Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

[TFSmith121]

You have mentioned 100,000 militia and 30,000 regulars

Considering I haven't put that number anywhere in the TL, you're talking through your hat sir.



Oh that is a good read. However, the number of troops dispatched was not what you took issue with, you took issue with the British dispatching troops well before the 4 month mark you had arbitrarily set.

Now though it seems that we are on the same page and we agree that the British reaction time of under a month is firmly historical.

Of course then we also have to agree that the numbers dispatched to Canada in an extended crisis are subject to change. Meaning of course the British will naturally not discontinue their mobilization and keep sending men and materials across the Atlantic well into the Spring. So men will still be marching overland well into March, probably into mid April.

Then of course the ice opens up navigation to Quebec on April 16th so the remainder will be arriving by ship directly at Quebec and by late April directly at Montreal when navigation there opens by April 28th



Ah perhaps you know who that quote is coming from then? It is still worth noting that throughout each period of tension in the Civil War Lyons had unrestricted access to communications with his peers. Blocking that would understandably send a message Lincoln wasn't keen on sending.

Of course they could evict him (sending the wrong message) or they could allow him to leave (much as Brazil did in their troubles with Britain in after severing diplomatic communications, and it's worth noting Christie was also able to communicate with his military peers). Lyons orders if the ultimatum was rejected were to take his staff and board a ship for Canada.

Not really sure what's so important about Boston that it has to be kept from the eyes of the British ambassador.



Now you want to reach into the next century!? Good heavens man this is the pre-1900 forum! Care to keep it in the right time frame?

I've gladly done so. We aren't exactly lacking historical precedents here.



Once again, read Chapter 3. Or John Bokyo, or Richard J. Gwyn, or perhaps Helen MacDonald? They all paint a very similar picture to the Canadian reaction to the Civil War and potential invasion.

It certainly wasn't one of surrender or being unwilling to fight.

Though perhaps a Canadian contemporary Alexander Somerville might sum it up: “Canada may be invaded and devastated, though never to be conquered. That last consequence is not to be admitted, even hypothetically – never.”

You have mentioned 100,000 militia and 30,000 regulars in this thread, so apparently it is your hat, not mine.

The actual numbers from Campbell make it clear how long it took for the British to get any worthwhile reinforcements into Upper Canada historically, how useless the Canadian Provincial Militia was at the time, and that is even with the historical "threat" ... The point about the Crimean short of war period is exactly that, diplomacy moved slowly in this era, and IMPERIAL STORM doesn't change that.

The point about the Americans being foolish in allowing Lyons free access to communications into Canada (for what justification is left unsaid) and leaving by sea, remains obvious. The difference with Adams and the Laird Rams incident is, of course, that Adams had not been ordered to leave London; in fact, he stayed and assisted in working out the issue, which was that building a pair of modern ironclad turret warships for the Confederacy was something even the British could not turn a blind eye too ... Which is, again, yet another example of how Palmerston et al acted when faced with the reality of war with the United States in this era, and was one of the realities that led to Victoria's comments regarding the ultimate futility of a British effort to defend BNA in the event of war with the US.

Finally, the realities of the Terrace, Montreal, and Quebec mutinies and riots over conscription and imperial service are historical; seems rather more significant than imaginary paper orders of battle. Obviously, it's embarrassing for a Canadian nationalist that not all Canadians - when faced with the reality of getting killed for England - said no, thanks, I'll pass ( to the extent of an entire infantry brigade arming themselves at Terrace, and both Anglophones and Francophones, interestingly enough), but it speaks volumes to the divides within Canadian society as late as 1944.

And of course, "Canada" even as of 1944 doesn't even exist in 1861. No one in the Maritimes in 1861, after all, had any obligation to muster for service outside of their four respective colonies, or even in any other colony but their own.

Now, granted, there were always some Johnny Canucks willing to take the Queen's shilling in the Nineteenth Century and afterwards, but the vast majority of them tried to avoid it, as witness the size of the contingent sent to South Africa. There are only so many Otters and Steeles and Denisons to go around, after all.

Best,

 

[EnglishCanuck]

You have mentioned 100,000 militia and 30,000 regulars in this thread, so apparently it is your hat, not mine.

Well going through the chapter updates and my notes, I've yet to find these 100,000 militia apparently mobilized that you speak of. I would politely ask you not make things up.

The 30,000 regulars is of course, mentioned in an earlier chapter, though they aren't all in Canada yet

The actual numbers from Campbell make it clear how long it took for the British to get any worthwhile reinforcements into Upper Canada historically

Which of course doesn't answer any question of how many could be shipped by boat from Halifax to Quebec and Montreal (or directly from Britain) come April.

The point about the Americans being foolish in allowing Lyons free access to communications into Canada (for what justification is left unsaid) and leaving by sea, remains obvious.

So Christie being able to depart by sea from Rio in 1863 was a mistake on the part of Pedro II eh? Or Foster doing so in 1812 was an example of Madison's stunning incompetence? Curious.

Finally, the realities of the Terrace, Montreal, and Quebec mutinies and riots over conscription and imperial service are historical; seems rather more significant than imaginary orders of battle. Obviously, it's embarrassing for a Canadian nationalist that not all Canadians - when faced with the reality of getting killed for England - said no, thanks, I'll pass ( to the extent of an entire infantry brigade arming themselves at Terrace, and both Anglophones and Francophones, interestingly enough), but it speaks volumes to the divides within Canadian society as late as 1944.

Interesting that this is all in response to a draft that doesn't exist here.

