Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

Chapter 77: Crossing the Gulf
Chapter 77: Crossing the Gulf

“For twenty long years I have been dragging myself through the dreary waste of Colonial politics. I thought then there was no end, nothing worthy of ambition, but, now I see something which is well worthy of all I have suffered in the cause of my little country. This question has now assumed a position that demands and commands the attention of all the Colonies of British America. There may be obstructions, local difficulties may arise, disputes may occur, local jealousies may intervene, but it matters not – the wheel is now revolving, and we are only the fly on the wheel, we cannot delay it – the union of the colonies of British America, under one sovereign, is a fixed fact.” - John A. Macdonald, a speech to the Colonial delegates at Halifax, October 15th 1863

“By late 1863, the various colonies which made up British North America were being hit hard by the war. In the United Province of Canada, despite some prosperity, the economy was depressed. While military spending, the presence of soldiers, and not inconsiderable investment from foreign sources drove financial engines in Canada East, Canada West was the opposite. Still occupied beyond Toronto, the country was deprived of many men, either serving in the armies, prisoners, or dead. Families had to sustain themselves on what they could, and despite some permission to sell in the United States, deflated food prices in that country meant that Canadian farmers often faced destitution. In those areas where Union control was lax, some trade could be carried out with British authorities, while in many places farmers and tradesmen had to accept almost worthless greenbacks, or nothing at all.

This economic trouble spread to the Canadian provincial government in Quebec. While many could afford finer goods, food prices had doubled from their pre-1862 costs, and in many cases what could be had was being sent to sustain the Army of Canada. As a consequence, civilians suffered from want of many hitherto easily obtainable goods. Coffee, tea, and salt could be had for reasonable prices, but bread and pork could not. It was a conundrum which would lead to much grumbling in places as diverse as Kingston and Montreal.

Similarly, the area occupied by the Union armies had paid almost two thirds of the pre-1862 taxes to the Canadian government, and its loss gutted the Canadian revenue stream. As a result, some higher taxes were levied, and the Canadian government had to beg financing from London to keep men in the field. While many in London would begrudge the expense, they did manage to rationalize the payments to Canada by writing them into the overall war spending…” – Blood and Daring: The War of 1862 and how Canada forged a Nation, Raymond Green, University of Toronto Press, 2002

“…the economic costs in 1863, for such a young nation, were staggering. Millions in tax revenues had been lost, and a provincial legislature which was accruing significant debts could little afford the costs of maintaining a not inconsiderable field force by itself.

Though the costs were largely folded into war spending by the Imperial Government, London did expect that the provinces would adjust to the war with financial sacrifices of their own. The Maritimes and Quebec in particular were drawn heavily upon. The Maritimes did receive some relief as in 1862 – 1863 the number of immigrants ballooned by a factor of four, some 40,000 arriving directly in Halifax, St. Johns, and St. Andrews. Many were drawn by work, especially the work on the roads and the expensive proposition of expanding the railroads north to Tobique and beyond. However, an influx of workers greatly deflated wages, and there were notable grievances in the provincial papers.

Similar economic patterns were noted in Canada East, where 60,000 people landed between 1862 and 1863, with over 200,000 coming through Quebec and Montreal between 1864 and 1871. These earlier years were more chaotic however, as work was not scarce, but wages again fell steadily. Though some of these immigrants did indeed volunteer to take the Queen’s shilling, it was apparent that neither purely patriotic rallying nor the enticement of bounties could bring all manner of people to the ranks.

It was these concerns which helped to drive the Maritime colonies to begin to discuss pooling their resources in August of 1863. From the great port of Halifax to tiny Charlottetown, the Maritimes had been largely spared the brunt of the war, and only those who had volunteered to serve alongside the regulars in New England had truly seen action from Portland to Augusta. Only the New Brunswick militia could claim to be seriously committed, policing the large expanse of territory seized from Maine to free up British regulars in the early months of the war.

It was, like all the ventures, costly however. Both Nova Scotia and New Brunswick saw the wisdom in combining their assets to ease the burden of economic hardship and financial competition. Prince Edward Island too hoped to join as even its very small militia contingent was an expense, and the Lt. Governors of each colony believed that together they might accomplish more than they could individually.

Leading the charge was the young and stubborn Lt. Governor of New Brunswick, Arthur Gordon. He had come to the colony in 1861, despite offerings of a far more comfortable and effective posting in Antigua. Arriving he had become enamored with the colony and its natural beauty, but had quickly found fault with its political apparatus. The ruling class were a mix of lumber merchants and parochial politicians who paid the Governor lip service and seemed inclined to ignore him altogether.


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Lt. Governor Arthur Gordon of New Brunswick

This changed dramatically as war threatened and then came and the legislature had begun falling over itself to accommodate the Mother Country. Gordon had cheekily written to the Colonial Secretary in late 1862 “whereas the parochial men of power in this Colony had before the crisis ignored and paid me lip service, they now fall on their faces in supplication. True the lumbermen are avarice for the trade, but the business class as a whole seems inclined to speak with me in order to obtain that most sure means of succor, railroad bonds…

Gordon had become increasingly convinced that the only way forward was unification. In this he had found a willing, if indifferent, ally in the Lt. Governor of Nova Scotia, the Earl of Mulgrave. While Mulgrave was, at best, ill concerned with the future of Nova Scotia, his return to England in the autumn of 1863 to replace his father in the House of Lords saw the rise of a figure with a vested interest taking command of Nova Scotia. Colonel Charles Hastings Doyle.

Doyle had played a part in bringing Nova Scotia, and effectively all the Maritimes, to readiness militarily in 1861 and 1862. As such, he had developed a prompt working relationship with Gordon. The two men had written often, and Doyle himself was often moving between Halifax and Fredericton inspecting his various commands and speaking with the legislatures and Lt. Governor Gordon. The two men had quickly come to agree that the Maritimes united would be more capable of defence than the Maritimes divided.

