW1. The weakness for the French was the disarray its industry suffered in the inter war period but there is still significant room for expansion once war is declared. They will also do as OTL and order from the USA to make up any shortfalls. An option less open to the Germans due to the Royal Navy sitting in the way of any sea born trade. Some of its military equipment is old and other elements poor (as was some german kit). Its doctorine especially with regards to armour was also unsuited to modern war. It has no mass tank formations (although these didn't save them in 1940) although in 1938 it's tanks are much more competitive than they would be in 1940 as the German tanks are significantly inferior (indeed the limitations of a one man turret are less when you machine gun armed adversary can't hurt you). The French army was also smaller than in 1938 but thanks to unbroken conscription the trained man power is present so the army can be enlarged relatively quickly (in some ways this lack of middle aged conscripts a smaller army is a boon to the fighting efficiency of the French Army). The ADA is also like the German Luftwaffe transitioning towards monoplanes. Although smaller than the Luftwaffe it would still be These would be inferior to the Luftwaffe in 1940 but this inferiority is not as marked as it would later become. I feel that these strengths and increased German weaknesses would make a condrontatio between Germany and France more in Frances favour than OTL.

Problem with this is that it assumes the French didn't begin all out mobilization until the declaration of war in 1939. In reality, the French did begin all out mobilization in 1938 as a result of their belated realization that the German army now significantly outnumbered them. The reserves were called up and industry began mobilization. Compared to IATL, the French were able to get in an extra year of wartime production and training of the reserves before war broke out.

While Germany's panzer divisions were made up mainly of Panzer I and II tanks in 1938 (and Panzer IIs still made up the majority in 1940), at least Germany had panzer divisions, grouped and organized in a logical manner. Compared to the four Panzer divisions Germany possessed in October of 1938 (with a fifth forming in November) France had... none. Although France had two DLM on paper, in 1938 they were basically just two understrength brigades of light tanks, lacking most of their heavier equipment. The powerful S35 tank that would equip the DLM during the Battle of France had only just entered full production at the start of the year, and less than 100 had been completed by mid 1938. At the time Guderian assessed French armoured formations as only having firepower fit for reconnaissance units. [Horne, "To Lose a Battle, p.118] France's first real armored divisions, the DCR's, didn't even exist at that point as the first DCR was not stood up until January of 1940. The DLMs would also undergo some 11th hour organizational changes in 1940 that made them powerful armored formations, but this they manifestly were not in late 1938.

By 1940 the numbers had shifted significantly. Whereas in 1938 France had only produced 400 tanks, in 1939 production more than doubled to over 1,000 vehicles (more than all the tanks produced in the years 1934-1937 combined, when France had begun her halting mechanized modernization), and in 1940 was set to double again, with 850 tanks produced in the first six months, before defeat abruptly ended production. [Jackson, "The Fall of France," p.13] In contrast, the Germans looted some 244 Pz 35 light tanks from Czech stocks, and had captured or built a further 237 Pz 38 tanks by the time of the Battle of France (so Czech tanks were about 20% of total German panzer strength). While the additional tanks were certainly appreciated by the Wehrmacht, it's clear that the Czech additions still didn't remotely match the massive increase in French tank production between 1939 and 1940.

In the air, the Moraine MS.406 was a decent enough fighter, but the numbers in service with the French Air Force in late 1938 were tiny, with each aircraft basically hand crafted. Yearly production in 1938 stood at a paltry 65 aircraft. [Goldstein, "The Munich Crisis," p.142] While you can argue that the 109D did not significantly outclass the MS.406, in September of 1938 Germany had over 500 Messerschmitts (along with about 60 early model Bf.110s and a smattering of 300 or so older biplane fighters), while France had just a few dozen Moranes - basically just an extended run of prototypes. It wasn't until late 1938 that the French began ordering new planes in large enough numbers for mass production, and the first production MS.406 didn't fly until January of 1939. In October of 1938 by far the most common French fighters the Germans would have faced would have been the obsolete Dewoitine D.500s and D.501s, which had fixed landing gear and open cockpits. Even then the French fighter squadrons were badly outnumbered, with only about 300 Dewoitines in frontline service as of August 1938. Similarly the RAF had only one operational Hurricane squadron (16 planes) at the time of Munich, as that type was also just entering service, with just four more squadrons forming. [Isby, "The Decisive Duel,"] This is ignoring the gross deficiency in the ADA's organization and training compared to the Luftwaffe.

In 1938, Germany had clear materiel superiority in several areas in 1938 and parity in the rest. In 1940, she was at parity in several areas and outnumbered overall. Unfortunately the French and British did not use their forces to best effect, and so Hitler still pulled off a win.

