By defender of Christians I mean that Russia reclaims the title of defender of Christians in the Balkans from the French. The dotted line represents the sphere of influences within an emaciated state; Hungary in the Russian sphere and Austrians in the German sphere.
WI: WW1 happened in the 1860s/1870s over German unification?
- Thread starter Disraeli2004
- Start date
Ah yes. It's the only mapping software I have, and it's 1815... I used it because it has the mapping software
For a wold war in the 1860's that involves the United States, I'd suggest that the St. Albans raid be bigger/deadlier and, as a butterfly, Booth be taken alive, and claims to have been financed by the British.
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What do you mean by a "total Russian victory"? No great power took any military action against Russia in 1877-8, yet just the threat of Britain doing so (unaided) was enough to make her pull in her horns.
The intervention was only diplomatic. There was never any question of Britain going to war. Prussia just wasn't important enough to justify that. Note that the Cabinet decided against war even in 1864.
As for Disraeli, his speech was made in February 1871, after the war was over, and five months after Sedan. Neither he nor anyone else was talking like that when war broke out, as most still expected a French victory.
In any case, he was in opposition at that time. Gladstone, one of the least warlike Prime Ministers we ever had, was in power. He would cough up $15 million for the Alabama claims, make no attempt to avenge either Majuba Hill or the death of Gordon, and would oppose British action against Russia in 1877/8. And this is the man who is supposed to send young men to their deaths just to rescue a wretched little foreign dictator from an entirely self-inflicted debacle.
BTW, Gladstone was also *very* anti-Austrian. In 1880 he would declare "There is not a spot on the entire map where you can put your finger and say 'There Austria did good'". For him (and most Britons) it was the land of Metternich and General Haynau. And as his 1877 attitude shows, he wasn't particularly worried about Russia. He has no interest in rescuing the Austrians. In any case, with both Prussia and Russia against him (and France unable to help) Franz Josef will almost certainly have to sue for peace in a matter of weeks to avert the dismemberment of his Empire, so the Austrian half of the war is likely to be over before Britain has come to any decision.
And Russia probably won't play a major role against France. She obviously can't acquire any French territory, so what's the point? . This, after all was what enabled Britain to ally with France in the Crimea. No matter how decisively she won, there was no way she could acquire any Russian territory. So we didn't have to worry about France coming out of the war any bigger than she went in. This would of course not be true with the FPW.
Things would of course be very different should Wilhelm I anticipate his grandson and buld a fleet of ironclads big enough rival the RN. But afaik no on in Prussia even imagined such a step in 1870, and even had they, given that German steel production was less than half of British, any naval race then would be very one-sided.
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1. I am in no way saying that Russia wants French land. What they do perhaps want is the title of protector of Christians in the Ottoman Empire back. But their intervention would mainly be against Austria.
2. WDYM about 1878? Yes the British would have acted alone, but it would have been to save the Ottoman Empire, so I assumed the Ottomans might have helped in 1878? Please elaborate
3. Gladstone's anti-Austrian views are probelmatic. But we have no evidence that he wasn't anti-Russian, especially considering the fact that Russia was MORE reactionary than Austria. Yes, he hated Austria, but France's liberal empire was a better prospect than the Prusso-Russian "Axis of Evil" and the triumph of reaction. I might also add it was Benjamin Disraeli at the 1878 conference, not William Gladstone.
4. With the navy, that is correct. Therefore, the British could affect serious damage against the Prussian state.
Which was my point also. And given the hopelessness of Austria's position she isn't likely to stay in the war long.
What "Axis of Evil"? Russia might intervene against Austria, but there was no reason to expect Prussia to act against Britain in the Near East. The Baghdad Railway was decades in the future. And with France and Austria both cut down to size, Russia and Prussia would have no common enemy to keep them together.
And I am not saying that Gladstone especially *liked* Russia, merely that he didn't fear it as much as the Tories did, and (if his behaviour in 1877-8 is any guide) viewed the "threat to India" as at least exaggerated. So while Russian intervention (primarily against Austria) might not especially please him, it wouldn't be even close to a ground for war.
And, insofar as there was any anti-Prussian feeling in Britain, iirc it was mostly directed at Bismarck, who presumably isn't on the scene in this TL.
But so could the French by themselves. OTL, their navy was far bigger than Prussia's. They wouldn't need British help at sea.
