Except Montgomery was training officers at the staff college at Quetta for more than two years. I would figure that at a staff college in India he's going to be having a lot of contact with Indian Army officers (either up and coming ones, or ones who are fellow instructors), unless there were multiple staff colleges in India at the time, and all the Indian Army officers were sent somewhere else?
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
marathag
Banned
But was the cause of of the few times Ike lost his cool and got to the point of yelling at a subordinate(Monty), for him to take Antwerp *and the Scheldt*, so the port could be used.
Nope
That was later (if at all) - Antwerp was captured well ahead of schedule
And its highly unlikely that the Scheldt could have been taken much faster than it was as while Antwerp was taken on the fly, mostly intact in a very opportunistic fashion on the 4th Sept by 4th Armoured Division, the forces required for the clearing of the Scheldt (horrible terrain for an attacking force) were still fighting all the way back to Normandy
15th Army group comprised
And the Amphibious assault troops (commandoes etc) were still recovering from 2 months of heavy fighting on the Eastern end of the Normandy battle and needed time to rest and recuperate and take on replacements
They then needed time to train for the Walcheren mission
Maybe the whole show might have been advanced by a few weeks had op Market garden not taken place but that has issues of its own - as the salient created by 2nd British and the allied airborne army effectively isolated the Scheldt - so I doubt it and this is only possible if Monty was not already focused on clearing other ports and op MG
He was also fully aware of the infrastructure that would need to be repaired before the port could be used and through Ultra he knew that the German 15th Army was fully committed to fanatically holding the Scheldt (the Germans were fully aware that Europe's 2nd largest port being made operational would be bad for them) so it would take time to clear and get the port operational.
And of all the top leadership only Admiral Ramsey was pushing for the Scheldt to be cleared earlier everyone from Ike down was behind the Op MG operation
marathag
Banned
But without the estuary in Allied Control, it could have been on the Moon for all the good it did.
Like I said, it was one of the few times the Ike got angry.
That took a lot.
He didn't do too well commanding VIII Corps after D day and was relieved in November and sent to India.
I think on the "slow and cautious" thing Monty gets given a lot of responsibility for a policy that would have applied under any British Army commander, specifically of all the major combatants Britain was the most casualty averse for a combination of reasons, mostly good. From top to bottom the British Army was unwilling to pay a price in blood to achieve something today that could be won more cheaply tomorrow with firepower. So when opposition was weak or non existent the British Army was as rapid on the advance as anyone else, in fact considering it's level of motorisation, it was considerably more rapid than almost everyone else but when there was moderate resistance there was a consistent tendency to stop and use firepower to clear the way where even the Americans would have pushed on through and accepted the price in avoidable casualties.
The best part of a million dead when the senior officers were junior officers will do that. Britain just didn't have the manpower it should otherwise have had.
At least they haven't suffered the losses in North Africa and Greece it had OTL by this point and Asia is going infinitely better than OTL.
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Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
The problem for General R O’Conner IOTL, was his capture by the Germans along with R Neame in 1941, and his subsequent imprisonment by the Italians. While his conditions of imprisonment were not harsh, they did take him out of the picture for two years. During which time officers that had been junior to him, received promotions, and he was isolated from the main stream of military thought. Nor did he get the opportunity to take a much deserved rest, and the chance to gather his thoughts. By the time he returned to action, not only had the pace and scale of warfare significantly increased, but the equipment had also been through significant change. He was to some extent a man out of place, and wasn’t given the time he needed to catch up with the changes. However ITTL, he hasn’t been captured by the Germans, and has successfully lead his formations to an outstanding victory. What should happen, is he should be relived of his command, let someone else tie up the lose ends of the North Africa campaign, all the principal glory is over. And he should return to the UK, where he can take some leave, pass on much of his hard won knowledge about armoured warfare, and be involved in the discussions about future armoured fighting vehicles. In the short term this will allow him to sort out his ideas, and begin to plan his next move. I do not know what his possible relationship with the Americans might be, but I doubt that it could be any worse than that Montgomery had.
RR.
RR.
I don't think it's just First World War losses, lots of others suffered hideous losses. I think it's partly that Britain has a choice, firepower was available in a way that it wasn't for the Italians or Germans. In a way the outlier are the Americans who were much more casualty tolerant than the British despite having other options.
