Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

[The Gunslinger]

Local consumption over the winter is a fairly significant need, however, if you expect the population to live until summer, however.

There's also the minor point that soldiers in the field, whether Provincial militia or British regulars or whatever sort of need to eat, and a) without any imports from the US those needs have to be met with local BNA produce, and b) if they can't be met locally, that's yet more material that has to imported from Europe, with the obvious needs for shipping and manpower.

And if the local produce is being harvested in November, the harvesters aren't drilling in October.

Best,

I'm not going to argue with you about what's harvested by the 25th of October because I've lived there and the vast, VAST majority of everything is done well before October. And what little there is would be done on a family scale and the slack would generally be taken up by members of the militia's extended family.

Generally, the Canadian men found other sorts of work over the winter regardless (the timber trade, mill work, etc), so what's likely to happen is that there's a general increase in the cost of living as there's an increase in the cost of labour, but to think that Canadian families won't adjust to the new economic conditions is odd. It probably means that the dependents have longer days and everyone is a lot more tired and a little more poor come spring... all of which is expected during a war.

 

[TFSmith121]

Any evidence of such?

In all honesty, it would not be an extreme stretch for the instructions to the station commanders to include something like "if the Ambassador does not report in at least once every three days, assume hostilities have broken out unless an explicit stand down is ordered".

It's slightly clunky to write, but then again it doesn't cost anything, and it's secure against the Americans doing something like denying an ambassador access to any communication in the midst of a diplomatic crisis. (Because if you refuse to allow an ambassador to communicate in the midst of a diplomatic crisis, then you are essentially intending to sabotage the negotiations.)

The alternative, of course, is that the mores of the 19th century would not allow such a thing - I think this is more likely, given the historical access and indeed the way that into the 20th Century the British ambassador was only briefly interned by the Gestapo when war was declared on Germany!

Any evidence of such? Especially given that in an era before radio, squadron commanders and their locations would be utterly unknown.

There's a reason they ran their commands from flagships, and not shore stations.

There's actually no way this works in an era before radio, absent a gathering of forces in a port that would forgo all the advantages of having ships at sea, much less allow the performance of all the peacetime missions which are going to become even more significant in a short of war period.

Again, in this era, once a ship is at sea they are out of reach absent a ring of dispatch vessels that would require more ships than a given squadron could maintain. There is a reason incidents like (for example) President-Little Belt and Trent occurred and were accepted as part of the price of doing business - they weren't causus belli because no ship captain was tied to his shoreside establishment; and captains were - essentially - gods while in command and at sea.

And the British understood that; they could not have maintained the Empire without it.

Again, this is why IMPERIAL STORM at anything much less than the (for example) historical example of the four months between Sinope and the Franco-British declaration of war is a-historical; the world didn't move that quickly because it physically could not communicate that quickly.

And the winter of 1861-62 predates effective oceanic cables, much less radio. It just could not happen, absent overt planning much earlier than the autumn of 1861, which raises the question of why, other than aggressive war, which is a non-starter.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Saskatchewan in the 21st Century or southeastern

I'm not going to argue with you about what's harvested by the 25th of October because I've lived there and the vast, VAST majority of everything is done well before October. And what little there is would be done on a family scale and the slack would generally be taken up by members of the militia's extended family.

Generally, the Canadian men found other sorts of work over the winter regardless (the timber trade, mill work, etc), so what's likely to happen is that there's a general increase in the cost of living as there's an increase in the cost of labour, but to think that Canadian families won't adjust to the new economic conditions is odd. It probably means that the dependents have longer days and everyone is a lot more tired and a little more poor come spring... all of which is expected during a war.

Saskatchewan in the 21st Century or southeastern Ontario in the 19th Century?

That you've lived in, I mean?

Being reduced to poverty and potentially facing death because of a political spat between an imperial capital 3,000 miles away and one's own country's neighbors to the south, said spat being one in which one has absolutely no political say in resolving, is probably not going to be a spur to recruiting, is it?

