Unsuccessful Hawaiian Invasion, 1941

As a future student of English Literature, Harry Turtledove was a slog for High School me to get through all those years ago. His scenarios are interesting for an alt history beginner, but he's just a terrible writer! His prose drags.

But I got through the entirety of the first book in his alternate Pearl Harbour series in which the Japanese magically conjure up two army divisions with which to invade the Hawaiian Islands, succeed through some actually fairly sound albeit wily military strategy in a battle that recalls Bataan, and subjugate the islands. Despite his awful prose, it was a compelling book.

So this is of course implausible, it's the Pacific Sealion, as explained here: http://combinedfleet.com/pearlops.htm

Additionally, near the very beginning the intrepid young staff officer who provides our POD plans to take Oahu with a single division sized force of IJN troops. I think Yamamoto convinces him that given the American troop strength on the Island, two army divisions are necessary. Turtledove tells us this is a hard task given IJN and IJA politics, but doesn't show us, instead waving a wand and having it happen.

But enough of Turtledove. Knowing full well that it is nearly an impossible task, I'm still of the opinion that Japan's only chance of winning the Pacific War was to take Oahu. In general the Axis, I think, were insufficiently aggressive. From the beginning, there was no way in hell they were winning a long war, so their survival depended on winning the war quickly. The Axis OTL lacked a clarity of purpose and a sense of urgency, they made some gains in the beginning and then waited patiently to be defeated in the mid and late war.

If I were leader of Japan, I would send a small force to attack Oahu in the days following the Pearl Harbour attack (I'd also have anyone who recalled the Third Wave beheaded.) I would maybe recall troops from Burma, as the link above suggests, or maybe I would task the Navy with using their SNLF troops exclusively as the young officer in Turtledove's story suggests initially. I don't foresee in either case the Japanese dedicating more than a single division to taking the Island. The Japanese showed their willingness to attack while outnumbered in Singapore.

The mission would be near suicidal, a Hail Mary, but to not take Oahu is to concede the war on the morning of December 7th.

Probably, the landing force would be destroyed in a total Japanese defeat. The valiant defense of Hawaii--no doubt at great cost to the defenders--would be burned for decades into the American popular consciousness.

Since I'm not altering the rest of the Pacific War that much, or the European Theatre, the Japanese still experience the success they did in the Philippines, Wake etc. etc. but the base at Pearl is now even more heavily damaged, and thousands more American troops are dead on Oahu, after having been tied down there for however long it took them to defeat the landing force (possibly a month.)

Here are some analysis questions for my "scenario" that I'm interested in hearing you folks' thoughts on.

How does the rest of the Pacific War look after this unsuccessful Japanese invasion of Hawaii? Are the Japanese in a better or worse position than OTL?

What if the preparations for a land invasion delayed Pearl Harbor by a week or so, which resulted in the carriers getting caught in the Harbor? Would the carriers be slaughtered in the attack or would they result in the Japanese air raid being less successful than OTL?

What if the US Garrison totally shits the bed (not unheard of for the Allies OTL in this stage of the war) and the Japanese take Hawaii? How does this go? They'd have a devil of the time supplying it. If I were the Japanese, I'd leave a token garrison and let the population starve. How would this affect the rest of the war?

I hope this scenario isn't too tired or boring.
 
As a future student of English Literature, Harry Turtledove was a slog for High School me to get through all those years ago. His scenarios are interesting for an alt history beginner, but he's just a terrible writer! His prose drags.

How does the rest of the Pacific War look after this unsuccessful Japanese invasion of Hawaii? Are the Japanese in a better or worse position than OTL?

What if the preparations for a land invasion delayed Pearl Harbor by a week or so, which resulted in the carriers getting caught in the Harbor? Would the carriers be slaughtered in the attack or would they result in the Japanese air raid being less successful than OTL?

What if the US Garrison totally shits the bed (not unheard of for the Allies OTL in this stage of the war) and the Japanese take Hawaii? How does this go? They'd have a devil of the time supplying it. If I were the Japanese, I'd leave a token garrison and let the population starve. How would this affect the rest of the war?

I hope this scenario isn't too tired or boring.

If they try and fail.. its basically hard times from then out as they will need just about everything they have. this is Pearl . and lots of islands
war ends much much sooner

if they manage to take it. and can actually put something on the islands to warrant a threat, the us might just decide the Aleutians are worth a whole lot more.
last but not least, its a long way from Hawaii to the US mainland.

if they can take it, it stalls things. but in the end we all know how this pans out.

let me say this japan needed the forces it had in china.

so, it decides to take Hawaii.
1. how does it get ships close enough to perform landings?
2. how does it time all of that with the air attacks.
3. how do you get enough troops on to Oahu, quick enough. granted if you could time the strikes with ground and airborne invasion ( and I am nto sure the Japanese had that ability ) you could create enough chaos maybe.

Hawaii is spread out, japan will need a sizable force to repeal any invasion to retake as it builds up. the only reason to take it and build up is a staging for trying to invade the USA. which in my mind is fanciful for the Japanese to even think attempting

I do not think the Japanese ever expected to try to make the US submit, they only wanted to hit us hard enough to make us say, ooo.. okay. unfortunately for them .. they hit us and we body slammed them.

so great they take Hawaii. logistics is a little messed up, we simply take a northerly approach, or the battle of Hawaii goes down in folklore on a level that would warrant a national holiday.
 
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I could, just could, see this scenario happening if, somehow, the Japanese managed to take the Philippines from the Spanish before the Spanish-American War (1) (of course, I don't need to mention that there would be butterflies from this)...

Even then, I see the invasion being a bloody failure for the Japanese (and, no, they can't count on the Japanese Hawaiians revolting, because that ain't happening (2); just look up the history of the Nisei troops, probably the most decorated unit in Europe in World War II, as many of them were from Hawaii)...

OTOH, Japanese victory disease probably ends real quickly ITTL...

(1) One way is to use @Jim Smitty's premise, where the Spanish-American War occurs in the 1870s; the Americans there still take the Marianas, along with Cuba and Puerto Rico (the latter two probably become states ITTL), but don't take the Philippines; I could see it happening there...
(2) According to US government reports at the time, the Japanese-Hawaiians had a high degree of loyalty to America, and I don't see that changing in this scenario...
 
As a future student of English Literature, Harry Turtledove was a slog for High School me to get through all those years ago. His scenarios are interesting for an alt history beginner, but he's just a terrible writer! His prose drags.

But I got through the entirety of the first book in his alternate Pearl Harbour series in which the Japanese magically conjure up two army divisions with which to invade the Hawaiian Islands, succeed through some actually fairly sound albeit wily military strategy in a battle that recalls Bataan, and subjugate the islands. Despite his awful prose, it was a compelling book.

So this is of course implausible, it's the Pacific Sealion, as explained here: http://combinedfleet.com/pearlops.htm

You say the Harry Turtledove book outlines the invasion of the Hawaiian Islands (plural), and a Combined fleet article which discusses the invasion of Oahu, (singular). In your opinion, why did the Combined Fleet article overlook discussing the outer islands in their Dec 1941 invasion scenario?

Turtledove tells us this is a hard task given IJN and IJA politics, but doesn't show us, instead waving a wand and having it happen.

The first lesson of strategy to differentiate between intentions and capabilities. The IJA had no intention of coughing up 2 divisions to invade Hawaii. The IJA had the capability to do so, if desired.

But enough of Turtledove. Knowing full well that it is nearly an impossible task, I'm still of the opinion that Japan's only chance of winning the Pacific War was to take Oahu.

Japan's best bet was to pile on the Soviets, cut Lend Lease, and keep the Germans in the war. You'll see all sorts of posters insisting the Soviets would have won a 1942 campaign handily, but whatever. That was probably their best bet.

If I were leader of Japan, I would send a small force to attack Oahu in the days following the Pearl Harbour attack (I'd also have anyone who recalled the Third Wave beheaded.) I would maybe recall troops from Burma, as the link above suggests, or maybe I would task the Navy with using their SNLF troops exclusively as the young officer in Turtledove's story suggests initially. I don't foresee in either case the Japanese dedicating more than a single division to taking the Island. The Japanese showed their willingness to attack while outnumbered in Singapore.

Your single division will be clobbered and Nagumo's carriers might be badly knocked about by the distraction, like they were at Midway.

Since I'm not altering the rest of the Pacific War that much, or the European Theatre, the Japanese still experience the success they did in the Philippines, Wake etc. etc. but the base at Pearl is now even more heavily damaged, and thousands more American troops are dead on Oahu, after having been tied down there for however long it took them to defeat the landing force (possibly a month.)

You need to work through your strategic confusion and decide what the objective is. You stated as the first principle that taking HAWAII is the only chance for victory. Now, you're listing a bunch of things that are not Hawaii.

How does the rest of the Pacific War look after this unsuccessful Japanese invasion of Hawaii? Are the Japanese in a better or worse position than OTL?

There would be little impact, except perhaps to damage the IJN carriers earlier and make IJA-IJN relations even worse, if that is possible.

What if the preparations for a land invasion delayed Pearl Harbor by a week or so, which resulted in the carriers getting caught in the Harbor? Would the carriers be slaughtered in the attack or would they result in the Japanese air raid being less successful than OTL?

Why not just have the IJN hunt for the US carriers near Oahu? Nagumo had 6 carriers, about 20 submarines, and three dozen flying boats in the Marshalls that could come forward to a seaplane base. Kimmel had Enterprise, Lexington, and the surviving aircraft on Oahu.

What if the US Garrison totally shits the bed (not unheard of for the Allies OTL in this stage of the war) and the Japanese take Hawaii? How does this go? They'd have a devil of the time supplying it. If I were the Japanese, I'd leave a token garrison and let the population starve. How would this affect the rest of the war?.

You'd leave the Hawaiians to starve, as part of a strategy to get the Americans to play nice? Before doing that, why wouldn't you figure out how big a supply problem you've actually got before taking such a drastic step?
 
Sigh...even if the Japanese take Hawaii, it does them no good. Reports of the Japanese atrocities against WHITE civilians, yes I know its racist but think 1941, will piss off the USA even more than the sneak attack itself. OK it will still take the USA time to build up and retake Hawaii, but retake it they will. Without counting the number of this or that bit of the Japanese military, getting the resources together to take and hold Hawaii for any length of time this means they simply don't do as well in the DEI and SEA - and therefore while pineapple exports to Japan are up, the IJN and IJA, and the Japanese economy grind to a halt within a year to eighteen months atmost due to no oil.
 
(I'd also have anyone who recalled the Third Wave beheaded.)

See this gives a wrong impression of what the pearl harbour attack was actually for. They never intended it to be an attack to decimate American resources and prevent them from waging a long war. They wanted to hit prestige and knock the enemy fleet out for 6 months. it was a good call not to do a third wave since the American AA fire was increasing and American planes had gotten into the air, next to that planes from the USS Enterprise were on their way. A third wave would only cause the loss of experienced, valuable pilots and cause damages that won't improve the goals of the japanese in a war with the USA. The battleships had been hit as hard as they could have been, taking out some more cruisers or hit the same battleships yet again doesn't help them. The actual accuracy of the planes wasn't all that good anyway so how much damage they would really do is questionable at best.

Whats more, with an idea to actually invade the island, ordering a third wave to take out the fuel depots and shipyards/submarine bunker would only work against them as they are something to take over and use themselves, if they are destroyed they can't use them for their own means.(even though they would never make it)
 
Japan's best bet was to pile on the Soviets, cut Lend Lease, and keep the Germans in the war. You'll see all sorts of posters insisting the Soviets would have won a 1942 campaign handily, but whatever. That was probably their best bet.

There is a good chance Japanese attacks on the Soviet union would cut off the Pacific route for Lend-Lease. Unfortunately for the Japanese and Germans there weere 2 more routes to provide the USSr with Lend-Lease. It would make it more difficult for them to recieve lend-lease, but they would stil get it. The Pacific route as i understood it was mostly used to transport the much needed food, but besides that mostly civilain equipments, not the war material. The food can still be brought through the southern route and they will have to do without their soaps and toothpaste.
 
There is a good chance Japanese attacks on the Soviet union would cut off the Pacific route for Lend-Lease. Unfortunately for the Japanese and Germans there weere 2 more routes to provide the USSr with Lend-Lease. It would make it more difficult for them to recieve lend-lease, but they would stil get it. The Pacific route as i understood it was mostly used to transport the much needed food, but besides that mostly civilain equipments, not the war material. The food can still be brought through the southern route and they will have to do without their soaps and toothpaste.

A lot of planes went directly to the Soviet Union from the US via the northern route.
 
See this gives a wrong impression of what the pearl harbour attack was actually for. They never intended it to be an attack to decimate American resources and prevent them from waging a long war. They wanted to hit prestige and knock the enemy fleet out for 6 months.

Ah yes, a classic example of how bad the Imperial Japanese were at war. In what world would killing 3,000 servicemen of a rival country make them NOT want to fight? It's like the baffling logic the Germans used for terror bombing London. Bombing countries tends to make them LESS inclined to want peace, not more. And in what world is not destroying the enemy the right decision? What is the point of preserving material for a long war when there's literally no way in hell you can win a long war? You might as well gamble everything on risky manoeuvres early on, because that's your only chance at winning. It's a choice between taking casualties in 1941 or taking casualties in 1943. You're just saving planes to be destroyed later on.

Like I said, the Axis lacked clarity of purpose and urgency, because they fundamentally didn't understand their enemy or like...war.
 
You say the Harry Turtledove book outlines the invasion of the Hawaiian Islands (plural), and a Combined fleet article which discusses the invasion of Oahu, (singular). In your opinion, why did the Combined Fleet article overlook discussing the outer islands in their Dec 1941 invasion scenario?



The first lesson of strategy to differentiate between intentions and capabilities. The IJA had no intention of coughing up 2 divisions to invade Hawaii. The IJA had the capability to do so, if desired.



Japan's best bet was to pile on the Soviets, cut Lend Lease, and keep the Germans in the war. You'll see all sorts of posters insisting the Soviets would have won a 1942 campaign handily, but whatever. That was probably their best bet.



Your single division will be clobbered and Nagumo's carriers might be badly knocked about by the distraction, like they were at Midway.



You need to work through your strategic confusion and decide what the objective is. You stated as the first principle that taking HAWAII is the only chance for victory. Now, you're listing a bunch of things that are not Hawaii.



There would be little impact, except perhaps to damage the IJN carriers earlier and make IJA-IJN relations even worse, if that is possible.



Why not just have the IJN hunt for the US carriers near Oahu? Nagumo had 6 carriers, about 20 submarines, and three dozen flying boats in the Marshalls that could come forward to a seaplane base. Kimmel had Enterprise, Lexington, and the surviving aircraft on Oahu.



You'd leave the Hawaiians to starve, as part of a strategy to get the Americans to play nice? Before doing that, why wouldn't you figure out how big a supply problem you've actually got before taking such a drastic step?

So by saying Japan's only chance at winning the war is taking Hawaii, I meant that in addition to all the other early war success they had. It wouldn't do any good to deny the US a base in Hawaii if you hand them a base in the Phillipines. You need to destroy the US's ability to project power in the Pacific. The operational objective is taking Hawaii, but the Strategic objective is denying the US the ability to project power in the Pacific.
 

Ian_W

Banned
Japan's best bet was to pile on the Soviets, cut Lend Lease, and keep the Germans in the war. You'll see all sorts of posters insisting the Soviets would have won a 1942 campaign handily, but whatever. That was probably their best bet.

An anti-Soviet campaign doesnt get Japan any oil, so it's a total non starter.

Additionally, it doesnt cut Lend Lease thru Persia or Archangel.
 
A lot of planes went directly to the Soviet Union from the US via the northern route.

Exactly, most war material came through the northern route.

Ah yes, a classic example of how bad the Imperial Japanese were at war. In what world would killing 3,000 servicemen of a rival country make them NOT want to fight? It's like the baffling logic the Germans used for terror bombing London. Bombing countries tends to make them LESS inclined to want peace, not more. And in what world is not destroying the enemy the right decision? What is the point of preserving material for a long war when there's literally no way in hell you can win a long war? You might as well gamble everything on risky manoeuvres early on, because that's your only chance at winning. It's a choice between taking casualties in 1941 or taking casualties in 1943. You're just saving planes to be destroyed later on.

Like I said, the Axis lacked clarity of purpose and urgency, because they fundamentally didn't understand their enemy or like...war.

Its not about about making them not want to fight, its about making them unable to fight even if its temporary. It was a bad call, we all know that, but that was the intent. The Japanese navy also knew its limitations, they couldn't replace pilots as well to keep the kido butai as effective, they knew they needed them for the decisive battle that they wanted to happen. Pearl Harbor was not that decisive battle, especially since there were not american carriers present. The Japanese had a battleship focus when it came to fighting but they knew they could only effectively knock out the American fleet if they took their carriers out as well. That failed so the operation was over. The die was cast.
 
Let us suppose Japan pulls off the successful invasion, we should assume it comes at a cost. Clearly the US suffers a huge logistical burden and the direct route to Japan is blocked. But I think people forget (Turtledove included) that the Pacific was not the only avenue of approach.

