When was the last time Napoleon had achieved a win of that magnitude?
WI: Napoleon winning Waterloo?
- Thread starter ReconGuy02
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When was the last time Napoleon had achieved a win of that magnitude?
To start with, they’d have to suffer these “massive defeats” (which did not stop them in 1813) and then you have to get down to the Earth and explain how would these massive defeats happen. Ligny surely did not qualify as one and Waterloo was a mishandled butchery before it turned into a disaster. While this is AH, it still requires some traction with a reality not to end up in ASB category.
As for the “national interests”, in Britain and Prussia Napoleon was hated on the “national level” and for Russia it was enough that Alexander hated him (not that he was generally liked after 1812). Both Britain and Austria wanted a reasonably strong France as a counterbalance to Russia and Prussia but they did not want Napoleonic France because, quite reasonably, everybody expected that as soon as he is getting a breathing space he is going to use it to rebuilt his military and to get back to his old policy of conquest. He was saying too often and to openly that his power is built upon the military success for his opponents not to trust him on that issue.
At Jena (strictly speaking, Davout won a major victory against the main Prussian army at Auerstedt while Napoleon at Jena won against a smaller Prussian force; basically these battles demonstrated that the French reconnaissance was absolutely inadequate) or, arguably, at Friedland (a much lesser scale). Essling was a defeat, Wagram was a butchery, Borodino was even greater butchery and none of the victories in 1813 and 1814 had a comparable effect.
That's rather what I thought. So even if he wins Waterloo, it's more likely to be a Wagram than an Austerlitz. The days when he won those kind of victories were long past.
Waterloo already was going “Wagramish” even before the Prussians arrived: it does not make sense to recite all “classic” mistakes made by the French in that battle and it seems that for at least part of the time Napoleon was not even in a complete control of the situation giving Ney too much freedom of action. Waterloo could end up as a British defeat (no Prussians and fewer French tactical blunders) but this would just mean that Wellington retires in a relatively good order and French are probably suffering greater losses. Even if the Brits are evacuating Belgium, nothing prevents them from landing, say, in Holland. The Prussians are still in a reasonably good shape and allies are arriving.
Scenarios which involve Nappy’s victory (even suggestion by Clausewitz) are based upon two fundamental assumptions:
(a) Napoleon wins some stunning victories which are demoralizing his opponents.
(b) The allies are treating Napoleon as somebody with whom a long-term peace agreement could be concluded.
The 1st assumption is more or less defeated by OTL record. Napoleon’s opponents had been improving on all levels but the French were still pretty much Napoleon-centric and Napoleon could not be everywhere in a broad front war. Not that he was on his peak performance.
The 2nd, AFAIK, was not quite realistic for Britain, Russia and Prussia and Austria would not break with the allies unless Napoleon is clearly victorious. Almost as soon as Napoleon returned to Paris he sent Alexander the documents demonstrating Anglo-Austrian-Burbon plotting against Russia and Prussia. Did not help a bit: Alexander was hellbent on destroying Napoleon and Prussians were in a state of the anti-Napoleonic (andanti-French) frenzy.
Battles are episodes like goals in a soccer game; A couple of mistakes for the enemy and a bit of luck for Napoleon, and things can change greatly; Beside, I want to clarify one thing: ASB means that something impossible happens like Dragons fighting for the French; if something is highly unlikely (Like the fall of the Tories governement after the battle) but not impossible, it is not ASB it's simply unlikely; Still, IMOH AH needs to be first interesting and only in a second time plausible.
Even if Napoleon wins at Waterloo he stil have one major problem, France had no horses suitable for cavalry and the only way Napoleon had cav at all was because France had bought horses after the last peace. Also, his army could not be reinforced. France was scraping the bottom of the barrel the year before and Napoleon could not resurect the millions of men he had lost already
The fall of Liverpool's government is not ASB. What *is* ASB is its replacement by an antiwar ministry, as there was no way that a Commons majority could be put together for such a government.
Wars are not the soccer games and comparison is plain silly. Napoleon’s victory at Waterloo was quite possible but his victory in a war has an extremely low probability.
By 1815 it was proven almost beyond any reasonable doubt that individual genius is not enough to compensate for the disparity of resources. Of course, being a genius, Nappy was the last person to accept that fact.
In 1813 - 14 the allies made plenty of mistakes and ended up in Paris while Napoleon’s battlefield victories ended up with a strategic defeat.
As for the “interesting” part, what’s so interesting in repeating that with an improbable amount of one-sided luck Napoleon could survive as a ruler of France? The subject is quite old and beaten to death and potentially interesting part starts after the dust settles. How exactly Europe is going to live “ever after”? But the thread is about him just winning at Waterloo.
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Not sure if this is necroposting or if the multitude of possible necroposts make this not necroposting…
I would argue that Napoleon was quite capable of achieving a victory in 1813 until the Armistice or even all the way up to Leipzig (where the Russian Tsar and Prussian King among others were nearly captured by a French cavalry squadron).
In 1815 Napoleon was faced with an army of declining quality and loyalty, as well as the loss of much of his manpower from his client-states. Victory for him in this scenario was possible, but not likely. There have been turnarounds of similar implausibility, but the odds remain overwhelmingly against him, even if he decisively crushes the British and Prussians in the Waterloo Campaign.
And just a comment about Napoleon's commanding ability declining, while I do think his performance during the Waterloo Campaign was lackluster, in 1814 he hadn't shown a particularly massive decline; the Six Days' Campaign corroborates this.
I would argue that Napoleon was quite capable of achieving a victory in 1813 until the Armistice or even all the way up to Leipzig (where the Russian Tsar and Prussian King among others were nearly captured by a French cavalry squadron).
In 1815 Napoleon was faced with an army of declining quality and loyalty, as well as the loss of much of his manpower from his client-states. Victory for him in this scenario was possible, but not likely. There have been turnarounds of similar implausibility, but the odds remain overwhelmingly against him, even if he decisively crushes the British and Prussians in the Waterloo Campaign.
And just a comment about Napoleon's commanding ability declining, while I do think his performance during the Waterloo Campaign was lackluster, in 1814 he hadn't shown a particularly massive decline; the Six Days' Campaign corroborates this.
With the difference that in 1813-1814 the Coalition member were already together and this is not the case; the situation is quite different from 1814 when in France he had to contend with 4 armies and he was at a loss of space and people; if he win here he has already secured the border; if the Liverpool Govenment fall, it will need time to organize a new governement, a new expedition, and find someone to command it in Wellinghton place; Time that Nappy will use to destroy the rest of the Prussian army, arrive at Vienna, and take Austria and Prussia out of the game; then there is only Russia and Great Britain on the Board; He has then, all the time he needs to defeat Russia. At that point, the anti-war faction would have had all the time to strenghten up; the argument would be: "we lost together with Prussia when we had our best field commander; now we havent him, and we have no acrive allies; he wants peace let give it to him!" The core of my argument is that if Napoleon can win decisevely at Waterloo (thanks to a better result at Ligny too) than he can do exactly what he wanted to do (that was his basic strategy, to fight multiple enemies one at a time) Napoleon believed that was possible, and he knew it better then the lot of us, so I too think it is possible; by the way this theory is not mine but is from famed Italian Historian Alessandro Barbero, who wrote "La Battaglia: Storia di Waterloo" which means "The Battle: history of Waterloo" in 2003. He actually told this same alternative histoty during an Italian Covention called "E se:.." meaning What if"
if someone knows Italian this is the video.
It's not literally ASB for Napoléon to win the war but extremely difficult, because the Coalition had declared war on him personally : they considered him an outlaw for breaking the treaty of 1814* and pledged to fight until he was removed. It is hard to imagine them suddenly changing their minds because of one defeat. They were convinced that there could be no peace with him ruling France.
*(Louis XVIII had also broken his agreement to subsidize Elba, leaving Napoléon's government there out of money, but this was ignored.)
You are right; Let's say that to keep Napoleon on the throne there are PoD more confortable then Waterloo, but I like to give a chance to any PoD. I reckon that we are walking on a narrow path;
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Why would they do that? The issue of making peace with Napoleon would be a matter of accepting the Bonaparte Dynasty over the Bourbons. At that point Napoleon would have to accept the borders of 1791. The other issues settled in Vienna would be unchanged.
If Prussia loses the Rhineland she'll have to be compensated, and the only obvious places would be in Poland,- which the Tsar will be dead against as he is in possession and wants to keep it, or else Saxony which Austria won't like. So any such proposal would be seen as a device to split up the Coalition, and rejected out of hand.
They might just possibly accept a Regency under marie Louise, but it would have to be within the borders already agreed at Vienna, and I can't see Napoleon agreeing to that unless/until he is irretrievably defeated - at whih ppoint the King of Rome option won't be necessary.[/QUOTE]
Ok lets talk about realistic, or plausible alternate history. History is replete with improbable events that change it's course. After starting the Waterloo Campaign by taking his enemies by almost complete strategic surprise a string of almost incomprehensible mistakes fumbled one golden opportunity after another; resulting in the failure of the campaign, and the final downfall of Napoleon. Now the Allies made many mistakes, but none of them could be described as incomprehensible.
Napoleon said "Given a choice between luck, and genius I would rather have luck." In the 1815 Campaign luck was solidly on the Allied side. Call it luck, kismet, probability, or the Will of God that's how things broke. Given so many incomprehensible mistakes on the French side it's easy to conjecture that with different field commanders, I would say Sault & Devout, and a chief of staff who can write clearly Napoleon could have won a great victory.
So we're drawn into Alternate History to explore what if's. But our what if's have to be based on extrapolations of what we know. Now saying things like Alexander was hellbent on destroying Napoleon are not supported by historically known facts. Alexander changed course on the fate of Napoleon several times. He was subject to many competing influences, and as I pointed out in an earlier post, destroying the Bonaparte Dynasty wasn't a vital Russian national interest worth a fight to the death. In 1814 Alexander openly wondered why Russian was suffering great losses for the benefit of the Germanic Powers, though he wanted to take Paris in revenge for Moscow. That Revenge was satisfied.
There is also no evidence that the Emperor Francis of Austria was hell bent on destroying Napoleon ether. Austria's vital national interests were in Germany, the Balkans, and Italy. They wanted a French Alliance as a counter weight to the Russo-Prussian alliance. Exhausting his own, and the French Army in a fight to the death, while Russia was only getting stronger was not in Austria's national interest. Unless Napoleon invaded Germany, or Italy Napoleon isn't a threat to their them.
Now the Prussians do have a very strong hostility to Napoleon, because of his vindictive humiliating treatment of them from 1806 on. A good reason not to humiliate a defeated enemy, they want to get back at you. Bismarck was wiser then Napoleon. Still King Fredrick William III had great misgivings about a continuation of the war in 1814. Most of the fire brands were in the Army particularly Blucher.
In 1814 the British were willing to let Napoleon stay in power, even letting him keep most of Belgium. Their condition was that the Port of Antwerp, and the river Scheldt be free of French control.
So all the powers that were ambivalent about overthrowing Napoleon in 1814 would have stood like lions in 1815, and insisted on a fight to the death. So if Napoleon wins the Waterloo Campaign, and then fends off an Austro-Russian invasion of Eastern France; (I went into some detail on how that would be plausible in an earlier post.) the leaders of all the Allied nations would say we must destroy Napoleon, at any cost, no matter how long it takes? With all respect to those that think they would do that, I think that is highly implausible. Nations go to war for vital national interests, and destroying Napoleon's Dynasty wasn't one for any of them.
Why would they do that? The issue of making peace with Napoleon would be a matter of accepting the Bonaparte Dynasty over the Bourbons. At that point Napoleon would have to accept the borders of 1791. The other issues settled in Vienna would be unchanged.
If Prussia loses the Rhineland she'll have to be compensated, and the only obvious places would be in Poland,- which the Tsar will be dead against as he is in possession and wants to keep it, or else Saxony which Austria won't like. So any such proposal would be seen as a device to split up the Coalition, and rejected out of hand.
They might just possibly accept a Regency under marie Louise, but it would have to be within the borders already agreed at Vienna, and I can't see Napoleon agreeing to that unless/until he is irretrievably defeated - at whih ppoint the King of Rome option won't be necessary.[/QUOTE]
Ok lets talk about realistic, or plausible alternate history. History is replete with improbable events that change it's course. After starting the Waterloo Campaign by taking his enemies by almost complete strategic surprise a string of almost incomprehensible mistakes fumbled one golden opportunity after another; resulting in the failure of the campaign, and the final downfall of Napoleon. Now the Allies made many mistakes, but none of them could be described as incomprehensible.
Napoleon said "Given a choice between luck, and genius I would rather have luck." In the 1815 Campaign luck was solidly on the Allied side. Call it luck, kismet, probability, or the Will of God that's how things broke. Given so many incomprehensible mistakes on the French side it's easy to conjecture that with different field commanders, I would say Sault & Devout, and a chief of staff who can write clearly Napoleon could have won a great victory.
So we're drawn into Alternate History to explore what if's. But our what if's have to be based on extrapolations of what we know. Now saying things like Alexander was hellbent on destroying Napoleon are not supported by historically known facts. Alexander changed course on the fate of Napoleon several times. He was subject to many competing influences, and as I pointed out in an earlier post, destroying the Bonaparte Dynasty wasn't a vital Russian national interest worth a fight to the death. In 1814 Alexander openly wondered why Russian was suffering great losses for the benefit of the Germanic Powers, though he wanted to take Paris in revenge for Moscow. That Revenge was satisfied.
There is also no evidence that the Emperor Francis of Austria was hell bent on destroying Napoleon ether. Austria's vital national interests were in Germany, the Balkans, and Italy. They wanted a French Alliance as a counter weight to the Russo-Prussian alliance. Exhausting his own, and the French Army in a fight to the death, while Russia was only getting stronger was not in Austria's national interest. Unless Napoleon invaded Germany, or Italy Napoleon isn't a threat to their them.
Now the Prussians do have a very strong hostility to Napoleon, because of his vindictive humiliating treatment of them from 1806 on. A good reason not to humiliate a defeated enemy, they want to get back at you. Bismarck was wiser then Napoleon. Still King Fredrick William III had great misgivings about a continuation of the war in 1814. Most of the fire brands were in the Army particularly Blucher.
In 1814 the British were willing to let Napoleon stay in power, even letting him keep most of Belgium. Their condition was that the Port of Antwerp, and the river Scheldt be free of French control.
So all the powers that were ambivalent about overthrowing Napoleon in 1814 would have stood like lions in 1815, and insisted on a fight to the death. So if Napoleon wins the Waterloo Campaign, and then fends off an Austro-Russian invasion of Eastern France; (I went into some detail on how that would be plausible in an earlier post.) the leaders of all the Allied nations would say we must destroy Napoleon, at any cost, no matter how long it takes? With all respect to those that think they would do that, I think that is highly implausible. Nations go to war for vital national interests, and destroying Napoleon's Dynasty wasn't one for any of them.
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I wonder what would happen if Napoleon's regime and campaigns were to last long enough to witness the harsh climate events of 1816 that resulted from the eruption of Mount Tambora.
