Hitler's Nazi Germany Focuses on North Africa and the Middle East Instead of Stalin's USSR

[Mike D]

In my opinion the Germans could've then denied a casus belli to the Americans and forced the Brits to face them alone in Africa, which would've been a losing fight for the British.

Given that Germany and Italy proved totally unable to prevent the UK's use of Malta as a naval and air base to attack Axis convoys supplying their forces in North Africa and the problems they already had moving supplies from their usable ports in Africa, can Germany (and Italy) get this great victory before their men surrender or starve?

 

[thaddeus]

... logistically an invasion of the Middle East via Turkey would be a pittance compared to what was expended supporting an invasion against the USSR. The real imponderables are how well or how poorly might the Turks be able to resist and whether a British loss of the Mideast would be enough to bring them to the peace table from a political standpoint.

... Then there's the whole question of whether anyone in Germany was thinking of hitting the Mideast via Turkey: most supporters of the Med option seemed to lean on the "Western Mediterranean" option via Libya, but the logistics there are vastly more difficult and the historical productivity of such an invasion route has never been good.

I don't pretend the Eastern Med option offers any sort of guarantee of German victory over Britain. It just offers better odds then the futility of trying to invade Egypt through the western wastes of Libya, which is not the route most (all, in fact, best I can tell) successful historical invasions of Egypt have come from.

while Nazi regime likely could not strike a deal with USSR they could have struck one with Vichy France over Syria-Lebanon? they gained access historically to resupply ill-fated Iraqi coup, as almost an inconsequential dealing? (and fumbled both Iraq and Syria away)

my (wildly speculative) scenario would be Germany replaces Italy in the Dodecanese, as Italy was considered (by Turkey) as their number two enemy (after USSR), those islands had been slated to return to Greek control so give the Italians a fig leave of returning them to Hellenic State (Axis puppet)

the already fortified Dodecanese track the coast of Turkey like a noose, and Germans would be backing Bulgaria and Syria, in other words they are surrounded.

why, to what end would they want to be in Syria? base to agitate for renewed Palestinian uprisings, they would have the purpose built French airfields for attacking Baku (NOT saying attack Baku, saying they would have the base, and Soviets of course would know this), would sit on top of Iraqi pipelines to the Med, and "hello" Syria is in the ME and could reasonably be expected to have oil reserves (which they do, and were available with 1940's tech)

 

[b0ned0me]

Eh, logistically an invasion of the Middle East via Turkey would be a pittance compared to what was expended supporting an invasion against the USSR. British staff estimates were that Turkish infrastructure along the Med coastal routes was good enough to comfortably support four panzer and six infantry divisions into the Mideast, which would be overkill against the handful of brigades the British had in the region in mid-'41, and the British Imperial Staff has a good track record when it comes to logistical estimates. The real imponderables are how well or how poorly might the Turks be able to resist and whether a British loss of the Mideast would be enough to bring them to the peace table from a political standpoint.

My personal view is that it’s logistically improbable for the Germans to get across Turkey, however it could conceivably happen since the Germans were gifted a number of extremely improbable achievements OTL by allied ineptitude/misfortune. However even if they do manage it, it just becomes Another Great British Embarrassment and has little overall impact since:

1. I find it hard to imagine the Germans would be able to top this victory off with either an advance into India or the ability to project naval power into the Indian Ocean - in which case UK/India communications round the cape continue as OTL
2. I find it equally hard to imagine they would be able to follow a Mideast victory up with a Barbarossa-analogue, in which case being able to disrupt the Iran lend-lease route becomes moot
3. The logistics of getting any meaningful amounts of oil back to Germany seem very challenging

So the Germans would end up gaining a lot of worthless territory and the Brits would look even more inept. Neither seem like game changers.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

My personal view is that it’s logistically improbable for the Germans to get across Turkey, however it could conceivably happen since the Germans were gifted a number of extremely improbable achievements OTL by allied ineptitude/misfortune. However even if they do manage it, it just becomes Another Great British Embarrassment and has little overall impact since:

