That is true but not everybody hated him and if he looked again to be almost invincible someone would have likely switched to his side again
That is true but not everybody hated him and if he looked again to be almost invincible someone would have likely switched to his side againFrom time to time Napoleon still won battles in 1813 and even 1814, yet this never caused the Allies to consider packing it in. Why should 1815 be any different?
Remember also that by 1814 his manpower problems were such that he was down to calling up 16yo boys. The return of PoWs in 1814 has given him some veterans back, but these are a wasting asset. A few more major battles (even if he wins more of them than he loses) and most of those men will be dead or crippled and he'll be back to green recruits again. All the Allies have to do is keep slogging and there's no way they can lose - and they know it. No one has any reason to break ranks when they've already fought their way to Paris once, and know that they can do so again if they only stick to their guns.
The difference is that, instead of an Anglo-Prussian dominated peace, the "Western" Coalition members would be the ones finding themselves blooded and the Russo-Austrian armies not only carrying the prestige of knocking out Napoleon, but having their armies standing in France and Western Europe. This means the final redrawing of the map of Europe leans at least somewhat more in Austria and Russia's favor; perhaps involving more minor German states restored in the Rhineland rather than handing such huge swaths of territory to Brandenburg, strengthening the relative power of the Habsburgs compared to the Hohenzollerns
That is true but not everybody hated him and if he looked again to be almost invincible someone would have likely switched to his side again
The Congress of Vienna had already closed, there's little reason to believe any meaningful border redrawing would be taking place. Austria had little interest in the Rhineland to begin with and Russia is not going to get behind stripping its junior partner of territory because Napoleon won a fleeting victory. I'm not sure why this forum is so obsessed with giving the Rhineland to someone other than Prussia post 1815 when it wasn't actually very controversial in OTL.The difference is that, instead of an Anglo-Prussian dominated peace, the "Western" Coalition members would be the ones finding themselves blooded and the Russo-Austrian armies not only carrying the prestige of knocking out Napoleon, but having their armies standing in France and Western Europe. This means the final redrawing of the map of Europe leans at least somewhat more in Austria and Russia's favor; perhaps involving more minor German states restored in the Rhineland rather than handing such huge swaths of territory to Brandenburg, strengthening the relative power of the Habsburgs compared to the Hohenzollerns
Here Davout would be extremely valuable in his capacity of War Minister. With a well handled War Ministry, Napoleon might be able to get 300,000 men in field armies (240,000 on the Marne, 60,000 around Lyons), plus another 100,000 in the immediate vicinity of Paris, plus fortress garrisons by mid-August. The Russians and Austrians are invading through corridors divided by the wide range of the Vosges; when the Coalition attempted this in 1814, Napoleon inflicted multiple defeats on Blucher and Schwarzenberg's separated commands, but lacked the strength to destroy either. In 1815, he'd definitely be in a comparatively stronger position to follow up on any defeats of the separate allied armies.
Clausewitz does, though, later argue that a stunning victory in the Lower Rhine theatre would have greatly demoralized the allies, and converted ever-present hesitation into terror among their leaders, while at the same time electrifying France and securing his domestic position, allowing him to pull troops out of the Vendee, for instance.Clausewitz was rather skeptical about Nappy's ability to raise the numbers he claimed (all kinds of considerations including political ones). Plus, the newly raised troops (mostly the young boys) would be lacking training, experience and simply physical stamina. But even within this optimistic scenario he would have to deal with an opponents having at least twice his numbers big part of which had been experienced troops with the reasonably good commanders.
It seems that you are missing something fundamental: in 1814 he was doing just great all the way until he found himself strategically defeated. He could not be everywhere at the same time and the Allies already figured out how to advance on a wide front making his personal victories pretty much pointless. In 1815 situation was pretty much the same and addition of Davout (not to mention clown like Murat) would not change things strategically.
