Alternate Battle of Lorraine 1914

[Alanith]

AFAIK the dominions were actually very eager to show their solidarity and support - some were offering it even before the british entered the war. The UK did not have to ask for it and they were not really concerned with Belgium to begin with. I dont see them less supportive.

How about if it takes several months to get to that point, and they've had time for a nice, sober look at the French feeding division after division into a woodchipper on the Western front?

 

[Fulton 44]

AFAIK the dominions were actually very eager to show their solidarity and support - some were offering it even before the british entered the war. The UK did not have to ask for it and they were not really concerned with Belgium to begin with. I dont see them less supportive.

It is possible that they would have been enthusiastic but the question is whether, as time wore on and the Germans were fighting a purely defensive battle on the Western front and appeared willing to settle for the status quo ante , the enthusiasm would have been as high as it was in the OTL.

 

[Tibi088]

How about if it takes several months to get to that point, and they've had time for a nice, sober look at the French feeding division after division into a woodchipper on the Western front?

It is possible that they would have been enthusiastic but the question is whether, as time wore on and the Germans were fighting a purely defensive battle on the Western front and appeared willing to settle for the status quo ante , the enthusiasm would have been as high as it was in the OTL.

Fully agree. Time would cure anyone with an eye of enthusianism for war who looked at what was happening. And yet nations were still kept joining the fray as the years went on and casualties were mounting.

 

[NoMommsen]

What should I make of this?

You've never seen this;


View attachment 688912


i find that quite amazing given that you link to Alekseyev's plan is from page 116 of war planning and this can be found on page 110.

... possibly because I also READ what's written in this source before and after page 110 regarding the deployment and mobilization schedule 1910.

Some examples :
page 109

... Moreover, the schedule’s considerations provided for no sure transition from defensive to counteroffensive operations. ...

..., but the deployment scheme frittered away new-found wealth by allocating two entire armies (three corps and six reserve divisions) to the defense of St. Petersburg and the border with Romania. ...

... Germany, leaving against Austria-Hungary only a single ungainly army of seven corps divided into two groupings (against then assumed 13 corps of the austrians). ..."

page 111

"... difficulty of attaining mutual support and mass at key points of defense and possible counterattack. ... "

"... The four armies north of the Pripet were arrayed two each in two strategic echelons, leaving insufficient deployment and maneuver space to bring all combat power to bear (except sequentially) against German forces in East Prussia. Meanwhile, planners within both the Warsaw and Kiev military districts understood that the lone Russian army (seven corps) south of the Pripet might expect an onslaught from as many as 13 Austro-Hungarian corps. The corresponding two Russian groupings between Rovno-Dubno and Proskurov ceded too much space and invited defeat in detail. Worse, planners worried about sabotage and even armed insurrection among elements of the Polish population that had grown weary of Russian occupation. ..."

from the same page regarding the ... acceptance of this schedule

"... Even as Mobilization Schedule 1910 took effect, the frontier district staffs and GUGSh (Glavnoe Upravlenie General’nogo Shtaba or 'Main Directorate of the General Staff' in some ways the russian counterpart og the german Great General Staff at the Königsplatz) were at odds over how to palliate serious shortcomings in the strategic concept."

They didn't like it at all from the moment it was introduced.
Once again when their was a war game scheduled to put this 'Plan 18' to the test it was cancelled (due to obvious shortcommings) and tried to be replaced by a number of conferences in which it was - once again not at least by your beloved Alekseev - harshly critizised.

So far for the deployment and strategical plan you have higghlightended this time as the russian "heal-all".
From the same book some citations somewhat ... relativating your assumed abilities of the GUGSh and/or STAVKA (former turned into on mobilisation) to change their in 1912 adopdet plans with a snip of your fingers.
page 105-106

"... But, during his (Danilov) tenure as quartermaster general between 1909 and 1914, his emphasis on orderly bureaucratic routine fit well with the war minister’s sense of centralized authority. Between 1909 and 1914, the chiefs of the various functional sections within GUGSh increasingly came to resemble Danilov.
... Except for Dobrorol’skii, who returned from regimental command to head the allimportant troop mobilization section as a general after 1912, none had any recent direct combat experience.

At the same time, Sukhomlinov employed the revolving door to preclude competition from his GUGSh chiefs. No fewer than four officers held this post during 1909–1914, and the last two, Ia. G. Zhilinskii and N. N. Ianushkevich, were “chancery generals,” who had made their reputations within the higher military bureaucracy in the imperial capital. Their skills and attributes suited the times, in which the larger institutional pattern was one of unchallenged bureaucratic authority within narrow ministerial and agency “stovepipes.” "

... what should also shed some light on these top brass' abilitiies to quickly adjust to whatever shortime changes and challenges they might come across and - even more important - would be recognized by them to actually change handling of affairs in terms of turning 180° from practice the last 2 years.

They'll modify it when Romania declares neutrality of course but it is the proper response to a German Eastern deploymen

... and about the situation of the fortresses under Sukhomlinov and the budgetary restriction since the 1910-'compromise' due to inability of navy and rmy to develop a combined concept for war
page 107

"... With sufficient means only for selectively rebuilding and rearming fortresses, he chose a “rear-to-front” option in the West that allocated scarce resources for Brest-Litovsk and Kovno, to which in 1912 he grudgingly added Novogeorgievsk (with its fortification just begun to be updated in 1914). The remainder he would abandon, except for fortifications on the Narew crossing at Osowiec (only 'in-time' effectivly modernized fortress)."

... a 'wee' notion of how ... effective the russian system of logistics could be for some as proposed quick switch from an actual to an outdated and not any more actualized deployment scheme
page 108

"... First, the reserve troops who made up the bulk of the transportation battalions were located far back in the mobilization schedule. Thus, they could not make their presence felt until at least the third and fourth weeks of a future war. And second, during the interim, first-line maneuver units were tethered to their own organic support units. Their limited carrying capacities meant that logistics would become problematic any time the distance between supporting railheads and advancing maneuver formations exceeded two or three days’ field march."

... when after the adoption of the new 'Paln 19' with its 2 iterations A and G was to be refined
page 121

"At the same time, logistical shortcomings imperiled the capacity to sustain and support mass, even in an attenuated form."

