WI: WW1 happened in the 1860s/1870s over German unification?

[Mikestone8]

How is a Franco-Austrian combination more threatening to his Polish lands than the military and economic juggernaut of a Germany united under Prussia?

A Germany united under Prussia is no threat at all in the 1860s, as they have a common interest in keeping the Poles down. OTOH, during the Polish Revolt Austria showed some interest in a Polish kingdom under a Habsburg, while France was always sympathetic to Poland. Prussia is the only power on which Alexander can rely to see things his way. He wants a strong Prussia to keep both France and Austria in their place.

Anyway, what juggernaut? Germany's OTL population (excluding Austria) was only slightly more than France's in 1871 - 41 million against 36 million. And TTL France's population will be greater by at least a million if she doesn't lose Alsace-Lorraine. Per AJP Taylor [1] her 1870 Army estimated were £15 million against £9,6 million for Germany, while their steel production was about equal at 0.3 million tons. Germany didn't become an industrial superpower for another generation. There was no juggernaut in 1870.

[1] Struggle For Mastery In Europe, Introduction.

 

[Mikestone8]

Plus if anyone is very familiar on military history in 1870 that'd be helpful. What would a slightly strengthened Austria and France (war scare and war preparation lasted longer) be like against a slightly more bloated North German Confederation?

Austria is in a much weaker position than in 1866 due to the loss of the Bohemian mountain ranges, while Prussia has a virtually impregnable border there. Also, iirc her mobilisation takes a lot longer than Prussia's. Add to that her need to leave large chunks of her army in Galicia, Transylvania and along the Italian border, to guard against attack from those directions, and she's very much up the creek.

As to France, not a lot changed unless Napoleon III has found some *much* more competent generals.

 

[Disraeli2004]

Austria is in a much weaker position than in 1866 due to the loss of the Bohemian mountain ranges, while Prussia has a virtually impregnable border there. Also, iirc her mobilisation takes a lot longer than Prussia's. Add to that her need to leave large chunks of her army in Galicia, Transylvania and along the Italian border, to guard against attack from those directions, and she's very much up the creek.

As to France, not a lot changed unless Napoleon III has found some *much* more competent generals.

But there are another 500,000 men to deal with. It's not going to be a Prussian rout, even if this strategic mountain passes have been taken. My idea, anyway, was for some kind of attempt an an inverse Schlieffen (i.e. a quick march on Prague and then Vienna) to knock Austria out of the war. Would this succeed?

 

[M79]

But there are another 500,000 men to deal with. It's not going to be a Prussian rout, even if this strategic mountain passes have been taken. My idea, anyway, was for some kind of attempt an an inverse Schlieffen (i.e. a quick march on Prague and then Vienna) to knock Austria out of the war. Would this succeed?

Hungary always makes for interesting questions in these sorts of scenarios

 

[MetternichDidNothingWrong]

A Germany united under Prussia is no threat at all in the 1860s, as they have a common interest in keeping the Poles down. OTOH, during the Polish Revolt Austria showed some interest in a Polish kingdom under a Habsburg, while France was always sympathetic to Poland. Prussia is the only power on which Alexander can rely to see things his way. He wants a strong Prussia to keep both France and Austria in their place.

Anyway, what juggernaut? Germany's OTL population (excluding Austria) was only slightly more than France's in 1871 - 41 million against 36 million. And TTL France's population will be greater by at least a million if she doesn't lose Alsace-Lorraine. Per AJP Taylor [1] her 1870 Army estimated were £15 million against £9,6 million for Germany, while their steel production was about equal at 0.3 million tons. Germany didn't become an industrial superpower for another generation. There was no juggernaut in 1870.

[1] Struggle For Mastery In Europe, Introduction.

The Habsburgs have a precedent for being abnormally kind to their piece of Poland, and floated the idea of a reuniting Poland under their influence (much as Russia would in WW1). France also has a history of sympathizing with the Polish cause. Neither of these, however, have much grounding in geopolitical realities. This particular Napoleon isn't at all at any risk of creating a new Duchy of Warsaw when he doesn't even control any land beyond the Rhine, and Austria hasn't been campaigning for a free Poland so much as it had a few opportunistic ideas of how to take advantage of a Polish revolt. Russia's interest in the west has been peace, quiet, and no Poland.