It's somewhat amusing you would resort to digging up events in the next century, when there's a perfectly good example in 1812 with the Lachine riots (but considering the crisis was defused, the rioters cheerfully handed over the instigators to the authorities, and then served their time in the militia, I suppose you would choose to ignore it).

I suppose one could also point out that the vaunted Terrace Mutiny lasted four days before the officers restored discipline and the men returned to duty or shipped out to the Pacific, but since that would undermine your point I can understand that's not mentioned.

Now, granted, there were always some Johnny Canucks willing to take the Queen's shilling in the Nineteenth Century and afterwards, but the vast majority of them tried to avoid it, as witness the size of the contingent sent to South Africa.

Funny then that when Laurier's government finally bowed to popular pressure and recruited a token force they had no trouble filling it, or the second contingent for that matter, and then when in order to pass the buck and placate his French constituents and he allowed Britain to do it directly the British themselves had no trouble recruiting 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Regiments of Canadian Mounted Rifles. That's not including men who volunteered to serve in other British regiments or local constabulary of course.

 

[TFSmith121]

Your words, not mine, as far as the 100,000 goes;

Well to support your point, the idea that the Canadians would somehow starve and go hungry if put 50,000 men in the field is a little silly. Even 100,000 wouldn't cause complete dislocation of the harvest.

Well going through the chapter updates and my notes, I've yet to find these 100,000 militia apparently mobilized that you speak of. I would politely ask you not make things up.

Your words, not mine, as far as the 100,000 goes; and as far as the Terrace Mutiny in 1944 goes, "your" army, as well. Same for the riots over conscription in 1917, as well, which makes for an interesting contrast with the US at the same time, or, for that matter, the US in 1861-65. There were draft protests in the US during the Civil War, of course, but they were suppressed and conscription for active service remained policy; not really the same result in Canada in 1917-18, and the 1917-18 mobilization is as close (~50 years) to 1862 as Lachine was, and the demographics and the politics of 1914-18 are closer to those of the 1860s than they were to those of 1812-15, certainly, "resonsible government" and all, after all. Of the 125,000 Canadians conscripted in 1918, only 25,000 went overseas, after all. Basically, French Canadians did not volunteer for imperial service in percentages anywhere approximately close to their Anglophone neighbors, and they were even more reluctant to be conscripted - which is, after all, what service in the sedentary militia in the Nineteenth Century amounted to...

Or, for that matter, in 1939-45, as evident in the numbers conscripted and where they served - BC and the Maritimes, for the most part. Not exactly the front lines.

Or, in terms of "white" dominions, generally, not in Ireland in the Great War, or Australia and South Africa in 1914-18 or 1939-45. New Zealand appears to have imposed conscription for unlimited service overseas in both conflicts; interesting contrast there, as well. Perhaps because of the proximity of the conquest, they felt more of a debt to England. In BNA turned Canada, however, the 1837-38 rebellions, the Annexation Manifesto, the Red River rebellion, the protests against conscription in both world wars, and the Terrace mutiny are all historical fact, and suggest something less than legions of Canucks springing to arms against a non-existent American threat that would only become real if London wanted and forced a war.

The bottom line is that Canada, as such in the Twentieth Century or even beforehand in the Nineteenth, after Confederation or beforehand as British North America, had deep societal and political fault lines that were papered over by a variety of means; obviously, this is and was the historical reality of the Canadien population since 1760. Ignoring that reality is roughly equivalent to suggesting the Afrikaner population in South Africa would unreservedly support the British Empire.

One could suggest that, but few would believe it.

Best,

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Your words, not mine, as far as the 100,000 goes

Actually, you my friend are the one who originally brought up 100,000 militia:

One awaits the 100,000 Canadian militia showing up

Of course neither of these comments come from the TL itself, so other than your desire to see 100,000 militia and one offhand comment about how Canadians won't starve you're just pulling things out of thin air. I'll gladly wait around for you to tell me what chapter it's in I've posted that the Canadians are mobilizing 100,000 militia, sadly I'll be waiting forever

Now other than an interesting exercise in grasping at straws (and a really bizarre tangent on events separated by over a century where you proceed to compare Canadians to Boers) are you actually here to talk about something in TTL?

So far, that doesn't seem to be the case.

 

[TFSmith121]

And you confirmed it, but whatever...

Actually, you my friend are the one who originally brought up 100,000 militia: Of course neither of these comments come from the TL itself, so other than your desire to see 100,000 militia and one offhand comment about how Canadians won't starve you're just pulling things out of thin air. I'll gladly wait around for you to tell me what chapter it's in I've posted that the Canadians are mobilizing 100,000 militia, sadly I'll be waiting forever Now other than an interesting exercise in grasping at straws (and a really bizarre tangent on events separated by over a century where you proceed to compare Canadians to Boers) are you actually here to talk about something in TTL? So far, that doesn't seem to be the case.

And you confirmed it, but whatever... so we're having this discussion, a point is raised regarding mobilization numbers, and your response is that such a number wouldn't have any impact on the civilian economy, so how was that supposed to be interpreted? If you agree such a number is ahistorical for the Province of Canada in the 1860s, you certainly did not say so.

And as far as basic concepts like comparing and contrasting "white" populations of daughter colonies conquered by Britain go, how are "events separated by over a century" when speaking of French Canadians in (say) the 1860s vis a vis the Afrikaners of "British" South Africa in (say) 1880-81?Or 1899-1902?

Or, for that matter, 1914-18 in both countries, or even 1939-45 in both countries.

Separating French Canadians in the 1860s from South Africans by a century would require a comparison dealing with South Africans in the 1970s, one would think.