1. I find it hard to imagine the Germans would be able to top this victory off with either an advance into India or the ability to project naval power into the Indian Ocean - in which case UK/India communications round the cape continue as OTL
2. I find it equally hard to imagine they would be able to follow a Mideast victory up with a Barbarossa-analogue, in which case being able to disrupt the Iran lend-lease route becomes moot
3. The logistics of getting any meaningful amounts of oil back to Germany seem very challenging

So the Germans would end up gaining a lot of worthless territory and the Brits would look even more inept. Neither seem like game changers.

I largely agree with these, with only some modest qualification. A German conquest of the Middle East would certainly not leave it in a position to advance into India (the infrastructure for a advance across Iran is VASTLY poorer then the one across Turkey), project power into the Indian Ocean, or let it immediately access the Middle Eastern oil supplies. The need to send 4 panzer divisions down to the Mideast (keeping in mind the Germans had 21 total such divisions in mid-1941, 2 of which were already committed to Libya and 2 of which were in the strategic reserve to guard against British action in the west) certainly means either a much weaker immediate Barbarossa or a postponement of Barbarossa into at least 1942, if not later... which benefits the Soviets either way.

However, the entire strategy is based on the assumption that the loss of the Mideast wouldn't just be Another Great British Embarrassment but rather A Great British Embarrassment Large Enough for Them to Sue For Peace. Only then would it truly prove to be any sort of serious gamechanger. If, however, it only proves to be as large an embarrassment as the loss of Singapore or Tobruk… well, then the Germans are gonna need a new plan. Even if defeat in the Med jeopardizes Churchill's Prime Ministership and leads to a cease fire of sorts, it won't change the basic hostility of the British to Hitler's Reich. From a physical perspective, there were no critical resources for the Empire within any conceivable German reach that the Americans could not make good. The bulk of Britain's war making potential was in Britain itself, and to a lesser extent in Canada, and so long as America was willing to provide the resources, the British could fight on with this alone.

 

[CalBear]

Do the math Random Guy.
From the lodgement that the Axis held in Libya in 1941 it is roughly 3000 Km to Baghdad.
Yeah right. Let's go boot-stomping our way across 1900 miles of uninhabited desert with no logistical train.
J effing C? Are you really that naive as to how an army works in the time period?
Even cutting the Suez Canal (a mere 1400 Km from the Axis' establishment in Benghazi) proved far beyond the logistical reality.

The idea you propose for boot-stomping Turkey is even more ludicrous.
Why, you ask?
Well the Third Reich had a rather "comfortable" set of trade agreements in place with the Turkish State in 1941.
Tungsten, Chromium, Molybdenum, and Vanadium were pretty "goldurned" important for war production in the good ol' Vaterland...and Turkey (at the time: i.e. before the Germans boot-stomped Greece and Yugoslavia) was a primary source for these imports. You can't make machine tools (and a lot of other things) without these alloying metals.

But I'm sure you knew that?
Even after they boot-stomp the Greeks and Yugo's in the Spring of '41, they're still 2200 Km from Baghdad (if they decide to go through Turkey), again over hostile terrain with minimal infrastructure in place to support a modern, mobile army.
To say nothing about the Soviet reaction to such an endeavor...but I digress.

All of this is a non-starter.
Hitler made the proper choice (of those available to him in the Spring of 1941) but it was a matter of him choosing (and of him hoping for) the best possible outcome which would keep his Nation's financial boat above water.

The Soviet people had other thoughts in that regard.

My honest advice is that you go read some of the (multiple) references I gave in my prior post.
This is not a videogame where you have a reset button and unlimited logistical support.
These are real men (hundreds of thousands of them) who need to eat, poop, and have ammunition to kill the enemy.
They also need fuel, spare parts, and a myriad of other "things" which all seem insignificant...until you have to go a month or two without them.
Like new socks, a letter from home, a pair of boots...because the soles are worn through on the pair you have and you refuse to wear a dead man's boots.