A united Germany was not the beast of 1914 in 1870, but it was definitely stronger than a Prussia with a posse of German statelets, and it would stand to reason that most statesmen of the time would view Germany without all those silly internal borders as something that would grow quickly. Alexander's game, as you said, is to keep France (the ideological opposite of Russia) and Austria (the ingrate rival in the Balkans) in their place to ensure a pleasant status quo. That his support (or indifference) for German unification needed to be bartered for in OTL suggests he didn't see an ascendant Prussia as a natural part of that status quo either.

Russia can effectively play the role Italy did in our WW1; look at both sides, wait for the inevitable bidding war of bribes and spoils from diplomats whose bargaining position only gets weaker with time, see who's winning, and commit to whoever can promise more land from the other side (ideally without making anyone they border too strong). They can't wait too long, but there's still no rush.

 

[Mikestone8]

A united Germany was not the beast of 1914 in 1870, but it was definitely stronger than a Prussia with a posse of German statelets, and it would stand to reason that most statesmen of the time would view Germany without all those silly internal borders as something that would grow quickly. Alexander's game, as you said, is to keep France (the ideological opposite of Russia) and Austria (the ingrate rival in the Balkans) in their place to ensure a pleasant status quo. That his support (or indifference) for German unification needed to be bartered for in OTL suggests he didn't see an ascendant Prussia as a natural part of that status quo either.

Russia can effectively play the role Italy did in our WW1; look at both sides, wait for the inevitable bidding war of bribes and spoils from diplomats whose bargaining position only gets weaker with time, see who's winning, and commit to whoever can promise more land from the other side (ideally without making anyone they border too strong). They can't wait too long, but there's still no rush.

Does he especially need more land in Europe? He is in process of acquiring masses of it in the Caucasus and Central Asia. If he wants any particular European land it is the bit of Bessarabia whih he lost in 1856, but that by itself isn't worth a war. Anything he gains on his western border is likely to be full of Poles and/or Jews, and he doesn't like either.

Agreed that he doesn't especially want a united Germany, but of the options open to him, a Prussian-dominated one is by far the least-worst option. Of course that doesn't necessarily have to mean war. He can probably keep Austria neutral by diplomacy, as he did OTL. After all, given his recent experiences Franz Josef won't move until he is 101% sure that he's joining the winning side, and even the possibility of Russian intervention means that this won't be the case.

 

[Mikestone8]

But there are another 500,000 men to deal with. It's not going to be a Prussian rout, even if this strategic mountain passes have been taken. My idea, anyway, was for some kind of attempt an an inverse Schlieffen (i.e. a quick march on Prague and then Vienna) to knock Austria out of the war. Would this succeed?

Probably, but Moltke may prefer to concentrate on winning a battle against the French, since this may well deter Franz Josef from going to war at all. After all, with the Bohemian Mountains in Prussia, Austria has no hope of breaking through on their common border, and iirc the Austro-Bavarian border is also largely mountainous and easy to defend. France is Enemy No1, Austria just a bit of a nuisance.

 

[MetternichDidNothingWrong]

@Mikestone8 You're right on all counts, but that brings us back to square one of this thread. Austria can't meaningfully participate in the Franco-Prussian War, Prussia still holds all the cards as it did OTL, and the rest of the great powers are happy to sit this one out. I still feel like there is a possibility of the war in 1870 escalating, but it would take a guarantee of neutrality from Russia to Austria (possible) and one from Italy (wildly improbable). Of course, even if the circumstances for such guarantees could be found or created, that'd mean at least temporarily taking those powers off the board for the escalation of the war.

 

[Disraeli2004]

Does he especially need more land in Europe? He is in process of acquiring masses of it in the Caucasus and Central Asia. If he wants any particular European land it is the bit of Bessarabia whih he lost in 1856, but that by itself isn't worth a war. Anything he gains on his western border is likely to be full of Poles and/or Jews, and he doesn't like either.