According to Clausewitz (https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/1815/five1-9.htm) who was, beyond any doubt, a good authority on the issue, in 1815 he really had 217,000 troops (he boasted about the great reserves but they did not materialize) vs. total 600 - 700K of the allied troops marching to France. To quote from the original "However confident he may have been about his rearmament efforts, he foresaw that before he could complete them, an enormously superior force would advance against him. He personally believed that 600,000 men would oppose him, but in fact between 600,000 and 700,000 appeared. If we compare these numbers with the 200,000 that he had in the field and add to them another 50,000 who were in the fortresses with which the enemy would come into contact, there still remains a superiority in numbers that even a Bonaparte had reason to fear."
Further: "In the first half of June, the forces that the Allies set into motion against Bonaparte had the following strengths and dispositions:
1. The army of the Netherlands
Wellington in Belgium
consisting of English, Hanoverian, Dutch,
Brunswick, and Nassau troops
100,000
Blücher on the Meuse
115,000
Germanic Confederation troops on the Moselle
20,000
Total
235,000
2. The Russian army, on the march towards the Middle Rhine
140,000
3. The Austrian army, together with Germanic Confederation
troops from Southern Germany, on the Upper Rhine
230,000
4. The Austrians and Sardinians in Italy
60,000
[Grand] Total
665,000
Against these masses the French had approximately:
Standing Army
180,000
National Guard
15,000
Total in the field
195,000
If we add to these about 80,000 men from the fortress garrisons, who could have come into action during the course of the campaign, then the French with their 275,000 men are supposed to hold their own against 665,000 men or even defeat them. But the Prussians alone had another 100,000 troops moving up, namely the Guard, the 5th and 6th Corps, and several regiments belonging to the other four corps. Later on, the Neapolitan and Danish troops would have to be taken into account as well, along with the new corps being raised in Germany, such as the Prussian 7th Corps in Westphalia."
It seems that you are missing something fundamental: in 1814 he was doing just great all the way until he found himself strategically defeated. He could not be everywhere at the same time and the Allies already figured out how to advance on a wide front making his personal victories pretty much pointless. In 1815 situation was pretty much the same and addition of Davout (not to mention clown like Murat) would not change things strategically.
According to Clausewitz (https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/1815/five1-9.htm) who was, beyond any doubt, a good authority on the issue, in 1815 he really had 217,000 troops (he boasted about the great reserves but they did not materialize) vs. total 600 - 700K of the allied troops marching to France. To quote from the original "However confident he may have been about his rearmament efforts, he foresaw that before he could complete them, an enormously superior force would advance against him. He personally believed that 600,000 men would oppose him, but in fact between 600,000 and 700,000 appeared. If we compare these numbers with the 200,000 that he had in the field and add to them another 50,000 who were in the fortresses with which the enemy would come into contact, there still remains a superiority in numbers that even a Bonaparte had reason to fear."
Further: "In the first half of June, the forces that the Allies set into motion against Bonaparte had the following strengths and dispositions:
1. The army of the Netherlands
Wellington in Belgium
consisting of English, Hanoverian, Dutch,
Brunswick, and Nassau troops
100,000
Blücher on the Meuse
115,000
Germanic Confederation troops on the Moselle
20,000
Total
235,000
2. The Russian army, on the march towards the Middle Rhine
140,000
3. The Austrian army, together with Germanic Confederation
troops from Southern Germany, on the Upper Rhine
230,000
4. The Austrians and Sardinians in Italy
60,000
[Grand] Total
665,000
Against these masses the French had approximately:
Standing Army
180,000
National Guard
15,000
Total in the field
195,000
If we add to these about 80,000 men from the fortress garrisons, who could have come into action during the course of the campaign, then the French with their 275,000 men are supposed to hold their own against 665,000 men or even defeat them. But the Prussians alone had another 100,000 troops moving up, namely the Guard, the 5th and 6th Corps, and several regiments belonging to the other four corps. Later on, the Neapolitan and Danish troops would have to be taken into account as well, along with the new corps being raised in Germany, such as the Prussian 7th Corps in Westphalia."
It seems that you are missing something fundamental: in 1814 he was doing just great all the way until he found himself strategically defeated. He could not be everywhere at the same time and the Allies already figured out how to advance on a wide front making his personal victories pretty much pointless. In 1815 situation was pretty much the same and addition of Davout (not to mention clown like Murat) would not change things strategically.