"However, several considerations hamstrung their collaborative approach to war planning.First, planning occurred inside the framework of the standing mobilization schedule from 1910, which came to be known in short-hand parlance as Schedule No. 19. A new schedule, No. 20, was not due until the spring of 1914."

That refers to the mobilisation issues regarding the necessary logistics. Which - by organisation of the russian top agency in peacetime the GUGSh - was done by yet another of its departments under the ever 'divide et impera' lead of the War Minister Sukhomlinov.

This is the Russian war plan when they thought an Eastern deployment likely given Russian weakness after the Japanese War.

No ... 'Plan 18' was conceived after french diplomacy had thrown its ally and its intentions about the Bosporus under the bus (Bosnian Crisis) and proper asll-embracing military reform after the catastrophy of 1905/06 had still not taken place.

They retained it in their files (the Russians keep everything).

... any source for aside your wishfull hoping ?
Probably they retained files alike the german Gerneral Staff. ... in respect of rather general allocation of troops but far from keeping all the now completly (not at least due to though still insufficient built-up of logistics/railways) outdated marching orders for single units (as were also burnt by the german War Ministry on onset of the next deployment plan every new 'season' on 1st April of each year).

They'll modify it when Romania declares neutrality of course but it is the proper response to a German Eastern deploymen

In an German Eastern Deployment, the obvious solution is for the Russians to dust off old plan 18, ....

See above about the ... 'abilities' of the russian planning institutions to easily switch plan without the thorough training on ever changing preconditions the german higher officers had to endure additionally to their troop assignments.

What I find amazing is your unfounded assertion that Russia and France will make no adjustments when confronted with a radically different political and military situation. ...

... what simply wouldn't have been a matter in a East First scenario decided upon in Germany during the July-crisis.
... same source as above page 121-122

"As a result, the strategic concept that flowed from planning priorities during 1912 would have two variants, “A” for a major offensive effort against Austria-Hungary, and “G” for a contrasting major effort with a defensive emphasis against Germany, should that country’s armed forces initially turn east. Planners paid only lip service to the latter proposition, with the result that “Plan G” was never as fully developed as its anti-Austro-Hungarian counterpart."

Adoption"G" of Plan 19 was already meant for a german East-First turn.
... but given the OTL performance I somehow doubt that 3 instead of 2 armies (a plus of one half compared to otl) would have made much of a difference given the fourtimes stronger german troops (even if only 3-times in East prussia)

It might be of help to actually read the references you use instead only wishfull phantazing upon singled out bit'n pieces to your taste.

...
The convention you endlessly cite was between the French and Russian staffs Those staffs are free to change their plans at any time. Something you never accept. ..

Something you never accept that these staff talks with their explicitly written down consideration were part of a legally valid traty binding both partners to what's written laid down in such treaty. ... including the regular actualisations.
... otherwise any treaty wouldn't be worth the ink signed with.


edit :
As you lads'n ... lady have already mooved on so far ...

I don't see any value in trying to refute again and again the same faulty ingnorances of reality singled out of context for conveniance hotchpotched with wishfull assumptions about conditions and abilities of troops, availability of equipment (i.e. certain guns'n shells for), terrain, political developments of at least 5 years prior to 1914 until at least 2nd August 1914 not only regarding military preparations, intelligence of the several adversaries influencing military positions (i.e. Redl affait and everything around it) as fought and argued just too many times.

... or simply see my signature ...

 

[kham_coc]

Yeah this argument about what France and Russia would do in an aufmarch ost scenario are pretty silly tbh - Russia would by defending surrender all initiative, so unlikely.
This is especially the case where everyone thinks the war is going to be short.
They also can't know that Germany is defending in the west, and must assume that France will need help.
And even if they don't act as aggressive as they did otl, they can't possibly surrender all of Poland - they got into the war to salvage their prestige, you can't do that by just withdrawing.

And as for France, even if they don't attack like obliged right away, they must after Russia starts coming under pressure, because Russia will demand it and would laugh at any complaints about losses (as theirs is worse; much worse).

But that brings us to communication - they don't have any fast one, and must thus act according to the plans.

One can certainly say that in the medium long term Frances preserved industrial potential will make things worse for Germany, but in the short term France would be forced to bleed.

 

[Alanith]

Yeah this argument about what France and Russia would do in an aufmarch ost scenario are pretty silly tbh - Russia would by defending surrender all initiative, so unlikely.
This is especially the case where everyone thinks the war is going to be short.
They also can't know that Germany is defending in the west, and must assume that France will need help.
And even if they don't act as aggressive as they did otl, they can't possibly surrender all of Poland - they got into the war to salvage their prestige, you can't do that by just withdrawing.

And as for France, even if they don't attack like obliged right away, they must after Russia starts coming under pressure, because Russia will demand it and would laugh at any complaints about losses (as theirs is worse; much worse).

But that brings us to communication - they don't have any fast one, and must thus act according to the plans.

One can certainly say that in the medium long term Frances preserved industrial potential will make things worse for Germany, but in the short term France would be forced to bleed.

And to be honest, I'm not sure France's industry being preserved offsets Germany retaining open access to the world markets. Not entirely at the least.

 

[NoMommsen]

...Only the railway bridge at Thorn itself was single track, so maybe that's causing confusion? ...

actually most bridge were "single-tracked" as built. the first bridge at Dirschau (the solely railbrideg as double track was built additionally there) as well as the bridge at Marienwerder as well as the bridge at Graudenz as well as the bridge at Fordon.
All of these bridges followed the same pattern when built :

a single rail-tarck and​

a (almost doubled as wide) pedestrian/cart way (which could easily equipped with an additional rail track)​

Nevertheless, these brigdes could handle the rail traffic 'thrown' at them by double tracked feeding lines through mamagement of waiting tracks and spacing of trains crossings. ... if there were such double-tracked feeding lines.

I have always understood that the Germans forced the Ottoman entry into the war through the Black Sea Raid. ...

... IMHO too much of a word.
While the german military and diplomacy were somewhat ... 'divided' (against each other as well as each of them internally) of not only an ottoman entry at all but also when and with what means there nevertheless was some pressure put at the ottomasn authorities (mainly through money ... NOT allocated to the ottomans).
In the end it was a mostly a belligerent Enver Pasha who draw the OE into the shooting war with an only-too-servile (?) to this wish Suchon doing as wished.

