Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

[EnglishCanuck]

So now a mobilization in BNA and reinforcements being despatched from the UK, and, presumably, moving the British garrison in the Maritimes into LC and UC in October, 1861 (rather than December/January, 1862) is "two weeks"? Historically, of course, no BNAers were called up in 1861 and no "new" battalions were organized as such in the PoC before January.

Yeah, okay.

I'm not sure you actually read what I wrote. The militia (as it was historically in response to the St. Albans raid, and organized into 'administrative battalions' to boot) was called out at the end of October. The decision to reinforce British North America then comes in mid November, irrespective of the news of the Trent (which hasn't arrived yet) then arrives the news of the Trent and the British simply do what they did historically, there's just another brigade in play earlier.

No idea where the moving of the Maritime garrison comes from in your reading.

The four months from Sinope to the declaration of war is, you know, historical as opposed to the typical "imaginary best case, Maxim guns not included" which although convenient for Johnny Canuck et al, hardly reflects the realities of a set of poor, divided, mostly ignored, and often fractious colonies on the other side of the Atlantic from Blighty that were, at best, second prize in the previous contests, beginning in the 1750s and continuing into the Nineteenth Century.

So it's historical for the Crimean War yes. Your point? The timeline for any hypothetical Trent War is vastly different, but that seems self evident.

I mean where's the Ottoman Empire counterpart here? Where are the French?

curious - why is it you are unwilling to actually stick to the "actual" timeframe of the winter of 1861-62? Be rather more of an "honest" test for your thesis, would it not?

What "actual" timeframe would that be? Going by the British reaction time historically, if they got news of the St. Albans raid early November, demurred for a few days and Palmerston raps his colleagues knuckles, he gets his way and a brigade is sent.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 6: A Stormy Sea Pt. 2​

“Lay not the blame on me, O sailor, but on the winds. By nature I am as calm and safe as the land itself, but the winds fall upon me with their gusts and gales, and lash me into a fury that is not natural to me.” ― Aesop

“The diplomatic notes from London arrived in the legation at Washington on the 9th of January. Lyons received them with some distress, but made an immediate appointment to see Seward. Lyons was well known for his pro-Northern sympathies, but he had been alienated in much of Washington society due to his eccentricities, and his distrust of the Northern Secretary of State, who had on multiple occasions made overtly hostile pronunciations against Great Britain and her colonies…

…Seward, well aware of the crisis brewing, cancelled all appointments for the day and accepted Lyons at his home in Washington. Upon the exchanging of pleasantries Lyons immediately delved into the topic at hand. He thanked Seward for the Americans prompt release of the commissioners and said it had gone some way to helping the American case. He stressed however that there was still considerable discontent within Britain over the American actions. Seward countered that Britain had inflamed American passions to such an extent as they had not been since 1812 and that he would be disappointed if Britain chose to involve itself in an internal affair of the United States. Lyons stressed that the British still did not recognize the Confederacy, and he was privy to no plans for such recognition on the part of his government. He informed Seward that Britain would fight to uphold her honor, and her rights at sea. Both men agreed that war was a result which was best to be avoided.

Soon they broached the subject of the British diplomatic response. Lyons did not inform him of the exact nature of the ultimatum but confirmed there were four points Britain expected to be followed, and informed Seward that these were the only terms London would offer on the crisis. Seward attempted to tease out the exact nature of some of the demands, and Lyons did confirm that a public apology was one of them. The two men talked past one another for another hour but found it impossible for reasons of decorum and protocol to continue speaking about the ultimatum. Lyons also informed Seward of the time limit his government had set upon the matter. They did eventually agree that it would be delivered officially in three days’ time to Lincolns cabinet. Lyons encouraged Seward to have his government see reason as; “War again between our nations would likely be the greatest and chiefest calamity of our time.” Seward adamantly agreed, knowing full well the consequences for the struggle to maintain the Union such a war would entail. The two left on agreeable terms, but each dreaded the outcome of the next round of deliberations in the White House.” Abraham’s Right Hand, Alan Ashford, University of Kentucky, 2012

William Seward, the would be peacemaker.​

“Though Lincoln and his cabinet had debated the possible demands, and the potential ramifications of the British ultimatum for three days its contents were still something of a shock when delivered on the 14th of January. With the seven day time limit imposed on the British in mind his cabinet set to immediately debating it. Not surprisingly they were chagrined at each point of the ultimatum. While some was reasonable for America to follow, all put together it amounted to America groveling in the court of international opinion and begging Britain’s forgiveness. Such demands could of course, not be accepted. The government in London’s rigid stance on the matter further complicated any response that Lincoln’s government might give.