Agreed that he doesn't especially want a united Germany, but of the options open to him, a Prussian-dominated one is by far the least-worst option. Of course that doesn't necessarily have to mean war. He can probably keep Austria neutral by diplomacy, as he did OTL. After all, given his recent experiences Franz Josef won't move until he is 101% sure that he's joining the winning side, and even the possibility of Russian intervention means that this won't be the case.

The Real fear is Austrian ascendancy, and moving the Austrian shaped lump that had stopped and helped to stop his ambitions in the Balkans from being a real threat is the main aim. I will discuss the limitation of aims in the next instalment. I have already written the Austrian intervention installememt and made my reasoning very clear.

@Mikestone8 You're right on all counts, but that brings us back to square one of this thread. Austria can't meaningfully participate in the Franco-Prussian War, Prussia still holds all the cards as it did OTL, and the rest of the great powers are happy to sit this one out. I still feel like there is a possibility of the war in 1870 escalating, but it would take a guarantee of neutrality from Russia to Austria (possible) and one from Italy (wildly improbable). Of course, even if the circumstances for such guarantees could be found or created, that'd mean at least temporarily taking those powers off the board for the escalation of the war.

Umm... I still think we are somewhere if some South German state ally with the Austrians (therefore removing the mountain problem. Given there have been 170 messages, I’m not just going to shelve the Time line, or as you say bring improbable Italian intervention (see earlier). Bavaria had stronger cultural ties to Prussia and fought against them in 1866, I wouldn’t rule out their intervention on the side of the Austrian/French (some may say catholic) alliance

 

[Disraeli2004]

@Mikestone8 @MetternichDidNothingWrong: I hope you understand if I reject wholesale attempts to rewrite the timeline, I've put way too much effort into this thus far and wholesale attempts to re-write it are off the table. I did write one where Russia doesn't get involved and Prussia loses, if you're intrested. But a Prussian victory regardless of the Austrian intervention would still change things. The threat of a total Prussian victory, in which all of Bohemia would be taken or perhaps Gross Deutschland would be accomplished if there was pan-nationalist feeling (I know Russia wouldn't be happy about this, this is in the works). Moreover, I still do not accept that the outcome is not changed. The route at Sedan could not be re-accomplished if there is a significant mobilisation by the Austrians; and given the Southern German states aren't likely to be turkies voting for Christmas, they'd probably stay with Austria as they had done. Remember an Austria planning to go to war would be more cavalier about disregarding the clause about staying out of German politics, the traditional cultural and religious ties would win the day. So I do reject that France would be quickly decimated. A bungled plan to knock Austria out of the war would also result in a real front line emerging (Prussia could mobilize faster and cross the mountain passes). So whilst I really appreciate your contributions, I would politely ask they accept that France and Austria are going to war with Prussia, if that's OK. I still need facts about a potential Russian intervention and the likelihood, so keep those coming.

 

[MetternichDidNothingWrong]

@Mikestone8 @MetternichDidNothingWrong: I hope you understand if I reject wholesale attempts to rewrite the timeline, I've put way too much effort into this thus far and wholesale attempts to re-write it are off the table. I did write one where Russia doesn't get involved and Prussia loses, if you're intrested. But a Prussian victory regardless of the Austrian intervention would still change things. The threat of a total Prussian victory, in which all of Bohemia would be taken or perhaps Gross Deutschland would be accomplished if there was pan-nationalist feeling (I know Russia wouldn't be happy about this, this is in the works). Moreover, I still do not accept that the outcome is not changed. The route at Sedan could not be re-accomplished if there is a significant mobilisation by the Austrians; and given the Southern German states aren't likely to be turkies voting for Christmas, they'd probably stay with Austria as they had done. Remember an Austria planning to go to war would be more cavalier about disregarding the clause about staying out of German politics, the traditional cultural and religious ties would win the day. So I do reject that France would be quickly decimated. A bungled plan to knock Austria out of the war would also result in a real front line emerging (Prussia could mobilize faster and cross the mountain passes). So whilst I really appreciate your contributions, I would politely ask they accept that France and Austria are going to war with Prussia, if that's OK. I still need facts about a potential Russian intervention and the likelihood, so keep those coming.

