Sir Peter Takes the Helm, Part 1 (with additions)
June 1935 upon taking up his post, Sir Philip reviews all the various sub-committees working under the auspices of the AM. The Work of CSSAD (Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence) under the wing of Sir Hugh Dowding and Chairmanship of Henry Tizzard catches his attention. Upon being briefed by them of detail of the work being done on the electronic detection of attacking bombers and the associated fighter direction and control systems, Sir Philip comes to the conclusion that Balfour’s famous prediction of the "Bomber will always get through" is not necessarily a 'given'. With this insight also throwing into doubt the veracity of the entire 'Trenchard Doctrine' that formed the basis of the strategic role of the RAF, Sir Philip proceeds to quietly carry out a 'Root and Branch' review of the entire purpose and roll of the RAF in National defence.
For the rest of 1935 Sir Phillip carried out a review of the capabilities of all branches of the RAF and of how new technologies available in the immediate future would change those capabilities. He gathered around him a small committee of serving officers, scientists, engineers and industrialists who could advise him, even if that advice could be considered partisan. Among those whose opinion and support he sought was that of Winston Churchill, though he was sceptical of Professor Lindemans influence on him. Whilst dining with Churchill at the House of Commons in the autumn of 1935, Sir Phillip asked Churchill what had caused him more concern in 1917, the Botha bombing raids and the possibilities of civilian panic or the unrestricted submarine warfare and the potential starvation of Britain. Having thought for a moment Churchill replied that it was the submarines which really worried him.
Shortly afterwards, Sir Philip had a private meeting, dinner again, with the First Sea Lord Chatfield. He surprised the first Sea Lord by informing him that he would support the return of the FAA directly to the RN and that this should take place as soon as the reorganisation of the RAF into separate commands took place in mid 1936. The sharing of ab nitio pilot training and the retaining/transfer of RAF pilots until the FAA had a sufficient pool of Naval pilots was also agreed. The final date of transfer of command would be set once the extent of the required naval reorganisation and infrastructure had been assessed. Sir Philip explained that this transfer of responsibility was in line with his perceived change in the role of the FAA that the new technology of RDF would bring to the capabilities of naval aircraft both in attack and defence. The ability of shipborne RDF to detect and attack and permit fighters to be directed to intercept it and the ability of the airborne system to ‘Find, Fix and Track’ the enemy fleet by day or night irrespective of weather and visibility was a quantum leap in capability. Sir Phillip at this time handed over to the First Sea Lord a briefing paper prepared by his advisory committee on the future naval application of RFD for the FAA. For there was every indication at that time that all the RN research on the subject was focused solely on RDF’s application to gunnery. Agreement was reached that the two gentlemen would occasionaly dine together to exchange views and progress of developments pertinent to both of their services.
Sir Phillip obtained via Churchill not only a copy of the 1919 submission for the future employment of the RAF but also copies of Trenchard’s earlier memorandum concerning the employment of the then newly fomed RAF and in Particular the independent air element command by Trenchard in France through the final stages of the war in 1918. From these papers he concluded that prior to having to justify the continued survival of an independent RAF in 1919 Trenchard had believed the air forces roll and actions to be defined by the following dictates.
Assumptions fundamental to Trenchards doctrines from the first world war in 1918.
- All air warfare is interdependent, Bombers cannot function in isolation.
- All Air warfare is undertaken in support of the army.
- offensive operations were essential to maintain the morale advantage
Assumptions fundamental to Trenchards doctrines from his submission of the :-
‘Permanent Organization of the RAF Note by the Secretary of State for Air on a Scheme Outlined by the Chief of Staff’.
This document was submitted to Winston Churchill as Air Minister, in lateDecember1919 and Trenchard’s new strategic doctrine was based on two key assumptions regarding the offensive capabilities of the bomber, firstly, that the morale effect of the bomber was twenty times that of the material and secondly that there was no viable defence against attacking aircraft.
The technical development’s currently going on a Orfordness and soon to be subject to a full scale trial at the new Bawdsey Manor research station in 1936 had shown Sir Phillip that at least one of these assumptions was probably no longer ‘Written in Stone’ and that the first was actually dependant upon the veracity of the second.
Sir Phillip had reached some startling conclusions and knew that both Lord Trenchard and Lord Salmon would fight him tooth and nail therefore he needed a way to disarm them and of course he had to keep a cordial working relationship with Sir Edward Elllington the chief of the Air Staff. So Sir Phillip decided to bide his time and keep his powder dry and only act when the ground work had been done. As Sir Phillip saw it the primary strategic role of the RAF post 1935 and the development of RDF was to prevent a potential enemy from delivering the much vaunted “Knock Out Blow” because if any potential enemy had themselves matched the RAF development in RDF and Fighter control then the fear of the RAF Bombers as a deterrent from aggression would no longer a tenable position. So with the proposed re organisation of the RAF into separate commands as of the middle of 1936, Sir Philip proposed that the primary command would be Fighter command with Bomber command coming second. Until Fighter command could by both Day and Night provide a comprehensive defence against Arial attack it would remain the priority for both material and personnel. Sir Phillips heresy was that he considered that the RAF bombers were incapable of flying to targets of strategic importance and hitting them let alone actually destroying them. This conclusion was drawn from examining the results of the various bombing exercises and navigation tests flown. Sir Phillip’s keen legal mind quickly unpicked the bias and outright deceit hidden within the parameters of the exercises to arrive at his own conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the current RAF bomber force and found it distinctly unfit for purpose. He concluded that with the new technologies of RDF the RAF bombers would suffer unsustainable losses during daylight attacks and in a night time campaign would be ineffectual in hitting the enemy.