..
Still, can you name one German General who proposed they do this?
..

... got one at least : Field Marschall Colmar von der Goltz

who staff rided this out as commanding general of I.Corps with Schlieffen once and​

who staff rided this out alone whn commanding general of the then VI. Army (East-Westprussia plus Silesia) district (from 1912 onwards I.Army district).​

... got another one : Mayor General (in summer 1914) Georg v. Waldersee

who as Senior Quartermaster General to Moltke the Minor on several occasions (last in may 1914 IIRC) proposed preventive attack on russia first​

 

[Karelian]

just one who thought they should go East in a two front war. That's not asking much.

Friedrich von Bernhardi, a Baltic German critic of Schlieffen - he wrote about it in his book:

Germany and the Next War, Bernhardi

Should Russia, then, after weighing these chances launch out into an offensive war in the West, the struggle would probably assume a quite different character from that, for example, of a Franco-German war. Russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the first place secure against complete subjugation. In case of defeat her centre of gravity is not shifted. A Russian war can hardly ever, therefore, become a struggle for political existence, and cause that straining of every nerve which such a struggle entails. The inhabitants will hardly ever show self-devotion in wars whose objects cannot be clear to them. Throughout the vast Empire the social and also political education, especially among the peasants, is so poor, that any grasp of the problems of a foreign policy seems quite out of the question. The sections of the people who have acquired a little superficial learning in the defective Russian schools have sworn to the revolutionary colours, or follow a blind anti-progressive policy which seems to them best to meet their interests. The former, at least, would only make use of a war to promote their own revolutionary schemes, as they did in the crisis of the Russo-Japanese War. Under the circumstances, there can be little idea of a united outburst of the national spirit which would enable an offensive war to be carried on with persistent vigour. There has been an extraordinary change in the conditions since 1812, when the people showed some unanimity in repelling the invasion. Should Russia to-day be involved in a Western war with Germany and Austria, she could never bring her whole forces into play. In the first place, the revolutionary elements in the heart of the State would avail themselves of every weakening of the national sources of power to effect a revolution in internal politics, without any regard for the interests of the community. Secondly, in the Far East, Japan or China would seize the moment when Russia's forces in the West were fully occupied to carry out their political intentions towards the Empire of the Czar by force of arms. Forces must always be kept in reserve for this eventuality, as we have already mentioned.

Although Russia, under the present conditions, cannot bring her whole power to bear against Germany and Austria, and must also always leave a certain force on her European Southern frontier, she is less affected by defeats than other States. Neither the Crimean War nor the greater exertions and sacrifices exacted by her hard-won victory over the Turks, nor the heavy defeats by the Japanese, have seriously shaken Russia's political prestige. Beaten in the East or South, she turns to another sphere of enterprise, and endeavours to recoup herself there for her losses on another frontier.

Such conditions must obviously affect the character of the war. Russia will certainly put huge armies into the field against us. In the wars against Turkey and Japan the internal affairs of the Empire prevented the employment of its full strength; in the latter campaign revolutionary agitation in the army itself influenced the operations and battles, and in a European war the same conditions would, in all probability, make themselves emphatically felt, especially if defeats favoured or encouraged revolutionary propaganda. In a war against Russia, more than in any other war, c'est le premier pas qui coute.

If the first operations are unsuccessful, their effect on the whole position will be wider than in any other war, since they will excite in the country itself not sympathetic feelings only, but also hostile forces which would cripple the conduct of the war.

So far as the efficiency of the Russian army goes, the Russo-Japanese War proved that the troops fight with great stubbornness. The struggle showed numerous instances of heroic self-devotion, and the heaviest losses were often borne with courage. On the other hand, the Russian army quite failed on the offensive, in a certain sense tactically, but essentially owing to the inadequacy of the commanders and the failure of the individuals. The method of conducting the war was quite wrong; indecision and irresolution characterized the Russian officers of every grade, and no personality came forward who ever attempted to rise above mediocrity. It can hardly be presumed that the spirit of Russian generalship has completely changed since the defeats in Manchuria, and that striking personalities have come on the stage. This army must therefore always be met with a bold policy of attack.

These men were not alone, since the entire Strategiestreit between supporters and opponents of Hans Delbrüch essentially dealt with this topic.

 

[NoMommsen]

... Bernhardi and Schlichting ... forgot about these two ...
👍 @Karelian

 

[Julian]

Thanks for your detailed response, @NoMommsen. Apologies for the delayed response, Pfizer shot #3 kicked my ass and I got caught up reading through the Bundesarchiv's online holdings.

As a first notion : sry but ... Groener never wrote something titled "Das Deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen".
This is a work edited by the Reichsarchiv in Potsdam and published (this peculiar volume) in 1927. Groener is only mentioned in its intro with a polite thanks for his - rather symbolic - supervision he was entrusted with by the historic commission of the Reichsarchiv.
... therefore ...
If you could name me a/the source in which he describes the capabilities of the eastern railways system in 1914 esp. where he - Groener - identifies such a "main bottleneck" as named by you I would be truly thankful (esp. as you seem to be keen for such minute citations by others).

... do we ... you really know ?
... because you seem to 'cheat' your calculations by completly omitting the southern double-track via Goßlershausen to Deutsch Eylau and further to Osterode-Allenstein-Lyck.

An cerebration seemingly out of the blue and at least without any reference/reverberating of any (contemporary) source known to me.
However, let's give in to your free-floating deliberation at least regarding the double-tracked crossing of the Vistula at Thorn (Torun) up to Schönsee (Kowalewo Pomorskie), 24 km with the border at one point (at Adolfshof) about 4 km away , further at any other part of this section.
There would still be the double-track crossing from Bromberg at Graudenz to Goßlershausen.

what in 1914 is simply wrong.
The two single-tracks in question here regarding crossing the Vistula at Fordon east of Bromberg (now part of Bromberg or Bydgoszcz) and Schmentau (Smetowo) were in 1914 fully operational with 20 trains a day with 60 minutes spacing up to 30 trains a day with 40 minutes spacing and even up to 36 trains ommiting the normally planned 4 hours pause a day.