The first point had already been adhered to and so it was a non-issue.

The second point however, was seen as purely insulting. The idea that Britain could compel the government of the United States to dismiss members of its navy was totally absurd to Lincoln’s government. Welles would sum up the discontent at this point by saying “I am not aware by what right Britain claims to have a say in the selection of captains in the United States Navy.” and Lincoln did not even bother to argue that it would be dismissed out of hand.

The third point was less contentious. While none in the cabinet (save the now much angered Welles) were prepared to argue against some kind of statement disavowing Wilkes actions, the idea of apologizing for the events of the Dacotah-Terror incident was galling. The Union could not possibly be expected to apologize for events which were largely perceived as being the fault of the British navy! As such it was seen that no kind of apology could be made for the events off St. Thomas. Lincoln however, felt it would be advisable that some ‘humanitarian sentiment’ be issued in the official reply regretting both the death of Captain Williams on the Trent, and the casualties caused in the engagement between the two warships while leaving out any mention of guilt or fault by either side.

Finally, the fourth point would need to be addressed. While the cabinet was not adverse to making some kind of monetary recompense for Captain Williams, there was no intention to make any sort of reparation for the damages done to the Terror. Even the suggestion that Britain be allowed to name the price of reparation was seen as unacceptable by some. Lincoln did not find this so, but agreed to all that any price set by Britain for the damage to her warships after it had fired upon an American warship would be too high. Chase made the major point though that, that very event might prevent the public from accepting any kind of reparation to the British whatsoever.

This was true. The release of the commissioners had not been popular, and it had caused an uproar in both Congress and the Senate. Senator John Hale of New Hampshire bitterly criticizing the decision stating that “..surrender on this front is mere precursory posturing prior to surrendering on others. Such embarrassment would reduce us to the position of a second rate Power, and make us the vassals of Great Britain.” Indeed many in Congress were rankled at not even being informed on Lincoln’s decision. Lincoln though, was ill concerned. If the price of peace was to be “a few hurt feelings” in Washington he was prepared to accept that.

What he was unwilling to accept was the terms London had presented. He at once turned to Sumner in order to tease out what the British were thinking. As it happened, Sumner’s own rosy reading of the situation in Britain had been in error. Whether this was purely in spite of Seward’s views or his own sincere belief that Britain would not press for war is up for debate, but nevertheless he soon found himself out maneuvered by Seward who stepped neatly into the gap left by Sumner sudden fall from favor. Lincoln was now looking for a way out of a potentially explosive situation.

Seward met once more with Lyons during the seven days of debate over the British ultimatum. He wished to inquire over whether there could be any sort of leeway between the stated demands from London and a counter proposal from Washington. Lyons informed him he had strict orders from his government to accept only an unequivocal response to the demands.

By this time Lincoln and the cabinet had come to rationalize that there was only one response which might be rendered to avoid humiliation and dishonor. Seward at first proposed the option of international arbitration to the cabinet, but it has been suggested that Lincoln first proposed this idea to Seward, an interpretation backed up in Lincoln’s later memoirs and Franklin Seward’s memory of conversations with his father on the subject. This all perhaps in an attempt to ease Seward back into a dominant position in the cabinet.

In any case the suggestion was warmly received by the cabinet and it was seen as the most face saving way to answer Britain’s ultimatum. Though there was debate over sending a recommendation of pre-approved nations to arbitrate such debates this was ruled out in favor of granting Britain some leeway in opening new negotiations.

