Fall Grun 1938: Are Germany's early-war odds really worse than OTL 1939?

[Garrison]

The big problem with the French army was its uneven nature of a number of good active divisions back up by first reserve divisions then the rest middle aged reservists with limited training and modern equipment in the B divisions. In theory this isn't son bad as the B divisions where there to make up the numbers in quiet areas. However the beauty of the OTL German 1940 offensive was it pitted these very units against the cream of the German Army.

By 1939 the French army was well supplied with modern albeit light anti tank guns in the form of the 25mm Hotchkiss that the French were capable of supplying 300 surplus of these anti tank guns to the British who where rather short of any anti tank weapons at the outbreak of war in 1939. I have read accounts where these 25mm guns did good work against the lighter German Pz 1's and Pz 2's in British hands. The French had also used the venerable 75's as anti tank guns to make up the numbers since the early 1930's. These would be able to take out any German tank in 1938 although admittedly over open sights (but it worked for the British with the 25 pounder in the dessert). The trick for the French is to get the good divisions into the fight against the Panzers where they would stand a good chance of putting up a credible defence.

Well not sending all of them to the Dyle Line would help and that only happened because they got their hands on the original German attack plan in 1940. Reading Dunkirk by Julian Thompson and looking at the maps showing the advance of Sickle Stroke it's breathtaking just how vulnerable the flanks were to any kind of organized counteroffensive. If the cream of the French armies hadn't been thrown into Belgium the whole thing could have fallen apart very easily. Sickle Stroke just needs so many things to go just right that I am hard pressed to see it working in 1939 with a much weaker armoured force.

 

[Shevek23]

...
All of that said, Germany probably did it right after all. Earlier would not have been great from a logistics point of view.

Ivan

Dunno about logistics, but overall Hitler was a measured but impetuous fellow. He generally did not stop to ask pretty please permission to take the next step in his master plan, already sketched out in Mein Kampf decades before he was in a position to act. People kept underestimating him, partially because he did things that were crazy risky.

So...how come in 1938, if it were in fact true that a canny analysis of the real military potential of Britain and France discounts their tremendous paper assets, and that Hitler's assets in hand were more relatively superior...not just to Britain and France as the "Gosh, I can't see how Hitler does worse a year earlier without unreasonable bad luck" school here likes to focus on, but the whole package of all enemies, for as I pointed out the third rate innocent bystander little countries had mixed track records of arming up after the OTL betrayal of Czechoslovakia, and of course that first victim outside of actual German territory had zero chance to try, so one has to consider how much larger a cost Hitler would have to pay--relatively!--to subdue nations like Belgium or of course Czechoslovakia herself...toting it all up, if it were in fact the case that Hitler could see himself in at least as good as position as he was in OTL September 1939, why did he in fact allow himself to be led down the primrose path of negotiating with France and Britain as late spring turned to summer, then autumn and the end of campaigning season loomed? Why did he allow "jaw jaw jaw" to run out his clock for swiftly taking CZ, then (as @Jan Olbracht perhaps too patriotically but not unreasonably holds Poland does pose a serious at least potential threat, no matter how cowed Hitler thinks their leaders probably are) having to crush Poland with no Soviet help of any kind, then conquer at the very least Belgium and France and probably have to take the Netherlands at the same time if he doesn't want them to join with Britain in sheer desperation and make their defenses work? If it were true that in May 1938 his overall relative position was actually better, why not just attack CZ and then wait and see if the Western powers or Soviets dare do anything at all, and if they do, handle them?

I think Hitler himself gives the lie to the idea that it was reasonable to expect OTL levels of German success a year earlier. Perhaps it was more a matter of the gamble looking subjectively too crazy even for Hitler, or perhaps it was a matter of Hitler not being sure his generals would not revolt effectively and needing the extra year and the glow of success of taking Czechia and puppetizing Slovakia to put the old military ruling class firmly behind the political eight ball. But I think it is quite likely Hitler himself looked at what he had in hand, estimated what the successive foes he'd have to take down in order had, including the smaller powers, and figured he needed to play for a bit more time himself. So he gambled on CZ, but with lower stakes than usual, gambling on a purely political-diplomatic coup with the downside being limited to losing some prestige--and, if he were not willing to follow through in September with all out attack, CZ resources and leaving a serious if second or third rate in scale military foe lodged in the Reich's guts. I don't suppose CZ could have done a lot with a year's grace, nor would they have a full year I suppose; with both CZ and Poland on the to do list I imagine the war would break out a lot earlier in 1939 than September.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The big problem with the French army was its uneven nature of a number of good active divisions back up by first reserve divisions then the rest middle aged reservists with limited training and modern equipment in the B divisions. In theory this isn't son bad as the B divisions where there to make up the numbers in quiet areas. However the beauty of the OTL German 1940 offensive was it pitted these very units against the cream of the German Army.