My apologies. I don't at all want you to shelve the timeline wholesale, and you're still entirely capable of going ahead with it. That being said, I think our arguing can be distilled into a handful of major points for your writing:

1. Russia and Italy will both be watching and waiting to see how the war unfolds before they involve themselves, if at all. The former is only particularly interested in the balance of power, and the latter is an opportunistic rascal that has irredentist claims on France and Austria equally. Britain remains aloof, aside for the historical voices in parliament that were worried about a united Germany.
2. Austria's role in this war would be to draw as many Prussian divisions south rather than west. Geography is not at all conducive to their theatre being the decisive one, given all those mountains between themselves and the Prussian heartland.
3. France is about as strong as it was OTL, with every advantage and disadvantage that entails. So long as their generals aren't idiots and get bottled up at Sedan, things could turn out very differently. They are admittedly arrayed against a Prussian-led alliance of Germans that are dividing their forces instead of hurling them all at Paris, but...
4. ... Prussia dividing its forces within Germany, with all its rail networks, was something they did in 1866 to brutal effect. von Moltke's plan is probably to crush Vienna first.

I think Bavaria could side with Vienna with some diplomatic pressure and prompting, but iirc they were part of Berlin's overall German defensive pact even if they weren't part of the NGF. That would give Austria somewhere other than mountains to attack, but their primary focus would still be stopping the Prussian steamroller from squashing Prague and Vienna.

 

[Disraeli2004]

I agree with all of those, but for point one I'd say that Russia would be watching to see if Austria obtains victory or appears to be on the verge of it. At that point they would swallow their doubts and go for limited intervention. In terms of Britain, I broadly agree until Russia intervenes. That would change the calculus significantly, as the reversal of what was so hard won in Crimea would be a travesty, and a greatly strengthened Russia could only mean that They still cared about in 1878, I think they would care enough to back the French in that eventuality. As for Italy, they'd just wait and digest their gains- they couldn't risk some foreign power dismembering the hard-won creation for the sake of Trieste and Dalmatia.

 

[Mikestone8]

@Mikestone8 @MetternichDidNothingWrong: I hope you understand if I reject wholesale attempts to rewrite the timeline, I've put way too much effort into this thus far and wholesale attempts to re-write it are off the table. I did write one where Russia doesn't get involved and Prussia loses, if you're intrested. But a Prussian victory regardless of the Austrian intervention would still change things. The threat of a total Prussian victory, in which all of Bohemia would be taken or perhaps Gross Deutschland would be accomplished if there was pan-nationalist feeling (I know Russia wouldn't be happy about this, this is in the works). Moreover, I still do not accept that the outcome is not changed. The route at Sedan could not be re-accomplished if there is a significant mobilisation by the Austrians; and given the Southern German states aren't likely to be turkies voting for Christmas, they'd probably stay with Austria as they had done. Remember an Austria planning to go to war would be more cavalier about disregarding the clause about staying out of German politics, the traditional cultural and religious ties would win the day. So I do reject that France would be quickly decimated. A bungled plan to knock Austria out of the war would also result in a real front line emerging (Prussia could mobilize faster and cross the mountain passes). So whilst I really appreciate your contributions, I would ask they accept that France and Austria are going to war with Prussia, if that's OK. I still need facts about a potential Russian intervention and the likelihood, so keep those coming.

Fair enough. I accept that Austria does go to war - though I pity her for doing so.

I'll even accept that in theory there could be a situation where Russia doesn't. Were the French to win a quick and decisive victory - inflicting on Prussia the sort of "KO in round one" that Austria got in 1866 - then it could well be that Alexander (like Louis Napoleon before him) would accept the fait accompli rather than go to war (in which Russia would bear the brunt of the fighting) to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for a *loser*. However, I consider this extremely unlikely. It would require a *huge* improvement in the French army - far mote than is likely in four years.

