'the Victorious': Seleucus Nicator and the world after Alexander
- Thread starter ClaustroPhoebic
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That's OK, @ClaustroPhoebic...
Quality over quantity is fine, IMO...
On a side note, this will be a Turtledove nominee next year, methinks...
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First thanks for the great and complete answers and secondly I wasn`t very informed of how different Babylonian kings were in comparison to Pharaohs and the Hellenistic kings that followed as I am in the process of reading all I can on The Seleucids as they are my favorite of the diadochi. So at first, the ruler cult was mainly given from the polis institution, and for the moment it stays there. In Mesopotamia, The Seleucids don`t have a precedent beyond being the builders and restorers.
Again thanks for answering my questions! and great writing.
So The Seleucids are making contact with the Romans and finally deciding to rebuild their naval prowess, although I am not sure if they will be able to catch up to the Egyptians at the very least, not for the moment. Do the Seleucids have trade relations with Carthage? As it would be beneficial to have a somewhat friendly contact in the area.
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Chapter Twenty-Two
Chapter Twenty-Two: A View from the South
At risk of getting too Seleucid-centric, it is worth us taking some time to reorient our perspective somewhat. While the Seleucid empire under Antiochus II was experiencing a period of expansion and relative stability, Ptolemaic Egypt was prospering in its own way. Unlike the Seleucid empire, Egypt was blessed with readily defensible 'borders' and a readily available ideological framework into which the Ptolemaic kings could slot themselves. From the time of Ptolemy I, the Ptolemaic dynasty had cast itself as pharaohs in the Egyptian mould, continuing to patronise temples and issue edicts as any other pharaoh would. During the early phases of Ptolemaic rule, the varying ideologies of the Ptolemies were largely kept separate, however. To Greeks (both within and without Egypt), the Ptolemies cast themselves as Greek kings while, to Egyptians, they were happy to present themselves as pharaohs. Alexandria, while it may well have incorporated Egyptianising elements for its Egyptian population (including indigenous temples, although the date of their construction is debatable), was presented as a bastion of Greek identity in a foreign environment. Built from the vast quantities of immigration encouraged by the Ptolemies, the population of Alexandria seems to have been predominately Cyreneans and Cyrenaicans with large populations of Thracians, Judaeans, and Athenians as well. The city, according to one poem, was filled with soldiers, mercenaries (although the term is largely ahistorical for the ancient period, it is a convenient term for people), poets, playwrights, merchants and the vast court and various hangers-on of the Ptolemaic kings.
From quite early, Alexandria achieved a reputation for being the location to go to for those seeking economic advancement or literary patronage. From all across Egypt and the Mediterranean came tens of thousands of people, all seeking fortune or better lives or access to the social and political capital of Alexandria itself. Of course, it did not simply emerge as such an iconic city; Alexandria had developed over the course of the reigns of Ptolemy I and II, starting off as a small city originally laid out under Alexander and turning into a bustling metropolis. In the 310s, Ptolemy I had moved his capital to Alexandria and it had been retained as the centre of their power ever since. Within the palace, which itself comprised between one-quarter and one-third of the city, lay the famous Library and Mouseion of Alexandria, a centre of royal patronage. The library probably emerged under Ptolemy I who was famous for his ruthless practices of acquiring literature to stock it with and, under his successors, the Mouseion became a major site of literary patronage. Part of the ideology of Hellenistic kingship was the production, and patronage, of literature of all varieties. Poetry, theatre, epic, even prose were all popular genres patronised by the kings. By building the Library and Mouseion, the Ptolemies were promoting their credentials as a major patron of Greek culture and literature while also promoting Alexandria as something of a new Athens (which the Ptolemies seem to have adopted as the cultural model for Alexandria to some degree, trying to create the image that Alexandria was the successor to Athens) as well as as a centre of Greek culture and identity in Egypt.
Outside of Alexandria, the vast quantities of papyrus surviving has given us invaluable insight into the society and administration of Ptolemaic Egypt during this period. In order to fund the immense costs of building, and maintaining, their empire, the Ptolemies had instituted an exceptionally intricate administrative system dedicated to cutting down on fraud, ensuring the continued functioning of justice systems, and collecting tax on anything and everything they could. Under Ptolemy II, the Ptolemies issued the so-called 'Revenue Laws', a series of incredibly intricate laws governing everything from the assessment of crops to the movement and sale of oil to the production of wine or the contracts for farming tax. These were probably not all issued as a single document but collated later based on a series of laws issued over time. At every level, the Ptolemies attempted to institute a deep and very ambitious level of control over the functioning of the Egyptian economy and its society. Papyrus also permits us to see the functioning of these systems through hundreds of letters, tax records, instructions sent to a variety of people throughout the administration and even personal wills. Through the Dryton papyri, we see the marriage of the Greek Dryton to the Egyptian Senmouthis and their children (who bear both Greek and Egyptian names), the various different wills issues by Dryton approaching his death and the continued lives of his children afterwards. Through tax records we learn that there were somewhat different taxes imposed on Greeks than on Egyptians. Police were instituted all across Egypt and seem to have been present even in very small villages.
Without going into too much detail, the impression we get is of a system that, at least, was intended to be a very centralised and controlled one. The exact success of all these many regulations is up for debate (certainly, we know that fraud was a very real problem) but what is clear is that the Ptolemies attempted to create an exceptionally bureaucratic system. Of course, this is not to say that the Seleucids did not have a very bureaucratic system; on the contrary, we know that they had a hierarchy of officials just as the Ptolemies did, but we see this more obviously in the Ptolemaic evidence owing to the survival of papyrus. It is also very probable that, given the size and relatively centralised habitation of Egypt, the Ptolemies were able to introduce this centralised system at a much more local and intimate level.
Alongside this, the Ptolemies had worked hard to both neuter and win over the Egyptian priesthood. Throughout the 3rd Century, temples continued to be patronised and priests wooed by the Ptolemaic kings even as they slowly stripped lands away from many of them. Even before Ptolemy I had made himself king, this process of winning over the Egyptian religious institutions had been a constantly ongoing trend. This was important because the temples acted effectively as a barometer for measuring Egyptian support and a potential locus of dissent should they be angered. Priests did not spend all their time working but also spent a lot of time living outside of the temples in local communities. As such, they had the potential to act as representatives for the Egyptian people and, with the wealth of temples, to focus popular dissent. Alternatively, they could be used to spread the ideology and support of the Ptolemies. Ptolemy I and II had both patronised the temples of Edfu and Kom Ombo quite extensively, organising repairs and restorations at both sites but had also continued the pharaonic traditions of building new temples, repairing old ones and had built themselves a base of support amongst much of the priesthood. With that said, the level of their support should not be overstated. Of particular interest are the so-called 'Apocalypse Oracles', the most famous of which is the 'Oracle of the Potter', a Demotic text written sometime in the 3rd Century which prophesies the destruction and overthrow of the Ptolemies who are portrayed as foreign invaders.
All of this was the base upon which Ptolemaic foreign policy was built. This administrative system, which I have only traced out in bare minimum to save time, provided the financial and political capital that the Ptolemies could use to look outwards and expand their power. In the Mediterranean, this was most famously accomplished through the Nesiotic League and their adventures in Coele-Syria and Southern Anatolia. They had also, from the time of Ptolemy II, made common cause with Rhodes and Rome, helping the former fight pirates in the Aegean and often exporting food to the latter. Just as important, however, were their political involvements inn the east and south. Under Ptolemy I, they had begun pushing into the eastern desert, building roads and cities to promote the exploitation of the mineral resources of the region (especially gold) and, in turn, building the ports of Myos Hormos and, more importantly, Berenice to open up the Red Sea. Under Ptolemy II, the Ptolemies began ever more political and financial adventures along the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. At this date, the trade in the Indian Ocean seems largely to have been dominated by peoples from East Africa and Southern Arabia who leveraged their position to connect the Ptolemies with India but from as early as Ptolemy II, the Ptolemies had begun trying to subvert this control somewhat. During the mid-3rd Century, Ptolemy II sent ambassadors to the Mauryan Empire and later Ptolemaic kings would fund exploration missions to trace the Indian Ocean monsoons and find trade routes directly to India itself.
Through Berenice and Myos Hormos came silks, spices, incense, jewels and a host of other very desired goods upon which the Ptolemies often collected astoundingly high taxes (possibly as high as 25-50%). On several occasions, Ptolemaic kings even seem to have made attempts to entirely subvert the trade altogether and famously tried to transplant frankincense which ultimately failed but shows the importance of the crop as a potential source of revenue for the Ptolemies and their awareness of the huge wealth coming from the east. Ptolemaic embassies are known in western and southern Arabia, possibly seeking to establish friendly relationships with local leaders, as well as pirate hunting expeditions in the Red Sea to protect against raids on their shipping.