Certainly wasn't one in 1899, 1914-18, or 1939-45, after all, and one doubts there were as many familial and societal ties between Canada and the South Africans and or Germans and Japanese as there were between BNAers and USAins in 1861-65.

Best,

 

[LordIreland]

To help readers overcome this particular problem I have created a story update only thread where I will link all the chapters to so you don't have to wade through pages of discussion

It's also right next to the TL link in my sig (Index) if you ever need to find it.



Ah thank you! I hope you enjoy WiF for what it is

God bless you sir. Whilst I will fight to the death to defend anyone's right to free speech...some people have very little to say and yet take so long to say it

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Nice to see this TL up and running again.

Thank you very much

God bless you sir. Whilst I will fight to the death to defend anyone's right to free speech...some people have very little to say and yet take so long to say it

Well I'm just glad this thread will have an easy reading format for people who want to just read versus discuss. Though I'm always thankful for some discussion

Though don't bless me, bless nepcotevalley, he gave me the idea in the first place

 

[EnglishCanuck]

I'm not going to argue with you about what's harvested by the 25th of October because I've lived there and the vast, VAST majority of everything is done well before October. And what little there is would be done on a family scale and the slack would generally be taken up by members of the militia's extended family.

Generally, the Canadian men found other sorts of work over the winter regardless (the timber trade, mill work, etc), so what's likely to happen is that there's a general increase in the cost of living as there's an increase in the cost of labour, but to think that Canadian families won't adjust to the new economic conditions is odd. It probably means that the dependents have longer days and everyone is a lot more tired and a little more poor come spring... all of which is expected during a war.

Well to support your point, the idea that the Canadians would somehow starve and go hungry if put 50,000 men in the field is a little silly. Even 100,000 wouldn't cause complete dislocation of the harvest.

When you look at the numbers of men in the volunteer militia historically, something like 2/3rds of the Volunteers were urban dwellers, and the men called up in October-December 1861 would likely be as well so that would not cut into the harvest at all really.

Then of course we should remember Canada was exporting food in this period. During the time from 1858-1862 they exported 76,000 tons of grain to the UK.

Adding to that when the government employed some 33,000 militia in 1838 that didn't break the bank or cause mass starvation (and this excludes the 2,000 or so Patriotes running around as well).

Then when we remember how much devastation was visited upon the people and farms of Canada by invaders from 1812-1814 alongside mass "requisitioning" by both armies and since we don't see mass starvation inside the provinces of Canada when there was a far smaller population, I think we have to conclude that any idea the Canadians are going to starve is outlandish.

I mean to use an example from 1866, when the 11th Battalion of Volunteers was called up "there was hardly a man left in Mille Isles or Morin Flats. On a number of farms the women had to put in the grain with a hoe, fathers and brothers being all off to the front with the Rangers." So it seems like people would get along well enough.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Another fine update Canuck. Shame that Lyons hadn't been given anymore leeway for negotiations really, could have avoided the whole mess.

Yeah, if granted more freedom by London he would probably have been able to diffuse the crisis with Seward's help. In something of an irony Lincoln was the one who got caught up in the nationalistic fervor when the Trent was seized historically while Seward was utterly appalled. Of course Lincoln finally came to his sense mid December when he realized just how bad it looked, but he did stick to the principle of negotiated arbitration to the end (although to be fair this was probably just to ensure no one could say he had caved to foreign pressure).

The whole war is a completely avoidable mess, but when you have someone as explosive as Palmerston in London, and someone with a reputation like Seward in Washington, and an ocean of difference, there's bound to be misunderstandings.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

So in other words - full mobilization in BNA and the UK, over nothing that came close to a causus belli based on historical precedent, and without anything approaching a realistic timeframe, again, based on historical precedent.

So either the British are ahistorically active compared with their actual ability to make a decision for war and move any substantial number of troops (as per 1853-54) or the Americans are ahistorically clueless in terms of their ability to perceive this purported reality (as per 1861-62).

