Alternate Battle of Lorraine 1914

How will TTL battle of Lorraine end?

  • Germany wins and then invades France.

    Votes: 101 42.6%
  • Stalemate along more or less the existing border.

    Votes: 102 43.0%
  • France wins and advances to the Rhineland.

    Votes: 34 14.3%

  • Total voters
    237
Holy ... Fu- - - ng ... SH- T
:eek::extremelyhappy::eek::extremelyhappy::eek:
THX a lot for such an highly informed and informing reply @Julian
You've just got me many months worth of diddling, diving into archives ... at least I finally registered with invenio :biggrin:
I may even attempt to learn on my ol' days the german writing ol' days.

Many of your comments, answers and counters I will keep in mind and strongly consider in times (and discussion) to come.
 
Holy ... Fu- - - ng ... SH- T
:eek::extremelyhappy::eek::extremelyhappy::eek:
THX a lot for such an highly informed and informing reply @Julian
You've just got me many months worth of diddling, diving into archives ... at least I finally registered with invenio :biggrin:
I may even attempt to learn on my ol' days the german writing ol' days.

Many of your comments, answers and counters I will keep in mind and strongly consider in times (and discussion) to come.
My position has not shifted, but I certainly cannot fault @Julian for lack of primary source citations over the last few days.

Thanks guys! I'm happy to swing back to discussing the Western Front for now so we don't deviate too much from @Helmuth48's topic. Like I said, typing other responses as work allows (@Athelstane More Joffre apologia incoming).

Last archive drop for the Eastern Front railways is from the Railway Department's files. I've read through/posted a few excerpts already, but here's all I could find digitized that're relevant:
 
Working on responses to others, but in the meantime here are some additional materials from Groener's personal collection (N 46/77 Pages 138-161) on possible cooperation with Austria-Hungary in 1914 (Again, help with his handwriting would be much appreciated!):


...
Well, given my more than just improvement needing abilities regarding the old german handwriting fonts of Sütterlin, here only the very first page deals with
"Thought for --- operations --- --- --- in the East 1914"
1. Act
embracing(?)/includin(?) attack of the 8th Army against the left wing of the russian Njemen-army, Abdrängen (?) der - - - im Norden auf Tilsit​
siehe Schluss (?)-Aufgabe 1898 ?​
2. Act
Festungen (??) and - - - (???) against/infront of Narew-Army, --- --- fight on Pultusk and Lomzha​
The second half seems to deal with as I can identify some :
"Deployment (Aifmarsch) --- --- in the line Czernowitz (?) - Przemysl ..."
for the rest I can only identify for
" 2. Act --- --- in the Carpathians"
For the rest I'm at a loss also on this page

All other pages shown in your link are - as it seems - diary entries and notes to in 1916 and not dealing with 1914.

I also have a handwritten letter from Groener to Kuhl from Groener's personal collection at the Bundesarchiv (N 46/41 pages 177-189 are attached) which refers to an Eastern deployment. He sent it to the Reicharchiv in response to their inquiry on the topic. I'm struggling hard with his handwriting, but if anyone wants to take a crack at it I'm sure Groener's opinion will be very valuable for the discussion!

Erhmm ... no.
The handwritten parts depicted here are 'only' the sketches of Groener for the machine written letter at the end.

... unfortunatly nothing regarding the letter to v.Kuhl he mentionesd having written in 1922. ... maybe with some deeper digging this might be found ... sometime somewhere ...

...
His memoirs discuss the issue on page 86, if I recall right.
...
... as a first ... 'riposte' on that post (more on that in the works)
Which 'memoirs' do you refer to ?​
Groener himself never wrote some. There is a ... 'biography' written/publish in 1955 by his daughter as well as a seemingly rather comprehensive one published first time in 1957 by a ... professional historian.

So ... what writing are you refering to ?
 
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As this would otherwise degrade (once again ... I apologize) into a rather 'unhandy' wall of text I will try to break-up work- down answering.
First : hope you're well again. I still have to get my 'third shot' as well as beginning to administer them :angel:.
Thanks for your detailed response, @NoMommsen. Apologies for the delayed response, Pfizer shot #3 kicked my ass and I got caught up reading through the Bundesarchiv's online holdings. ...
... what I'm gratefull of as aside tze links you've provided so far it has finally convinced me to sign with them ;)
On the rule limiting transport to 50 trains per day except for rare exceptions:
...
Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen pages 18-19.
Well, ... as written in german it represents lesser a rule but rather a ... "recommendation" to be followed if possible esp. if there are enough alternative routes to be utilized. ... should be rendere a bit more as the "pirates law laid down by ..." in Pirates of the Caribbean (maybe somewhat too pointy :biggrin:)

We can see that even on the intensely used Western Front, where speed was of the utmost importance, this rule was only ignored in one case:
...
Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen, page 36.
This IMHO proofs only that that there actually were enough bridges in most regions that an increase above the named numbers wasn't necessary.
... aside the exemption of Cologne showing as IMHO that the local railway administration hadn't much of a problem exceeding the recommended numbers when necessary and organizable by them on the ground.