Here is how I see the aftermath to Japan having Turtledoved its way to victory at the battle of Oahu. Failure is probably not all that different in terms of the issue I raise.

The air wings of the carriers are greatly reduced, the additional operational losses and losses to AA would cause significant losses beyond that sustained on the first few days.
The invasion fleet probably needs to be ‘all in’ for the IJN, that is to say more battleships, the light carriers and lots of shipping to land two divisions, several tank regiments and extra artillery. Beyond that is the need to transport support personnel to set up air bases quickly and bring crated aircraft to base there. That means the other opening operations from 1941 simply can’t happen as they did in OTL. Therefore very likely the invasion of Malaya is delayed and probably no landings on the phillipines either for a month. The delay in Malaya might well be the difference between the historical success and the 18th infantry division being deployed along with a veteran tank regiment before Japan can invade. If Britain deploys tanks and has the 18th in good shape and ready to go then I think the Japanese invasion would not have been successful.

If Malaya holds then the overall Japanese plan is not viable, Japan does not secure enough oil and the Allies have a major base to launch their counter-offensive from a year later.

Thus even taking Hawaii could end the war earlier for Japan...
 

Paul Large

Banned
Scratch that. When fleet left the Hawaiian islands after doing at least one more bombing run. Taking out the fuel depots and perhaps even bomb the city’s to set a tone of fear in the public. Then after leaving sail directly to Midway and meet an invasion force there. Taking the island days after the start of the war. Thus allowing the Japanease the ability to bomb Hawaii daily. Costly to hold and support but having said that it would be the allies main focus . I can’t see them wanting to do anything other then removing the Japanese from Midway and stop the daily bombing. It could even put the allies on the defensive in the Pacific. Allowing the Japanese free rain in other areas they had to fight very hard for.
 

nbcman

Donor
Scratch that. When fleet left the Hawaiian islands after doing at least one more bombing run. Taking out the fuel depots and perhaps even bomb the city’s to set a tone of fear in the public. Then after leaving sail directly to Midway and meet an invasion force there. Taking the island days after the start of the war. Thus allowing the Japanease the ability to bomb Hawaii daily. Costly to hold and support but having said that it would be the allies main focus . I can’t see them wanting to do anything other then removing the Japanese from Midway and stop the daily bombing. It could even put the allies on the defensive in the Pacific. Allowing the Japanese free rain in other areas they had to fight very hard for.

Unescorted Bettys and Nells (maybe) won't last long against radar guided USAAF interception efforts. It is about 2100 km one way between Midway and Honolulu. A Zero's max range is about 75% of that distance.
 
One does wonder why an attack on pearl harbor was conducted and Wake island captured, but Midway was mostly left alone(2 destroyers from the kido butai shelled the island).
 
Out of curiosity, how much fuel did the US have stored in its depots on Oahu near Pearl Harbor. What would be the probability of capturing it intact in a surprise invasion?
 
So by saying Japan's only chance at winning the war is taking Hawaii, I meant that in addition to all the other early war success they had. It wouldn't do any good to deny the US a base in Hawaii if you hand them a base in the Phillipines. You need to destroy the US's ability to project power in the Pacific.

According to your conclusion, the Japanese need to take Hawaii to have any chance. But also, a laundry list of other objectives such as Luzon. This is, strategically speaking, discordant. Either Hawaii is or isn't, of itself, sufficient to get the US to talk. If not, the loss of Luzon hardly tips the scales any further. If so, the distraction of Luzon might be fatal to the Japanese chances by diverting them from the main objective.

The operational objective is taking Hawaii, but the Strategic objective is denying the US the ability to project power in the Pacific.

That would imply the USN of 1942 could project power far into the Pacific without possessing Hawaii. Is it feasible for the USN to even supply Luzon for defensive purposes if Hawaii and Singapore have fallen, or does the act of taking those two doom any defense there? Can the USN defend or threaten any point west of Hawaii if Hawaii were Japanese? By 1944, would the possession of Hawaii prevent the now massive USN from rolling up the Japanese position as per historical, just 6 months later in starting and with Hawaii first?
 
Out of curiosity, how much fuel did the US have stored in its depots on Oahu near Pearl Harbor. What would be the probability of capturing it intact in a surprise invasion?

About 600,000 tons stored with a 0.00% chance of the Japanese ever taking it in any significant quantity.
 
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