Operation Thrush: The Don Basin Counteroffensive, January – March 1942
With the
Wehrmacht reeling after the Battle of Moscow, the Comintern leadership pushed for immediate extensions of the victory along the frontline. While Molotov had ascended to General Secretary of the CPSU, it became immediately clear to all but the most casual observers that power balance had dramatically shifted. The shake-up of leadership was signaled by the formation of an American-style Revolutionary Military Committee, with politically trustworthy RKKA officers ascending in influence within the party.
Marshal Frunze shared Stalin’s offensive bias, but was much more measured in his application. Rather than attempt a general theater-wide counteroffensive, Frunze’s strategy was to focus resources in a single strategic sector while preparing, if possible, for attacks of opportunity in other sectors. The strategy would be a rolling offensive; a successful offensive in one sector would force the diversion of forces to contain it, enabling a second offensive to exploit weakened sectors.
Initial plans began in early December for an Operation Kite, which would break the Siege of Leningrad. But when the first reliable stream of Enigma intercepts began filtering into Stavka HQ that month, Frunze was forced to immediately reconsider. Army Group South was at a greater strength than previous reconnaissance had suggested. Furthermore, it was preparing for its own offensive to push the Comintern army back across the Volga and flood south into the Caucasus.
Frunze settled on beating the Germans to the punch, pushing the Germans back before they could complete preparations for their spring offensive. He assigned General of the Army Zhukov to serve as the Stavka representative of the three fronts assigned to the operation. The order of battle is as follows:
- Saratov Front: General Konstantin Rokossovsky
- 8th Air Army: Lt. General James Doolittle
- V and IX Tactical Aviation Corps
- 15th Army: General F.S. Kollontai*
- Rifle Divisions: 41st, 62nd, 88th
- Grenadier Divisions: 1st, 4th Guards
- Tank Divisions: 7th
- 41st Army: Lt. General S.D. Dragunov*
- Rifle Divisions: 17th Guards, 99th, 114th, 140th
- Grenadier Divisions: 3rd
- Tank Brigades: 44th, 80th
- Special Brigades: 11th
- Front Reserve: 7th Guards Rifle Division, 85th Tank Brigade
- Stalingrad Front: General of the Army George S. Patton
- 4th Air Army: Lt. General V.I. King*
- X and XIV Tactical Aviation Corps
- 9th Tank Army: General Vasily Chuikov
- Grenadier Divisions: 2nd, 3rd, 15th
- Tank Divisions: 11th, 19th, 20th
- 22nd Army: Lt. General O.S. Zhirinovsky*
- Rifle Divisions: 37th Guards, 40th, 55th, 82nd
- Tank Brigades: 4th, 21st Guards
- 66th Army: Lt. General John H. Lawson
- Rifle Divisions: 9th, 33rd, 41st, 65th
- Grenadier Divisions: 8th
- Tank Divisions: 40th
- Front Reserve: 1st Guards Tank Division, 5th Rifle Division
- Southwestern Front: General A.M. Vasilevsky
- 21st Army: Maj. General K. Schultz*
- Rifle Divisions: 33rd, 42nd, 68th, 94th, 108th
- Grenadier Divisions: 13th
- Tank Brigades: 49th, 66th
- 29th Army: Maj. General V.V. Ivanov*
- Rifle Divisions: 71st, 89th, 92nd
- Tank Brigades:111th
- XVII Tactical Aviation Corps
- Front Reserve: 11th IVA Brigade
Total Comintern forces were thus 25 rifle divisions, 8 grenadier (mechanized infantry) divisions, 6 tank divisions, 8 independent tank brigades, plus supporting corps, army and front level artillery assets. At the outset of the operation, Comintern forces in theater amounted 941,000 men, 1541 tanks, 942 aircraft, and 7200 artillery pieces.
They faced an Axis force of comparable fighting power. In anticipation for the coming campaign, Army Group South was being divided in two; Army Group Volga and Army Group Caucasus. Their respective strategic aims were coded into their names: Army Group Volga would be preparing to take Stalingrad and drive through to the Caspian Sea while Army Group Caucasus would drive south to Baku.
Due to the disposition of forces, Operation Thrush would be directed primarily at Army Group Volga. The German order of battle was as follows:
- Army Group Volga: Generalfeldmarschal Erich von Manstein
- 2. Armee: Generaloberst Rudolf Schmidt
- Infantry Divisions: 29th, 40th, 44th, 121st, 276th, 301st, 334th
- Panzergrenadier Divisions: 1st SS, 2nd SS, 4th SS
- Panzer Divisions: 3rd SS, 17th, 21st[/FONT]
- 6. Panzer Armee: Generaloberst Erwin Rommel[/FONT]
- Panzergrenadier Divisions: 4th, 5th, 11th SS, 12th SS
- Panzer Divisions: 5th SS, 11th SS, 14th
- Infantry (motorized): 101st, 140th
- 8. Armee: General Hermann Hoth
- Infantry Divisions: 11th, 14th, 190th, 401st, 443rd, 480th
- Jager Divisions: 4th, 7th
- 8th Italian Army
- Infantry Divisions: 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 156th
- Mountain Divisions: 2nd, 3rd, 4th
- Motorized Divisions: 9th, 51st
- Armored: 1st
- 2nd Rumanian Army
- Infantry Divisions: 1st, 11th, 14th, 17th, 21st, 25th
- Motorized: 2nd
- 3rd Hungarian Army:
- Infantry Divisions: 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th
- Luftflotte 6
Total strength: 31 infantry divisions, 7 panzergrenadier divisions, 7 panzer divisions, and 5 mountain divisions. With 740,000 men, 1230 tanks, 800 aircraft, and 6200 artillery pieces, Army Group Volga represented a formidable foe.