According to Clausewitz (https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/1815/five1-9.htm) who was, beyond any doubt, a good authority on the issue, in 1815 he really had 217,000 troops (he boasted about the great reserves but they did not materialize) vs. total 600 - 700K of the allied troops marching to France. To quote from the original "However confident he may have been about his rearmament efforts, he foresaw that before he could complete them, an enormously superior force would advance against him. He personally believed that 600,000 men would oppose him, but in fact between 600,000 and 700,000 appeared. If we compare these numbers with the 200,000 that he had in the field and add to them another 50,000 who were in the fortresses with which the enemy would come into contact, there still remains a superiority in numbers that even a Bonaparte had reason to fear."
Further: "In the first half of June, the forces that the Allies set into motion against Bonaparte had the following strengths and dispositions:
1. The army of the Netherlands
Wellington in Belgium
consisting of English, Hanoverian, Dutch,
Brunswick, and Nassau troops
100,000
Blücher on the Meuse
115,000
Germanic Confederation troops on the Moselle
20,000
Total
235,000
2. The Russian army, on the march towards the Middle Rhine
140,000
3. The Austrian army, together with Germanic Confederation
troops from Southern Germany, on the Upper Rhine
230,000
4. The Austrians and Sardinians in Italy
60,000
[Grand] Total
665,000
Against these masses the French had approximately:
Standing Army
180,000
National Guard
15,000
Total in the field
195,000
If we add to these about 80,000 men from the fortress garrisons, who could have come into action during the course of the campaign, then the French with their 275,000 men are supposed to hold their own against 665,000 men or even defeat them. But the Prussians alone had another 100,000 troops moving up, namely the Guard, the 5th and 6th Corps, and several regiments belonging to the other four corps. Later on, the Neapolitan and Danish troops would have to be taken into account as well, along with the new corps being raised in Germany, such as the Prussian 7th Corps in Westphalia."
Interesting Thread. A well reasoned thesis, but I think your overlooking several factors. Yes your troop strength figures are correct, but are only static numbers. First if Wellington's Army had been badly beaten at ether Quatre Bras on June 17, after a decisive French victory over the Prussians at Ligny, (Assuming d'Erlon's 1st Corps arrives at the time and place it was ordered to be at. In which case Blucher would have been most likely killed, or captured.) or at Waterloo the remaining UK forces would have been evacuated back to Britain.
This would leave Gneisenau in command of what was left of the Prussian Army, Probably 2 Corps now with very low moral. Gneisenau's main strategic concern was defending his lines of communications with the Rhineland. The Prussian, and German allied troops your counting in the allied forces would have been in a defensive posture east of the Meuse, not aggressively campaigning against the French on the Northern Front. What was left of Wellington's army after a period of rest and refitting might have been re-landed in Holland, but their role would have strategically defensive, to support Dutch independence, not invading France from the north.
No Danish army would be coming after Norway was granted to Sweden. The additional Prussian army your talking about would have been slow to be committed, especially after the defeat of their main army, and the loss of their best commander. Prussia after all was the smallest of the major powers, with much higher mobilization levels then any of the others. Like Israel today they had a very large army, but can't afford massive loses.
After victory in Belgium Napoleon would leave half of the northern army under Soult behind to hold Belgium, and recruit more troops. Many of the Belgian/Dutch troops from Wellington's army might have switch back to the French side, and would have helped in the defense of the north. By the beginning of July Napoleon would be back in Eastern France with 3 corps, along with the Guard Corps, and most of the cavalry. The French were mobilizing a new army of 117,000 troops, new recruits, with some veterans to stiffen the ranks, and provide the sergeants, and junior officers that make an army work. No generals without sergeants.
