WI: Napoleon winning Waterloo?

One fewer song in ABBA's repertoire. Unless whatever battle Napoleon is eventually defeated at has a name sufficiently euphonious to make into a pop song.
 

TruthfulPanda

Gone Fishin'
Nappy gets thrashed the next day by Blucher.
Hopefully we get spared the British spewing the legend about defeating Napoleon. However, we get to listen how their defeat was due to Dutch troops which "ran away" while alongside them British "fell back" ... a difference lost on neutral bystanders ...
 
"The question has often been asked, 'What if Napoleon had won at Waterloo?' The answer is as certain as any mere hypothesis can be: Waterloo would have occurred a few weeks later under another name. Physically, the disparity of forces was too great. Morally, France had lost heart." Albert Guerard, *France: A Modern History,* p. 281. https://archive.org/stream/franceamodernhis006433mbp#page/n307/mode/2up

I know it's been argued that this or that minor member of the anti-Napoleon coalition might drop out. But even if true it would not be decisive. Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia had the power and the determination to crush Napoleon no matter what happened at Waterloo. They would no longer trust him to keep any compromise agreement--they had had too many bad experiences. Thus, any attempt to split them *before Napoleon was defeated* would fail. (There was of course plenty of danger of them falling out afterwards.) Defections by Belgians or minor German states just would not be enough to make a difference except in the very short run.

(A victory, even if short-lived, by Napoleon at Waterloo would still have significant effects on pop music. Stonewall Jackson's "Waterloo" and Abba's song of the same name would both be impossible. The scene of whatever is Napoleon's final battle in this ATL might have a totally unmusical, unrhymable name... )
 
To answer the OP more seriously, it would have taken a miracle to keep Napoleon on the throne post-Leipzig. The major powers of Europe were in agreement on one thing and that was Napoleon must be removed and France cut down to size.

Now if Napoleon makes a better show of it and manages to destroy Wellington at Waterloo he might grind out another few months and that could have ramifications for the post war settlement of Europe but the end result where he's defeated and exiled again are just about guaranteed.

At best for Nappy maybe he can sneak away to the Americas and have a grand old adventure there.
 
What if Napoleon won Waterloo, ultimately defeating Duke of Wellington?

The Brits would not be able to push "we defeated Napoleon" down everybody's throats. :rolleyes:

Other than that, he would be defeated with or without a major battle by the weight of the arriving numbers. Waterloo was just a token event.
 
Reposting an old answer to this PoD.

By 1815, Napoleon was totaly geopolitically isolated in a way he never was before, and while he beneficied from a relatively strong inner political dynamic in France that wouldn't last forever due to more than 20 years of war and a certain defiance from both senatorial and semi-republican tendencies.
Even with a victory at Waterloo, all military options available aren't that thrilling (entering in Bruxelles just to leave it fleeing for incoming coalised armies in the East, with admittedly local recruitement being a given), and only a political alternative can be really efficient.

Giving that Austrian and especially Russian armies aren't that in perfect shape either, it's up to what happen in London, if he does defeat or prevent these to advance thanks to a French army victorious in Waterloo, plus Belgian reinforcement, plus freshly mobilized French army. But that implies French success in Alsace too. Then, maybe you could end up in London with a moderate faction allowing the emperor to stay in power while keeping 1814 borders.

Assuming Nappie got what he expected (remaining in power), his Cent Jours were really reliant on inner political dynamism from one hand, and the army (that had a strong republican base) on the other, surfing on popular support after a really mishandled Bourbon Restauration.
Would he fail to account that, and before the really mild liberal reaction (and royalist discontentment in several places), he would be without real allies.
The Charter of 1815 (particularily similar to Charte Constitutionelle or Senatorial Constitution of 1814) was a good start, that had to be adapted with times tough, lest the Empire suffer the same fate than Bourbons eventually.