It was thus decided that the different leaders would meet in Halifax come October 1863…

With the Maritime initiative, it begs the question of how Macdonald was even invited to Halifax in the first place. It was, to some extent, dumb luck. The Lt. Governors of the Maritime provinces had happened to be in Quebec for a conference in September 1863 and Macdonald was speaking with Lord Monck when he discovered the proposed Maritime meeting.

In his fashion, Macdonald set out to “wine and dine” the various Lt. Governors until they felt they had no choice but to include beleaguered Canada in the discussions. Doyle, who also had interests in the railroad, felt obliged to invite those representing its Canadian terminus in Quebec to at least speak on the project's behalf. It was Gordon however, who had the most clout to deliver, and Macdonald spent much time conversing and joking with the man.

Macdonald wasted no time in choosing suitable men to accompany him.

Cartier would of course follow in his footsteps, with him would also be his military secretary Hewitt Bernard. He also brought Thomas D’Arcey McGee, Alexander Tilloch Galt, and Hector Louis Lavengin, Oliver Mowat, among other principle delegates. These men would form the backbone of the Province of Canada delegation. The absence of George Brown, who had stayed behind to help run provincial matters in the absence of the major figures, would lead to some acrimony in the aftermath.

Nova Scotia would place the stately Charles Tupper at the head of their delegation. He would be supported by William Alexander Henry and Adams G. Archibald, among others. Joseph Howe had hoped to take part in the deliberations, but at the time was in London dealing with the ever contentious Intercolonial Railroad to investors, hoping to sway some away from the ongoing St. Andrews Railroad project.

New Brunswick would be represented by Gordon, who simply could not stay away while his dream of a Maritime Union was on the line. In tow were his supporters Samuel Leonard Tilley, John Hamilton Gray, and William Henry Steeves among others, but through Tilley, all would defer to Gordon who, importantly, had London’s ear.

Prince Edward Island had sent a particularly distinguished delegation, with its Lt. Governor, Andrew A. Macdonald leading it, the premier John Hamilton Gray, former (and first premier) George Coles, the legal scholar and journalist William H. Pope, and notably, a man who adamantly opposed the unification Edward Palmer. Cartier would joke “With such a distinguished delegation, who shall govern the island in their absence?

Distant Newfoundland sent only a single observer, Ambrose Shea. Deeply conservative, and primarily interested in railroad matters, he was there to represent his colony in the matter, but arrived not wholly convinced of the merits of uniting with all of Canada rather than simply the Maritimes.

The delegates for the initial conference gathered at Halifax on October 14. Meeting at Dalhousie College (now Dalhousie University) which was notably free of students, many of whom were instead enrolled in the defences of the colony instead. While many curious Haloginians did hang around, the Conference did little to attract the attention of most, as many were more interested in the war, and much gossip remained on the outcome of the Battle of Sandy Hook, as ships from that battle were still streaming into harbor alongside many wounded crew. For now, the delegates were able to discuss the issue in relative peace. The representatives from Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and the Canadas all began to speak about the pressing issues of the day.


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Dalhousie College, 1864

For the mainland colonies the most pressing issue was the war. In the Canadas and New Brunswick, the potential of another American invasion remained very real to the men leading the province, and the poor communications between Fredericton and the true might of any British army in North America at Quebec hung deeply on their minds. New Brunswickers were even then holding territory in Maine and giving their lives in skirmishes against Union troops. While there

Nova Scotia found itself in a comfortable position. The potential of a land invasion, so long as the Royal Navy ruled the seas, was remote in the extreme. From the position as a natural harbor on the Atlantic and having port facilities the navy could use, Halifax had grown in importance and population. In just over a year it had grown from barely 50,000 inhabitants to over 55,000. The coal mines of Truro were extremely important to the navy, and the timber and fish were vital in allowing Britain to keep her blockade. Tens of thousands of pounds sterling had been poured into the province, and many men had become rich. The only blight on Nova Scotia’s trajectory to importance was that, unlike the railroad being cobbled together in New Brunswick to reach Quebec, Nova Scotia could not easily send goods and military material overland. That, as much as anything else, was why Nova Scotia was hosting the conference; they could not allow themselves to be left out of any potential railroad negotiations. This was a fact Joseph Howe would later stress at Quebec...

Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland were also at little risk of invasion, and not even remotely connected to the mainland. PEI was concerned with communications, but so long as the Royal Navy reigned supreme, it too had little to worry from the United States. The greatest threat in most Islanders minds were the absentee landlords, the hated “Cunards” who owned, outright, much of the land on the island. Newfoundland was even more remote, and only a few of her sons had volunteered to fight in the war and so was detached from the conflict as a whole. Her greatest grievance was with American raiders occasionally burning fishing vessels of the Grand Banks. Other than that, the larger island was little interested in the affairs of the mainland…

As the conference opened, there was some discussion of what was to be done. Initially, the Maritime delegates floated their proposals of a Maritime Union including the Province of Canada. However, the proposal was poorly thought out and it was later castigated by Macdonald as a “poor man’s customs union” which would have only a single body to discuss internal trade, and one legislative assembly to discuss all other issues. Even in a time of war the Maritimers looked primarily to the Royal Navy for defence.

At the opening of the Conference on the 14th, speeches opened the Conference. It fell to Tupper of Nova Scotia to commence the opening address. In doing so he welcomed “our brothers in arms and loyal subjects of the Queen from Canada,” and lauded the work to be done. He spoke of the potential for ‘a unified nation’ in all of British North America, but was keen to speak of the bounty of the Atlantic, the proximity of the Mother Country, and the benefits of connecting Halifax with "that great bastion of England, Quebec.” He managed to soothe any irritation from the smaller Maritime provinces by speaking glowingly of the advantages to them, but in the main, he seemed more concerned with listing all Nova Scotia had to offer.

