These documents are from the same Air Ministry file as the one in Post 13 and are also dated October 1936.
AHC: Peerless Air Ministry
- Thread starter perfectgeneral
- Start date
I know its not exactly ideal but instead of the Battle, how about replacing it with the Blenheim? At the time of its introduction it was a first class aircraft and is slightly faster than the Battle. It free's up the engines used in the Battle and would keep Bomber Command happy by having more light bombers made.
I don't know if we're allowed to use too much hindsight here, as the best solution is a ground attack Hurricane as has been mentioned in various TL's on this forum, that way you get a plane that can fight and attack and won't go obsolete so quickly unlike the Blenheim and Battle.
I don't know if we're allowed to use too much hindsight here, as the best solution is a ground attack Hurricane as has been mentioned in various TL's on this forum, that way you get a plane that can fight and attack and won't go obsolete so quickly unlike the Blenheim and Battle.
Roc or Skua?
All 3 medium bombers?
Fairey Battle changes
Radial fighter for the Far East
Hurricane with thin wings
I was hoping that an Air Ministry that thinks that the bomber won't get through, will decide that the bomber will have fighter escorts, which will eat turret fighters for breakfast, and so scrap both of them for more Hurricanes and Skuas.
All 3 medium bombers?
I think they were going for maximizing numbers, but with foresight maybe insist on just the Wellington and get license-builds from the other two manufacturers for ease of supply?
Fairey Battle changes
How early could you get a Fulmar instead of a Battle?
Radial fighter for the Far East
There were a number of possibilities not taken up - hopefully the Air Ministry will pick one and get it out to Egypt and Singapore in numbers.
Hurricane with thin wings
And maybe navalize it earlier.
Bad Bloke, no biscuit.
Well the high sped wind tunnel is going to highlight the problem with Hurricane wings (among others).
The Mosquito had a good fighter-bomber wing shape, but you could do even better with something thinner for a single seat fighter.
Chord/Thickness ratios like 13%(root) to 9%(tip) would match the Spitfire. Get the peak thickness back past 40% from the leading edge.
The Mosquito had a good fighter-bomber wing shape, but you could do even better with something thinner for a single seat fighter.
Chord/Thickness ratios like 13%(root) to 9%(tip) would match the Spitfire. Get the peak thickness back past 40% from the leading edge.
*hopeful noises whilst glancing at the Westland Whirlwind* I know the Whirlwinds one of those common aircraft that Teaaboo's often look at whistfully along with the G.34 design, but hey, the RAF with a more sensible boss might see the need for a heavy fighter like the Whirlybird.
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_events_preceding_World_War_II#1935
The Neutrality Act should be an alert that Britain needs to be more strategically self reliant. The USA is going to be less reliable as a source of arms if current tensions become conflict. The RAF should take on more machine tools and train up more machinists to build up a strategic reserve. Likewise aircraft manufacturers should be encouraged to buy in or build new machine tools for modern manufacturing methods applicable to combat aircraft and take on "Air Reserve" apprentices. We can register all vital skilled workers in order to exempt them from any conscription and indoctrinate them in the importance of such a wartime role. Look into extending this registration to those currently unemployed via trade organisations and unions.
Begin talks with management and unions on special wartime work practices to amplify the production of the skilled workforce using temporary semi-skilled labour to increase volume production for the increased wartime requirements. Ask treasury to convert some of our gold reserves into aluminium, wolfram and nickel reserves to the same value.
"It is not the Royal Army and Col. of Regt. positions are purely honorary." - Air Ministry statement
"He is a Nazi sympathiser." - Air Ministry private accusation in camera.