A rule I never came across esp. not as "written in stone" aka unadjustable/unchangeable no matter what.
I would be grateful for the page in "Das Deutsche Feldeisenbahnwese" - or any other citation/place - where you've seen this rule.

... and again I would like to question where you've got this info for the railways in 1914.

However, relativating your (cheated see above) calculations I come out with
2 x 60 (3 per hour at 20 minutes spacing, what was the 'general rule' for double tracked line, "Feldeisenbahnwese" page 10) trains a day on double tracked crossing (Dirschau/Marienburg AND at least one leading to Goßlershausen)
or
2 x 72 trains a day omitting the 4 hours pause ("Feldeisenbahnwese" page 19)
and possibly/probably up to
2 x 100 trains if we shorten the planned for spacing of trains
now for the "unhelpfull" single-tracked crossing
2 x 20 (1 per hour) trains a day on mentioned single-tracked crossing
or
2 x 24 trains a day omitting the 4 hours pause
and up to
2 x 30/39 trains with shortening the spacing

thereby I come to 160 trains/day on almost peace conditions up to 250/260 trains/day on emergency conditions as described above compared to the meager 100 you admitt.
... and here I even follow your unproven neglect of the Thorn crossing.

Given your calculation of 20.1 days for the deployment of troops listed with double the number of trains available as I've shown you above (or even more) I would render v.Staabs calculation to be ready to rumble up to day M 15 still very ... 'conservative'.

As a side note : the railway administration was from 1913 onwards already preparing new military train schedules due to the development in capabilities of trains, locomotives, track-capabilities and simple imcrease length of available tracks (page 10 to 11 of "Das Deutsch Feldeisenbahnwesen").
Partially these preliminary works - not fully completed in 1914 - came already into usage during the western deployments IOTL.

On the rule limiting transport to 50 trains per day except for rare exceptions:

In der Regel durften auf den zweigleisigen Strecken nicht mehr als 50 Züge täglich in jeder Richtung durch Mobilmachungs- und Kriegstransport beansprucht werden. Rur bei wesentlich schwächerer Belastung der Gegenrichtung war ausnahmsweise eine Belegung bis zu 60 Zügen zulässig.

Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen pages 18-19.

We can see that even on the intensely used Western Front, where speed was of the utmost importance, this rule was only ignored in one case:

Bridge at Wesel by IX. Army corps with 20 trains a day;
Bridge at Hamborn by II Army Corps with 30 trains a day;
Bridge near Duisburg by VII Army Corps, III. and VII. Reserve corps with 40 trains per day;
Rordbrücke near Düsseldorf by X Army Corps with 20 trains per day;
Südbrücke near Düsseldorf by III. and IV. Army Corps with 40 trains per day;
North bridge near Cologne by Guard Corps, VX. Reserve Corps and Heavy Artillery for 2nd Army with 40 trains perday;
South bridge near Cologne by XI. Army Corps, Guard Reserve Corps and 1/2 X. Reserve corps with 60 trains per day;
Bridge at Koblenz by XII. and XIX. Army Corps and XII. Reserve corps with 40 trains per day;
North bridge near Mainz by XVIII. Army Corps and XVIII. Reserve corps with 40 trains per day;
South bridge near Mainz by the 5th Army Corps and the Mainz garrison with 40 trains per day;
Bridge at Worms by VI. Army Corps, garrisons of Metz and Strasbourg with 40 trains per day;
Bridge near Ludwigshafen by II. Bavarian Army Corps, V. Reserve Corps and garrison of Germersheim with 40 trains per day;
Bridge at Germersheim by XIII. Army Corps, VI. Reserve Corps and I. Bavarian Reserve Corps with 50 trains per day;
Bridge at Röschwoog by III. Bavarian army corps with 20 trains per day;
Bridge near Strasbourg by I. Bavarian Army Corps and garrison of Strasbourg with 30 trains per day.

Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen, page 36.

Plans for adjustments to the military timetable to operate at higher speeds were being worked on for the 1915-1916 deployment, as you correctly note:

Schon in den letzten Friedensjahren wurde erkannt, daß der bestehende Militärfahrplan die Leistungsfähigkeit der Strecken nicht in dem Maße ausnutzte, wie es der Stand des hoch entwickelten deutschen Eisenbahnwesens gestattete. Nachdem festgestellt war, daß für den Fall der Steigerung der Geschwindigkeit ausreichend starke Lokomotiven für Bewältigung der im Kriege geforderten Transportleistungen zur Verfügung standen, wurde auf Anregung des letzten Chefs der Cisenbahnabteilung, Oberstleutnants Groener, im Jahre 1913 mit den Vorarbeiten zur Aufstellung eines neuen Militärfahrplans begonnen. Für die Haupttransportstraßen wurde die Grundgeschwindigkeit auf 40 km in der Stunde erhöht. In Verbindung mit dem gleichzeitig in Aussicht genommenen, großzügigen strategischen Ausbau des Vahnnetzes sollte hierdurch eine wesentliche Beschleunigung der Operationsbereitschaft des heeres erreicht werden. Die in vollem Gange befindlichen Arbeiten zur Neuaufstellung des Fahrplans mit seinen rund 3000 Einzelstrecken fanden durch den Ausbruch des Krieges eine vorzeitige Unterbrechung.

Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen, pages 10-11.

To get a sense of these plans, we can turn to the Bundesarchiv holdings for the GGS Railway Department. PH 3/901 holds 135 pages from the first half of 1914 of the railway department's plans for the new mobilization timetable. We have the preparatory materials for the April conference in Metz which began the planning process from the Railway Department and individual Linienkommission, the conference summary, and follow-up materials sent to the Railway Department in April-June 1914 by the Linienkommission about the estimated maximum capacity of the lines under their purview for the new schedule.

What do these files tell us?

1. The new mobilization schedule was still in the early stages of planning and was not applied in the actual mobilization which took place in July 1914. Even for the Western railways' most developed Linienkommission, the schedule estimated for the new plan ran consistently faster than what was implemented IOTL:

https://imgur.com/a/SJcFjjR

There's no evidence, therefore, to believe that excessively faster speeds with radical adjustments to the schedule could or would be adopted. If it wasn't done for the Western deployment IOTL, it's not going to be done for an ad-hoc Eastern deployment.

