Heresy and Greed
The annexation of Provence opened interesting strategic opportunities for Milan. Traditionally, Italy relied upon the Alps for defense, and while the Alps were an effective frontier, they only worked if Italy was strong, as political disunity, internal instability, military weakness, or any combination of the three allowed the barbarians easy passage through the Alps. The strategy also had little redundancy- if any one of the passes were breached, an army could then enter into Lombardy and freely ravage the economic core of the Visconti domain. Although this could be remedied somewhat- using the Po and old Roman Roads and with the strong walls of the cities to ward off invaders- Visconti believed that letting any enemy into Lombardy at all represented an unacceptable strategic failure regardless of the outcome. Far better to have buffer marches across the Alps- better to fight potential invaders in the rugged mountains of Austria or Switzerland than the rich Padanian plain.
Provence effectively provided the kingdom with a second layer of defense from the west. The wealthy coastline was sheltered to the east and north by the Alps, and bounded on the west by the Rhone, which as Gian Maria proved at Beucaire was an effective position for repelling an enemy army. Any defending forces could be ferried up and down river as needed, and further reinforcements sent from Italy along the well traveled coastal cities and roads. France was presently on her knees, but Gian Visconti knew that his neighbor's impotence would not last forever.
Correspondingly by the end of 1413 Italian engineers swarmed into Lyons, tasked with surveying the Rhone basin, and all its roads, fortresses, walls, bridges, and defenses in preparation for new construction. At Gian Maria's suggestion the condotierri Muzio Sforza was given the position of Warden of the Rhone, and given a standing guard of five hundred cavalry to garrison that city.
Despite his earlier promises to the Savoy Gian Visconti ultimately decided to keep all of Provence for himself. Trading Provence or the Dauphine for Piedmont would give him near total control over the western passages and establish a friendly buffer across the Alps, but in diplomacy alliances were always ad hoc affairs- as the denouement of the Anjou-Visconti alliance dramatically proved- and if he kept Provence, even if it meant defending against France himself, his territory almost completely surrounded Savoy, and there would be only a single point of failure- the integrity of the Italian state and its defenders- as opposed to two- the Savoy-Visconti alliance
and the Italian military- for the western frontier. Savoy across the Alps was an ally; Savoy straddling the Alps was a vassal. The latter was more reliably subservient to Italian interests than the former. He did, however, transfer the city of Grenoble- capital of the Dauphine- to Savoy, effectively giving him the eastern portion of those lands. Lyons, Provence, and all the Rhone remained in Italian hands. Duke Amadeus naturally complained at receiving so small a portion of the spoils, but surrounded and utterly outmatched as he was, and with his daughter slated to marry the heir he could do little more than complain fretfully. His men were complicit in all of the atrocities of Gian Maria; he could not easily defect to the French, especially not once Gabriele Maria married Duke John of Burgundy's daughter
Anne of Burgundy in 1413. Amadeus was completely surrounded by the Visconti and isolated from his only potential savior, and learned too late that the Winter Serpent of Milan kept no allies, only subjects and enemies.
The expanse of the Visconti estate mirrored the rapid expanse of state expenditures. Even the wealth of Italy had its limits, and in conquering not only the Patrimonium and Naples but Provence and Sardinia as well the Lombard state reached and exceeded those limits by a considerable margin. To the staggering costs of invading, holding and administering this newfound empire must be added the immense costs of overhauling Lombardy's existing infrastructure- Gian Galeazzo not only ordered the restoration of old Roman roads, and the completion of the Valentina Hospital in Milan, but a sprawling network of canals and dams to manage the Po valley. This network, begun in 1390, was completed in 1414 to immense celebration, and almost immediately the state saw a massive spike in trade revenues, but it would take time for this to pay down the initial costs, time which the aging Gian Galeazzo increasingly felt he did not have to spare. Not even Milan's capable bureaucracy could meet all of these enormous fiscal demands.
Into the breach stepped two Florentine banking clans, the Medici and the Strozzi. Gian Galeazzo's reputation meant he had ready access to capital from the urban classes, but the past years had strained even those connections, and to consolidate state debts and renegotiate more favorable terms the Florentines, in alliance with a collection of Genoese and Lombard oligarchs founded
The Bank of St Ambrose by state ordinance in the June of 1414. Prior to this banks were largely personal affairs, extended merchant clans hoarding their wealth in vaults and only occasionally lending it out to relatives. Loans, when they were given, were charged at enormous interest due to the heavy uncertainty involved- in the absence of any coherent means of collecting or enforcing debt banks frequently resorted to street level violence, hiring mercenaries to intimidate, beat or even kill those who failed to pay their debts.
This bank was something different: with the full support of the powerful Visconti family the royal bank could call upon the fiscal capital of all of northern and central Italy, and following its expansion into Venice later in the decade from that republic as well. Royal backing gave it an aura of respectability and reliability- interest rates were lower, payments more regular, and the Visconti name meant peace, order, and tidy profits.
In 1414 Gian Galeazzo finalized the succession plans for his vast estates. He and his sons had already estabilished the division of territory between them: Gian Maria was heir to everything in the north, and everything he had conquered, whilst Filippo Maria received Naples, and Gian Maria's bastard Gabriele Maria received dominion over Tuscany as an appanage to the crown of Sardinia and Corsica and thus (in theory) the Pope. This was technically opposed to the fact that Tuscany was supposedly an Imperial fief, but Gian Galeazzo's lawyers, alongside the Pope, argued that as the great Tuscan Countess Matilda of Canossa had bequeathed all her lands to the Church, so could the Church dispose of the former March of Tuscany. Similar arguments were made regarding Provence- until the Italian conquest these lands were technically fiefs of the Empire and France. France, however, relinquished all claims in 1412, while the Emperor- it was argued- had lost these lands when Provence declared its independence from the Empire during the Investiture controversy. The fief enjoyed de facto independence, but Gian Galeazzo wanted more- and Pope Innocent obliged. Citing the cession of Avignon by Charles of Anjou Pope Innocent provided documents freeing Provence from any imperial suzerainity, and placing it all under the Pope. Removing the Dauphine from imperial oversight was less straightforward, but the Pope argued that as the Emperor had formally invested the French kings with responsibility for the lands, they surrendered any claim of dominion to Paris, and the French in turn yielded the lands to the Visconti. All of this, along with the revised succession laws, ideally required Imperial as well as papal approval, but this was not impossible to get. Gian Galeazzo had courted both sides of the Imperial Civil War, but increasingly backed Ladislaus after 1411, judging (correctly) that Jobst's incompetence and Ladislaus' possession of Hungary made him the more likely victor. When Ladislaus crossed the Alps in 1413 on his way to Rome for his Imperial coronation Gian Galeazzo hosted him in Milan with every courtesy, and plied the soon to be Emperor with lavish gifts and promises of fealty. Ladislaus did not trust Gian Galeazzo, and resented his power and ambition, but after the costly civil war he could not turn away the gold offered by the Visconti, and he agreed not to contest Gian Galeazzo's succession (although neither did he explictly endorse it), acknowledged his title as “King in Corsica” and formally invested him with Provence and the Dauphine. Nevertheless Ladislaus' wariness of the slippery Visconti lord incited him to intervene against the Republic of Venice, forcing them to relinquish their claims in Aquileia, and he refused to sell them the duchy of Dalmatia despite being deep in debt. Gian Galeazzo did nothing, but the Republic of Venice naturally resented imperial infringement upon their expansion and drew inexorably closer to their ally Milan.
In 1415 Gian Galeazzo undertook the most dangerous gamble of his career when he dispatched twelve handpicked knights to Prague with orders to retrieve- in the utmost secrecy- the heretic Jan Hus to the upcoming Council of Bologna.
the heretic Jan Hus of Bohemia
Jan Hus drew heavily from the writings of the English heretic John Wycliffe, who's writings proved immensely popular and influential both for the Lollards of England and for Hus' followers in Bohemia; Wycliffe detested the worldliness and corruption of the church hierarchy and denounced many “corrupt” church practices, such as monasticism, indulgences, simony, and even the Papacy itself. Wycliffe even argued for the complete subordination of the clergy to the state and a return to the “pure” practices of Scripture, free of the layers of doctrine and bureaucracy the Catholic Church had developed over the centuries.
While later allegations that Gian Galeazzo was a partisan of the heretical Wycliffe are obviously unsubstantiated, there were aspects of his thought which naturally appealed to him, in particular the caesaropapist contention that Papal decrees were valid only if they were approved by the secular liege. The papacy was itself a massive institution, and the immense bureaucratic network centered on Rome represented an organ of state power outside of Gian Galeazzo's direct control, but if he embraced a reform movement that advocated that clergy abstain from worldly affairs then the Patrimonium could legitimately be annexed wholesale into his own regime.
Consequently Gian Galeazzo applied considerable pressure on Pope Benedict to lighten Rome's stance against Hus and other reformers, and even went so far as to suggest a Church Council to address the issues raised by the heretics. This effort provoked deep and substantial resistance from Benedict, who naturally resented the idea of compromise with an excommunicated and unrepentant heretic- despite Gian Galeazzo's efforts he could not prevent Benedict from levying excommunication on the Bohemians in 1410- and for the first time the master of Italy found to his unpleasant surprise that he could not simply cow the Pontiff into obeisance whenever he desired.
In his ongoing reform efforts Gian Galeazzo found an unexpected ally in King Wenceslaus of Bohemia. Initial correspondence between the two rulers was limited to purely secular affairs- as a potential enemy of Ladislaus of Hungary Gian Galeazzo naturally courted the King of Bohemia (though this did not stop him from currying favor with Ladislaus, before or after his victory over Wenceslaus and Jobst). Wenceslaus, while still denouncing Hus for heresy, nevertheless sought to compromise with the heretics, and it was inevitable that he would reach out to the master of Italy and the Papacy in this goal. In 1415, two years after Wenceslaus' defeat, Hus was confronted by Italian knights with an offer of safe passage to Ravenna. The duke offered his personal guarantee of safe passage, and pledged solemnly that he would prevent the Pope or any other enemy from seizing him for the duration of the Council. Hus did not fail to notice that the duke made no promises concerning his safety
after the council, but the chance to speak his mind to the collective authority of the Roman Catholic Church at a council explicitly convened for its reform was too great an opportunity to ignore. Hus settled his affairs and departed for Italy.
Hus was the most infamous attendant, but Gian Galeazzo summoned hundreds of men from across Europe- some were reformers, some were radicals, some were clerical appointees loyal to him personally. His intention was to flood the Council with a natural constituency predisposed to support him even against the Pope. Gian Galeazzo met with these and other men, including Hus himself, in the leadup to the council. No record of their conversation survives, but in all likelihood the duke- knowing full well that Hus would not back down, even under threat of death- warned him that to appear in front of the Pope was to invite his death, and pleaded with him to moderate his tone and shift his testimony in a manner conducive to Visconti's goals.
On May 2nd, 1415, as the initial discussions were winding down, Jan Hus and his companions quietly entered into the synod at Bologna. Hus stood silently for an hour, quietly observing the proceedings; as the Pope moved to adjourn he threw back his cloak and declared himself to the assembled clergy of Europe.
Jan Hus before the Pope[A]
Hus' unmasking provoked immediate pandemonium, and only the timely intercession of Lombard soldiers prevented his untimely demise. Cardinals hurled accusations of heresy and treachery at the Bohemian as Pope Benedict looked on in stupor, “so silent and still that I feared briefly that the shock had killed him,” duke Visconti remarked waggishly in his own recounting of the event. Benedict rallied, however, and promptly joined in denouncing Hus, but at this point Visconti interceded. He revealed that he had personally pledged Jan Hus safety during the council; that he had thus delivered the heretic to Rome to defend himself and face censure; that Hus would surrender himself to the Church upon the conclusion of the Council; and that he would not tolerate any injury done “to my solemn oath before the Lord” before that time.
Pope Benedict immediately demanded Hus repent his heresies and publicly denounce Wycliffe; but Hus, for his part, refused to engage. Instead Hus spoke of the need for unity and to prevent the sinfulness which had condemned the Church to a hundred years of schism; he denounced Indulgences, schismatic Pontiffs, and “ungodly priests who comport themselves as princes” and advocated that the Church place itself in the care “of the Caesars, as Christ commanded of his followers.”
Benedict responded that Christ had also commanded that men render unto God what was his, and that as Christ's Vicar the Pope of Rome was naturally superior to any prince; to which Hus retaliated that that Benedict himself was of Avignon, and installed at the head of a French army, and thus a slave of the princes he claimed to be above. At this point order broke down completely, and Gian Galeazzo chose this moment to intercede personally, struggling to be heard over partisan screeching and naked threats of excommunication and violent demise. Visconti replied primarly to Hus, explicating that the seeds of the Avignon Schism were sown when the the Papacy received its lands in Provence, this after compelling Charles of Anjou to a crusade against Naples; and that the clergy, not the princes, started the Schism when they first moved to Avignon and then back to Rome; and that the secular princes had thereafter divided themselves in support of one or the other “in accordance with conscience, whim or personal gain, as men are wont to do”. Visconti concluded by reiterating his support for Benedict “over the puppet of the murderer Ladislaus” and exorting the Council towards unity and reform to prevent future Schisms from marring the Church.
This was far and away the most dangerous and delicate of the Grand Duke's gambits. A General Church Council was not a city, or even a kingdom: Pope Benedict had already demonstrated a willingness to defy his supposed master over matters of doctrine. By inviting Hus to the Council, and giving him and the reformers his open support, Gian Galeazzo made himself vulnerable to accusations of heresy. If Benedict dig in his heels, then there was the very real risk that Rome would escape his control entirely and denounce him as a heretic.
Yet in the reformers Gian Galeazzo perceived a unique opportunity to legitimize his grip on Rome. By portraying his efforts as an attempt at preventing future schisms, and championing the cause of clerical reform, he not only undermined the Papacy's claim to secular dominion over Italy but drew upon deepseated aspirations for a more pious Church among the European laity.
The council convened for the day, and Gian Galeazzo almost immediately approached Pope Benedict. As with Hus, the precise nature of their meeting is unfortunately unrecorded, but when the Council reconvened the following day the Pope opened the proceedings with a denunciation of “unworldly and unworthy priests, schismatic cardinals, false Pontiffs, and greedy bishops” and declared his intention to “restore Rome to purity, so that no Schism may mar our Holy Church ever again.” It was to this topic that the Council ultimately devoted itself.
The Council of Bologna proved a major turning point in European history. The immense theological, political, and cultural ramifications of its proceedings cannot be covered with even a lifetime's worth of scholarly work, but the major points of doctrine promulgated on May 15th 1415 were as follows:
- that the Catholic Church was an inviolate and indivisible whole;
- that the Pope, as the head of the Universal Church, was naturally superior to all other secular and spiritual authority;
- that the corpus of the Church had not only the right but the obligation to participate in her affairs, including matters of Church doctrine;
- that Rome would convene a General Council once every ten years;
- that the Pope or the College of Cardinals could convene an irregular Council should a particular issue arise among the Faithful;
- a general denunciation of "sinful" priests, and expansions of existing canon law on what disqualified a clergyman from his position, and how these men might be removed from office;
- a tightening of restrictions on personal conduct for monks, nuns, abbots, priests, bishops, cardinals, and all the Clergy, and restrictions on how they could spend tithes collected from Church offices and lands;
- that should any cleric knowingly go against Canon law, they automatically forfeited their position, and that if after receiving official censure from the Church, their superiors, their secular liege or a Council or synod they did not repent or reform they would be excommunicated, defrocked and deposed;
- that should a Pope ever contradict canon law, or become a heretic, or cause a Schism, or commit "crimes against God, Church, or Man" he could be deposed only by a Church Council convened by the College of Cardinals, or a majority of the Archbishops of the Church explicitly for that purpose;
- formal cession of the Papal Patrimonium to King Visconti and all temporal power vested in the territories therein as a papal fief, conditional upon the continued blessing of the Papacy for him and his heirs;
- withdrawal of the Milanese garrison in Rome, and cession of the Eternal City and its environs to the Pope as his exclusive dominion;
- pledge that the Visconti state would underwrite the Papacy with state funds, “so that the Pontiff and his Church might comport themselves with the dignity of their office";
- formal denunciation of Indulgences as simony and automatic excommunication for any who issued them;
As with all compromises the Council of Bologna dissatisfied everyone. The reformists, naturally, felt it did not go nearly far enough in disengaging the Church from worldly life; others felt it gave far too many concessions to heretics and their supporters. Pope Benedict admitted the Papal Deposition Clause only under intense duress from nearly the entire body of the Council- for not even the conservatives could argue against a mechanism to depose schismatic Popes in 1415- and viewed the formal reduction of the Patrimonium to Rome an insufferable captivity, whereas prescient clergymen saw in the now reduced Papal State an uncomfortable vulnerability to Italian pressure; Gian Galeazzo, in contrast, described the "loss" of Rome as “a grievous injury and insult to [his] dominion over Italy”- for no man could truly claim to master Italy if he did not control the Eternal City- and the withdrawal from the city itself the loss of his greatest leverage over n intractable Papacy.
The denunciation of Papal indulgences was the only unambiguous victory for Hus and his partisans. Indulgences had long attracted criticism from clergymen in Germany and Bohemia, and it was one of the few proposals which Hus and his more orthodox[B*] colleagues agreed upon. Despite Hus' association with the proposal the German, English, and Bohemian clergy between them had enough power to force it through, especially as they could tie it to the two “secular Crusades” against Naples, first by the elder and then the younger House of Anjou.
In the wake of the Council Jan Hus was arrested by the Church and forced to stand trial for heresy. True to his word, Gian Galeazzo had protected him during the council, and not a day beyond that. Jan Hus refused to recant his support of Wycliffe, demanding that the Church present rebuttals from Scripture against their writings, and on May 31st 1415 Jan Hus was burned at the stake for heresy in Rome.
Rumors as to the fate of Jan Jus almost immediately appeared like a tumor in Germany and Bohemia. Allegations that he had been escorted from Italy by the duke of Milan, then seized by either the bishop of Trent, or of Aquileia, were common, as was the allegation that he had never made it to the council at all but that Emperor Ladislaus had him arrested and hanged in Germany. None of this prevented word of his trial and execution from crossing the Alps, but the rumors spread by Visconti's agents muddied the waters enough for him to wash his hands of the whole sordid affair, and when the Hussites eventually rose in revolt their enemy was neither the duke of Milan nor the Pope, but Ladislaus of Bohemia.
Five days after the council concluded, Princess Catarina of Sicily, Gian Galeazzo's first grandchild to reach adulthood, was born to Gian Maria and Giovanna of Savoy. A son was born to the couple the following year, but died barely a month later from a fever.
The Council of Bologna proved to be the venerable duke's last great triumph. On June 5th, 1418, as he celebrated his granddaughter's third birthday, Gian Galeazzo collapsed into convulsions before the horrified revelers. He was quickly carried away, but despite the ministrations of some of the best physicians in Europe his health deteriorated rapidly, and the Grand Old Duke Gian Maria Visconti, the first native-born king to rule in northern Italy since the campaign of Otto the Great five centuries before, died in Pavia on June 11th, 1418, at the impressive age of sixty seven.
[A]This is from his OTL trial and condemnation. I was going to use Luther but Luther is clean shaven and Hus has a proper beard, the dirty heretic
[B*]I briefly debated using kosher for extra laughs, but orthodox works too