I can imagine the Southern states defecting if and when the Prussians are clearly defeated - but would they really try it before that? After all, given the slowness of Austrian mobilisation, the Prussians would almost certainly get to Munich before the Austrians (ostensibly to "protect" it against Austrian aggression), so the King of Bavaria (and Wurttemberg ditto) would have to trust the Franco-Austrians to liberate him after he has been conquered by Prussia - a very big gamble indeed. Would Ludwig really risk it after his experience in 1866 - especially if the Prussians are offering him Tyrol, Salzburg and maybe other titbits in return for playing ball?

And even when Austria is fully mobilised (does anyone recall how long this is likely to take?) what can she really do? If Russia comes in, Rumania will likely do the same (her Prince is an Hohenzollern, and she has national claims against Austria) so Austria has to guard her entire eastern border from Cracow round to Orsova. As if that weren't enough, she'll also have to guard against any possible move by the Italians. All this done, how much remains to her for a campaign in Germany? Sounds to me as if her impact on the French war will at least initially be pretty minimal.

 

[Mikestone8]

I think worries were swirling after the destruction of the German Confederation and 3 week war- but not enough to attack them, apart from France. The annexation of all Saxony and some of Austria might rouse international opinion enough for intervention

They'll cause a flurry of excitement but not much more.

Note that Britain had been in a similar situation eleven years earlier When Nappy III went to war with Austria, rousing memories of his uncle's campaigns in the same Italian theatre, and went on to annex Nice and Savoy, this set all sorts of alarm bells ringing in GB, as fears arose that the Napoleonic Wars might be starting up all over again. Iirc, concrete pill boxes got built to guard against a possible French invasion, and the scare left a poetic legacy in Alfred Lord Tennyson's ditty Riflemen Form, which is online at http://www.telelib.com/authors/T/TennysonAlfred/verse/deathofoenone/riflemenform.html for anyone who is really interested.

The German victory of 1870 left an analogous legacy in The Battle of Dorking. But of course both were nonsense. Neither Napoleon III nor Wilhelm I had either the wish or the means to attack Britain, Wiser heads quickly realised it and people soon calmed down . Nappy's acquisitions on the Italian border were no threat to the UK, and neither would any annexations that Wilhelm might have made in Saxony or Bohemia.

There would be one or two more war scares over the next forty years, two against Russia in 1878 and 1904 (San Stefano and Dogger Bank) and two with France in the 1890s (over Siam and Sudan) but none at all with Germany until the 1905 Moroccan Crisis. It took a 50% increase in the German population, an eleven-fold increase in her iron production, a forty-two-fold increase in her steel production, and last but not least a nearly twenty-fold rise in her naval expenditure before Britain got seriously worried about her. A few paltry scraps of land changing hands in the middle of Europe simply won't do it.

 

[Disraeli2004]

They'll cause a flurry of excitement but not much more.

Note that Britain had been in a similar situation eleven years earlier When Nappy III went to war with Austria, rousing memories of his uncle's campaigns in the same Italian theatre, and went on to annex Nice and Savoy, this set all sorts of alarm bells ringing in GB, as fears arose that the Napoleonic Wars might be starting up all over again. Iirc, concrete pill boxes got built to guard against a possible French invasion, and the scare left a poetic legacy in Alfred Lord Tennyson's ditty Riflemen Form, which is online at http://www.telelib.com/authors/T/TennysonAlfred/verse/deathofoenone/riflemenform.html for anyone who is really interested.

The German victory of 1870 left an analogous legacy in The Battle of Dorking. But of course both were nonsense. Neither Napoleon III nor Wilhelm I had either the wish or the means to attack Britain, Wiser heads quickly realised it and people soon calmed down . Nappy's acquisitions on the Italian border were no threat to the UK, and neither would any annexations that Wilhelm might have made in Saxony or Bohemia.