To the south, the Ptolemies were drawn largely by the potential animal wealth of east Africa. Ptolemy II himself is said to have developed the so-called 'elephantegoi', a new ship built specifically for the purposes of carrying home live elephants and, from the 260s, the earliest hunting base known as 'Ptolemais of the Hunts' was established to the south. Live elephants were brought back both for the prestige (and association with kingship) and for their military utility although, in battle they tended to be easily frightened by the larger Asian elephants employed by the Seleucids. This required a huge investment of resources; the camps established by the Ptolemies were often semi-permanent residences for hunters who needed to capture and train the elephants before they could be brought onto ships. This involved direct state involvement and frequent supply expeditions were organised with hunters paid well above the average wages of the time (as much as double other labourers for their work!).
Ivory hunting was also important and, during the 3rd Century, ivory prices dropped in the Mediterranean as the Ptolemies began to export huge quantities of ivory brought from east Africa. In time, their hunters began to deplete local hunting grounds, forcing them to travel ever further south. These hunts would eventually die off during the 2nd Century but, by that point, the Ptolemies had reached as far as Cape Guardafui in the Horn of Africa. Under Philadelphus, the Ptolemies campaigned in Nubia, bringing back captives, ivory and gold which were paraded through the streets of Alexandria in a grand display of wealth and power. As their influence and connections spread ever further out, the Ptolemies were able to expand their ambitions. Do not misunderstand, the loss of Coele-Syria was indeed a loss but it was far from being one that they could not recover from; the Ptolemaic empire continued to dominate the seas and was far from down and out (as events would soon show). Under Ptolemy II, Ptolemaic soft power and political influence had reached a height. In 246 BCE, Ptolemy II died and passed the throne to his son, the 34-year-old Ptolemy III.
The Reign of Ptolemy III:
Alongside Antiochus II, Ptolemy III was one of the great commanders of the age. The clash between Antiochus and Ptolemy in the 220s, the infamous 3rd Syrian War (or Great Syrian War) in which Ptolemy III earned the nickname 'Nikator', has gone down in history as one of the most important wars of the 3rd Century, one which would set the tone for the two powers going forward. However, the early parts of Ptolemy III's reign were remarkable peaceful on his northern front. If Ptolemy sought to reclaim Syria at this date, he did not show it. Instead, he originally seems to have placed his focus on shoring up his position in the eastern Mediterranean after the defeats of the 250s. In particular, he took advantage of the declining popularity of the Seleucids in Greece to cement and increase Ptolemaic influence there. In 244, Ptolemy welcomed several Athenians to Alexandria where one orator gave a speech about Antiochus II, naming him 'The Seleucid Xerxes'. Around the same time, he was also active in the Peloponnese where the spectre of Seleucid imperialism won him supporters amongst the Achaean League, and in Corinth. Several cities in Judaea were fortified as well, possibly in preparation for another war with the Seleucids in the future.
At the same time, he turned his attention south and east as his father had done. As mentioned, embassies were sent to several leaders in western Arabia and Ptolemy seems to have promoted further relations with the Mauryas at this date. In the south, he continued the relentless push south in search of ivory and elephants but, possibly seeking more room in which to build his empire, made several campaigns south along the Nile valley. Ptolemy II had already begun carving out a province in the region but Ptolemaic control seems to have largely declined during the wars of the 250s. As such, in the 240s, Ptolemy III began a new series of campaigns against the Kingdom of Kush. The first of these campaigns, undertaken during the late 240s, was probably more of a tribute seeking mission. However, during the 230s, Ptolemy seems to have made more attempts to carve a lasting empire out in the region. It is possible that he saw Nubia as an opportunity to build his empire, accrue more soldiers, and expand his economy or simply as a place where he could match the military expansionism of Antiochus and carve out his own 'conqueror' identity in a period where retaking Syria was currently not on the cards while the Ptolemies rebuilt. Regardless, the campaigns of the 230s brought Ptolemaic control as far south as the second cataract where he famously made a visit to the mortuary temple of Ramesses II (and had sand cleared away), an area which was carved out into the province named the very easy to remember Triakontaschoinos, originally placed under the leadership of Mosollamos, a Jewish commander who had distinguished himself in the campaigns.
Here, the Ptolemies patronised the construction of a whole series of grand new Egyptian temples, likely in an attempt to try and syncretise Nubian and Egyptian gods to make ruling the region easier. Forts were established and new roads carved which helped access the gold resources of the region. In the 220s, Mosollamos would fight a Second Ptolemaic-Kushite war which would result in a temporary extension of the Triakontaschoinos as far as the third cataract where a 3rd Century Ptolemaic fort was found, occupied likely between 228 and 226 BCE when Mosollamos would have had to pull his soldiers out of Nubia to help provide extra resources for the campaign against Antiochus II.
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Note from the Author: I have tried very hard not to indulge too much in talking about Ptolemaic East Africa and the Red Sea but it is, in my opinion, one of the most interesting topics in Hellenistic history and one which not a lot of people pay enough attention to. Thank you all for reading and all the support you've given, I hope you enjoy this chapter!
At risk of getting too Seleucid-centric, it is worth us taking some time to reorient our perspective somewhat. While the Seleucid empire under Antiochus II was experiencing a period of expansion and relative stability, Ptolemaic Egypt was prospering in its own way. Unlike the Seleucid empire, Egypt was blessed with readily defensible 'borders' and a readily available ideological framework into which the Ptolemaic kings could slot themselves. From the time of Ptolemy I, the Ptolemaic dynasty had cast itself as pharaohs in the Egyptian mould, continuing to patronise temples and issue edicts as any other pharaoh would. During the early phases of Ptolemaic rule, the varying ideologies of the Ptolemies were largely kept separate, however. To Greeks (both within and without Egypt), the Ptolemies cast themselves as Greek kings while, to Egyptians, they were happy to present themselves as pharaohs. Alexandria, while it may well have incorporated Egyptianising elements for its Egyptian population (including indigenous temples, although the date of their construction is debatable), was presented as a bastion of Greek identity in a foreign environment. Built from the vast quantities of immigration encouraged by the Ptolemies, the population of Alexandria seems to have been predominately Cyreneans and Cyrenaicans with large populations of Thracians, Judaeans, and Athenians as well. The city, according to one poem, was filled with soldiers, mercenaries (although the term is largely ahistorical for the ancient period, it is a convenient term for people), poets, playwrights, merchants and the vast court and various hangers-on of the Ptolemaic kings.
From quite early, Alexandria achieved a reputation for being the location to go to for those seeking economic advancement or literary patronage. From all across Egypt and the Mediterranean came tens of thousands of people, all seeking fortune or better lives or access to the social and political capital of Alexandria itself. Of course, it did not simply emerge as such an iconic city; Alexandria had developed over the course of the reigns of Ptolemy I and II, starting off as a small city originally laid out under Alexander and turning into a bustling metropolis. In the 310s, Ptolemy I had moved his capital to Alexandria and it had been retained as the centre of their power ever since. Within the palace, which itself comprised between one-quarter and one-third of the city, lay the famous Library and Mouseion of Alexandria, a centre of royal patronage. The library probably emerged under Ptolemy I who was famous for his ruthless practices of acquiring literature to stock it with and, under his successors, the Mouseion became a major site of literary patronage. Part of the ideology of Hellenistic kingship was the production, and patronage, of literature of all varieties. Poetry, theatre, epic, even prose were all popular genres patronised by the kings. By building the Library and Mouseion, the Ptolemies were promoting their credentials as a major patron of Greek culture and literature while also promoting Alexandria as something of a new Athens (which the Ptolemies seem to have adopted as the cultural model for Alexandria to some degree, trying to create the image that Alexandria was the successor to Athens) as well as as a centre of Greek culture and identity in Egypt.
Outside of Alexandria, the vast quantities of papyrus surviving has given us invaluable insight into the society and administration of Ptolemaic Egypt during this period. In order to fund the immense costs of building, and maintaining, their empire, the Ptolemies had instituted an exceptionally intricate administrative system dedicated to cutting down on fraud, ensuring the continued functioning of justice systems, and collecting tax on anything and everything they could. Under Ptolemy II, the Ptolemies issued the so-called 'Revenue Laws', a series of incredibly intricate laws governing everything from the assessment of crops to the movement and sale of oil to the production of wine or the contracts for farming tax. These were probably not all issued as a single document but collated later based on a series of laws issued over time. At every level, the Ptolemies attempted to institute a deep and very ambitious level of control over the functioning of the Egyptian economy and its society. Papyrus also permits us to see the functioning of these systems through hundreds of letters, tax records, instructions sent to a variety of people throughout the administration and even personal wills. Through the Dryton papyri, we see the marriage of the Greek Dryton to the Egyptian Senmouthis and their children (who bear both Greek and Egyptian names), the various different wills issues by Dryton approaching his death and the continued lives of his children afterwards. Through tax records we learn that there were somewhat different taxes imposed on Greeks than on Egyptians. Police were instituted all across Egypt and seem to have been present even in very small villages.