Best,

 

[EnglishCanuck]

-snip-

So is Canada in 1860 comparible with Canada in 1914 or not? You're not being very consistent here. I must admit that your logic (if we can call that) is becoming more than a little difficult to follow.

Some consistency would be nice.

Though are you actually going to talk about something in the TL or just make broad sweeping generalizations?

 

[TFSmith121]

Upper Canada and Lower Canada (or) Canada West and Canada East

So is Canada in 1860 comparible with Canada in 1914 or not? You're not being very consistent here. I must admit that your logic (if we can call that) is becoming more than a little difficult to follow. Some consistency would be nice. Though are you actually going to talk about something in the TL or just make broad sweeping generalizations?

In societal terms and the expected reaction to a British-forced mobilization order, Upper Canada and Lower Canada (or) Canada West and Canada East in the 1860s are certainly comparable to the provinces of Ontario and Quebec in 1914-18, given the history of men like Louis-Joseph Papineau and Henri Bourassa (who were, after all, directly related; grandfather and grandson) - seems entirely consistent that they had little patience for Anglophone Anglophiles.

http://www.warmuseum.ca/firstworldw...cruitment-and-conscription/conscription-1917/

Given that opposition to conscription was so marked among Francopohones the Francœur Motion was considered in Quebec for independence in 1918, yes, seems rather consistent over no less than five decades that Canadiens had little interest in dying for the British; the Annexation Manifesto, signed in 1849 by such Anglophone stalwarts as Abbott, Molson, and Redpath, and supported well into the 1850s by them and others (including Galt) makes the same case self-evident for non-Francophones.

The basic (and entirely sober, pragmatic, and sensible - in other words, stereotypically "Canadian") question, of course, was why allow London to turn the Canadas into a battlefield (yet again) in a dispute that had nothing to do with Canadians?

Granted, there would always be Col. Blimps like the Denisons and Hughes, but they could certainly go be volunteers in far off corners of the Empire - if the Empire would have them, of course; the British turned down both men repeatedly, which says a lot about the capacity of "native Canadian" military establishment in this period, even after Confederation. To be blunt, it was and remained useless for anything more than aid to the civil power missions, and the British and everyone else knew it, as per a very distinguished Canadian officer and historian:

http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/defence-policy/

"...the defence of Canada was a costly burden for France and then for Great Britain, invariably against enemies to the south, be they Iroquois, English or the American invaders of 1775-76 or of 1812-14. The AMERICAN CIVIL WAR persuaded the British that there could be no successful replay of the WAR OF 1812. Confederation became, in British eyes, a device to help their North American colonists accept the hopeless burden of their own defence. The day the last British garrison left central Canada, November 11, 1871, might be celebrated as Canada's Independence Day. More accurately, the few Canadians who thought about it realized that they had been left to their own devices.

... To the south, whatever George T. DENISON and other militia colonels might assert, defence was impossible without a level of preparedness that would, itself, be provocative. In fact, the British departure was a signal for the United States to close its border forts and move their garrisons west to protect their western settlers. Canada's policy, as A.A. Dorion had suggested in 1865, was "to keep quiet and give no cause for war."

Given the above realities, well understood in every capital from Ottawa to London to Washington, why should a habitant die for a flag that had conquered his homeland, over a dispute as non-relevant to him as the Trent or something similar (a two hour delay in the mails, for example; horrors!), and in a situation where the only way there would be a war is if London insisted on it?

As apparently even you acknowledge, which is more than many are willing to admit. Lincoln, Seward, et al were neither fools nor warmongers, despite those who would suggest otherwise.

Best,

 

[Zulufoxtrot]

Woot, glad to see this back!

I don't think I commented on the previous version, but was subscribed, definitely subscribing to this one as well. Great stuff!

 

[Karolus Rex]

EnglishCanuck, great TL you have here, I am really enjoying it. Keep up the good work .

Now please excuse me, as I enter the ongoing argument between you and Smith.

TFSmith121 given that you are the person that made this amazing claim on a tread sometime ago...

Again, the population of the US in 1810 was 7.2 million. Even a 10 percent mbilization yields 720,000 men.

... I just have one question.

If according to your own words, in the British victory in the war of 1812 thread, the US could mobilize 10% of it's TOTAL population, that is including people that wouldn't be fit for war (after all the 7M figure you give includes women, children and old people), how can you be so shocked and revolted that one person would claim that Canada could raise enough men to protect itself?

After all, using your 10% logic, and given that Canada had a TOTAL population of 3,463,000 people in 1867, we could and should expect some 346,300 seal murdering canucks, to fight against the US.

I expect your answer with much anticipation.

 

[galveston bay]

EnglishCanuck, great TL you have here, I am really enjoying it. Keep up the good work .

Now please excuse me, as I enter the ongoing argument between you and Smith.

TFSmith121 given that you are the person that made this amazing claim on a tread sometime ago...



... I just have one question.

If according to your own words, in the British victory in the war of 1812 thread, the US could mobilize 10% of it's TOTAL population, that is including people that wouldn't be fit for war (after all the 7M figure you give includes women, children and old people), how can you be so shocked and revolted that one person would claim that Canada could raise enough men to protect itself?

After all, using your 10% logic, and given that Canada had a TOTAL population of 3,463,000 people in 1867, we could and should expect some 346,300 seal murdering canucks, to fight against the US.

I expect your answer with much anticipation.