"I'm sorry this is all far outside your purview. I'll take your position on aircraft carriers under advisement due to your control of the aircraft that fly and fight off them. Although you make a better case for returning the FAA to the Royal Navy." - Stanley Baldwin
The Neutrality Act should be an alert that Britain needs to be more strategically self reliant. The USA is going to be less reliable as a source of arms if current tensions become conflict. The RAF should take on more machine tools and train up more machinists to build up a strategic reserve. Likewise aircraft manufacturers should be encouraged to buy in or build new machine tools for modern manufacturing methods applicable to combat aircraft and take on "Air Reserve" apprentices. We can register all vital skilled workers in order to exempt them from any conscription and indoctrinate them in the importance of such a wartime role. Look into extending this registration to those currently unemployed via trade organisations and unions.
Begin talks with management and unions on special wartime work practices to amplify the production of the skilled workforce using temporary semi-skilled labour to increase volume production for the increased wartime requirements. Ask treasury to convert some of our gold reserves into aluminium, wolfram and nickel reserves to the same value.
_____~_____
On 1936 March 7th Germany reoccupied/seized the Rhineland. British armed forces were ordered to stand down. Not by the government, but by the new King. What would Air Ministry policy be on this German breach of the Versailles Treaty and the King's unusual flexure of power?"It is not the Royal Army and Col. of Regt. positions are purely honorary." - Air Ministry statement
"He is a Nazi sympathiser." - Air Ministry private accusation in camera.
_____~_____
Would the cabinet be interested in the Air Minister's views on a second Naval Treaty? More aircraft carriers to twice the tonnage? 36,000t minimum size limit for both battleships and aircraft carriers? What is it to the Royal Air Force if other countries don't sign up yet we are still compelled to limit our new ships? Two stage escalation clause with 15 inch guns and a part-way escalator 42,000 tonnage per ship permitted for only partial naval powers sign up, why? The Americans were pushing for 16 inch and 48,000 tons for breach conditions in the treaty."I'm sorry this is all far outside your purview. I'll take your position on aircraft carriers under advisement due to your control of the aircraft that fly and fight off them. Although you make a better case for returning the FAA to the Royal Navy." - Stanley Baldwin
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Liking this a lot so far; please, please bring in the Whirlybird for the BoB and the Henley for the RAF and FAA.
This is from a Cabinet Paper CAB.024.272 (0003), title Defence Expenditure in Future Years, dated October 1937.
Sir Peter Takes the Helm
Sir Peter Takes the Helm, Part 1 (with additions)
June 1935 upon taking up his post, Sir Philip reviews all the various sub-committees working under the auspices of the AM. The Work of CSSAD (Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence) under the wing of Sir Hugh Dowding and Chairmanship of Henry Tizzard catches his attention. Upon being briefed by them of detail of the work being done on the electronic detection of attacking bombers and the associated fighter direction and control systems, Sir Philip comes to the conclusion that Balfour’s famous prediction of the "Bomber will always get through" is not necessarily a 'given'. With this insight also throwing into doubt the veracity of the entire 'Trenchard Doctrine' that formed the basis of the strategic role of the RAF, Sir Philip proceeds to quietly carry out a 'Root and Branch' review of the entire purpose and roll of the RAF in National defence.
For the rest of 1935 Sir Phillip carried out a review of the capabilities of all branches of the RAF and of how new technologies available in the immediate future would change those capabilities. He gathered around him a small committee of serving officers, scientists, engineers and industrialists who could advise him, even if that advice could be considered partisan. Among those whose opinion and support he sought was that of Winston Churchill, though he was sceptical of Professor Lindemans influence on him. Whilst dining with Churchill at the House of Commons in the autumn of 1935, Sir Phillip asked Churchill what had caused him more concern in 1917, the Botha bombing raids and the possibilities of civilian panic or the unrestricted submarine warfare and the potential starvation of Britain. Having thought for a moment Churchill replied that it was the submarines which really worried him.