However, as there were not such demands for an eastern deployment regarding the railways we have not much possibilities to actually ask their performance and efficiancy.
But ...
I may hint you to this map showing the deployment/movement of troops towards the 2nd Battle of the Masurian Lakes.
Eisenbahnaufmarsch Masuren 1914-15.jpg

The numbers within the circles depic the number (roughly) of trains per day to be used for the according armycorps (see the legend lower right). About your prior named 'bottlenecks' of the Vistula- crossings you can count for Dirschau/Marienburg :
30 + 20 + 20 (3 Corps to cross) = 70 trains per day
and for the crossing at Thorn :
30 + 30 (2 Corps to cross) = 60 trains a day
In both cases after these 'bottlenecks' the trains are spread of more numerous even 'smaller' tracks for keeping the stress on these tracks as low as sensible (what IMHO is only ... sensible ;-) )
Unfortunatly there isn't an account regardung the crossing at Thorn (at least I haven't found one yet) but for Marienburg (page 185 Das Deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen)
" ... Therewith the number of trains cleared on the station of Marienburg amounted to :
XXI.CorpsXXXVIII Res.Corps XXXIX Res.Corps
until midnight from 2. to 3. February342019
until midnight from 3. to 4. February644038
until midnight from 3. to 5. February906059
what amounts to 209 trains in 3 days roughly 70 trains a day. :hushedface:

That the 'smaller' crossings at Fordon or Schmentau as well as at Graudenz are not utilized/mentioned here ...
tbh I have no idea but I render it rather they were utilized for other transport (one shoudn't forget that there were civilian and economical trains also still and regularly running) instead of taking this 'unmentioness' as if they were not used or even some "They'r so 'rotten' that noone wants to use them".
...
3. Capacity delays. As has been repeatedly noted, the East Prussian railway network was inadequate for the swift deployment of corps on the scale Staabs, much less Moltke, had conceived. These bottlenecks, combined with the rushed nature of the planning, will make an Eastern deployment a messy and drawn out process.
IMHO this point of your critique can be rendered ... 'relativated' at best.


... more to come ...
 
...
2. Operational delays. Reorienting men and material, preparing transport, etc. takes time, as it did IOTL when transport didn't get underway until up to 3-5 days after mobilization was declared.
...
I'm afraid ... you overlooked something.
It was planned as such and wished for that the transports - esp. of larger bodies of troops or as they were named in Das Deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen "Massentransporte" - begun only after M+3.
As a reference this might suffice (Das Deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen page 9) :
"The base for these assessments (capacities of railways) was made bei the military-schedule being empowered on 3rd day of mobilization as at the two foregoing day the peacetime schedule would still be driven."

Within these peacetime-timetables of the first 2 days of mobilization there had to be placed additional military trains for preparations of the railways themself, for preparatory material transports (horses, whole remote-offices, carts, ammo, etc. etc., stuff needed within the framework of mobilization at the garrisons) as well as a fast '1st time supply' for the borderguarding Corps to enable them ASAP until the first 'true' mobilization transport within the military-schedule began on M+3. ... though the 'real' deployment or 'Kriegstransporte' (war transports) towards their jump-off points started around M+6.

... aside ... some 'special' troops.
Almost every active and esp. but not only the border Corps were able to set up kinda 'quick reaction force' in strenght of about a reinforced brigade within 12 to 24 hours ready to march.
Such troops of III.Corps, IV.Corps, VII.Corps, IX.Corps, X.Corps, XI.Corps, XII.Corps, XIX.Corps, XVIII.Corps, XIII.Corps, I.bav.Corps, II.bav.Corps and III.bav.Corps were IOTL delivered towards the western borders arriving on their destinations from 2nd to 4th ASugust IOTL.

edit :
Overview_arrivals_west.jpg
a chart of the arrivals as planned for the western armies with the 'quick reaction forces' highlightened
 
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...
1. Administrative delays. A new transportation plan must be crafted from scratch to carry out the new deployment over the course of several days.
...
Regarding this last point of critique I haven't adressed yet ... I would like to refer once again to Das Deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen page 22 :
"... Mit Hilfe neuer Arbeitsmethoden wurden in den letzten Friedensjahren Militär-Eisenbahnbehörden und Eisenbahnverwaltungen unter Anleitung des Chefs der Eisenbahnabteilung, Oberstleutnants Groener, in der Durchführung plötzlich notwendig werdender Aufmarschänderungen sowie operativer Heeresverschiebungen geschult, und der früher übliche starre Rücktransport der Truppen aus dem Kaisermanöver in vollständig freier Form durchgeführt. Das neue Verfahren sollte bei weiterer Ausgestaltung die Grundlage für eine freiere Bearbeitung auch des planmäßigen Aufmarsches bieten und hierdurch der Führung die Unabhängigkeit des Entschlusses in weitestem Umfange wahren. Als der Krieg ausbrach, waren Militär-Eisenbahnbehörden und Eisenbahnverwaltungen mit der neuen Arbeitsweise so weit vertraut, daß die schnelle Durchführung teilweiser Änderungen im Aufmarsch sowie von Truppenverschiebungen gesichert schien. ..."
"... With help of new working methods during the last years of peace the military railway institutions and (civilian) railway-administrations were trained under guidance of the Chief of the railway-department (of the Great General Staff) Lieutenant colonel Groener for the implementation suddenly becomming necessary changes in deployment as well as operative army-shifting und the formerly customary rigid return transport of troops from the Kaisermaneuver were executed in a completly free form (aka left completly to the discretion of the involved line commands in coordination with civilian railadministrations). This new procedure was intended to offer with further improvement a basis for a more free processing of the planned deploymend also and thereby guarantee the leadership independence of decision to the widest extent. When war broke out the military railway institutions and railway-administrations were so familiar with the new way of working, that the fast execution of partial changes in the deployment as well as of shifting of troops seemed secure (what they actually were).
highlightenings by me
Therefore I render it well within the capacity of military railway institutions and civilian railway-administrations to work something functioning out
... i.e. by breaking the "new" eastern deployment down into the movement of single corps concentrating alike needed and trained for small numbers of corps for the mentioned Kaisermaneuvers (just one way popping into my mind to get the official on board ... without too much of lamenting ;)).
 
