My position has not shifted, but I certainly cannot fault @Julian for lack of primary source citations over the last few days.
Holy ... Fu- - - ng ... SH- T
THX a lot for such an highly informed and informing reply @Julian
You've just got me many months worth of diddling, diving into archives ... at least I finally registered with invenio
I may even attempt to learn on my ol' days the german writing ol' days.
Many of your comments, answers and counters I will keep in mind and strongly consider in times (and discussion) to come.
My position has not shifted, but I certainly cannot fault @Julian for lack of primary source citations over the last few days.
Well, given my more than just improvement needing abilities regarding the old german handwriting fonts of Sütterlin, here only the very first page deals withWorking on responses to others, but in the meantime here are some additional materials from Groener's personal collection (N 46/77 Pages 138-161) on possible cooperation with Austria-Hungary in 1914 (Again, help with his handwriting would be much appreciated!):
...
The second half seems to deal with as I can identify some :"Thought for --- operations --- --- --- in the East 1914"
1. Act
embracing(?)/includin(?) attack of the 8th Army against the left wing of the russian Njemen-army, Abdrängen (?) der - - - im Norden auf Tilsitsiehe Schluss (?)-Aufgabe 1898 ?2. Act
Festungen (??) and - - - (???) against/infront of Narew-Army, --- --- fight on Pultusk and Lomzha
for the rest I can only identify for"Deployment (Aifmarsch) --- --- in the line Czernowitz (?) - Przemysl ..."
For the rest I'm at a loss also on this page" 2. Act --- --- in the Carpathians"
Erhmm ... no.I also have a handwritten letter from Groener to Kuhl from Groener's personal collection at the Bundesarchiv (N 46/41 pages 177-189 are attached) which refers to an Eastern deployment. He sent it to the Reicharchiv in response to their inquiry on the topic. I'm struggling hard with his handwriting, but if anyone wants to take a crack at it I'm sure Groener's opinion will be very valuable for the discussion!
... as a first ... 'riposte' on that post (more on that in the works)...
His memoirs discuss the issue on page 86, if I recall right.
...
... what I'm gratefull of as aside tze links you've provided so far it has finally convinced me to sign with themThanks for your detailed response, @NoMommsen. Apologies for the delayed response, Pfizer shot #3 kicked my ass and I got caught up reading through the Bundesarchiv's online holdings. ...
Well, ... as written in german it represents lesser a rule but rather a ... "recommendation" to be followed if possible esp. if there are enough alternative routes to be utilized. ... should be rendere a bit more as the "pirates law laid down by ..." in Pirates of the Caribbean (maybe somewhat too pointy )On the rule limiting transport to 50 trains per day except for rare exceptions:
...
Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen pages 18-19.
This IMHO proofs only that that there actually were enough bridges in most regions that an increase above the named numbers wasn't necessary.We can see that even on the intensely used Western Front, where speed was of the utmost importance, this rule was only ignored in one case:
...
Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen, page 36.
what amounts to 209 trains in 3 days roughly 70 trains a day." ... Therewith the number of trains cleared on the station of Marienburg amounted to :
XXI.Corps XXXVIII Res.Corps XXXIX Res.Corps until midnight from 2. to 3. February 34 20 19 until midnight from 3. to 4. February 64 40 38 until midnight from 3. to 5. February 90 60 59
IMHO this point of your critique can be rendered ... 'relativated' at best....
3. Capacity delays. As has been repeatedly noted, the East Prussian railway network was inadequate for the swift deployment of corps on the scale Staabs, much less Moltke, had conceived. These bottlenecks, combined with the rushed nature of the planning, will make an Eastern deployment a messy and drawn out process.
I'm afraid ... you overlooked something....
2. Operational delays. Reorienting men and material, preparing transport, etc. takes time, as it did IOTL when transport didn't get underway until up to 3-5 days after mobilization was declared.
...
"The base for these assessments (capacities of railways) was made bei the military-schedule being empowered on 3rd day of mobilization as at the two foregoing day the peacetime schedule would still be driven."
Regarding this last point of critique I haven't adressed yet ... I would like to refer once again to Das Deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen page 22 :...
1. Administrative delays. A new transportation plan must be crafted from scratch to carry out the new deployment over the course of several days.