Shortly afterwards, Sir Philip had a private meeting, dinner again, with the First Sea Lord Chatfield. He surprised the first Sea Lord by informing him that he would support the return of the FAA directly to the RN and that this should take place as soon as the reorganisation of the RAF into separate commands took place in mid 1936. The sharing of ab nitio pilot training and the retaining/transfer of RAF pilots until the FAA had a sufficient pool of Naval pilots was also agreed. The final date of transfer of command would be set once the extent of the required naval reorganisation and infrastructure had been assessed. Sir Philip explained that this transfer of responsibility was in line with his perceived change in the role of the FAA that the new technology of RDF would bring to the capabilities of naval aircraft both in attack and defence. The ability of shipborne RDF to detect and attack and permit fighters to be directed to intercept it and the ability of the airborne system to ‘Find, Fix and Track’ the enemy fleet by day or night irrespective of weather and visibility was a quantum leap in capability. Sir Phillip at this time handed over to the First Sea Lord a briefing paper prepared by his advisory committee on the future naval application of RFD for the FAA. For there was every indication at that time that all the RN research on the subject was focused solely on RDF’s application to gunnery. Agreement was reached that the two gentlemen would occasionaly dine together to exchange views and progress of developments pertinent to both of their services.
Sir Phillip obtained via Churchill not only a copy of the 1919 submission for the future employment of the RAF but also copies of Trenchard’s earlier memorandum concerning the employment of the then newly fomed RAF and in Particular the independent air element command by Trenchard in France through the final stages of the war in 1918. From these papers he concluded that prior to having to justify the continued survival of an independent RAF in 1919 Trenchard had believed the air forces roll and actions to be defined by the following dictates.
Assumptions fundamental to Trenchards doctrines from the first world war in 1918.
‘Permanent Organization of the RAF Note by the Secretary of State for Air on a Scheme Outlined by the Chief of Staff’.
This document was submitted to Winston Churchill as Air Minister, in lateDecember1919 and Trenchard’s new strategic doctrine was based on two key assumptions regarding the offensive capabilities of the bomber, firstly, that the morale effect of the bomber was twenty times that of the material and secondly that there was no viable defence against attacking aircraft.
The technical development’s currently going on a Orfordness and soon to be subject to a full scale trial at the new Bawdsey Manor research station in 1936 had shown Sir Phillip that at least one of these assumptions was probably no longer ‘Written in Stone’ and that the first was actually dependant upon the veracity of the second.
Sir Phillip had reached some startling conclusions and knew that both Lord Trenchard and Lord Salmon would fight him tooth and nail therefore he needed a way to disarm them and of course he had to keep a cordial working relationship with Sir Edward Elllington the chief of the Air Staff. So Sir Phillip decided to bide his time and keep his powder dry and only act when the ground work had been done. As Sir Phillip saw it the primary strategic role of the RAF post 1935 and the development of RDF was to prevent a potential enemy from delivering the much vaunted “Knock Out Blow” because if any potential enemy had themselves matched the RAF development in RDF and Fighter control then the fear of the RAF Bombers as a deterrent from aggression would no longer a tenable position. So with the proposed re organisation of the RAF into separate commands as of the middle of 1936, Sir Philip proposed that the primary command would be Fighter command with Bomber command coming second. Until Fighter command could by both Day and Night provide a comprehensive defence against Arial attack it would remain the priority for both material and personnel. Sir Phillips heresy was that he considered that the RAF bombers were incapable of flying to targets of strategic importance and hitting them let alone actually destroying them. This conclusion was drawn from examining the results of the various bombing exercises and navigation tests flown. Sir Phillip’s keen legal mind quickly unpicked the bias and outright deceit hidden within the parameters of the exercises to arrive at his own conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the current RAF bomber force and found it distinctly unfit for purpose. He concluded that with the new technologies of RDF the RAF bombers would suffer unsustainable losses during daylight attacks and in a night time campaign would be ineffectual in hitting the enemy.