It was there in pre war doctrine and training and while manpower shortage post 1943 exacerbated it from the outbreak of war Britain was determined to minimise casualties. Thus Britain pouring a higher percentage of it's GDP than any other power into the RAF and having proportionally the largest Artillery arm of everyone.
Britain was the only democracy that fought through all of WWI and WWII so felt the loss of those who the dead of WWI would have fathered badly.
France was so traumatised by WWI they sank most of the defence budget on fortifications and chucked in the towel in 6 weeks after the Germans attacked.
Italy, Germany and the SU didn't care about casualties as losing would cost the dictators their lives.
The majority of US troops in WWI only saw a few weeks of actual combat.
Japan was odd.
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Pre-war fears of a military-backed right-wing coup & dread of the heavy casualties sustained fighting to drive the invaders from northeastern France, and the lessons the French learnt from battles like Verdun led to their military planning and heavy investment in defensive infrastructure along their border with Germany. The idea was to man the Maginot Line with older reservists who were not as mobile as their younger counterparts, freeing up said younger troops for mobile operations. Sadly, fortress troops were also typically under trained & equipped at the small unit level, the Maginot Line fortresses had their design flaws (poor ventilation, condensation and mould) and ammunition shortages were common. Despite all this, the Maginot Line worked exactly as it said on the box: the Germans moved north to flank it, just as French doctrine said they would.
Unfortunately for the French, that is where German co-operation with French war plans came to an end. No plan survives contact with the enemy and all that. This is where poor communications & logistics, inadequate manoeuvre training during the Phoney War stage, the stunning displays of ego & stubborn pride among senior French officers (see also British & Belgian command), rampant defeatism among the populace including government & the military, and what was almost certainly outright treason on the part of officers like Petain, Huntzinger and the command of the Armee de l'Air led to the rapid collapse of the French in 1940. Seriously, who thought transferring the bulk of your frigging air force to Algeria & Tunisia DURING the invasion of your frigging homeland was a good idea?
Unfortunately for the French, that is where German co-operation with French war plans came to an end. No plan survives contact with the enemy and all that. This is where poor communications & logistics, inadequate manoeuvre training during the Phoney War stage, the stunning displays of ego & stubborn pride among senior French officers (see also British & Belgian command), rampant defeatism among the populace including government & the military, and what was almost certainly outright treason on the part of officers like Petain, Huntzinger and the command of the Armee de l'Air led to the rapid collapse of the French in 1940. Seriously, who thought transferring the bulk of your frigging air force to Algeria & Tunisia DURING the invasion of your frigging homeland was a good idea?
I find the "they were dictators" answer unsatisfying. While Fascist Italy was definitely not a democracy it wasn't a totalitarian state in the inter war period like the USSR and the Army retained a lot of institutional continuity. Admittedly the Italian military was so ill equipped comparatively it's not a great example but you can say the same about the German Army which certainly at a doctrinal level was far more Seeckt's army then Hitler's until quite late in the war but right from September 1939 they were willing to waste lives.
The only country for who that answer really does apply is the USSR where the Red Army was a clean sheet organisation built in a society where the individual did not matter.
I think it 'helped' on that front that both the Nazis and Soviets didn't shy away from genocide. If you're willing to kill one group of people to achieve your aims, you wont agonise much over putting another group in jeopardy.
I remember reading that membership of the communist party bloomed in the army - because if you were a member at least your family would learn of your death........
But there is a difference between the attitude of the national leadership and what is actually taught at Staff College in Camberley or the Prussian Kriegsakademie. Churchill was constantly complaining about the British Army being too squeamish and that seems to have minimal impact.
8 January 1942. Redlynch, England.
allanpcameron
Donor
8 January 1942. Redlynch, England.
Redlynch House had become the home of the Headquarters of the Guards Armoured Division, though some HQ elements were at Wincanton. The whole Division was being assembled around Salisbury Plain. The 5th Guards Armoured Brigade (GAB) were grouped around Warminster and Shaftsbury, 6th GAB was at Codford, the Support Group was at Castle Cary, Frome and Midsomer Norton. The Divisional Reconnaissance Regiment, 2nd Household Cavalry Regiment were based at Bulford.