As the commander of the Stalingrad Front, Patton’s troops would carry the bulk of the battle. Zhukov’s operational plan was bold; the Stalingrad front would attack southwest from the Don River staging points, cleaving between 6. Panzer Armee and the 8th Italian Army. While the 9th Tank Army pushed along that frontage, the 22nd and 66th Armies would strike directly at 6. Panzer. To the south, the Southwestern Front would make supporting attacks against the 2nd Rumanian Army, while the Saratov Front attacked almost due south towards the Donets and Rostov.
Thus the plan would be for the Southwestern Front trap the Axis against the south bend of the Don River like an anvil, while the Saratov and Stalingrad fronts hammered into their troops in a brutal battle of attrition.
The timing was absolutely crucial. It was generally only known to the front level commanders and the Stavka delegations that the balance of forces would likely start to reverse after February. Foreign intelligence had gathered an inkling of German strategic plans in the west and had assumed the worst. At best, France would be knocked out of the war quickly by a rightist fifth column. At the worst, France would be an Axis member. This meant that up to 1.1 million German troops could be pulled to the Central theater by summer; they would be fresh, well trained and well equipped.
The offensive began on the 5th of January. Following a twenty-minute barrage by three front’s worth of artillery, including massed Katyusha rocket fire, the lead elements of the Saratov and Stalingrad fronts began their attacks. The Germans had been fortifying since they’d reached their stopping points last October. Pioneers worked dutifully in the early morning hours to clear obstacles and mines while the assault guns pounded away at earthworks.
The Army Air Forces had begun to deploy a new toy on their A-14 and Il-2 attackers: hollow-charge warhead cluster bombs and rockets. Though limited in availability, they significantly increased the lethality of direct attacks on enemy armor, which were generally quite resilient. Air-ground coordination had improved significantly since the last campaign, and the Soviets had finally amassed a good crop of division level officers and a backbone of NCOs for their units.
While the Soviets had dramatically closed the gap with their American allies, victory was not in the cards for Operation Thrush. Previous Comintern victories such as the crushing crackback in the Battle of Moscow had been won against worn out, understrength and overstretched German units. In Operation Thrush, the Comintern would strike at a relatively well dug in and supplied enemy.
While
maskirovka had concealed Comintern intentions in the sector, the German military leadership reacted quickly to the attack. The surprise and shock advantage lasted perhaps a day in most sectors, though longer against the minor Axis allies. Manstein quickly coordinated counterattacks, moved up reserves, and blocked Rokossovsky and Patton’s spearheads.
A battle in three dimensions would rage across Don basin for two months. The Germans would fight as conservatively as they could, while the Comintern sought to maximize the level of attrition suffered by their enemies. This meant a savage expenditure of human life made bearable only because the frontline was inching backwards, and they were giving the Germans for the first time in the war no easy excuses for the losses they suffered. Stavka fed more reserves of men and materiel into the operation as it progressed, as the Germans were inched backwards to the bridgheads of the Donets river.
In the rear area, the Comintern made every effort possible to evacute the populations of liberated towns and villages. The roads soon became choked with civilians waiting to hitch a ride on the relay of military trunks. Many thousands were killed in deliberate terror attacks by the Luftwaffe. Such savage displays by the thoroughly Nazified Luftwaffe, along with all too common instances of German pilots machine gunning their opponents after they had bailed out, resulted in vicious reprisals, often against the orders of commanders and political commissars. The policy was not done out of humanitarian concerns; captured pilots were often excellent sources of intelligence if it could be pried out of them.
A little over a month into the operation, the offensives began to lose steam. Reserves had been used up, and the stream of replacements were not up to the task. While the Comintern was churning through equipment at a staggering rate, this was much more easily replaced than the trained pilots, tankers or infantrymen that wielded them. Worse, the news was starting to confirm Stavka’s worst fears.
After a heated argument at the Stalingrad Front HQ, during which Zhukov and Patton nearly came to blows, an agreement was finally reached. Patton wanted to continue the push in his sector; even using conservative estimates of claimed destruction of enemy materiel and men, the exchange ratios were still positive according to revolutionary warfare doctrine’s military calculus. The Comintern may have been losing more men and materiel, but the rate of German losses were exceeding sustainable attrition levels, while Comintern attrition levels were still within a comfortable margin. After some vodka, the two pugnacious officers worked out their personal problems, and agreed to continue the attack until 15 March. Weather forecasts predicted thawing soon after, and the spring rasputitsa would give time to prepare for the expected summer onslaught.
The battle continued, and Manstein continued to bend before he broke. They dug their heels in stubbornly whenever possible, and gave a little bit of ground if necessary. It was enough to keep Hitler’s frustration down to a dull roar.
When the offensive operation ceased on the 15th, the Stalingrad and Saratov fronts made a minor tactical retreat, averaging 15 to 20 kilometers, selecting superior defensive ground for the next campaign season. They’d pushed the German vanguard back almost 200 kilometers, from the Don back to the Donets, but had made no deep exploitations. The Germans still occupied the east bank of the Donets.
The casualties in the campaign were immense. The Comintern suffered nearly 600,000 killed, wounded or captured. Some 3500 tanks, 5500 artillery pieces, and 990 combat aircraft. German casualties were considerable as well; 347,000 killed or missing. In terms of materiel, 1400 tanks, 2900 artillery pieces and 940 combat aircraft were lost.
Significantly, at the end of the campaign, in spite of the greater losses the Comintern had increased the disparity of forces in the theater in their favor. German frontline divisions were exhausted, reserves of spare parts and ammunition were at critical levels, and some of the Panzer divisions had no working tanks in their inventory. Losses exceeded the rate of resupply; much of the difference had come by “borrowing” tanks, artillery and aircraft from Army Group Caucasus’ inventory.
* Denotes fictional person