With RDF in it’s infancy but showing true promise Sir Philllip decided to bide his time until he had a fully worked up program of reform for the AM and the RAF, He therefore spent the flowing six months quietly seeking advice on a wide variety of technical points varying from engine design, airframe design, air Navigation and Bombs just for starters. He needed to be able to Judge not only what aircraft the RAF really needed but what was technically possible both now and within the lifetime of any proposed aircraft. His panel of experts helped him to formulate a list of conditions that would inform his determination of the viability of any proposed aircraft and its fitness for purpose. There were a number of factors that could be historically proven as a given within aircraft design and these he listed in no particular order as.
Aircraft in each class tend to get heavier with each subsequent design.
Each generation of engine gets more powerful.
Speed is important in hostile airspace.
An Aircraft must have a primary task and be designed for that task. Designing for secondary tasks cannot be allowed to undermine the achievement of the primary role.
Navigation is the lifeblood of the bomber if you cannot find your target you cannot hit it.
The bigger the bomb the bigger the damage radius.
Each new generation of aircraft is more expensive than the previous one.
When he looked at those aircraft coming into service when he was appointed he saw that both the Gloster Gauntlet and the Blackburn Overstrand would not have seemed out of place to him and his comrades in the trenches in 1918. However the Highspeed Mono Plane Fighters being built to specifications F36/34 and F37/34 would have been like something from an HG wells novel in 1918.
Sir Phillip read every Operational Requirement issued since 1930 and reviewed the subsequent specifications issued to the aircraft imdustry. By careful analysis of these documents and asking advice from his committee of experts Sir Phillip began to get a feel for the assumptions and bias within the RAF that effected the formulation of the OR’s and industries response. Talks with Sir Hugh Dowding and Tizzard confirmed not only the reluctance of the RAF to listen to Scientists or external experts but also their utter faith in their own assumptions.
Starting in January 1936 Sir Phillip had also started a study of the aero engine requirements and the state of the British industry. Very quickly he had come to the realisation that with the technological leap from wood and fabric built aircraft to the all metal mono plane more powerful engines were required. Whilst aircraft being delivered in 1935 would have engines of around 750hp those due to enter service in 1937/38 would require 1000hp or more. This was clearly illustrated by the specifications for the new fighter aircraft issued in 1934. F5/34 was based on an engine of 750hp pluss ( this attracted no less than five designs) yet issued at the same time were specifications F36/34 and F37/34 issued to Hawkers and Supermarine utilising the new Rolls Royce engine of 100hp pluss. Sir Philip saw quickly that basically the aircraft built to F5/34would could not match the performance of the F36 and F37 designs unless they two adopted engines of 1000hp of more and here Sir Philip came up against one of the paramount problems in the British aero engine industry at that time. Whish was that there was basically a reliance on just two manufactures to provide the most powerful class of engine, Rolls Royce for inline liquid cooled Engines and Bristol’s for Radial Air cooled engines and as of early 1936 there were no radial 1000hp plus engines in production. Having Talked to Sir Hugh Dowding in his role as Air Member for Supply and Development regarding the situation Sir Phillip thought that at least a second manufacture in each lass of engine should be encouraged. Napier seemed the logical choice for the second in line liquid cooled engine as they had a distinguished history in this field. The second radial manufacturer was not so clear cut as there were a number of other companies building radial of varying capacity. Eventually Alvis came forward as they were negotiating with Gnome Rhone to licence their Mistral engine. What was encouraging was that Alvis were proposing not only a new purpose built factory but to re-engineer the engine with newer materials for higher stress and to redesign those parts that had been shown to be problematical. Sir Philip agreed a letter of intent to purchase the new Alvis engine providing it passed its type test by mid 1937 at over 1000hp and was in production by early 1938. The AM would supply a number of test aircraft for the engine.
As to the engine developments by Both Bristol and Rolls Royce as far as Sir Philip was concerned it was a case of wait and see.