There would be one or two more war scares over the next forty years, two against Russia in 1878 and 1904 (San Stefano and Dogger Bank) and two with France in the 1890s (over Siam and Sudan) but none at all with Germany until the 1905 Moroccan Crisis. It took a 50% increase in the German population, an eleven-fold increase in her iron production, a forty-two-fold increase in her steel production, and last but not least a nearly twenty-fold rise in her naval expenditure before Britain got seriously worried about her. A few paltry scraps of land changing hands in the middle of Europe simply won't do it.

I agree. It’s a marauding Russia and a potential reversal of Crimea which would instigate the British into war, and not Prussia

 

[Mikestone8]

I agree. It’s a marauding Russia and a potential reversal of Crimea which would instigate the British into war, and not Prussia

But we did nothing OTL when Russia took advantage of the FPW to repudiate the Black Sea clauses of the peace treaty. Nor, eight years later, did we prevent Russia recovering the land on the north bank of the Danube which that treaty had taken from her.

Also, iirc, on your TL there is no Sedan, so presumably no Siege of Paris. Yet these (esp the latter) were what did most to arouse British sympathy for France. Until then she was simply viewed as an aggressor who had been sent packing with the bloody nose she had so richly deserved. W/o Sedan, presumably that attitude continues.

And if we did go to war, what exactly would we be fighting *for*? W/o Sedan, French independence is in no danger, At worst she may lose a border province, which would not harm Britain. And even supposing (*very* optimistically) that our assistance somehow enabled her to hang on to Metz and Strasbourg, how would this help GB to defend, say, Constantinople against the Russians? We'd have to do that alone, just as we actually had to OTL. We'd have thrown away a lot of soldiers' lives for nothing.

Note that in the 1859 war scare with France, our reaction consisted of building new defensive works on the coast. We made no move to enter the war. Why would an 1870 scare be any different?

 

[Disraeli2004]

But we did nothing OTL when Russia took advantage of the FPW to repudiate the Black Sea clauses of the peace treaty. Nor, eight years later, did we prevent Russia recovering the land on the north bank of the Danube which that treaty had taken from her.

Also, iirc, on your TL there is no Sedan, so presumably no Siege of Paris. Yet these (esp the latter) were what did most to arouse British sympathy for France. Until then she was simply viewed as an aggressor who had been sent packing with the bloody nose she had so richly deserved. W/o Sedan, presumably that attitude continues.

And if we did go to war, what exactly would we be fighting *for*? W/o Sedan, French independence is in no danger, At worst she may lose a border province, which would not harm Britain. And even supposing (*very* optimistically) that our assistance somehow enabled her to hang on to Metz and Strasbourg, how would this help GB to defend, say, Constantinople against the Russians? We'd have to do that alone, just as we actually had to OTL. We'd have thrown away a lot of soldiers' lives for nothing.

Note that in the 1859 war scare with France, our reaction consisted of building new defensive works on the coast. We made no move to enter the war. Why would an 1870 scare be any different?

I know about the fact that the Crimean clauses were repudiated and the British did nothing. But an Austro-Russian war with a rampaging Russia would be even worse than this and would be an intolerable conditions, combined with the Tsar's tricks in the Black Sea. Austria was a bulwark against Russian expansionism in the Balkans (think of their painful mobilization against the Russians during Crimea) and although Britain and Austria weren't friends or allies, the British were still interested. Remember they hadn't lost interests in the Balkans entirely (think the events of 1878), but the British really couldnt' have contained Russian aggression in both France and Austria were humbled. A Russian victory would give them a carte blanche to expand in the Balkans and Central Asia, perhaps even threatening India. These would have been intolerable terms for the British sake. In terms of the tide of popular opinion, I disagree with you. The British and French were begrudging allies (see Crimea) and Napoleon III was suspected but admired to some extent. Franco-British relations were pretty good. A more expansionist and openly threatening Prussia would have certainly helped sweeten the relationship with France. Although the old Bonaparatist fears were still there and thus an intervention was unlikely except in case of Russian intervention, that Russian intervention would provide a tipping point, where Britain must make a choice or be frozen out of the international order. Russia was pretty hated within Britain in the 1870s; it was seen as a reactionary backwater, full of superstition, and the Tsarist government was rightly seen as the most despotic in Europe. Certainly British opinion could be mobilized against Russia.