Since the formation of the Division the previous summer a large number of Guards Officers had passed through training courses at Bovington and Lulworth, where the Royal Armoured Corps had instructed them on the practical mechanical, gunnery and wireless knowledge that they’d need.
The decision had been made that every Guardsman of the rank of full corporal and above was to be trained in gunnery, driving, maintenance and wireless. The guardsmen below the rank of Corporal would be trained in just one of those skills. The flow of NCOs returning from the courses had been increasing as the weather had been worsening. The threat of imminent invasion was ever more remote, but the training regime for all in the Division was unrelenting.
The delivery of tanks had hampered this process. There were a great many calls on new tanks, not least to the Russians and the 8th Armoured Division, which was about to sail from Capetown on its journey to foreign parts. Major-General Oliver Leese had got his way and the tanks that had started appearing were Vickers Valiant II* cruiser tanks. The tank had a petrol engine and were equipped with the 6-pdr main tank gun. There were weekly deliveries fresh from the factories, and as each Battalion received more tanks, more exercises were being programmed.
Leese, with his Brigade Commanders (Allan Adair [6th GAB], William For-Pitt [5th GAB] and Lionel Manners-Smith [Support Group]), along with other senior staff officers had gathered to consider the lessons learned from the Armoured Divisions in North Africa. General O’Connor (GOC 8th Army) had overseen the writing up of lessons learned, both positive and negative about the handling of tank formations. This was a very complete document that had contributions from all the main actors, from O’Connor himself, to the Corps, Division, Brigade, Regiment commanding officers. In addition, there were reports from quartermasters, engineers, the Light Aid Detachments, all those elements which made a Division tick. O’Connor had also made sure that the learning was from the ground up. There were detailed reports from members of tank crews, Troop and Squadron Leaders, all of which tried to communicate what they had experienced, what had worked and what had failed.
It was expected that General O’Connor himself would be coming back to Britain for some leave and to present his report to the senior commanders of the Army. Leese was looking forward to hearing it all ‘from the horse’s mouth’, but reading the lengthy written report had taken up quite a bit of the Christmas and New Year leave.
Leese had always had in mind that the creation of the Guards Armoured Division was not just to be like the rest of the Royal Armoured Corps Divisions. As a Guards Division it would have the look and feel of the elite soldiers the Guards embodied. He had spent some considerable time working at the insignia of the Division. During the Great War, the Guards Division had used an ‘Eye’ as its insignia, and Leese had asked the officers and men of the Division to make suggestions of how have something that kept the glorious traditions of their forebears. Eventually the artist Rex Whistler, a Lieutenant in the Welsh Guards, had been commissioned to paint a variety of the ‘Eye’ on various vehicles. These had been presented to Leese and a chosen group of officers to choose which best kept the tradition of the past, but showed also the fighting characteristics of a modern armoured formation. Once chosen, it wasn’t long before every vehicle in the Division was painted with the ‘Eye’.
There were quite a few things that the staff of the Armoured Division disagreed upon, sometimes quite strenuously. Manners-Smith, whose Support Group was an odd assortment of one Infantry Battalion (1st Bn Welsh Guards), and one regiment each of artillery, anti-tank and light AA, felt that a more balanced force, one Armoured Brigade and one Motorised Infantry Brigade, with the artillery and engineers under Divisional control made more sense. That was the way the short lived 22nd Armoured Division had operated, and it certainly seemed a better model than the current one. Manners-Smith, as an artillery man, was particularly worried about how light the artillery support was for an Armoured Division.
The two Armoured Brigade commanders also were unsure of having one motorised battalion attached to their Brigades. Having four Battalions (three armoured and one infantry) in a Brigade wasn’t the normal British Army way of doing things. There were some lessons that Lt General Pope had noted from his experience in XXX Corps. Having an Armoured and Infantry Brigade working together, almost as three ‘battlegroups’ seemed to be fairly balanced. The other armoured Brigade tended to be used more in the Tank Brigade model of supporting an Infantry Division. Whether that was because the Valiant tanks that 2nd Armoured Division was equipped with lent themselves to that model, or it made more tactical sense was the cause of some debate.