As to armament the 8 guns machine guns specified for the F5/34, F36/34 and the F37/34 was at the time of issuing the heaviest armament proposed for any fighter, however already the RAF was looking at arming aircraft with 20mm cannons to ensure that bomber could be fatally damaged in a single pass. This was formalised in early 1936 when the earlier specification F10/35 was rewritten and issued as F37/35 for a four cannon fighter with either single or twin engines. With the issuing of this specification Sir Phillip became interested in the licencing, production and testing of a suitable 20mm cannon as soon as possible.
Part two will cover turret fighters and look at bomber development.
June 1935 upon taking up his post, Sir Philip reviews all the various sub-committees working under the auspices of the AM. The Work of CSSAD (Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence) under the wing of Sir Hugh Dowding and Chairmanship of Henry Tizzard catches his attention. Upon being briefed by them of detail of the work being done on the electronic detection of attacking bombers and the associated fighter direction and control systems, Sir Philip comes to the conclusion that Balfour’s famous prediction of the "Bomber will always get through" is not necessarily a 'given'. With this insight also throwing into doubt the veracity of the entire 'Trenchard Doctrine' that formed the basis of the strategic role of the RAF, Sir Philip proceeds to quietly carry out a 'Root and Branch' review of the entire purpose and roll of the RAF in National defence.
For the rest of 1935 Sir Phillip carried out a review of the capabilities of all branches of the RAF and of how new technologies available in the immediate future would change those capabilities. He gathered around him a small committee of serving officers, scientists, engineers and industrialists who could advise him, even if that advice could be considered partisan. Among those whose opinion and support he sought was that of Winston Churchill, though he was sceptical of Professor Lindemans influence on him. Whilst dining with Churchill at the House of Commons in the autumn of 1935, Sir Phillip asked Churchill what had caused him more concern in 1917, the Botha bombing raids and the possibilities of civilian panic or the unrestricted submarine warfare and the potential starvation of Britain. Having thought for a moment Churchill replied that it was the submarines which really worried him.
Shortly afterwards, Sir Philip had a private meeting, dinner again, with the First Sea Lord Chatfield. He surprised the first Sea Lord by informing him that he would support the return of the FAA directly to the RN and that this should take place as soon as the reorganisation of the RAF into separate commands took place in mid 1936. The sharing of ab nitio pilot training and the retaining/transfer of RAF pilots until the FAA had a sufficient pool of Naval pilots was also agreed. The final date of transfer of command would be set once the extent of the required naval reorganisation and infrastructure had been assessed. Sir Philip explained that this transfer of responsibility was in line with his perceived change in the role of the FAA that the new technology of RDF would bring to the capabilities of naval aircraft both in attack and defence. The ability of shipborne RDF to detect and attack and permit fighters to be directed to intercept it and the ability of the airborne system to ‘Find, Fix and Track’ the enemy fleet by day or night irrespective of weather and visibility was a quantum leap in capability. Sir Phillip at this time handed over to the First Sea Lord a briefing paper prepared by his advisory committee on the future naval application of RFD for the FAA. For there was every indication at that time that all the RN research on the subject was focused solely on RDF’s application to gunnery. Agreement was reached that the two gentlemen would occasionaly dine together to exchange views and progress of developments pertinent to both of their services.
Sir Phillip obtained via Churchill not only a copy of the 1919 submission for the future employment of the RAF but also copies of Trenchard’s earlier memorandum concerning the employment of the then newly fomed RAF and in Particular the independent air element command by Trenchard in France through the final stages of the war in 1918. From these papers he concluded that prior to having to justify the continued survival of an independent RAF in 1919 Trenchard had believed the air forces roll and actions to be defined by the following dictates.
Assumptions fundamental to Trenchards doctrines from the first world war in 1918.
- All air warfare is interdependent, Bombers cannot function in isolation.
- All Air warfare is undertaken in support of the army.
- offensive operations were essential to maintain the morale advantage
‘Permanent Organization of the RAF Note by the Secretary of State for Air on a Scheme Outlined by the Chief of Staff’.