Another problem would be economical : Paris' Bourse knew some crisis with Napoleonic restauration. If the situation isn't normalized quickly, you'd likely see a financial defiance towards the emperor, and Napoleon certainly can't afford that.
Basically any surviving Empire would have to deal with both post-revolutionary (if not republican) expectations from the army and 1815 popular support, and liberal expectations from bourgeoisie, financials and ruling elite that switched side twice at this point.

All of this, of course, assuming Napoleon defeats Austrians and Russians in Alsace, and that Britain agree to a new Vienna Congress with a Napoleonic France. If not, Napoleon is militarily toasted, pure and simple.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
If Berthier had returned to Napoleon's side as chief-of-staff rather than falling (jumping? being pushed?) to his death, I think it could have made a decisive difference. Not only would Berthier superlative abilities as chief-of-staff have prevented much of the command confusion that plagued the French in the Waterloo Campaign IOTL, but it would have freed Soult up to take his proper place as a corps commander and Napoleon would not have been shackled with the walking disaster that was Grouchy.

Even better, if he had had Davout with him as a corps commander rather than leaving him in Paris, it would have been a huge help. It's understandable that Napoleon was worried about being stabbed in the back and wanted Davout to keep the capital in order, but fighting such a battle without one's most outstanding corps commander was a severe handicap.

Finally, if he had taken Murat's offer and placed him back in command of the cavalry, the outcome might have been different. Sure, the guy was a despicable human being and basically a morality-free zone, but put him on a horse and point towards the enemy and you still have one of the world's most ferocious cavalry commanders at your disposal.

And to those who say that a Napoleonic victory at Waterloo would not have made any difference, I'd only reply that it's generally a bad idea to underestimate Napoleon. Considering how well he did during the 1814 campaign in France against much longer odds than he would have faced in 1815 suggests that he had at least a shot at victory.
 
Oh I don't think defeat is inevitable as victory gains its own momentum

If Napoleon can defeat Wellington, turn and defeat Blucher, then get his army to unite with the Rhineland one and keep the Russians/Austrians out

Sounds nuts? But he has done it before?

People often say he was lacking in great subordinates but
1) people rise through the ranks
2) victory should free up Davout to retake the field, and even Eugene might come back if Napoleon looks dominant again (his wife's father urged him not to)
 
I don't think Napoleon can win, because all of Europe is on "Kill Napoleon" mode. The old "We will fight to the Last Austrian" story won't cut it anymore. It doesn't matter how long it takes, every single non-pariah country on Europe agreed Napoleon had to go. Depending on how long it takes, we might see the Portuguese and the Spanish showing up to get some payback, too. Can Napoleon fight Britain, Russia, Austria, Hungary, Prussia, Spain, Sweden, Portugal, Netherlands, most of Germany... really, pretty much everyone?

From Portugal to Russia, Napoleon is surrounded by enemies who have been attacked and wronged by him. So what if Napoleon beats the Brits, the Austrians will come for him. Then the Prussians. Then the Russians. Then the Portuguese and the Spanish. All with British gold and help. Who else remains as a possible ally... Murat in Naples? lol.
 
I tend to think it wouldn't change much. Russia and Austria would probably invade from the East, surrounding Paris. Napoleon couldn't hope to defeat all of those troops. At best, he might be able to flee to the United States.
 
And to those who say that a Napoleonic victory at Waterloo would not have made any difference, I'd only reply that it's generally a bad idea to underestimate Napoleon. Considering how well he did during the 1814 campaign in France against much longer odds than he would have faced in 1815 suggests that he had at least a shot at victory.

It seems that you are missing something fundamental: in 1814 he was doing just great all the way until he found himself strategically defeated. He could not be everywhere at the same time and the Allies already figured out how to advance on a wide front making his personal victories pretty much pointless. In 1815 situation was pretty much the same and addition of Davout (not to mention clown like Murat) would not change things strategically.