Thats how it played out at Sedan, Givet, and a few other locations. The French army commanders understood the weakness, but were too slow in deploying higher quality corps to reinforce those vulnerable points. ie: at Dinat the 18th ID, a Series A formation fought the 7th Pz Div for 60 hours alone. The key formation in reinforcing that sector, the 1st DCR received three changes of orders in four days and arrived after the 18th ID had been ordered to retreat. Ditto for the other 9th Army formations that were to back stop the sectors under attack.

The 21st Corps was not ordered to reinforce the 2d Army until the Sedan sector (French X Corps) was under attack by Guderians Corps on the 12th May. While it completed its movement to its assembly areas with the 2d Army quick enough the Army and corps commanders were too slow in organizing a counter attack, then canceled it. That allowed the complete destruction of the X Corps at Sedan, the 55th & 71st Series B ID, virtually unsupported. The 63rd ID suffered a similar fate near Givet. This Series B ID fought alone for a day, destroyed while the potential reinforcements received orders from 9th Army to late to help.

By 1939 the French army was well supplied with modern albeit light anti tank guns in the form of the 25mm Hotchkiss that the French were capable of supplying 300 surplus of these anti tank guns to the British who where rather short of any anti tank weapons at the outbreak of war in 1939. I have read accounts where these 25mm guns did good work against the lighter German Pz 1's and Pz 2's in British hands. The French had also used the venerable 75's as anti tank guns to make up the numbers since the early 1930's. These would be able to take out any German tank in 1938 although admittedly over open sights (but it worked for the British with the 25 pounder in the dessert).

Alone the French AT guns were too thin on the ground to deal with a concentration of tank battalions. The ratio of four AT guns per kilometer (IIRC) was sufficient for attacking company size tank groups per kilometer. French doctrine did not leave the AT guns alone. The plentiful artillery with its surfeit of 75mm cannon and large corps and army artillery Groupements were organized to support the AT gun nests first with direct fire from forward batteries of 75mm guns, & then with concentrations of indirect fire from multiple groups of a dozen cannon each. This helped bring the density of counter fire against tanks closer to what was needed. It also stripped away the accompanying infantry and blinded the tanks in a pall of dust and smoke.

The trick for the French is to get the good divisions into the fight against the Panzers where they would stand a good chance of putting up a credible defence.

The outright defeat of the 3rd & 4th PzDiv by a French infantry corps at Gembloux illustrates this. Despite lacking and defensive terrain or amor and air support the French infantry divisions repealed a full on armored attack for three days. The Belgian plain north of Gembloux was about as perfect tank country as one could ask for. A gently rolling upland plain there were no streams a man could not wade in a minute, the well drained ground was firm without bogs or marshes, no forests, a few scattered orchards, no dense urban sprawl. The corps had two small battalions of infantry support tanks, and air support was a few dozen sorties of armed reconnaissance by light Poetz bombers. They defeated the armored attack with well trained/disciplined men & leaders who had a decent understanding of their tactical system. The Germans attacked into a web of entrenched strongpoints where their infantry were killed or driven back by a combination of MG and concentrated artillery fire. 48 75mm guns in each division were reinforced by battalions of 75, 105, & 155mm artillery in the corps artillery Groupment. The two Pz Divisions between them mustered only 48 cannon and lacked any corps artillery. Bereft of their infantry and weakly supported by artillery the German tanks were picked off by the light AT guns and support from direct firing 75mm guns behind the AT guns. From the 15th through 17th May the Germans attempted to overrun the French corps and salt the 1st Army as per their orders. On the afternoon of the 17th they were ordered to give it up and move south to join Pz Group Kliest in its breakout & exploitation to the coast.