A specific example of the effect this could have can be found in the example of the battle of Sedan in that the pending commitment of several French motorized and armoured divisions which did not exist in 1938/39 pushed the Germans to move much faster. In 1940 these were very different forces from those nascent units the French fielded in 1938/39, and the DLMs in particular had become very skilled and powerful armoured units. French operational limitations still led to the Germans getting the drop (such as Rommel overrunning 1e DCR at Dinant) or the French committing them in the wrong locations and directions (such as the battles of Hannut and Stonne), but if the Germans had not had the fear of powerful French formations with - in many regards - superior tanks, they could have operated even more freely.

And the best of the French tank divisions were a very serious threat. On 12 and 13 May, 2e and 3e DLM (two of the best divisions in the French army) faced 3 and 4 Panzer divisions at Hannut and fought them to a tactical draw, which was rather better than anyone else ever achieved in their first armoured clash with the Germans. Unfortunately the French had committed their armour to the wrong location, so the battle was strategically meaningless, but it did show that if they had been committed to the right locations there was a chance for them to win.

As it was, historically, the French armoured forces ceased to be a serious concern after 15 May, with only de Gaulle's newly formed and inexperienced 4e DCR remaining both combat effective and in a location to do any good, but prior to then they offered the French their best hope for blunting the German spearhead. After they were destroyed, the French proved incapable of stopping the Panzers from doing whatever they wanted. Infantry divisions simply lacked the mobility and the firepower to prevent the Panzers running wild.

Also Guderian only had three panzer divisions at Sedan. He can still mass this force in this scenario, particularly since the weaker French mobile forces means the Germans will need to send comparatively fewer tanks up north to participate in the massive deception in Belgium, and the weaker French reserves mean they don't need to hedge with additional flanking panzer penetrations. And the lack of a few dozen Panzer IIIs and IVs in those divisions will hardly be the hinge on which the whole panzer assault succeeds or fails. That's giving rather too much credit to a small number of machines. The Panzer II remained the workhorse in 1940, just as it would be in 1938 or 1939.

There is no way this senario is possible without the British standing by the French in a DOW with Germany. France won't do it without a solid alliance with the British. The British will be able to improvise some forces initially and more will follow before the spring offensive. The British, Dutch and Belgian armies and air forces are also inferior to what they would be in 1940. However it was a lack of modern equipment especially tanks and anti tank weapons. However with the Germans having less tanks and especially less effective tanks these limitations are less of a hinderance than they would prove to be in OTL. I wthink it is reasonable to think that this could be considered a small increase in comparative advantage in the potential Wallies favour.

The British, like the French, only began all-out mobilization with Munich. The forces that would constitute the BEF (the Dutch and Belgians small enough to be irrelevancies) in 1940 consisted of two poorly equipped infantry divisions. They can be discounted.

The Soviets don't need to invade / be invited into either Poland or Rumania to make a serious impact on the Nazis. The Soviets would not be trading with the Nazis if there was a war in 1938 as this was before their first significant trade agreement in 1939 as well as the much more significant trade agreements in 1940/1941. So no Soviet oil, grain, or other trade goods. Germany's economy would be sputtering out of resources within a year or two. Overall, this is the dream war that France and Britain were set up to fight.

Depends on whether Germany knocks France out in 1939 or not.​

 

[Derwit]

Problem with this is that it assumes the French didn't begin all out mobilization until the declaration of war in 1939. In reality, the French did begin all out mobilization in 1938 as a result of their belated realization that the German army now significantly outnumbered them. The reserves were called up and industry began mobilization. Compared to IATL, the French were able to get in an extra year of wartime production and training of the reserves before war broke out.

While Germany's panzer divisions were made up mainly of Panzer I and II tanks in 1938 (and Panzer IIs still made up the majority in 1940), at least Germany had panzer divisions, grouped and organized in a logical manner. Compared to the four Panzer divisions Germany possessed in October of 1938 (with a fifth forming in November) France had... none. Although France had two DLM on paper, in 1938 they were basically just two understrength brigades of light tanks, lacking most of their heavier equipment. The powerful S35 tank that would equip the DLM during the Battle of France had only just entered full production at the start of the year, and less than 100 had been completed by mid 1938. At the time Guderian assessed French armoured formations as only having firepower fit for reconnaissance units. [Horne, "To Lose a Battle, p.118] France's first real armored divisions, the DCR's, didn't even exist at that point as the first DCR was not stood up until January of 1940. The DLMs would also undergo some 11th hour organizational changes in 1940 that made them powerful armored formations, but this they manifestly were not in late 1938.