Leese tended towards Manners-Smith position and wondered about asking the War Office to allow either 32nd or 33rd Brigade (Guards) to work with his Division to experiment on the model of 22nd Armoured Division. Fox-Pitt wondered if that model was to work, whether it would be better for 5th and 6th GAB to break into two Divisions, otherwise, one of the two Brigades might have to become a Tank Brigade. Adair thought that having two Guards Armoured Divisions would be problematic to get enough artillery and engineering units, as well as all the other necessary units to support a Division.
The next item that was discussed at length was the report’s estimation of both the Italian and German armoured Divisions, written by a senior Intelligence Corps officer. The Italian Divisions were dismissed primarily because of their poor quality tanks. The information on the Afrika Korps was fascinating. With the capture of some many of its men and equipment a much stronger picture was emerging of the way in which the Germans had adapted to the experience in France and Flanders.
The Panzer Division in North Africa had consisted of only two battalions of tanks and three Battalions of an Infantry Regiment. Each battalion of tanks had one ‘heavy’ and two ‘light’ Companies. The Panzer IV was much the same as that captured before Dunkirk. The Panzer III’s improved 50mm main gun, like the 75mm gun in the Panzer IV was short barrelled. If they produced a long barrelled version, it was likely to be as good as the new 6-pdr. The Germans had also improved their tanks’ armour, by adding extra armour plates. The expectation was that new build tanks would have thicker armour as standard.
In addition to the panzers there was another battalion which was known as the Panzerjāger (tank hunter) which consisted of what might be thought of as mobile armoured anti-tank guns. Based on Panzer I hulls, with the Czech 47mm anti-tank gun, the assessment wasn’t very complimentary, but noted that the crews were better protected (and mobile) that the British 2-pdr crews, including those which had been put on the back of lorries as portées. The reports from the fighting in Greece suggested there was a better version developed, and it was noted in the report that it would be helpful to get some intelligence from the Soviets about what they were encountering.
The report noted that as well as the two infantry Battalions, the Panzer Division had a very effective Reconnaissance Battalion, considered by many to be better armed and trained than the British reconnaissance battalions. The CO of 2nd Household Cavalry Regiment begged to disagree, but the armoured cars that his men were getting used to, compared with the various German vehicles were certainly outmatched, though his colleagues did agree about his men being highly trained. The fact that they were only recently moving from horses to armoured cars did leave the question open about what exactly they were highly trained for.
The Panzer Division’s three 3 artillery regiments, with Pioneers, Signals and other Divisional support units rounded out the Division. The report noted that there seemed to be some adaptation of the Panzer Division to North Africa, which may mean that it was a smaller formation than facing the Soviets. Currently the Guards Armoured Division only had one field artillery regiment (the other two were anti-tank and anti-aircraft). Using the model of one Armoured Brigade and one Motorised Brigade, instead of the Support Group, would mean that there would be three Field Regiments, preferably of Royal Horse Artillery, especially if equipped with the self-propelled Birch Gun.
Knowing the enemy was a crucial part of any chance of defeating them. The growing emphasis on signals within the Division was a direct result of the encounters with the German army so far in the war. Their command and control seemed to be excellent, an excellence that the Guards Armoured Division would need to emulate.
As well as receiving the Valiant II* tanks, the Guards Armoured Division were also being issued with the latest marks of anti-aircraft tanks (Vanguard), self-propelled guns (Birch), and the Viking personnel carrier. Their engineers would also have some of the ‘funnies’ being developed, for bridge laying and armoured recovery. All of these vehicles would take time to get used to and work out how best to use them.
Brigadier Adair noted that fighting in the deserts of North Africa would be different from fighting an invader of England, or even if the fighting was in France. He wondered if some of the lessons of desert warfare might not be applicable to the probable type of fighting that the Guards Armoured Division might be involved in.
Major-General Leese noted that it was time for lunch in the Officers’ Mess, so be brought the first part of the formal meeting to an end, but a visit to the War Office to talk over with the new CIGs (General Alan Brooke) was becoming a necessity. Given time, and equipment Leese knew that there would be a lot of experimentation to get things right in exercises, and then apply that experience to combat when the time was right.
Redlynch House had become the home of the Headquarters of the Guards Armoured Division, though some HQ elements were at Wincanton. The whole Division was being assembled around Salisbury Plain. The 5th Guards Armoured Brigade (GAB) were grouped around Warminster and Shaftsbury, 6th GAB was at Codford, the Support Group was at Castle Cary, Frome and Midsomer Norton. The Divisional Reconnaissance Regiment, 2nd Household Cavalry Regiment were based at Bulford.