This raises another point, which I apologise for not spotting earlier. In 1870, the RN was in a position very similar to that of the early 1900s. The development of the explosive shell and the ironclad ship had left it in a similar position to where it would be after the invention of the dreadnought - saddled with more obsolete ships than any other power, and having to reckon with other powers taking the opportunity to play catchup.
In the event, only one power took the opportunity - France. In 1870 her naval estimates were £7 million against Britain's 9.8 million, and in 1880 the gap had actually narrowed -- £8.8m to our £10.2m. The next nearest competitor - Russia - was miles behind at £2.4m and £3.8m respectively. So France was the only power about which GB needed to worry. The others were nowhere. The author of The Battle of Dorking clearly wasn't doing his arithmetic homework.
So I owe an apology to the UK government iro of its defensive measures it took in 1859-60. In the event, they were never needed, but at the time they were a reasonable precaution in the circumstances. And neither Prussia nor any other third party was in a position to be more than a minor nuisance. There as absolutely nothing we needed to go to war about.
My point about the British was more commercial than it was military in terms of damage. The blockade of British goods to Prussia could harm both the war effort and civilian morale, if it was protracted. Considering that the rate of rapid industrialization only kicked off after German unification, that could be a serious problem
But the French will impose a blockade themselves, as OTL. How does British participation change anything?
And anyway, why bother, just to save France from losing a fortress or two on its eastern border? How does that help Britain (in the Near East or anywhere else) and why would GB want to antagonise Germany and push it all the more firmly into alliance with Russia?
There's a good article about British attitudes to the FPW at https://vc.bridgew.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1125&context=honors_proj
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Firstly, I honestly don't know if the French were sinking British ships carrying imports to Germany, but I highly doubt it. If the British stopped supplying Prussia altogether, that could hurt. Secondly, the Russians were the main threat to the Near East. If they are already allied with Prussia, the British aren't going to fret about anatagonisation. If the Russians and Prussians are massively winning and clearly the British are just going to have to accept that reality, they would reach out to Prussia as a bulwark, but if the result is very much in doubt, it seems self-evident that the best way to contain Russia would be to stop it while they can militarily- which will also involve putting pressure on Prussia.
They wouldn't have to - just intercept them. Submarine warfare hadn't been invented yet.
Incidentally, I may have oversimplified the British attitude. Apparently there was a Cabinet meeting at the outbreak of the war, at which the sending of troops to the Continent was discussed. However, the troops were to go to Antwerp, to guard Belgium against any intrusion by either of the combatants. As things turned out, the troops were never sent, nor were there any further such discussions - presumably because it was the French who were suspected of such intentions and after Sedan that danger disappeared. But had the French moved into Belgium at any point, then Britain might indeed have been drawn into the war - but on the *Prussian* side.
Think "Second Battle of Waterloo". After all, the French in Antwerp would be a far bigger deal for Britain than the Russians in Constantinople - supposing the Russians could even get there.
I don't wish to mess up your timeline, but is there any vital reason that GB be paired with France rather than Prussia? You seem to be ok with Austria and Russia having changed partners so why not Britain? Either way you've involved all the major WW1 combatants except he US - and if the Alabama dispute boils over even they may get drawn in - on the Anti-British side of course.. So you've got your early First World War all right.
The Gladstone point has been giving me some concern though and is very valid. He's not exactly pro-Ottoman, his speech on Bulgaria in 1877 was with extremly strong condemnation of the Turks:
"Their Zaptiehs and their Mudirs, their Bimbashis and their Yuzbachis, their Kaimakarns and their Pashas, one and all, bag and baggage, shall, I hope, clear out from the province they have desolated and profaned"
So clearly Gladstone is quite unlike Disraeli in the sense in which he sees the containment of Russia as secondary to human rights in the Ottoman Empire. My overall point is that PM Gladstone in 1870 is not one to get paranoid fits about Russia and India, which does rather throw a spanner into the works of my Timeline. Thoughts?