This document was submitted to Winston Churchill as Air Minister, in lateDecember1919 and Trenchard’s new strategic doctrine was based on two key assumptions regarding the offensive capabilities of the bomber, firstly, that the morale effect of the bomber was twenty times that of the material and secondly that there was no viable defence against attacking aircraft.
The technical development’s currently going on a Orfordness and soon to be subject to a full scale trial at the new Bawdsey Manor research station in 1936 had shown Sir Phillip that at least one of these assumptions was probably no longer ‘Written in Stone’ and that the first was actually dependant upon the veracity of the second.
Sir Phillip had reached some startling conclusions and knew that both Lord Trenchard and Lord Salmon would fight him tooth and nail therefore he needed a way to disarm them and of course he had to keep a cordial working relationship with Sir Edward Elllington the chief of the Air Staff. So Sir Phillip decided to bide his time and keep his powder dry and only act when the ground work had been done. As Sir Phillip saw it the primary strategic role of the RAF post 1935 and the development of RDF was to prevent a potential enemy from delivering the much vaunted “Knock Out Blow” because if any potential enemy had themselves matched the RAF development in RDF and Fighter control then the fear of the RAF Bombers as a deterrent from aggression would no longer a tenable position. So with the proposed re organisation of the RAF into separate commands as of the middle of 1936, Sir Philip proposed that the primary command would be Fighter command with Bomber command coming second. Until Fighter command could by both Day and Night provide a comprehensive defence against Arial attack it would remain the priority for both material and personnel. Sir Phillips heresy was that he considered that the RAF bombers were incapable of flying to targets of strategic importance and hitting them let alone actually destroying them. This conclusion was drawn from examining the results of the various bombing exercises and navigation tests flown. Sir Phillip’s keen legal mind quickly unpicked the bias and outright deceit hidden within the parameters of the exercises to arrive at his own conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the current RAF bomber force and found it distinctly unfit for purpose. He concluded that with the new technologies of RDF the RAF bombers would suffer unsustainable losses during daylight attacks and in a night time campaign would be ineffectual in hitting the enemy.
With RDF in it’s infancy but showing true promise Sir Philllip decided to bide his time until he had a fully worked up program of reform for the AM and the RAF, He therefore spent the flowing six months quietly seeking advice on a wide variety of technical points varying from engine design, airframe design, air Navigation and Bombs just for starters. He needed to be able to Judge not only what aircraft the RAF really needed but what was technically possible both now and within the lifetime of any proposed aircraft. His panel of experts helped him to formulate a list of conditions that would inform his determination of the viability of any proposed aircraft and its fitness for purpose. There were a number of factors that could be historically proven as a given within aircraft design and these he listed in no particular order as.
Aircraft in each class tend to get heavier with each subsequent design.
Each generation of engine gets more powerful.
Speed is important in hostile airspace.
An Aircraft must have a primary task and be designed for that task. Designing for secondary tasks cannot be allowed to undermine the achievement of the primary role.
Navigation is the lifeblood of the bomber if you cannot find your target you cannot hit it.
The bigger the bomb the bigger the damage radius.
Each new generation of aircraft is more expensive than the previous one.
When he looked at those aircraft coming into service when he was appointed he saw that both the Gloster Gauntlet and the Blackburn Overstrand would not have seemed out of place to him and his comrades in the trenches in 1918. However the Highspeed Mono Plane Fighters being built to specifications F36/34 and F37/34 would have been like something from an HG wells novel in 1918.
Sir Phillip read every Operational Requirement issued since 1930 and reviewed the subsequent specifications issued to the aircraft imdustry. By careful analysis of these documents and asking advice from his committee of experts Sir Phillip began to get a feel for the assumptions and bias within the RAF that effected the formulation of the OR’s and industries response. Talks with Sir Hugh Dowding and Tizzard confirmed not only the reluctance of the RAF to listen to Scientists or external experts but also their utter faith in their own assumptions.