By 1940 the numbers had shifted significantly. Whereas in 1938 France had only produced 400 tanks, in 1939 production more than doubled to over 1,000 vehicles (more than all the tanks produced in the years 1934-1937 combined, when France had begun her halting mechanized modernization), and in 1940 was set to double again, with 850 tanks produced in the first six months, before defeat abruptly ended production. [Jackson, "The Fall of France," p.13] In contrast, the Germans looted some 244 Pz 35 light tanks from Czech stocks, and had captured or built a further 237 Pz 38 tanks by the time of the Battle of France (so Czech tanks were about 20% of total German panzer strength). While the additional tanks were certainly appreciated by the Wehrmacht, it's clear that the Czech additions still didn't remotely match the massive increase in French tank production between 1939 and 1940.

In the air, the Moraine MS.406 was a decent enough fighter, but the numbers in service with the French Air Force in late 1938 were tiny, with each aircraft basically hand crafted. Yearly production in 1938 stood at a paltry 65 aircraft. [Goldstein, "The Munich Crisis," p.142] While you can argue that the 109D did not significantly outclass the MS.406, in September of 1938 Germany had over 500 Messerschmitts (along with about 60 early model Bf.110s and a smattering of 300 or so older biplane fighters), while France had just a few dozen Moranes - basically just an extended run of prototypes. It wasn't until late 1938 that the French began ordering new planes in large enough numbers for mass production, and the first production MS.406 didn't fly until January of 1939. In October of 1938 by far the most common French fighters the Germans would have faced would have been the obsolete Dewoitine D.500s and D.501s, which had fixed landing gear and open cockpits. Even then the French fighter squadrons were badly outnumbered, with only about 300 Dewoitines in frontline service as of August 1938. Similarly the RAF had only one operational Hurricane squadron (16 planes) at the time of Munich, as that type was also just entering service, with just four more squadrons forming. [Isby, "The Decisive Duel,"] This is ignoring the gross deficiency in the ADA's organization and training compared to the Luftwaffe.

In 1938, Germany had clear materiel superiority in several areas in 1938 and parity in the rest. In 1940, she was at parity in several areas and outnumbered overall. Unfortunately the French and British did not use their forces to best effect, and so Hitler still pulled off a win.

A specific example of the effect this could have can be found in the example of the battle of Sedan in that the pending commitment of several French motorized and armoured divisions which did not exist in 1938/39 pushed the Germans to move much faster. In 1940 these were very different forces from those nascent units the French fielded in 1938/39, and the DLMs in particular had become very skilled and powerful armoured units. French operational limitations still led to the Germans getting the drop (such as Rommel overrunning 1e DCR at Dinant) or the French committing them in the wrong locations and directions (such as the battles of Hannut and Stonne), but if the Germans had not had the fear of powerful French formations with - in many regards - superior tanks, they could have operated even more freely.

And the best of the French tank divisions were a very serious threat. On 12 and 13 May, 2e and 3e DLM (two of the best divisions in the French army) faced 3 and 4 Panzer divisions at Hannut and fought them to a tactical draw, which was rather better than anyone else ever achieved in their first armoured clash with the Germans. Unfortunately the French had committed their armour to the wrong location, so the battle was strategically meaningless, but it did show that if they had been committed to the right locations there was a chance for them to win.

As it was, historically, the French armoured forces ceased to be a serious concern after 15 May, with only de Gaulle's newly formed and inexperienced 4e DCR remaining both combat effective and in a location to do any good, but prior to then they offered the French their best hope for blunting the German spearhead. After they were destroyed, the French proved incapable of stopping the Panzers from doing whatever they wanted. Infantry divisions simply lacked the mobility and the firepower to prevent the Panzers running wild.

Also Guderian only had three panzer divisions at Sedan. He can still mass this force in this scenario, particularly since the weaker French mobile forces means the Germans will need to send comparatively fewer tanks up north to participate in the massive deception in Belgium, and the weaker French reserves mean they don't need to hedge with additional flanking panzer penetrations. And the lack of a few dozen Panzer IIIs and IVs in those divisions will hardly be the hinge on which the whole panzer assault succeeds or fails. That's giving rather too much credit to a small number of machines. The Panzer II remained the workhorse in 1940, just as it would be in 1938 or 1939.



The British, like the French, only began all-out mobilization with Munich. The forces that would constitute the BEF (the Dutch and Belgians small enough to be irrelevancies) in 1940 consisted of two poorly equipped infantry divisions. They can be discounted.

Depends on whether Germany knocks France out in 1939 or not.​

A simple look at British defence spending year on year from the early 1930's until the DOW in 1939 illustrates that the British started rearmament long before Munich in 1938. The difference was that the British spent much of this money on the RN and RAF and only decided to send a field army to France in the spring of 1939. My knowleadge of French rearmament is more sketchy but they where also increasing their defence spending throughout the 30's but again too much of this was spent in static defences than on mobile warefare.