Historically the British reaction time was under a month during the crisis from November-January 61-62. There is no justification to reach back eight years and use their reaction time to the Crimean War as an example when we have the British reaction time for the incident in front of us, yet apparently you prefer to ignore it.

As to the American reaction, I'm really only extrapolating the American actions of OTL. Lincoln et al don't want war, yet until mid-December were apparently completely oblivious to the preparations that were underway in Britain. There's no possible reason for Britain to slow her rate of preparations from what she did historically.

But as always, it's the best of both worlds for the British and absolute stupidity for the Americans, and at a pace that belies the realities of the closest historical precedents for exactly the situation.

For all the bluster you've yet to point out a single instance of the Americans being 'stupid'.

and accepting of being ordered to war under British officers absent any Canadian agency ... because that's exactly how it happened, historically, whether in BNA/Canada or for imperial duties, in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries.

The issue on Canadian agency is covered in Chapter 3, you may have missed it.

Of course the Canadians seeing their homes under threat are going to happily enroll under British officers, as of course they did in 1812-15, 1837-38, and 1866.

Expecting otherwise is completely ahistorical.

 

[Saphroneth]

Using the Crimean reaction time is doubly silly because there were post-Crimea reforms to cover the deficiencies of that very war - among them increasing the size of the standing army by something like 70,000 men AND recruiting approx. 300,000 militia and reserves to form a home defence unit.

To use Crimea reaction times is to use the reaction times of an army which has one third the resources, and to use their first overseas deployment of any magnitude in forty years - whereas a Trent war is the third time in eight years. (Crimea, Mutiny, Trent.)


Complicating the reaction speed comparison is that, OTL, one of the two powers prepared in advance of the war, and it wasn't the Americans.

Britain sent 25,000 troops to Canada, readied ships from the reserve, moved ironclads, despatched artillery, began fortifications, sent weapons, issued conditional war orders, and called up militia.
The US appointed Colonel C.A. Waite to manage the sector from Maine to Michigan, sent two companies of infantry to occupy Fort Montgomery, and then backed down.

If this becomes a war, then the US are scrambling without a warplan while the British already have one set up. In fact, the following were either in or under orders for Canada (this based on the Times):






Existing Garrison
1/17th Foot
62nd Foot
63rd Foot
5 batteries of RA

Reinforcements of Summer 1861
30th Foot
47th Foot
4/60th Rifles
D/4 Brigade RA

Reinforcements ordered to Canada
Those in italics had not embarked for the Canada by the settlement, and were not sent.

Cavalry
The Lancer Brigade:
9th Lancers
12th Lancers
16th Lancers
(unnamed RHA battery)


(Presumably another cavalry brigade)


Military Train
1st Bn, Military Train
3rd Bn, Military Train

Infantry
1/ Grenadier Gds
2/ Coldstream Gds
2/ Scots Fus Gds
1/10th Foot
1/11th Foot
2/12th Foot
1/15th Foot
1/16th Foot
2/16th Foot
2/17th Foot
2/20th Foot
1/36th Foot
1/45th Foot
1/55th Foot
1/58th Foot
1/76th Foot
1/96th Foot
1/ Rifle Brigade

Artillery
A Bty, 4RA
B Bty, 4RA
E Bty, 4RA
F Bty, 4RA
G Bty, 4RA
H Bty, 4RA
A Bty, 8RA
1 Bty, 10RA
2 Bty, 10RA
3 Bty, 10RA
4 Bty, 10RA
5 Bty, 10RA
6 Bty, 10RA (for New Brunswick)
7 Bty, 10RA
8 Bty, 10RA
2 Bty, 15RA (for Bermuda)
3 Bty, 15RA (for Bermuda)
(The lettered Btys of 4 and 8RA are field btys with 6x 12pdr Armstrong Rifles, the numbered Btys of 10 and 15RA are Garrison and Heavy Btys)

Engineers
2nd Coy, RE
4th Coy, RE
5th Coy, RE
7th Coy, RE
15th Coy, RE
18th Coy, RE
34th Coy, RE