I generally am skeptical about 10% mobilizations pre 20th Century. The French seem to have reached that number during the Napoleonic Era, and so did Prussia (or pretty close) but everyone else seemed to be closer to around 5-7% of population

The US mobilized, including people who reenlisted, around 2 million men from the Northern States from a population of 22 million (according the the official history of the US Army) while the CSA mobilized around 800,000 - 900,000 men out of 9 million people (including Black Slaves). The Union Army usually ran around 1 million, the CSA peaked at around 600,000.

http://www.history.army.mil/books/AMH-V1/ch09.htm#b

so around 5-7% generally speaking, with the possibility of going higher (although the casualties would tend to level off that peak pretty quick)

so using those figures as a guide 3.4 million gets you a maximum of 340,000 but the 5-7% figure we see from the other North Americans in the picture gives us around 160-200,000 at most

and overwhelmingly concentrated east of the Great Plains too but with much poorer communications to the West (especially in winter). The manpower pools matter a lot of course, so the American West has a far greater (hugely so) manpower pool than Pacific Canada. I am not sure what the population is of Australia is at this point (but I feel confidant that that tidbit will show up presently), but I do know that Australia consists of separate colonies some of which are scarcely settled at this point

Which means the next manpower pools for the British in regards to the West Coast are really far away.

While the British Empire has effectively an unlimited manpower pool (India after all), its effective manpower pool is going to be sharply limited. If the British are unwilling to conscript (which I can't imagine would sit well), they are limited to the usual 3-5% of the population of the UK (including Ireland) generally willing to volunteer for overseas service.

I also think it doubtful in the extreme that any troops that are not White are going to show up in North America or Europe from India to replace garrisons or serve as troops for the campaign. I can't think of many examples, with the first really big showing for Indian troops in a European campaign not being until 1914-15 (and they were soon sent elsewhere)

 

[Karolus Rex]

I generally am skeptical about 10% mobilizations pre 20th Century. The French seem to have reached that number during the Napoleonic Era, and so did Prussia (or pretty close) but everyone else seemed to be closer to around 5-7% of population

The US mobilized, including people who reenlisted, around 2 million men from the Northern States from a population of 22 million (according the the official history of the US Army) while the CSA mobilized around 800,000 - 900,000 men out of 9 million men. The Union Army usually ran around 1 million, the CSA peaked at around 600,000.

http://www.history.army.mil/books/AMH-V1/ch09.htm#b

I completely agree with all that you are saying on the mobilization point. And I apologize if I mislead you into thinking I seriously believed in the 10% Smith claimed.

so around 5-7% generally speaking, with the possibility of going higher (although the casualties would tend to level off that peak pretty quick)

so using those figures as a guide 3.4 million gets you a maximum of 340,000 but the 5-7% figure we see from the other North Americans in the picture gives us around 160-200,000 at most

Personalty I always use the following rule:

divide the total population by 4 (considering that the adult male population fit to serve is a quarter of the full population), which gives you some 850 000 people

then consider some 5% of them would serve which gives you 42 500, this number can both rise or fall considering the nationalist fervor and/or conscription.

and overwhelmingly concentrated east of the Great Plains too but with much poorer communications to the West (especially in winter). The manpower pools matter a lot of course, so the American West has a far greater (hugely so) manpower pool than Pacific Canada. I am not sure what the population is of Australia is at this point (but I feel confidant that that tidbit will show up presently), but I do know that Australia consists of separate colonies some of which are scarcely settled at this point

I bow to your great knowledge on this part. On the Australia part, at the time they were indeed separated into several colonies. Only after the 1880s did the idea of federation begun to take form.

Which means the next manpower pools for the British in regards to the West Coast are really far away.

While the British Empire has effectively an unlimited manpower pool (India after all), its effective manpower pool is going to be sharply limited. If the British are unwilling to conscript (which I can't imagine would sit well), they are limited to the usual 3-5% of the population of the UK (including Ireland) generally willing to volunteer for overseas service.

I also think it doubtful in the extreme that any troops that are not White are going to show up in North America or Europe from India to replace garrisons or serve as troops for the campaign. I can't think of many examples, with the first really big showing for Indian troops in a European campaign not being until 1914-15 (and they were soon sent elsewhere)

Given that the Mutiny had only happened 5 years before the start of the TL, I think it would be too early for the UK to depend on the Indian manpower to ensure their war capacity.

 

[TFSmith121]

BNA didn't have 3.4 million people in 1861

- snip - .

BNA didn't have 3.4 million people in 1861; Statscan gives the following:

Upper Canada (Canada West/Ontario) had a population of 1,396,091; Lower Canada (Canada East/Quebec) haad 1,111,566, for a total of 2,507,657 in the Province. The population was (roughly) 60-40 Anglophone/Francophone.

In the Maritimes (each a separate colony, with a separate British governor, separate local legislature, and separate local militia structure and politics), the numbers were as follows: New Brunswick had 252,047; Nova Scotia, 330,857; Prince Edward Island had 80,857; Newfoundland had 122,638 in 1857. Link is here:

http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/98-187-x/4064809-eng.htm

The ten percent figure is a historical standard for the male population that can be subtracted from the overall population for war service (army, navy, or otherwise) without a major impact on the existing economy of a given population.

The reality is ten percent is rarely reached, but it is a yardstick; the War College and ICotAF has reams of material on these issues, if you truly wish to pursue it.

That being said, ten percent of the population of the Province of Canada's population in 1861 would have totalled 250,765. The reality of mobilization, however, is that (for example) the US states of Ohio (2,339,502) and Minnesota (172,023) are roughly equivalent to the entire population of Upper and Lower Canada, and (historically), over the course of 48 months of war, Ohio is credited with 313,180 enlistments, and Minnesota with 24,020, for a total of (roughly) 337,000 enlistments.