Since the formation of the Division the previous summer a large number of Guards Officers had passed through training courses at Bovington and Lulworth, where the Royal Armoured Corps had instructed them on the practical mechanical, gunnery and wireless knowledge that they’d need.
The decision had been made that every Guardsman of the rank of full corporal and above was to be trained in gunnery, driving, maintenance and wireless. The guardsmen below the rank of Corporal would be trained in just one of those skills. The flow of NCOs returning from the courses had been increasing as the weather had been worsening. The threat of imminent invasion was ever more remote, but the training regime for all in the Division was unrelenting.
The delivery of tanks had hampered this process. There were a great many calls on new tanks, not least to the Russians and the 8th Armoured Division, which was about to sail from Capetown on its journey to foreign parts. Major-General Oliver Leese had got his way and the tanks that had started appearing were Vickers Valiant II* cruiser tanks. The tank had a petrol engine and were equipped with the 6-pdr main tank gun. There were weekly deliveries fresh from the factories, and as each Battalion received more tanks, more exercises were being programmed.
Leese, with his Brigade Commanders (Allan Adair [6th GAB], William For-Pitt [5th GAB] and Lionel Manners-Smith [Support Group]), along with other senior staff officers had gathered to consider the lessons learned from the Armoured Divisions in North Africa. General O’Connor (GOC 8th Army) had overseen the writing up of lessons learned, both positive and negative about the handling of tank formations. This was a very complete document that had contributions from all the main actors, from O’Connor himself, to the Corps, Division, Brigade, Regiment commanding officers. In addition, there were reports from quartermasters, engineers, the Light Aid Detachments, all those elements which made a Division tick. O’Connor had also made sure that the learning was from the ground up. There were detailed reports from members of tank crews, Troop and Squadron Leaders, all of which tried to communicate what they had experienced, what had worked and what had failed.
It was expected that General O’Connor himself would be coming back to Britain for some leave and to present his report to the senior commanders of the Army. Leese was looking forward to hearing it all ‘from the horse’s mouth’, but reading the lengthy written report had taken up quite a bit of the Christmas and New Year leave.
Leese had always had in mind that the creation of the Guards Armoured Division was not just to be like the rest of the Royal Armoured Corps Divisions. As a Guards Division it would have the look and feel of the elite soldiers the Guards embodied. He had spent some considerable time working at the insignia of the Division. During the Great War, the Guards Division had used an ‘Eye’ as its insignia, and Leese had asked the officers and men of the Division to make suggestions of how have something that kept the glorious traditions of their forebears. Eventually the artist Rex Whistler, a Lieutenant in the Welsh Guards, had been commissioned to paint a variety of the ‘Eye’ on various vehicles. These had been presented to Leese and a chosen group of officers to choose which best kept the tradition of the past, but showed also the fighting characteristics of a modern armoured formation. Once chosen, it wasn’t long before every vehicle in the Division was painted with the ‘Eye’.
There were quite a few things that the staff of the Armoured Division disagreed upon, sometimes quite strenuously. Manners-Smith, whose Support Group was an odd assortment of one Infantry Battalion (1st Bn Welsh Guards), and one regiment each of artillery, anti-tank and light AA, felt that a more balanced force, one Armoured Brigade and one Motorised Infantry Brigade, with the artillery and engineers under Divisional control made more sense. That was the way the short lived 22nd Armoured Division had operated, and it certainly seemed a better model than the current one. Manners-Smith, as an artillery man, was particularly worried about how light the artillery support was for an Armoured Division.
The two Armoured Brigade commanders also were unsure of having one motorised battalion attached to their Brigades. Having four Battalions (three armoured and one infantry) in a Brigade wasn’t the normal British Army way of doing things. There were some lessons that Lt General Pope had noted from his experience in XXX Corps. Having an Armoured and Infantry Brigade working together, almost as three ‘battlegroups’ seemed to be fairly balanced. The other armoured Brigade tended to be used more in the Tank Brigade model of supporting an Infantry Division. Whether that was because the Valiant tanks that 2nd Armoured Division was equipped with lent themselves to that model, or it made more tactical sense was the cause of some debate.