Starting in January 1936 Sir Phillip had also started a study of the aero engine requirements and the state of the British industry. Very quickly he had come to the realisation that with the technological leap from wood and fabric built aircraft to the all metal mono plane more powerful engines were required. Whilst aircraft being delivered in 1935 would have engines of around 750hp those due to enter service in 1937/38 would require 1000hp or more. This was clearly illustrated by the specifications for the new fighter aircraft issued in 1934. F5/34 was based on an engine of 750hp pluss ( this attracted no less than five designs) yet issued at the same time were specifications F36/34 and F37/34 issued to Hawkers and Supermarine utilising the new Rolls Royce engine of 100hp pluss. Sir Philip saw quickly that basically the aircraft built to F5/34would could not match the performance of the F36 and F37 designs unless they two adopted engines of 1000hp of more and here Sir Philip came up against one of the paramount problems in the British aero engine industry at that time. Whish was that there was basically a reliance on just two manufactures to provide the most powerful class of engine, Rolls Royce for inline liquid cooled Engines and Bristol’s for Radial Air cooled engines and as of early 1936 there were no radial 1000hp plus engines in production. Having Talked to Sir Hugh Dowding in his role as Air Member for Supply and Development regarding the situation Sir Phillip thought that at least a second manufacture in each lass of engine should be encouraged. Napier seemed the logical choice for the second in line liquid cooled engine as they had a distinguished history in this field. The second radial manufacturer was not so clear cut as there were a number of other companies building radial of varying capacity. Eventually Alvis came forward as they were negotiating with Gnome Rhone to licence their Mistral engine. What was encouraging was that Alvis were proposing not only a new purpose built factory but to re-engineer the engine with newer materials for higher stress and to redesign those parts that had been shown to be problematical. Sir Philip agreed a letter of intent to purchase the new Alvis engine providing it passed its type test by mid 1937 at over 1000hp and was in production by early 1938. The AM would supply a number of test aircraft for the engine.
As to the engine developments by Both Bristol and Rolls Royce as far as Sir Philip was concerned it was a case of wait and see.
As to armament the 8 guns machine guns specified for the F5/34, F36/34 and the F37/34 was at the time of issuing the heaviest armament proposed for any fighter, however already the RAF was looking at arming aircraft with 20mm cannons to ensure that bomber could be fatally damaged in a single pass. This was formalised in early 1936 when the earlier specification F10/35 was rewritten and issued as F37/35 for a four cannon fighter with either single or twin engines. With the issuing of this specification Sir Phillip became interested in the licencing, production and testing of a suitable 20mm cannon as soon as possible.
Part two will cover turret fighters and look at bomber development.
Does it make sense to continue with an integrated ADGB including AA guns, rather than splitting off Fighter command?
By 1939 OTL Fighter Command included the AA guns under General Pyle, The Observer Corps as it then was and Barrage balloons as well. The Original
ADGB as developed by General Ashmore provided the root stock from which the Oak of Fighter Command grew.
ADGB as developed by General Ashmore provided the root stock from which the Oak of Fighter Command grew.
Might be better however to name the commands to functions. Stops the Treasury and others getting confused and blocking funds, no "Why does Coastal Command need Very Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft ?", for instance. Getting a split into Tactical and Strategic Commands would help on the bomber front as these could have fighter squadrons assigned as well as bombers. It would head off most of the OTL wrangling over priorities as well as unifying the chain of command and so ensure missions were not scrubbed due to fighters not being released for example.
I humbly beg to differ, this is the 1930's and the whole point of the RAF reorganisation was to allow for expansion whilst remaining a taught command system, when function and numbers require, then as in OTL extra commands will appear such as Transport Command and quite possibly Tactical Air Support Command.