Gray spoke next, speaking on behalf of New Brunswickers. He spoke admiringly of the sacrifice of the people of the Canadas, and expressed hope for ‘the speedy unification of our lands by rail and in politics,’ which rankled the Nova Scotian delegates. Gray then spoke of the ‘unrivaled bounty’ to be made from unification, but whether this was from Canada or with Maine, none were entirely sure…

It fell then to Macdonald to make the opening speech on behalf of Canada. On the 15th he began with an impassioned speech, not about abstract notions, but about the need for national unity, and most importantly, the sovereignty of one power. He went to great lengths in his speech in pointing out one of the great evils of the American system to the south which had caused so many problems. Namely “we know that every individual state was an individual sovereignty – that each had its own army and navy and political organization – and when they formed themselves into a confederation they only gave the central authority certain specific powers, reserving to the individual states all the other rights appertaining to sovereign powers.

Clearly then there was only one answer. He argued “the dangers that have risen from this system we will avoid if we can agree upon forming a strong central government – a great central Legislature – a constitution for a Union which will have all the rights of sovereignty except those that are given to the local governments. Then we shall have taken a great step in advance of the American Republic.”

On the 16th he gave a rousing endorsements of those duties of local governments, however, he was slow to name exactly what those duties were, an issue which would come to haunt him…

He did however, lay out exactly what the issues a Union government would attend to. Chief among them were defence, the posts, and the railroad. Of those three, defence and railroad were the most pressing. He freely admitted that knitting the colonies together by railroad would unite them more firmly than even their ties to the British Crown. In his speeches he addressed the pressing need for a unified defence against the potential future encroachment of the American Republic. Indeed, the two were naturally complimentary, he stressed, and he painted a picture of the government which would do it.

Macdonald inherently distrusted any system with a weak central government. He felt sure that a strong central government was what Canada needed. He laid out a plan which, whether he intended it or not, drew as much influence from the United States as it did Great Britain. There would be two houses, an elected lower house and an appointed upper house. In 1863 he breezed past the nature of the upper house, but drove home his plan for an elected ‘united legislature’ which he wished to establish with a unified representation. Twenty delegates for Canada West, twenty for Canada East, and five for each of the Maritime colonies, whether independent or united. He dazzled them with, if not equal, then proportional representation altogether.

Concluding his whirlwind remarks on the 17th he said “If we can only obtain that object – a vigorous general government – we shall not be New Brunswickers, nor Nova Scotians, nor Canadians, but British Americans, under the sway of the British Sovereign. In discussing the question of colonial union, we must consider what is desirable and practicable; we must consult local prejudices and aspirations. It is our desire to do so. I hope that we will be enabled to work out a constitution that will have a strong central Government, able to offer a powerful resistance to any foe whatever, and at the same time will preserve for each Province its own identity.

The major matters concluded, the delegates would break on the 18th, and from there a charm offensive led by Cartier would be taken up. It was here the complimentary nature of Macdonald and Cartier would shine, as Macdonald dazzled the delegates with visions of the United British North America, Cartier worked behind the scenes with his smooth words and high energy. Any delegate who appeared to be flagging in support found themselves with a smooth word or a joke to brighten them in their spirits. He would use his ‘rebel’ past as a way to disarm and charm his fellow delegates, and promise them they would not be swamped by the ‘monolith’ of the United Province of Canada.

When the delegates again assembled on the 19th, it was Galt’s turn to go on the offensive. Galt would use his financial acumen to paint a clear picture of a financially sustainable union, one which could afford not only a railroad, but to pay for a ‘well appointed militia to protect hearth and home from the Muskokas to the Bay of Fundy’ which rung well in the ears of both Nova Scotians and New Brunswickers…

By the 21st, the delegation had begun to break up. In the wholesale meeting most had come away convinced of the need for the unity of all the British North American colonies. Gordon himself would realize he needed much to do if he was to make New Brunswick a key player in these negotiations. The delegates from Prince Edward Island came away feeling that they would soon own their lands outright, while the Nova Scotians felt that they had something to gain. Even the aloof Shea came away convinced of this dream of all Britain’s colonies in North America united.

It was decided that the delegates would meet again in six months time at Quebec in April. The time between, it was agreed, would be spent in consultation and correspondence regarding the various needs and concerns of the colonies. Macdonald expected that he would be able to corral and cajole any reluctant members, and he felt that he would be in for an easy ride to a strong central government, and a unified British North America.

What he did not count on was George Brown and Joseph Howe…” - The Road to Confederation, 1863 – 1869 the Formative Years, Queens University Press, Donald Simmonds
 
my first thought seeing the notification was "I love you "..which is impressive for a timeline about my some of favorite countries ripping each other apart .but seriously thank you just when I needed a boast!

now thoughts on the chapter.
Mcdonald in real life thought the American system a good one expect for the lack of clear sovereignty and the head of state also being the head of government but I am guessing ITTL he can't say that outright .

unification is bound to succeed given what we know of the future but my guess is it won't be as strong a government as he Is hoping for .

my guess is the martimes will somehow create there own "union inside a union" or create special protections that amount to the same thing and somehow screw over canada in a future crisis.


the name of the country might be "kingdom " instead of "dominion" because the delegates won't be scared about provoking american sensibilities like OTL.


I wonder if given the war Americans will flat-out refuse to believe canada is a democracy and like OTL condemn the union as "a monarchist usurpation of the people " .

Or maybe we'll use that in propaganda it does prove union ideology after all "even our enemies see the need for a strong union !"


on the positives from the hints given qubebc might be more pro confederation/federalist ITTl.


and lastly

that great bastion of England, Quebec.”
did that feel as weird to write it did to read?
 
No matter how many times I read about Confederation it boggles the mind to see how short-sighted everyone was with regards to the Senate and how prone to abuse it is.
 
my first thought seeing the notification was "I love you "..which is impressive for a timeline about my some of favorite countries ripping each other apart .but seriously thank you just when I needed a boast!

Glad to inject some endorphins into your system!

now thoughts on the chapter.
Mcdonald in real life thought the American system a good one expect for the lack of clear sovereignty and the head of state also being the head of government but I am guessing ITTL he can't say that outright .

He can express some sympathy for the war, but here he's far more likely to emphasize the "evils" of the American system. Indeed all I basically did here is take his most unflattering takes from the speeches he made OTL and add them in without the preamble that expressed sympathy for the North. He certainly saw the American Union as flawed, and he had some first hand experience with it, and did not want to draw on it more than necessary.

unification is bound to succeed given what we know of the future but my guess is it won't be as strong a government as he Is hoping for .

my guess is the martimes will somehow create there own "union inside a union" or create special protections that amount to the same thing and somehow screw over canada in a future crisis.

Macdonald is going to be in for some hurdles that will surprise him. So far he has 3/5 existing provinces on his side (Newfoundland is...well Newfoundland) and there are some men who will not be very happy about the version of Confederation that Macdonald has painted at Halifax. The Quebec Conference of TTL will have some interesting ripples it didn't see OTL.

There's going to be some interesting events in the Maritimes, but they have arguments of their own.

the name of the country might be "kingdom " instead of "dominion" because the delegates won't be scared about provoking american sensibilities like OTL.

I will admit, this is something I'm rather divided on still. Canada as a name just seems like it will stick, but Dominion, Kingdom, Confederacy, Union? Well, that's something I have not quite nailed down.

I wonder if given the war Americans will flat-out refuse to believe canada is a democracy and like OTL condemn the union as "a monarchist usurpation of the people " .

Or maybe we'll use that in propaganda it does prove union ideology after all "even our enemies see the need for a strong union !"

The US is going to have some particular grievances against Canada. There will be certain factions who will say Canada is not a democracy and merely a puppet of Great Britain, and this will have some effects in the latter half of the 1860s and the 1870s. A few important issues will exist in the post war world...

Macdonald is going to have a lot to say about the merits (or lack thereof) of the US system. OTL he didn't think it was very effective, and felt that his chief executive (or him if you want to be a bit uncourteous) needed a strong hand to mold the regional problems of Canada together. There's going to be some advantages the war brings, in that everyone is going to be terrified of another war in the near future, but also some unexpected complications. Macdonald is going to run into a mildly humorous one that will really rub him the wrong way vis a vis defence.

on the positives from the hints given qubebc might be more pro confederation/federalist ITTl.

Quebec will still be unique, but its internal politics for a generation will be rather outward looking compared to OTL. The very real fear of another invasion is going to hang over them, and all the potential hurdles that involves. There's also going to be a certain loyalty to the Church that will be, somewhat, extreme.

and lastly


did that feel as weird to write it did to read?

Oh you have no idea!
 
No matter how many times I read about Confederation it boggles the mind to see how short-sighted everyone was with regards to the Senate and how prone to abuse it is.

I've been reading about it with interest. I'm certainly not having the Confederation of OTL go ahead verbatim so expect some interesting changes in how to use and abuse the Senate...
 
Chapter 78: A Conundrum in Whitehall
Chapter 78: A Conundrum in Whitehall

“Mr. Roebuck, after presenting a Petiton praying the House to enter into negotiations with the great Powers of Europe, with the object of recognising the independence of the Confederate States of America, said: I am well aware of the gravity and importance of the question I am about to bring before the House; and I well know, also, the sort of obloquy which will be directed against me for so doing by those persons who deem themselves the salt of the earth, and who think that every opinion of theirs ought to be the opinion of all other men, or that all other men ought to bow to their opinions. In spite, however, of that obloquy, believing the course I shall take to be for the interest of my countrymen, I now appeal to the House—to its honour and duty—ask the Crown to enter into negotiations with the great Powers for the purpose of acknowledging the independence of the Southern States of North America.” MP John A. Roebuck before the House of Commons, June 30th, 1863, Hansard

“While the appointed ambassadors to Europe were floundering, one unofficial envoy was doing very well…

Henry Hotze was only twenty-seven years old when he came to London to argue the case for the Confederacy. The son of naturalized Swiss immigrants living in Mobile, he managed to win his way into foreign service unofficially with a combination of charm and intelligence. Fluent in French and German, he had briefly been engaged in mercantile efforts in Brussels in the 1850s where he had been praised for his intelligence and wit. Using this connection he had managed to make his way to London where he after the fact convinced the Confederate State Department to make use of him. Judah Benjamin would quickly come to regard him as one of his most dependable agents.

He had actually managed to arrive in London before the release of Mason and Slidell, allowing him to become familiarized with the newspapers of the city. When Mason arrived, he was connected to Hotze, who then followed Mason wherever he went, gaining many important social connections otherwise unavailable to him. However, the two did not work well together, and Hotze merely tolerated Mason, despising his tobacco chewing and confused mannerisms. Mason however, as in so much else, remained in the dark to Hotze’s attitudes, and encouraged the young man...


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Henry Hotze, the premier propagandist

Faster than anyone would have thought possible, Hotze managed to place an editorial in the Morning Post, a newspaper which Palmerston used often as his own mouthpiece. This gave him an edge as a propagandist, and through February 1862 was placing editorials in newspapers such as the London Standard and the Herald.

Thanks to the declaration of war he found an audience hungry for content. He deftly appealed to latent anti-Union feelings in Britain, British naval rights, and the rights of smaller nations, and the feeling that the South was the underdog.

By May of 1862 he had managed to set up his own pro-Confederate newspaper, The Index, which he found headquarters for on Fleet Street. The war made for a hungry audience, and by early 1863 he was distributing all across England, with a readership in France and Belgium as well. Soon he was managing to cover his own costs without financial aid from the State Department, and even giving fair salaries to his own employees.

Hotze was rapidly becoming the most influential Confederate in Europe…

In 1863 he would face his greatest challenge. The Emancipation Proclamation allowed the Union to sally forth on some moral high ground, and did indeed shake some pro-Southern feeling in England. Hotze would devote his considerable energies to undermining it.

He decided that the best way to defeat it was to conjure the images of a race war. Writing in April 1863 he said “And what does Emancipation bring? A horde of freed negroes without wage or shelter, free to wander the land but without any means of sustenance. Lincoln has found the means to enfranchise them, and like the Janissaries of old he grants them muskets in exchange for Southern scalps. What will these armed sepoys bring to the innocent women of the South if not all the horrors of Hayti and Cawnpore.

Hotze had, quite cynically and cleverly, found a chord with the British public. Memories of the slaughter of women and children by the sepoy troops of the Mutiny were still fresh in many minds. Playing to racist fears of the day and the real memories of the Mutiny, he managed to push many otherwise moderate opinions towards the Southern cause. Skilled imagery of the hardships of war and the unknown future of Emancipation allowed him to make common cause with men like William Lindsay and John Roebuck. They would, in turn, argue vigorously for the Southern cause in London…” - The Press is Mightier than the Sword: Henry Hotze and the Confederate Propaganda Machine in Europe 1861-1867, Emmanuel Robertson, Oxford Press, 1968


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The Confederate mouthpiece, The Index

“In London, the matters of foreign policy in Britain were not examined lightly in late 1863.

There had been some attempt to exert influence on St. Petersburg over its suppression of the Poles, but this had been ignored. The matter of the Greek throne had been settled to London’s satisfaction, and they could soon free up yet more men for service in North America. In Asia, the Taiping had been repulsed by French, English and the mercenary army of Charles Ward, meaning that there was no threat to the great British entrepot on the Chinese coast. In New Zealand, the Maori began to agitate against encroaching British settlement, and it would only be a matter of time before British attention would need to be turned to the problems there. The Japanese meanwhile, continued to vex British merchants and ambassadors, requiring the intervention of the Royal Navy.

However, all attention was required for North America, where the war continued in earnest.

The question of Confederate status remained contentious, and split across the political lines so recently created. Many of Palmerston’s own colleagues in the Liberals, even in Cabinet, were also leaning distinctly in a recognition direction, creating a schism in the government at a time when the government could least afford it.

Gladstone had been the most vocal, and the most problematic with his speech at Newcastle on Tyne in October 1862, saying: “We know quite well that the people of the Northern States have not yet drunk of the cup -- they are still trying to hold it far from their lips -- which all the rest of the world see they nevertheless must drink of. We may have our own opinions about slavery; we may be for or against the South; but there is no doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made, what is more than either, they have made a nation.

Palmerston’s greatest threat came from the newly created Southern Independence Association founded in Manchester. A coalition of Peers and MPs had, in late autumn with the backing of many popular voices - especially in Lancashire - founded the Association to pressure the government to recognize the Confederate States. The president was Edward Stuart-Wortley-Mackenzie, 1st Earl of Wharncliffe, a peer and railway magnate who was heavily invested in open trade with the South. The group used newspapers, public rallies and speeches to gin up support for the Confederacy, and by extension, the war. Coupled as it was with the generally popular anti-Union sentiment pervasive in Britain at the time, many willingly flocked to its cause.

Some of the most vocal proponents of the Southern cause Britain were John Laird, the MP for Birkenhead, William H. Gregory, MP for Galway, William Schaw Lindsay, MP for Sunderland, and the most wild of all, John Arthur Roebuck, MP for Sheffield. The loyalties crossed party affiliations, and as the rebel armies surged, calls for recognition of the Confederacy rose in volume…

Many conservatives, especially amongst the Lords, were more friendly to an independent South and felt that the vacillation of the Palmerston ministry was a chance to strike and unseat the minister. The Earl of Derby, though tepid on Southern independence, was hoping to bait the Palmerston government into misstep. His second in command, Disraeli, was far more active. As Britain was at war, and now seemingly engaged directly alongside the Confederacy, he was adamant the government take a stance.

Disraeli himself addressed the question of Southern recognition in February. His greatest concern was at first taking a shot at the seeming inconsistency of the government’s policy on the Confederacy, stating that: “It appeared to me that the course which Her Majesty's Government had apparently resolved upon was one which, on the whole, was honourable to this country, and would prove beneficial to all classes of the community. I was therefore surprised and, individually speaking, somewhat mortified, when I found that in the course of the autumn Her Majesty's Government commissioned one of their Members to repair to the chief seats of industry in the country to announce, as I understood it, an entire change in the policy which they had throughout supported and sanctioned. It was not an accident; the declaration was made formally, and it was made avowedly with the consent and sanction of the Government. Now, Sir, what did that declaration mean? If it meant anything, it meant that the Southern States would be recognised; because, if it be true that they have created armies navies, and a people, we are bound by every principle of policy and of public law to recognise their political existence,” which caused Palmerston some trouble to rebut.

He spoke at length again outlining his views that; “For my own part, I am bound to say that from the first—and subsequent events have only confirmed my conviction —I have always looked upon the struggle which has occurred in America in the light of a revolution, and of a great revolution. Great revolutions, whatever may be their causes, are not lightly commenced, and are not concluded with precipitation... I cannot conceal from myself the conviction that whoever in this House may live to witness the ultimate conclusion of the consequences of this civil war will see, whenever the waters have subsided, a different America from that which was known to our fathers, and from that even of which this generation has had so much experience. It will, I believe, be an America of armies, it will be an America of diplomacy, it will be an America of rival States and maneuvering Cabinets, of frequent turbulence, and of frequent wars. With these views, I have myself, during the last Session, exerted whatever influence I might possess in endeavoring to dissuade my Friends from embarrassing Her Majesty's Government in that position of politic and dignified reserve which they appeared to me to have taken up on this question.

He had supported the initial war, and as 1862 turned to 1863 he had maintained his support. That Palmerston drove for a hard war meant that his foes could do little to unseat him at first. There was overall however, a sense of unity of purpose amongst the establishment which Disraeli supported…


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Benjamin Disraeli, the Conservative leader in waiting

This changed in early 1863 as word of the Emancipation Proclamation crossed the seas. Upon learning of the freedom of slaves in the Confederate States under Lincoln’s orders Palmerston was said to have quipped “Yes, but how many walk free in Kentucky?”

It raised a point that became difficult for the abolition movement in Britain. Argyll was known to have thrown up his hands in despair at the news. “Had they but announced this claim a year before we might never have commenced this wretched war!” Cobden and Bright, both private, but not public, opponents of the war, mused bitterly in a similar vein. Cobden though, would stridently use the Emancipation Proclamation as means to try and support a separate peace. Much like their opponents in the Independence Association, the two radicals would attempt to use the press, and the moral revulsion of slavery, to pressure the government to accept a separate peace with the North.

It may be better for England,” Cobden would write “to gracefully exit this vast conflict and allow the matter of Southern independence to be decided in the halls of power in Richmond and Washington. After all, we do not propose to intervene in the matter of the present Chinese revolution, why so should England exert her power upon this new American revolution?

This, rather succinctly, captured the conundrum facing Lord Palmerston. Though he truly wished to see the Union shattered by 1863, he did not wish to make the Confederacy believe that the Union could be held at bay with British force of arms.

To this end he had done much to distance himself from the Confederate envoy Mason. He had politely rebuffed Southern gentlemen, Lords, and even Southern ladies from his home, even once retreating to Broadlands out of season to put off a delegation of Charleston and Lancashire merchants who were forced to call upon his wife Emily instead. It strained relations within the War Cabinet as Palmerston would redirect the issue of recognition to that of strategy.

In one particularly heated exchange with the Duke of Somerset, the Duke would ask firmly how England ought to coordinate with the Southern navy if they did not speak with Richmond? Palmerston would coyly note “There is no envoy with which we might coordinate. And it is far too much time across the Atlantic as to make coordination with our own admirals impossible.

As such, he managed to deftly parry the issue for now. However, as Lee’s armies encircled Washington, he found himself perilously close to having to commit.

From all the news received, it appeared inevitable that the South would capture Washington, and with it the greatest army fielded by the Union and thus open the whole coast up to Confederate force. The men of the Southern Independence Association called loudly on the government to commit to recognizing the Confederacy. This was where Roebuck again entered the scene.

A Liberal member of Parliament, he could not be accused of attempting to unseat the government, and he maintained cordial relations with men from both parties. He had, he assumed, a broad popular support to declare a motion to recognize the Confederate States as an independent nation. He wrote privately to Russell, exhorting him to push the Cabinet towards recognition. He spoke with Disraeli that he might gain Conservative support for his motion. He did, by and large, everything he ought to have...

Throughout June, as the success of the Confederate attack became clear, London society was filled with rumours. Mason would write positively to Richmond that “There is a great swell upon the air, as though the City is holding its breath in anticipation of a momentous event. I am informed from reliable quarters (Hotze) that there is soon to be a motion put forward in Parliament regarding our recognition amongst nations. It is said France will soon put word out to that effect.

Palmerston himself made one of his few true mistakes in June. On the 20th, while entertaining guests at Cambridge House, he would say “Many people who talk of acknowledgment seem to imply that that acknowledgment, if made, would establish some different relations between this country and the Southern States. But that is not the case. Acknowledgment would not establish a nation unless the Northern States were to accede to this reality and accept an ambassador from the South.

It was, in brief, an assertion that Britain would follow the Union’s lead in recognizing Southern independence. The newspapers were swift to report, with varying degrees of accuracy, Palmerston’s statement. He would spend a week fighting that perception in the press, attempting to play off the statement as ‘idle speculation’ which in light of rumours of Roebuck’s proposal, proved to be detrimental to his cause. A stormy meeting of the Cabinet Ensued the next day in which various insults were thrown back and forth, Gladstone and Russell accusing Palmerston of casual undermining of the government, and Palmerston reprimanding his fellows for “setting government policy in speechmaking on the Tyne rather than Whitehall” which induced Lord Granville to call the cabinet to recess.

Palmerston did return however, to propose a solution to the difficulty. He argued that, before Washington fell, any movement to adjudicate between the question of Southern independence and peace with the North was ‘premature’ and so ought to wait. This was, much to Gladstone and Russell’s chagrin, accepted. It was deemed wiser to negotiate from a position of unrivalled strength rather than risk a premature declaration. If Parliament attempted to move the motion forward, the government and its allies would move to delay the debate…

June the 30th came and, as many expected, Roebuck rose to propose his motion, stating “I now appeal to the House—to its honour and duty—ask the Crown to enter into negotiations with the great Powers for the purpose of acknowledging the independence of the Southern States of North America.” He warmed up a lengthy appeal and proclamation, “Now comes the question—What are we to do? I say at once we ought to acknowledge the independence of the South; and why? first because they have a right to claim it. They are a gallant people, who, with a very small force, have resisted and conquered the North. They have rolled back the tide of invasion. It is not Richmond that is now in peril, but Washington; and if there be terror anywhere, it is in the minds of the merchants of New York.”