According to Clausewitz (https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/1815/five1-9.htm) who was, beyond any doubt, a good authority on the issue, in 1815 he really had 217,000 troops (he boasted about the great reserves but they did not materialize) vs. total 600 - 700K of the allied troops marching to France. To quote from the original "However confident he may have been about his rearmament efforts, he foresaw that before he could complete them, an enormously superior force would advance against him. He personally believed that 600,000 men would oppose him, but in fact between 600,000 and 700,000 appeared. If we compare these numbers with the 200,000 that he had in the field and add to them another 50,000 who were in the fortresses with which the enemy would come into contact, there still remains a superiority in numbers that even a Bonaparte had reason to fear."

Further: "In the first half of June, the forces that the Allies set into motion against Bonaparte had the following strengths and dispositions:



1. The army of the Netherlands
Wellington in Belgium
consisting of English, Hanoverian, Dutch,
Brunswick, and Nassau troops
100,000
Blücher on the Meuse
115,000
Germanic Confederation troops on the Moselle
20,000
Total
235,000

2. The Russian army, on the march towards the Middle Rhine
140,000
3. The Austrian army, together with Germanic Confederation
troops from Southern Germany, on the Upper Rhine
230,000
4. The Austrians and Sardinians in Italy
60,000
[Grand] Total
665,000


Against these masses the French had approximately:

Standing Army
180,000
National Guard
15,000
Total in the field
195,000


If we add to these about 80,000 men from the fortress garrisons, who could have come into action during the course of the campaign, then the French with their 275,000 men are supposed to hold their own against 665,000 men or even defeat them. But the Prussians alone had another 100,000 troops moving up, namely the Guard, the 5th and 6th Corps, and several regiments belonging to the other four corps. Later on, the Neapolitan and Danish troops would have to be taken into account as well, along with the new corps being raised in Germany, such as the Prussian 7th Corps in Westphalia."
 
If Berthier had returned to Napoleon's side as chief-of-staff rather than falling (jumping? being pushed?) to his death, I think it could have made a decisive difference. Not only would Berthier superlative abilities as chief-of-staff have prevented much of the command confusion that plagued the French in the Waterloo Campaign IOTL, but it would have freed Soult up to take his proper place as a corps commander and Napoleon would not have been shackled with the walking disaster that was Grouchy.

Even better, if he had had Davout with him as a corps commander rather than leaving him in Paris, it would have been a huge help. It's understandable that Napoleon was worried about being stabbed in the back and wanted Davout to keep the capital in order, but fighting such a battle without one's most outstanding corps commander was a severe handicap.

Finally, if he had taken Murat's offer and placed him back in command of the cavalry, the outcome might have been different. Sure, the guy was a despicable human being and basically a morality-free zone, but put him on a horse and point towards the enemy and you still have one of the world's most ferocious cavalry commanders at your disposal.

And to those who say that a Napoleonic victory at Waterloo would not have made any difference, I'd only reply that it's generally a bad idea to underestimate Napoleon. Considering how well he did during the 1814 campaign in France against much longer odds than he would have faced in 1815 suggests that he had at least a shot at victory.


People often assign Davout to the Armee du Nord for Waterloo TLs, and not without reason, but I think this is somewhat short sighted. Napoleon had what he needed to win in June, but had to count on Davout to get him the strength to survive the coming storm in July and August.

I likewise would have him accept Murat's saber back into his service, instead of spurning him, and make Suchet his chief of staff, rather than Soult. Soult is a great battle commander, but chief-of-staff-ing was not his strength, so Soult could instead take Suchet's place as commander in the Alpine theatre, or potentially give Ney that responsibility and make Soult commander of his left wing. With proper staffwork, Napoleon could get I Corps into battle against the Prussians in a timely manner and seal the deal at Ligny. This would make Wellington's position south of Mt. St. Jean untenable, as the French could control the road from Wavre, operationally enveloping him. Any retreat past this point by the Allied armies would make the possibility of mutual support increasingly remote. However, that still leaves the allied armies in the Rhine theatre.