Now, I happen to think that simple economics makes a Trent war unlikely - the US is more likely to back down than to go to war with the nation which supplies a third or more of its iron (1859 numbers, pre-war) and effectively all saltpetre, and more rifles than it can produce domestically until at least the second half of 1862. It would be, frankly, stupid - even if they win a full war (and the trade/strategic situation is horrendous since the Union basically has to find a good hundred thousand extra men just to garrison the east coast) then there's no guarantee that they can simply swing back south and handle the CSA as easily as OTL (with the CSA benefitting from many of the weapons which OTL would have gone to the Union, not to mention also benefitting from all the Union troops who died/deserted/were crippled in Canada.

But if one did happen, it would not be a case of the US finding them easier opponents than the CSA. It would be trying to fight a much better trained, more technologically advanced enemy than the CSA with a large navy, large reserves, and they'd have to do it at the same time as still fighting the CSA.
Indeed, the British were worried by the Trent affair not because they feared fighting the US while the US was engaged with the CSA, but because they felt the provocation made more sense if the US was trying to get out of the Civil War without losing face (by turning on the British instead). This is one reason they thought they'd face 200,000 Union troops - they were expecting the entire Union field army to march north in accordance with careful pre-planning.

Of course, as we now know, no such pre-planning existed and the Union certainly didn't intend to sacrifice the CSA to independence in return for getting to fight Britain.


(This is one reason I feel that, if anything, EC's being too lenient on the Union problems! It's not going to be fun for the Union trying to do considerably more with considerably less than OTL - as just one example, the Rodman 10" and Dahlgren 11" burn something like 16lb of powder per shot, and if you have a fort mounting a dozen of the things (which is a moderate armament for a single antiship battery) and equip it with 50 shots per gun then you're looking at about four and a half tonnes of powder. The 15" is even hungrier.)

As another example, almost all Union weapons issued in 1862 were in fact from Europe. Many of them directly purchased from Britain, others from European nations and which would fall foul of any conceivable blockade. This means that the Union finds itself requiring 200,000 extra troops at the same time as its ability to issue weapons drastically shrinks over OTL. And this is when counting that OTL saw the issue of percussion muskets to a not inconsiderable fraction of the Union Army, to the point that even by Gettysburg in 1863 10% of the troops in the Union's primary Eastern army were still carrying smoothbores.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Using the Crimean reaction time is doubly silly because there were post-Crimea reforms to cover the deficiencies of that very war - among them increasing the size of the standing army by something like 70,000 men AND recruiting approx. 300,000 militia and reserves to form a home defence unit.

To use Crimea reaction times is to use the reaction times of an army which has one third the resources, and to use their first overseas deployment of any magnitude in forty years - whereas a Trent war is the third time in eight years. (Crimea, Mutiny, Trent.)

It is silly to not use the historical precedent set historically

But you raise a good point, large mobilizations and far off expeditions have been carried out by the British army for nearly a decade now. They have experience doing it, and most of the men involved on the staff in North America have some experience in handling logistics (Doyle was a quartermaster in the Crimea and used those skills brilliantly moving men and materials overland, Paulet had handled brigade sized formations and logistics in the Crimea and so naturally put his skills to work trying to find alternate winter routes and efficient means of supply, Wolseley had served as a quartermaster, battalion commander, brigadier, engineer and was put to work organizing and training the militia historically, and Lysons was an old hand with the British volunteer movement, hence his assignment).

Then in the Crimea the British handled almost all the shipping for the armies in the Crimea (in 1856 moving a total of 294,000 men on all stations). So it's really not up for debate that men and materials in convoy can be moved across the Atlantic in good quantity.

(This is one reason I feel that, if anything, EC's being too lenient on the Union problems! It's not going to be fun for the Union trying to do considerably more with considerably less than OTL - as just one example, the Rodman and Dahlgren 11" burn something like 16lb of powder per shot, and if you have a fort mounting a dozen of the things (which is a moderate armament for a single antiship battery) and equip it with 50 shots per gun then you're looking at about four and a half tonnes of powder. The 15lb is even hungrier.)