Leese tended towards Manners-Smith position and wondered about asking the War Office to allow either 32nd or 33rd Brigade (Guards) to work with his Division to experiment on the model of 22nd Armoured Division. Fox-Pitt wondered if that model was to work, whether it would be better for 5th and 6th GAB to break into two Divisions, otherwise, one of the two Brigades might have to become a Tank Brigade. Adair thought that having two Guards Armoured Divisions would be problematic to get enough artillery and engineering units, as well as all the other necessary units to support a Division.
The next item that was discussed at length was the report’s estimation of both the Italian and German armoured Divisions, written by a senior Intelligence Corps officer. The Italian Divisions were dismissed primarily because of their poor quality tanks. The information on the Afrika Korps was fascinating. With the capture of some many of its men and equipment a much stronger picture was emerging of the way in which the Germans had adapted to the experience in France and Flanders.
The Panzer Division in North Africa had consisted of only two battalions of tanks and three Battalions of an Infantry Regiment. Each battalion of tanks had one ‘heavy’ and two ‘light’ Companies. The Panzer IV was much the same as that captured before Dunkirk. The Panzer III’s improved 50mm main gun, like the 75mm gun in the Panzer IV was short barrelled. If they produced a long barrelled version, it was likely to be as good as the new 6-pdr. The Germans had also improved their tanks’ armour, by adding extra armour plates. The expectation was that new build tanks would have thicker armour as standard.
In addition to the panzers there was another battalion which was known as the Panzerjāger (tank hunter) which consisted of what might be thought of as mobile armoured anti-tank guns. Based on Panzer I hulls, with the Czech 47mm anti-tank gun, the assessment wasn’t very complimentary, but noted that the crews were better protected (and mobile) that the British 2-pdr crews, including those which had been put on the back of lorries as portées. The reports from the fighting in Greece suggested there was a better version developed, and it was noted in the report that it would be helpful to get some intelligence from the Soviets about what they were encountering.
The report noted that as well as the two infantry Battalions, the Panzer Division had a very effective Reconnaissance Battalion, considered by many to be better armed and trained than the British reconnaissance battalions. The CO of 2nd Household Cavalry Regiment begged to disagree, but the armoured cars that his men were getting used to, compared with the various German vehicles were certainly outmatched, though his colleagues did agree about his men being highly trained. The fact that they were only recently moving from horses to armoured cars did leave the question open about what exactly they were highly trained for.
The Panzer Division’s three 3 artillery regiments, with Pioneers, Signals and other Divisional support units rounded out the Division. The report noted that there seemed to be some adaptation of the Panzer Division to North Africa, which may mean that it was a smaller formation than facing the Soviets. Currently the Guards Armoured Division only had one field artillery regiment (the other two were anti-tank and anti-aircraft). Using the model of one Armoured Brigade and one Motorised Brigade, instead of the Support Group, would mean that there would be three Field Regiments, preferably of Royal Horse Artillery, especially if equipped with the self-propelled Birch Gun.
Knowing the enemy was a crucial part of any chance of defeating them. The growing emphasis on signals within the Division was a direct result of the encounters with the German army so far in the war. Their command and control seemed to be excellent, an excellence that the Guards Armoured Division would need to emulate.
As well as receiving the Valiant II* tanks, the Guards Armoured Division were also being issued with the latest marks of anti-aircraft tanks (Vanguard), self-propelled guns (Birch), and the Viking personnel carrier. Their engineers would also have some of the ‘funnies’ being developed, for bridge laying and armoured recovery. All of these vehicles would take time to get used to and work out how best to use them.
Brigadier Adair noted that fighting in the deserts of North Africa would be different from fighting an invader of England, or even if the fighting was in France. He wondered if some of the lessons of desert warfare might not be applicable to the probable type of fighting that the Guards Armoured Division might be involved in.
Major-General Leese noted that it was time for lunch in the Officers’ Mess, so be brought the first part of the formal meeting to an end, but a visit to the War Office to talk over with the new CIGs (General Alan Brooke) was becoming a necessity. Given time, and equipment Leese knew that there would be a lot of experimentation to get things right in exercises, and then apply that experience to combat when the time was right.
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