Here Davout would be extremely valuable in his capacity of War Minister. With a well handled War Ministry, Napoleon might be able to get 300,000 men in field armies (240,000 on the Marne, 60,000 around Lyons), plus another 100,000 in the immediate vicinity of Paris, plus fortress garrisons by mid-August. The Russians and Austrians are invading through corridors divided by the wide range of the Vosges; when the Coalition attempted this in 1814, Napoleon inflicted multiple defeats on Blucher and Schwarzenberg's separated commands, but lacked the strength to destroy either. In 1815, he'd definitely be in a comparatively stronger position to follow up on any defeats of the separate allied armies.
 
The Brits would not be able to push "we defeated Napoleon" down everybody's throats. :rolleyes:

Other than that, he would be defeated with or without a major battle by the weight of the arriving numbers. Waterloo was just a token event.

The difference is that, instead of an Anglo-Prussian dominated peace, the "Western" Coalition members would be the ones finding themselves blooded and the Russo-Austrian armies not only carrying the prestige of knocking out Napoleon, but having their armies standing in France and Western Europe. This means the final redrawing of the map of Europe leans at least somewhat more in Austria and Russia's favor; perhaps involving more minor German states restored in the Rhineland rather than handing such huge swaths of territory to Brandenburg, strengthening the relative power of the Habsburgs compared to the Hohenzollerns
 
The difference is that, instead of an Anglo-Prussian dominated peace, the "Western" Coalition members would be the ones finding themselves blooded and the Russo-Austrian armies not only carrying the prestige of knocking out Napoleon, but having their armies standing in France and Western Europe.

Don't you worry about the prestige: at least the Russians "knew" that it was them who defeated Napoleon. :winkytongue:

As for staying in France, the Russian and Austrian troops had been staying there in 1814 and then marched back home: it does not look like anybody was planning a long-term occupation. Nothing would change Alexander's servile attitude toward the Brits either so no big difference there.


This means the final redrawing of the map of Europe leans at least somewhat more in Austria and Russia's favor; perhaps involving more minor German states restored in the Rhineland rather than handing such huge swaths of territory to Brandenburg, strengthening the relative power of the Habsburgs compared to the Hohenzollerns

I'm not sure how and why restoration of the Rhineland states would be in the Russian interests: unlike the Austrians, Prussians were their true allies.
 
I think who if Napoleon can win at Waterloo and maybe the next battle (because he had a better staff and accepted any help) some of his old allies (like Bavaria) will think/start to support him again and a couple of loss can persuade Austria to rethink to their Napoleon's strategy: Franz II is still Napoleon's father-in-law and has both Napoleon's Empress and heir in his custody and sending them back in Paris can cut their loss if Napoleon looks like to have back his military luck and winning streak... Sure they will still hate him but usually they are also very pragmatic
 
I think who if Napoleon can win at Waterloo and maybe the next battle (because he had a better staff and accepted any help) some of his old allies (like Bavaria) will think/start to support him again and a couple of loss can persuade Austria to rethink to their Napoleon's strategy: Franz II is still Napoleon's father-in-law and has both Napoleon's Empress and heir in his custody and sending them back in Paris can cut their loss if Napoleon looks like to have back his military luck and winning streak... Sure they will still hate him but usually they are also very pragmatic

From time to time Napoleon still won battles in 1813 and even 1814, yet this never caused the Allies to consider packing it in. Why should 1815 be any different?

Remember also that by 1814 his manpower problems were such that he was down to calling up 16yo boys. The return of PoWs in 1814 has given him some veterans back, but these are a wasting asset. A few more major battles (even if he wins more of them than he loses) and most of those men will be dead or crippled and he'll be back to green recruits again. All the Allies have to do is keep slogging and there's no way they can lose - and they know it. No one has any reason to break ranks when they've already fought their way to Paris once, and know that they can do so again if they only stick to their guns.
 
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