Had the 2d & 9th French Armies been able to move their better quality corps into the defense on the Meuse River in time the Sickle would have been broken there. Those units existed, and were available in the reserve of the 2d & 9th Armies, and Georges "Reserve Strategic" of the North West Front. Unfortunately neither Georges nor his army commanders Huntzinger & Corap understood the threat and urgency. Deploying their reserves some 48 hours late.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I'm not sure why you'd say that, since the French won't be launching any major tank assaults (or assaults in general... French doctrine was cripplingly passive)

French doctrine was not passive. Its leadership, as personified by Gamelin, was slow to the point of passivity. Tactical and operational doctrine of the French army of the 1930s resembled closest the US Army doctrine of 1943-45, depending on firepower, combined arms, methodical bite and hold or bite and chew tactics to destroy the enemy.

...on those German infantry divisions given their total lack of major armored formations.

Yet the French had as many or more modern tanks as the Germans in 1938. The difference is they would be directly working in combination with the infantry and artillery to methodically destroy the German defense. German doctrine sought to disrupt and demoralize a defense. French doctrine sought to destroy it, or demoralize it with the threat of destruction.

It'd be more useful to examine French AT use which was... well, it was poor as it was in 1940. Without the extra one to two years of training, it'd probably be completely ignorable now.

As demonstrated at Gembloux the trained formations did have a doctrine effective against armor. But my question is if the German defense in the Rhineland could in 1938 withstand what the French Active Series formations could deliver.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Well not sending all of them to the Dyle Line would help and that only happened because they got their hands on the original German attack plan in 1940.

Thats interesting. I knew the French had a German turncoat, a civil servant, who had been delivering them miscl military documents. Around 1936 he gave them a operating manual for the Enigma encryption machine. But had no knowledge of the war plans falling into French hands. Where can I read more about this? Who were the agents and how were they run?

 

[Ian Henderson]

Thats interesting. I knew the French had a German turncoat, a civil servant, who had been delivering them miscl military documents. Around 1936 he gave them a operating manual for the Enigma encryption machine. But had no knowledge of the war plans falling into French hands. Where can I read more about this? Who were the agents and how were they run?

I believe @Garrison is referring to this

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mechelen_incident

A liaison plane carrying a staff officer with a copy of the early Fall Gelb plans made a forced landing in Belgium, and the French and British got a look at them.

 

[Shevek23]

French doctrine was not passive. Its leadership, as personified by Gamelin, was slow to the point of passivity. ...

One question I raised, aimed at someone I took to be a French citizen who might know in great detail, but really is out there for everyone--how did the French political leadership of spring and summer 1938 differ in attitude and interests from those in charge in late summer and early Sept 1939? I believe there had been a shift in top 3rd Republic leadership over the year, due in part to the debacles of the Munich betrayal and also the collapse of the Republican side in the Spanish Civil war, and that in mid-1938 the French government was actively supporting the Republicans in Spain, which I take as a token of a more leftward stance than a year later. If instead of washing their hands of Czechoslovakia, the government in charge in OTL May '38 steps up to declare war on Hitler if he goes ahead and attacks CZ, and never gives the CZ leaders any cause to doubt they will honor their alliance, how much impact would the different political leadership have? Would they approve the same commanders, and would those commanders be as defeatist and desultory as OTL? Would the same generals act differently if overseen by the 1938 government, and if not would this government be more proactive at weeding out the defeatists and shifting in more energetic generals and perhaps more technically adept and flexible ones? Someone like Charles DeGaulle (not a particular example for the top command level, of course, he is too low in rank for that, but someone a bit more like him higher up, or many people more like him at his level) might not be thrilled by left wing government, which is my impression we had more of in 1938 in France due mainly to their support of the Spanish Republicans, but neither will he tolerate the idea of slacking off on the theory that victory is hard whereas German victory under Hitler might be good for France; he is far too patriotic for that, and has new ideas he wants to try. Are there more DeGaulles to give more free rein to? Are there generals who mind less that the government is left wing than that France is threatened and with resolve, can win?

Having better morale and better commanders might not guarantee a slam dunk victory; if in 1938 they are objectively weak and Hitler has a great plan that will surely take them all down with his nifty army all hyped up by his inspiring leadership and armed with nifty new higher tech toys, then defeat will happen, will or no will.