Roebuck’s speech gained many cheers, and there seemed to be much support as he labored on the evils of slavery, the condition of blacks in the North, the hope of England to enlighten America, and his hope that it would “drive the war to a speedy conclusion at the forefront of a powerful alliance between that Confederation of States and the Powers of Europe that the Northern States could not hope to resist.

Predictably, he received pushback from some Liberals, and notably John Bright who admonished Roebuck in that “he would throw the weight of England into the scale in favour of the cause of slavery” which Roebuck vigorously refused until the speaker called him to order. Predictably the debate raged until the late hours of the morning when Palmerston himself, certainly not feigning exhaustion, stood to speak for the government.

It has been the honor of this House to accept the speech of the Member from Sheffield, and he proposes a course which may indeed become the responsibility of this government. I must ask him however, whether he has received word from North America in advance of this government or Her Majesty? Has Washington fallen? Have the Southern armies advanced upon New York? Has our fleet won a great victory of which we are unaware…I would then propose to this House a debate on the recognition of the Southern Confederacy be postponed until a sure picture of the war has progressed.

It was thus through exhaustion and debate that Roebuck’s motion would, for the moment, be postponed…

Characteristically, Roebuck would not take the postponement sitting still. While no clear picture has emerged of what his thinking was, it is known Roebuck immediately wrote to the Confederate envoy in Paris, Mr. Slidell, to obtain some form of joint meeting with the Emperor. Travelling to France on the 6th of July, he would anxiously await communication with the Emperor on July 12th. In a short interview Roebuck came away believing that he had secured a promise of support from the French Emperor and would now be able to show a ‘united front’ from Europe to back up his position…

...Taking up the argument again on July 17th, Roebuck would produce his French connection. In this, he blundered badly. Immediately even supporters of his motion castigated him for his ‘representation of France’ in the House. Enemies pounced and would denounce the motion as ‘a French plot’ which leaked to the papers the next day. Roebuck had managed to sabotage his own motion and Palmerston deftly managed to throw it off for debate.


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In pushing the 'French Connection' John Roebuck managed to soundly sink his own motion

He managed to do so well until the defeat of Lee’s army in Maryland. This cooled the Cabinet’s ardor for intervention, at the moment. It also meant Palmerston could now present himself to his colleagues as ‘correct’ in regards to his slow trot of recognizing the Confederate states…

With the end of the threat to Washington, the news of the repulse of the army at Saratoga and the humiliating reversal off of Sandy Hook, the Cabinet now found themselves facing a stark choice, whether they should continue to fight in a war with no fixed end point, or gracefully extract themselves while their goals were thus far intact. The war, should it continue, would prove costly, and one that had cost so much already.

This debate would now permeate the Cabinet’s discussions, and even then questions would come raised in the House on the course of the war. It made the messages from Saint Petersburg very interesting…” - The World on Fire: The Third Anlgo-American War, Ashley Grimes, 2009, Random House Publishing
 
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So that's political catch up in 1863, and we can move on to 1864 after I round out the rest of the world as its been happening in this year. I think I've hinted well enough at some of the premier events of 1864.
 
Though I doubt Britain will accept the offer, in 1861 both Nepal and Bhutan offered to actually send troops in North America if war broke out with America. According to The Bloodstained Throne quotes Jung Bahadur Rana's letter to London stating 'upon the threat of the spillover of the Southern Revolution in the Americas onto the Northern Colonies of Britain, having spoken with my Bhutanese counterpart at length, should the parliament London accept I am willing to send 10,000 troops to aid any defense of British North America.' An interesting tidbit of history.
Very unlikely, but it would be cool to see Gurkhas and Druk Regiments during the war.
 
Funny how a point of possible strength helped scupper the chances of recognition quite neatly. With the war not really going anywhere as it is, I imagine the thought of peace is becoming tempting and is Russia offering to host peace negotiations going by that last comment?
 
Though I doubt Britain will accept the offer, in 1861 both Nepal and Bhutan offered to actually send troops in North America if war broke out with America. According to The Bloodstained Throne quotes Jung Bahadur Rana's letter to London stating 'upon the threat of the spillover of the Southern Revolution in the Americas onto the Northern Colonies of Britain, having spoken with my Bhutanese counterpart at length, should the parliament London accept I am willing to send 10,000 troops to aid any defense of British North America.' An interesting tidbit of history.
Very unlikely, but it would be cool to see Gurkhas and Druk Regiments during the war.

I had toyed with the idea, but ultimately I had believed that Britain wouldn't face a manpower crunch and would be unlikely to deploy sepoy troops to North America, especially not so close after the Mutiny. It's an interesting idea however, and I'll admit this is one tidbit I didn't know.

Overall, unless Britain really needed soldiers, I think the potential backlash would be too great in the 1860s rather than employing colored Volunteers and local Indigenous groups as I've illustrated. There'd be Colored Corps in both Canada West and Canada East (there's a Colored Corps in Montreal, but the garrison of Montreal has not been overly important to mention) and like at the Battle of Mount Pelion, there's Natives serving as scouts and auxiliaries in the armies already.
 
Funny how a point of possible strength helped scupper the chances of recognition quite neatly. With the war not really going anywhere as it is, I imagine the thought of peace is becoming tempting and is Russia offering to host peace negotiations going by that last comment?

Roebuck seemed to have a habit of contracting "foot in mouth" disease, or at least being a mite too radical in certain areas. He was very willing to support minority positions, Generally, he was someone who would be known for challenging the government of the day on any issue and I've, ironically, just spelled out what he did historically in 1863 without a war going on. He was indeed castigated for going to the French first, and while he's done it second here, it's basically guaranteed you're going to lose supporters if you say you've got a Bonaparte's ear rather than the Queens!