However, that is over the course of 48 months of war, and in a nation of ~22 million (free states and border states) with an aggregate number of enlistments of ~2.8 million. The actual numbers of US troops in service in the winter of 1861-62 was roughly 527,000 (less than a quarter of the "ideal"), and some percentage of those were always going to be sick, on furlough, detached duty (recruiting, administrative, etc), absent, or in transit. This holds true for all armies throughout history, of course.

But, set that aside. If the 10 percent rule is adhered to (again, as a yardstick), the US can mobilize 2.2 million men; the Province of Canada can mobilize 250,765.

Including all the "settled" colonies in BNA brings in ~25,000 from New Brunswick, ~33,000 from Nova Scotia, ~8,000 from PEI, and ~12,000 from Newfoundland, for another ~78,000, or a total of ~330,000.

However, if the percentages of those actually in service mirror those of the US (historically), that those actually in uniform and organized are roughly 82,500.

There's another caveat, however; the ~527,000 in US service historically by the winter of 1861-62 existed as such only after (essentially) 9-12 months of hard work since the mobilization began, back in April of 1861.

So if the BNA mobilization begins in (say) January of 1862, which is essentially historical for BNA (no additional volunteer militia battalions beyond the three prewar units were formed until January, 1862, for example) that means that the BNA field force might - all else being equal - total the equivalent of 82,500 by (roughly) September, 1862. That is for the entirety of BNA, of course; the number in the Province is roughly 50,000, with the other 30,000 or so split between the four Maritime colonies.

It is worth noting that in an official British Army summary of the available/useful volunteer and militia personnel in the Province of Canada by the summer of 1862, the total number of such was estimated at ~15,000 volunteers and 10,000 useful militia. No more, no less, and so that number is (being charitable) the absolute largest number of cadre any mobilization is going to be built upon. The source is:

Petrie, Capt. Martin (14th F.) and James, Col. Sir Henry (RE - Topographical and Statistical Dept., War Office), Organization, Composition, and Strength of the Army of Great Britain, London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office; by direction of the Secretary of State for War, 1863 (preface dated Nov., 1862)

The above is available through Google books, if one wishes to look for it. Also useful (and available thanks to Google) are:

Hart, Col. H.G. (Depot Battalion – h.p.), The New Annual Army List and Militia List for 1862, London: John Murray (pub. – printed by Woodfall and Kinder), 50 Albermarle Street, 1862 (corrected to 30 Dec., 1861);

Wily, Thomas {Lt. Col., Militia Dept., (Province of Canada) Ottawa} Annual Volunteer and Service Militia List of Canada; G.E. Debarats, Ottawa, 1st March, 1867; by authority, Provincial Parliament, Office of the Registrar;

So that's the issue: armies don't come into existance overnight, and they require cadre to be organized, even with green or raw fillers to bring new or existing units up to strength; the issue there, of course, is that every trained man used as cadre in a "new" wartime-raised unit is one taken from the peacetime structure, regular or reserve (as in the Canadian provincial volunteers, who were part-time soldiers with limited training), which otherwise is the "emergency" force.

This is bad enough, but in reality, in an operational sense, the choice for the British government in Canada in 1861-62 is mobilize the existing (and small) organized reserve force (since there was not a regular "Canadian" force of any kind in the 1860s) to try and hold the line, or mobilize the same men as cadre for a (hoped for) larger force of volunteers or (essentially) conscripted militia that may be ready in months, but have fewer even half-formed units to throw into the line.

Mobilization in wartime is a very difficult strategic problem, especially in a situation where the (potential) enemy has a 9-12 month lead ... there are no shortcuts to mobilizing an effective field force.

So, that's the problem. It will be interesting to see how EC tries to address it, and whether realistically or not.

Best,

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Woot, glad to see this back!

I don't think I commented on the previous version, but was subscribed, definitely subscribing to this one as well. Great stuff!

EnglishCanuck, great TL you have here, I am really enjoying it. Keep up the good work .

Many thanks I hope you continue to enjoy the TL as it continues, and I should have the next chapter up early next week!

 

[EnglishCanuck]

In societal terms and the expected reaction to a British-forced mobilization order, Upper Canada and Lower Canada (or) Canada West and Canada East in the 1860s are certainly comparable to the provinces of Ontario and Quebec in 1914-18, given the history of men like Louis-Joseph Papineau and Henri Bourassa (who were, after all, directly related; grandfather and grandson) - seems entirely consistent that they had little patience for Anglophone Anglophiles.

Ah yes, your much vaunted Papineau, the man who embodied "he who fights and runs away lives to run away again" who left his own followers (to quote one of them) "in the lurch" who was by and large abandoned by his own followers in the aftermath. Yes that is certainly the man who will be able to lead them to victory, though it is somewhat interesting it was his lack of ability to work with even his Anglophone supporters that lead to his overall failure as a politician.

Bourassa had plenty of time for Anglophones, considering he worked with them freely enough (he was a staunch Liberal party member after all). Then of course he was a Canadian nationalist who never supported the idea of French Canadian independence, and to top it off was an ultramontane to boot.

the Annexation Manifesto, signed in 1849 by such Anglophone stalwarts as Abbott, Molson, and Redpath, and supported well into the 1850s by them and others (including Galt) makes the same case self-evident for non-Francophones.

Ah this simply beautiful chestnut! Yes 300 odd businessmen and fringe politicians certainly speak for all of Canada! So interesting that the Anglophones who signed it were men opposed to the Rebellion Losses Bill, but were also disappointed at Britain's abolition of preferential duties on Canadian lumber, wheat and flour products, in which they might lose money. However, the second Britain signs the Reciprocity Treaty they drop it and never bring it up again, despite if they were so opposed to something like an independent Canada having ample opportunity to support it again during the Confederation debates by allying with someone like Dorion.

Of course they didn't, which leads one to suspect just how much these men actually supported the idea, versus of course using it as a way to protest politically.

Such staunch ideologues do inspire

The basic (and entirely sober, pragmatic, and sensible - in other words, stereotypically "Canadian") question, of course, was why allow London to turn the Canadas into a battlefield (yet again) in a dispute that had nothing to do with Canadians?

Ah so you still haven't read Chapter 3?

Granted, there would always be Col. Blimps like the Denisons and Hughes,

Which Denison would that be? George Denison I? Soldier in two wars with no bad news to his name? George Denison II long time militia organizer, victorious leader in 1837-38? George Denison III who was described by one Garnet Wolseley as "One of the ablest and professionally one of the best read officers I ever knew...he would have been a military leader of note in any army he joined. It is much to be regretted that he did not adopt the Army as a profession. Had he done so he must have risen to eminence."
. Who served during the Fenian raids and the North West Rebellion? Frederick Denison? Chosen by Wolseley to be his ADC in the Red River and again to serve in the Sudan Campaign? Or one after those?

Sam Hughes? Who served with daring in the Second Boer War under Sir Charles Warren but was dismissed for criticizing the British command preformance?

Honestly if we're looking for Canadian Colonel Blimps, I'd suggest starting with John Stoughten Dennis, who abandoned his duties in the face adversity not once, but twice.

Given the above realities, well understood in every capital from Ottawa to London to Washington, why should a habitant die for a flag that had conquered his homeland, over a dispute as non-relevant to him as the Trent

The French Canadians have a long record of dying for the Crown, whether in 1775 in Quebec, 1812-1815 along the banks of the Chateauguay and Lacolle, or in 1837-38 against their fellows, and in 1866-68 against the Fenians.

What's interesting to note in that in all the cases of invasions, (even when the British arguably "started it") they failed to revolt or support the invaders in any meaningful way. Perhaps it's because they resented the idea of "freedom" imposed at the point of a bayonet, perhaps it's because they did not desire to be apart of American institutions, or even perhaps because they saw the dubious value in trading devil they knew for the devil they didn't.

Either way, there is a distinct lack of anything suggesting the Francophone population being unwilling to fight in the defense of their homes or desire for American intervention in their affairs.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

so using those figures as a guide 3.4 million gets you a maximum of 340,000 but the 5-7% figure we see from the other North Americans in the picture gives us around 160-200,000 at most

For the sum total of all of Britain's North American subjects from West to East this isn't a horrible estimation of perhaps the max number who could be mobilized over the course of a war in the era.

and overwhelmingly concentrated east of the Great Plains too but with much poorer communications to the West (especially in winter). The manpower pools matter a lot of course, so the American West has a far greater (hugely so) manpower pool than Pacific Canada. I am not sure what the population is of Australia is at this point (but I feel confidant that that tidbit will show up presently), but I do know that Australia consists of separate colonies some of which are scarcely settled at this point

Which means the next manpower pools for the British in regards to the West Coast are really far away.

Manpower on the West Coast for the British (I believe) is generally limited to the volunteers they can arm in the immediate area (maybe 600, before new weapons are dispatched) and the men who can be drawn upon from the Pacific holdings and the Indian garrisons.

Though theoretically speaking you could also get some 2,000+ Australians, seeing as that number did volunteer to serve in the Wakaito in 1863.

Personalty I always use the following rule:

divide the total population by 4 (considering that the adult male population fit to serve is a quarter of the full population), which gives you some 850 000 people

then consider some 5% of them would serve which gives you 42 500, this number can both rise or fall considering the nationalist fervor and/or conscription.

Not a bad rule to follow.

Given that the Mutiny had only happened 5 years before the start of the TL, I think it would be too early for the UK to depend on the Indian manpower to ensure their war capacity.

While the British Empire has effectively an unlimited manpower pool (India after all), its effective manpower pool is going to be sharply limited. If the British are unwilling to conscript (which I can't imagine would sit well), they are limited to the usual 3-5% of the population of the UK (including Ireland) generally willing to volunteer for overseas service.

Putting Indian troops is a non-starter in the 19th century, even the "Indian" troops brought in for the Second Boer War were largely service troops who did no fighting. They're just not trusted enough to serve outside of India, and by and large this would be a 'white mans' war in 1862, so bringing in Native troops from India would be a terrible idea (American newspapers would have a field day decrying the British unleashing 'the savages of Cawnpore' on them). So they are basically reserved to (as galveston notes) those who would be willing to volunteer for service in war time and those regulars on hand.

 

[Karolus Rex]

BNA didn't have 3.4 million people in 1861; Statscan gives the following:

Upper Canada (Canada West/Ontario) had a population of 1,396,091; Lower Canada (Canada East/Quebec) haad 1,111,566, for a total of 2,507,657 in the Province. The population was (roughly) 60-40 Anglophone/Francophone.

Thank you for the correction of the Canadian population, I will use those numbers for now on.