This being the official decision of the cabinet Seward composed the note which would be delivered to the British legation, which he would personally present on the 21st of January…” Snakes and Ladders: The Lincoln Administration and America’s Darkest Hour, Hillary Saunders, Scattershot Publishing, 2003

Richard Lyons, Her Majesties Unfortunate Ambassador
​

“When Seward presented himself to the British Legation early on the 21st Lyons was anxious about the possible reply. He had slept little the night before and had wearily accepted the Secretary of State who seemed to be propelled only by his own nervous energy throughout the exchange.

Lyons asked whether the cabinet had accepted London’s demands. Seward informed him that they had not, but were prepared to offer a counter proposal. This left Lyons in a quandary, he was told to accept nothing but either an affirmative or a negative answer from Washington. Seward’s offered counter proposal left room for a peace which he personally desired. However, his instructions were clear and he informed the American Secretary of State that he would be pleased to inform his government of the proposal, but he would have no choice but to comply with the instructions given to him by London and close the legation. Seward was miffed at the implications and informed him that this would be the best offer from Washington. Lyons accepted this with a heavy heart and sadly told Seward “Of course, it is superfluous for me to point out that this means war.”

He would then transmit the response from Washington to his superiors in London via courier.

He and his staff evacuated the British Legation in Washington on the 28th of January, preparing to depart on a British ship to Canada from Baltimore. Before departing Washington however, Lyons transmitted a fateful telegram to Halifax. It was to inform Vice Admiral Milne of the closure of the Legation. However, it also contained the request “Could you forward a letter for me to Antigua?” though at first glance a seemingly innocuous request, it was in fact the signal for plans laid long in advance…” Her Majesties Ambassador: The Life of Richard Lyons, Sir Joshua Pembrook, Oxford Publishing, 1962

 

[TFSmith121]

There's nothing in your "canon" sections

There's nothing in your "canon" sections talking about a) a single British brigade; there are several vague references to reinforcements, including two of "divisions"; likewise, in terms of b) the Canadian Provincial Militia, there's nothing in the references in your "canon" sections to limited call-ups in terms of aid to the civil power as in the actual St. Albans affair (where the arresting agents were police, not soldiers, at least according to the NYT), only multiple mentions of militia drilling from various locations across UC and LC.

So my apologies for reading what you actually wrote.

The short of war period in the confrontation with Russia was in the winter of 1853-54 and lasted for four months; the short of war period in any Anglo-American crisis in the winter of 1861-62, even in your version where the British are ahistorically active, is still going to face the transatlantic communications lag, the need for consultations in an era absent telecommunications, political and diplomatic discussions, and parliamentary maneuvering: as far as the potential allies/cobelligerants, presumably the CSA suffice for the French and the BNAers suffice for the wholly-owned subsidiary that were the Turks, although with 5-6 different colonial entities to deal with (depending on how one treats UC and LC, or CW and CE), the BNAers are even more brittle than the Turks.

However, at least the Turks actually had an army...

As far as the St. Albans Raid goes (and nice acknowledgement of your inspiration for it, by the way) what evidence is the British government in London had any reaction to it? That was a purely Canadian (as in province of) CF, with strong evidence Abbott bribed both Coursol and the Montreal chief of police to get his clients off... Combined with the "Canadian" handling of the Chesapeake pirates in 1863, one can see why the Americans didn't think much of the various proclamations of BNA's neutrality.

Interestingly enough, Victoria seems one of the more clear-sighted people in London about the pointlessness of Britain trying to defend BNA against a mobilized United States, given her most famous quote about the strategic situation.

But then again, you know that.

Ah, and the chestnut of Lyons having untrammeled access to communications - via the US telegraph network, which had, of course, been under USG control from 1861 - with BNA, which is the bastion of British power in the Western Hemisphere. And to allow a British ship access to Baltimore, rather than shutting Lyons et al into a sealed train and sending him north via St. Albans. Boy, those Americans sure are accommodating for a nation at war and on the brink of war with the British.

 

[Richter von Manthofen]

IS there ONE US/UK timeline where we can read without glossing over a hundred or more TFS "glory to the US" posts ...

 

[Unknown]

Can we read this without having another argument between EnglishCanuck and TFSmith121, please?