Without going into too much detail, the impression we get is of a system that, at least, was intended to be a very centralised and controlled one. The exact success of all these many regulations is up for debate (certainly, we know that fraud was a very real problem) but what is clear is that the Ptolemies attempted to create an exceptionally bureaucratic system. Of course, this is not to say that the Seleucids did not have a very bureaucratic system; on the contrary, we know that they had a hierarchy of officials just as the Ptolemies did, but we see this more obviously in the Ptolemaic evidence owing to the survival of papyrus. It is also very probable that, given the size and relatively centralised habitation of Egypt, the Ptolemies were able to introduce this centralised system at a much more local and intimate level.
Alongside this, the Ptolemies had worked hard to both neuter and win over the Egyptian priesthood. Throughout the 3rd Century, temples continued to be patronised and priests wooed by the Ptolemaic kings even as they slowly stripped lands away from many of them. Even before Ptolemy I had made himself king, this process of winning over the Egyptian religious institutions had been a constantly ongoing trend. This was important because the temples acted effectively as a barometer for measuring Egyptian support and a potential locus of dissent should they be angered. Priests did not spend all their time working but also spent a lot of time living outside of the temples in local communities. As such, they had the potential to act as representatives for the Egyptian people and, with the wealth of temples, to focus popular dissent. Alternatively, they could be used to spread the ideology and support of the Ptolemies. Ptolemy I and II had both patronised the temples of Edfu and Kom Ombo quite extensively, organising repairs and restorations at both sites but had also continued the pharaonic traditions of building new temples, repairing old ones and had built themselves a base of support amongst much of the priesthood. With that said, the level of their support should not be overstated. Of particular interest are the so-called 'Apocalypse Oracles', the most famous of which is the 'Oracle of the Potter', a Demotic text written sometime in the 3rd Century which prophesies the destruction and overthrow of the Ptolemies who are portrayed as foreign invaders.
All of this was the base upon which Ptolemaic foreign policy was built. This administrative system, which I have only traced out in bare minimum to save time, provided the financial and political capital that the Ptolemies could use to look outwards and expand their power. In the Mediterranean, this was most famously accomplished through the Nesiotic League and their adventures in Coele-Syria and Southern Anatolia. They had also, from the time of Ptolemy II, made common cause with Rhodes and Rome, helping the former fight pirates in the Aegean and often exporting food to the latter. Just as important, however, were their political involvements inn the east and south. Under Ptolemy I, they had begun pushing into the eastern desert, building roads and cities to promote the exploitation of the mineral resources of the region (especially gold) and, in turn, building the ports of Myos Hormos and, more importantly, Berenice to open up the Red Sea. Under Ptolemy II, the Ptolemies began ever more political and financial adventures along the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. At this date, the trade in the Indian Ocean seems largely to have been dominated by peoples from East Africa and Southern Arabia who leveraged their position to connect the Ptolemies with India but from as early as Ptolemy II, the Ptolemies had begun trying to subvert this control somewhat. During the mid-3rd Century, Ptolemy II sent ambassadors to the Mauryan Empire and later Ptolemaic kings would fund exploration missions to trace the Indian Ocean monsoons and find trade routes directly to India itself.
Through Berenice and Myos Hormos came silks, spices, incense, jewels and a host of other very desired goods upon which the Ptolemies often collected astoundingly high taxes (possibly as high as 25-50%). On several occasions, Ptolemaic kings even seem to have made attempts to entirely subvert the trade altogether and famously tried to transplant frankincense which ultimately failed but shows the importance of the crop as a potential source of revenue for the Ptolemies and their awareness of the huge wealth coming from the east. Ptolemaic embassies are known in western and southern Arabia, possibly seeking to establish friendly relationships with local leaders, as well as pirate hunting expeditions in the Red Sea to protect against raids on their shipping.
To the south, the Ptolemies were drawn largely by the potential animal wealth of east Africa. Ptolemy II himself is said to have developed the so-called 'elephantegoi', a new ship built specifically for the purposes of carrying home live elephants and, from the 260s, the earliest hunting base known as 'Ptolemais of the Hunts' was established to the south. Live elephants were brought back both for the prestige (and association with kingship) and for their military utility although, in battle they tended to be easily frightened by the larger Asian elephants employed by the Seleucids. This required a huge investment of resources; the camps established by the Ptolemies were often semi-permanent residences for hunters who needed to capture and train the elephants before they could be brought onto ships. This involved direct state involvement and frequent supply expeditions were organised with hunters paid well above the average wages of the time (as much as double other labourers for their work!).
Ivory hunting was also important and, during the 3rd Century, ivory prices dropped in the Mediterranean as the Ptolemies began to export huge quantities of ivory brought from east Africa. In time, their hunters began to deplete local hunting grounds, forcing them to travel ever further south. These hunts would eventually die off during the 2nd Century but, by that point, the Ptolemies had reached as far as Cape Guardafui in the Horn of Africa. Under Philadelphus, the Ptolemies campaigned in Nubia, bringing back captives, ivory and gold which were paraded through the streets of Alexandria in a grand display of wealth and power. As their influence and connections spread ever further out, the Ptolemies were able to expand their ambitions. Do not misunderstand, the loss of Coele-Syria was indeed a loss but it was far from being one that they could not recover from; the Ptolemaic empire continued to dominate the seas and was far from down and out (as events would soon show). Under Ptolemy II, Ptolemaic soft power and political influence had reached a height. In 246 BCE, Ptolemy II died and passed the throne to his son, the 34-year-old Ptolemy III.
The Reign of Ptolemy III:
Alongside Antiochus II, Ptolemy III was one of the great commanders of the age. The clash between Antiochus and Ptolemy in the 220s, the infamous 3rd Syrian War (or Great Syrian War) in which Ptolemy III earned the nickname 'Nikator', has gone down in history as one of the most important wars of the 3rd Century, one which would set the tone for the two powers going forward. However, the early parts of Ptolemy III's reign were remarkable peaceful on his northern front. If Ptolemy sought to reclaim Syria at this date, he did not show it. Instead, he originally seems to have placed his focus on shoring up his position in the eastern Mediterranean after the defeats of the 250s. In particular, he took advantage of the declining popularity of the Seleucids in Greece to cement and increase Ptolemaic influence there. In 244, Ptolemy welcomed several Athenians to Alexandria where one orator gave a speech about Antiochus II, naming him 'The Seleucid Xerxes'. Around the same time, he was also active in the Peloponnese where the spectre of Seleucid imperialism won him supporters amongst the Achaean League, and in Corinth. Several cities in Judaea were fortified as well, possibly in preparation for another war with the Seleucids in the future.
At the same time, he turned his attention south and east as his father had done. As mentioned, embassies were sent to several leaders in western Arabia and Ptolemy seems to have promoted further relations with the Mauryas at this date. In the south, he continued the relentless push south in search of ivory and elephants but, possibly seeking more room in which to build his empire, made several campaigns south along the Nile valley. Ptolemy II had already begun carving out a province in the region but Ptolemaic control seems to have largely declined during the wars of the 250s. As such, in the 240s, Ptolemy III began a new series of campaigns against the Kingdom of Kush. The first of these campaigns, undertaken during the late 240s, was probably more of a tribute seeking mission. However, during the 230s, Ptolemy seems to have made more attempts to carve a lasting empire out in the region. It is possible that he saw Nubia as an opportunity to build his empire, accrue more soldiers, and expand his economy or simply as a place where he could match the military expansionism of Antiochus and carve out his own 'conqueror' identity in a period where retaking Syria was currently not on the cards while the Ptolemies rebuilt. Regardless, the campaigns of the 230s brought Ptolemaic control as far south as the second cataract where he famously made a visit to the mortuary temple of Ramesses II (and had sand cleared away), an area which was carved out into the province named the very easy to remember Triakontaschoinos, originally placed under the leadership of Mosollamos, a Jewish commander who had distinguished himself in the campaigns.