In terms of how the British could help, I notice you talk about saving Constantinople for the Russians. That does rage a potentially interested question about Ottoman intervention, who presumably also fear being partitioned and rampaged through by an unrestrained Russia. Surely in this eventuality the British could provide invaluable naval support to Ottomans? The British could also cut off imports to Prussia, which would really hurt in 1870, much more so than in 1914, as well as provide troops for the defence of France after a period of mobilization.

 

[Mikestone8]

I know about the fact that the Crimean clauses were repudiated and the British did nothing. But an Austro-Russian war with a rampaging Russia would be even worse than this and would be an intolerable conditions, combined with the Tsar's tricks in the Black Sea. Austria was a bulwark against Russian expansionism in the Balkans (think of their painful mobilization against the Russians during Crimea) and although Britain and Austria weren't friends or allies, the British were still interested. Remember they hadn't lost interests in the Balkans entirely (think the events of 1878), but the British really couldntt' have contained Russian aggression in both France and Austria were humbled. A Russian victory would give them a carte blanche to expand in the Balkans and Central Asia, perhaps even threatening India. These would have been intolerable terms for the British sake. In terms of the tide of popular opinion, I disagree with you. The British and French were begrudging allies (see Crimea) and Napoleon III was suspected but admired to some extent. Franco-British relations were pretty good. A more expansionist and openly threatening Prussia would have certainly helped sweeten the relationship with France. Although the old Bonaparatist fears were still there and thus an intervention was unlikely except in case of Russian intervention, that Russian intervention would provide a tipping point, where Britain must make a choice or be frozen out of the international order. Russia was pretty hated within Britain in the 1870s; it was seen as a reactionary backwater, full of superstition, and the Tsarist government was rightly seen as the most despotic in Europe. Certainly British opinion could be mobilized against Russia.

In terms of how the British could help, I notice you talk about saving Constantinople for the Russians. That does rage a potentially interested question about Ottoman intervention, who presumably also fear being partitioned and rampaged through by an unrestrained Russia. Surely in this eventuality the British could provide invaluable naval support to Ottomans? The British could also cut off imports to Prussia, which would really hurt in 1870, much more so than in 1914, as well as provide troops for the defence of France after a period of mobilization.

The Turks certainly won't attack Russia, They aren't crazy.

As for France being "humbled", I thought your TL assumed there would be no Sedan, which implies no siege of Paris. So she's in no danger of anything worse than the loss of a border province - which does Britain no harm. Indeed GB may well be pleased to see Napoleon III cut down to size. 1870 is after all his second aggressive war (third if Mexico counts) in little more than a decade, so it's high time *someone* gave him a bloody nose.

Nor of course is there any guarantee that a victorious France would take Britain's side in the Near East. Nappy tried to cosy up to to Russia in the years following the Crimean War, and for all Britain knows may well do so again.

Britain certainly doesn't want Austria destroyed, but nor does anyone else. Its collapse would probably lead to a Greater Germany stretching all the way to the Adriatic, and an independent Hungary whose leaders have traditional ties to Polish nationalists. The Tsar won't want either. In case of war he may take Eastern Galicia for himself and possibly Transylvania for Rumania, but that's probably about it. And none of this wiil harm Britain. In any case, even if she does intervene, she is powerless to do anything to save Austria. She may (just possibly) save a border fortress or two for France, but that's no help in Central Europe or the Near East. Not to mention that in the process she has, quite needlessly, made an enemy of Germany, with whom she has no issues.

It took more than thirty years to get Britain into the anti-German camp, and by then the circumstances were utterly different. Germany's growth in population and industrial might (not even a gleam on the horizon in 1870) put her in a position to completely dominate Europe in a way that was impossible three decades before., when France Germany and Austria all had similar populations and none was industrialised in any serious way. Nor was Prussia building a fleet of ironclads two-thirds the size of the RN. The forces that pushed Britain into the Triple Entente simply didn't exist and couldn't be made to exist.