 

[Raunchel]

I just found this, and despite not being much of an expert in either the American Civil War or the British Empire in this period, you have got me hooked.

IS there ONE US/UK timeline where we can read without glossing over a hundred or more TFS "glory to the US" posts ...

Perhaps in a thread that really only just started?

Can we read this without having another argument between EnglishCanuck and TFSmith121, please?

It would be nice yes, it sometimes made the old thread a bit difficult to keep up with.

 

[Deckhand]

IS there ONE US/UK timeline where we can read without glossing over a hundred or more TFS "glory to the US" posts ...

She is like a dog with a bone. Just put her on ignore. I did and it makes the site much more enjoyable.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

There's nothing in your "canon" sections talking about a) a single British brigade; there are several vague references to reinforcements, including two of "divisions"; likewise, in terms of b) the Canadian Provincial Militia, there's nothing in the references in your "canon" sections to limited call-ups in terms of aid to the civil power as in the actual St. Albans affair (where the arresting agents were police, not soldiers, at least according to the NYT), only multiple mentions of militia drilling from various locations across UC and LC.

So my apologies for reading what you actually wrote.

There's reference to 3,000 men being dispatched in Chapter 2 (you must have missed that) and in Chapter 5 I refer to the Divisions at Aldershot and Shorncliffe being ordered to full strength, and preparations to send out as many as 30,000 men (I'm sure you just missed it).

There's no solid number of the troops prepared to be send historically, but since it included (according to The Times) 18 Battalions of infantry, six regiments of cavalry, 7 detachments of the Royal Engineers, 7 field batteries and 8 garrison batteries, alongside various logistic corps, 30,000 seems like a solid guess since I don't have the actual strength of all the formations in Britain to hand.

As to the militia, again in Chapter 2 there's mention of the call out in October (so you must have missed that). Then it explicitly states that the drilling of volunteer companies begins spontaneously (akin to 1837) with the news of the Trent, which is historical.

If you wish to dispute that I suggest you take it up with John Bokyo or C.P. Stacey.

The short of war period in the confrontation with Russia was in the winter of 1853-54 and lasted for four months; the short of war period in any Anglo-American crisis in the winter of 1861-62, even in your version where the British are ahistorically active, is still going to face the transatlantic communications lag, the need for consultations in an era absent telecommunications, political and diplomatic discussions, and parliamentary maneuvering: as far as the potential allies/cobelligerants, presumably the CSA suffice for the French and the BNAers suffice for the wholly-owned subsidiary that were the Turks, although with 5-6 different colonial entities to deal with (depending on how one treats UC and LC, or CW and CE), the BNAers are even more brittle than the Turks.

However, at least the Turks actually had an army...

How are the British ahistorically active? OTL they received news of the Trent affair on Nov 27th, on December 4th (8 days later) they ordered a mobilization, on the 9th they order out troops, the first leaving on the 16th.

By my count that's 19 days from the receiving of the news of the Trent affair and the dispatch of soldiers. Not sure why you want to add the extra weeks on for some reason.

Also why would they be discussing their plans with the CSA? Their interests are tetriary at best. No allies to wrangle with really makes for a quick reaction time as was the case historically.

As far as the St. Albans Raid goes (and nice acknowledgement of your inspiration for it, by the way)

Not sure what you mean in here.

Interestingly enough, Victoria seems one of the more clear-sighted people in London about the pointlessness of Britain trying to defend BNA against a mobilized United States, given her most famous quote about the strategic situation.

Though of course on the whole subject of war one eminent historian has written: "Thus the British must always have been confident of ultimate victory, provided that the Americans remained so dependent on their trade and shipping and their naval power did not rival Great Britain's. There was much that would have made them hesitate before going to war but in the end only the danger of betrayal by a European neighbour would have been a really effective deterrent. Once this had been removed-as it was in the Trent case-then the British were prepared to accept the cost of an Anglo-American war, even humiliating though temporary defeat in Canada, rather than sacrifice their prestige as a great power by headlong diplomatic defeat."

Ah, and the chestnut of Lyons having untrammeled access to communications - via the US telegraph network, which had, of course, been under USG control from 1861

He had it historically.