Here, the Ptolemies patronised the construction of a whole series of grand new Egyptian temples, likely in an attempt to try and syncretise Nubian and Egyptian gods to make ruling the region easier. Forts were established and new roads carved which helped access the gold resources of the region. In the 220s, Mosollamos would fight a Second Ptolemaic-Kushite war which would result in a temporary extension of the Triakontaschoinos as far as the third cataract where a 3rd Century Ptolemaic fort was found, occupied likely between 228 and 226 BCE when Mosollamos would have had to pull his soldiers out of Nubia to help provide extra resources for the campaign against Antiochus II.
--------------------------
Note from the Author: I have tried very hard not to indulge too much in talking about Ptolemaic East Africa and the Red Sea but it is, in my opinion, one of the most interesting topics in Hellenistic history and one which not a lot of people pay enough attention to. Thank you all for reading and all the support you've given, I hope you enjoy this chapter!
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Not a problem! I like the fact that my timeline can have an educational effect and there is a lot of thought goes into trying to balance real history with alternative history here so I'm always happy to discuss the real considerations and topics that went into it.
As for Seleucid-Carthaginian relations, they almost certainly do have some connections. Right now, that is probably just traders; Antiochus does not currently really see Rome as a problem that needs to be managed so he's unlikely to be seeking a Carthaginian alliance against them or anything. Right now, the Ptolemies are still the one great enemy of the Seleucids and we are not yet at a point where the Romans are going to try and throw their weight around against all the Hellenistic kingdoms, not with Carthage still out there and Hamilcar Barca on the loose.
Chapter Twenty-Three
Chapter Twenty-Three: The Tyrian Revolution (255-227 BCE)
By the late 250s, most of the cities of Phoenicia had emerged under republican regimes. From the 270s onwards, we begin to see more and more cities throughout Phoenicia issuing coins and inscriptions referencing the peoples of their cities, coins with local kings disappear and are replaced with Greco-Phoenician issues which embraced Phoenician images on one side and usually a Hellenistic king on the other. The earliest of these cities was Sidon, probably around 278 BCE, which began issuing coins in 'the Era of the people of Sidon' but, by the end of the decade, Tyre had also emerged as a democratic city and, by the 250s, most of the other cities in Phoenicia had followed. Despite being treated as effectively Ptolemaic cities, these Phoenician democracies seem to have been rather opportunist at various points. Between 280 and the mid-250s, they pursued relationships with both kingdoms at various points. For instance, around 279 or 278, Tyre became one of the cities to acknowledge Seleucus as King of Macedon, even when the Ptolemies held off on doing so. During the First Syrian War, Tyre had fallen on the side of the Ptolemies as it did several decades later in the 250s but, in the interim, continued its middle ground policy; in the 260s, Tyre had welcomed benefaction from Antiochus I and, in 259, also received promises of a new temple from Antiochus II.
As we have discussed, none of this should be seen as unexpected. For the most part, Phoenicia seems to have fallen into the Ptolemaic sphere of influence but a certain amount of back and forth political wrangling was entirely expected and accepted by Hellenistic kings. In a world without fixed borders, most ancient states had a tendency to 'breathe' somewhat, growing and shrinking constantly without any real concern by its leaders or even rivals. Even during the Second Syrian War, both kings are seen appealing to the Phoenician cities, implying that, despite Ptolemaic garrisons and fortifications, these cities were considered as potential third players in the wars between the two kings. During the course of the war, Antiochus had seized opportunities from local elites to take control of the cities by force and, in the process, had displaced the democratic constitutions of the cities of Phoenicia in order to establish more pro-Seleucid monarchical governments. One of these opportunities was Philocrates of Tyre.
Born in 294 BCE to a Tyrian father and Greek mother, Philocrates had made himself at home moving between Tyre and the various Hellenistic courts of the eastern Mediterranean. His Greek name is almost certainly a 'double name' but his Phoenician name is unknown to us and he only appears as Philocrates in the Greek sources. By the mid-260s, Philocrates was active in the courts of Ptolemy II and Antiochus I, moving freely between both courts as the situation demanded it. In 262, Philocrates was in Alexandria where he is said to have fallen in love with the enormous Ptolemaic palace complex there. Nevertheless, by 255 BCE, Philocrates emerged as part of a group of elite Tyrians involved in turning the city over to Antiochus II. In return, Philocrates' cabal of rich Tyrians was placed in command of the city alongside a Seleucid garrison some 600 strong led by a commander named Hyginos. In 254 BCE, the cabal was still issuing coinage and inscriptions in the name of the 'People of Tyre' and, for at least a short while, seems to have maintained at least a premise of democracy, even as they massively restricted access to political power. Philocrates seems to have made his move quite quickly; in the weeks after the Seleucid capture of the city, he began wooing Hyginos and, with the help of two other conspirators; Azemilkos (possibly related to the old king of Tyre back in the 4th Century) and Diotimos (a Phoenician who, again, only appears through a Greek name), started fabricating conspiracies against Seleucid rule. Over the next year, with the help of Hyginos' garrisons, the three conspirators began to whittle down the rest of the cabal until, by 253 BCE, inscriptions from the city refer to the Tritarchs of Tyre.
Even this situation didn't last very long, however. Between 253 and 251, the three began to dismantle the old political institutions of the city; the old councils and assemblies were side-lined and new laws issued investing the three with increased powers and authority. Alongside this, each of the three started to reach out to outside forces to strengthen their own position against each other. In particular, each of the three reached out to similar elite groups (or kings) in other Phoenician cities, many of whom were happy to lend soldiers in return for pay, as well as either (or both) of the relevant Hellenistic kings. Philetairos, in particular, reached out to the Seleucid authorities while Azemilkos turned to Ptolemaic support in turn. When Diotimos died in 251 BCE, the two survivors turned to outright conflict in the streets of Tyre. Accusing Azemilkos of treating with the Ptolemies to overturn Seleucid authority, Philocrates was able to convince Hyginos to move against him. Azemilkos, finding himself outmanoeuvred and without direct Ptolemaic support, fled the city. In the aftermath, Philocrates made himself basileus.
It didn't take long for everything to go wrong. By himself, Philocrates quickly earned a reputation for heavy-handed rule. His first act was to establish a more official fortress for the Seleucid garrison (and himself) near the Sidonian harbour and the temple of Melqart in the northern part of the city. Having just had their republic stripped away, the Tyrian population was only further outraged by the construction of this new fortress-palace in their city. As rumours of dissent grew in the city, Philocrates very soon stumbled into making the exact wrong decision, deciding that the people of Tyre were upset over a constitution they should never have had and promptly ordering for the old boule (council building) to be demolished. Incensed by the destruction of the physical infrastructure of their lost democracy, the people of Tyre went to prevent the demolition, going so far as to engage in fistfights with the men sent to demolish the building. Philocrates proceeded to respond by demanding that Hyginos step in to stop the revolting Tyrian populace. To his credit, Hyginos promptly refused to do so, stating that his job was to maintain Seleucid authority and protect the city, not to help destroy buildings. Furious, Philocrates turned to his Phoenician 'mercenaries', the same soldiers from across Phoenicia who had helped him come to power in the first place, ordering them to intervene.
And intervene they did, in mid-250, the Phoenician mercenaries descended on the site and tried to disperse the groups of people gathered there. When they fought back, things turned violent. In the battle, the mercenaries killed some 50-60 Tyrians and drove the rest off. Their victory wouldn't last long, however, as news quickly began to spread throughout the city and groups of Tyrian citizens began to gather in the streets in response. This time, when ordered to disperse, they responded with rocks and improvised weapons. For several weeks, Philocrates' mercenaries and the people of Tyre fought in the streets for control of the boule until, finally, Philocrates' forces emerged triumphant once again and successfully dismantled the chambers once and for all. For the next two years, this pattern repeated itself time and again. The people of Tyre, increasingly frustrated with Philocrates' abuses of power, would rise up and find themselves going head to head with the mercenary forces of the king and (on several occasions) the Seleucid garrison itself. Things really came to a head, however, in 247 BCE during the so-called 'First Tyrian Revolution'.
The inciting incident, this time, was a murder during a drunken brawl. Some of Philocrates' mercenaries killed a local resident during the fight but were forced to retreat when a larger crowd began to gather. News spread quickly and, by morning, a huge crowd had gathered outside of the palace demanding for the culprits to be handed over. At first, Philocrates refused to compromise, demanding the citizens retreat and threatening to have them dispersed. When he tried to do so, however, things went somewhat differently. As his mercenaries streamed out, the Tyrians fell back, luring Philocrates' forces into the streets of the city. There, the Tyrians turned around trapping them in tight streets and surrounding them, bombarding them with rocks from upper stories and even rooftops, capturing and repurposing weapons. A few were able to fight their way back to the palace but, by the evening, many of the mercenaries were dead. Now, sensing that there was a very real possibility of wholesale revolution, Hyginos intervened. That night, he ordered Philocrates to turn his mercenaries over to Hyginos' command and took control of the walls himself. The next morning, the crowds had gathered again, swelling as news of the victory the previous day spread. In an attempt to sate them, Hyginos had the culprit of the murder a few days before arrested and publicly tried. It wasn't enough and the crowd began to call for their own trial. Hyginos complied, turning the mercenary over to the people who, the next evening, organised their own trial and execution.
Contrary to his expectations, however, the crowd did not disperse. On the contrary, emboldened by their victories, they demanded the removal of Philocrates and the re-institution of the old Tyrian democracy. Indeed, for a while, Hyginos seemed close to agreeing despite the best efforts of Philocrates himself. However, when the crowd demand also called for the dismantling of Philocrates' fortress and the removal of the Seleucid garrison from the island, he finally chose his side. Refusing the demands, Hyginos instead called for mediation and offered to help institute a new political system that could incorporate the demands of the people. It was too late, however. For many, the very image of the fortress and the Seleucid garrison were intimate parts of Philocrates' regime, they were symbols of anti-democratic sentiment and oppression that the Tyrians were not about to stand for. Finally, with negotiations stalling, Hyginos took action. The next morning, Seleucid forces marched out into the city to disperse the crowd and end the siege of the palace. At first, the Tyrians were able to gain the upper hand, succeeding in luring some contingents of Seleucid soldiers into the streets and ambushing them as they had done a couple of days earlier. However, Hyginos was able to rally his soldiers and drive off many of the rebels. For the next two weeks, this pattern continued to repeat itself until, finally, a larger Seleucid force arrived and put down the revolution once and for all.
In the aftermath, Seleucid control of the city grew stronger. Hyginos remained in command of the garrison and, increasingly, began to side-line Philocrates. All decisions now had to be run past Hyginos before being made and the Phoenician mercenaries were officially disbanded. In turn, the garrison was also increased from 600 to 1000 soldiers. Again, to his credit, Hyginos seems to have made very real attempts to assuage the people of Tyre. Between 247 and 246, Hyginos assisted Kleopatra in helping provide for the food requirements of the city and, in 245, Hyginos convinced Philocrates to reconstruct the boule, providing Seleucid soldiers to help in its construction. However, dissent continued; Philocrates was still in power, his palace still intact and the Seleucid garrison still in control of the city. What's more, Seleucid soldiers were ever more visible, present in the marketplace, patrolling the city and arresting several popular leaders of the rebellion. In 244 BCE, a second (though smaller) rebellion broke out near the Egyptian harbour in the southern part of the city culminating in a pitched battle in which several Seleucid soldiers were killed and Hyginos injured. A third rebellion, just over a year later, marked the third and final major uprising (before the 220s at least).
Afterwards, however, active dissent seems to have undergone a general downwards trend. By 234 BCE, Tyre found itself in a reasonable state of equilibrium. Hyginos died in 241 BCE and, in 235, Philocrates also died and passed the throne to his son, Pausanias. For a time, a certain amount of peace seems to have continued. In the late 230s, however, a charismatic young Tyrian came to the fore by the name of Melqartamos. Melqartamos seems to have been only one of a general wave of pro-democratic sentiment rising in the Phoenician cities at the time. What is interesting is that the general patterns seen in Tyre seem to have been borne out in other Phoenician cities at the time. In the 250s, Tyre had been only one of many Phoenician cities to find itself under oligarchic or royal rule and, throughout the 250s and 40s, several cities seem to have found themselves in states of turmoil. But the decade between 245 and 235 saw a decline in this dissent before another rise in democratic feeling amongst the younger people of a new generation headed by figures such as Melqartamos. Born in 258 BCE, Melqartamos had grown up through the early waves of revolt and was deeply affected by the events of the early 240s. Probably part of a wealthy family, Melqartamos travelled to Athens around 238 BCE where he remained for two years, learning oratory, philosophy, and, in particular, the history and constitution of the old democracy.
His return to Tyre was delayed somewhat, however, and he spent a few more years travelling around the eastern Mediterrnaean, visiting both Antioch and Alexandria where he spent a lot of time at the library of Alexandria. Upon his return to Tyre in 233, he initially turned his attention to the creation of new genres of Phoenician literature, seeking to emulate the cultural and literary output of the Greek world in a form adapted for Phoenician tastes and interests. Melqartamos was one of the first to begin popularising 'Neo-Phoenician script', a variation of the Phoenician alphabet which adapted the Greek vowels to better emulate speech and make literature more accessible. The first of his works was published either in 232 or 231 and entitled 'The Phoenician Politea' in imitation of Aristotle's 'Athenian Politea'. Unlike Aristotle's work, however, the Phoenician Politea was not an attempt to describe an existing constitution but an attempt to imagine an ideal constitution for the future of the Phoenician city states. Modelling it off Athenian democracy, Melqartamos adopted the Assembly and Boule but reintroduced the sufets which, until the overthrow of the democracies in the 250s, had been annually elected in many Phoenician cities. He may also have been, to some degree, inspired by Carthage which sent votive offerings to the temple of Melqart at Tyre every year. To some extent, this was simply a call for a return to the old pre-Seleucid system but the political context of Melqartamos' work was very much rooted in his environment. In a break from previous policy, Melqartamos argued that no true democracy could be beholden to a Hellenistic king but must be treated as autonomous. While he didn't entirely call for the removal of all Seleucid authority (to do so may well have had him arrested), he did argue for an autonomous and ungarrisoned status for Tyre similar to that of Ionian poleis.
Alongside the literary publication of this work, Melqartamos often lectured on the topic, supposedly memorising the pamphlet and reciting entire passages to other young Tyrians. In 229, Pausanias, worried about the implications of this philosophy, stepped in and ordered the pamphlet destroyed, having several copies rounded up and burned. However, in a display of how hard ideas can be to truly destroy, Melqartamos simply rewrote the pamphlet word for word and had a copy smuggled out of the city where it would spend several years in Alexandria in the possession of a friend. Melqartamos' written work wouldn't return to Tyre until after the end of the Second Tyrian Revolution in 229 BCE. In the meantime, he continued to lecture, attracting ever growing crowds. Realising that destroying the literary work of Melqartamos hadn't worked, Pausanias stepped in again and, along with the commander of the Seleucid garrison, ordered for Melqartamos and several other democratic leaders to be arrested. Anticipating this, however, Melqartamos relied on the safety of the crowd. During the days, he would travel around the city very visibly, lecturing in increasingly public places and staying at different friends' houses each night. When the soldiers came to arrest him one morning, they found their way blocked by listeners. Forcing their way through, they seized Melqartamos but found the crowd unwilling to let them leave. Calls for his release soon turned into direct action as people surged forward to free him from arrest. In the scuffle, several Seleucid soldiers were injured and forced to abandon the arrest entirely.
Next day, the Seleucid garrison marched out in force to arrest Melqartamos and, once again, found a fight. This time, the soldiers made better headway and Melqartamos was successfully captured alongside several other ringleaders. Taken back to Pausanias' palace, Melqartamos was tried in private and sentenced to imprisonment. In his absence, however, dissent began to swell yet again. Demands for his release grew throughout the city and old slogans of the rebellions of the 240s began to be employed. In one particularly striking instance, a group of Tyrians are said to have made an effigy of Pausanias and publicly beheaded it before parading the severed 'head' around the city. Several were arrested and executed. Once again, the Seleucid garrison commander seems to have made an attempt to step in and restore some order but without much success; demands for the release of Melqartamos and, increasingly, rumours that the young man had been executed, began to grow. Trying to avoid turning Melqartamos into a martyr, Pausanias took the radical step of having him brought up onto the walls to show the crowd that he was alive. However, the sight of Melqartamos, haggard and injured, only increased the anger amongst the crowd. In response, several hundred Tyrians marched from the palace to the Sidonian port, driving off the Seleucid guards and storming the port where they set fire to several ships, chanting for the release of Melqartamos and his friends.
For two weeks, the Seleucid garrison was placed under effective siege until, finally, news of an approaching Seleucid force arrived. Emboldened by the news, Pausanias demanded that the rioters stand down, only to be ridiculed. One story states that, a few days after the news of the approaching army arrived, Pausanias went up onto the walls of his palace only to see hundreds of effigies outside, each of them with their heads removed. Finally, sometime in June 229, a Seleucid army entered the city and marched, entirely unopposed, to the palace. Hearing of their approach, the protestors had evaporated back into the city to wait for another opportunity. Pausanias, now with a larger force at his back, had Melqartamos sentenced to death and set out to round up more of the democratic ringleaders. He was, fatefully as it turned out, stopped by the intervention of one of the men accompanying the Seleucid force; the 19-year-old Prince Demetrius of the Seleucid empire.