But will capitulation to German rule follow, or will the 1938 government take as much French force that survives to Britain or Algeria and perhaps even Spain, and defy the Reich in exile? Even if this has zero good effect on the Allied cause in Europe itself, it surely denies Hitler a lot of potential naval and air power he might pick up, and cuts him off from puppet-mastering the far flung (but also densely packed nearby) French empire system, which remains firmly in Allied hands should France's leadership refuse to capitulate. Surely Mussolini would not have time to reinforce Libya enough for it to survive; the whole North African campaign of OTL is out of the question, and Hitler's hands are tied in the Levant and Middle East generally without the access Vichy rule of Syria and Lebanon gave Nazi agents. Whatever resources French colonial possessions gave to the Axis OTL are denied. Indochina is not going to be handed over gift wrapped to Japan. The French Navy operates from overseas bases nearly intact, minus any ships that were trapped in harbor for any reason. If the British propose to sink those too, the French government in exile has no complaints and whatever the French Quislings might have to say is roundly ignored by all; the USA never extends diplomatic recognition to Vichy. This might actually cost the Allies a bit of intelligence and diplomatic back channels, but by and large it is a clear win.

So--who ran France OTL in 1938, and are they worse or better news than who ran things in 1939? I targeted the question at someone I believed was French but for whatever reason we have no answer from them, so anyone feel free to opine on this!

 

[Derwit]

My hazy understanding of French politics at this time is that it was very unstable with government rising and falling on what seamed a weekly basis. Although in reality the top jobs got shuffled around the same group of politicians.

One big difference between 1938 and 1940 is the Russian position. There were a lot of communists across the working classes in France in the 1930's. These men also made up a significant proportion of the French rank and file in times of war. In the phoney war the spiritual homeland of communism at the time was effectively allied to Germany and many communists in France where therefore luke warm to the French war effort and rather defeatist. This has been attributed as a major factor to the pooor civilian and military moral during the phoney war. In 1938 the opersite is true. The communist regime in Russia is actively aiding the socialists in Spain against Germany and is very hostile to the Germans in gerneral. I do not think it far fetched to assume that the french communists will be much more supportive of the war in 1938 which would have as positive an effect on French moral as their OTL negative effect in 1940.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

French doctrine was not passive. Its leadership, as personified by Gamelin, was slow to the point of passivity. Tactical and operational doctrine of the French army of the 1930s resembled closest the US Army doctrine of 1943-45, depending on firepower, combined arms, methodical bite and hold or bite and chew tactics to destroy the enemy

French doctrine was quite passive and they lacked any use of combined-arms or offensive capability in 1940. Even when doing what it was designed to do, was sub-optimal. With its continual focus on the tactical defense it sacrificed any chance for real operational success. There were much better ways of operating, even on the defensive. The fundamental problem was the defensive deployment of the French could give the Germans problems on their attack, but it could not stop them from attacking.

Yet the French had as many or more modern tanks as the Germans in 1938.

Of the tanks in the French inventory in 1938 at the end of 1938, only 100 were modern models. The rest were WW1 left-overs.

The difference is they would be directly working in combination with the infantry and artillery to methodically destroy the German defense. German doctrine sought to disrupt and demoralize a defense. French doctrine sought to destroy it, or demoralize it with the threat of destruction.

German doctrine sought to destroy the enemy defense through disruption and demoralization. The French didn't try to destroy enemy defenses at all. They instead focused on spreading their forces out into a continuous line and then tried to maintain that line at all costs. No thought was given to the offensive beyond how it assisted the tactical defense. The enemies destruction was not sought out, merely his repulse. The same cannot be said about German doctrine in 1940 or American doctrine in 1943-45.

As demonstrated at Gembloux the trained formations did have a doctrine effective against armor.

Even doing what it was supposed to do, as at Gembloux, French doctrine was actually remarkably ineffective. The French tanks proved individually superior to the Panzers, damaged them quite seriously, and were able to delay the Germans and then withdraw in good order without being encircled or routed. The battle basically went according to how the French expected the war would play out. But it still showed all the flaws in the French way of war. Their continuous front was simply outmatched by the German methods. It sacrificed the initiative to the Germans and dispersed French forces so they could never achieve decisive local superiority. Even a close look at the armoured losses show that the French really got the worst of it since the Germans now controlled the battlefield they then recovered most of their knocked out panzers and repaired the ones which were salvageable (which was most of them) while the French lost all of theirs.