Well ... and now at leat a begin on that archival
...
To get a sense of these plans, we can turn to the Bundesarchiv holdings for the GGS Railway Department. PH 3/901 holds 135 pages from the first half of 1914 of the railway department's plans for the new mobilization timetable. We have the preparatory materials for the April conference in Metz which began the planning process from the Railway Department and individual Linienkommission, the conference summary, and follow-up materials sent to the Railway Department in April-June 1914 by the Linienkommission about the estimated maximum capacity of the lines under their purview for the new schedule.
A first note :
"Linienkommissionen" were from 1907 onwards "Linienkommandanturen" - as they are adressed on the pages of this archival - which I will take the freedom to translate them to "line commands" further on .
What do these files tell us?
While the first set of pages (pages 0005 to 0046) are the redelivered line proposals of the railway-department with eventual additions by the line commands prior to the Metz confernece on page 66
PH_3_901_0066_left.jpgthe exact requirement for the second round of returns from the line commands (pages 0067 to 0134) are defined - and for us of what these actually embraced :
To
all Line Commands
In the attached and sentwith sketch (unfortunatly not part of the archival) are those main lines denoted, for which the set up of a highest-performance-requirement-train-time-table is necessary while maintaining the passenger trains timetable but under falling away of the cargotrains timetable.
These requirement-trains are to be carried out with the speed of the new military time schedule.
(in an earlier page of the conference summary the decision of another conference to settle on 40 km/h instead of also then discussed 55 km/h can be found)
Lines with preference of II-direction are denoted by arrow. At the lines not denoted that way the I-direction have preference befor II-direction.
(I haven't been able yet to sort out what these different I- or II-directions actually were.)
For all in the sketch denoted lines the prospective highest number of trains of the new requirements-train timetable are to be determined distinct for each direction in the form of a fraction (48/46) with the number standing above the dash relating to the I-direction the number standing below to the II-direction. Neighbouring line commands are to put oneself in touch for the determination of highest numbers for passing htrough lines. Return these until 3.6.14. After examination of the entries by the department a decree redarging the set up of the requirements-train timetable will be issued.
Therefore
The numbers to be found are what the line commands (the guys 'on the ground') rendered the possible max. capacity on some selected (not all available lines) raillines would be under the peculiar conditions of only the first two days of mobilization with simultaneous civil passanger trains running but without simultaneous civil cargo trains and on the new to be set basic pace of 40 km/h for the trains.
  • They tell not what might be possible from 3rd day onwards with a/the military timetable/schedule put into validity omitting all civilian transports.
  • They tell not what might be possible with utilizing all available lines of which's capacities in 1914 we don't have records.
  • They tell us not what a complete new schedule would have been overall for an eastern deployment of troops.
... Even for the Western railways' most developed Linienkommission, the schedule estimated for the new plan ran consistently faster than what was implemented IOTL:
as was ofc intended. ... for new, not yet implemented timetable matching already existing possibilities/capabilities.
I'm somewhat at a loss what you actually want to show us with the proposals of line command H (west of Cologne) for the as above mentioned special conditions.
The estimated possibility to run some lines with 63 trains (4th line from above) or even 72 trains (8th line from above) already ?
That these numbers weren't used/implemented IOTL seems rather obvious as there WAS a since 1st April 1914 valid schedule implemented planned on the 'old' numbers of capacities used for years already. Therefore no match of numbers as IOTL the trains were running on this schedule.
There's no evidence, therefore, to believe that excessively faster speeds with radical adjustments to the schedule could or would be adopted. If it wasn't done for the Western deployment IOTL, it's not going to be done for an ad-hoc Eastern deployment.
I fail to see the 'excessivness' of a speed increase from 30 km/h to 40 km/h when higher speed up to 55 km/h were on some lines regularly driven in peacetime.
Also I can't see any 'radicality' only that ther're adjustments proposed asked for the the various railway institution for years already.
Also I can't see why a non-implementation of a far from ready (intended readiness of this specific part of the overall new schedule was 10th October [page 0135]) plan - despite technical possibilities - IOTL excluses an alternative usage of technical possibilities in an ATL.
In an east-first scenario most of the changes needed for the western deployment - now 'defensive' - would have been cancelling of trains and a change of disembarkation stations on the existing already planned routes for the still to be deployed troops. ... not really much of a challange doing some thing NOT or disembark a station earlier or later.