 

[Disraeli2004]

The Turks certainly won't attack Russia, They aren't crazy.

As for France being "humbled", I thought your TL assumed there would be no Sedan, which implies no siege of Paris. So she's in no danger of anything worse than the loss of a border province - which does Britain no harm. Indeed GB may well be pleased to see Napoleon III cut down to size. 1870 is after all his second aggressive war (third if Mexico counts) in little more than a decade, so it's high time *someone* gave him a bloody nose.

Nor of course is there any guarantee that a victorious France would take Britain's side in the Near East. Nappy tried to cosy up to to Russia in the years following the Crimean War, and for all Britain knows may well do so again.

Britain certainly doesn't want Austria destroyed, but nor does anyone else. Its collapse would probably lead to a Greater Germany stretching all the way to the Adriatic, and an independent Hungary whose leaders have traditional ties to Polish nationalists. The Tsar won't want either. In case of war he may take Eastern Galicia for himself and possibly Transylvania for Rumania, but that's probably about it. And none of this wiil harm Britain. In any case, even if she does intervene, she is powerless to do anything to save Austria. She may (just possibly) save a border fortress or two for France, but that's no help in Central Europe or the Near East. Not to mention that in the process she has, quite needlessly, made an enemy of Germany, with whom she has no issues.

It took more than thirty years to get Britain into the anti-German camp, and by then the circumstances were utterly different. Germany's growth in population and industrial might (not even a gleam on the horizon in 1870) put her in a position to completely dominate Europe in a way that was impossible three decades before., when France Germany and Austria all had similar populations and none was industrialised in any serious way. Nor was Prussia building a fleet of ironclads two-thirds the size of the RN. The forces that pushed Britain into the Triple Entente simply didn't exist and couldn't be made to exist.

Point 1: I'm dabbling with it. A total Russian victory and not heeding a British call to arms could spell isolation and disaster for the Ottomans, but it REALLY needs British intervention before they could countenance that possibility
2: No, not necessarily. But the French are less immediate enemies than the marauding Russians. The British and French co-operated to some extent after Crimea, in Mexico for instance (forgive me when I'm wrong). By 1870, there's no way that the French could threaten India, but the Russian threat was very real
3: Britain begins to have balance of power issues with Prussia by 1870 even in our OTL. I'd refer you to Disraeli's speech, and other concern arising from Britain. Remember Britain DID intervene to stop Prussian expansion into Schwelsig in 1848, it's not out of the question that they'd attempt to contain Prussian again. So France 'needlessly' making an enemy of Prussia would not be the description used in Westminster halls of power, that's for sure. Certainly the 'Baden Crisis' or an attempt by Prussia to invade and incorporate the South
4: A good point. Certainly for my next write up I am considering this and I heed the point that Russia doesn't want to kill the Habsburg empire, although it was observed it "couldn't survive another loss'. The problem with a more limited arrangement, such as Prussia swallowing the rest of Bohemia and Tsar getting Balkan guarantees and Galicia is that it may swiftly not become fit for purpose with domestic pressure in Prussia. The Pan-Nationalists would certainly seize the second war to advocate for a definitive end to the 'Austrian problem'- the eradication of Austria and the formation of Greater Germany. The King of Prussia can't just rule this out, because then the war seems pointless and he can't mobilise German popular opinion in the way he could otherwise, and thus has to at least entertain this idea in public. FOr all the British know, he is serious. If the war drags on 4 years, it is both unlikely that the Hapsburgs could survive or that Germany could withstand Grossdeutschland domestic pressure; otherwise what was the conflict for?
5: In 1905 foreign brinkmanship combined with a growth in German industrial strength to deeply scare the British, yes. But this brinkmanship would be immediately more serious. Prussia swallowed North Germany and is threatening to emaciate the Austrian Empire and carve up Europe with Russia, all in a few short years. These ruptures to the balance of power, far worse than in our OTL, would drive Britain towards war.

 

[Disraeli2004]

This is what I had in mind for the provisional agreement: