Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

[TFSmith121]

President-Little Belt is apples and oranges

Apples and oranges.

Nor would those nations have been ones Britain felt a particular grudge against or felt they could have pushed around without consequence.

President-Little Belt is apples and oranges?

Okay.

After all, as the man himself said, "ships sailing on the sea cannot stop armies marching on land."

Best,

 

[galveston bay]

Or if the Austrians or Prussians had gotten into an incident with a British warship that ended with 32 RN dead or wounded, surely that would have led to war.

Oh wait.

Best,

the only reason the Leopard/Chesapeake incident didn't lead to war was Jefferson. He might have been right although it is hard to say. We did better in 1812 with 5 extra years to train up the Navy and Army, but it was still too small, but on the other hand in 1807 the British Army was still instituting the reforms from General Moore, so it was worse than it would be later (much worse)

An Anglo-American War then might have even butterflied out the Pennisula Campaign and wouldn't that have been an interesting butterfly indeed.

Certainly the Little Belt/President incident (which is what you are referring to) should have been more instructive to the British than it turned out to be. Sloop of War or not, the British had been watching the Americans do reasonably well against the Barbary Pirates and many had friendly relations with American naval officers. Some of the senior ones even fought against the Americans in the Revolution. Of course both sides had their arrogant or blindly nationalistic leaders, so plenty of blame to toss around for 1812 that is for sure.



Would make an interesting timeline

 

[TFSmith121]

Certainly should have been...the point, however, is

the only reason the Leopard/Chesapeake incident didn't lead to war was Jefferson. He might have been right although it is hard to say. We did better in 1812 with 5 extra years to train up the Navy and Army, but it was still too small, but on the other hand in 1807 the British Army was still instituting the reforms from General Moore, so it was worse than it would be later (much worse)

An Anglo-American War then might have even butterflied out the Pennisula Campaign and wouldn't that have been an interesting butterfly indeed.

Certainly the Little Belt/President incident (which is what you are referring to) should have been more instructive to the British than it turned out to be. Sloop of War or not, the British had been watching the Americans do reasonably well against the Barbary Pirates and many had friendly relations with American naval officers. Some of the senior ones even fought against the Americans in the Revolution. Of course both sides had their arrogant or blindly nationalistic leaders, so plenty of blame to toss around for 1812 that is for sure.



Would make an interesting timeline

Certainly should have; the point, however, is that such incidents (1807, 1811, or even the 1863 Chesapeake incident, which was more egregious than Trent) didn't lead to war, any more than Amethyst, Saumarez- Volage, Liberty, or Pueblo did ... Great powers will accept a lot, actually, largely because as satisfying as some might see "teaching those so-and-sos a lesson" the strategic realities is great powers have more important strategic interests, in most cases.

Otherwise, the British would have presented an ultimatum to the US in 1811, the US one to the UK in 1863, the British to the Chinese and/or Albanians in the 1940s, or the US to the Israelis or the North Koreans in the 1960s.

Didn't work out that way, of course.

Best,

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Wolseley is on record when sent in 1861 that he and rest of the force would be dead or prisoners early in 1862

He seems to have changed his tune when he actually arrived saying "one or two Battalions & a handful of Artillery would be enough to deter the evil-minded from attempts upon these bright regions of the Crown."

Yeah, all 25,000 Upper and Lower Canadians the British actually expected would show up by the end of 1862, along with the roughly ~6,000 Maritimers - who could not, of course, been ordered to serve outside of their home colonies

It's rather ridiculous to cling to the idea that the Canadians could only raise those who volunteered in the two weeks that elapsed between the issuance of the militia order historically and the discovery that peace was imminent. Volunteers understandably don't have much of an interest in military service without the imminent threat of war.

The rapid demobilization of the Union army in 1865 speaks to that.

There's more than enough men who volunteered historically for service in the times of peace and even after the Trent affair. 1838 and 1866 are rather instructive in that matter.

I've got the OOB's for the larger call up of militia pretty much ready, but those will come when we get to them.

 

[galveston bay]

He seems to have changed his tune when he actually arrived saying "one or two Battalions & a handful of Artillery would be enough to deter the evil-minded from attempts upon these bright regions of the Crown." .

one hopes he was saying that to buck up morale... I have a reasonably good opinion of Wolseley as a soldier and certainly hope he didn't actually believe that.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

President-Little Belt is apples and oranges?

Okay.

If you're referring to the Dacotah-Terror affair of TTL then I would say that is similar, but President-Little Belt is not similar to the boarding of the Trent historically.

 

[galveston bay]

Certainly should have; the point, however, is that such incidents (1807, 1811, or even the 1863 Chesapeake incident, which was more egregious than Trent didn't lead to war, any more than Amethyst, Saumarez- Volage, Liberty, or Pueblo did ... Great powers will accept a lot, actually, largely because as satisfying as some might see "teaching those so-and-sos a lesson" the strategic realities is great powers have more important strategic interests, in most cases.

Otherwise, the British would have presented an ultimatum to the US in 1811, the US one to the UK in 1863, the British to the Chinese and/or Albanians in the 1940s, or the US to the Israelis or the North Koreans in the 1960s.

Didn't work out that way, of course.

Best,

The Liberty Incident was an odd situation and the US did the complete reverse of smiting the wicked by rearming them and becoming their best pal instead

I would argue that the British had no way of punishing the Chinese in the 1940s postwar, although the saga of the Amythest is pretty interesting and Albania is similar. Certainly the British were no longer the same kind of relative power they were in the early 19th Century. The Pueblo Incident probably deserved far harsher measures on the North Koreans, who seem to still deserve a thorough smacking. Not that we will do so as they are loony enough to fight an allout war if we smack them lightly.

Which you could probably argue should be the British perspective, especially after the 54-40 or Fight Crisis, when the US was perfectly willing to fight the British Empire and the Republic of Mexico at the same time... which would tend to make me cautious if I were a British official because that shows a certain insanity that can be dangerous to deal with. But then I am not an arrogant British policy maker who is 'certain' of his righteous position or military and economic power (however unjustified)

War rarely start from rational decision making. Nearly always there are irrational decisions being made by at least one of the powers clashing. I am willing to let the poetic license go forward here just as I was with "Burnished Rows of Steel" because of that. After all, a sober evaluation of the economics and military potential of the two sides would or should have convinced the average Southerner that secession and especially a war over it was dangerously close to suicidal for the very society he was urging to do so.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

one hopes he was saying that to buck up morale... I have a reasonably good opinion of Wolseley as a soldier and certainly hope he didn't actually believe that.

TBH he probably did in 1862. It was a sentiment distressingly common amongst the officers in Canada at the time (from Williams down) and the idea of a British regular being of more value than a 'mere citizen soldier' fits pretty well with the sort of arrogance common to the British officer class of the era.

However, when you read his memoirs and his published works on observing the maneuvers of the Confederate Army his opinion changed quite a bit.

Of course he also regards Lee as an unparalleled genius like Hannibal and sees the Confederate cause as just in these writings, but that was also distressingly common to the views of the British upper class in this period. Needless to say there was something of a bit of elitist feeling in all that...

 

[TFSmith121]

Private statements vs public ones can be illuminating

He seems to have changed his tune when he actually arrived saying "one or two Battalions & a handful of Artillery would be enough to deter the evil-minded from attempts upon these bright regions of the Crown."



It's rather ridiculous to cling to the idea that the Canadians could only raise those who volunteered in the two weeks that elapsed between the issuance of the militia order historically and the discovery that peace was imminent. Volunteers understandably don't have much of an interest in military service without the imminent threat of war.

The rapid demobilization of the Union army in 1865 speaks to that.

There's more than enough men who volunteered historically for service in the times of peace and even after the Trent affair. 1838 and 1866 are rather instructive in that matter.

I've got the OOB's for the larger call up of militia pretty much ready, but those will come when we get to them.

Public statements vs private ones can be illuminating.

The 25,000 in UC/LC (15,000 volunteers with limited training at the company or battalion level and 10,000 militia without any significant training or organization at all) and another 6,000 split between the four Maritimes is an official British army estimate as of the end of 1862 ... Considering there were all of 12 organized battalions in the PoCM at the same time (even after a year of war scares and what passed for mobilization and training under British supervision) it is much more historically valid than any other imaginary total.

Since the British were (like the US), after all, the ones with an actual army and staff, unlike the BNAers.

And if one wants pretend there's a higher percentage, the numbers above are what passes for cadre for any such expansion (which, obviously, a) takes time and b) reduces the available units that can actually be thrown into the line, so to speak... And said percentages should (presumably) be used north and south of the border, and the numbers under arms and ready for the field or already on active service on either side of the border should be recognized as well. Given the US mobilization had begun in April, 1861, 8-9 months before any realistic Trent-related mobilization in BNA or the UK, there's the minor reality of the existing US forces in the winter of 1861-62. Again, there's a reason numerous Britons with expertise were not especially sanguine about the potential correlation of forces that winter.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

It's bloodier, certainly, and involves actual combat

If you're referring to the Dacotah-Terror affair of TTL then I would say that is similar, but President-Little Belt is not similar to the boarding of the Trent historically.

It's bloodier, certainly, and involved actual combat, and yet Perceval et al dispatched no ultimatums. Much closer to an incident than anything imaginable with Trent as it was...

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

In BROS, however, there's more going on

The Liberty Incident was an odd situation and the US did the complete reverse of smiting the wicked by rearming them and becoming their best pal instead

I would argue that the British had no way of punishing the Chinese in the 1940s postwar, although the saga of the Amythest is pretty interesting and Albania is similar. Certainly the British were no longer the same kind of relative power they were in the early 19th Century. The Pueblo Incident probably deserved far harsher measures on the North Koreans, who seem to still deserve a thorough smacking. Not that we will do so as they are loony enough to fight an allout war if we smack them lightly.

Which you could probably argue should be the British perspective, especially after the 54-40 or Fight Crisis, when the US was perfectly willing to fight the British Empire and the Republic of Mexico at the same time... which would tend to make me cautious if I were a British official because that shows a certain insanity that can be dangerous to deal with. But then I am not an arrogant British policy maker who is 'certain' of his righteous position or military and economic power (however unjustified)

War rarely start from rational decision making. Nearly always there are irrational decisions being made by at least one of the powers clashing. I am willing to let the poetic license go forward here just as I was with "Burnished Rows of Steel" because of that. After all, a sober evaluation of the economics and military potential of the two sides would or should have convinced the average Southerner that secession and especially a war over it was dangerously close to suicidal for the very society he was urging to do so.

In BROS, however, there's more going on, but fair point ... That being said, the switch from bellicose posturing in 1862 by Pam the Magnificent to absolute realpolitik in 1864 by Pam the Realistic is illuminating.

Either he got a lot smarter and better at reading a balance sheet in two years, or all the posturing in 1862 was just that.

Presumably after the realities of 1855-56, even Pam understood what Britain could do by itself, which suggests how little there was to the historical Trent "crisis," especially given the insignificance of the stakes ...

Best,

 

[EnglishCanuck]

It's bloodier, certainly, and involved actual combat, and yet Perceval et al dispatched no ultimatums. Much closer to an incident than anything imaginable with Trent as it was...

Best,

So it has precisely what to do with the TL exactly?

 

[EnglishCanuck]

The 25,000 in UC/LC (15,000 volunteers with limited training at the company or battalion level and 10,000 militia without any significant training or organization at all) and another 6,000 split between the four Maritimes is an official British army estimate as of the end of 1862 ... Considering there were all of 12 organized battalions in the PoCM at the same time (even after a year of war scares and what passed for mobilization and training under British supervision) it is much more historically valid than any other imaginary total.

Since the British were (like the US), after all, the ones with an actual army and staff, unlike the BNAers.

And if one wants pretend there's a higher percentage, the numbers above are what passes for cadre for any such expansion (which, obviously, a) takes time and b) reduces the available units that can actually be thrown into the line, so to speak... And said percentages should (presumably) be used north and south of the border, and the numbers under arms and ready for the field or already on active service on either side of the border should be recognized as well. Given the US mobilization had begun in April, 1861, 8-9 months before any realistic Trent-related mobilization in BNA or the UK, there's the minor reality of the existing US forces in the winter of 1861-62.

The simple reality that we can see from 1838 and 1866 is that the assumption that volunteers could be raised rapidly (and that like OTL much of the early mobilization would be entirely organic) is completely correct, and with British help they can be armed and equipped and put in defences to deter serious assault in good time.

Of course the difference ITTL is that the border tensions have been ongoing since October, the militia has been called out since the end of the same month, the British have responded in kind by ferrying more troops and arms over in November than historically, and the organic meeting of volunteer and sedentary militia companies is taking place much earlier that OTL.

When they go to call the militia out earlier here there's going to be a nucleus of volunteers which will rally to the flag. The creation of new battalions would be a rather simple affair if going by the scheme proposed by the commissioners historically, and that which was adopted when they were rapidly created in 1864 and 1866.

As to staff and officers, well there wasn't a shortage of qualified officers assigned to the task historically, nor was there lacking any men inside Canada who could fill the necessary shoes there.

But I'm getting ahead of myself

Again, there's a reason numerous Britons with expertise were not especially sanguine about the potential correlation of forces that winter.

Like who? Of the staff charged with planning deployments and a defensive response only MacDougall believed that the US could overcome the major disadvantages of winter to move forces north. Even then these hypotheticals were still in line with the belief that the US would make peace with the South to take on Britain alone, considering it would the height of folly to do otherwise.

Otherwise there's little pessimism in the prospect of taking on the North, and when one views the various responses by each side historically, they have a point. Wolseley wrote that 'it would be a toughish work' but felt it was doable after all.

There's no doubt the political will was there by December as Palmerston told the Queen "Great Britain, is in a better state than at any former time to inflict a severe blow upon and to read a lesson to the United States which will not soon be forgotten." and even Lewis as the new Secretary of War certainly didn't seem especially pessimistic as preparations wore on writing "we shall soon iron the smile out of their face" (emphasis original).

Then of course on the whole subject of war one eminent historian has written: "Thus the British must always have been confident of ultimate victory, provided that the Americans remained so dependent on their trade and shipping and their naval power did not rival Great Britain's. There was much that would have made them hesitate before going to war but in the end only the danger of betrayal by a European neighbour would have been a really effective deterrent. Once this had been removed-as it was in the Trent case-then the British were prepared to accept the cost of an Anglo-American war, even humiliating though temporary defeat in Canada, rather than sacrifice their prestige as a great power by headlong diplomatic defeat."

 

[EnglishCanuck]

As I said earlier (though I am a day late) I have created an index of all the chapters so far for TTL which I will update whenever I make a chapter post. You can find it here, but for further reference it will be in the TL next to the chapter link in my signature.

 

[TFSmith121]

Other than being a historical incident bloodier and

So it has precisely what to do with the TL exactly?

Other than being a historical incident both bloodier and "more" of an affront to Britain than even your soured up Trent or Terror-Dacotah incidents that didn't lead to war, nothing at all, apparently.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

So to cut to the quick, basically you have the

The simple reality that we can see from 1838 and 1866 is that the assumption that volunteers could be raised rapidly (and that like OTL much of the early mobilization would be entirely organic) is completely correct, and with British help they can be armed and equipped and put in defences to deter serious assault in good time.

Of course the difference ITTL is that the border tensions have been ongoing since October, the militia has been called out since the end of the same month, the British have responded in kind by ferrying more troops and arms over in November than historically, and the organic meeting of volunteer and sedentary militia companies is taking place much earlier that OTL.

When they go to call the militia out earlier here there's going to be a nucleus of volunteers which will rally to the flag. The creation of new battalions would be a rather simple affair if going by the scheme proposed by the commissioners historically, and that which was adopted when they were rapidly created in 1864 and 1866.

As to staff and officers, well there wasn't a shortage of qualified officers assigned to the task historically, nor was there lacking any men inside Canada who could fill the necessary shoes there.

But I'm getting ahead of myself



Like who? Of the staff charged with planning deployments and a defensive response only MacDougall believed that the US could overcome the major disadvantages of winter to move forces north. Even then these hypotheticals were still in line with the belief that the US would make peace with the South to take on Britain alone, considering it would the height of folly to do otherwise.

Otherwise there's little pessimism in the prospect of taking on the North, and when one views the various responses by each side historically, they have a point. Wolseley wrote that 'it would be a toughish work' but felt it was doable after all.

There's no doubt the political will was there by December as Palmerston told the Queen "Great Britain, is in a better state than at any former time to inflict a severe blow upon and to read a lesson to the United States which will not soon be forgotten." and even Lewis as the new Secretary of War certainly didn't seem especially pessimistic as preparations wore on writing "we shall soon iron the smile out of their face" (emphasis original).

Then of course on the whole subject of war one eminent historian has written: "Thus the British must always have been confident of ultimate victory, provided that the Americans remained so dependent on their trade and shipping and their naval power did not rival Great Britain's. There was much that would have made them hesitate before going to war but in the end only the danger of betrayal by a European neighbour would have been a really effective deterrent. Once this had been removed-as it was in the Trent case-then the British were prepared to accept the cost of an Anglo-American war, even humiliating though temporary defeat in Canada, rather than sacrifice their prestige as a great power by headlong diplomatic defeat."

So to cut to the quick, basically you have Lincoln et al being stupid and Palmerston et al being smart, and entirely ahistorically by a period of three months.

Got it.

Best,

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Other than being a historical incident both bloodier and "more" of an affront to Britain than even your soured up Trent or Terror-Dacotah incidents that didn't lead to war, nothing at all, apparently.

Well an event half a century prior to the POD of this TL with different leaders and a completely different geopolitical/strategic situation for both sides seems like it requires at least some explanation of how it relates to this TL

So to cut to the quick, basically you have Lincoln et al being stupid and Palmerston et al being smart, and entirely ahistorically by a period of three months.

Got it.

Glad to see the quality of your input hasn't suffered.

Of course I'm left to wonder why you say this since you don't provide any specific examples of why you believe this to be the case. Quite hard to make a response to something as vague as this.

 

[TFSmith121]

Essentially, you are giving the British an M-Day that is three months

Well an event half a century prior to the POD of this TL with different leaders and a completely different geopolitical/strategic situation for both sides seems like it requires at least some explanation of how it relates to this TL



Glad to see the quality of your input hasn't suffered.

Of course I'm left to wonder why you say this since you don't provide any specific examples of why you believe this to be the case. Quite hard to make a response to something as vague as this.

Considering the President-Little Belt was both more violent and actually, you know, happened and yet didn't lead to war, one would think it would be self-evident.

As far as the thumb on the scales, you are giving the British an M-Day (October, 1861) that is three months ahead of what would have been the earliest historical possibility after the Trent (January, 1862) or four months ahead of the closest historical example (Sinope to the Anglo-French declarations of war) ... so Palmerston et al are light years ahead of where they would have been historically in terms of readiness, and Lincoln et al are fools for not recognizing it. Yes, that's realistic.

Cripes, give the British Maxim guns while you're at it.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Considering the President-Little Belt was both more violent and actually, you know, happened and yet didn't lead to war,

Well it actually did, but I digress.

As far as the thumb on the scales, you are giving the British an M-Day (October, 1861) that is three months ahead of what would have been the earliest historical possibility after the Trent (January, 1862) or four months ahead of the closest historical example (Sinope to the Anglo-French declarations of war) ... so Palmerston et al are light years ahead of where they would have been historically in terms of readiness, and Lincoln et al are fools for not recognizing it. Yes, that's realistic.

It's curious that you would define the mobilization of the Canadian militia at the end of October and the Cabinet's decision to order out another brigade to Canada in mid November as pressing on the scales.

The British have, at best, two weeks more mobilization time than they did historically.

This is all broadly in line with the stated desires and the historical actions of people from OTL. Williams and Palmerston were both looking to send more troops to North America, they ordered them out in early December historically, here it's late November with orders to keep more men on standby. Here of course there's been a nasty border spat, someone's been killed, and warships have opened fire on one another. Hard to imagine the British reacting slower in this situation.

As an aside, the Crimean War is a rather odd choice to compare to the Trent scenario. So far its only Britain making decisions to act in her own interests without having to consult any allies (or potential allies), and as the case seems to have been with the British demands historically, had Lyons left Washington in early January the severance of diplomatic communications could only have been followed by two things 1) extended diplomatic troubles as the Union backs down or 2) war.

Of course the actions of the Lincoln administration are, again, broadly in line with what happened historically. Even with the St. Albans raid historically the Lincoln administration put pressure on the British to deal with it rather than move around a large number of men to deal with the problem. During the Trent affair historically Lincoln tried to hush it up as much as possible and made no particular response to the obvious build up by British forces in North America and the Atlantic.

However, it's fair to say that had the crisis seeped into January there would have had to be some kind of response to the action. Of course here in the TL we're only at the end of December thus far, so you'll have to wait and see.

 

[TFSmith121]

Not in 1811 and not by the allegedly aggrieved party

Not in 1811 and not with the allegedly aggrieved party declaring war on the allegedly transgressing party, however.

But you know that.

So now a mobilization in BNA and reinforcements being despatched from the UK, and, presumably, moving the British garrison in the Maritimes into LC and UC in October, 1861 (rather than December/January, 1862) is "two weeks"? Historically, of course, no BNAers were called up in 1861 and no "new" battalions were organized as such in the PoC before January.

Yeah, okay.

The four months from Sinope to the declaration of war is, you know, historical as opposed to the typical "imaginary best case, Maxim guns not included" which although convenient for Johnny Canuck et al, hardly reflects the realities of a set of poor, divided, mostly ignored, and often fractious colonies on the other side of the Atlantic from Blighty that were, at best, second prize in the previous contests, beginning in the 1750s and continuing into the Nineteenth Century.

curious - why is it you are unwilling to actually stick to the "actual" timeframe of the winter of 1861-62? Be rather more of an "honest" test for your thesis, would it not?

Best,