This would put Napoleon at the head of a field army of 180,000 men, almost 3 times the size of the army he led on the main front in 1814. This army would also have been of much higher quality, and moral then in that campaign, with better leadership. Napoleon had available to him leaders such as Davout, and Jourdan who were underutilized in the 1815 campaign. In addition Murat, the finest cavalry commander in Europe was ready to serve, if Napoleon wanted to take him back. Marshal Massena, who Napoleon considered his best marshal was sitting on the fence during the "Hundred days", but after 2 major victories he might well have fallen Napoleon's way.
Has for the allied forces in Italy. The Sardinian army was one of worst in Europe, the Neapolitans were even lower in quality. The hard fighting would have been left to the Austrians. Invasions between France, and Italy are no easy matter going in ether direction. Passing over the Martine Alps was a major feat in it's self. The French defense would have involved defending a limited number of mountain passes, which can be accomplished with an economy of force. Alternatively the Royal Navy could move some allied troops by sea to attack Southern France, as in 1792, but again that's no easy matter. There are reasons they never attempted to do that again.
That leaves the main front of the middle too the upper Rhine, and the mountain passes of Switzerland. This is the same ground as the 1814 Campaign, with most of the same players, with some notable exceptions, and additions. The 140,000 Russians, under the command of the competent, though not tactically brilliant Barclay de Tolly wouldn't reach the Rhine till the middle of August. The 230,000 Austrian Troops under the competent, though cautious leadership of Schwarzenberg would never have started a major invasion of France under these circumstances without waiting for the Russians. Napoleon would have loved to take Schwarzenberg's Army on, with the Russians still weeks away.
This gives the Allies 370,000 troops for an invasion of France. Now assuming 25% of the allied army would be used for defending lines of communications, and masking French fortresses, this leaves an Allied field army of 277,500 men, which is only odds of 3 vs 2. These are hardly decisive odds, and no worse then Napoleon faced in the Waterloo Campaign, which most students of history agree was very winnable, or at Dresden where he did win. Napoleon's strategy of using interior lines, that is holding the central position, and striking two separate armies with superior strength on the day of battle has been a sound principle of war for thousands of years.
This is what he tried to do in 1814, but he simple lacked the strength, the odds were just too high. On top of that his political front collapsed, causing the fall of Paris without a major battle. After a smashing victory in the Belgian Campaign his political front would have been much stronger then in April 1814. In August 1815 the Allies couldn't have advanced as a compact mass heading towards one objective, disregarding their flanks, and lines of communications. The French had the geographic advantage of numerous river lines, and bridge crossings to channel the Allied advance, and compel them to divide their forces to protect their flanks, and rear.
In 1814 the Allied leadership was much better then it would have been in 1815. Prince Blucher was the most aggressive, and effective of all the Allied leaders, and his absence would be sorely felt. In 1814 both the Czar, and the Austrian Emperor were accompanying their armies in the field. On several occasions they both put some steel in the back bones of their commanding generals, particularly the cautious General Schwarzenberg, this time they would be on their own. Both Schwarzenberg, and de Tolly, were cautious by nature, and nether had any confidence in a face off with Napoleon himself.
The strategy of avoiding battle with Napoleon, and instead attacking his marshals would have been harder to achieve in 1815 then in 1813. The narrow confines between the river systems of Eastern France don't compare with the much larger arena of Germany where armies were many days march from each other. Holding the central position Napoleon would be likely no more then a day or two's march from the support of any of his marshals. The strategy of trying to pick off parts of Napoleon's army would require aggressive leadership, and nether of the principle Allied leaders was particularly aggressive, or willing to take great risks.
Napoleon on the other hand was one of the great risk takers of all time, both his greatest strength, and weakness. At the risk of some exaggeration the psychological match up of Napoleon vs. Schwarzenberg, & de Tolly would be comparable to Lee vs. McClellan. de Tolly was more aggressive then Schwarzenberg, or McClellan, but at least McClellan had only one head, not two. Napoleon would have had the advantage of unity of command, a major principle of Clausewitz's dictums.