However a new plan and new schedule utilising such higher numbers also for the western deployment of troops would have been done if there would have been a new schedule for an mobilization period 1915/1916 at all.

2. Even if we assume the new deployment timetable could be adopted with no preparation, the three Linienkommission operating on the Vistula/East Prussia (N, R, and V) show that there were substantial capacity issues even running at their maximum estimated speed:





Honestly ... I fail to see any mentioning of "substantial capacity issues" by the line commands. There weren't any certain capacities demanded (see above what these pages actually were asked for) they could have had "issues" with meeting them. So ... what "issues" do you mean ?
We can see that from Elbing to Intersburg capacity couldn't exceed 40 trains per day even under the new schedule. From Thorn to Schonsee capacity was 25 trains, while from Laskowitz to Graudenz it was 32, to Graudenz to Goßlershausen it was 36, and from Osterode to Korschen it was 30! The Fordon and Marienwerder lines weren't even considered for use in the new deployment plan. From the same materials for Linienkommission N (East Prussia), we can see recommendation against using numerous smaller routes:
Again : these were NOT any numbers valid for a whole 'new schedule' at all. You also omitt for the special situation alone these numbers were asked for and why i.e. Fordon or Marienwerder lines weren't mentioned ... they simply weren't asked for.
I also fail to see any "recommendation" against using smaller routes.
"Es werden demnach für die Bedarfszüge wie bisher die I und II Richtungen des Friedensfahrplans gewählt werden, da ein Durcheinanderwerfen der Richtungen zur Vermeidung von Jrrtümern bei dem Stations-und Streckenpersonal mieden werden muß. "
I may translate your cited part to help identifying what the line command actually meant :
"Therefore for the requirement-trains the I- and II-directions will be selected as until now, as a jumbling of directions has to be avoided to avert mistakes by station and track personnel."
It was NOT a recommendation to NOT use these line but to keep the organisation of directions of the trains as before to avoid eventually possible mishaps. Instead it is a proposal of how to use these lines assumied better.

What I find more interesting is comparing the proposals of the three neighbouring line commands in question for an eastern deployment are the differences on matching lines :
line command V from Deutsch-Eylau to Osterode 56-59 trains/day​
line command N from border to area of line command V via Osterode to Allenstein 30-32 trains/day​
or
line command R from Thorn to Schönsee (border to area of line command V) 25/25 trains/day​
line command V from Schönsee to Gosslershausen 53-59 trains/day​
just to name two of such inconsitencies of the assumptions of different line commands.

IMHO you apply much too much ... 'authority' to these numbers as they are only assumptions of certain yet unmatched demands new to the line commands in that specific circumstances (as to the whole railway department as well). But they might give an idea of what might be possible (and for being directed to these insight of possibilities I'm still grateful to you).

... but ofc you're free select the numbers fitting your depiction of possibilities,
So while you are correct that two double-track lines run into Goßlershausen, only one double track line leaves Goßlershausen and therefore its capacity is limited to that of a single double track. It's a bottleneck which sharply limits the deployment opportunities via this route. Further, the Schönsee—Thorn line wouldn't be fully used owing to its proximity to the border and capacity issues.
ignoring other numbers to fit your own narrative only.

I might also lead your eye to the report of line command X (page 0129) Mecklenburg-Pommerania.
PH_3_901_0129_left.jpg

There you can find number-pairs of 84/78 trains/day, 98/90 trains/day, 90/83 trains/day, 73/70 trains per day, for the crossing to Usedom of 104/100 trains/day, for the crossing of the Oder in Stettin even 122/130 trains/day.

... what was it with the 'rule' of only 60 trains/day in exceptional situations only ?


Once again, the sources are quite clear that the lines running East-West from the Vistula were equal at most to two double-track lines:
...
Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen, page 5. The construction plans for a full third track East of the Vistula are discussed here:
...
Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen, page4.
...
From the same page, particular emphasis on this point regarding single track lines:
...
Well ... lamenting and complaing that things aren't as they ideally wished to be is part of the german DNA.
Doesn't mean that things are as bad as complaining might let them look alike.
I know only too well about :
I am german. 🤪​
 
... as a first ... 'riposte' on that post (more on that in the works)
Which 'memoirs' do you refer to ?​
Groener himself never wrote some. There is a ... 'biography' written/publish in 1955 by his daughter as well as a seemingly rather comprehensive one published first time in 1957 by a ... professional historian.

So ... what writing are you refering to ?
Have to apologize here.

Both works of his daighter as well as the historians work are based mainly on a draft Groener seems to have (almost ?) finished shortly before his death.
However he was keen on NOT making it known esp. to the Nazis and therefore it was published together with some critical overlook (less 'critical' as it seems by his daughter :biggrin:) and check against other sources.

However ... I still fail to find in it the reference you mentioned.