In my mind there are two possibilties- a neutral Britain or a French-allied Britain. A British-Prussian alliance is not feasible unless strict conditions are met. Prussian expansion deeply worried Britain, even more so with "New Silesia" and the annexation of Saxony in this alt history, who saw that it blew apart the balance of power and created a powerful commercial adversary. Contrast that with the bumbling Napoleon III, who had already proved himself to be relatively benign. After Crimea, the Bonapartist spectre was less alarming. Combine this with the fact that France and Austria are highly unlikely to wallop the Prussians and split it between them (the Prussian army was in a much better shape than either Austria or France in 1870), which means there is little risk of some unrestrained French expansion. In our OTL the focus wasn't on containing France, it was, as the Antwerp example demonstrates, preserving their sphere of influence as much as possible as well as trying to salvage some balance of power. Especially if the reactionary Russia gets involved in the fray, getting domestic opinion behind what would be seen as Prussian aggression (see the POD about the Baden claims in the timeline, changed from Bavaria) would be a nightmare. Yes, old Bonpartist ghosts could be whipped up, but the 2nd Empire was a very different beast, especially given the fact it is the throes of reform. If, somehow, Russia didn't join Prussia's side and Prussia was thawlopped by France and France refused to sign a peace deal and threatened to annex vast swathes of the Rhineland for example, yes, maybe British intervention is possible. But given the military realities on the ground, that's unlikely. These are valid considerations in the event of a victorious France-British-Austrian alliance, as there would be massive tension between all three.
P.S.- I think I'm going to leave 'Murica out of this for now. The last thing the British government would be doing would be picking fights with the American government and probably would as in our OTL acquiesce. Going to war for these claims would be a domestic nightmare for the Americans- they were just in the process of reconstruction! Although yes, there would be some sympathy from the Irish and German minorities, I really cannot foresee this escalating, as it didn't in our OTL.
"Their Zaptiehs and their Mudirs, their Bimbashis and their Yuzbachis, their Kaimakarns and their Pashas, one and all, bag and baggage, shall, I hope, clear out from the province they have desolated and profaned"
So clearly Gladstone is quite unlike Disraeli in the sense in which he sees the containment of Russia as secondary to human rights in the Ottoman Empire. My overall point is that PM Gladstone in 1870 is not one to get paranoid fits about Russia and India, which does rather throw a spanner into the works of my Timeline. Thoughts?
In my mind there are two possibilties- a neutral Britain or a French-allied Britain. A British-Prussian alliance is not feasible unless strict conditions are met. Prussian expansion deeply worried Britain, even more so with "New Silesia" and the annexation of Saxony in this alt history, who saw that it blew apart the balance of power and created a powerful commercial adversary. Contrast that with the bumbling Napoleon III, who had already proved himself to be relatively benign. After Crimea, the Bonapartist spectre was less alarming. Combine this with the fact that France and Austria are highly unlikely to wallop the Prussians and split it between them (the Prussian army was in a much better shape than either Austria or France in 1870), which means there is little risk of some unrestrained French expansion. In our OTL the focus wasn't on containing France, it was, as the Antwerp example demonstrates, preserving their sphere of influence as much as possible as well as trying to salvage some balance of power. Especially if the reactionary Russia gets involved in the fray, getting domestic opinion behind what would be seen as Prussian aggression (see the POD about the Baden claims in the timeline, changed from Bavaria) would be a nightmare. Yes, old Bonpartist ghosts could be whipped up, but the 2nd Empire was a very different beast, especially given the fact it is the throes of reform. If, somehow, Russia didn't join Prussia's side and Prussia was thawlopped by France and France refused to sign a peace deal and threatened to annex vast swathes of the Rhineland for example, yes, maybe British intervention is possible. But given the military realities on the ground, that's unlikely. These are valid considerations in the event of a victorious France-British-Austrian alliance, as there would be massive tension between all three.
P.S.- I think I'm going to leave 'Murica out of this for now. The last thing the British government would be doing would be picking fights with the American government and probably would as in our OTL acquiesce. Going to war for these claims would be a domestic nightmare for the Americans- they were just in the process of reconstruction! Although yes, there would be some sympathy from the Irish and German minorities, I really cannot foresee this escalating, as it didn't in our OTL.
And when war began in 1870, French expansion was what everyone
Blew it apart how? The NGC, even with "New Silesia", is still considerably smaller in population than either France or Austria, and even with the southern states added is only slightly larger. France, OTOH, is reckoned to be Europe's premier military power, so French expansion will arouse far more alarm than Prussian. And when war began in 1870, it was French expansion that almost everyone outside Germany expected.
If Prussia was such a worry, then why, even after Sedan, was it almost another quarter-century before any continental power - let alone GB - thought it necessary to ally with France against Germany? Were they all blind? No, they took that long because that was how long it took before Germany's growth in population and industrial muscle started to make her a big concern. Even then, it took another decade and a naval race to start Britain moving toward them. And in 1870 that couldn't happen because we had no naval rival except France.
Blew it apart how? The NGC, even with "New Silesia", is still considerably smaller in population than either France or Austria, and even with the southern states added is only slightly larger. France, OTOH, is reckoned to be Europe's premier military power, so French expansion will arouse far more alarm than Prussian. And when war began in 1870, it was French expansion that almost everyone outside Germany expected.
