Errolwi
Monthly Donor
I could see the development of the Wirraway trainer being stopped (if an alternative design + engine is offered), but I assume you meant the Boomerang fighter.
So is OTL's mid-1938 order for RAF Harvards happening?
AHC: Peerless Air Ministry
- Thread starter perfectgeneral
- Start date
So is OTL's mid-1938 order for RAF Harvards happening?
Ah the Vickers Type 293, to which serial L6899 was allocated, but was not pursued. Neither the Putnams, Vickers Aircraft since 1908 or the Air Britain, British Aircraft Specifications File quote an Air Ministry contract number, so L6899 probably wasn't formally ordered.
OTL
2 Stirling prototypes (L7600 and L7605) were ordered against Contract No. 677299/37 and L7600 made its first flight on 14th May 1939. The first production aircraft N3635 flew on 7th May 1940.
2 Supermarine B.12/36 prototypes (L6889 and L6890) were ordered against Contract No. 605350/37. However, the project was cancelled following the destruction of the mock-up and L6889 during an air raid on Woolston on 26th September 1940.
So is your TL for the Vickers B.1/35 to be cancelled in 1936 and 4 Vickers Type 293 prototypes (L6889, L6890, L6899 and L9704) to be ordered? That is the single Type 293 prototype for which serial number L6899 was reserved IOTL, the 2 instead of the Supermarine B.12/39 prototypes ordered IOTL and one instead of the second Warwick prototype (L9704) which was ordered in July 1937 (K8178 the first Warwick prototype was ordered in October 1935).
Not ordering any B.12/36 prototypes from Supermarine should allow the firm to concentrate on improving the Spitfire including producing a Seafire with folding wings much sooner.
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Do not need metal wings for rockets. It was just one of the two fallacies believed to be needed when they were first introduced, the other being long launch rails . Latter on they used zero length rails and ASW Swordfish removed the metal plates they originallywere given to guard the wing against damage.
I am still debating with myself regarding the fate of the B.12/36 prototypes from Supermarine. ITTL as of 01/01/1939 the contract are proceeding as OTL.
Correct. However, building something like infrastructure for RCAF (which it would likely be OTL) in NF means basing marine patrol a/c there will be much less an odd notion for RAF SOs once war starts. Also, experience with conditions by RCAF (& RAF) *VLR crews will be of benefit when hunting U-boats (or, at least, flying convoy cover). Even "scarecrow" patrols by trainers would be of value, if carried out.
(Yes, this is a favorite hobby horse idea of mine. Sue me.
)Part 11 looks like it would not allow dropping before ignition
Not gonna lie, when I first saw this I thought "Why have they put rockets on the engine behind the propeller!?"
Can any one confirm that it was only HVARs that could be fired from rail less mounts. I seem to recall from somewhere that the original low velocity bombardment rocket did require launch rails.
The British RP3 was used on zero point latter in the war as well. You seem to be forgetting, just like they did, its effective airspeed over the fins that matters, not absolute. If the plane is doing 2-300mph then the rocket is already going fast enough for the fins to work at ignition.
PJMIDD, good point, but how do you legitimately advance that knowledge without going ASB of ultrawankum? As I am writing within the remit of the OP I am trying to avoid always having the AM roll double six.
Not so much ASB just a bit better testing, with less stress as its not wartime , they can experiment properly. All it needs is someone after reducing weight, and so seeing how short the rails can be, actually using a plane in the air not as OTL on the ground. It would not take many flights to see the length of rail is not affecting accuracy and then its a Do'h moment as they realize that the planes speed is enough.
On the subject of rockets, there is this
Dowding of Fighter Command: Victor of the Battle of Britain by Vincent Orange.
Dowding had been invited to meet Sir Hugo Cunliffe-Owen, chairman of the British-American Tobacco Company, in 1934. He showed Dowding photographs taken in Germany of rockets designs for use in aircraft against air or ground targets, asking him to keep in mind the danger to his staff in Germany if word got out about these photographs.