But ...
in the 1957 published version there on page 145 Groener wrote about the episode regarding the upheavel the famous/infamous Lichnowsky-telegram caused :
"... Nach Eintreffen des Telegramms aus London forderte der Kaiser von Moltke die Verlegung des militärischen Schwergewichts nach dem Osten. Moltke erklärte es für unmöglich, den Aufmarschplan zu ändern, es sei denn, daß man den Westaufmarsch auslaufen lasse und dann die Transportbewegung nach dem Osten umkehre. Ich bin - obwohl die Angelegenheit in erster Linie eisenbahntechnischer Natur war - nicht gefragt worden, ...​
"... After the arrival of the telegram from London the Kaiser demanded of Moltke the shifting of the military heavyweight to the East. Moltke explained it impossible to change the deployment unless the West-Deployment would be let running to the end and then turning the transportmovement to the East. I haven't - though the affair was primarily of railwaytechnical natur - been asked, ... "​
"... Aber möglich wäre die Durchführung eines unvorbereiteten großen Ostaufmarsches durchaus gewesen. ..." (italics by Groener himself)​
"... But possible the implementation of an unprepared great East-Deployment it had been absolutly (perfectly/definitely/completly or whatever other word you might choose). ..."​

I think there we have the looked for statement of Geroener.
 
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This is an interesting scenario. I made a “Gross Ostmarche” scenario for the Der Weltkrieg game (an excellent operational level WWI series) a long time ago to simulate the first several months of such a conflict based on von Staabs deployment plan. In this plan, five armies are sent east while four stay in the west. This means that each east army is a little smaller than historical (the four in the west are about the same size and correspond historically to the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th, though the 4th is called the 7th, and the 7th is an armee abteilung HQ that would quickly have been designated as the 9th army).

One of the east armies deploys west of Warsaw, but the other four deploy in Prussia. The railways, even along the border, would surely have been heavily guarded and safe in this situation. Nevertheless, the posters here make a good point that von Staabs was probably overoptimistic about the speed of deployment. This probably would not have been a huge issue. Things would be slowed down for the first week or two, but the Russians also had a slow mobilization schedule compared to the Germans. I doubt the risk of a spoiling attack is high. Maybe there would be some effective cavalry raids. In the Russian plan, the historical deployment would be changed in favor of the existing “G” variants, with four armies facing Germany and only two facing Austria-Hungary (the reverse of the historical deployment). An additional armies would likely have been added to each of the groups after the initial mobilization.

The Russian plan in this situation would indeed be defensive. While local counterattacks in the wide-open east front would be assured (and occasionally even successful), the Russians would have to be firmly on the strategic defensive due to being outnumbered by eight German and Austro-Hungarian armies. Austria-Hungary’s mobilization plan would be less confused, allowing them to be somewhat more successful against Serbia. They probably would not have enough power for a big win on this front, though. They could perhaps hold Belgrade, though. The Central Powers would likely be able to advance in the east and win most of the battles, but the specific circumstances surrounding Tannenberg make it unlikely that such as success would be repeated. After all, the logistical situation fighting against Russia would be downright terrible, and the Russians would know to trade space for time. Most likely, the central Powers could obtain the results of the historical Gorlice-Tarnow offensive before the 1914 campaign season is over, maybe a bit less ground with a less disorganized Russian retreat (they’d be able to get the rest of the ground and much more in 1915).

On the West front, I think that there would be some urgency for the French to attack, but not as much as for the Russians to attack Prussia int he historical situation. This is because the slower mobilization on the east front means that the initial French attacks would probably be underway anyway before major engagements occurred in the east. The French plan was aggressive, though, and I have no doubt the regular divisions would go forward before waiting for the reserves. These would result in some defeats for the French. It would be less bad than historically, though, due to greater concentration of French forces against fewer Germans. The French would probably still hold some German territory even after moderately successful German counterattacks. They have no need to redeploy to face German attacks through Belgium, after all. When the reserve divisions come up, the French will attack again more carefully, having learned some lessons. They might get some ground here, but they are not strong enough to capture the Metz or Strassborg forts. Eventually, the front would stabilize. The idea that the Germans could counterattack into France with any long-term success is absurd considering the overall correlation of forces. Indeed, I expect that the Germans would need to feed most of their mobilizing reserve units into the west front rather than the east to keep things stable and prevent moderate French success.

The UK is an interesting question, and probably one that would determine the ultimate outcome of the war. The idea of supporting the weaker powers would hold a lot of traction, especially after the first month or two of war resulting in many Entente defeats and no clear victories. I imagine that such government ministers will use some minor excuse to declare war. It might be Luxembourg, or it might be some little naval incident later in 1914 or early 1915. It is not impossible, though, that the UK gets fully distracted by Ireland, or can’t quite get enough governmental support for war.