If Prussia was such a worry, then why, even after Sedan, was it almost another quarter-century before any continental power - let alone GB - thought it necessary to ally with France against Germany? Were they all blind? No, they took that long because that was how long it took before Germany's growth in population and industrial muscle started to make her a big concern. Even then, it took another decade and a naval race to start Britain moving toward them. And in 1870 that couldn't happen because we had no naval rival except France.
Here we definitively diverge. Even in our OTL what remained of the Vienna system was thoroughly blown apart. The German Confederation was the centrepiece of the balance of power, it's raison d'etre to keep it and prevent a single hegemony in Germany. Europe's centre was balanced on weakness and the balance between Austria and Prussia. That balance has been very unceremoniously blown apart with Iron and Blood and the Prussian army has effectively taken over all of North Germany and destroyed the Austrian bulwark. This is what Disraeli was echoing, and just because the population isn't as high as France and Austria doesn't change the fact that the German Confederation lies in the dust, Prussia has almost doubled in size and in this alternate timeline is annexing vast swathes of territory including chunks of Bohemia and is now threatening the armed conquest of parts of France and in this alternate timeline Austria? It was a diplomatic revolution that the British didn't fully grasp in the OTL, but with the Russians involved and Europe and the balance of power being sliced into two? The balance of power was decimated, destroyed and trodden into the ground. As 1914 would show, it would never truly recover; the Balance of Power which ensured, even in its own imperfect way, the relative prevention of grand conflicts as seen in the 18th century wars of Succession and the Napoleonic wars give way to a precarious alliance system. The magnitude of the crisis is so much greater in the ATL, especially if the Russians are involved. A German-Russian victory would remake Europe, and Britain would find herself on the unhappy side-lines, discredited, downtrodden and disheartened.
Yet OTL Europe was far more peaceful in the decades after 1870 than in those before it. In just he 16 years there were for wars. Yet for 43 years after the FPW there were none outside the Balkans, unless a short-lived Carlist revolt in Spain counts as a war.It was one of the longest stretches of peace that Europe had had since the death of Emperor Commodus. So the balance of power can't have broken down that badly.
There's no reason why the cession of a couple of strips of Austrian territory with a population of perhaps a million or so, should cause things to take a different course. The annexation of Saxony changes nothing in a military sense since Saxony would be in the NGC whether annexed or not.
No one lifted a finger to help Denmark in 1864. No one lifted a finger to help Austria in 1866. No one lifted a finger to help France in 1870. Coincidence? No. No one interfered because no one had any particular reason to interfere. In '66 an Austrian victory would have annoyed at least as many powers as the Prussian one did and in '70 a French victory woud have scared more of them than Prussia's did.
Of course the peace ended eventually. Everything ends sometime. Conditions change and "in the long run every decision is wrong." But it was a *very* long run, and in 1870 the Prussian victory almost certainly caused fewer problems than a French victory would have done.
There's has been lots of work done on why the imposition of a German state destroyed the balance of power. As you say, it has a lot to do with the fact that an agrarian society suddenly became industrial which blew a whole in the middle of the balance of power. But it also has a lot to do with the fact the whole balance was rested on a balance in the German Confederation, torn to pieces. Suddenly France was usurped by the least of the great powers by the great contintental army of Europe. Although Great powers quenched their appetities through expansion elsewhere, in Africa and Asia, the peace couldnt' hold precisely because of the creation of the miltiarised German state, as well as the focus on "national honour" that it had inaugurated. Britain's anxiety about being usurped as a diplomatic arbitor manifested themselves in the Suez purchase as well as vast expansions, for an example. The peace was always tense and prone to collapse, in a more specular fashion. German unification was the driving factor towards the creation of the alliance system that ultimately led to war. This is combined with the sonderweg argument; a Great power was moulded in a militaristic cast and Junkers controlled real political power in Germany. The insutiotions of Germany were fragile and at the will of the Kaiser, and yet it could yield vast armies and was the power on land in Europe. That would always be preciarious. The French would have probably been restrained. As 1859 shows, they get out at reasonable points and they don't press things too far. They'd probably stop with a small piece of the Rhineland and perhaps the re-establishment of Hanover and Saxony. Hardly earthshattering stuff.
P.S. Ignore that map for now. That's a small teaser....
The peace held for 43 years - a long period as these things go.