Arming all the forts on the coast is indeed a problem, but its not insurmountable. There's ~1900 heavy guns in the Union which could be mounted, not counting batteries which could be created by removing guns from the ships which are useless for military purposes to make batteries, even just mounting 'Quaker guns' on some forts to make them simply look threatening is an option.

Of course powder too is a problem. BUT! Say we rob Peter to pay Paul and we can end up with some forts low on powder in 1862 in favor of places like on the Delaware, Chesapeake, Boston, Portland, ect, while others wait for renewed powder stocks. Then if you want to start fleecing the civilian industry you can certainly make up the shortfall for 1862-63.

By 1864 the nitre beds we can expect to be set up would be ready for large scale production.

As another example, almost all Union weapons issued in 1862 were in fact from Europe. Many of them directly purchased from Britain, others from European nations and which would fall foul of any conceivable blockade. This means that the Union finds itself requiring 200,000 extra troops at the same time as its ability to issue weapons drastically shrinks over OTL. And this is when counting that OTL saw the issue of percussion muskets to a not inconsiderable fraction of the Union Army, to the point that even by Gettysburg in 1863 10% of the troops in the Union's primary Eastern army were still carrying smoothbores.

Well the weapons stocks (muskets really) on hand mean they can certainly arm whatever number of volunteers show up in a call up in early 1862, but these men will of course only be ready for service (at the earliest) come June for field service, that's just throwing them into the field on four months training. No doubt though by fall 1862 there's enough men in the field to man the battlements as it were and to make up the losses from spring campaigning.

 

[Saphroneth]

Well the weapons stocks (muskets really) on hand mean they can certainly arm whatever number of volunteers show up in a call up in early 1862, but these men will of course only be ready for service (at the earliest) come June for field service, that's just throwing them into the field on four months training. No doubt though by fall 1862 there's enough men in the field to man the battlements as it were and to make up the losses from spring campaigning.

I'm actually not so sure they can arm the early-1862 volunteers - there's a good reason for this lack of sureness, and it's this.


In August 1861, the Federal armouries have almost no more weapons to give.
In December 1861, Cameron asks Northern governors not to send any more regiments unless called for.
In June 1862, there are 300,000 weapons in Federal armouries.


Now, we know that a lot of foreign purchases arrived in the first half of 1862. We also know that the Union was having problems arming new regiments in December 1861.

Put together, this suggests that the Union may only just be able to arm the OTL force sizes domestically - quoting RobC about the historically raised 1862 forces:

57% of the regiments New York put in the field in 1862 were armed with Enfields. They were 37% of the weapons Maine gave its troops in the same year, 37.5% for New Jersey, 38.7% for Massachusetts, 30% for Wisconsin, 50% for Iowa, and 27% for Ohio. And these are just Enfields.

New York
Regiments raised as at 15 January 1862: 87, of which 52% were armed wholly and 10% partly with muskets both foreign and domestic; 14% with the Enfield, 3% with the Springfield and 2% with French rifles.
Regiments raised between 15 January 1862 and 27 January 1863: 79, of which 57% were armed with the Enfield, 15% with Austrian rifles, 14% with French rifles, and 13% with Springfield rifles.

If New York's 79 new regiments are 87% armed with foreign weapons, that means that 69 regiments are lost from the Union OOB just from the loss of NY's non-domestic issued weapons. Other states do not appear quite so bad, but given domestic Springfield production was something like 120,000 by end of June 1862, then I think the ability of the Union to arm even the OTL numbers is seriously in doubt - though not quite at the point of mathematical impossibility.

(Since there were 300,000 weapons in federal armouries in June 1862, a reasonable first approximation is that every lost foreign weapon corresponds to a lost weapon from the stocks as of 30 June 1862. And since any extra troops would be functionally armed from that stockpile, things get weapon-critical fairly fast.)


Now, none of this is meant as criticism - it's your TL, and your opinion differs. I just wanted to make clear that it is by no means certain that the Union Army in 1862 with a Trent PoD is even able to issue weapons of any kind to their OTL recruits, let alone to an extra 200,000 or so.