In this latter case, the Central Powers would surely win. 1915 would see Italian neutrality, the defeat of Serbia, stablemate in the west, steady advance against Russia in the east, and the entry of Romania and Bulgaria on the side of the Central Powers (with the Ottomans having either jumped in as historically or perhaps also in 1915). The east front certainly would not be easy due to terrible logistics and stiff Russian resistance, but the Russians and French are just not strong enough. The west front would be a stalemate. There might be a negotiated peace after the 1915 campaign season that sees pieces of western Russia detached (especially Poland) and a puppet government installed in Serbia. Otherwise, the war might still last quite a long time. Russia would be fighting defensively, after all, which could make the people rally to defend, even if the Russian government was still crappy (obviously not to nearly the extent as 1941, but still a better situation than historically). The war in this case could potentially end any year, though it could also easily last to 1918 before Russia gives up or collapses, having lost St. Petersburg, Moscow, and all of the Ukraine. France may negotiate then or how to suffer a defeat in a year of campaigning before throwing in the towel.

Now, there is also a third scenario where Britain enters the war, but really does not send significant ground forces anywhere (I am not qualified to evaluate this possibility - it seems a bit half-hearted to me even for a nation mostly dedicated to peripheral intervention but might still be possible). This would perhaps see the Ottomans either neutral or just slowly losing against some volunteer British forces (maybe just a year faster than historically, with surrender only “scheduled” in late 1918 when Ankara falls after a protracted campaign starting in Palestine). The British don’t commit major forces anywhere else other than colonies. In this case, Italy might be more hesitant to join the war as well. Russia would eventually be defeated, and the peace would certainly favor the Central Powers in the east, but would perhaps favor the Entente in the west (some small territory to France and Italy, plus some colonies).

However, it is more likely that the UK enters the war normally, though certainly with less of a manpower commitment to the west front than historically. Since there is so little space to fight on the western front, likely only one army would be sent there. Another could fight in Italy (also limited space - this army would likely be just a couple corps and some artillery). Yes, Italy would probably still join the war for historical reasons even if Austria-Hungary was less battered, probably on roughly the historical timetable. The UK’s main contribution, of course, would be the blockade, but this still leaves lots of potential land combat units, even if conscription is less widespread. This is a very bad thing for the Ottoman Empire.

The Ottomans, in addition to facing Russia, would face major British commitments in Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Gallipoli. Maybe even with additional landings in west Anatolia and Alexandretta. With butterflies, even Gallipoli could potentially succeed in this situation where the only limitation is amphibious shipping (still a bit maybe) and the Ottoman divisions are more committed to other fronts. Bearing the brunt of British power, the Ottomans would likely collapse in late 1915 or 1916. Serbia may also be helped by another British expeditionary force, which may preclude Bulgaria from joining the war (especially if Greece joining against a tottering Ottoman Empire). Serbia would still likely lose the north half of their country, but it is possible that the line would stabilize in North Macedonia (perhaps near the north, perhaps further south, depending on the complex political situation in the region and the exact nature of the fighting).

While the Ottoman Empire was not an industrial power, it was still an essential source of chromium and other non-iron metals. Without this, it would be much more difficult for the German and Austro-Hungarian industry to produce enough war material to sustain their armies. This is compounded by the fact that Germany would not capture huge amounts of French iron mines. In fact, they would lose some of their own along the border. This iron was essential for the German war economy, especially since most Swedish iron went to the UK during many months of the year. On the other hand, without the iron, maybe Germany would not run low on chromium...

France, on the other hand, would be a stronger industrial power in this war. While the front would still creep along, the intact industry and manpower in the north (where it was most concentrated, as from Paris) would be a large advantage, as would avoiding the disorganization of their remaining industry after losing these regions. This would result in a somewhat bigger and much better equipped French army. They would quickly close the firepower gap against Germany. Perhaps they would make enough siege artillery to turn Metz into a Verdun for the Germans (extremely bloody on both sides, regardless if the French can capture the place). After all, Metz may be partially surrounded (again like Verdun) after the French 1914 offensives.

Now, even though Britain is getting lots of victories on the periphery, it is still an overall less effective combatant in this scenario simply because the west front is still the most important front and the easiest spot for it to apply its combat power. This will be slightly mitigated by greater industrial output due to less conscription. The one British army in France will be lavishly equipped, as would the other armies fighting in many scattered locations.

Russia would certainly suffer more in this war. No matter the success of the Entente on other fronts, and no matter how well France can draw off German resources with nibbling attacks, the Russians simply won’t be able to avoid being pushed back. The generally low quality of their forces means that they would be doing this in the context of defeat as well, not a perfect “lure the Germans into the interior” plan. However, they have some advantages. Their forces would have more relative combat power, unit per unit (of course not overall) because the Central Powers would always be fighting at the end of their logistical tether. Meanwhile, Russian morale would be higher (as noted above in even the pessimistic situation) because they are fighting on the defensive deep in their motherland. In late 1915 or 1916, they would benefit from the defeat of the Ottomans. Caucasus reinforcements could stiffen their front, and their armies could receive major supplies from the UK and France (who have a glut of supplies in this war compared to historically). You might even see a British army fighting at the south end of the front (or even in Romania/Bulgaria, though the Romanian situation would be so complicated I hesitate to predict anything around here). Overall, though, the Central Powers would certainly capture Warsaw in 1914, Riga and Mink in 1915, Kiev, Smolensk, and Tallinn in 1916, and perhaps even St. Petersburg, Moscow, and the rest of the Ukraine in 1917 and 1918.