What upset it was Germany's growth in population and, even more, in industrial clout. In 1870 this was barely a gleam on the horizon. In 1870 neither Britain nor Russia had any reason to prevent unification, which produced only a state with about the same population and industry as France. The statesmen of 1870 didn't have crystal balls.
Re Britain in particular, her most sensitive point was Belgium, which she didn't wish to see controlled by a major power. And in 1870 it was *France*, not Prussia, which was suspected of designs on Belgium. So having France cut down to size wasn't necessarily seen as a bad thing. .
I heard you. But there is a great deal of historical discourse about this topic and it seems indisputable that a major German power emerging out of 800 years of disunity from the weakest of the Great powers ruptures the balances of power beyond what those at Vienna in 1815 could have ever imagined. It is not just the industrialisation and population expansion of Germany that makes this problematic; it's problematic because it redrew the map of Europe in a way thoroughly more precarious. It doesn't take a 'crystal ball' to see that and Napeleon III realised the threat this posed to France and Disraeli belatedly for Britain. The peace only held because of the careful stewardship of Bismarck and the fact that the powers focus on overseas expansion in Asia and Africa instead of continental expansion. When that steady stream of expansion stopped and reached its zenith, and reckless German nationalists like Tirpitz got their hands on power in Germany, that peace was going to implode in ways more catastrophic than anyone could imagine. A small chunk of the Rhineland hardly compares to the German Revolution in diplomacy that this caused, forever shaping Europe and destroying the central pillar of the Balance of Power- a weak and balanced Germany.
Now in the ATL it's even worse! Russia's involved in the fray and threatening to remake the balance Britain has fought so hard to keep. Prussia and Russia carving up Europe would be worse than, say, the independence of Hanover. Britain would feel compelled to act.
Part 2- The Reaction
PART 2:
“The power of the joint blow will end this silly idea of German Unification”- Napoleon III
The Reaction:
Robbed of their chief diplomatic asset, Bismarck, the Prussians found themselves facing a war on two fronts; although Austria was weakened, France was the primary continental power in Europe and it was clear they were facing an uphill struggle. The crisis was however expedient in rallying German opinion around Prussia through the threat of French invasion and the betrayal of the Austrians. This is reflected on a speech given by Wilhelm I to the North German Parliament three weeks after the war began:
“There is no doubt that the Austrians have played the key role in the majority of the winding course of German history. But here the Hapsburgs menace has shown his true colours. Austria has sold its German soul to the common enemy of the Germans, to stop Germans uniting under one government and one system. This they have been trying to do unaltered since Napoleon. But there is hope for the German people. I know, as I have known before, the striking ingenuity and resilience of the Germans. We resisted the French for a brutal 20 years, to come out victorious despite the gross disadvantages. This, by the grace of grace, will be the spirit that will carry us forward to the great battlefields that now have to follow this act of aggression committed by the French. For God and the fatherland, all Germans will resist foreign malice, resist the marauding armies of Napoleon, and resist tyranny and despotism. Because the emperor, cowering in his capital, does not know this. The spirit of Germany will never be broken”.
This speech, widely publicised, was a rallying call. The government of North Germany was soon inundated with soldiers wishing to enlist, even from previously sceptical Hanoverians, Saxons and even New Silesians, although some began to use the war to co-ordinate regionalist resistance, especially in Hanover. The speech outraged Junkers and worried members of the government, though. Prussian identity seemed to melt under the heat of national patriotism, and Junkers fretted that their rights and privileges would be subsumed under a Greater German feeling in the case of victory. But the war was a Godsend for the struggling Prussian apparatus in their conquests, and German public opinion was firmly behind them.
In Austria, the situation was much different. Revanchists as well as German liberals, unwilling to give up the dream of unifying Germany under Austria, agitated constantly for war after the humilliations of Prague. Disgruntled Austrian citizens had blamed the Prussian indemnity extracted as a result of the Peace of Prague for the increase in the burden of taxation, and the predominantly German circle wished to used the war as an opportunity to walk back on the Compromise of 1867 and re-establish Austrian hegemony within the whole empire. However, the optics were not good for many Germans; why was Austria intervening against the national cause? The Hungarians also were extremely dissatisfied, fearing the war was a pretext to roll back the 1867 compromise. Franz Jospeh offered his personal reassurances that under no account would he row back the compromise, although many Hungarians remained susipicous. Low level resistance cropped up in Hungary and among some German groups, especially those being conscripted.