2. Even if we assume the new deployment timetable could be adopted with no preparation, the three Linienkommission operating on the Vistula/East Prussia (N, R, and V) show that there were substantial capacity issues even running at their maximum estimated speed:

https://imgur.com/a/SQB4O1y

https://imgur.com/a/GhjkWUC

https://imgur.com/a/i2KG0HL

We can see that from Elbing to Intersburg capacity couldn't exceed 40 trains per day even under the new schedule. From Thorn to Schonsee capacity was 25 trains, while from Laskowitz to Graudenz it was 32, to Graudenz to Goßlershausen it was 36, and from Osterode to Korschen it was 30! The Fordon and Marienwerder lines weren't even considered for use in the new deployment plan. From the same materials for Linienkommission N (East Prussia), we can see recommendation against using numerous smaller routes:

Es werden demnach für die Bedarfszüge wie bisher die I und II Richtungen des Friedensfahrplans gewählt werden, da ein Durcheinanderwerfen der Richtungen zur Vermeidung von Jrrtümern bei dem Stations-und Streckenpersonal mieden werden muß.

So while you are correct that two double-track lines run into Goßlershausen, only one double track line leaves Goßlershausen and therefore its capacity is limited to that of a single double track. It's a bottleneck which sharply limits the deployment opportunities via this route. Further, the Schönsee—Thorn line wouldn't be fully used owing to its proximity to the border and capacity issues. Once again, the sources are quite clear that the lines running East-West from the Vistula were equal at most to two double-track lines:

Nicht so günstig war die Leistungsfähigkeit des östlichen Netzes. Abgesehen von den gut entwickelten Bahnen Oberschlesiens, das mit drei leistungsfähigen Transportstraßen ausgestattet war, konnte bei dem vorwiegend landwirtschaftlichen Gepräge des Ostens und seinem im Frieden geringen Verkehrsbedürfnis ein dichtes Netz leistungsfähiger Bahnen nicht entstehen. In den schmalen Grenzstreifen östlich der Weichsel führten nur zwei durchgehende, doppelgleisige Transportstraßen, Marienburg—Königsberg—Insterburg und Goßlershausen—Allenstein—Korschen. Letztere verlief auf langen Strecken in nicht allzu weiter Entfernung von der russischen Grenze und war hierdurch feindlichen Störungen leicht ausgesetzt. Aus dem gleichen Grunde kam die in unmittelbarer Nähe der Landesgrenze gelegene Bahn über Schönsee—Strasburg (Westpr.)—Soldau—Ortelsburg für den Aufmarsch nicht in Betracht. Sie war überdies, wie die Mehrzahl der ost-
preußischen Bahnen, eingleisig und wenig leistungsfähig. Trotz dieser Mängel gewährte das ostpreußische Netz bei der geringen Stärke der anfangs im Osten eingesetzten Kräfte ausreichende operative Beweglichkeit. Erst bei der im weiteren Verlaufe des Krieges notwendig gewordenen stärkeren Beanspruchung der Eisenbahnen Ostpreußens erwies sich deren beschränkte Leistungsfähigkeit recht nachteilig.

Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen, page 5. The construction plans for a full third track East of the Vistula are discussed here:

Im Osten sollte eine dritte Transportstraße in das Land östlich bet Weichsel endlich verwirklicht werden, eine Forderung, die seit langem teils aus außenpolitischen, teils aus finanziellen Erwägungen zurückgestellt war.

Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen, page4.

From the same page, particular emphasis on this point regarding single track lines:

Sie war überdies, wie die Mehrzahl der ostpreußischen Bahnen, eingleisig und wenig leistungsfähig.

The inadequacy of the rail network, particularly single-track lines, is elaborated further by Zimmerman in his recent book on the Tannenberg Battle (Pages 27-28):

Denn ebenso ungenügend sah der Zustand der für den vorgesehenen Bewegungskrieg so wesentlichen Eisenbahn aus: Obwohl Moltke im März 1914 zum wiederholten Male den Ausbau des Eisenbahnnetzes gefordert hatte, floss der Großteil der überhaupt bewilligten Gelder auch hier in den Ausbau im Westen.35 Schon den Zeitgenossen ist also klar gewesen, dass der nächste Krieg »militärisch und wirtschaftlich, ressourcenpolitisch und symbolisch auch ein Eisenbahnkrieg«36 sein würde. Trotzdem blieb das ostpreußische Netz militärisch betrachtet derart mangelhaft, dass man schon aus diesem Grund 1913 von einem Großen Ostaufmarsch hätte Abstand nehmen müssen.37 Es existierten lediglich zwei leistungsfähige doppelgleisige Strecken, eine von Marienburg über Königsberg nach Insterburg, die andere von Gosslarshausen über Allenstein nach Korschen; Letztere lag so nahe an der deutsch-russländischen Grenze, dass sie bereits kurz nach Kriegsbeginn vom Gegner bedroht werden konnte.38 Die weni gen anderen Strecken waren eingleisig und wurden, wenigstens teilweise, erst im Krieg ausgebaut, doch die Bahnstationen erwiesen sich als unzulänglich, selbst in den größeren Städten:

»Der Bahnhof Königsberg spottete jeder Beschreibung. Es hat Zeiten im Kriege gegeben, in denen sich dank seiner Unvollkommenheit die Züge bis Elbing rückwärts stauten. Die Nebenbahnen [...] waren ohne militärische Rücksicht angelegt.«

39 Diese Zustände überraschen umso mehr, als die deutsche militärische Führung die wachsende militärische Macht des Zarenreiches angesichts dessen Reform bemühungen seit dem Desaster im Krieg gegen Japan 1905 sehr genau und durch aus mit wachsender Sorgewahrnahm.40

As Stevenson adds in his overview essay on railway construction before the war, Moltke had urged greater investment into East Prussia to increase its military preparedness and increase the number of East-West double-track lines in East Prussia leaving the Vistula from 2 to 3. But this was only planned to be ready by Spring 1918. Further, Germany also had to accept limited detraining ramps for actually delivering troops - just 1 for every 8 kilometers in the East, versus 1 for every 2 in the West. This from Stevenson, "War by Timetable? The Railway Race before 1914", 187-188.

