Fall Grun 1938: Are Germany's early-war odds really worse than OTL 1939?

[BiteNibbleChomp]

I've been reading a bunch of the old threads about the Munich Agreement falling through and a shooting war erupting over Czechoslovakia in October 1938, with the conclusion always being: Germany gets a bloody nose, eventually beats CZE, eventually battles France somehow and gets smashed. With some mention of a coup against Hitler thrown in.

However, in an ATL where the war happens over CZE, I imagine that *AH.com would have threads "what if the Munich Pact happened and war broke out in 1939 over Poland. Which would go something like: Poland hurts Germany but eventually dies, then Germany moves against France and gets its face smashed up. Because the Allies knew about the Schlieffen trick. Also replace "coup against Hitler" with "Red Army jumps on Hitler".

Both of these scenarios are very similar, and an AH.commer of the ATL would dismiss the OTL outcome (insert calls of ASB), although we can see that there was a small-% chance of it actually happening. So I'm going to reframe the usual Fall Grun question slightly: is Germany's position in 1938 really that much worse than the Allies compared to their relative positions in 1939? That being, if Germany was just as lucky as it was IOTL, could it beat France?

Furthermore, could it achieve a negotiated peace afterwards (say, Germany keeps Austria and Bohemia, else status quo ante bellum).

Why do I say this? Those other threads make a lot of mention of Pz38s and other stuff being necessary to beat Poland and France, but they couldn't kill a French heavy or a Matilda any better than a Pz2 could, and is there any reason why a war in 1938 wouldn't see an earlier model Pz3 pushed into production earlier to make up some of the shortfall? AFAIK the LW was also in a better relative position to the French air force in 1938 compared to 1939.

Assume the following:
USSR either doesn't intervene on the ground, or if they do they are attacking Poland, and Poland doesn't contribute anywhere else to the Axis war efforts. (Until at least 1941 USSR won't be powerful enough to roll over Poland, much less Germany)
Similar as above with Hungary and Romania: either they are neutral or counter each other exactly (neither is really strong enough to crush the other).
France doesn't flood Spain with help - the SCW is ongoing and it is fine if Franco DOWs France, but no major changes to the Spanish theatre from OTL 1938 (although the Republicans are allowed to fight on for a bit longer).
The 1938 coup against Hitler fails. We know how good the bastard was at avoiding assassinations. If he is booted out as a requirement for a negotiated peace in ~1940, that is fine.

Also, is the UK remaining neutral necessary for Germany not to just get sat on? Or Italy joining?

- BNC

 

[MagicalPhantom345]

I don't know honestly

 

[GDIS Pathe]

I doubt it, to be honest, The Western Allies hadn't really gotten rearmament of the ground yet, The French and British air forces were still flying Bi-Planes and obsolescent interwar monoplanes the French had just gotten the MS 406 into production and there was just a single squadron of Hawker Hurricanes operational. The French didn't have any armored or real mobile formations worth their salt and the BEF that was lavishly equipped come 1940 barely existed.

Germany is correspondingly weaker no Czech tanks or industry two fronts to worry about but they had a major edge in modern fighters and superior leadership

TBH I think the outcome of a 38 war is a coin flip

 

[marathag]

The French and British air forces were still flying Bi-Planes and obsolescent interwar monoplanes the French had just gotten the MS 406 into production and there was just a single squadron of Hawker Hurricanes operational.

Most of the Luftwaffe was in the early marks of the Bf-109, the 'A' were prototypes, not many 'C' were produced, most of the force was a few hundred 'B' and 'D' that were not all that impressive in Combat over Spain. It was the 'E' model that really got the Messerschmidt its reputation in 1939

 

[ObssesedNuker]

It’s really really the potential butterflies of a ‘38 war rather than the forces.

On paper, the Allies had the forces to win in 1940. They lost because of soft factors and operational execution which defy easy quantification. Given a few plausible changes (the most common of which is the Germans executing their original Schlieffen Mk.II battle plan) an Allied victory, or at least strategic stalemate and the avoidance of immediate defeat and thus the gaining of eventual long term victory, was possible.