 

[TFSmith121]

EC has a read-only thread; this is (supposedly) the discussion

EC has a read-only thread; this is (supposedly) the discussion one.

See:
Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War (Index)

If one doesn't want discussion, of course, it raises the question as to why post on a site with comments.

As far as discussion goes, you'll note that it has always been welcomed on BROS. Keeps one honest.

Best to all,

 

[EnglishCanuck]

IS there ONE US/UK timeline where we can read without glossing over a hundred or more TFS "glory to the US" posts ...

Can we read this without having another argument between EnglishCanuck and TFSmith121, please?

It would be nice yes, it sometimes made the old thread a bit difficult to keep up with.

To help readers overcome this particular problem I have created a story update only thread where I will link all the chapters to so you don't have to wade through pages of discussion

It's also right next to the TL link in my sig (Index) if you ever need to find it.

I just found this, and despite not being much of an expert in either the American Civil War or the British Empire in this period, you have got me hooked.

Ah thank you! I hope you enjoy WiF for what it is

 

[EnglishCanuck]

As far as discussion goes, you'll note that it has always been welcomed on BROS. Keeps one honest.

Well no one is discouraging discussion here. WiF is, and always was, open to discussion. Though I imagine my solution will really increase readers ability to enjoy TTL.

 

[DAv]

Another fine update Canuck. Shame that Lyons hadn't been given anymore leeway for negotiations really, could have avoided the whole mess.

IS there ONE US/UK timeline where we can read without glossing over a hundred or more TFS "glory to the US" posts ...

Very, very few, alas.

 

[TFSmith121]

So in other words: full mobilization in BNA and the UK

- snip - .

So in other words - full mobilization in BNA and the UK, over nothing that came close to a causus belli based on historical precedent, and without anything approaching a realistic timeframe, again, based on historical precedent.

Or, IMPERIAL STORM 2.0. Yeah, that's likely.

Lyons may have had access to the telegraph system and British shipping historically in a strategic situation where - unlike in your tale - the actual risk of war was vastly different because the alleged incidents during the short of war were vastly different. Here, things are somewhat different, are they not?

So either the British are ahistorically active compared with their actual ability to make a decision for war and move any substantial number of troops (as per 1853-54) or the Americans are ahistorically clueless in terms of their ability to perceive this purported reality (as per 1861-62). At least you're not making Seward the villain; that's progress.

But as always, it's the best of both worlds for the British and absolute stupidity for the Americans, and at a pace that belies the realities of the closest historical precedents for exactly the situation.

One awaits the 100,000 Canadian militia showing up, in the middle of the autumn harvest season, fully armed, equipped, and organized, and accepting of being ordered to war under British officers absent any Canadian agency ... because that's exactly how it happened, historically, whether in BNA/Canada or for imperial duties, in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries.

May want to read Stacey about those realities; how did it work out for Hughes, Steele, and McNaughton, again? Much less Mignault et al?

Best,

 

[The Gunslinger]

One awaits the 100,000 Canadian militia showing up, in the middle of the autumn harvest season, fully armed, equipped, and organized, and accepting of being ordered to war under British officers absent any Canadian agency ... because that's exactly how it happened, historically, whether in BNA/Canada or for imperial duties, in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries.

The St. Albans raid is on the 10th of October and the Trent affair happens in November, the only things the Canadians will be harvesting is snow.

 

[TFSmith121]

According to this:

The St. Albans raid is on the 10th of October and the Trent affair happens in November, the only things the Canadians will be harvesting is snow.

According to this:

http://www.pickyourown.org/CAONharvestcalendar.htm

or this:

http://ontariofarmfresh.com/consumers/whats-in-season/#october

or this:

https://www.ontario.ca/foodland/page/availability-guide

or this:

http://www.harvestontario.com/seasonal.php

fruits and vegetables into October, and some vegetables into November. Cherries as late as December.

They you have to preserve them (canning, pickling, etc., which in the 1860s, is fairly labor-intensive, isn't mechanized, and takes time). Livestock have to be cared for year-round, of course; even more so in the winter, obviously.