The messages from Saint Petersburg are just the natural extension of the ones passed through the Russian minister from Philadelphia as Lincoln has directed Seward to do in September at the end of Chapter 73. There's some negotiations coming up...
 
Roebuck seemed to have a habit of contracting "foot in mouth" disease,
I think that's putting it mildly. Dude snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.

I love the irony of the the war starting over Mason and Slidell but neither making much traction in what they were supposed to accomplish.
 
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Lovely to see this is back.

I will admit, this is something I'm rather divided on still. Canada as a name just seems like it will stick, but Dominion, Kingdom, Confederacy, Union? Well, that's something I have not quite nailed down.

The Federated Viceroyalties of Canada and the Maritime Provinces?

Also interesting to see the British establishment handling being between two poor choices. Either one does not officially recognize a cobelligerent despite fighting alongside them, or one is in nearly direct support of the odious practice of slavery. Delaying and debating it might make one seem as indecisive, but strictly speaking from the perspective of supporting the confederacy, official recognition when the British are already providing naval support and kit for the soldiers is more of a cherry on the cake rather than a be-all-end-all goal.
 
I had toyed with the idea, but ultimately I had believed that Britain wouldn't face a manpower crunch and would be unlikely to deploy sepoy troops to North America, especially not so close after the Mutiny. It's an interesting idea however, and I'll admit this is one tidbit I didn't know.

Overall, unless Britain really needed soldiers, I think the potential backlash would be too great in the 1860s rather than employing colored Volunteers and local Indigenous groups as I've illustrated. There'd be Colored Corps in both Canada West and Canada East (there's a Colored Corps in Montreal, but the garrison of Montreal has not been overly important to mention) and like at the Battle of Mount Pelion, there's Natives serving as scouts and auxiliaries in the armies already.
Perhaps Britain could use the Nepalese and Bhutanese troops to replace others elsewhere in the Empire?
 
I think that's putting it mildly. Dude snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.

He seemed to have that ability in real life too. He suffered from being a bit of a contrarian, and I honestly think that had he come so close to something so potentially historic he still might have managed to somehow scuttle the idea. Coupled with a Confederate military defeat around Washington and an embarrassing British defeat at Saratoga... well let's just say that it is something that would cool amongst the political classes pretty easily.

I love the irony of the the war starting over Mason and Slidell but neither making much traction in what they were supposed to accomplish.

Of the two, Mason was pretty clearly out of his depth. Slidell has made some accomplishments, but we can explore that a bit more in 1864!
 
The Federated Viceroyalties of Canada and the Maritime Provinces?

The more complex the name the more everyone may be satisfied! In later updates I do intend to allude to the various amusing names bandied about historically.

Also interesting to see the British establishment handling being between two poor choices. Either one does not officially recognize a cobelligerent despite fighting alongside them, or one is in nearly direct support of the odious practice of slavery. Delaying and debating it might make one seem as indecisive, but strictly speaking from the perspective of supporting the confederacy, official recognition when the British are already providing naval support and kit for the soldiers is more of a cherry on the cake rather than a be-all-end-all goal.

Despite what a lot of people believe, Palmerston especially was not in any hurry to recognize the Confederacy as an independent nation. He was rather aware that would invite a lot of problems, and I think he was more than willing to merely follow popular opinion, whichever way it might blow. People in Britain were willing to support the Confederacy on the grounds that it was a smaller nation fighting for liberty, and you certainly saw that rhetoric, but there were many people who also saw it as a slave holding republic.

I've tried to game out who I feel might be drawn towards recognition and who would sit on the fence, but one sure thing is that even at war, there would be those who see recognition as drawing them in deeper to the conflict rather than allowing them to exit gracefully. With the offer currently on the table from Washington for negotiations, Britain has a way to exit the war on her own terms, and more than enough leverage to exact some decent compensation from Washington. Though with recognition being debated, they also have a way to walk away and really make Washington regret turning down any terms offered, no matter how harsh...

Perhaps Britain could use the Nepalese and Bhutanese troops to replace others elsewhere in the Empire?

In Africa and Asia probably. I think that should the war continue that would end up being the case. Though they may be needed closer to home in 1864 as the world is going to get interesting indeed! The 1863 year in review section will set us up for more butterflies in the coming year.
 
I've tried to game out who I feel might be drawn towards recognition and who would sit on the fence, but one sure thing is that even at war, there would be those who see recognition as drawing them in deeper to the conflict rather than allowing them to exit gracefully. With the offer currently on the table from Washington for negotiations, Britain has a way to exit the war on her own terms, and more than enough leverage to exact some decent compensation from Washington. Though with recognition being debated, they also have a way to walk away and really make Washington regret turning down any terms offered, no matter how harsh...
The question is whether the British would be satisfied with chopping off part of Northern Maine, or whether adjustments in the West would be expected as well. or to put it another way, British Seattle?
 
The question is whether the British would be satisfied with chopping off part of Northern Maine, or whether adjustments in the West would be expected as well. or to put it another way, British Seattle?

I can for certain say that Palmerston would love to change up the Maine boundary (he called it the Ashburton Surrender) and is keenly aware of the need to get the frontier there a bit more defensible, it was indeed something that was well known OTL so the chance to change it will be leapt at. He's looking for harsh terms, but perhaps not so harsh it would make the Union feel like fighting to the death. The Cabinet is, broadly, behind him in being punitive.

In the West...well that's more up in the air. The main question might be what they gain from an expanded colonial holding out that way? There's certainly men on the ground (Douglas, if you remember from Chapter 42) who want the expanded territory there. Certainly people in the Hudson's Bay Company - the only real organization with British control between the Muskokas and the Rockies - wouldn't mind the extra money. However, it remains to be seen whether London is necessarily interested in enforcing that with effort in men and ships. They will have some other pressing issues in the Pacific that take up their attention in 1864...
 
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