But if the same butterflies and soft factors break the Germans way in a hypothetical 1939 invasion of France following a 1938 invasion of Czechoslovakia there's no reason they can't win then either. They're still in with a punchers chance and with a similar amount of leeway that they had in 1940.

 

[QuentinEdwardDevrill]

I think you forget the Spanish Civil war is still ragin on.

One of the arguments on the coup is that 1/6th of the Luftwaffe and most of is modern planes were on Sapin, if the wolrd war breaks no way they can get them back.

The germans in Sapin become the enemy so the french probably not only release the materiel they where witholding at the frontier but also sent trops to Spain to, 1st secure the troops transfer from Morocco and Algeria. 2 Deny bases in Spain for the germans or italians to hamper this transit of troops. 3 Get hand of the new weapons the germans were testing.

Not sure the move on the british side, they are to low on new gadgets, but the joker will be uncle Joe, the baltic attack dreamed by Fisher 25 years later, the soviet troops landing in germany covered by the RN, no real german navy few subs and the planes can't be in 2 places at the same time

 

[Anchises]

It’s really really the potential butterflies of a ‘38 war rather than the forces.

On paper, the Allies had the forces to win in 1940. They lost because of soft factors and operational execution which defy easy quantification. Given a few plausible changes (the most common of which is the Germans executing their original Schlieffen Mk.II battle plan) an Allied victory, or at least strategic stalemate and the avoidance of immediate defeat and thus the gaining of eventual long term victory, was possible.

But if the same butterflies and soft factors break the Germans way in a hypothetical 1939 invasion of France following a 1938 invasion of Czechoslovakia there's no reason they can't win then either. They're still in with a punchers chance and with a similar amount of leeway that they had in 1940.

Mostly agreed. I still think people tend to overestimate how likely Schlieffen MK II was. There was considerable institutional resistance, a lot of influential officers opposed it (Rundstedt for example) and Hitler didn't like it either.

Personally I think that even without the plane crash Schlieffen MK II wouldn't have been implemented. Someone influental would have been able to convince Hitler that a different plan is needed. Hitler wanted to be convinced and there were enough officers ready to do it.

 

[threadnecromancer]

I think you forget the Spanish Civil war is still ragin on.

One of the arguments on the coup is that 1/6th of the Luftwaffe and most of is modern planes were on Sapin, if the wolrd war breaks no way they can get them back.

The germans in Sapin become the enemy so the french probably not only release the materiel they where witholding at the frontier but also sent trops to Spain to, 1st secure the troops transfer from Morocco and Algeria. 2 Deny bases in Spain for the germans or italians to hamper this transit of troops. 3 Get hand of the new weapons the germans were testing.

Not sure the move on the british side, they are to low on new gadgets, but the joker will be uncle Joe, the baltic attack dreamed by Fisher 25 years later, the soviet troops landing in germany covered by the RN, no real german navy few subs and the planes can't be in 2 places at the same time

Is France getting heavily involved in the Spanish quagmire going to help them when the Germans invade? If they over-extend themselves then I think a German victory becomes even more likely. Then the Germans are in a good position to help the Nationalist finish the civil war and cause trouble for the British.

Not sure if the KM would be as capable of pulling off a Norway campaign - so that is one issue. Although if the British are the ones to invade Norway (and potentially Sweden) that could go to Germany's advantage.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Mostly agreed. I still think people tend to overestimate how likely Schlieffen MK II was. There was considerable institutional resistance, a lot of influential officers opposed it (Rundstedt for example) and Hitler didn't like it either.

Personally I think that even without the plane crash Schlieffen MK II wouldn't have been implemented. Someone influental would have been able to convince Hitler that a different plan is needed. Hitler wanted to be convinced and there were enough officers ready to do it.

I'm given to understand Rundstedt was all for it and was very much against Manstein's Ardenne's proposal? Or maybe I'm getting him confused with Von Bock or someone similar. In any case, it took more then just the plane crash for Manstein's proposal to be adopted but it is true that Hitler didn't much like the plan and there were some powerful people fishing around for alternatives. So whether the Germans hit upon Manstein's proposal as per OTL, a different proposal with similar odds of success, a different proposal that's actually worse, or wind up sticking with the Schlieffen 2.0 is all rather up in the air.