Really cold weather doesn't kick in until the end of December or early January (in southeastern Ontario, that is; gets colder the farther to the northeast into Quebec, obviously, and earlier); the lakes and rivers aren't navigable, of course, but that doesn't mean the travel was impossible, certainly not from the south. Railways helped, of course.

http://climate.weather.gc.ca/climat...&SearchType=Contains&stnNameSubmit=go&dCode=0

Best,

 

[The Gunslinger]

According to this:

http://www.pickyourown.org/CAONharvestcalendar.htm

or this:

http://ontariofarmfresh.com/consumers/whats-in-season/#october

or this:

https://www.ontario.ca/foodland/page/availability-guide

or this:

http://www.harvestontario.com/seasonal.php

fruits and vegetables into October, and some vegetables into November. Cherries as late as December.

They you have to preserve them (canning, pickling, etc., which in the 1860s, is fairly labor-intensive, isn't mechanized, and takes time). Livestock have to be cared for year-round, of course; even more so in the winter, obviously.

Really cold weather doesn't kick in until the end of December or early January (in southeastern Ontario, that is; gets colder the farther to the northeast into Quebec, obviously, and earlier); the lakes and rivers aren't navigable, of course, but that doesn't mean the travel was impossible, certainly not from the south. Railways helped, of course.

http://climate.weather.gc.ca/climat...&SearchType=Contains&stnNameSubmit=go&dCode=0

Best,

I would say that the vast majority of produce in those lists would be for local consumption and not for export so wouldn't be an issue (and in any case, there are usually other members of the household who aren't going to sit idly by when the menfolk get called up), but I strongly suspect that overwhelming majority of the foods listed would already be harvested. Considering that wheat, corn, oats and rye make up over three quarters of Canadian agricultural production and will be harvested by November.

 

[Hallesworth49]

Nice to see this TL up and running again.

 

[machine3589]

She is like a dog with a bone. Just put her on ignore. I did and it makes the site much more enjoyable.

I second this. Half the posts in the thread will be blocked, but boy is it worth it not to wade through TFSmith's stuff.

 

[TFSmith121]

Local consumption over the winter is a fairly significant need,

I would say that the vast majority of produce in those lists would be for local consumption and not for export so wouldn't be an issue (and in any case, there are usually other members of the household who aren't going to sit idly by when the menfolk get called up), but I strongly suspect that overwhelming majority of the foods listed would already be harvested. Considering that wheat, corn, oats and rye make up over three quarters of Canadian agricultural production and will be harvested by November.

Local consumption over the winter is a fairly significant need, however, if you expect the population to live until summer, however.

There's also the minor point that soldiers in the field, whether Provincial militia or British regulars or whatever sort of need to eat, and a) without any imports from the US those needs have to be met with local BNA produce, and b) if they can't be met locally, that's yet more material that has to imported from Europe, with the obvious needs for shipping and manpower.

And if the local produce is being harvested in November, the harvesters aren't drilling in October.

Likewise, if the draft animals and mounts for the field forces (BNAers, British regulars, or whatever) are expected to be supplied from the pools of both in BNA, there's that much less to sustain the civilian economy, and, of course, said livestock requires more manpower to gather it up and care for it with the field forces - and those men, too, aren't available for the field forces in combat roles.

Sooner rather than later, with a population as small as the Province of Canada's in the 1860s, Peter and Paul show up.

Best,

 

[Saphroneth]

In all honesty, it would not be an extreme stretch for the instructions to the station commanders to include something like "if the Ambassador does not report in at least once every three days, assume hostilities have broken out unless an explicit stand down is ordered".

It's slightly clunky to write, but then again it doesn't cost anything, and it's secure against the Americans doing something like denying an ambassador access to any communication in the midst of a diplomatic crisis. (Because if you refuse to allow an ambassador to communicate in the midst of a diplomatic crisis, then you are essentially intending to sabotage the negotiations.)

The alternative, of course, is that the mores of the 19th century would not allow such a thing - I think this is more likely, given the historical access and indeed the way that into the 20th Century the British ambassador was only briefly interned by the Gestapo when war was declared on Germany!