In this senario are we assuming that the French doctorine will not alter when they see the effectiveness of the Panzer divisions in the attack on Czechoslovakia? I would guess some ad hoc armoured units would be formed by the French in response during TTL phoney war period. Perhaps not as effective as the OTL French armoured forces but there is nothing like a war to hurry along substantial change.

 

[nbcman]

Problem with this is that it assumes the French didn't begin all out mobilization until the declaration of war in 1939. In reality, the French did begin all out mobilization in 1938 as a result of their belated realization that the German army now significantly outnumbered them. The reserves were called up and industry began mobilization. Compared to IATL, the French were able to get in an extra year of wartime production and training of the reserves before war broke out.

While Germany's panzer divisions were made up mainly of Panzer I and II tanks in 1938 (and Panzer IIs still made up the majority in 1940), at least Germany had panzer divisions, grouped and organized in a logical manner. Compared to the four Panzer divisions Germany possessed in October of 1938 (with a fifth forming in November) France had... none. Although France had two DLM on paper, in 1938 they were basically just two understrength brigades of light tanks, lacking most of their heavier equipment. The powerful S35 tank that would equip the DLM during the Battle of France had only just entered full production at the start of the year, and less than 100 had been completed by mid 1938. At the time Guderian assessed French armoured formations as only having firepower fit for reconnaissance units. [Horne, "To Lose a Battle, p.118] France's first real armored divisions, the DCR's, didn't even exist at that point as the first DCR was not stood up until January of 1940. The DLMs would also undergo some 11th hour organizational changes in 1940 that made them powerful armored formations, but this they manifestly were not in late 1938.

By 1940 the numbers had shifted significantly. Whereas in 1938 France had only produced 400 tanks, in 1939 production more than doubled to over 1,000 vehicles (more than all the tanks produced in the years 1934-1937 combined, when France had begun her halting mechanized modernization), and in 1940 was set to double again, with 850 tanks produced in the first six months, before defeat abruptly ended production. [Jackson, "The Fall of France," p.13] In contrast, the Germans looted some 244 Pz 35 light tanks from Czech stocks, and had captured or built a further 237 Pz 38 tanks by the time of the Battle of France (so Czech tanks were about 20% of total German panzer strength). While the additional tanks were certainly appreciated by the Wehrmacht, it's clear that the Czech additions still didn't remotely match the massive increase in French tank production between 1939 and 1940.

In the air, the Moraine MS.406 was a decent enough fighter, but the numbers in service with the French Air Force in late 1938 were tiny, with each aircraft basically hand crafted. Yearly production in 1938 stood at a paltry 65 aircraft. [Goldstein, "The Munich Crisis," p.142] While you can argue that the 109D did not significantly outclass the MS.406, in September of 1938 Germany had over 500 Messerschmitts (along with about 60 early model Bf.110s and a smattering of 300 or so older biplane fighters), while France had just a few dozen Moranes - basically just an extended run of prototypes. It wasn't until late 1938 that the French began ordering new planes in large enough numbers for mass production, and the first production MS.406 didn't fly until January of 1939. In October of 1938 by far the most common French fighters the Germans would have faced would have been the obsolete Dewoitine D.500s and D.501s, which had fixed landing gear and open cockpits. Even then the French fighter squadrons were badly outnumbered, with only about 300 Dewoitines in frontline service as of August 1938. Similarly the RAF had only one operational Hurricane squadron (16 planes) at the time of Munich, as that type was also just entering service, with just four more squadrons forming. [Isby, "The Decisive Duel,"] This is ignoring the gross deficiency in the ADA's organization and training compared to the Luftwaffe.

In 1938, Germany had clear materiel superiority in several areas in 1938 and parity in the rest. In 1940, she was at parity in several areas and outnumbered overall. Unfortunately the French and British did not use their forces to best effect, and so Hitler still pulled off a win.

A specific example of the effect this could have can be found in the example of the battle of Sedan in that the pending commitment of several French motorized and armoured divisions which did not exist in 1938/39 pushed the Germans to move much faster. In 1940 these were very different forces from those nascent units the French fielded in 1938/39, and the DLMs in particular had become very skilled and powerful armoured units. French operational limitations still led to the Germans getting the drop (such as Rommel overrunning 1e DCR at Dinant) or the French committing them in the wrong locations and directions (such as the battles of Hannut and Stonne), but if the Germans had not had the fear of powerful French formations with - in many regards - superior tanks, they could have operated even more freely.

And the best of the French tank divisions were a very serious threat. On 12 and 13 May, 2e and 3e DLM (two of the best divisions in the French army) faced 3 and 4 Panzer divisions at Hannut and fought them to a tactical draw, which was rather better than anyone else ever achieved in their first armoured clash with the Germans. Unfortunately the French had committed their armour to the wrong location, so the battle was strategically meaningless, but it did show that if they had been committed to the right locations there was a chance for them to win.

As it was, historically, the French armoured forces ceased to be a serious concern after 15 May, with only de Gaulle's newly formed and inexperienced 4e DCR remaining both combat effective and in a location to do any good, but prior to then they offered the French their best hope for blunting the German spearhead. After they were destroyed, the French proved incapable of stopping the Panzers from doing whatever they wanted. Infantry divisions simply lacked the mobility and the firepower to prevent the Panzers running wild.

Also Guderian only had three panzer divisions at Sedan. He can still mass this force in this scenario, particularly since the weaker French mobile forces means the Germans will need to send comparatively fewer tanks up north to participate in the massive deception in Belgium, and the weaker French reserves mean they don't need to hedge with additional flanking panzer penetrations. And the lack of a few dozen Panzer IIIs and IVs in those divisions will hardly be the hinge on which the whole panzer assault succeeds or fails. That's giving rather too much credit to a small number of machines. The Panzer II remained the workhorse in 1940, just as it would be in 1938 or 1939.



The British, like the French, only began all-out mobilization with Munich. The forces that would constitute the BEF (the Dutch and Belgians small enough to be irrelevancies) in 1940 consisted of two poorly equipped infantry divisions. They can be discounted.

Depends on whether Germany knocks France out in 1939 or not.​

My guess is Germany doesn't knock France out in 1939 as the German Army was still expanding in 1938-9. A great deal of the arms that were required to expand the German army were seized from the Czechs so I don't see the German Army being able to expand to the significant degree they did IOTL beyond what they would enter the Sudetenland war in 1938 as a large portion of the Czech weapons / ammunition would be destroyed / expended plus a significant portion of the German weapons would be destroyed / expended in fighting the Czechs. The Germans had about 750k troops deployed against the Czechs at the start of September 1938 as compared to about double that amount against Poland in 1939 (1.5 million per Wiki) and four times that amount versus France in 1940 (3 million per wiki). Even considering a weaker starting position by the French and British, the Germans would be hard pressed to knock them out when the Germans would maybe be at half the quantity of troops in 1939 compared to 1940 and probably less than half the strength.

Plus the British and French will most likely have a more conservative defensive plan in 1939 than their rush into Belgium and Netherlands strategy of 1940 which would leave them less susceptible to being bagged by a Sickle Cut if the Germans attempted it.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

In this senario are we assuming that the French doctorine will not alter when they see the effectiveness of the Panzer divisions in the attack on Czechoslovakia?

Best I can tell... no? They didn't really alter their doctrine in response to the Polish campaign either, rather following along with prior plans drafted towards the start of mobilization.

I would guess some ad hoc armoured units would be formed by the French in response during TTL phoney war period. Perhaps not as effective as the OTL French armoured forces but there is nothing like a war to hurry along substantial change.

It's not just the formation of the armoured units, but the amount of time that has passed before their formation. It's worth comparing the vast gulf in experience between the DLM and DCR formations: the DLM which had been around for years by mid-1940 and had the actually trained personnel put up plenty credible fights whereas the DCRs which had only been formed at the start of 1940 and their ranks filled mostly with green-as-grass recruits folded like wet paper bags. It's a similar story with the Soviet tank divisions of 1941, many of which had only been formed in the past few months and had only had time for platoon and company-level training by the time the German invasion came. It's entirely possible that the French DLM's forced to fight in 1938 or 1939 without the benefit of the years of additional formation level training they conducted historically will be brushed aside as contemptuously as the unprepared Soviet tank forces in the border regions were in 1941, no matter their numbers and equipment.

A simple look at British defence spending year on year from the early 1930's until the DOW in 1939 illustrates that the British started rearmament long before Munich in 1938.

Technically, so did the French. The re-occupation of the Rhineland in 1936 really jolted the French. When the government asked Gamelin what he had available to deal with three German battalions, Gamelin was forced to admit that out of the 200,000 soldiers in metropolitan France he had nothing that could deploy, and would need a month of mobilization and a billion francs to put something together. This lack of readiness was shocking, and let to a growing reinvestment in the military, but it wasn't until 1938 that the shift went from "rearmament program" to "all-out mobilization", but for both cases vast improvements still needed to be made.

My guess is Germany doesn't knock France out in 1939 as the German Army was still expanding in 1938-9. A great deal of the arms that were required to expand the German army were seized from the Czechs so I don't see the German Army being able to expand to the significant degree they did IOTL beyond what they would enter the Sudetenland war in 1938 as a large portion of the Czech weapons / ammunition would be destroyed / expended plus a significant portion of the German weapons would be destroyed / expended in fighting the Czechs. The Germans had about 750k troops deployed against the Czechs at the start of September 1938 as compared to about double that amount against Poland in 1939 (1.5 million per Wiki) and four times that amount versus France in 1940 (3 million per wiki). Even considering a weaker starting position by the French and British, the Germans would be hard pressed to knock them out when the Germans would maybe be at half the quantity of troops in 1939 compared to 1940 and probably less than half the strength.

A lot of this is speculative and presumes the Czechs put up more of a fight on the ground then the Poles, which I rather don't see.

Plus the British and French will most likely have a more conservative defensive plan in 1939 than their rush into Belgium and Netherlands strategy of 1940 which would leave them less susceptible to being bagged by a Sickle Cut if the Germans attempted it.

That's a distinct possibility and probably the most likely butterfly proposed here that could lead to France not falling. The "luck" people speak of the Germans getting in 1940 really refers to two things that occurred between September 1939 and May 1940: the adoption of the Manstein proposal by the Germans and the simultaneous French adoption of the more aggressive variant of the Dyle Plan that called for them to rush most of their army even deeper into northern Belgium, which extended their lines and thinned out their reserves... thus playing into the Manstein's plan hands. Even if the first still happens (and there's been some arguments presented on this thread that it still could) there is no guarantee the second will.

 

[Veiovis]

Problem with this is that it assumes the French didn't begin all out mobilization until the declaration of war in 1939. In reality, the French did begin all out mobilization in 1938 as a result of their belated realization that the German army now significantly outnumbered them. The reserves were called up and industry began mobilization. Compared to IATL, the French were able to get in an extra year of wartime production and training of the reserves before war broke out.

While Germany's panzer divisions were made up mainly of Panzer I and II tanks in 1938 (and Panzer IIs still made up the majority in 1940), at least Germany had panzer divisions, grouped and organized in a logical manner. Compared to the four Panzer divisions Germany possessed in October of 1938 (with a fifth forming in November) France had... none. Although France had two DLM on paper, in 1938 they were basically just two understrength brigades of light tanks, lacking most of their heavier equipment. The powerful S35 tank that would equip the DLM during the Battle of France had only just entered full production at the start of the year, and less than 100 had been completed by mid 1938. At the time Guderian assessed French armoured formations as only having firepower fit for reconnaissance units. [Horne, "To Lose a Battle, p.118] France's first real armored divisions, the DCR's, didn't even exist at that point as the first DCR was not stood up until January of 1940. The DLMs would also undergo some 11th hour organizational changes in 1940 that made them powerful armored formations, but this they manifestly were not in late 1938.

By 1940 the numbers had shifted significantly. Whereas in 1938 France had only produced 400 tanks, in 1939 production more than doubled to over 1,000 vehicles (more than all the tanks produced in the years 1934-1937 combined, when France had begun her halting mechanized modernization), and in 1940 was set to double again, with 850 tanks produced in the first six months, before defeat abruptly ended production. [Jackson, "The Fall of France," p.13] In contrast, the Germans looted some 244 Pz 35 light tanks from Czech stocks, and had captured or built a further 237 Pz 38 tanks by the time of the Battle of France (so Czech tanks were about 20% of total German panzer strength). While the additional tanks were certainly appreciated by the Wehrmacht, it's clear that the Czech additions still didn't remotely match the massive increase in French tank production between 1939 and 1940.

In the air, the Moraine MS.406 was a decent enough fighter, but the numbers in service with the French Air Force in late 1938 were tiny, with each aircraft basically hand crafted. Yearly production in 1938 stood at a paltry 65 aircraft. [Goldstein, "The Munich Crisis," p.142] While you can argue that the 109D did not significantly outclass the MS.406, in September of 1938 Germany had over 500 Messerschmitts (along with about 60 early model Bf.110s and a smattering of 300 or so older biplane fighters), while France had just a few dozen Moranes - basically just an extended run of prototypes. It wasn't until late 1938 that the French began ordering new planes in large enough numbers for mass production, and the first production MS.406 didn't fly until January of 1939. In October of 1938 by far the most common French fighters the Germans would have faced would have been the obsolete Dewoitine D.500s and D.501s, which had fixed landing gear and open cockpits. Even then the French fighter squadrons were badly outnumbered, with only about 300 Dewoitines in frontline service as of August 1938. Similarly the RAF had only one operational Hurricane squadron (16 planes) at the time of Munich, as that type was also just entering service, with just four more squadrons forming. [Isby, "The Decisive Duel,"] This is ignoring the gross deficiency in the ADA's organization and training compared to the Luftwaffe.

