Perhaps the deployed submarines need an introduction course to ASDIC from the NEI destroyers that are working up?
It would be beneficial to both to understand its advantages and limitations. An ABDA training command so to speak?
Could be counterproductive though, if the effectiveness of ASDIC gets overrated and submarine commanders go for longer shots that they are not trained for.
 
Despite their personal shortcomings, am I right in assuming both are lauded as great prime ministers of Australia.
Both by their respective Parties. Menzies' had his original party - the United Australia Party disintegrate during his absence in the UK. He later organised the Liberal Party, post-war. Curtin was lauded by the Labor Party, which still exists today.
 
MWI 41061023 The Warning

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Tuesday 10 June;

Nearly 11pm now, he’d been keying for over twenty minutes, following the script. Just a couple of them in a small room, sunken deep inside the building with no windows, most of the others had gone. He wasn’t privy to the message, which had been encoded, but the fact they’d been at it this long told him this was important. Once he was finished, the script would be taken from him, and he’d be reminded of the need for secrecy.

Four floors above him, in a nicely furnished room, blackout curtains pulled, a table lamp on and a half-drunk bottle of scotch beside him, sat Ivan Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom, very aware of the message. With him was the Military Attaché, who’d help him code the message. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden had met with Maisky earlier that day, and handed over a document, an order of battle for the entire German Army camped on the Soviet borders, and the warning of an imminent attack.

Both were mulling over alternative responses to what Moscow might say. The information was so important, it had to be sent, but what if it was a lie, would they be deemed complicit in its giving, or could “just doing my job” be enough to exonerate them. And on the other hand, what if they were right, how did that go. If Stalin believed them and it happened, then great, but what if he didn’t act, having knowledge of Stalin’s failure could be very career threatening to say the least. Up to now the messages they had passed on had gone with no comment, but the detail of this was just frightening.

However, why would the Germans want to attack Russia now, the war with the British was far from finished, indeed they’d only recently sent troops to North Africa, while the war at see raged on, only two weeks ago the British had sunk the Bismarck, following the lost of their own beloved Hood. And indeed, the amounts of raw materials Nazi Germany were receiving from the USSR was staggering. In the first 12 months of their commercial agreement Germany had received 1,600,000 tons of grain, 900,000 tons of oil, 500,000 tons of iron ore, 300,000 tons of scrap metal and pig iron, 200,000 tons of cotton, 200,000 tons of phosphates, 140,000 tons of manganese, along with significant amounts of chrome ore, rubber, soybeans and platinum, and that tonnage was growing, why lose all that?

Whereas the British, oh how they would love to have Germany and Russia at each other’s throats. What better way to save their own skin, and Churchill, that old dog had been trying to destroy the Soviet Union ever since its inception, a bigger communist hater there wasn’t. Maisky drank the half glass, and then pour another three fingers for himself, before passing over the bottle. It was one of a case he’d been given, and he fully intended to do real damage to that number tonight.
 
Hi Parma, I'd love to know more about their surprise at experiencing the Japanese sonar, can you remember where you read that?
I'm not sure about Japanese sonar but this is what Anten says in Navalism kills submarine:
Only in march 1941 could the [Dutch] submarines in the Indies practice against British active sonar and the ‘pings’ hit the submarine service thundering. They confirmed [commander of the submarines] Bussemakers worries. His predecessor, J.A. de Gelder had written a report on these exercises. In it the active British sonar was given a maximum range of 2.300 meters, though it also made clear that the range would drop to 1.500 if the submarine was pinged not on it’s side but aft or fore. De Gelders conclusions show a certain amount of tunnelvision: the incapability to relate the results of these exercises to other situations and circumstances. This could be the result of the dogma of the School of Furstner (of which he was part of): that submarines were made old-fashioned by sonar. In any way, De Gelder didn’t see that these exercises were unfit to make realistic conclusions. Because of this interpretation he had no choice but to reccommend attacks at 3,000 meters or more. After publication such attacks were planned more often but at that range the lack of modern aimtechnology [?] was clear. The exercises also showed that there was ample opportunity to avoid attack and break contact. Despite this De Gelder concluded that ‘experience learned that a submarine which was detected had a 50% chance of being lost.’ This was even more than the British ‘peacetimesucceses’ of 30 to 40%. He didn’t realise that the chance of destroying a submarine in warconditions was massively overstated in his report.