Because of all this, your below assertion is sharply contradicted by all our available primary and secondary material:

The two single-tracks in question here regarding crossing the Vistula at Fordon east of Bromberg (now part of Bromberg or Bydgoszcz) and Schmentau (Smetowo) were in 1914 fully operational with 20 trains a day with 60 minutes spacing up to 30 trains a day with 40 minutes spacing and even up to 36 trains ommiting the normally planned 4 hours pause a day.

And the calculation you've drawn up below, which I believe you're getting from Staabs' recommendations in his book, are far beyond what is possible:

However, relativating your (cheated see above) calculations I come out with
2 x 60 (3 per hour at 20 minutes spacing, what was the 'general rule' for double tracked line, "Feldeisenbahnwese" page 10) trains a day on double tracked crossing (Dirschau/Marienburg AND at least one leading to Goßlershausen)
or
2 x 72 trains a day omitting the 4 hours pause ("Feldeisenbahnwese" page 19)
and possibly/probably up to
2 x 100 trains if we shorten the planned for spacing of trains
now for the "unhelpfull" single-tracked crossing
2 x 20 (1 per hour) trains a day on mentioned single-tracked crossing
or
2 x 24 trains a day omitting the 4 hours pause
and up to
2 x 30/39 trains with shortening the spacing

Perhaps, with the benefit of hindsight, Staab's recommendations might have been implemented for an Eastern deployment were they possible. But they were not even used for the Western deployment, when as we know time was of the essence. To apply such radical adjustments to an ad-hoc Eastern deployment on railway lines with limited capacity and documented poor quality seems to go beyond what is justifiable and plausible.

Al due respect ... that's nothing to be expected to be delivered in a from the beginned as an overview only planned publication. As there no such deployment IOTL planned there ofc were nowhere as minutely elaborated deployment plans.

Nevertheless he actually adressed these questions ... and advised what I've shown and calculated for you above (omitting the daily pause of operation, shortening spacing and using the now in contrast to 1019/11 available capabilities of the rails (number of waggons, speed) together with somewhat locally "fine tuned" early diembarkations of troops with (rather short) additional footmarching (more in the range of 10 to 30 km than 100+ as Zuber had read out of his source).

This is exactly my criticism of Staabs here - without the data and sources to back up his arguments, he's making a "proof of concept" at best and writing a polemic at worse. Staabs is doing what every other postwar general did. He takes advantage of the unlimited power and capabilities which hindsight grants to implement a plan which contemporary sources show is implausible both for objective reasons (Capacity limits on the main lines, low quality of Eastern railways and the ) and subjective ones (Unwillingness of the Railway Department to make substantial adjustments to their SOPs during mobilization even on well-developed lines).

... again I wonder what writing of Groener you refer to ...

His memoirs discuss the issue on page 86, if I recall right.

Let me counter with :

Der Deutsche Generalstab in Vorbereitung und Durchführung des Weltkrieges Hermann von Kuhl 1920
(The German Generalstaff in preparation und execution of the Worl War)​

page 76 :

"Is was assumed that the Njemen-(Wilna) Army at the time of 6th to 8th day of mobilisation, the Warsaw (Narew-) Army at the time of 3rd to 5th be ready to march."​

page 80 :

"The russian deployment was execute in the year 1914 in general as we had suppoesed.​

The by us assumed marching readiness of the army was not fully accomplished. At that point we had made for the russians too favorable assumptions."​

(translations by me as I assume most of you are not too familiar with german fonts of this time (Fraktur))

... I truly miss any M+20 or even longer (as stated by someone else in thread) ...

M+20 comes from the 1912-13 intelligence assessment for Russian mobilization. Obviously you're correct that by 1914 intelligence assessments, which Moltke was well aware of, had moved up the speed of Russian mobilization even further. Which makes it no surprise that, knowing how slow a planned Eastern deployment would be, he argued against sending a large force East.

... as baseless that he was fully< educated of the possibilities of an eastern employment in 1913/1914.
Moltke the Minor simply wasn't interested in an eastwards campaign (aside his IMHO debatable abilities as a commander of campaign at all).

I think it's far more plausible that the Chief of the GGS had a broad understanding of the deployment possibilities for both East and West, including his repeated appeals for greater investment in the Eastern railways in order to improve capacity (In March 1914, no less!). His understanding of the technical specifics was inferior, but Moltke was aware that an Eastern deployment would be slower, more logistically challenging, and less likely to achieve a decisive result.

By'n large you rely here on the renarration of a reduced compilation of documents for plans completly outdate already at the beginning of 1914. As I tried to make clear :
anything regarding "Aufmarsch Ost" for the period of 1912 to 1913 was recycling paper the day it lost validity on 1st April 1913.

You've reiterated this point several times, but haven't indicated why the plans for 1912-1913 were outdated by Spring 1914 re: deployment problems. The East Prussian railways didn't radically improve in quality or capacity from 1912-1914. Their deficiencies were just as great in 1914 as when Aufmarsch II Ost planned deployment around substantial delays and an inadequate railway network. Primary sources from 1914 itself back up this assertion. If the railway network was inadequate in both 1912 and in 1914, it follows that the deployment plans must work around the same inadequacies in 1914 it had to in 1912.

To sum up, Germany faces 3 fundamental delays in an Eastern deployment:

1. Administrative delays. A new transportation plan must be crafted from scratch to carry out the new deployment over the course of several days.

2. Operational delays. Reorienting men and material, preparing transport, etc. takes time, as it did IOTL when transport didn't get underway until up to 3-5 days after mobilization was declared.

3. Capacity delays. As has been repeatedly noted, the East Prussian railway network was inadequate for the swift deployment of corps on the scale Staabs, much less Moltke, had conceived. These bottlenecks, combined with the rushed nature of the planning, will make an Eastern deployment a messy and drawn out process.

That all being said, this is not to dismiss the fundamental premise that an Eastern deployment could be done without facing disaster in the deployment phase. But there are clear tradeoffs which were known IOTL which made an Eastern deployment an unappealing prospect to Moltke, the main one being that Germany will face a spoiling attack by 1st, 2nd, and 4th Army before it has finished deploying. This will be a messy, violent, and confused struggle which Germany could still turn into a big victory - but it's no glorious march on Warsaw as you and @Helmuth48 conceive.