Schwarzenberg would probably be commander in chief as in 1814, but with two armies cooperating there still would be more friction then Napoleon's forces would have to deal with. Friction is another factor in Clausewitz's understanding of war, that is the inevitable conflicts, and stress of command. With the more aggressive commander under the more cautious one, even more friction would prevail on the Allied side. Eisenhower's great achievement was keeping Friction to a minimum in the Western Alliance in WWII. Making a NATO campaign work would require a vary high order of leadership.
Now to be fair the Napoleon of 1815 wasn't the man of 1805. He lost the Waterloo Campaign due to periods of lethargy, unclear orders, poor staff work, and abandoning his correct original strategy of concentrating his forces to defeat his two opponents one at a time. Sending Grouchy
with the right wing off in an independent action against the Prussians at Wavre, instead of covering the main armies right flank was simply reckless. Still Napoleon on a bad day was better then any of his opponents.
His choices for the top commands were also problematic. Like Lee he needed good corps commanders to carry out his strategic designs. As it's been written 10,000 times Nay was simple not fit for a major command, and Grouchy had no experience commanding large infantry formations He was a good cavalry corps commander, and would have done well under Murat. To make things worse most of the cavalry was with the main army, where Nay destroyed most of them.
For the Waterloo Campaign, and the forthcoming campaign against the Austro Russian armies my alternative wing commanders are Sault for the left, and Davout the right, with Murat in overall command of the cavalry, assigned to the vital task of scouting out the enemy. Napoleon mostly stumbled on the Prussian, and Anglo Allied armies in Belgium, they needed better reconnaissance, as Murat had provided in the glory days of the Empire. In a defensive campaign on French soil intelligence on enemy movements, and strength would have been much easier.
With his experience of dealing with Wellington Sault would never have employed the reckless tactics Nay resorted to at Quatre Bras. At Waterloo he would have used the correct combined arms tactics that Nay only employed in the last 90 minutes of the battle, which if used earlier would have broken the Anglo/Allied Army before the Prussians arrived in force. For his part Davout would have understood his part of the operation was to protect the right flank of the main army, so no Prussians would have arrived to save Wellington.
So IMHO if Napoleon had different subordinates, and had won at Waterloo he would have had a fair to good chance of prevailing in a defensive campaign against the Austro Russian Army in August. Now if he could have struck a peace deal with the Allies is a political unknown. If Napoleon had agreed to the 1791 borders of France, for recognition of the Bonaparte Dynasty he might have got a deal. At one point in 1814 the Allies had offered just those terms. In his megalomania he refused, but later agreed, after the proposal was withdrawn.
Everyone was war weary in 1815. Austria saw the Russian, Prussian alliance as a threat to their interests, and wanted an alliance with a strong France as a counter weight. Powerful elements in Russia, with the Czar's ear saw Britain as the winner of the war, with it's global economic dominance only strengthening the longer the struggle continued. Even Britain wanted a peace, but insisted on the port of Antwerp, and the river Scheldt being free of French control. So maybe a deal could have been reached, but Napoleon would have had to forever abandon his dreams of conquest. That would have died hard, but even Napoleon was tired of war. As he himself said "We only have a short season for war."
Whig were benevolement un regard of Napoleon
Russian needs a month to Arrive, Austrian three weeks; If Napoleon beat the Brithish so soundly it could make the Duke of Liverpool cabinet fall; Whig were benevolement un regard of Napoleon and would come off the coalition; Austrians can be defeated, and then 1816 will see a new campaign agains Russia which could mean a nrw Napoleonic victory.
After such a massive defeat? What if the King calls for a fresh election? I think the anty-war faction could gain majority.
Maybe if Napoleon is victorious against the armies on the Lower Rhine, the powers agree to restore the Natural Frontiers
Well, I would not say that your argument is invalid, just that it more than a little bit lopsided by providing the best case scenario for Nappy.
Thank you for your reply. Yes my argument is based on a best, or at least better case scenario for the French. If not there would be no point of the discussion. After all Napoleon did lose the war, and for many of the reasons your pointing out, but let me make a few counter points.