Entry of the United States is a wild-card. It could easily happen in the same way as historically. It might be less of a benefit for the Entente due to the smaller space in the west front, but with French and British war industry at high levels, the US army certainly wouldn’t have equipment problems.

The outcome of the war probably depends on whether Russia manages to stay intact of collapse, despite losing major areas in 1917 or 1918. If it holds on, the war could end in 1918 as historical, though with no one front being as decisive as the west front in 1918. If it collapses, especially if in 1917, then the Central Powers have a shot at victory if they can take out Italy and shock the Entente with a successful counterattack that recovers French-occupied territory. This might cause peace negotiations. If not, the Germans might lose due to effects of the blockage, but they might be okay for a much longer war with no definite end of they managed to organize food shipments from the east in the event of a Russian collapse.

If Russia collapses in 1918, then things are still tricky for the Central Powers. They would be less able to launch a counteroffensive against France and would have had less time to start exploiting food resources of the Ukraine. I can see Austria-Hungary being ground down in 1918 in Italy and in a much more active Balkan front (which lacks Bulgarian allies). Germany would then have to throw in the towel after loosing their ally, even if they were still fairly solid in the west front.
 
The Central Powers would likely be able to advance in the east and win most of the battles, but the specific circumstances surrounding Tannenberg make it unlikely that such as success would be repeated.

I tend to agree with this (though it may depend on how quickly the Russians learn that the Germans are unexpectedly deploying East). The Russians are still having all their radio traffic heard by the Germans, though, so the Russians might still find a way to blow their foot off.
 
While the Ottoman Empire was not an industrial power, it was still an essential source of chromium and other non-iron metals. Without this, it would be much more difficult for the German and Austro-Hungarian industry to produce enough war material to sustain their armies.
What about the Belgian nitrate? IOTL, Germany captured a large stockpile of nitrate in Belgium in 1914. AIUI, this stockpile allowed Germany to continue producing munitions in spite of the British blockade until nitrate production with the Haber-Bosch process was fully operational.

If Germany goes east, then Germany doesn't capture the nitrate. Germany could still buy the nitrate, unless Britain outbid them. (That would require Britain realizing that the nitrate is critical before the Germans have got it.)

If Germany doesn't have that nitrate, would that cause an ammunition shortage? Temporary, to be sure, but it could cripple Germany for a few months in a critical period.
 

ferdi254

Banned
Actually yes, the first way would be to simply buy it. Then of course as long as the UK does not blockade Germany can still purchase all hhe Nitrate they need.

And even if the UK outbids them, declares war and blockaded, Germany can still speed up Haber Bosch.

Oh and with capturing the Russian fortresses they will have all the explosives they need for some time.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
... possibly because I also READ what's written in this source before and after page 110 regarding the deployment and mobilization schedule 1910.

Some examples :
page 109



page 111


from the same page regarding the ... acceptance of this schedule

They didn't like it at all from the moment it was introduced.
Once again when their was a war game scheduled to put this 'Plan 18' to the test it was cancelled (due to obvious shortcommings) and tried to be replaced by a number of conferences in which it was - once again not at least by your beloved Alekseev - harshly critizised.

So far for the deployment and strategical plan you have higghlightended this time as the russian "heal-all".
From the same book some citations somewhat ... relativating your assumed abilities of the GUGSh and/or STAVKA (former turned into on mobilisation) to change their in 1912 adopdet plans with a snip of your fingers.
page 105-106


... what should also shed some light on these top brass' abilitiies to quickly adjust to whatever shortime changes and challenges they might come across and - even more important - would be recognized by them to actually change handling of affairs in terms of turning 180° from practice the last 2 years.

... and about the situation of the fortresses under Sukhomlinov and the budgetary restriction since the 1910-'compromise' due to inability of navy and rmy to develop a combined concept for war
page 107

... a 'wee' notion of how ... effective the russian system of logistics could be for some as proposed quick switch from an actual to an outdated and not any more actualized deployment scheme
page 108

... when after the adoption of the new 'Paln 19' with its 2 iterations A and G was to be refined
page 121


That refers to the mobilisation issues regarding the necessary logistics. Which - by organisation of the russian top agency in peacetime the GUGSh - was done by yet another of its departments under the ever 'divide et impera' lead of the War Minister Sukhomlinov.



No ... 'Plan 18' was conceived after french diplomacy had thrown its ally and its intentions about the Bosporus under the bus (Bosnian Crisis) and proper asll-embracing military reform after the catastrophy of 1905/06 had still not taken place.

... any source for aside your wishfull hoping ?
Probably they retained files alike the german Gerneral Staff. ... in respect of rather general allocation of troops but far from keeping all the now completly (not at least due to though still insufficient built-up of logistics/railways) outdated marching orders for single units (as were also burnt by the german War Ministry on onset of the next deployment plan every new 'season' on 1st April of each year).



See above about the ... 'abilities' of the russian planning institutions to easily switch plan without the thorough training on ever changing preconditions the german higher officers had to endure additionally to their troop assignments.