I'll respond to others as time allows!

 

[Julian]

I also have a handwritten letter from Groener to Kuhl from Groener's personal collection at the Bundesarchiv (N 46/41 pages 177-189 are attached) which refers to an Eastern deployment. He sent it to the Reicharchiv in response to their inquiry on the topic. I'm struggling hard with his handwriting, but if anyone wants to take a crack at it I'm sure Groener's opinion will be very valuable for the discussion!

https://imgur.com/a/wsX9xiv

 

[Lexijag]

No. What the cabinet decided on was what needed to happen for Britain to go to war.

So . . . I'll repeat what I said on a similar thread earlier this year:

a) Asquith's cabinet was a pacifist-dominated Liberal cabinet in 1914. And when I say "pacifist," I do not mean it in a George Lansbury sense. It might be better to say "non-interventionist" for our purposes. It was probably in the neighborhood of about 15 to 5 - with the five interventionists/hawks being Grey, Churchill (at the hard end), Haldane, Asquith, and - marginally - Lloyd George. At the other end, the most opposed to war could be identified in the four Liberal ministers who resigned over the decision for war (Beauchamp, Morley, Burns, and Simon - Asquith did of course later manage to persuade Beauchamp and Simon to rescind their resignations). So it is quite remarkable that Edward Grey was able to maneuver a mostly non-interventionist Cabinet to agree to a decision that would take Britain into war, even with his unusually close relationship with Asquith to lean on.​

​

b) The key decisions were taken on Sunday, August 2, the date of the German ultimatum to Brussels. There were two Cabinet meetings that day: 1) one from 11:00am-2:00pm, and a second from 6:30-8:00pm. In the first, the Cabinet voted that a stance that a German naval bombardment of French Channel ports would be a trigger for war. In the second, it was also decided that a violation of Belgian neutrality would be a trigger, too. These were the conditions that the majority decided would be necessary for them to support war, not a declaration of war itself - but even so, they provided the necessary tripwires when the time came for Kaiser Willie to trip them. Note that the prospect of the HSF cruising the Channel blowing up stuff was the first and easiest "get" for the Cabinet - not Belgian neutrality.​

​

c) Something else noteworthy happened on Sunday, August 2, that mattered a great deal. Bonar Law and Lansdowne delivered a letter to Asquith promising "unhesitating" support for the government in any measures it sought to employ in support of the Dual Alliance. This promise was bolstered by Churchill's reading, before the Cabinet, of a letter from prominent Tory F. E. Smith saying that a canvas of his colleagues permitted him to say that "the government can rely upon the support of the Unionist party, in whatever manner that support can be most effectively given." The italics are mine. It became apparent that the prospect now loomed of a national government, one which could well be mostly Tory: a prospect that chilled Asquith, and most ministers present. This had the effect of nudging wavering ministers into the agreement to a "Belgian" formula in the evening. It acted, it seems, as a kind of unspoken threat by Asquith. This wasn't just for crass self-intrested reasons (though these can't be ruled out), but also because Asquith and his ministers mostly thought the Tories were irresponsible madmen who could not be trusted with running a war.​

​

d) Even so, it took the news of Belgium's refusal of the ultimatum, and German bellicosity, on the following two days to shore up the waverers - to give not just them, but the public, the cover they felt they needed to go to war for what really were other reasons - unwillingness to allow the German fleet in the Channel, and fear of Liberal government being replaced by a de facto Tory dominated government. And since the German fleet did *not* make that appearance, it really did come down to a need for Germany to violate Belgian neutrality to close the deal.​

Asquith's cabinet wasn't burning to knock down Germany, and nor was the British public. (Churchill himself made this point in his history of the second world war, contrasting the mood of the Commons wih that on September 1, 1939.) They needed a reason. And they came up with two. The Germans were going to have to fulfill *one* of them, and fortunately for Grey, they did.



Which would be ironic, since the choice they took resulted in its downfall!

There's a lot of talk about the August 4 DOW being in the long tradition of British pursuit of balance of power on the continent, which I suppose is what you're trying to get to. But "balance of power" wasn't going to get Grey most of a non-interventionist Liberal cabinet to war. He and Asquith needed something more concrete. The cabinet was far more concerned about domestic and Irish issues, and there was already enough resentment about expenditures on dreadnoughts. Going to war would set all that on fire.

And that's going to be even more true of an Aufmarsch Ost scenario, because France's existence as a balancing great power (which is really what fretted Grey) isn't obviously in danger if Germany is standing on defense in the West.



It would really depend on how the scenario plays out. Grey is the likeliest departure in most variations here. Asquith is going to hang on to power as long as he possibly can (as indeed he did in OTL in 1915-16). Churchill and Haldane don't have quite as much face to lose, especially if Asquith can make a naval restriction policy on the HSF stick.



Are there? What's the source on this, beyond Harcourt's diary?

That was very well stated.

 

[Lexijag]

Nope, the Germans have to defeat the Russian armies. There's no way to force a decision in the East before the French reach the Rhine

Under the pod conditions.
1 France attacks head on. Gets pounded by German howitzers as happened in 14. France did not learn bettet or have strong heavy artillery in sufficient quantities till 17.
2 Russia retreats loses Poland, Baltic states up to a and past Riga.
3 ah does not have the losses as it incurred in 14 because of 4 German armies. No itialian front for ah.
4 Romania joins cp 16.
5 western front forces equal in troops in mid 15. With German firepower superior on western front in 14 thru end of war in 17.
6 Russian issues are intensified to full collapse in 17.

 

[Lexijag]

Go check your figures. Seven German armies totalled only 1,500,000 so the three armies your sending East are pretty small.

Of course when you add the French reserves, territorial and active divisions, you get 1700,000.
Add another 800,000 in the fortresses. So yeah even with the British out and the Belgians in, the Germans aren't in good shape

It's less about troop count vs firepower and tactics. The German firepower, defensive advantage, and much higher population will quickly erase any French advantage as will the massive French losses

 

[Karelian]

Thanks for your detailed response, @NoMommsen. Apologies for the delayed response, Pfizer shot #3 kicked my ass and I got caught up reading through the Bundesarchiv's online holdings.