Neither Russia nor Britain joined immediately. Britain was unhappy about the potential for further Prussian expansion but was unwilling to intervene to help the French just yet. Gladstone wanted to avoid if at all possible foreign conflict. Russia was watching closely and preparing for intervention. Napoleon III, who had usurped the title of defender of Christians in the Balkans was loathed and the Austrian betrayal in Crimea not forgotten. A French-Austrian victory would bring a very real threat closer to Russian borders, but pan-Slavist opinion was turned very much against a German state. Bismarck emerged from political disgrace to be sent a special envoy to Russia and negotiations for a Prusso-Russian alliance began in earnest. But much was now resting on the Prussian military plan- known secretly as Operation Black Eagle, to knock Austria out of the war. Now it was over to Moltke.
“The power of the joint blow will end this silly idea of German Unification”- Napoleon III
The Reaction:
Robbed of their chief diplomatic asset, Bismarck, the Prussians found themselves facing a war on two fronts; although Austria was weakened, France was the primary continental power in Europe and it was clear they were facing an uphill struggle. The crisis was however expedient in rallying German opinion around Prussia through the threat of French invasion and the betrayal of the Austrians. This is reflected on a speech given by Wilhelm I to the North German Parliament three weeks after the war began:
“There is no doubt that the Austrians have played the key role in the majority of the winding course of German history. But here the Hapsburgs menace has shown his true colours. Austria has sold its German soul to the common enemy of the Germans, to stop Germans uniting under one government and one system. This they have been trying to do unaltered since Napoleon. But there is hope for the German people. I know, as I have known before, the striking ingenuity and resilience of the Germans. We resisted the French for a brutal 20 years, to come out victorious despite the gross disadvantages. This, by the grace of grace, will be the spirit that will carry us forward to the great battlefields that now have to follow this act of aggression committed by the French. For God and the fatherland, all Germans will resist foreign malice, resist the marauding armies of Napoleon, and resist tyranny and despotism. Because the emperor, cowering in his capital, does not know this. The spirit of Germany will never be broken”.
This speech, widely publicised, was a rallying call. The government of North Germany was soon inundated with soldiers wishing to enlist, even from previously sceptical Hanoverians, Saxons and even New Silesians, although some began to use the war to co-ordinate regionalist resistance, especially in Hanover. The speech outraged Junkers and worried members of the government, though. Prussian identity seemed to melt under the heat of national patriotism, and Junkers fretted that their rights and privileges would be subsumed under a Greater German feeling in the case of victory. But the war was a Godsend for the struggling Prussian apparatus in their conquests, and German public opinion was firmly behind them.
In Austria, the situation was much different. Revanchists as well as German liberals, unwilling to give up the dream of unifying Germany under Austria, agitated constantly for war after the humilliations of Prague. Disgruntled Austrian citizens had blamed the Prussian indemnity extracted as a result of the Peace of Prague for the increase in the burden of taxation, and the predominantly German circle wished to used the war as an opportunity to walk back on the Compromise of 1867 and re-establish Austrian hegemony within the whole empire. However, the optics were not good for many Germans; why was Austria intervening against the national cause? The Hungarians also were extremely dissatisfied, fearing the war was a pretext to roll back the 1867 compromise. Franz Jospeh offered his personal reassurances that under no account would he row back the compromise, although many Hungarians remained susipicous. Low level resistance cropped up in Hungary and among some German groups, especially those being conscripted.
Neither Russia nor Britain joined immediately. Britain was unhappy about the potential for further Prussian expansion but was unwilling to intervene to help the French just yet. Gladstone wanted to avoid if at all possible foreign conflict. Russia was watching closely and preparing for intervention. Napoleon III, who had usurped the title of defender of Christians in the Balkans was loathed and the Austrian betrayal in Crimea not forgotten. A French-Austrian victory would bring a very real threat closer to Russian borders, but pan-Slavist opinion was turned very much against a German state. Bismarck emerged from political disgrace to be sent a special envoy to Russia and negotiations for a Prusso-Russian alliance began in earnest. But much was now resting on the Prussian military plan- known secretly as Operation Black Eagle, to knock Austria out of the war. Now it was over to Moltke.
How would they be "carving up Europe?
Austria losing a slice of Galicia and a fortress or two in Bohemia and Moravia, while three small German states whuich are already united with Prussia militarily now become united politically as well, hardly turns the world upside down.
What shook people was the Battle of Sedan, which I understood wasn't going to happen on your TL. If the French fight the Prussians to a standstill around Metz or somewhere, Britain will just yawn.