...
"... Mit Hilfe neuer Arbeitsmethoden wurden in den letzten Friedensjahren Militär-Eisenbahnbehörden und Eisenbahnverwaltungen unter Anleitung des Chefs der Eisenbahnabteilung, Oberstleutnants Groener, in der Durchführung plötzlich notwendig werdender Aufmarschänderungen sowie operativer Heeresverschiebungen geschult, und der früher übliche starre Rücktransport der Truppen aus dem Kaisermanöver in vollständig freier Form durchgeführt. Das neue Verfahren sollte bei weiterer Ausgestaltung die Grundlage für eine freiere Bearbeitung auch des planmäßigen Aufmarsches bieten und hierdurch der Führung die Unabhängigkeit des Entschlusses in weitestem Umfange wahren. Als der Krieg ausbrach, waren Militär-Eisenbahnbehörden und Eisenbahnverwaltungen mit der neuen Arbeitsweise so weit vertraut, daß die schnelle Durchführung teilweiser Änderungen im Aufmarsch sowie von Truppenverschiebungen gesichert schien. ..."
"... With help of new working methods during the last years of peace the military railway institutions and (civilian) railway-administrations were trained under guidance of the Chief of the railway-department (of the Great General Staff) Lieutenant colonel Groener for the implementation suddenly becomming necessary changes in deployment as well as operative army-shifting und the formerly customary rigid return transport of troops from the Kaisermaneuver were executed in a completly free form (aka left completly to the discretion of the involved line commands in coordination with civilian railadministrations). This new procedure was intended to offer with further improvement a basis for a more free processing of the planned deploymend also and thereby guarantee the leadership independence of decision to the widest extent. When war broke out the military railway institutions and railway-administrations were so familiar with the new way of working, that the fast execution of partial changes in the deployment as well as of shifting of troops seemed secure (what they actually were).
Therefore I render it well within the capacity of military railway institutions and civilian railway-administrations to work something functioning outhighlightenings by me
A first note :...
To get a sense of these plans, we can turn to the Bundesarchiv holdings for the GGS Railway Department. PH 3/901 holds 135 pages from the first half of 1914 of the railway department's plans for the new mobilization timetable. We have the preparatory materials for the April conference in Metz which began the planning process from the Railway Department and individual Linienkommission, the conference summary, and follow-up materials sent to the Railway Department in April-June 1914 by the Linienkommission about the estimated maximum capacity of the lines under their purview for the new schedule.
While the first set of pages (pages 0005 to 0046) are the redelivered line proposals of the railway-department with eventual additions by the line commands prior to the Metz confernece on page 66What do these files tell us?
ThereforeToall Line CommandsIn the attached and sentwith sketch (unfortunatly not part of the archival) are those main lines denoted, for which the set up of a highest-performance-requirement-train-time-table is necessary while maintaining the passenger trains timetable but under falling away of the cargotrains timetable.
These requirement-trains are to be carried out with the speed of the new military time schedule.
(in an earlier page of the conference summary the decision of another conference to settle on 40 km/h instead of also then discussed 55 km/h can be found)
Lines with preference of II-direction are denoted by arrow. At the lines not denoted that way the I-direction have preference befor II-direction.
(I haven't been able yet to sort out what these different I- or II-directions actually were.)
For all in the sketch denoted lines the prospective highest number of trains of the new requirements-train timetable are to be determined distinct for each direction in the form of a fraction (48/46) with the number standing above the dash relating to the I-direction the number standing below to the II-direction. Neighbouring line commands are to put oneself in touch for the determination of highest numbers for passing htrough lines. Return these until 3.6.14. After examination of the entries by the department a decree redarging the set up of the requirements-train timetable will be issued.
as was ofc intended. ... for new, not yet implemented timetable matching already existing possibilities/capabilities.... Even for the Western railways' most developed Linienkommission, the schedule estimated for the new plan ran consistently faster than what was implemented IOTL:
I'm somewhat at a loss what you actually want to show us with the proposals of line command H (west of Cologne) for the as above mentioned special conditions.