At least in the case of Russia the numbers assigned for the campaign were only a part of the immediately available total troops and, IIRC, Prussians also could raise considerable numbers of the additional troops. If the Brits were forced to evacuate from BeLgium, nothing would prevent them from landing elsewhere on the allied-held coast either in Germany or in Spain but, anyway, numbers wise they were not the main contributor.
Yes Russia could send many more troops then just de Tolly's Army, the question is would they? This type of debate is often based on a fight to the finish argument. In WWII all the great powers fought to the finish, absolute victory, or total defeat. Most wars are not like that. 1815 would not be like 1812 with Russia fighting for it life. 1813 was to end French hegemony in central Europe, necessary to defend Russia from future isolation, or invasion. 1814 was about finishing a job, and holding a coalition together. 1815 would be very different, there is no danger of the French crossing the Rhine and reestablishing domination over Germany. Russia's vital national interests are not endangered.
Another factor is Russia has other national interests. Internal reconstruction from the damage of 1812. Reestablishing normal trade, and economic relations in Europe, which were subjects being address at the Congress of Vienna. resuming Russian expansion in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Khanates of Asia. overthrowing the Bonaparte Dynasty isn't a vital national interest. At different times in 1813, and 14 Russia thought it might be in their interest for Napoleon to stay in power as a counter weight to the British.
Likewise Prussia's vital interests are in Germany, and Poland, not France. The Prussians viewed both Austria, and Sweden as rivals to defend their interests against, and their foreign policy is invariable linked to Russia's. Has for the British in the whole of the Napoleonic Wars they never considered doing what your suggesting, that is landing in Germany to join a European Coalition. They hadn't done that since the days of the Duke of Marlborough. Spain wasn't a member of the 7th Coalition, and was completely consumed with internal conflicts.
Now, the French soldiers of the Waterloo campaign had been experienced but as far as the reserves were involved Napoleon was scrapping bottom of the barrel in the previous campaign so his only realistic option was to win strategically fast. Was was exhausting for everybody but the allies had a much greater economic potential and a much greater population and could fight for a longer time.
Your correct, I totally agree with you. Napoleon needed a quick victory, a war of attrition was a losing strategy.
Nappy still was the greatest general available but his subordinates were what they were and mostly not better than their allied opponents (both Ney and Murat had been worse as the independent commanders). However, his health was deteriorating and, as Schliffen said about his campaign of 1815, “the people are aging fast on the battlefields”. He was not the same man as at Jena and your scenario is based upon him being at his peak performance. He could not easily shuffle his available subordinates due to the seniority issues and even personalities. And, due to his egocentric system, with few exceptions he was promoting brave over the intelligent and by 1815 was very short on the successful
independent commanders. Probably Davout was the only one remaining after Lannes died and Massena retired (well, Massena was seriously down the hill well before retirement).
Valid points. As I said Napoleon was not the man of 1805, but has emperor he had many options in choosing leadership. There were many highly competent officers of general rank, and below who could fill vital roles. It's amazing to me that Napoleon couldn't find a general who could write, and dispatch orders, he needed a marshal to do that? Sault's duties in the Waterloo Campaign were largely clerical. A real chief of staff would have assured that Corps commanders received clear understandable orders, and that oversights were brought to his commanders attention.
On the morning of June 16 1815 during a general advance no orders of any kind were issued to general lobau's 6th Corps. Consequently they arrived very late in the day at Ligny. If they had been there in the early afternoon things would have gone much worse for the Prussians. What happened with d'Erlon 1st Corps was a comic opera. With proper orders Ligny would have been one of the greatest Napoleonic victories, ranking with Jena. That night Sault made no effort to find out what had happened to Nay at Quatre Bras. Everything was left to Napoleons tired brain.
My point is there was a huge pool of young talent, with vast combat, and administrative experience to call on. In a what if we can speculate about what was reasonable possible, and Napoleon had a lot of options. What he chose were leaders he was familiar and comfortable with, not who could do a better job. One of Napoleon's biggest failures was not making a more systematic effort to train a new generation of leaders in the operational, and logistical arts, but then that was true of all armies of the time. The French were actually ahead of the other European powers in this area, just not far enough.