 

[mudhead]

Germany owed a lot of it's early wartime successes to the Czech equipment it "inherited" in 1938-39, and the intact munitions factories that continued to supply the Reich until 1945.

With a 1938 war, a lot of that equipment will be destroyed, as will the factories. So, much less armaments production and tanks in the 139-41 period. If Germany fights and wins in 1938, it may be much less likely to win in 1940.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Germany owed a lot of it's early wartime successes to the Czech equipment it "inherited" in 1938-39, and the intact munitions factories that continued to supply the Reich until 1945.

With a 1938 war, a lot of that equipment will be destroyed, as will the factories. So, much less armaments production and tanks in the 139-41 period. If Germany fights and wins in 1938, it may be much less likely to win in 1940.

Why is the invasion of France taking place in 1940? If we assume a German invasion of Czechoslovakia in September of 1938 leads to an Anglo-French declaration of war and then an invasion of France in May of 1939, the Germans will still acquire some Czech tanks. Some will be salvaged from the battlefield (and since the 38 was not yet in operational service they're more likely to be captured) and depending on how much damage the Czech factories take, some may also be in production. So the Germans may still invade with some Czech tanks if they attack in 1939... if admittedly not as many.

However, it's worth considering the other side of the coin here: does Germany having somewhat fewer and less capable tanks in 1939 then it did in 1940 matter more then the fact they'll be facing an enemy who does not yet have any effective tank divisions and has not properly trained any of their infantry in using their anti-tank weapons? How about the fact the French army in 1939 is less then half the size of what it was in 1940 (65 divisions vs 117)?

 

[iron]

Why is the invasion of France taking place in 1940? If we assume a German invasion of Czechoslovakia in September of 1938 leads to an Anglo-French declaration of war and then an invasion of France in May of 1939, the Germans will still acquire some Czech tanks. Some will be salvaged from the battlefield (and since the 38 was not yet in operational service they're more likely to be captured) and depending on how much damage the Czech factories take, some may also be in production. So the Germans may still invade with some Czech tanks if they attack in 1939... if admittedly not as many.

However, it's worth considering the other side of the coin here: does Germany having somewhat fewer and less capable tanks in 1939 then it did in 1940 matter more then the fact they'll be facing an enemy who does not yet have any effective tank divisions and has not properly trained any of their infantry in using their anti-tank weapons? How about the fact the French army in 1939 is less then half the size of what it was in 1940 (65 divisions vs 117)?

People overstate the manifest importance of the 38, while ignoring the fact that the biggest gain accrued was the artillery/munitions and ammunition production capacity of the complexes taken in the "second stage" of the Czechoslovakian "conquest"(OTL...of course).

That and the foreign capital seized.

This is not addressed to you, but to the poster to which you were replying.

In the big picture, we will see a Germany in full possession of most of the elements that made the historical outcome possible and the French and BEF will be in a far worse position.

One serious question is: "how will German industry deal with the historical deficit in artillery ammunition and aerial delivered "iron bomb" stocks that occurred as a result of the Polish campaign OTL"? Usage levels would most likely be comparable in an invasion of the remainder of Czechoslovakia and this may prove to be a real serious problem for them in this particular (accelerated) case. Historically, they were seeing limited production from re-tooled Czech industry by Spring of 1940, although it should be pointed out that lack of plant capacity was not the primary reason for this historical deficit.
To whit, the OTL ammunition situation had more to do with allocations of finished steel within the bureaucracy of the Four Year Plan (Plan Z/Industrial [RKV/Junkers/IG Farben Synthetics/ Nibelungenwerke...and dozens of lesser initiatives] Expansion had priority) than a specific lack of productive facilities.
Tactical decisions will obviously play a big part (as pointed out above), but the equipment, training, and motivation of those that will carry out the ground operations on the German side are (for the large part) already well established if they've seen serious combat operations in Czechoslovakia.
I don't like the French/English chances in this scenario at all; advantage to Germany over OTL...if they have the ammunition reserves to pull it off.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I'm given to understand Rundstedt was all for it and was very much against Manstein's Ardenne's proposal? Or maybe I'm getting him confused with Von Bock or someone similar. In any case, it took more then just the plane crash for Manstein's proposal to be adopted but it is true that Hitler didn't much like the plan and there were some powerful people fishing around for alternatives. So whether the Germans hit upon Manstein's proposal as per OTL, a different proposal with similar odds of success, a different proposal that's actually worse, or wind up sticking with the Schlieffen 2.0 is all rather up in the air.