 

[TFSmith121]

Go hungry? Quite possibly, if you're calling up in rural areas

Well to support your point, the idea that the Canadians would somehow starve and go hungry if put 50,000 men in the field is a little silly. Even 100,000 wouldn't cause complete dislocation of the harvest.

-snip -

So it seems like people would get along well enough.

Go hungry? Quite possibly, if you're calling up in rural areas, especially since the late autumn harvest is what's going to be feeding the 130,000 or so regulars and militia/volunteers you've already mentioned, unless you're planning on feeding them the livestock you're depending on to carry their supplies anywhere away from a railhead and draw their field artillery in the middle of winter.

And the urban dwellers, of course, are the ones who work in the factories and workshops and run the warehouses and railways, and provide the building trades to build or convert barrack space for the 130,000 troops you've mentioned as well, unless you plan on them living under canvas in the middle of winter; how'd that work out in the Crimea, again?

There's no such thing as a free lunch, and you and Sap may believe the services of supply don't require manpower, but no one who's ever worn a uniform does.

There's a reason, as it is said, that amatuers talk tactics and professionals study logistics.

Best,

 

[Not Henry G.]

For some reason I always picture you as being all day on a computer, refreshing the Before 1900 page over and over until you see a Civil War thread.

 

[TFSmith121]

The British managed to get all of 7,000 troops

Historically the British reaction time was under a month during the crisis from November-January 61-62. There is no justification to reach back eight years and use their reaction time to the Crimean War as an example when we have the British reaction time for the incident in front of us, yet apparently you prefer to ignore it.

As to the American reaction, I'm really only extrapolating the American actions of OTL. Lincoln et al don't want war, yet until mid-December were apparently completely oblivious to the preparations that were underway in Britain. There's no possible reason for Britain to slow her rate of preparations from what she did historically.

-snip -

...you've yet to point out a single instance of the Americans being 'stupid'.

Expecting otherwise is completely ahistorical.

The British managed to get all of 274 officers and 6544 men from Halifax to Riviere du Loup between January 1, 1862, and 13 March, 1862 (10 weeks); this included both battalions of the entire prewar British regular garrison in the Maritimes and three battalions from the UK. These five battalions (1st, Grenadier Guards; 2nd, Scots Fusilier Guards, 1st, Rifle Brigade, 62nd, 63rd) raised the total British force in the Province of Canada to about 10 battalions (depending on how one regards the RCR), with three more (more or less) left behind in the Maritimes.

Source is THE TRENT AFFAIR OF 1861, Major WD Campbell, The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 4, Winter 1999, which seems a rather more reliable source than the London Times on-line, given that Campbell actually had access to various and sundry official records that the Times, presumably, did not, even in 1861.

So, about the equivalent of one field division on the US order of battle in 1862; maybe 13,000 troops, including infantry, artillery, etc. Throw in the three Canadian Provincial Volunteer Militia battalions (Montreal Light Onfantry, 1st VMRC, 2nd VRMC) that actually existed as such prior to 1862, and you're up to 16 battalions, or about four brigades.

Just as an aside, in the winter of 1861-62, the Army of the Potomac (alone) disposed of 14 such divisions, each with three brigades. That doesn't include, of course, the other 400,000 or so US troops, in most cases organized into brigades and the brigades into divisions, in commands ranging from Maine to the Great Lakes to the West to the Pacific. Oh well, 500,000 to 20,000 is what, 25 to 1 odds? Yeah, that looks encouraging.

Stupid? Let's see, the British minister who has literally just told the Americans that their proposal for arbitration "means war" is allowed to a) communicate with British military headquarters in North America over US-controlled telegraph lines, and then is b) allowed to leave the US via a British flag ship, steaming into a US harbor, and head to sea ... which is where, after all, the RN's North American squadron is expected to be found.

No, that's not stupid at all; it's sheer brilliance, General.