I have to respectfully disagree on your 25,000 casualty figure. Assuming someone, (I would put Sault in command of the Left Wing.) more sane then Nay is in overall command things could be quite different. The first attack was at about 11:30AM with the assault on Chateau Hougoumont, by Prince Jerome's Division. What was supposed to be a diversionary action was allowed to involve half of Reille's II Corps, in a battle that lasted almost the whole day. Sault would not have allowed such a waste of troops. He would have just pulled Jerome's Division back, and blasted the place with his Howitzers. He had more important work for II Corps.
d'Erlon's Corps then launched the main attack on the Allied Left, East of the Charleroi Brussels Road before 2PM. 3 of his 4 Infantry divisions advanced in a formation called Columns of battalion by Division. This massive, unwieldy formation presented a front of 200 men with each battalion advancing in succession, with only a few paces between battalions. This mistaken formation presented a massive target to the English Guns, and when the Union, and Somerset Brigades charged Donzelot's Division the men couldn't form Square to defend themselves. The French attack broke, and retreated.
There was a reason this formation was almost never used, casualties were unnecessarily high. Only Durutte's Division on the extreme right used the correct battalion columns, and they captured their objectives, but without support were forced to pull back, after a counter attack. If they had used the correct formations, with more cavalry support, and more guns for direct fire this attack might well have smashed though Wellington's Left flank. Combined arms tactics were standard for the French, why they didn't plan this out better is a mystery.
That this CAT attack would have worked is strongly suggested by the fact that after he had wasted so much fine cavalry Nay finally reverted to the correct tactics, and captured La Hale Sainte, in the center of Wellington's Army. At that point Allied casualties were mounting fast, with French Artillery pouring deadly fire into British Squares, at point blank range. Wellington considered this the crisis of the Battle, throwing everything he had into the defense. But it was just too late. The Prussians had arrived, and Napoleon had to commit Lobau VI Corps, and most of the Guard Corps to the right flank to blunt the Prussian advance. By the time the Old Guard was available to attack Wellingtons Center it was too late.
If d'Erlon's I Corps had smashed through Wellington's Left Center at 2:30PM there would have been plenty of infantry, and cavalry to exploit the breakthrough. Wellington said at the crisis of the battle, "Bring me night, or bring me Blucher." At 2:30 Blucher wasn't quite there yet, and night was 5 hours away. Wellington's I Corps would have been forced into a precipitous retreat, up the Brussels Road, with II Corps having to retreat up the North West Road past Braine L' Alleud, towards the troops holding Hal, and possible make at new stand there.
Now of course we only know what happened, but can make logical suppositions about what might have happened if the French had acted rationally. There were good reasons Wellington did not want to face Napoleon alone. He didn't think he had the strength to hold off a concerted French attack. In the circumstances I described, which makes more sense then what actually happened the French would not have taken 25,000 casualties, more likely under 10,000. This would be less then at Ligny, which was a grinding battle of attrition, lasting about 5 hours.
My guess would be Wellington would have taken 20,000 casualties, including prisoners, and deserters. Not all deserters? are real deserters, many are just separated from their units, trying to get away from the enemy. Wellington's Army would need to break contact with the French, and take a few days to reform, and make new plans. But Napoleon would then be free to turn his attention back to the Prussians, and a major battle may have insued on the 19th. Napoleon would have summoned Grouchy westward from Wavre, and Blucher would have to face the whole French Army of the North.
So no I don't believe the French would have had to take as many loses winning the battle as they did losing it. Even as badly as the battle was fought almost half their losses occurred after the army broke, with many casualties being deserters. Wellington's victory was not inevitable, in fact the odds were against him.
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Let’s start with the “improbable events”. Most of those happening during Waterloo campaign were byproducts of two main factors:
(a) shortcomings of Napoleon’s military system that was relying too much on his personal genius and resulted in promoting (with too few exceptions) brave and obedient people instead of those capable to act independently
(b) growing competence level of the opponents from quality of their commanders and all the way to improved quality of the troops.
Napoleon still was well ahead as a strategist but the wars are not won by the strategy alone, especially when the people trusted with the independent command are not up to the task. You can talk about the luck as much as you want but “everybody talks about the luck, isn’t it a time to acknowledge a talent?” (Suvorov). Napoleon himself said that God is on the side of the big battalions and he started getting on God’s wrong side.