Prince Demetrius:
Demetrius has become something of a romantic figure in the memories of many. In the Hellenistic, his actions during the Great Syrian War and, ultimately, his tragic downfall turned him into a tragic hero of true Greek fashion. As a young man, Demetrius was often compared to his father and achieved fame as much for his love of fighting and bravery in combat as for his even-handedness and good temperament. Unlike his brothers, Demetrius is said to have enjoyed following his father on campaign and was lauded for refusing to travel on horseback, marching alongside the infantry instead. Much of this may well be fiction, the romanticised image of Demetrius that would later become popular in Hellenistic literature, but it shows the popularity of Demetrius even in his own time. By the time he was 19, Demetrius was a fully active member of the Seleucid court and, possibly on his own initiative, was part of the force (perhaps 2-3000 soldiers maximum) sent to Phoenicia in 229. Tyre was not the only ongoing issue there; democratic movements had been breaking out in several cities with varying responses. In Sidon, the transfer of power was largely peaceful and, by 230, the city was once again a republic. In Tyre and Byblos, however, civil unrest had broken out, often prompted by the reactionary responses of their leaders.
We have focussed on Tyre for a reason; the political environment of Tyre is crucial for the events of the Great Syrian War and for Demetrius' own actions within it, but that is not to say that the events in the other Phoenician cities were any less interesting or important. Regardless, the focus on Tyre is the easiest way to describe the general events ongoing in the Levant during this period. Upon his arrival, Demetrius immediately took command of the situation, ordering Pausanias to release Melqartamos and issuing a general pardon for the rebels. He agreed to negotiate with the rebels personally and organise a peaceful transfer of power from Pausanias to a new constitution and ordered for Pausanias to be deposed. Fearing that his deposition would lead inevitably to his murder, however, Pausanias escaped the city under cover of night and fled south to Egypt. In the end, Demetrius' republic would not come to pass. Not yet, at least. In early 228 BCE, Pausanias, now in Alexandria, approached Ptolemy III for help restoring him to power. In truth, Ptolemy may well have had no such intention; the Seleucids themselves had learned that monarchy was not currently popular in Phoenicia. However, Pausanias gave Ptolemy a handy casus belli; later that year, he began mobilising his army and, in 227 BCE, he launched his invasion of Coele-Syria with the stated goal of 'protecting the cities of Phoenicia against rampant rebellion and ending internecine violence'.
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Note: I know I've used 'republic' and 'democracy' interchangeably here and that they are not interchangeable. I cannot find much information on the OTL Phoenician cities and their governments but they may well have been republican in a similar manner to what we see in Carthage. Phoenician cities had been republics before, some going back a lot further than the Hellenistic. However, many cities do seem to have had kings during the time of Alexander, many of whom appear to have been overthrown during the 3rd Century. Mostly, I really use republic and democracy interchangeably here for my own convenience and to make the reading a bit less samey and varied. Understand that I am working on the basis that these 'democracies' are probably Carthage-style republics albeit, in this case following Melqartamos' ideology, with a possibly wider franchise.
By the late 250s, most of the cities of Phoenicia had emerged under republican regimes. From the 270s onwards, we begin to see more and more cities throughout Phoenicia issuing coins and inscriptions referencing the peoples of their cities, coins with local kings disappear and are replaced with Greco-Phoenician issues which embraced Phoenician images on one side and usually a Hellenistic king on the other. The earliest of these cities was Sidon, probably around 278 BCE, which began issuing coins in 'the Era of the people of Sidon' but, by the end of the decade, Tyre had also emerged as a democratic city and, by the 250s, most of the other cities in Phoenicia had followed. Despite being treated as effectively Ptolemaic cities, these Phoenician democracies seem to have been rather opportunist at various points. Between 280 and the mid-250s, they pursued relationships with both kingdoms at various points. For instance, around 279 or 278, Tyre became one of the cities to acknowledge Seleucus as King of Macedon, even when the Ptolemies held off on doing so. During the First Syrian War, Tyre had fallen on the side of the Ptolemies as it did several decades later in the 250s but, in the interim, continued its middle ground policy; in the 260s, Tyre had welcomed benefaction from Antiochus I and, in 259, also received promises of a new temple from Antiochus II.
As we have discussed, none of this should be seen as unexpected. For the most part, Phoenicia seems to have fallen into the Ptolemaic sphere of influence but a certain amount of back and forth political wrangling was entirely expected and accepted by Hellenistic kings. In a world without fixed borders, most ancient states had a tendency to 'breathe' somewhat, growing and shrinking constantly without any real concern by its leaders or even rivals. Even during the Second Syrian War, both kings are seen appealing to the Phoenician cities, implying that, despite Ptolemaic garrisons and fortifications, these cities were considered as potential third players in the wars between the two kings. During the course of the war, Antiochus had seized opportunities from local elites to take control of the cities by force and, in the process, had displaced the democratic constitutions of the cities of Phoenicia in order to establish more pro-Seleucid monarchical governments. One of these opportunities was Philocrates of Tyre.
Born in 294 BCE to a Tyrian father and Greek mother, Philocrates had made himself at home moving between Tyre and the various Hellenistic courts of the eastern Mediterranean. His Greek name is almost certainly a 'double name' but his Phoenician name is unknown to us and he only appears as Philocrates in the Greek sources. By the mid-260s, Philocrates was active in the courts of Ptolemy II and Antiochus I, moving freely between both courts as the situation demanded it. In 262, Philocrates was in Alexandria where he is said to have fallen in love with the enormous Ptolemaic palace complex there. Nevertheless, by 255 BCE, Philocrates emerged as part of a group of elite Tyrians involved in turning the city over to Antiochus II. In return, Philocrates' cabal of rich Tyrians was placed in command of the city alongside a Seleucid garrison some 600 strong led by a commander named Hyginos. In 254 BCE, the cabal was still issuing coinage and inscriptions in the name of the 'People of Tyre' and, for at least a short while, seems to have maintained at least a premise of democracy, even as they massively restricted access to political power. Philocrates seems to have made his move quite quickly; in the weeks after the Seleucid capture of the city, he began wooing Hyginos and, with the help of two other conspirators; Azemilkos (possibly related to the old king of Tyre back in the 4th Century) and Diotimos (a Phoenician who, again, only appears through a Greek name), started fabricating conspiracies against Seleucid rule. Over the next year, with the help of Hyginos' garrisons, the three conspirators began to whittle down the rest of the cabal until, by 253 BCE, inscriptions from the city refer to the Tritarchs of Tyre.
Even this situation didn't last very long, however. Between 253 and 251, the three began to dismantle the old political institutions of the city; the old councils and assemblies were side-lined and new laws issued investing the three with increased powers and authority. Alongside this, each of the three started to reach out to outside forces to strengthen their own position against each other. In particular, each of the three reached out to similar elite groups (or kings) in other Phoenician cities, many of whom were happy to lend soldiers in return for pay, as well as either (or both) of the relevant Hellenistic kings. Philetairos, in particular, reached out to the Seleucid authorities while Azemilkos turned to Ptolemaic support in turn. When Diotimos died in 251 BCE, the two survivors turned to outright conflict in the streets of Tyre. Accusing Azemilkos of treating with the Ptolemies to overturn Seleucid authority, Philocrates was able to convince Hyginos to move against him. Azemilkos, finding himself outmanoeuvred and without direct Ptolemaic support, fled the city. In the aftermath, Philocrates made himself basileus.
It didn't take long for everything to go wrong. By himself, Philocrates quickly earned a reputation for heavy-handed rule. His first act was to establish a more official fortress for the Seleucid garrison (and himself) near the Sidonian harbour and the temple of Melqart in the northern part of the city. Having just had their republic stripped away, the Tyrian population was only further outraged by the construction of this new fortress-palace in their city. As rumours of dissent grew in the city, Philocrates very soon stumbled into making the exact wrong decision, deciding that the people of Tyre were upset over a constitution they should never have had and promptly ordering for the old boule (council building) to be demolished. Incensed by the destruction of the physical infrastructure of their lost democracy, the people of Tyre went to prevent the demolition, going so far as to engage in fistfights with the men sent to demolish the building. Philocrates proceeded to respond by demanding that Hyginos step in to stop the revolting Tyrian populace. To his credit, Hyginos promptly refused to do so, stating that his job was to maintain Seleucid authority and protect the city, not to help destroy buildings. Furious, Philocrates turned to his Phoenician 'mercenaries', the same soldiers from across Phoenicia who had helped him come to power in the first place, ordering them to intervene.