As far as the "Canadians seeing their homes under threat" wait, I thought the Americans were the ones who were so trusting in Britain that even after being told "this means war!" they are allowing the British minister to communicate with his military peers. Which is it, either the Americans are trusting fools or they are threatening evil invaders? Can't have it both ways...

Considering Canadians rioted or mutined or both repeatedly over the prospect of being drafted for imperial service in both world wars, no, you're being pretty ahistorical. Some Johnny Canucks would fight for the Queen, but only some, based on the historical reality of 1917 in Montreal and Quebec and 1944 in Terrace.

It's worth noting that of the 400,000 Canadians who volunteered for service in WWI, fewer than one in 20 were French. Of English Canadian volunteers, 70% were recent immigrants from Britain.

So, what was the point of "responsible government" if John A. and the rest of the fathers of confederation didn't get to vote on whether making the Province a theater of war for London's convenience, again?

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

There's also the minor reality that the winter of 1861-62

Using the Crimean reaction time is doubly silly because there were post-Crimea reforms to cover the deficiencies of that very war - among them increasing the size of the standing army by something like 70,000 men AND recruiting approx. 300,000 militia and reserves to form a home defence unit.

To use Crimea reaction times is to use the reaction times of an army which has one third the resources, and to use their first overseas deployment of any magnitude in forty years - whereas a Trent war is the third time in eight years. (Crimea, Mutiny, Trent.)

Complicating the reaction speed comparison is that, OTL, one of the two powers prepared in advance of the war, and it wasn't the Americans.

As another example, almost all Union weapons issued in 1862 were in fact from Europe. Many of them directly purchased from Britain, others from European nations and which would fall foul of any conceivable blockade. This means that the Union finds itself requiring 200,000 extra troops at the same time as its ability to issue weapons drastically shrinks over OTL. And this is when counting that OTL saw the issue of percussion muskets to a not inconsiderable fraction of the Union Army, to the point that even by Gettysburg in 1863 10% of the troops in the Union's primary Eastern army were still carrying smoothbores.

Along with the fact it took the British from New Years to mid-March, 1862, to historically get any reinforcements of note into the Province of Canada, there's also the minor reality that the winter of 1861-62 came, let's see, how many years after the British regular garrison in India was doubled in size because the Indians were revolting.

And then there was the China garrison and the British regular force in New Zealand to beat up the Maoris ... all of which postdated the post-1856 expansion.

The Americans, of course, already had 500,000 men under arms, organized and either ready for action or already in the field in the winter of 1861-62, and - of course - had equipped them with the 400,000 long arms in the US arsenals prewar (not to mention those in state hands), and the weapons produced in the US (which included, but were not limited to, 109,000 M1861s at Springfield Arsenal alone in the 15 months between April, 1861 and July, 1862), plus some or all of the three quarters of a million European weapons imported in the same period (along with powder and nitre, of course), and on both federal and various state accounts.

This is all sourced from the Official Records, which are (of course) on-line in various places; the version at Cornell is the easiest to use.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Just the ones that are based on the same handwavium as ZEELOWE

For some reason I always picture you as being all day on a computer, refreshing the Before 1900 page over and over until you see a Civil War thread.

Just the ones that are based on the same handwavium as ZEELOWE.

Best,

 

[Richter von Manthofen]

For some reason I always picture you as being all day on a computer, refreshing the Before 1900 page over and over until you see a Civil War thread.

PFRRRRT - I just fel over laughing

 

[machine3589]

For some reason I always picture you as being all day on a computer, refreshing the Before 1900 page over and over until you see a Civil War thread.

I think this isn't that far from the truth actually...

 

[EnglishCanuck]

(Since there were 300,000 weapons in federal armouries in June 1862, a reasonable first approximation is that every lost foreign weapon corresponds to a lost weapon from the stocks as of 30 June 1862. And since any extra troops would be functionally armed from that stockpile, things get weapon-critical fairly fast.)

I'll have to take a look at the ORD again and get back to you on this.