The recommendations of De Gelder were dated 8 april 1941, but seem to be from years before. The British had concluded shortly after the declaration of war in september 1939 that their trust in active sonar was badly misplaced. They soon discovered that a maximum range of 1,200 meter was much more realistic. Before the war, the wisdom that a submarine could avoid or counter a sonar attack in 9 out of 10 times, was only known among a small group of British sonarexperts . Given that such an attack would not always be succesful, the real chance of succes if probably not more than a few percents.

[…]

Stated foremost that the Dutch shortrangeattack was only used when it was needed – so against transportfleets, battleships and carriers – there was not reason to change the doctrine. American wolfpacks had great succes because of the shortrange attack. Thankfully Dutch pessimism regarding modern anti-submarine warfare couldn’t overcome their doctrine which was taking account terrible loses to their own force, which allowed Bussemaker and others later that year to gain fame with their resoluteness in attack. Devoid of German and apparently British experiences he and De Gelder overestimated active sonar. Because of the start of the Pacific War Bussemaker was never abe to complete the reform of the wolfpack-divisiontactic. It is telling though, that his last wolfpack exercise and his own attacks on the Japanese forces were at night.
Translation and mistakes are on me!
 
Could be counterproductive though, if the effectiveness of ASDIC gets overrated and submarine commanders go for longer shots that they are not trained for.
ASDIC did unintentionally degrade allied submarine tactics because its capability was both over estimated pre war / early war and at the same time it was assumed that if the British had it, the Germans, Italians and Japanese had it.

USN doctrine for example was to conduct attacks using sonar from longer ranges simply because it would be folly to close and attack

This 'error' along with other foibles such as remaining submerged during the day persisted for at least a year if not longer before the Darwinian process that is war exerted change.

And the British for the same reasons built submarines 'with all the torpedo tubes' for the same reason which is why we see pre war and early war British subs with 8 or 10 forward firing tubes because the maths of such a sonar directed attack rather than a closer range periscope directed attack dictated a larger number of torpedoes in the spread to achieve a hit.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
One thing that really makes this TL great is a different approach to the subject. The focus is not so much on the units and various materials of war, but the logistics side of things, the ability to not only send units to the theatre, but to be able to sustain them there for long term periods. That is where this Timeline really shines, in its devotion to Logistics, the True God of War.
Thank you

The most difficult thing I find in writing this timeline is finding a reasonable balance between what resources go to Malaya, and the real war in North Africa, which is Britain's main effort, aside from keeping the Atlantic sea lanes open, and developing Bomber Command. While writing about some of the resources that do end up in Malaya, I'm continually thinking along those lines, and can it be spared in North Africa. Obviously, given I'm exploring if Britain could have held Malaya, I'll need to send more that way, but there has too be an argument ready to justify it. By 1941, there were no empty ships lying around, so anything that sails for Malaya, means something doesn't go where else. Sailing from West Canada, across the relatively war free Pacific allows shipping to move at its most economical and quickest pace, not tied down to slower convoy movement, which although much safer, is so much more inefficient. This is an example of how you might get more with less, while sourcing supplies from India, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and the afore mentioned Canada, is another. But I'm not introducing anything new here, just putting a little more emphasis on it.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Perhaps the deployed submarines need an introduction course to ASDIC from the NEI destroyers that are working up?
It would be beneficial to both to understand its advantages and limitations. An ABDA training command so to speak?
Well we can't have an ABDA command yet, as the Americans haven't committed to it, but your right in pointing out the advantages of working with the Dutch East Indies more closely, and earlier. Much of that failure, historically, was from the Dutch, keen to appear as neutral as possible to the Japanese, until Britain, or more importantly, the USA, announce a guarantee of security to them. In this timeline, Britain is trying hard to have very warm relations with the Dutch, stopping just short of announcing a protection of her sovereignty. Which is a bit crazy, come how there is a Dutch Government in exile in London, the Dutch being firmly allies of Britain against Germany and Italy.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Australians tend to decry their politicians and laud their personal failings. Both are considered “effective” for what they stood for happening to Australians. Despite the excellence of their personal failings they advanced the causes they stood for.
and
Both by their respective Parties. Menzies' had his original party - the United Australia Party disintegrate during his absence in the UK. He later organised the Liberal Party, post-war. Curtin was lauded by the Labor Party, which still exists today.
So I'll ask this of you both, and anyone else who has a strong Australian centred opinion on all of this. What was the Australian view of Churchill, when did it change, and how anti British did Australia turn thanks to his decisions over the defence of Singapore and Malaya.
 