Things like this.

Consider it.

Play the ball.

 

[TonyA]

Surely the Soviets will encounter some teething difficulties, but short of sending the whole Wehrmacht to conquer India by sea, you couldn't give the Soviets a more favorable situation to attack.

Wow! Talk about "Sealion" being difficult...

 

[lucaswillen05]

Conquering the Middle East oil fields aided and abetted by the pro Nazi Arabs perhaps achievable but would likely strain Wehrmacht logistics to a breaking point. Maybe the arrival of US and Commonwealth reinforcements might be in time to halt the German advance. If however the Germans do conquer the Middle East theu might win WW2.

If Stalin does not stab Hitler in the back. If however Stalin waits until 1942 and stabs Hitler in the back....

 

[b0ned0me]

A Great British Embarrassment Large Enough for Them to Sue For Peace. Only then would it truly prove to be any sort of serious gamechanger. If, however, it only proves to be as large an embarrassment as the loss of Singapore or Tobruk… well, then the Germans are gonna need a new plan.

This is the crux of the it, but given Hitlers penchant both for using treaties and commitments as toilet paper and going on massive invasion sprees, how big a hit would the British need to take before any serious “peace” sentiments emerge? Even when Churchill bumbled his way into a no-confidence vote, continuing the war was never under discussion only whether the current leadership was up to the job. Given the potential difficulties with the Dominions and USA that could be caused by stopping and then inevitably restarting the war, my perception is that they would just keep grinding on unless something absolutely critical is under severe threat - but in that scenario it seems like the Nazis would be unlikely to offer anything other than a crushing peace. So one is back to trying to square the circle, there doesn’t seem much basis for peace other than one side or the other occupying the enemy capital.

 

[iron]

Play the ball.

I still don't understand this reply.
If you're indicating that I should be addressing inconsistencies or issues that I found in the logic of the OP?
Well...that's pretty much what I did initially.
If you are suggesting that I am "attacking" the OP on a personal level (as opposed to attacking his ATL/proposal) then that is another subject altogether.
I sent a private message your way three days ago (in the interests of keeping the thread "clean").
Now I just really would like clarity about how you would like me to "play the ball"?
I was preparing a follow-up post to this thread, but I am somewhat confused by your comment.
That's all. Ron

 

[CalBear]

I still don't understand this reply.
If you're indicating that I should be addressing inconsistencies or issues that I found in the logic of the OP?
Well...that's pretty much what I did initially.
If you are suggesting that I am "attacking" the OP on a personal level (as opposed to attacking his ATL/proposal) then that is another subject altogether.
I sent a private message your way three days ago (in the interests of keeping the thread "clean").
Now I just really would like clarity about how you would like me to "play the ball"?
I was preparing a follow-up post to this thread, but I am somewhat confused by your comment.
That's all. Ron

Sure.

You went OUT of your way to belittle a fellow member AT LEAST five times in the quoted post.

No worries, though. From this point forward we'll just skip the gentle remainders.

Da' Bear

 

[Ivyteainn]

you are forgetting an important factor: the mediterranean. The axis wasn't in control of it.

If the Germans controlled the Suez Canal and Gibraltar, the British couldn't have maintained a naval position in the Mediterranean.

 

[Ivyteainn]

You can walk into Russia. All those targets require ships they don't have the coal or steel to build nor oil to run.

Pushing more Axis troops into those theatres just makes the lack of shipping for supply worse.

I seem to recall some factoid that one of the major US contributions to the war was railroad tracks. Where the Allies could build tracks the Axis lacked the steel to do things like lines from Tripoli to Cairo.