Had the French had a more offensive doctrine they had the forces not to play just for a costly draw, but for an outright victory. With two armored divisions and more forces on the way, with superior tanks, and with the Germans spread out on the advance, outnumbered overall (remember that the whole northern attack was a diversion to draw the best of the Allied armies deeper into Belgium, while the best of the German army slipped through the Ardennes to the south) and unclear about what lay before them, a better French army could instead have counter attacked in strength at Gembloux, and potentially destroyed two Panzer divisions. As it stood, the methodical nature of French tactics meant there was never any chance of this.

What's more, the trained formations they used at Gembloux do not exist. As I talked about several pages the DCR's have not been formed and the DCM's are a shadow of what they would be, lacking the armored and even much of their motorized elements. It's a similar story with the infantry: vastly fewer skilled personnel and equipment.

But my question is if the German defense in the Rhineland could in 1938 withstand what the French Active Series formations could deliver.

Could German forces withstand an attack by more poorly equipped, more poorly trained formations then they historically withstood in 1939, which was all the French Active Series formations could deliver? I think the answer to that is quite evident from the fact the Germans withstood them quite well.

 

[Chris S]

I found this article on the British (and French) policy leading up to the war in OTL and discussed the pitfalls of the deterrence policy: http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~lorenzo/Alexandroff Deterrence 1939.pdf

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I believe @Garrison is referring to this

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mechelen_incident

A liaison plane carrying a staff officer with a copy of the early Fall Gelb plans made a forced landing in Belgium, and the French and British got a look at them.

That does not follow tho. The Dyle Plan (& the Escaut Plan for that matter) existed and was at the top of the French options before January 1940. The Mellithin Incident triggered a partial execution of the Dyle Plan, the French armies rushed up to the borders. The Germans were able to observe some of that (Mays 'Strange Victory', Horne 'To Lose a Battle, Chapman 'Why France Fell') Which led to a reevaluation of the Allied dispositions by the German intelligence section Enemy Armies West. Its not clear to me if that led to Halder deciding to commit to the Sicklecut concept, but the German intelligence officers studying the French movements in this reaction concluded, among other things, the French senior command would react substantially slower than expected.

The Dyle & Escaut Plans seem to be based on assumptions earlier than January 1940. It would be really interesting to turn up information on other French agents or traitors operating inside the German command structure.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...

German doctrine sought to destroy the enemy defense through disruption and demoralization. The French didn't try to destroy enemy defenses at all. They instead focused on spreading their forces out into a continuous line and then tried to maintain that line at all costs. No thought was given to the offensive beyond how it assisted the tactical defense. The enemies destruction was not sought out, merely his repulse. The same cannot be said about German doctrine in 1940 or American doctrine in 1943-45.

This is flat out not true. I am unsure where you draw any evidence from, but Doughty 'Seeds of Diaster' or 'The Breaking Point', Horne 'To Lose a Battle', Chapman, 'Why France Fell', jackson, & others with extensive research credits on the subject describe both a offensive doctrine, and a defense other than yours. Considerablly more depth...

...Even doing what it was supposed to do, as at Gembloux, French doctrine was actually remarkably ineffective ...

Well, it enabled a French corps to repeatedly repel a Pazer corps, with the support of only a couple small tank battalions. No DCR, DLM, or Mech cavalry were present there.

What's more, the trained formations they used at Gembloux do not exist. As I talked about several pages the DCR's have not been formed and the DCM's are a shadow of what they would be, lacking the armored and even much of their motorized elements. It's a similar story with the infantry: vastly fewer skilled personnel and equipment.

The French formations at Gembloux were largely infantry and artillery. Active and A series formations that existed in 1938.

Beyond all that I am seeing a error in this thread in judging the capability of the German army. Its performance in 1940 was based on a full training cycle during the winter of 1939-40 that drew on the lessons of the Polish campaign. & which earlier drew on exercises in 1938-39 that drew on the preparations for invading Chezchoslovakia. All that is waived away were war to start in 1938. A look at the pros and cons of the use of the panzer corps in 1938 & 1939 is useful.