Mays analysis the evolution of the German plans in 'Strange Victory' is probably the best source for all this. He notes that well before October 1939 no one was happy with the current attack plan. They had been testing it in map and field exercises, from army up to the top at Zossen & the results of those exercises were indecisive at best. Everyone had a opinion and a variety of vague proposals were floated. When the October attack was canceled and the November date postponed as well Halder ordered another map exercise at Zossen in early November. He directed three basic plans be tested. One would be with the schweherpunckt or mass of maneuver be on the Belgian plain. The second with the schwehrpunckt in the Ardennes, The third with the mass of maneuver uncommitted, to be sent where success developed as the battle progressed. the Army group commanders, A & B were directed to prepare or up date their plans and studies on how they would execute their role in these three options.

Manstein as Rundsteadts CoS was responsible for the detail work in this planning. He took the Ardenne option very seriously, He also took the presence of two armored corps in AG A for the Ardennes option seriously. The plan he outlined had those two corps advance ahead to disrupt the Belgian screening forces in the Ardennes and seize crossings on the Meuse River before the Belgians and French reinforcements could consolidate on the river.

When tested at the early November map ex. none of the plans produced anything decisive. The plan that kept the mass of maneuver in reserve failed the most completely. It strongly suggested the attack had to succeed early or not at all. The other two showed more promise. Mansteins idea for sending the armored corps rapidly ahead to the Meause river was noted, and some generals present thought it too risky. Others objected that control of the armored corps was separated from the local army commanders. Hitler kept a close eye on the exercises and was intrigued by the Ardennes variant that week. In later discussions with Halder & others he went back to the north or Belgian Plain option. Later in November Hitler met Manstein at a scheduled dinner introducing him to several newly appointed corps commanders. man stein claimed he inspired Hitler at this meeting. Hitler did not seem to remember it, however he Halder, Rundstedt, and others had been discussing the entire question at weekly and twice weekly conferences since the Zossen wargame in early November.

Halder, the AG commanders, and the army commanders continued testing variants in both field and map exercises through into January. Hitler waffled from meeting to meeting on which option to support. There were variants where the Netherlands were not attacked. Variants with the armored corps spread out, and concentrated. By January its was becoming clear that Guderians arguments for concentrating the panzer arm, into a focused striking force had much better results than with the corps parceled out to local army commanders.

It was this constant testing and variant trials that was the actual synthesis of the Sickle Cut maneuver. Gaming out battle plans had been a Prussian Army habit since the early 19th Century & their inheritors in the Imperial German Army, the Reichwehr, and the Wehrmacht took the testing of plans with map and field exercises very seriously. Nothing certain here, but whatever the variants in dates ect... its possible the German army will improve its campaign plans as far as time allows.

 

[Anti-GrammarNazi]

You fail to take into account something really important. The genius plan of the Battle of France was an improvised plan. It only happened because Germany lost the original plans.

A war in 38 moves things so much, that the very small, almost lottery jackpot winning butterfly of losing the original plans, does not happen. Which means Germany not only gets the bloody nose in 38, but also has way worse plans to invade France.

This also moves Barbarossa even further in time, which strenghten the Soviets.

I am going to do a leap of faith and say that it id possible that even with a 38 war, France is defeated in 1940 or 41.

However one thing is certain: Germany is not going to be in a position to launch Barbarossa.

What happens here is anyone's guess. This might force Germany to continue the Unholly Alliance with Stalin. OTL Stalin was shitting bricks over the quick German victories and (or so I have read) cut some help he was giving Germany. Hitler taking longer to defeat France and receiving more blood loss, will make Stalin most pleased, and as such might be more agreeable resulting in less tensions.

Ironically this might be better for Hitler as there would be no Eastern Front. Assuming he manages to get this far.

 

[BiteNibbleChomp]

However one thing is certain: Germany is not going to be in a position to launch Barbarossa.