In 1938, Germany had clear materiel superiority in several areas in 1938 and parity in the rest. In 1940, she was at parity in several areas and outnumbered overall. Unfortunately the French and British did not use their forces to best effect, and so Hitler still pulled off a win.

A specific example of the effect this could have can be found in the example of the battle of Sedan in that the pending commitment of several French motorized and armoured divisions which did not exist in 1938/39 pushed the Germans to move much faster. In 1940 these were very different forces from those nascent units the French fielded in 1938/39, and the DLMs in particular had become very skilled and powerful armoured units. French operational limitations still led to the Germans getting the drop (such as Rommel overrunning 1e DCR at Dinant) or the French committing them in the wrong locations and directions (such as the battles of Hannut and Stonne), but if the Germans had not had the fear of powerful French formations with - in many regards - superior tanks, they could have operated even more freely.

And the best of the French tank divisions were a very serious threat. On 12 and 13 May, 2e and 3e DLM (two of the best divisions in the French army) faced 3 and 4 Panzer divisions at Hannut and fought them to a tactical draw, which was rather better than anyone else ever achieved in their first armoured clash with the Germans. Unfortunately the French had committed their armour to the wrong location, so the battle was strategically meaningless, but it did show that if they had been committed to the right locations there was a chance for them to win.

As it was, historically, the French armoured forces ceased to be a serious concern after 15 May, with only de Gaulle's newly formed and inexperienced 4e DCR remaining both combat effective and in a location to do any good, but prior to then they offered the French their best hope for blunting the German spearhead. After they were destroyed, the French proved incapable of stopping the Panzers from doing whatever they wanted. Infantry divisions simply lacked the mobility and the firepower to prevent the Panzers running wild.

Also Guderian only had three panzer divisions at Sedan. He can still mass this force in this scenario, particularly since the weaker French mobile forces means the Germans will need to send comparatively fewer tanks up north to participate in the massive deception in Belgium, and the weaker French reserves mean they don't need to hedge with additional flanking panzer penetrations. And the lack of a few dozen Panzer IIIs and IVs in those divisions will hardly be the hinge on which the whole panzer assault succeeds or fails. That's giving rather too much credit to a small number of machines. The Panzer II remained the workhorse in 1940, just as it would be in 1938 or 1939.

thats a very informative post. maybe you should give some credit to the person who actually made it originally,though.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

thats a very informative post. maybe you should give some credit to the person who actually made it originally,though.

Sure. I fully acknowledge that a lot of the information I've presented here has already been laid out on another forum by a very different poster and in many cases I've even copy-and-pasted his words with some modest editing for grammar. Doesn't really change the substance of the arguments though.

 

[marathag]

Might not Poland be persuaded to allow Soviet forces to transit Poland to reach Czechoslovakia directly, again with the war under League auspices?

I don't think there is enough Gold in the French and British Treasuries to get a large enough Bribe to allow any Soviet units on Polish territory

 

[marathag]

While Germany's panzer divisions were made up mainly of Panzer I and II tanks in 1938 (and Panzer IIs still made up the majority in 1940), at least Germany had panzer divisions, grouped and organized in a logical manner.

But the Panzer I had no way of stopping any of the French Tanks(or any AFV, for that matter) short of ramming them. By this time, there were around 660 Panzer II thru the 'C' model that had some AP capability.

Panzer III was having real teething troubles at this time, few produced

Germany has the problem of not being able to concentrate the Panzers, have to have some in reserve against the Poles, who had several hundred tanks, then the fighting against the Czechs, and then the French

 

[nbcman]

Best I can tell... no? They didn't really alter their doctrine in response to the Polish campaign either, rather following along with prior plans drafted towards the start of mobilization.



It's not just the formation of the armoured units, but the amount of time that has passed before their formation. It's worth comparing the vast gulf in experience between the DLM and DCR formations: the DLM which had been around for years by mid-1940 and had the actually trained personnel put up plenty credible fights whereas the DCRs which had only been formed at the start of 1940 and their ranks filled mostly with green-as-grass recruits folded like wet paper bags. It's a similar story with the Soviet tank divisions of 1941, many of which had only been formed in the past few months and had only had time for platoon and company-level training by the time the German invasion came. It's entirely possible that the French DLM's forced to fight in 1938 or 1939 without the benefit of the years of additional formation level training they conducted historically will be brushed aside as contemptuously as the unprepared Soviet tank forces in the border regions were in 1941, no matter their numbers and equipment.