Realising at once the immense importance of this information, Dowding sought permission from his Air Ministry colleagues to begin his own development programme. Permission was refused on the grounds that the Army was in charge of such matters. So with grim forebodings’ he handed this project over to his military opposite number. From time to time, Dowding attended firing tests at Portland Bill, the tip of a peninsula off Dorset on the south coats. They all failed, and after two or three years of negligible progress, the programme was cancelled, but Dowding did not learn of this until 1937 when he prevailed upon Henry Tizzard to use his influence to get the programme restarted and conducted with a great deal more enthusiasm. Rockets that could be carried under the wings of fighters did become formidable weapons against armoured vehicles and shipping by 1943, but Dowding believed they could have been available at least two years earlier.
Dowding of Fighter Command: Victor of the Battle of Britain by Vincent Orange.
Dowding had been invited to meet Sir Hugo Cunliffe-Owen, chairman of the British-American Tobacco Company, in 1934. He showed Dowding photographs taken in Germany of rockets designs for use in aircraft against air or ground targets, asking him to keep in mind the danger to his staff in Germany if word got out about these photographs.
Realising at once the immense importance of this information, Dowding sought permission from his Air Ministry colleagues to begin his own development programme. Permission was refused on the grounds that the Army was in charge of such matters. So with grim forebodings’ he handed this project over to his military opposite number. From time to time, Dowding attended firing tests at Portland Bill, the tip of a peninsula off Dorset on the south coats. They all failed, and after two or three years of negligible progress, the programme was cancelled, but Dowding did not learn of this until 1937 when he prevailed upon Henry Tizzard to use his influence to get the programme restarted and conducted with a great deal more enthusiasm. Rockets that could be carried under the wings of fighters did become formidable weapons against armoured vehicles and shipping by 1943, but Dowding believed they could have been available at least two years earlier.
Yes, That is the OTL event that I commented on when I introduced rockets into TTL. I have Sir Phillip and Tizard's scientific team pushing the Airforce from 1937 and Sir Arthur Dowding doing the same with the RN. The Army has been enlisted to help via the UP program. More will come of this!
6.03 The Problems of Expansion
Part 6.03 The problems of expansion.
By early 1939 every expansion scheme set by the government had been superseded before it it’s predecessor had been achieved. By now the AM were working on expansion scheme M, having transitioned since scheme F in November 1935, via schemes H,J,K and L to finally scheme M. Expansion scheme F was due for completion on March 1st 1939 and the targets would not be met. Scheme F not only required a front line strength of 1,736 aircraft but also a 75% reserve of aircraft held at squadron level (including servicing and maintenance). Pluss an additional reserve of 150% held at RAF depots. This reserve was deemed sufficient for four months of war wastage. So for every squadron converted to a new type you actually required three and one quarter squadrons worth of aircraft. Or to put it another way to field a new squadron with a strength of sixteen aircraft you actually had to build fifty two new aircraft. With all three Hawker controlled factories now turning out aircraft rapidly the commissioning of Hurricane squadrons for Fighter Command could go ahead at pace.
Meanwhile expansion of the adoption of the Spitfire was hamstrung by the abject failure of the Morris controlled castle Bromwich factory to build anything. This huge installation had been projected to cost the vast sum of two million pounds but to add insult to injury the cost was now soaring towards the four million pound mark. Sir Phillip and Sir Archibald decided that this was intolerable and there had to be a wholesale change in the management at Castle Bromwich. The simplest way to achieve this would be to get Lord Nuffield to relinquish control. The problem was how to engineer such a result. For once Sir Phillip thought Churchill and Parliamentary privilege might be put to good use on behalf of the AM and of course Sir Archilald Sinclair was in the perfect place to ‘prime the pump’ so to speak.
The need of ‘manpower’ in all the new RDF stations, Filter, control rooms and communications centres was increasing rapidity and obviously going to put a huge stain on the available resources. At the begging of October 1938 it was estimated that some 260 RDF operators would be required. By the end of November Squadron leader J.A. Tester, now Hart's second in command at Bawdsey had revised that requirement to 600 RDF operators and mechanics. To cope with this increase a new RDF school was being opened at a Tangmere RAF base but would not be ready before June 1939. With both CHL and GCI stations being built as quickly as possible this estimate had been revised to more than 1200 by late April 1939 and that was for just the RDF stations.