What happens here is anyone's guess. This might force Germany to continue the Unholly Alliance with Stalin. OTL Stalin was shitting bricks over the quick German victories and (or so I have read) cut some help he was giving Germany. Hitler taking longer to defeat France and receiving more blood loss, will make Stalin most pleased, and as such might be more agreeable resulting in less tensions.

Ironically this might be better for Hitler as there would be no Eastern Front. Assuming he manages to get this far.

There's no unholy alliance. Stalin would have DOWed Germany in 1938, and then either done very little (because of neutral Poland or Romania) or attacked Poland and/or Romania and made a mess of it Winter War-style (Sept 38 is still peak purge period after all). The Red Army that could curbstomp anything in its path won't be around until 1941 at the very earliest, which is why I thought a negotiated peace in 1939 or 1940 a more likely outcome than a war to the end.

I think you forget the Spanish Civil war is still ragin on.

One of the arguments on the coup is that 1/6th of the Luftwaffe and most of is modern planes were on Sapin, if the wolrd war breaks no way they can get them back.

The germans in Sapin become the enemy so the french probably not only release the materiel they where witholding at the frontier but also sent trops to Spain to, 1st secure the troops transfer from Morocco and Algeria. 2 Deny bases in Spain for the germans or italians to hamper this transit of troops. 3 Get hand of the new weapons the germans were testing.

Not sure the move on the british side, they are to low on new gadgets, but the joker will be uncle Joe, the baltic attack dreamed by Fisher 25 years later, the soviet troops landing in germany covered by the RN, no real german navy few subs and the planes can't be in 2 places at the same time

The Condor Legion had like 100 planes. In contrast Wikipedia gives Bf109 production until the end of 1938 as about 1800. Certainly not 1/6th of the LW, and probably not enough planes to matter. Also the first Bf109Es were sent to Spain in December 1938, in this scenario they're being sent to Germany/CZE/France theatres as soon as they're built.

So apart from the Nationalists possibly joining the Axis, not sure the SCW has a lot of direct impact?

- BNC

 

[marathag]

The Condor Legion had like 100 planes. In contrast Wikipedia gives Bf109 production until the end of 1938 as about 1800.

I'd like to know where that 1.8k number comes from.

The A and C were low number prototypes, leaving the 'B' and 'D'

Also have this
As of 1st August 1938 Luftwaffe fighter strength was 643 machines with less than half Bf-109 fighters. Due to more factories coming on line this figure was lifted to 583 machines by the end of September.

In late spring the first Daimler powered Bf-109D-1 came off the production line. The DB-600Aa was not a reliable engine and when the Bf-109E-1 entered service in February 1939 it was powered by the more reliable DB-601.

1,056 Bf-109 fighters of all types were in service at the time of the Polish invasion

 

[BiteNibbleChomp]

I'd like to know where that 1.8k number comes from.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Bf_109#Production

- BNC

 

[marathag]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Bf_109#Production

I don't believe it was footnoted on where the pre 1939 number came from. German Propaganda before the war bumped up the size of the Luftwaffe.

Good to know how many of each type. 'D' Model had real issues with reliability, 'B' just were not that good, proven by combat results in Spain

 

[BiteNibbleChomp]

From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Bf_109_variants
We have something like
341 Bf109B-1 built ever
647 Bf109D built ever (235 still in service as of invasion of Poland)
1183 109E-1 built ever (these numbers go as far as 1940, I'm guessing ~300 would be available for a 5/39 invasion of France)

The Bf110 was also entering service in 1938, so maybe a couple of hundred of them available as well.

As for bombers, 250 Hs123 built total (production ended 1939). And some Stukas (336 in 9/39).

Compare France:
535 MS406 at 9/39
381 Dewoitine 500 built ever (majority available by 1938/9).
Couldn't find any ground support bombers with decent production numbers by 1939.

Doesn't look great for France, even after significant losses in CZE.

- BNC

 

[marathag]

Built, but how many flying at that point in 1938

“Fully 11,000 of the 33,000 Bf-109 built were destroyed in takeoff and landing accidents alone …
I was most amazed when my late friend, 176-kill ace General Johannes Steinhoff, related this fantastic landing accident rate to me in 1956.”
_Flight Journal_ by Meyer pg.157