Could German forces withstand an attack by more poorly equipped, more poorly trained formations then they historically withstood in 1939, which was all the French Active Series formations could deliver? I think the answer to that is quite evident from the fact the Germans withstood them quite well.[/QUOTE]

 

[ObssesedNuker]

This is flat out not true. I am unsure where you draw any evidence from, but Doughty 'Seeds of Diaster' or 'The Breaking Point', Horne 'To Lose a Battle', Chapman, 'Why France Fell', jackson, & others with extensive research credits on the subject describe both a offensive doctrine, and a defense other than yours. Considerablly more depth...

Interesting, because those are the same books from which I have drawn my evidence.

Well, it enabled a French corps to repeatedly repel a Pazer corps, with the support of only a couple small tank battalions. No DCR, DLM, or Mech cavalry were present there.

...

The French formations at Gembloux were largely infantry and artillery. Active and A series formations that existed in 1938.

This is flat out wrong. The French 1st Army, which was dispatched into the Gembloux gap, alone included no less then all three DLM divisions: the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd (the 3rd didn't even exist prior to 1939), along with one of the DCR divisions. The 1st and 2nd would go on to engage the Germans in a major tank battle at Hannut, losing 105 tanks and knocking out 160. However of the 160 tanks they lost, the Germans were able to recover and repair while the French couldn't retrieve any of their own, making the final tally of irrecoverable losses really 55 to 105.

The other two DCR's were held back, but as they were freshly formed units still undergoing basic training (and it showed when the Germans hit them) that only made sense.

Beyond all that I am seeing a error in this thread in judging the capability of the German army. Its performance in 1940 was based on a full training cycle during the winter of 1939-40 that drew on the lessons of the Polish campaign. & which earlier drew on exercises in 1938-39 that drew on the preparations for invading Chezchoslovakia. All that is waived away were war to start in 1938. A look at the pros and cons of the use of the panzer corps in 1938 & 1939 is useful.

The ATL invasion of Czechoslovakia could probably substitute for Poland in this case, given that it would be a actual invasion akin to Poland and not just occupation of nonresisting land, so the performance difference would probably be very minor.

 

[Derwit]

French doctrine was quite passive and they lacked any use of combined-arms or offensive capability in 1940. Even when doing what it was designed to do, was sub-optimal. With its continual focus on the tactical defense it sacrificed any chance for real operational success. There were much better ways of operating, even on the defensive. The fundamental problem was the defensive deployment of the French could give the Germans problems on their attack, but it could not stop them from attacking.



Of the tanks in the French inventory in 1938 at the end of 1938, only 100 were modern models. The rest were WW1 left-overs.



German doctrine sought to destroy the enemy defense through disruption and demoralization. The French didn't try to destroy enemy defenses at all. They instead focused on spreading their forces out into a continuous line and then tried to maintain that line at all costs. No thought was given to the offensive beyond how it assisted the tactical defense. The enemies destruction was not sought out, merely his repulse. The same cannot be said about German doctrine in 1940 or American doctrine in 1943-45.



Even doing what it was supposed to do, as at Gembloux, French doctrine was actually remarkably ineffective. The French tanks proved individually superior to the Panzers, damaged them quite seriously, and were able to delay the Germans and then withdraw in good order without being encircled or routed. The battle basically went according to how the French expected the war would play out. But it still showed all the flaws in the French way of war. Their continuous front was simply outmatched by the German methods. It sacrificed the initiative to the Germans and dispersed French forces so they could never achieve decisive local superiority. Even a close look at the armoured losses show that the French really got the worst of it since the Germans now controlled the battlefield they then recovered most of their knocked out panzers and repaired the ones which were salvageable (which was most of them) while the French lost all of theirs.

Had the French had a more offensive doctrine they had the forces not to play just for a costly draw, but for an outright victory. With two armored divisions and more forces on the way, with superior tanks, and with the Germans spread out on the advance, outnumbered overall (remember that the whole northern attack was a diversion to draw the best of the Allied armies deeper into Belgium, while the best of the German army slipped through the Ardennes to the south) and unclear about what lay before them, a better French army could instead have counter attacked in strength at Gembloux, and potentially destroyed two Panzer divisions. As it stood, the methodical nature of French tactics meant there was never any chance of this.

What's more, the trained formations they used at Gembloux do not exist. As I talked about several pages the DCR's have not been formed and the DCM's are a shadow of what they would be, lacking the armored and even much of their motorized elements. It's a similar story with the infantry: vastly fewer skilled personnel and equipment.