I fail to see the 'excessivness' of a speed increase from 30 km/h to 40 km/h when higher speed up to 55 km/h were on some lines regularly driven in peacetime.There's no evidence, therefore, to believe that excessively faster speeds with radical adjustments to the schedule could or would be adopted. If it wasn't done for the Western deployment IOTL, it's not going to be done for an ad-hoc Eastern deployment.
Honestly ... I fail to see any mentioning of "substantial capacity issues" by the line commands. There weren't any certain capacities demanded (see above what these pages actually were asked for) they could have had "issues" with meeting them. So ... what "issues" do you mean ?2. Even if we assume the new deployment timetable could be adopted with no preparation, the three Linienkommission operating on the Vistula/East Prussia (N, R, and V) show that there were substantial capacity issues even running at their maximum estimated speed:
Again : these were NOT any numbers valid for a whole 'new schedule' at all. You also omitt for the special situation alone these numbers were asked for and why i.e. Fordon or Marienwerder lines weren't mentioned ... they simply weren't asked for.We can see that from Elbing to Intersburg capacity couldn't exceed 40 trains per day even under the new schedule. From Thorn to Schonsee capacity was 25 trains, while from Laskowitz to Graudenz it was 32, to Graudenz to Goßlershausen it was 36, and from Osterode to Korschen it was 30! The Fordon and Marienwerder lines weren't even considered for use in the new deployment plan. From the same materials for Linienkommission N (East Prussia), we can see recommendation against using numerous smaller routes:
I may translate your cited part to help identifying what the line command actually meant :"Es werden demnach für die Bedarfszüge wie bisher die I und II Richtungen des Friedensfahrplans gewählt werden, da ein Durcheinanderwerfen der Richtungen zur Vermeidung von Jrrtümern bei dem Stations-und Streckenpersonal mieden werden muß. "
It was NOT a recommendation to NOT use these line but to keep the organisation of directions of the trains as before to avoid eventually possible mishaps. Instead it is a proposal of how to use these lines assumied better."Therefore for the requirement-trains the I- and II-directions will be selected as until now, as a jumbling of directions has to be avoided to avert mistakes by station and track personnel."
ignoring other numbers to fit your own narrative only.So while you are correct that two double-track lines run into Goßlershausen, only one double track line leaves Goßlershausen and therefore its capacity is limited to that of a single double track. It's a bottleneck which sharply limits the deployment opportunities via this route. Further, the Schönsee—Thorn line wouldn't be fully used owing to its proximity to the border and capacity issues.
Well ... lamenting and complaing that things aren't as they ideally wished to be is part of the german DNA.Once again, the sources are quite clear that the lines running East-West from the Vistula were equal at most to two double-track lines:
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Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen, page 5. The construction plans for a full third track East of the Vistula are discussed here:
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Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen, page4.
...
From the same page, particular emphasis on this point regarding single track lines:
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Have to apologize here.... as a first ... 'riposte' on that post (more on that in the works)
Which 'memoirs' do you refer to ?Groener himself never wrote some. There is a ... 'biography' written/publish in 1955 by his daughter as well as a seemingly rather comprehensive one published first time in 1957 by a ... professional historian.
So ... what writing are you refering to ?
"... Nach Eintreffen des Telegramms aus London forderte der Kaiser von Moltke die Verlegung des militärischen Schwergewichts nach dem Osten. Moltke erklärte es für unmöglich, den Aufmarschplan zu ändern, es sei denn, daß man den Westaufmarsch auslaufen lasse und dann die Transportbewegung nach dem Osten umkehre. Ich bin - obwohl die Angelegenheit in erster Linie eisenbahntechnischer Natur war - nicht gefragt worden, ...
"... Aber möglich wäre die Durchführung eines unvorbereiteten großen Ostaufmarsches durchaus gewesen. ..." (italics by Groener himself)
The Central Powers would likely be able to advance in the east and win most of the battles, but the specific circumstances surrounding Tannenberg make it unlikely that such as success would be repeated.
What about the Belgian nitrate? IOTL, Germany captured a large stockpile of nitrate in Belgium in 1914. AIUI, this stockpile allowed Germany to continue producing munitions in spite of the British blockade until nitrate production with the Haber-Bosch process was fully operational.While the Ottoman Empire was not an industrial power, it was still an essential source of chromium and other non-iron metals. Without this, it would be much more difficult for the German and Austro-Hungarian industry to produce enough war material to sustain their armies.