This is the type of content I like most in this forum: actual archical sources used to support polite discussion instead of "See, says here that I am right and you are wrong."

 

[Helmuth48]

Really? You have no forces there to stop the French. You realize they have a lot of firepower you've never accounted for?

As for the field artillery, I admit that the French "Canon de 75 modèle 1897" was revolutionary for its time because of the "Hydraulic recoil mechanism", which significantly increased the rate of fire. Later on, other countries, including Germany, also applied recoil mechanisms to their artillery, such as the "7.7 cm FK 96 n.A."

However, according to this interesting article, the French relied too much on the 'Canon de 75 modèle 1897':

The long barrel recoil technology developed by the French revolutionized artillery and made previous artillery obsolete. However, early in the war, the French over-relied on this gun under the assumption that it was the only artillery they needed. The development of trench warfare demonstrated the need for a wider variety of artillery, which mostly entered service in 1916 and 1917. Much of this artillery was kept in service and used to battle the Nazi's in the Battle of France in 1940.[7]

The answer to the firepower of field artillery was Trench warfare, in which the defender had the advantage. Since the French had no answer to Trench warfare in 1914 due to a lack of heavy howitzers and mortars, I don't see how they could ever push through to the Rhine.

In the hypothetical scenario in which the French still violate Belgian neutrality, the Germans will of course regroup and deploy their reserves to dig trenches in the Ardennes. In that case, the trenches will extend as far as Maastricht.

 

[Helmuth48]

Thanks for your detailed response, @NoMommsen. Apologies for the delayed response, Pfizer shot #3 kicked my ass and I got caught up reading through the Bundesarchiv's online holdings.

Interesting! The discussion at the time was perhaps as intense as it is on this forum.

That all being said, this is not to dismiss the fundamental premise that an Eastern deployment could be done without facing disaster in the deployment phase. But there are clear tradeoffs which were known IOTL which made an Eastern deployment an unappealing prospect to Moltke, the main one being that Germany will face a spoiling attack by 1st, 2nd, and 4th Army before it has finished deploying. This will be a messy, violent, and confused struggle which Germany could still turn into a big victory - but it's no glorious march on Warsaw as you and @Helmuth48 conceive.

Of course, this also depends on the chosen route to Warsaw. Since the Russians are mobilizing east of the Vistula and Narew rivers, the march from Silesia to Warsaw is almost unimpeded, certainly at the beginning of August. In October, the Germans attempted such an advance during the Battle of the Vistula River, but unfortunately that was 'too little too late'. As mentioned before, I worked out such a scenario in the thread WW1 Aufmarsch II Ost in maps.

 

[Fulton 44]

A few things jump out at me here.
1. A lot depends on the TOD. A last minute decision to go East is one thing. On the other hand, an Eastern strategy planned well in advance (in response to constant Balkan crises which suggest how a war would likely originate) implies the creation of more infrastructure to facilitate the deployment of forces in that direction.
2. The Eastern strategy helps Austria by - at a minimum - forcing Russian deployment north. This is turn may keep Romania and Italy out of the war (or maybe lead Romania to join the CP). It also makes Austria a more robust partner.
3. The Eastern strategy may keep the UK out or, at a minimum, make it less committed to the Allied cause.
With a TOD of around 1908 (and the strengthening of rail links and other infrastructure heading East, it is very likely that the Eastern strategy leads to a very different outcome for Germany.

 

[Julian]

Working on responses to others, but in the meantime here are some additional materials from Groener's personal collection (N 46/77 Pages 138-161) on possible cooperation with Austria-Hungary in 1914 (Again, help with his handwriting would be much appreciated!):

https://imgur.com/a/JhUz3Mz

Here's a compilation of Groener-related material from his personal collection which might relate to an Eastern deployment/railways/strategy in 1914, if anyone's interested in some deep-dives:

• Personal Diary
  • N 46/22 https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/invenio/direktlink/f31aba1b-3a39-4f71-a09a-37e54d7b70b9/
    • Covers the 1914 campaign
• Prewar Documents
  • War games 1912-1914
    • N 46/104 https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/invenio/direktlink/b3480e52-0075-428d-b7d7-82c4ddea84d4/
      • War games and tasks from 1911-1914, with discussion and commentary by Groener.
    • N 46/105 https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/invenio/direktlink/aec76bc2-5cd3-432c-a109-7b3c1fdb7165/
      • Railway line commander's war games and test results from 1912.
    • N 46/106 https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/invenio/direktlink/351a8550-1d55-4c42-b103-b6e5f290a2de/
      • 1st railway war game of 1913, looks at deployment of troops and measures in the event of railway destruction - includes comments and results from Groener
    • N 46/107 https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/invenio/direktlink/aaa1ba45-3719-4ea8-bd20-f619863bc51f/
      • Railway war games 1-4 in 1914, deals with transport and deployment plans, the railway network, etc.
  • Conferences 1914
    • N 46/153 https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/invenio/direktlink/e642da85-fc46-446e-b35c-728ecc9fba09/
      • Materials on the April 1914 Railway Department conference in Metz
• Letters
  • N 46/31 https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/invenio/direktlink/d37a2dc7-55df-418a-9be4-db2ec6184145/
    • Wartime letters to his wife Helene
  • N 46/180 https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/invenio/direktlink/8f44819f-2e35-4377-b4ca-8e4299957324/
    • Various wartime letters to Groener
• War Diary/Wartime Correspondence
  • N 46/24 https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/invenio/direktlink/fa37dd80-4292-462d-b8c8-43e570bf818d/
    • Personal war diary and wartime letters, 1913-1918

 

[Athelstane]

1. A lot depends on the TOD. A last minute decision to go East is one thing. On the other hand, an Eastern strategy planned well in advance (in response to constant Balkan crises which suggest how a war would likely originate) implies the creation of more infrastructure to facilitate the deployment of forces in that direction.

Sure.

Wilhelm digging in with Moltke in that famous August 1 scene Tuchman describes is the easist point of departure that people latch on to. But Moltke dying in a horse dismount in, say, 1912 certainly gives time for more logistical planning.