Could German forces withstand an attack by more poorly equipped, more poorly trained formations then they historically withstood in 1939, which was all the French Active Series formations could deliver? I think the answer to that is quite evident from the fact the Germans withstood them quite well.

I am curious where you get the figure for only 100 modern tanks in the French arsenal in 1938. Not counting the proliferation of FT's (most if not all where produced post WW1 by the way) which although better armoured was inferior to the Pz 1 the French had a number of modern types either produced, in production or entertainment production in 1938.

After some simple serching online including tank_encyclopaedia.com and with mild embarisment wikipedia (have started my letter to Santa asking for some proper books about the French army pre WW2) I have come up with some rough numbers of French tanks in 1938.

R35 580+ (unlikely all completed by Jan 1938)
H35 100+ (100 in service in 1937)
D2 50
AMR35 in production (187 built between 1936 and 1939)
B1 in production from 1935
S35 in production from 1936 (very slow tank production with 430 built before the war)
Limited production runs of very light tanks.

All of these tanks have their strengths and limitations particularly the one man turrets and the poor armour penetration of the short 37mm canons on the R35's and H35's (although not such a problem when going up against Panzer 1's and 2's)

Another reason armour penetration wasn't seen as such an issue by the French was that the majority of these tanks where designed to support the infantry in the attack against heavily fortified defences. It seams incomprehensible that an army that is as passive as you state would develop tanks with such an offencive funcion. Surely if they where only preparing for a linear defence they should have developed heavy tanks with big high velocity guns to destroy attacking armour at a distance like the germans did after 1942.

 

[Derwit]

Interesting, because those are the same books from which I have drawn my evidence.



This is flat out wrong. The French 1st Army, which was dispatched into the Gembloux gap, alone included no less then all three DLM divisions: the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd (the 3rd didn't even exist prior to 1939), along with one of the DCR divisions. The 1st and 2nd would go on to engage the Germans in a major tank battle at Hannut, losing 105 tanks and knocking out 160. However of the 160 tanks they lost, the Germans were able to recover and repair while the French couldn't retrieve any of their own, making the final tally of irrecoverable losses really 55 to 105.

The other two DCR's were held back, but as they were freshly formed units still undergoing basic training (and it showed when the Germans hit them) that only made sense.



The ATL invasion of Czechoslovakia could probably substitute for Poland in this case, given that it would be a actual invasion akin to Poland and not just occupation of nonresisting land, so the performance difference would probably be very minor.

I feel that this is a simplification. Czechoslovakia is not Poland and different lessons would be learnt by both sides in this ATL assuming that we are looking at a spring 1938 invasion. Firstly unlike in Poland the Germans are going to come up against a modern defence system they can't go around. That they will prevail is in my opinion not in doubt. The ability of the 88 at bunker buster has already been tested in Spain. However they will take significant casualties breaching these defences as they lack the casualty reducing and force multiplying heavy tanks for this kind of fighting. Once these defences are breached and the Panzers are let loose it is only a matter of time until the czechs are finished. Again I would be surprised if it lasts a more than a month.

The big difference is what do the French learn form this. Firstly that the Maginot Line no longer looks such a sound investment as the pre war experts believed. Additional reserves will need to be held back in case the German attack along the French boarder including the defences around Sedan. The French will also put some effort into into forming their own armoured divisions although whether the Germans give them time is debatable.

So what do the Germans do. They know that the East is hostile if not actively belligerent. The British and French will implement a blockade strangling the German capacity to make the weapons and fuel it requires to make war. At the same time the French and British will use their grater industrial and man power reserves to build up an unstoppable force to attack the Germans (the OTL allied plan pre the fall of France). Time is not on Hitler's side.

The German war plans against France where for a WW1 replay of the Scheliffen plan with more modern weapons and trucks. Although I am not sure that with the 65 divisions you have stated the Germans have in 1938 I am not sure they have the strength to take on the 40+ French divisions and 20+ Low Country divisions (and whatever the British can scrape together). IOTL a lot is made of plans falling into the allied hands and what not (see the posts of others above). I feel like you do that it is not a great leap for the talent available to the German army's high command to look for another option. However OTL it took several months of planning, war games and very intensive training of the troups involved to make the Sickle Cut a success. Here the clock is ticking. The best option is for the Germans to attack as soon as possible. IMO their best option in this scenario would be to demonstrate against the Franco-German boarder to draw in the French reserves then go through the Ardens as OTL although perhaps avoiding as much as possible the Belgian sector while trying to keep the Belgians neutral for as long as possible.