And intervene they did, in mid-250, the Phoenician mercenaries descended on the site and tried to disperse the groups of people gathered there. When they fought back, things turned violent. In the battle, the mercenaries killed some 50-60 Tyrians and drove the rest off. Their victory wouldn't last long, however, as news quickly began to spread throughout the city and groups of Tyrian citizens began to gather in the streets in response. This time, when ordered to disperse, they responded with rocks and improvised weapons. For several weeks, Philocrates' mercenaries and the people of Tyre fought in the streets for control of the boule until, finally, Philocrates' forces emerged triumphant once again and successfully dismantled the chambers once and for all. For the next two years, this pattern repeated itself time and again. The people of Tyre, increasingly frustrated with Philocrates' abuses of power, would rise up and find themselves going head to head with the mercenary forces of the king and (on several occasions) the Seleucid garrison itself. Things really came to a head, however, in 247 BCE during the so-called 'First Tyrian Revolution'.
The inciting incident, this time, was a murder during a drunken brawl. Some of Philocrates' mercenaries killed a local resident during the fight but were forced to retreat when a larger crowd began to gather. News spread quickly and, by morning, a huge crowd had gathered outside of the palace demanding for the culprits to be handed over. At first, Philocrates refused to compromise, demanding the citizens retreat and threatening to have them dispersed. When he tried to do so, however, things went somewhat differently. As his mercenaries streamed out, the Tyrians fell back, luring Philocrates' forces into the streets of the city. There, the Tyrians turned around trapping them in tight streets and surrounding them, bombarding them with rocks from upper stories and even rooftops, capturing and repurposing weapons. A few were able to fight their way back to the palace but, by the evening, many of the mercenaries were dead. Now, sensing that there was a very real possibility of wholesale revolution, Hyginos intervened. That night, he ordered Philocrates to turn his mercenaries over to Hyginos' command and took control of the walls himself. The next morning, the crowds had gathered again, swelling as news of the victory the previous day spread. In an attempt to sate them, Hyginos had the culprit of the murder a few days before arrested and publicly tried. It wasn't enough and the crowd began to call for their own trial. Hyginos complied, turning the mercenary over to the people who, the next evening, organised their own trial and execution.
Contrary to his expectations, however, the crowd did not disperse. On the contrary, emboldened by their victories, they demanded the removal of Philocrates and the re-institution of the old Tyrian democracy. Indeed, for a while, Hyginos seemed close to agreeing despite the best efforts of Philocrates himself. However, when the crowd demand also called for the dismantling of Philocrates' fortress and the removal of the Seleucid garrison from the island, he finally chose his side. Refusing the demands, Hyginos instead called for mediation and offered to help institute a new political system that could incorporate the demands of the people. It was too late, however. For many, the very image of the fortress and the Seleucid garrison were intimate parts of Philocrates' regime, they were symbols of anti-democratic sentiment and oppression that the Tyrians were not about to stand for. Finally, with negotiations stalling, Hyginos took action. The next morning, Seleucid forces marched out into the city to disperse the crowd and end the siege of the palace. At first, the Tyrians were able to gain the upper hand, succeeding in luring some contingents of Seleucid soldiers into the streets and ambushing them as they had done a couple of days earlier. However, Hyginos was able to rally his soldiers and drive off many of the rebels. For the next two weeks, this pattern continued to repeat itself until, finally, a larger Seleucid force arrived and put down the revolution once and for all.
In the aftermath, Seleucid control of the city grew stronger. Hyginos remained in command of the garrison and, increasingly, began to side-line Philocrates. All decisions now had to be run past Hyginos before being made and the Phoenician mercenaries were officially disbanded. In turn, the garrison was also increased from 600 to 1000 soldiers. Again, to his credit, Hyginos seems to have made very real attempts to assuage the people of Tyre. Between 247 and 246, Hyginos assisted Kleopatra in helping provide for the food requirements of the city and, in 245, Hyginos convinced Philocrates to reconstruct the boule, providing Seleucid soldiers to help in its construction. However, dissent continued; Philocrates was still in power, his palace still intact and the Seleucid garrison still in control of the city. What's more, Seleucid soldiers were ever more visible, present in the marketplace, patrolling the city and arresting several popular leaders of the rebellion. In 244 BCE, a second (though smaller) rebellion broke out near the Egyptian harbour in the southern part of the city culminating in a pitched battle in which several Seleucid soldiers were killed and Hyginos injured. A third rebellion, just over a year later, marked the third and final major uprising (before the 220s at least).
Afterwards, however, active dissent seems to have undergone a general downwards trend. By 234 BCE, Tyre found itself in a reasonable state of equilibrium. Hyginos died in 241 BCE and, in 235, Philocrates also died and passed the throne to his son, Pausanias. For a time, a certain amount of peace seems to have continued. In the late 230s, however, a charismatic young Tyrian came to the fore by the name of Melqartamos. Melqartamos seems to have been only one of a general wave of pro-democratic sentiment rising in the Phoenician cities at the time. What is interesting is that the general patterns seen in Tyre seem to have been borne out in other Phoenician cities at the time. In the 250s, Tyre had been only one of many Phoenician cities to find itself under oligarchic or royal rule and, throughout the 250s and 40s, several cities seem to have found themselves in states of turmoil. But the decade between 245 and 235 saw a decline in this dissent before another rise in democratic feeling amongst the younger people of a new generation headed by figures such as Melqartamos. Born in 258 BCE, Melqartamos had grown up through the early waves of revolt and was deeply affected by the events of the early 240s. Probably part of a wealthy family, Melqartamos travelled to Athens around 238 BCE where he remained for two years, learning oratory, philosophy, and, in particular, the history and constitution of the old democracy.
His return to Tyre was delayed somewhat, however, and he spent a few more years travelling around the eastern Mediterrnaean, visiting both Antioch and Alexandria where he spent a lot of time at the library of Alexandria. Upon his return to Tyre in 233, he initially turned his attention to the creation of new genres of Phoenician literature, seeking to emulate the cultural and literary output of the Greek world in a form adapted for Phoenician tastes and interests. Melqartamos was one of the first to begin popularising 'Neo-Phoenician script', a variation of the Phoenician alphabet which adapted the Greek vowels to better emulate speech and make literature more accessible. The first of his works was published either in 232 or 231 and entitled 'The Phoenician Politea' in imitation of Aristotle's 'Athenian Politea'. Unlike Aristotle's work, however, the Phoenician Politea was not an attempt to describe an existing constitution but an attempt to imagine an ideal constitution for the future of the Phoenician city states. Modelling it off Athenian democracy, Melqartamos adopted the Assembly and Boule but reintroduced the sufets which, until the overthrow of the democracies in the 250s, had been annually elected in many Phoenician cities. He may also have been, to some degree, inspired by Carthage which sent votive offerings to the temple of Melqart at Tyre every year. To some extent, this was simply a call for a return to the old pre-Seleucid system but the political context of Melqartamos' work was very much rooted in his environment. In a break from previous policy, Melqartamos argued that no true democracy could be beholden to a Hellenistic king but must be treated as autonomous. While he didn't entirely call for the removal of all Seleucid authority (to do so may well have had him arrested), he did argue for an autonomous and ungarrisoned status for Tyre similar to that of Ionian poleis.
Alongside the literary publication of this work, Melqartamos often lectured on the topic, supposedly memorising the pamphlet and reciting entire passages to other young Tyrians. In 229, Pausanias, worried about the implications of this philosophy, stepped in and ordered the pamphlet destroyed, having several copies rounded up and burned. However, in a display of how hard ideas can be to truly destroy, Melqartamos simply rewrote the pamphlet word for word and had a copy smuggled out of the city where it would spend several years in Alexandria in the possession of a friend. Melqartamos' written work wouldn't return to Tyre until after the end of the Second Tyrian Revolution in 229 BCE. In the meantime, he continued to lecture, attracting ever growing crowds. Realising that destroying the literary work of Melqartamos hadn't worked, Pausanias stepped in again and, along with the commander of the Seleucid garrison, ordered for Melqartamos and several other democratic leaders to be arrested. Anticipating this, however, Melqartamos relied on the safety of the crowd. During the days, he would travel around the city very visibly, lecturing in increasingly public places and staying at different friends' houses each night. When the soldiers came to arrest him one morning, they found their way blocked by listeners. Forcing their way through, they seized Melqartamos but found the crowd unwilling to let them leave. Calls for his release soon turned into direct action as people surged forward to free him from arrest. In the scuffle, several Seleucid soldiers were injured and forced to abandon the arrest entirely.