As an experiment three typists from Bawdsey Manor had done the RDF course and had successfully completed it by late 1938. By the end of WW1 the Women's Royal Air Force had 32,000 personnel on it s strength and by the 1st of April 1920 it had been disbanded. Sir Philip and the CAS decided now was the time to resurrect a women’s branch of the RAF and on April 2nd 1939 (originally planned to be April the 1st, so nineteen years to the day since the disbandment of the original WRAF but moved by a day because some thought ‘All Fools Day’ would be used against the organisation) the Woman’s Auxiliary Air Force came into being under the command of Lady Trenchard’s good friend Jane Trefusis-Forbes. The core of this new service was formed by transferring members of the RAF companies currently part of the ATS (Auxiliary territorial Service).
Scheme F reserves, planned 1,736 frontline aircraft. Completion 1 march 1939. 75% reserve of aircraft held at squadron level (including servicing and maintenance). An additional reserve of 150% held at RAF depots, sufficient for four months of war. RAFVR, 6,646 pilots, 1623 observers, 10,217 Wireless operators/air gunners by September 1939.
Sir Hugh Dowding was, as he always had been adamant that Fighter command had to be fit for purpose. To that end he would rather have a smaller number of first class squadrons armed with the best and latest fighters than a larger force of obsolete and obsolescent aircraft. Reserves formed an inortant part of this discussion. Was it better to convert more squadrons onto the new fighters and have lower reserves or only convert squadrons when there was an adequate aircraft reserve held. Providing the new shadow factories delivered and with due consideration to the political aspects both the CAS and Sir Phillip sort it acceptable to reduce the reserve aircraft stocks to convert and form more squadrons. If war broke out this policy would of necessity be rescinded. It did however increase the pressure on Sir Archibald Sinclair to have a confrontation with Lord Nuffield over the management of Castle Bromwich.
Using parliamentary privilege during a defence debate Churchill’s attacked the waste, delay and the failures of Castle Bromwich. Focusing on the completely and utterly incompetent management of the Nuffield Organisation and by inference on that of Lord Nuffield himself. Portraying Lord Nuffield as a selve promoter, no more than a bag of hot air and hollow promises. Whilst historically this speech would be overshadowed by Churchill’s great wartime speeches, this one is still held today as being a prime example of the debater’s art and one of the greatest character assassinations ever carried out in Parliament. Both Hazards and the Times carried the speech verbatim and it set the financial institutions in London buzzing. The more important result was that lord Nuffield called the Air ministry demanding to talk to the Air Minister for Production. Nuffield demanded that Sir Archibald immediately rebutted all of the speech in the house of commons. Sir Archibald declined to do any such thing, whereupon Lord Nuffield stated, that left him in an intolerable position incapable of managing the Castle Bromwich project. Sir Sinclair (with Sir Phillip listening on the phone extension) instantly acceopted Lord Nuffield’s de-facto relinquishment of control of Castle Bromwich and put down the phone. The AM immanently made the announcement that thee would be a change in the Management of castle Bromwich and called in Vickers and their subsidiary Supermarine to take over. Lord Nuffield found himself out manoeuvred and forced to accept the fait accompli.
By early 1939 every expansion scheme set by the government had been superseded before it it’s predecessor had been achieved. By now the AM were working on expansion scheme M, having transitioned since scheme F in November 1935, via schemes H,J,K and L to finally scheme M. Expansion scheme F was due for completion on March 1st 1939 and the targets would not be met. Scheme F not only required a front line strength of 1,736 aircraft but also a 75% reserve of aircraft held at squadron level (including servicing and maintenance). Pluss an additional reserve of 150% held at RAF depots. This reserve was deemed sufficient for four months of war wastage. So for every squadron converted to a new type you actually required three and one quarter squadrons worth of aircraft. Or to put it another way to field a new squadron with a strength of sixteen aircraft you actually had to build fifty two new aircraft. With all three Hawker controlled factories now turning out aircraft rapidly the commissioning of Hurricane squadrons for Fighter Command could go ahead at pace.