The logistics of transporting oil from Baku is just as difficult as importing oil from Iraq or Kuwait. The railroad lines necessary for such transport didn't exist. There is also the Soviet partisans that would have continued to attack the oil transport. In the long run, oil from a friendly Arab world would have been a better choice.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The logistics of transporting oil from Baku is just as difficult as importing oil from Iraq or Kuwait. The railroad lines necessary for such transport didn't exist. There is also the Soviet partisans that would have continued to attack the oil transport. In the long run, oil from a friendly Arab world would have been a better choice.

There is the option to ship it out via the Black Sea to Romania for refining, probably easier to build a pipeline/restore the Soviet one than build up the rail infrastructure.

 

[McPherson]

Yeah. If nothing else, you have to think that the British would be staying very close to the Bosporus as soon as the Germans got near. What's to stop them from sending naval reinforcements to the straits as soon as soon as Germans attack? And how do the Germans breach that blockade once they're there?

Airpower. The Germans, contrary to popular opinion, at least in the TACAIR sense, were very good at it. It is why the British lost in Greece and why they would lose in the Bosporus.

 

[McPherson]

Given that Germany and Italy proved totally unable to prevent the UK's use of Malta as a naval and air base to attack Axis convoys supplying their forces in North Africa and the problems they already had moving supplies from their usable ports in Africa, can Germany (and Italy) get this great victory before their men surrender or starve?

They didn't try hard enough. It is feasible and doable to knock Malta out. But you have to give up something first. What do you give up? Airpower is time dependent and finite. Means it will not be there for you to support Rommel because you spent pilots and machines. So what do you give up?

 

[McPherson]

A Great British Embarrassment Large Enough for Them to Sue For Peace.

I actually agree that the fall of Egypt, much less Malta changes very little with regards to London's policy. This war is a matter of British life or death at that time and place as they see it.

 

[Tonrich]

You can walk into Russia. All those targets require ships they don't have the coal or steel to build nor oil to run.

Pushing more Axis troops into those theatres just makes the lack of shipping for supply worse.

I seem to recall some factoid that one of the major US contributions to the war was railroad tracks. Where the Allies could build tracks the Axis lacked the steel to do things like lines from Tripoli to Cairo.

As well as steel pipe for pipeline runs. The US did a lot of that for gas to as close to the front line as possible...

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Even with a prompt conquest of Libyan oil fields, it would still tak two or three years to develop significant oil production.

As already pointed out by others, Libya didn't produce any oil until well after the end of World War II IOTL.

Production started in 1961 when 861,000 long tons were produced. However, by 1969 it had increased to 148,000,000 long tons.

World production of crude petroleum (including shale oil) was 285,380,000 long tons in 1939, including 173,282,464 long tons by the USA.

 

[sarahz]

Instead of doing Operation Barbarossa, what if Hitler instead decides to focus on invading North Africa and working with Italy. In this scenario, Hitler would try to seize Egypt and the Middle East to cut off the British in the Mediterranean and seize vital oil supplies. Without invading the USSR, can Hitler pull this off with Mussolini?

Would Spain be willing to let Axis troops through to Morocco? Would Turkey have to be invaded (or allow Axis troops through)? How successful will it be? And does this guarantee long-term victory or does this only delay the inevitable? How will the USSR react? How would the people in the Middle East and North Africa react to this? Does this save Italy's East African colonies from British annexation?

EDIT: Italy NOT Greece, it was an error

hmm good luck finding enough shipping to seriously move resources to north Africa or invading Turkey, rather reminds me of Napoleon invading Span only the Turkish government and armed forces are rather more competent than the spanish. The only way this works is if the USSR also attack Turkey and/or Iran

 

[Garrison]

Concentrating non the Middle East rather than the USSR might make sense if oil were the sole limiting factor on the Nazi war effort. The problem is that in 1941-42 the real issues for the war economy were the supplies of food and labour. Only the conquest of the Ukraine could solve the food crisis and provide a source of labour to keep the war machine going.