He did need Davout in Paris because he was a reliable and strong-willed man capable of doing needed administrative work (and because Davout was generally disliked by his colleagues): war required a considerable effort back at home and Napoleon was very short of the suitable candidates. Surely, he could not assign the task to somebody like Ney or Grouchy.
Again there were no politically reliable, competent generals of division to command the garrison of Paris? No retired competent general, or civilian to serve as War Minister? There were dozens of people who's names we don't know who could have done those jobs. Davout's disagreeable personality was less of a disadvantage in the field then in a political position, dealing with politicians, and bureaucrats. Napoleon sidelined his best available marshal to an administrative assignment for the same reason of comfort that he made Sault his chief of staff.
Bertier was not there and he was rather an over glorified clerk than a real Chief of Staff: he would not move a finger without a direct Napoleon’s order.
Couldn't agree more.
Ney was brave but this was probably the only good thing that can be said about him as a general. It was said that after 1812 he was in a “shell shocked” mental condition and after Jomini (his chief of staff) left his performance was going down the tubes. In 1813 both him and Oudinot had been beaten by Bernadotte and at Waterloo he screwed up royally. After 1812 he was on bad terms with Davout. But, unlike Davout, he was quite popular among the troops because of the personal bravery (and not being a harsh disciplinarian). So in 1815 he was doomed to get a high position.
Again I agree fully. If not for Nay's incompetence Bautzen would have been a victory to rival Austerlitz, a Napoleonic masterpiece. Jomini urged Nay to move forward, and cut the allies line of retreat, but he decided to engage in a useless action against a secondary objective. Nay's stupidity at Bautzen was the final straw in Jomini's decision to defect, a great loss to France. A smashing victory at Bautzen might have kept Austria from joining the coalition. With Austria neutral Napoleon would have won the 1813 Campaign.
The same goes for Grouchy but he was a marshal and could not serve under a younger general no matter how capable that general was.
Grouchy was only made a marshal during the Hundred Days.
Murat, besides not being available, hardly was such a great person in arranging for reconnaissance: in 1812 he could not find the whole Russian army and, let’s face it, the main merit of the French Napoleonic cavalry was its bravery. It could not even tend to its own horses properly and the pool of the horses available in France was quite limited so in a prolonged campaign French cavalry would start having very serious problems. Tactically, Murat since the Eilau, had been moving toward attacks in the big masses, which proved to be expensive and of a questionable efficiency.
Respectfully I have a higher opinion of Murat, and the French cavalry then you seem to. In 1805 Murat's cavalry preformed it's role of scouting, and screening to near perfection. In 1812 they had no problem finding the Russian Army, it was the infantry that couldn't maneuver into position in time to catch the Russian Army in pincer movements. On 3 occasions Napoleon was one day late in forcing the Russian Army into a decisive engagement. That wasn't the cavalry's fault. The horses wasted away in Russia just like the men from logistical failures, Russian scorched earth tactics, and the simple fact the land was just not rich enough for the army to live off of. Murat was available. He was in France at the time, and offered his services, but Napoleon rejected him for his defection in 1814, and what Napoleon thought was a premature war in Italy in March-May 1815. Spite got the better of Napoleon on that occasion.
A cavalry horse has about 6 months of hard service in him, then he can be relegated to other jobs. The French Cavalry reached it's peak between 1807-1812 because they had access to large Prussian breed horses. Napoleon lost 200,000 horses in 1812, and was unable to replace them all for 1813. It was this weakness in the cavalry arm that held Napoleon back in that campaign. He lacked the light cavalry to protect his supply lines from Cossack cavalry, to do reconnaissance, or screen his own movements, or the heavy cavalry to smash an enemy line, and finish them off in retreat. Has Napoleon said "Without cavalry battles have are without result."
Massive cavalry charges were an established part of the doctrine of every army of the period, and the French were vary good at it. In both the Prussian, and Austrian Armies their cavalry were their best arm. In the 1809 Campaign the Austrian heavy cavalry gave the French a hell of run for their money. The Russians engaged in huge cavalry attacks. In the Waterloo Campaign both the Prussian, and Allied army launched massive charges. At Waterloo it was an all out cavalry charge that counter attacked, and sent the initial French assault reeling back, and saved the Allied center.