and

So I'll ask this of you both, and anyone else who has a strong Australian centred opinion on all of this. What was the Australian view of Churchill, when did it change, and how anti British did Australia turn thanks to his decisions over the defence of Singapore and Malaya.
Australians tend to be pro-Churchill. Why? I am not sure why. Most are not aware of how shabbily the Australian Government was treated by the British and then later by the American Governments. I only really learnt about both episodes at University. It was openly published in the official history but was largely forgotten about. The Australian people consume most of their history from TV and most TV is produced overseas and so they tend to laud Churchill.
 

Driftless

Donor
I think that people gravitate towards bullies. An American author, H.L. Mencken wrote. " For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong." GEN MacArthur was sent to Australia to solve a complex American problem...
Did FDR/Marshall hope that sending Mac to Australia he'd be in a comparative backwater and far away from American press? IF they had that idea, boy....., what a mis-calculation. Mac should never have been removed from the PI - regardless of his security knowledge. (IMO)
 
Did FDR/Marshall hope that sending Mac to Australia he'd be in a comparative backwater and far away from American press? IF they had that idea, boy....., what a mis-calculation. Mac should never have been removed from the PI - regardless of his security knowledge. (IMO)
The only way to have removed MacArthur from the Western press was to leave him in the Philippines. Then only his supporters would've made noise about him. "Take Tokyo and free MacArthur."
 
GEN MacArthur's talent was wasted in SWPA. He would have done better as AGF and subsequently Europe. He wanted to do dinner theater as opposed to Broadway.
FDR would never have let MacArthur come back to the USA. AGF would mean a Washington press circus every day, with Mac spouting off on militarily strategy, and domestic politics. He would've been a pain in Marshall's side, with people always questioning who was running the Army. Mac would be called in front of Congress to tell the world what FDR, the Democrats, and Marshall were getting wrong. It would just be a total mess.
 
“So what you’re telling me is that Churchill was a self important bastard who callously sacrificed Australians and Australian political interests? What a fully sick c—.”

MacArthur is forgotten, detested and loved for similar reasons. Be a big enough bastard and be loved for it.
 
Did FDR/Marshall hope that sending Mac to Australia he'd be in a comparative backwater and far away from American press? IF they had that idea, boy....., what a mis-calculation. Mac should never have been removed from the PI - regardless of his security knowledge. (IMO)
Mac Arthur's knowledge of the entire radio and codebreaking system was the Imperative for rescuing him. Both he and Hart were very aware of that program, something the commanders in Hawaii did not know about.
 
Thank you

The most difficult thing I find in writing this timeline is finding a reasonable balance between what resources go to Malaya, and the real war in North Africa, which is Britain's main effort, aside from keeping the Atlantic sea lanes open, and developing Bomber Command. While writing about some of the resources that do end up in Malaya, I'm continually thinking along those lines, and can it be spared in North Africa. Obviously, given I'm exploring if Britain could have held Malaya, I'll need to send more that way, but there has too be an argument ready to justify it. By 1941, there were no empty ships lying around, so anything that sails for Malaya, means something doesn't go where else. Sailing from West Canada, across the relatively war free Pacific allows shipping to move at its most economical and quickest pace, not tied down to slower convoy movement, which although much safer, is so much more inefficient. This is an example of how you might get more with less, while sourcing supplies from India, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and the afore mentioned Canada, is another. But I'm not introducing anything new here, just putting a little more emphasis on it.
In your storyline has Canada been sending a little bit more material and supplies to Singapore then OTL? One further possible "what if" have the Canadian government decide to send C-Force to Singapore instead of Hong Kong. That would not require any more ships then were already being used to transport them. And the decision has already been made that Canada can spare a brigade group and its equipment and supplies for the Far East. Though what kind of political lobbying and maneuvering would be required to get PM King to approve the change and PM Churchill to agree or at least not oppose it is hard for me to define.

Arriving in Singapore in mid to late November 1941 C-Force is not going to have an easy time of it. But it certainly can't be any worse then what happened to them at Hong Kong OTL. Perhaps they will fare better in an alternate Malayan campaign. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C_Force
 
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