Now, none of this is meant as criticism - it's your TL, and your opinion differs. I just wanted to make clear that it is by no means certain that the Union Army in 1862 with a Trent PoD is even able to issue weapons of any kind to their OTL recruits, let alone to an extra 200,000 or so.

Oh the notes are appreciated A difference of opinion is never a bad thing, and its always wonderful to find someone who can discuss it civilly versus the reverse.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Go hungry? Quite possibly, if you're calling up in rural areas, especially since the late autumn harvest is what's going to be feeding the 130,000 or so regulars and militia/volunteers you've already mentioned

Considering I haven't put that number anywhere in the TL, you're talking through your hat sir.

The British managed to get all of 274 officers and 6544 men from Halifax to Riviere du Loup between January 1, 1862, and 13 March, 1862 (10 weeks); this included both battalions of the entire prewar British regular garrison in the Maritimes and three battalions from the UK. These five battalions (1st, Grenadier Guards; 2nd, Scots Fusilier Guards, 1st, Rifle Brigade, 62nd, 63rd) raised the total British force in the Province of Canada to about 10 battalions (depending on how one regards the RCR), with three more (more or less) left behind in the Maritimes.

Source is THE TRENT AFFAIR OF 1861, Major WD Campbell, The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 4, Winter 1999, which seems a rather more reliable source than the London Times on-line, given that Campbell actually had access to various and sundry official records that the Times, presumably, did not, even in 1861.

Oh that is a good read. However, the number of troops dispatched was not what you took issue with, you took issue with the British dispatching troops well before the 4 month mark you had arbitrarily set.

Now though it seems that we are on the same page and we agree that the British reaction time of under a month is firmly historical.

Of course then we also have to agree that the numbers dispatched to Canada in an extended crisis are subject to change. Meaning of course the British will naturally not discontinue their mobilization and keep sending men and materials across the Atlantic well into the Spring. So men will still be marching overland well into March, probably into mid April.

Then of course the ice opens up navigation to Quebec on April 16th so the remainder will be arriving by ship directly at Quebec and by late April directly at Montreal when navigation there opens by April 28th

Stupid? Let's see, the British minister who has literally just told the Americans that their proposal for arbitration "means war" is allowed to a) communicate with British military headquarters in North America over US-controlled telegraph lines, and then is b) allowed to leave the US via a British flag ship, steaming into a US harbor, and head to sea ... which is where, after all, the RN's North American squadron is expected to be found.

Ah perhaps you know who that quote is coming from then? It is still worth noting that throughout each period of tension in the Civil War Lyons had unrestricted access to communications with his peers. Blocking that would understandably send a message Lincoln wasn't keen on sending.

Of course they could evict him (sending the wrong message) or they could allow him to leave (much as Brazil did in their troubles with Britain in after severing diplomatic communications, and it's worth noting Christie was also able to communicate with his military peers). Lyons orders if the ultimatum was rejected were to take his staff and board a ship for Canada.

Not really sure what's so important about Boston that it has to be kept from the eyes of the British ambassador.

Considering Canadians rioted or mutined or both repeatedly over the prospect of being drafted for imperial service in both world wars, no, you're being pretty ahistorical. Some Johnny Canucks would fight for the Queen, but only some, based on the historical reality of 1917 in Montreal and Quebec and 1944 in Terrace.

Now you want to reach into the next century!? Good heavens man this is the pre-1900 forum! Care to keep it in the right time frame?

I've gladly done so. We aren't exactly lacking historical precedents here.

So, what was the point of "responsible government" if John A. and the rest of the fathers of confederation didn't get to vote on whether making the Province a theater of war for London's convenience, again?

Once again, read Chapter 3. Or John Bokyo, or Richard J. Gwyn, or perhaps Helen MacDonald? They all paint a very similar picture to the Canadian reaction to the Civil War and potential invasion.

It certainly wasn't one of surrender or being unwilling to fight.

Though perhaps a Canadian contemporary Alexander Somerville might sum it up: “Canada may be invaded and devastated, though never to be conquered. That last consequence is not to be admitted, even hypothetically – never.”