The reason I say Blucher would have been killed, or captured in my alternate Ligny is because near the end of the battle he personally led a cavalry charge in an attempt to stop the French advance. His horse was killed, and fell on him, trapping him under it. It took an aid about 20 minutes to free him, with French cavalry all around them, and then in the gathering darkness they joined the disorganized retreat. If d'Erlon had received proper orders the Prussian right and center would have been cut off from retreat, and most of them forced to surrender.
I think the criticism many have of the costly tactics employed in Napoleon's later campaigns stem first from their rising scale, the armies just got bigger. Also his enemies confronted him with massive defensive positions, that required a massive frontal assault. Unless Napoleon was willing to give up Vienna what was he to do at Aspern-Essling, and Wagram? Though Aspern-Essling was very poorly planned, and is one of Napoleon's biggest mistakes, but Wagram was a great victory. He should have flanked the Russians at Borodino, but the objective was to smash the Russian Army, not force it to retreat.
Soult eventually made a great career but by 1815 he did not demonstrate any outstanding performance in the Peninsula War (from which he was recalled) and always was at odds with his colleagues.
You say no outstanding performance in Spain? Why, because he didn't win the war? The war was almost certainly unwinnable, and Wellington would probable say Sault was his toughest opponent. All Napoleon's Marshals were at odds with each other, because they all curried favor with the Emperor, and no one wanted to serve under anyone but Napoleon himself. Sault did about the best any general could have done in Spain after 1812. The Spanish Ulcer was Napoleon's second greatest mistake.
As a result, Napoleon in 1815 had to rely mostly upon himself.
I quite agree that in the case of victory at Waterloo he could successfully defend Belgium but:
(a) such a victory would be realistic if the Prussians did not arrive, which means that Blucher retreats relatively unharmed and joins the arriving allies.
If the Prussians are relatively unharmed as you say then Napoleon doesn't win the Belgian Campaign. In the case I was making Ligny should have been a decisive victory that would have destroyed half the Prussian Army, and killed or captured Blucher. Has it was Blucher was very lucky to personally escape after the defeat at Ligny.
(b) if the allies attack on a broader front, which they would do, then staying behind the rivers and whatever else in a relatively narrow sector would be useless: he would have to defend France and we are back to 1814 scenario.
Respectfully I think your misunderstanding the strategy of 1814. Napoleon wasn't hiding behind rivers. They were moving back and forth between river crossings using the rivers to cover their flanks. The Allies needed to hold their crossing points to protect their supply lines. Napoleon would move to a crossing point so he could attack the flank, or rear of the advancing army, and force them to turn around. In that way he kept the Allies off balance for most of the campaign. Blucher took the lead in heading toward Paris ignoring his supply lines. The gamble paid off because the political front collapsed, and Paris fell without a fight.
Their is no way to invade France from the middle, and upper Rhine without having to navigate that river system, it's just geography. Your thinking in terms of later wars with much bigger armies that advance in continues fronts. Napoleonic Armies have open flanks at some point that you can go around. In this alternative August 1815 Campaign it's a rerun of 1814, with Napoleon having almost 3 times the strength he had the first time. In 1814 Napoleon was out numbered by better then 4 to 1, this time it's only 3 to 2. In 1814 he didn't really have the strength for one major battle, in 1815 he would have been able to sustain several.
Again I'm not saying he would win this hypothetical campaign, I said he had a fair to good chance. Geography was on his side, with the rivers, and he would have been holding the central position. Has the defender he would have the advantage of making counter moves after the enemy has committed himself. The strategic defensive coupled with the tactical offence, is a very strong combination. He would be fighting on home ground, with the advantages of intelligence, easier supply, and better familiarity with the terrain. He would have the advantage of unity of command, and he was more aggressive then his two opponents.
Could he negotiate an acceptable peace? I don’t think that this was a realistic option in 1815 short of an absolute strategic miracle.