Actually yes, the first way would be to simply buy it. Then of course as long as the UK does not blockade Germany can still purchase all hhe Nitrate they need.
Couldn't help yourself, could you?... possibly because I also READ what's written in this source before and after page 110 regarding the deployment and mobilization schedule 1910.
Some examples :
page 109
page 111
from the same page regarding the ... acceptance of this schedule
They didn't like it at all from the moment it was introduced.
Once again when their was a war game scheduled to put this 'Plan 18' to the test it was cancelled (due to obvious shortcommings) and tried to be replaced by a number of conferences in which it was - once again not at least by your beloved Alekseev - harshly critizised.
So far for the deployment and strategical plan you have higghlightended this time as the russian "heal-all".
From the same book some citations somewhat ... relativating your assumed abilities of the GUGSh and/or STAVKA (former turned into on mobilisation) to change their in 1912 adopdet plans with a snip of your fingers.
page 105-106
... what should also shed some light on these top brass' abilitiies to quickly adjust to whatever shortime changes and challenges they might come across and - even more important - would be recognized by them to actually change handling of affairs in terms of turning 180° from practice the last 2 years.
... and about the situation of the fortresses under Sukhomlinov and the budgetary restriction since the 1910-'compromise' due to inability of navy and rmy to develop a combined concept for war
page 107
... a 'wee' notion of how ... effective the russian system of logistics could be for some as proposed quick switch from an actual to an outdated and not any more actualized deployment scheme
page 108
... when after the adoption of the new 'Paln 19' with its 2 iterations A and G was to be refined
page 121
That refers to the mobilisation issues regarding the necessary logistics. Which - by organisation of the russian top agency in peacetime the GUGSh - was done by yet another of its departments under the ever 'divide et impera' lead of the War Minister Sukhomlinov.
No ... 'Plan 18' was conceived after french diplomacy had thrown its ally and its intentions about the Bosporus under the bus (Bosnian Crisis) and proper asll-embracing military reform after the catastrophy of 1905/06 had still not taken place.
... any source for aside your wishfull hoping ?
Probably they retained files alike the german Gerneral Staff. ... in respect of rather general allocation of troops but far from keeping all the now completly (not at least due to though still insufficient built-up of logistics/railways) outdated marching orders for single units (as were also burnt by the german War Ministry on onset of the next deployment plan every new 'season' on 1st April of each year).
See above about the ... 'abilities' of the russian planning institutions to easily switch plan without the thorough training on ever changing preconditions the german higher officers had to endure additionally to their troop assignments.
... what simply wouldn't have been a matter in a East First scenario decided upon in Germany during the July-crisis.
... same source as above page 121-122
Adoption"G" of Plan 19 was already meant for a german East-First turn.
... but given the OTL performance I somehow doubt that 3 instead of 2 armies (a plus of one half compared to otl) would have made much of a difference given the fourtimes stronger german troops (even if only 3-times in East prussia)
It might be of help to actually read the references you use instead only wishfull phantazing upon singled out bit'n pieces to your taste.
Something you never accept that these staff talks with their explicitly written down consideration were part of a legally valid traty binding both partners to what's written laid down in such treaty. ... including the regular actualisations.
... otherwise any treaty wouldn't be worth the ink signed with.
edit :
As you lads'n ... lady have already mooved on so far ...
I don't see any value in trying to refute again and again the same faulty ingnorances of reality singled out of context for conveniance hotchpotched with wishfull assumptions about conditions and abilities of troops, availability of equipment (i.e. certain guns'n shells for), terrain, political developments of at least 5 years prior to 1914 until at least 2nd August 1914 not only regarding military preparations, intelligence of the several adversaries influencing military positions (i.e. Redl affait and everything around it) as fought and argued just too many times.
... or simply see my signature ...
Actually, Waldersee favored offensives in both the East and West (i.e. 8th Army should advance in conjunction with Conrad while the Western offensive proceeded).Waldersee
who as Senior Quartermaster General to Moltke the Minor on several occasions (last in may 1914 IIRC) proposed preventive attack on russia first