You can speculate as much as you want on what would happen if Napoleon had Davout and Soult as the field commanders and also a competent chief of staff but if we are starting PoD with Waterloo, he simply could not have that arrangement and got stuck with the bad options that he had. Even Bertier was a lousy chief of staff and nothing had been done over the years of fighting to train competent staff officers capable to replace him or act as a meaningful staff of the commander in chief. Having Davout at the field would help in the battle but who was capable of organizing the military effort? The war was not expected to end in a couple of months and there was a need in organizing mobilization, supply of the troops and many other things. Davout was a reasonably good administrator and possessed a strong will needed for the task. Whom else Napoleon could use instead of him? Ney? Not even funny. Soult? AFAIK, by 1815 he did not demonstrate any noticeable administrative abilities and as was shown in OTL, could not act even as a competent clerk (which was pretty much scope of Bertier’s functionality). In 1815 Napoleon found himself extremely short of the cadres in the top echelon of his administration. So the mistakes you are talking about had been anything but incomprehensible. D’Erlon was meandering between Ligny and Quatre Bras and Grouchy was going the wrong way following Napoleon’s order. Incomprehensible? How about Bernadotte doing the same during Jena-Auerstedt following Napoleon’s order?
OTOH, the Prussians at Ligny were not decisively beaten even with Napoleon present so shouldn’t this tell us something about the improved quality of their troops and leadership? And subsequent march to Waterloo clearly puts Blucher and Gneisenau above Grouchy. Just more incomprehensive lack? At Waterloo the French side demonstrated very little besides bravery of the troops but how about Wellington’s arrangements for his troops? Was placing the infantry on the inverse slope of the hill just a bit of a blind luck or should we “acknowledge a talent”? In the terms of a general organization Russians were ahead since 1810: not only did they have a standard organization on an army corps level (absent in the French army) but they had an army level administrative structure as well with its own staff and properly organized Ministry of War.
Now, about Alexander and Russian “national interests”. We are talking Russia of the early XIX and the “national interest” was defined by monarch’s will (limited by a regicide but Palen, Bennigsen and a bunch of the drunken officers of the Guards did not represent any “national interest” when they killed Paul). And the problem for Nappy was that Alexander quite sincerely and consistently hated his guts even when he was forced to embrace him and to call him a great man. Another part of the same problem was in another well-known fact that just as much as he hated Napoleon Alexander was admiring the Brits and things British (but not British political system). Just as there was no Russian “national interests” in the war of the 2nd Coalition (as was demonstrated by the easiness with which Paul changed sides), none existed in the 3rd and 4th. The only reason was Alexander’s whim. What was his happiest moment? Wellington’s comment that he never thought that the troops could be drilled to such a precision. What he wanted the most after the war was over? A permission to bring some of his Guards to Britain during his visit to demonstrate their drill.
“National interests” in the war of 1812 had been served when Napoleon was kicked out of Russia. This was Kutuzov’s expressed opinion, just as his prediction that the continued war would just serve the British interests. So the alleged Alexander’s remorse dated by 1814 is neither here nor there: continued war was his exclusive initiative. The same goes for the “revenge”: if he really cared about it, Paris would be burned (with the Prussian willing help) but he explicitly did not permit this to happen. Not that he did give a s—t about the whole 1812: he did not visit the “sacred” battlefields, never participated in the celebration of anniversary of the events, etc. Just paid a minimal lip service and that was it. In 1814 Alexander, indeed, expressed noticeable flexibility regarding future of France but these scenarios did not include Napoleon as its ruler.
So it is pretty much pointless to try to model Alexander’s behavior based upon the general notions of the “national interests”: for him (just as for Louis XIV, Nappy and quite a few others) national interests where closely linked to his own glory. And the only way for hm to be truly glorious was to remove even more glorious figure, Napoleon.
Where the Allied Army was mauled but nonetheless got away, and which was decisively reversed at Leipzig only seven weeks later. Yes, that is very probably how a French win at Waterloo would have turned out.