With RDF in it’s infancy but showing true promise Sir Philllip decided to bide his time until he had a fully worked up program of reform for the AM and the RAF, He therefore spent the flowing six months quietly seeking advice on a wide variety of technical points varying from engine design, airframe design, air Navigation and Bombs just for starters. He needed to be able to Judge not only what aircraft the RAF really needed but what was technically possible both now and within the lifetime of any proposed aircraft. His panel of experts helped him to formulate a list of conditions that would inform his determination of the viability of any proposed aircraft and its fitness for purpose. There were a number of factors that could be historically proven as a given within aircraft design and these he listed in no particular order as.
Aircraft in each class tend to get heavier with each subsequent design.
Each generation of engine gets more powerful.
Speed is important in hostile airspace.
An Aircraft must have a primary task and be designed for that task. Designing for secondary tasks cannot be allowed to undermine the achievement of the primary role.
Navigation is the lifeblood of the bomber if you cannot find your target you cannot hit it.
The bigger the bomb the bigger the damage radius.
Each new generation of aircraft is more expensive than the previous one.
When he looked at those aircraft coming into service when he was appointed he saw that both the Gloster Gauntlet and the Blackburn Overstrand would not have seemed out of place to him and his comrades in the trenches in 1918. However the Highspeed Mono Plane Fighters being built to specifications F36/34 and F37/34 would have been like something from an HG wells novel in 1918.
Sir Phillip read every Operational Requirement issued since 1930 and reviewed the subsequent specifications issued to the aircraft imdustry. By careful analysis of these documents and asking advice from his committee of experts Sir Phillip began to get a feel for the assumptions and bias within the RAF that effected the formulation of the OR’s and industries response. Talks with Sir Hugh Dowding and Tizzard confirmed not only the reluctance of the RAF to listen to Scientists or external experts but also their utter faith in their own assumptions.
Starting in January 1936 Sir Phillip had also started a study of the aero engine requirements and the state of the British industry. Very quickly he had come to the realisation that with the technological leap from wood and fabric built aircraft to the all metal mono plane more powerful engines were required. Whilst aircraft being delivered in 1935 would have engines of around 750hp those due to enter service in 1937/38 would require 1000hp or more. This was clearly illustrated by the specifications for the new fighter aircraft issued in 1934. F5/34 was based on an engine of 750hp pluss ( this attracted no less than five designs) yet issued at the same time were specifications F36/34 and F37/34 issued to Hawkers and Supermarine utilising the new Rolls Royce engine of 100hp pluss. Sir Philip saw quickly that basically the aircraft built to F5/34would could not match the performance of the F36 and F37 designs unless they two adopted engines of 1000hp of more and here Sir Philip came up against one of the paramount problems in the British aero engine industry at that time. Whish was that there was basically a reliance on just two manufactures to provide the most powerful class of engine, Rolls Royce for inline liquid cooled Engines and Bristol’s for Radial Air cooled engines and as of early 1936 there were no radial 1000hp plus engines in production. Having Talked to Sir Hugh Dowding in his role as Air Member for Supply and Development regarding the situation Sir Phillip thought that at least a second manufacture in each lass of engine should be encouraged. Napier seemed the logical choice for the second in line liquid cooled engine as they had a distinguished history in this field. The second radial manufacturer was not so clear cut as there were a number of other companies building radial of varying capacity. Eventually Alvis came forward as they were negotiating with Gnome Rhone to licence their Mistral engine. What was encouraging was that Alvis were proposing not only a new purpose built factory but to re-engineer the engine with newer materials for higher stress and to redesign those parts that had been shown to be problematical. Sir Philip agreed a letter of intent to purchase the new Alvis engine providing it passed its type test by mid 1937 at over 1000hp and was in production by early 1938. The AM would supply a number of test aircraft for the engine.
As to the engine developments by Both Bristol and Rolls Royce as far as Sir Philip was concerned it was a case of wait and see.
As to armament the 8 guns machine guns specified for the F5/34, F36/34 and the F37/34 was at the time of issuing the heaviest armament proposed for any fighter, however already the RAF was looking at arming aircraft with 20mm cannons to ensure that bomber could be fatally damaged in a single pass. This was formalised in early 1936 when the earlier specification F10/35 was rewritten and issued as F37/35 for a four cannon fighter with either single or twin engines. With the issuing of this specification Sir Phillip became interested in the licencing, production and testing of a suitable 20mm cannon as soon as possible.
Part two will cover turret fighters and look at bomber development.