I cant see it working. The Germans just aren't strong enough and a weaker Franch army won't do anything as bold as to effectively invade Belgium in 1938 leaving enough reserves available to blunt the German armoured spear heads. Once the offence runs out of steam its game over for the Germans. It's just a matter of time for either Hitler to be retired permanently or for the allies to go on the offensive.

 

[Astrodragon]

The problem with the Germans attacking 'as soon as possible' after defeating CZ is twofold.

First (as in OTL Poland), they will want to work on the training of a lot of the divisions which was found to be sub-standard.
Second (and more important), after Poland they were low on ammunition and bombs. Given the CZ fortifications, this is likely to be even more of an issue. They simply wont have the shells and bombs to attack until they have built up reserves. This takes time (it took them 9 months in OTL with an absolute priority),and here they have more material contraints.

Certainly they will want to attack soon, but this isnt going to be a month or two after finishing in CZ.

 

[KACKO]

Interestingly nobody is really considering terrain of Czechoslovakia. It is not Poland or Ukraine.

In Slovakia during Uprising some 50k Germans took 2 months to defeat app same ammount of Slovaks, while technological as well as tactical gap was much bigger. And it was on much smaller territory. And from these 50 k Slovaks majority were reservists trained mostly by... Czechoslovak army. Some did well, some not so well. Worst were doing forces under Partisan command. Best units with commanders with experience from wars Slovakia took part.

Czechoslovak army was actively preparing destruction of bridges and dams to stop or slow advance of Germans, since mobilization on 23rd September this preparations were very active.

But of course I alao read opinion Benes by his action wonnfor Czechs ethnically clean Sudetenland.

 

[marathag]

The rest were WW1 left-overs.

Those Panzer I and Panzer II would have real issues with the Char 2C.

The Panzer I would have trouble with the old FT with the short Puteaux 37mm

 

[Derwit]

Those Panzer I and Panzer II would have real issues with the Char 2C.

The Panzer I would have trouble with the old FT with the short Puteaux 37mm

The Panzer 1 wouldn't be able to penetrate the armour of the FT at all. The 20mm Cannon on the Panzer 2 could manage it at 100m and at 500m if able to use its better mobility to hit the sides and rear if the FT. The Panzer 2 might have success against the lighter French tanks like the R35 and H35 at close ranges of under 100m but at such ranges the short 37mm guns would be equally as dangerous to the Panzer 2's.

I agree with Astro's analysis that an immediate German offensive in the west however advantageous for the Germans is unlikely. I would suspect that the better guns introduced for these two (important due the numbers available) tanks in 1939 could and would start being fitted in the period of calm before the storm ITTL.

Also such a period allows the French time to do some rudimentary training of their reserve formations and to produce more modern tanks. The numbers I gave in my previous post where for tanks produced before 1938. If the offensive in the west starts late summer then hundreds of additional R35's and H35's would be produced along with dozens of the much more formidable B2's and S35's. The Germans would also be able to produce more tanks of course but these ar best would be a few hundred more Panzer 1's and 2's with potentially a few dozen at most of the Panzer 3's and 4's.

 

[Chris S]

Interestingly nobody is really considering terrain of Czechoslovakia. It is not Poland or Ukraine.

In Slovakia during Uprising some 50k Germans took 2 months to defeat app same ammount of Slovaks, while technological as well as tactical gap was much bigger. And it was on much smaller territory. And from these 50 k Slovaks majority were reservists trained mostly by... Czechoslovak army. Some did well, some not so well. Worst were doing forces under Partisan command. Best units with commanders with experience from wars Slovakia took part.

Czechoslovak army was actively preparing destruction of bridges and dams to stop or slow advance of Germans, since mobilization on 23rd September this preparations were very active.

But of course I alao read opinion Benes by his action wonnfor Czechs ethnically clean Sudetenland.

Hence why I reckon on 2-3 months (let's average it out to 75 days) for Czechoslovakia to be completely conquered. I suspect Hungary will join in the action which might shorten the time frame from say 2-3 months to 45-60 days.