... what simply wouldn't have been a matter in a East First scenario decided upon in Germany during the July-crisis.
... same source as above page 121-122

Adoption"G" of Plan 19 was already meant for a german East-First turn.
... but given the OTL performance I somehow doubt that 3 instead of 2 armies (a plus of one half compared to otl) would have made much of a difference given the fourtimes stronger german troops (even if only 3-times in East prussia)

It might be of help to actually read the references you use instead only wishfull phantazing upon singled out bit'n pieces to your taste.


Something you never accept that these staff talks with their explicitly written down consideration were part of a legally valid traty binding both partners to what's written laid down in such treaty. ... including the regular actualisations.
... otherwise any treaty wouldn't be worth the ink signed with.


edit :
As you lads'n ... lady have already mooved on so far ...

I don't see any value in trying to refute again and again the same faulty ingnorances of reality singled out of context for conveniance hotchpotched with wishfull assumptions about conditions and abilities of troops, availability of equipment (i.e. certain guns'n shells for), terrain, political developments of at least 5 years prior to 1914 until at least 2nd August 1914 not only regarding military preparations, intelligence of the several adversaries influencing military positions (i.e. Redl affait and everything around it) as fought and argued just too many times.

... or simply see my signature ...
Couldn't help yourself, could you?

While you had already gone into "Playing the Man" with several comments that would have akated skated since this post was reported for better than a week.

Then you had to take the extra effort to directly insult another member.

You are running out of chances really fast at this point. Might want to think on that while you are on the bench.

Kicked for a week.
 
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Aphrodite

Banned
Waldersee
who as Senior Quartermaster General to Moltke the Minor on several occasions (last in may 1914 IIRC) proposed preventive attack on russia first​
Actually, Waldersee favored offensives in both the East and West (i.e. 8th Army should advance in conjunction with Conrad while the Western offensive proceeded).

He also spoke of the need to strike "while Italy remained loyal". Which brings up the point:. What's Italy role in this Eastern plan? Aren't they supposed to be tying down 6 French divisions in the Alps and supplying a relief army on the Rhine?
 

kham_coc

Kicked
To be honest, if AH isn't looking like they were about to collapse, and instead Russia is looking like it's going to collapse - I would say that neutrality is more likely.
if that is true and the UK isn't in it, then neutrality is very likely, tbh, going to war with France should be more likely in that case (than AH, not likely in an of itself).
 
Thanks for the discussion thus far. Especially @NoMommsen and @Julian for the detailed discussion on railway capacity.

It strikes me that many people vote for "Germany wins and then invades France". The how and why is not really reflected in the discussion. An invasion of France increases the chances of a British DOW. The idea of defending in the west is to keep Britain neutral, IMO.

In the meantime I have made a detailed map of the Moselstellung. The elevation model in the background clearly shows the strategic choices when it comes to the locations of the fortifications.

Moselstellung.jpg
 
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Thanks to input from @Julian and @Athelstane, among others, I made a 'war game' regarding the 'alternate battle of Lorraine'. Of course with maps! I am curious about your opinion.

Part 1/5, 6 to 13 August:

The first move of Joffre's plan of attack begins on 7 August, with the Battle of Mülhausen. The French VII Corps takes this town on 8 August, but is chased out of it two days later by the German XIV and XV Corps. Assuming that the French are sufficiently defeated, the German XV Corps withdraw to the north and the defense of Mülhausen is left to XIV Corps. However, Joffre reinforces the VII Corps with the 1st Reserve Group, which now make up the Alsace army, in preparation for another attack.

Meanwhile, the French 2nd Army is preparing for a major offensive in Lorraine. It will be protected on the flanks by the 1st and 4th Army. The aim of the attack is to bind as many German armies as possible, so that they cannot be used against Russia. At the same time, Russia will launch an offensive to take East Prussia.

Germany has now occupied Luxembourg and the French fear an attack via the south of Belgium. The 5th Army is therefore deployed along the Belgian border.

BattleofLorraine1.jpg

map updated on October 22, 2022
 
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Part 2/5, 14 to 20 August:

On 14 August, Joffre starts the expected offensive and invades Lorraine. The 2nd Army is steadily advancing towards Saarbrücken without encountering much resistance. However, the advance of the 1st Army is stopped by heavy German resistance at Saarburg. Due to the poor cooperation between infantry and artillery, the French are unable to force a breakthrough and suffered heavy casualties. Meanwhile, an attack by the 4th Army is bloodily repulsed by the entrenched divisions of the German 6th Army with their machine guns. This creates a large bulge in the front line, with the 2nd Army approaching Saarbrücken up to 20 km. Joffre orders the 2nd Army to halt, as the flanks now become vulnerable.

Further south, the Alsace army has recaptured Mülhausen after fierce house-to-house fighting and is now advancing further north. The German XIV Corps try to slow down the French advance as much as possible, aided by the XIV-R Corps.

Joffre comes to the conclusion that the Germans do not intend to violate Belgian neutrality. Since the French government has forbidden Joffre to attack via Belgium, Joffre orders the 5th Army on 20 August to start the 'Moselle Offensive' towards Luxembourg / Diedenhofen. It will be supported on the southern flank by the 3rd Army.

BattleofLorraine2.jpg

map updated on October 22, 2022
 
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