There was one of those IOTL. No. 22 (Army Co-operation) Group, which was part of the Inland Area command until the reorganisation of 1936 when it joined Fighter Command. During the war it evolved into Army Co-operation Command and then the Second Tactical Air Force.
marathag
Banned
The Battle should have been Navalized to a Torpedo Bomber
Fairey Swordfish 138 mph top speed, 46mph landing 607sq.ft and 4000 pound payload 201 gallon tank, optional 82 gallon tank in observers place 1934
B5N Kate had a 235mph top speed 72 mph landing speed, 406sq.ft area and 4016 pounds of payload, 255 gallon tank 1937
Fairey Battle had a 257 mph top speed 60 mph landing speed, 422 sq.ft area and 4145 pounds of payload, 255 gallon tank , plus 54 fuse and 39 wing tank
@sonofpegasus
I love your initial treatment of this challenge. Very orderly and logically connected. I'd love to see more!
Turret fighters might work as night interceptors. Strange Music, but from many angles to find the easiest approach.
@steamboy
@marathag
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/making-the-fairey-battle-viable.402224/
I like the battle as a twin engine torpedo and nose cannons aircraft. This replaces the Torbeau, Beaufighter, Blenheim and Beaufort. Hopefully (intentionally) wing folds outside the engine and undercarriage pods would make them deck lift size on the new aircraft carriers. Same outer wing as the Spitfire whole wing? The inner wing sections would be as the Spitfire root 13% thickness to chord.
Fairly should get an order for a navalised Spitfire too. Although I confess I don't know if they had the production capacity for both. The standard wing would help. Variation for extra fuel in place of undercarriage and armament when used for the twin engine Battle. This puts extra advantage in an early wet leading edge box section.
All Fairey Swordfish should be (retro)fitted with enclosed cockpits. Larger engine option?
I love your initial treatment of this challenge. Very orderly and logically connected. I'd love to see more!
Turret fighters might work as night interceptors. Strange Music, but from many angles to find the easiest approach.
@steamboy
@marathag
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/making-the-fairey-battle-viable.402224/
I like the battle as a twin engine torpedo and nose cannons aircraft. This replaces the Torbeau, Beaufighter, Blenheim and Beaufort. Hopefully (intentionally) wing folds outside the engine and undercarriage pods would make them deck lift size on the new aircraft carriers. Same outer wing as the Spitfire whole wing? The inner wing sections would be as the Spitfire root 13% thickness to chord.
Fairly should get an order for a navalised Spitfire too. Although I confess I don't know if they had the production capacity for both. The standard wing would help. Variation for extra fuel in place of undercarriage and armament when used for the twin engine Battle. This puts extra advantage in an early wet leading edge box section.
All Fairey Swordfish should be (retro)fitted with enclosed cockpits. Larger engine option?
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https://ww2aircraft.net/forum/threads/bristol-radial-engine-development.14674/
Interesting quote at the end about air ministry permission to pursue the sleeve valve engine. Could Feddon be told to stick with poppet valves? A 14 and 18 cylinder version of the Pegasus and Mercury. Maybe a shorter stroke Mercury twin for lower area drag? Four valves per cylinder would be tricky, but not impossible and wouldn't present the same grinding sleeves production problems for Bristol and then Napier.
No Taurus, no Hercules, no Centaurus.
Interesting quote at the end about air ministry permission to pursue the sleeve valve engine. Could Feddon be told to stick with poppet valves? A 14 and 18 cylinder version of the Pegasus and Mercury. Maybe a shorter stroke Mercury twin for lower area drag? Four valves per cylinder would be tricky, but not impossible and wouldn't present the same grinding sleeves production problems for Bristol and then Napier.
No Taurus, no Hercules, no Centaurus.
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marathag
Banned
They were working on the 1571cu.in. _16_ cylinder radial with dual overhead cams, the Hydra
It was good for around 1000hp, but at over 3600 rpm, very high, and had vibration issues. note the jugs were inline. Think of it as series of V-4s around a common crank
It needed to be redesigned, but Bristol went down the sleeve path instead.
So ATL, they get told 'nope' to sleeve valves, and a new *Hydra is made with a stronger bottom end