Technically, so did the French. The re-occupation of the Rhineland in 1936 really jolted the French. When the government asked Gamelin what he had available to deal with three German battalions, Gamelin was forced to admit that out of the 200,000 soldiers in metropolitan France he had nothing that could deploy, and would need a month of mobilization and a billion francs to put something together. This lack of readiness was shocking, and let to a growing reinvestment in the military, but it wasn't until 1938 that the shift went from "rearmament program" to "all-out mobilization", but for both cases vast improvements still needed to be made.



A lot of this is speculative and presumes the Czechs put up more of a fight on the ground then the Poles, which I rather don't see.



That's a distinct possibility and probably the most likely butterfly proposed here that could lead to France not falling. The "luck" people speak of the Germans getting in 1940 really refers to two things that occurred between September 1939 and May 1940: the adoption of the Manstein proposal by the Germans and the simultaneous French adoption of the more aggressive variant of the Dyle Plan that called for them to rush most of their army even deeper into northern Belgium, which extended their lines and thinned out their reserves... thus playing into the Manstein's plan hands. Even if the first still happens (and there's been some arguments presented on this thread that it still could) there is no guarantee the second will.

Another item that I failed to mention is the impact to the US industrial mobilization due to the various countries placing orders in 1938 due to the start of the European war instead of 1939/40. Can someone say Two Ocean Act in 1939?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

But the Panzer I had no way of stopping any of the French Tanks(or any AFV, for that matter) short of ramming them. By this time, there were around 660 Panzer II thru the 'C' model that had some AP capability.

So? The Germans inability for the bulk of their tank park to harm the best French tanks in a 1-1 confrontation simply didn't matter IOTL, because the German tanks didn't face the French tanks in a 1-1 confrontation. Panzer I's and Panzer IIs did just fine tearing through French infantry divisions in 1940 that were better armed in 1938, which is all they'll face in 1938 because the French have no tank divisions (by mid-1939 they could pull together six armoured brigades, but these were still very much works in progress and many of the tanks were not fully operational because the French had a habit of rolling unfinished machines out of the factories). Even their infantry divisions don't have the more modern (if poorly designed) tanks they had in 1940. In 1938 the production of new tanks was still halting and the numbers produced small, so the main infantry tank well into 1939 was still the WWI-era Renault FT-17, which a Panzer I could easily outmaneuver and leave in the dust while the Panzer II and any German AT weapon you care to name was more than a match for.

Panzer III was having real teething troubles at this time, few produced

As it was, the Panzer III and IV were too few in numbers in 1940 and the I's and II's were what did the bulk of the fighting anyways. It didn't make any sort of difference. Given that the French tank park in 1938 and 39 overwhelmingly were FT-17s, with modern tank production only ramping up during the course of 1939, they should be more then adequate for a French campaign in 1938 or 39.

Germany has the problem of not being able to concentrate the Panzers,

Say what? What mystical forcefield do the French have that suddenly prevent the Germans from concentrating panzers against them?

have to have some in reserve against the Poles

What? Why? Why would the Germans opt to send panzer divisions to defend against Poland who aren't doing anything? They didn't bother allocating any panzer divisions against the French when invading Poland in 1939 and they were actually at war with the France in 1939. Why would they suddenly do more then have some infantry divisions garrison the border against a country they aren't even at war with?

then the fighting against the Czechs, and then the French

So like they OTL fought against the Poles and then the French.

Another item that I failed to mention is the impact to the US industrial mobilization due to the various countries placing orders in 1938 due to the start of the European war instead of 1939/40. Can someone say Two Ocean Act in 1939?

That's predicated on French falling in 1939. While there undoubtedly would be some moving up of the orders, the overwhelming bulk of those didn't arrive to influence the Battle of France as it was, so I don't see why that would suddenly be different.

It's worth noting that there are some details that do need to be fleshed out: the Munich Crisis ran from May to September of 1938. If Britain and France make it clear from the start there'll be no negotiation then Fall Grun could be executed as early as 30 May. In that worse case scenario that means Czech resistance might cease by the end of June, giving Hitler the late summer and early fall to attack France, which he probably will. The only thing that stopped Hitler from ordering the invasion of France right after Poland in 1939 was the worsening winter weather. That's really bad news for the French: it means the German army hits a France with only 40 divisions, all infantry, with only a portion of those likely combat capable even by French standards.

Now if Munich drags on into August or September before war breaks out, then the weather will likely prevent an immediate follow on blow against France... but that just means the Germans invade in the spring of 1939 rather than 1940. There's no way Hitler would accept a year of doing nothing.​