In the Maritimes (each a separate colony, with a separate British governor, separate local legislature, and separate local militia structure and politics), the numbers were as follows: New Brunswick had 252,047; Nova Scotia, 330,857; Prince Edward Island had 80,857; Newfoundland had 122,638 in 1857. Link is here:

http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/98-187-x/4064809-eng.htm

I have serious doubts that the British Empire wound't use the military forces of the Maritimes in a war so close to them. Especially given that the reserve troops in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland represented 25351 volunteers.

The ten percent figure is a historical standard for the male population that can be subtracted from the overall population for war service (army, navy, or otherwise) without a major impact on the existing economy of a given population.

The reality is ten percent is rarely reached, but it is a yardstick; the War College and ICotAF has reams of material on these issues, if you truly wish to pursue it.

That being said, ten percent of the population of the Province of Canada's population in 1861 would have totalled 250,765. The reality of mobilization, however, is that (for example) the US states of Ohio (2,339,502) and Minnesota (172,023) are roughly equivalent to the entire population of Upper and Lower Canada, and (historically), over the course of 48 months of war, Ohio is credited with 313,180 enlistments, and Minnesota with 24,020, for a total of (roughly) 337,000 enlistments.

However, that is over the course of 48 months of war, and in a nation of ~22 million (free states and border states) with an aggregate number of enlistments of ~2.8 million. The actual numbers of US troops in service in the winter of 1861-62 was roughly 527,000 (less than a quarter of the "ideal"), and some percentage of those were always going to be sick, on furlough, detached duty (recruiting, administrative, etc), absent, or in transit. This holds true for all armies throughout history, of course.

I will disagree on this one. 10% in pre-1900 is a too bug yardstick, especially given that in 1812 the French Empire, using large scale conscription, only managed to gather 550,000 men from a 44,000,000 population, even if you had the men that were in service in other areas of the Empire they were far from the 10% mark. In 1870 the North German Confederation from a population of 37.8M (according to tacitus.nu) only managed to mobilize 900,000 reserves and militia and this was using an army based of compulsory service of all males of military age.

So as you can in both cases Armies that relied heavily in conscription only considered practicable to raise between 5 to 10% of the male population available.

The problem with your math is that you are using the full population, instead of only using the male population in military age (16 to 45) and that would be fit enough to serve. If you use the quarter rules you get the German male population with those specs would be 9,450,000, then you can use the 10% rule. Marshal Adolphe Niel tried to do the same in France and considered that the 800,000 conscripts would be the most realistic number they could gather, and this from a population base of 36.9M (according to tacitus.nu).

In contrast the Union army had 698,000 at it's maximum and the 2,2M that you provide was the number of people that serve in some capacity during the war, independently of the branch (navy, army, marines and revenue service) and independently of the time they served, given that many served only 3 to 6 months during the full war.

But, set that aside. If the 10 percent rule is adhered to (again, as a yardstick), the US can mobilize 2.2 million men; the Province of Canada can mobilize 250,765.

Including all the "settled" colonies in BNA brings in ~25,000 from New Brunswick, ~33,000 from Nova Scotia, ~8,000 from PEI, and ~12,000 from Newfoundland, for another ~78,000, or a total of ~330,000.

From the numbers you provide (Composition, and Strength of the Army of Great Britain), Canada could had used 25000 militia and volunteers and if you add the numbers from all BNA the number rises to 50,000 militia more volunteers. And if the UK uses their home reserve, that had 79,146 militia and 179,190 from the Yeomanry and Volunteers, to augment the 192,852 regular forces, that had an artillery force of 624 guns, stationed in GB, they could easily send a 50,000 expeditionary force to augment the forces that would protect Canada before campaigning season (this is considering TTL circumstances).

There's another caveat, however; the ~527,000 in US service historically by the winter of 1861-62 existed as such only after (essentially) 9-12 months of hard work since the mobilization began, back in April of 1861.

So if the BNA mobilization begins in (say) January of 1862, which is essentially historical for BNA (no additional volunteer militia battalions beyond the three prewar units were formed until January, 1862, for example) that means that the BNA field force might - all else being equal - total the equivalent of 82,500 by (roughly) September, 1862. That is for the entirety of BNA, of course; the number in the Province is roughly 50,000, with the other 30,000 or so split between the four Maritime colonies.

First we must consider that unlike the UK, the US had no previous experience with mobilization and the 9-12 months that you provide would be an exaggeration of the rime the British home forces would take to mobilize.

On the bolded part of the text, please remember EC stated that the mobilization begun in late October, early November 1861 and not January 1862.

So that's the issue: armies don't come into existance overnight, and they require cadre to be organized, even with green or raw fillers to bring new or existing units up to strength; the issue there, of course, is that every trained man used as cadre in a "new" wartime-raised unit is one taken from the peacetime structure, regular or reserve (as in the Canadian provincial volunteers, who were part-time soldiers with limited training), which otherwise is the "emergency" force.

This is bad enough, but in reality, in an operational sense, the choice for the British government in Canada in 1861-62 is mobilize the existing (and small) organized reserve force (since there was not a regular "Canadian" force of any kind in the 1860s) to try and hold the line, or mobilize the same men as cadre for a (hoped for) larger force of volunteers or (essentially) conscripted militia that may be ready in months, but have fewer even half-formed units to throw into the line.

Mobilization in wartime is a very difficult strategic problem, especially in a situation where the (potential) enemy has a 9-12 month lead ... there are no shortcuts to mobilizing an effective field force.

Despite all that you point here, especially with the no regular Canadian force of any kind, ignoring the Royal Canadian Rifles stated in Composition, and Strength of the Army of Great Britain.