Meanwhile expansion of the adoption of the Spitfire was hamstrung by the abject failure of the Morris controlled castle Bromwich factory to build anything. This huge installation had been projected to cost the vast sum of two million pounds but to add insult to injury the cost was now soaring towards the four million pound mark. Sir Phillip and Sir Archibald decided that this was intolerable and there had to be a wholesale change in the management at Castle Bromwich. The simplest way to achieve this would be to get Lord Nuffield to relinquish control. The problem was how to engineer such a result. For once Sir Phillip thought Churchill and Parliamentary privilege might be put to good use on behalf of the AM and of course Sir Archilald Sinclair was in the perfect place to ‘prime the pump’ so to speak.
The need of ‘manpower’ in all the new RDF stations, Filter, control rooms and communications centres was increasing rapidity and obviously going to put a huge stain on the available resources. At the begging of October 1938 it was estimated that some 260 RDF operators would be required. By the end of November Squadron leader J.A. Tester, now Hart's second in command at Bawdsey had revised that requirement to 600 RDF operators and mechanics. To cope with this increase a new RDF school was being opened at a Tangmere RAF base but would not be ready before June 1939. With both CHL and GCI stations being built as quickly as possible this estimate had been revised to more than 1200 by late April 1939 and that was for just the RDF stations.
As an experiment three typists from Bawdsey Manor had done the RDF course and had successfully completed it by late 1938. By the end of WW1 the Women's Royal Air Force had 32,000 personnel on it s strength and by the 1st of April 1920 it had been disbanded. Sir Philip and the CAS decided now was the time to resurrect a women’s branch of the RAF and on April 2nd 1939 (originally planned to be April the 1st, so nineteen years to the day since the disbandment of the original WRAF but moved by a day because some thought ‘All Fools Day’ would be used against the organisation) the Woman’s Auxiliary Air Force came into being under the command of Lady Trenchard’s good friend Jane Trefusis-Forbes. The core of this new service was formed by transferring members of the RAF companies currently part of the ATS (Auxiliary territorial Service).
Scheme F reserves, planned 1,736 frontline aircraft. Completion 1 march 1939. 75% reserve of aircraft held at squadron level (including servicing and maintenance). An additional reserve of 150% held at RAF depots, sufficient for four months of war. RAFVR, 6,646 pilots, 1623 observers, 10,217 Wireless operators/air gunners by September 1939.
Sir Hugh Dowding was, as he always had been adamant that Fighter command had to be fit for purpose. To that end he would rather have a smaller number of first class squadrons armed with the best and latest fighters than a larger force of obsolete and obsolescent aircraft. Reserves formed an inortant part of this discussion. Was it better to convert more squadrons onto the new fighters and have lower reserves or only convert squadrons when there was an adequate aircraft reserve held. Providing the new shadow factories delivered and with due consideration to the political aspects both the CAS and Sir Phillip sort it acceptable to reduce the reserve aircraft stocks to convert and form more squadrons. If war broke out this policy would of necessity be rescinded. It did however increase the pressure on Sir Archibald Sinclair to have a confrontation with Lord Nuffield over the management of Castle Bromwich.
Using parliamentary privilege during a defence debate Churchill’s attacked the waste, delay and the failures of Castle Bromwich. Focusing on the completely and utterly incompetent management of the Nuffield Organisation and by inference on that of Lord Nuffield himself. Portraying Lord Nuffield as a selve promoter, no more than a bag of hot air and hollow promises. Whilst historically this speech would be overshadowed by Churchill’s great wartime speeches, this one is still held today as being a prime example of the debater’s art and one of the greatest character assassinations ever carried out in Parliament. Both Hazards and the Times carried the speech verbatim and it set the financial institutions in London buzzing. The more important result was that lord Nuffield called the Air ministry demanding to talk to the Air Minister for Production. Nuffield demanded that Sir Archibald immediately rebutted all of the speech in the house of commons. Sir Archibald declined to do any such thing, whereupon Lord Nuffield stated, that left him in an intolerable position incapable of managing the Castle Bromwich project. Sir Sinclair (with Sir Phillip listening on the phone extension) instantly acceopted Lord Nuffield’s de-facto relinquishment of control of Castle Bromwich and put down the phone. The AM immanently made the announcement that thee would be a change in the Management of castle Bromwich and called in Vickers and their subsidiary Supermarine to take over. Lord Nuffield found himself out manoeuvred and forced to accept the fait accompli.