Now, you say several times that the 500,000 men that the US had was a quarter of the ideal number, so for you the ideal number would be a 2M army, and in no point you argue that this would be impracticable (in contrast you state that the Canadian mobilization would be hell), so I ask you this question.

If the US raises that number to fight both the CSA and the UK how would they equip such a force, considering that in 1862 the US Army was dependent on British weapons and sulfate to equip a force a quarter of the size the number you consider the "ideal"?

They would had enough problems to ensure that their current forces stay in good shape, without adding more men, so that comes to another question. They would be equipped with what? Muskets from the Napoleonic Wars? Pikes, like the CSA thought of using in 1862? And where would they gather the gunpowder and the ammunitions to feed this huge war best?

 

[The Gunslinger]

Ah yes, your much vaunted Papineau, the man who embodied "he who fights and runs away lives to run away again" who left his own followers (to quote one of them) "in the lurch" who was by and large abandoned by his own followers in the aftermath. Yes that is certainly the man who will be able to lead them to victory, though it is somewhat interesting it was his lack of ability to work with even his Anglophone supporters that lead to his overall failure as a politician.

Bourassa had plenty of time for Anglophones, considering he worked with them freely enough (he was a staunch Liberal party member after all). Then of course he was a Canadian nationalist who never supported the idea of French Canadian independence, and to top it off was an ultramontane to boot.



Ah this simply beautiful chestnut! Yes 300 odd businessmen and fringe politicians certainly speak for all of Canada! So interesting that the Anglophones who signed it were men opposed to the Rebellion Losses Bill, but were also disappointed at Britain's abolition of preferential duties on Canadian lumber, wheat and flour products, in which they might lose money. However, the second Britain signs the Reciprocity Treaty they drop it and never bring it up again, despite if they were so opposed to something like an independent Canada having ample opportunity to support it again during the Confederation debates by allying with someone like Dorion.

Of course they didn't, which leads one to suspect just how much these men actually supported the idea, versus of course using it as a way to protest politically.

Such staunch ideologues do inspire



Ah so you still haven't read Chapter 3?



Which Denison would that be? George Denison I? Soldier in two wars with no bad news to his name? George Denison II long time militia organizer, victorious leader in 1837-38? George Denison III who was described by one Garnet Wolseley as "One of the ablest and professionally one of the best read officers I ever knew...he would have been a military leader of note in any army he joined. It is much to be regretted that he did not adopt the Army as a profession. Had he done so he must have risen to eminence."
. Who served during the Fenian raids and the North West Rebellion? Frederick Denison? Chosen by Wolseley to be his ADC in the Red River and again to serve in the Sudan Campaign? Or one after those?

Sam Hughes? Who served with daring in the Second Boer War under Sir Charles Warren but was dismissed for criticizing the British command preformance?

Honestly if we're looking for Canadian Colonel Blimps, I'd suggest starting with John Stoughten Dennis, who abandoned his duties in the face adversity not once, but twice.



The French Canadians have a long record of dying for the Crown, whether in 1775 in Quebec, 1812-1815 along the banks of the Chateauguay and Lacolle, or in 1837-38 against their fellows, and in 1866-68 against the Fenians.

What's interesting to note in that in all the cases of invasions, (even when the British arguably "started it") they failed to revolt or support the invaders in any meaningful way. Perhaps it's because they resented the idea of "freedom" imposed at the point of a bayonet, perhaps it's because they did not desire to be apart of American institutions, or even perhaps because they saw the dubious value in trading devil they knew for the devil they didn't.

Either way, there is a distinct lack of anything suggesting the Francophone population being unwilling to fight in the defense of their homes or desire for American intervention in their affairs.

Papineau couldn't even get all of Lower Canada on the same page, the Anglos were near universal in their defiance of his rebellion. He picked a fight with the church and they were adamantly opposed to his view for the future of the province. The seigneurees were literally to man not indicted or associated with the rebellion. And even the dischord amongst the habitants post rebellion themselves was almost wholly evaporated when the Union government paid out the land owners and significant land reform took place, Oullet (who wrote the most seminal book on the Lower Canadian rebellion) that the habitants were basically bilked by the liberal elite into rebelling and would have been infinitely better off had they voted as a block and supported the Anglos who had been arguing for land reform in the Lower Canadian legislature for years prior to the conflict. And although Greer (who wrote the next best book on the rebellion putting the emphasis on rural areas) says that isn't so, he tacitly endorses the theory by showing that the habitants spent as much (or more) time seizing the manors of the landownders and burning documents than they did opposing the British rule.

So by the time of the American Civil War, the small farmers have been completely placated, the church is in a position of power allied with the British government, the elite of the province are firmly entrenched in the British camp, the Anglos are fully supportive of Britain, and the liberals have had to slowly rebuild their shattered support.

 

[galveston bay]

infantry weapons of the US Civil War

this includes number produced or imported. I have not found one that breaks it down by year as of yet

http://www.civilwarwiki.net/wiki/Table_of_Civil_War_Era_Small_Arms

 

[Major Crimson]

I'm convinced you guys spend more time arguing than writing the TLs at this point. :|


Not to say that it isn't a fab piece of work, so please keep it up EnglishCanuck!

I do have to wonder, specifically in the case of TFSmith, why even bother with this argument? Its clearly going nowhere and its got to have been going on for a year now. Your disagreements are fundamental and I think we all know neither of you will ever be brought round, do you just enjoy the debate? Its just a bit of a blight on both TLs imo and hell, it's got to be a year old now.

 

[Mrstrategy]

The British can use their naval superiority in the pacific to raid and land troops all along the west coast