Next day, the Seleucid garrison marched out in force to arrest Melqartamos and, once again, found a fight. This time, the soldiers made better headway and Melqartamos was successfully captured alongside several other ringleaders. Taken back to Pausanias' palace, Melqartamos was tried in private and sentenced to imprisonment. In his absence, however, dissent began to swell yet again. Demands for his release grew throughout the city and old slogans of the rebellions of the 240s began to be employed. In one particularly striking instance, a group of Tyrians are said to have made an effigy of Pausanias and publicly beheaded it before parading the severed 'head' around the city. Several were arrested and executed. Once again, the Seleucid garrison commander seems to have made an attempt to step in and restore some order but without much success; demands for the release of Melqartamos and, increasingly, rumours that the young man had been executed, began to grow. Trying to avoid turning Melqartamos into a martyr, Pausanias took the radical step of having him brought up onto the walls to show the crowd that he was alive. However, the sight of Melqartamos, haggard and injured, only increased the anger amongst the crowd. In response, several hundred Tyrians marched from the palace to the Sidonian port, driving off the Seleucid guards and storming the port where they set fire to several ships, chanting for the release of Melqartamos and his friends.
For two weeks, the Seleucid garrison was placed under effective siege until, finally, news of an approaching Seleucid force arrived. Emboldened by the news, Pausanias demanded that the rioters stand down, only to be ridiculed. One story states that, a few days after the news of the approaching army arrived, Pausanias went up onto the walls of his palace only to see hundreds of effigies outside, each of them with their heads removed. Finally, sometime in June 229, a Seleucid army entered the city and marched, entirely unopposed, to the palace. Hearing of their approach, the protestors had evaporated back into the city to wait for another opportunity. Pausanias, now with a larger force at his back, had Melqartamos sentenced to death and set out to round up more of the democratic ringleaders. He was, fatefully as it turned out, stopped by the intervention of one of the men accompanying the Seleucid force; the 19-year-old Prince Demetrius of the Seleucid empire.
Prince Demetrius:
Demetrius has become something of a romantic figure in the memories of many. In the Hellenistic, his actions during the Great Syrian War and, ultimately, his tragic downfall turned him into a tragic hero of true Greek fashion. As a young man, Demetrius was often compared to his father and achieved fame as much for his love of fighting and bravery in combat as for his even-handedness and good temperament. Unlike his brothers, Demetrius is said to have enjoyed following his father on campaign and was lauded for refusing to travel on horseback, marching alongside the infantry instead. Much of this may well be fiction, the romanticised image of Demetrius that would later become popular in Hellenistic literature, but it shows the popularity of Demetrius even in his own time. By the time he was 19, Demetrius was a fully active member of the Seleucid court and, possibly on his own initiative, was part of the force (perhaps 2-3000 soldiers maximum) sent to Phoenicia in 229. Tyre was not the only ongoing issue there; democratic movements had been breaking out in several cities with varying responses. In Sidon, the transfer of power was largely peaceful and, by 230, the city was once again a republic. In Tyre and Byblos, however, civil unrest had broken out, often prompted by the reactionary responses of their leaders.
We have focussed on Tyre for a reason; the political environment of Tyre is crucial for the events of the Great Syrian War and for Demetrius' own actions within it, but that is not to say that the events in the other Phoenician cities were any less interesting or important. Regardless, the focus on Tyre is the easiest way to describe the general events ongoing in the Levant during this period. Upon his arrival, Demetrius immediately took command of the situation, ordering Pausanias to release Melqartamos and issuing a general pardon for the rebels. He agreed to negotiate with the rebels personally and organise a peaceful transfer of power from Pausanias to a new constitution and ordered for Pausanias to be deposed. Fearing that his deposition would lead inevitably to his murder, however, Pausanias escaped the city under cover of night and fled south to Egypt. In the end, Demetrius' republic would not come to pass. Not yet, at least. In early 228 BCE, Pausanias, now in Alexandria, approached Ptolemy III for help restoring him to power. In truth, Ptolemy may well have had no such intention; the Seleucids themselves had learned that monarchy was not currently popular in Phoenicia. However, Pausanias gave Ptolemy a handy casus belli; later that year, he began mobilising his army and, in 227 BCE, he launched his invasion of Coele-Syria with the stated goal of 'protecting the cities of Phoenicia against rampant rebellion and ending internecine violence'.
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Note: I know I've used 'republic' and 'democracy' interchangeably here and that they are not interchangeable. I cannot find much information on the OTL Phoenician cities and their governments but they may well have been republican in a similar manner to what we see in Carthage. Phoenician cities had been republics before, some going back a lot further than the Hellenistic. However, many cities do seem to have had kings during the time of Alexander, many of whom appear to have been overthrown during the 3rd Century. Mostly, I really use republic and democracy interchangeably here for my own convenience and to make the reading a bit less samey and varied. Understand that I am working on the basis that these 'democracies' are probably Carthage-style republics albeit, in this case following Melqartamos' ideology, with a possibly wider franchise.
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Fascinating as always. Interesting developments in Phoenicia and some tantalizing hints for the future. Its great to have such a high-quality Hellenistic TL on the site.
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Ant changes in case of india due to greater connection with Egypt and selucid state?
According to Historical data Bindusara expanded his Empire in south india. Does in this timeline it expanded further than canon?
P.S. you can check a eassy titled Emporer Asoka and the Five Greek Kings by Richard Thompson for Buddhist missionaries in Greece and west.
According to Historical data Bindusara expanded his Empire in south india. Does in this timeline it expanded further than canon?
P.S. you can check a eassy titled Emporer Asoka and the Five Greek Kings by Richard Thompson for Buddhist missionaries in Greece and west.
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Thank you so much for the support, it’s so appreciated! Just to give everyone a bit of insight (or a teaser) as to what’s coming next, the next four (or so, I’ll add more if I need) chapters are dedicated to, what else, the Great Syrian War. In order we have:
Chapter Twenty-Three: Moves and Countermoves
Chapter Twenty-Four: The Siege of Tyre Part One: Demetrius the Besieged
Chapter Twenty-Five: The Siege of Tyre Part Two: Dionysus and Herakles
Chapter Twenty-Six: I don’t actually have a name for this one yet
Chapter Twenty-Three: Moves and Countermoves
Chapter Twenty-Four: The Siege of Tyre Part One: Demetrius the Besieged
Chapter Twenty-Five: The Siege of Tyre Part Two: Dionysus and Herakles
Chapter Twenty-Six: I don’t actually have a name for this one yet
I’m not entirely sure why it would expand much further. Bindusara, of course, is long dead by this point. For the most part, there isn’t much in the way of extra connections; most of what I’ve written about is pretty much the same as our timeline with the exception of a few of the literary developments.
Good updates, and looking forward to the upcoming chapters...
Of course, all of these powers are going to have to deal with the Romans at some point in TTL...
Like I said, this will be a nominee for the Turtledove Awards (AH.com's version of the Oscars, basically) next year for Best Ancient Timeline...
Of course, all of these powers are going to have to deal with the Romans at some point in TTL...
Like I said, this will be a nominee for the Turtledove Awards (AH.com's version of the Oscars, basically) next year for Best Ancient Timeline...
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Awesome! Indeed this Timeline has made me start wanting to start a deep dive into the Hellenistic period and specifically The Seleucids of course. As this is my first time being active on a thread it's great to interact with the Author!.
It will be very interesting how Carthaginian-Seleucid relationship develops, specially as Antiochus is gearing up to re-establish his naval power on the eastern Mediterranean.
Also I hope that comment about the amount of surviving papyri means the Library had a better faith than in our timeline.
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I'm so glad you think so and are enjoying the work! Honestly one of my difficulties is trying to avoid the whole 'coming of the Romans thing'. I find that it's very easy to fall into the trap of viewing the Hellenistic as just the inevitable march towards Roman domination which I'm hoping to avoid. It's one of the reasons I've largely sidelined them thus far so as to avoid portraying them as some big bad. That said, you're not wrong that eventually the Seleucids are going to have to deal with Rome eventually, whether diplomatically or on the battlefield is yet to be seen.
I mean the comment about the amount of surviving papyri is honestly just real life. Huge amounts of papyrus survive from Ptolemaic Egypt with rather little of it being stuff that would've been kept in the library of Alexandria. Much of it is letters or tax records with a few laws (some histories and literature too but these probably were parts of private collections), regulations, notices, wills and a whole bunch of other stuff. What makes it important is not its connection to the library of Alexandria (and most of it had no connection whatsoever) but its connection to the people living in Ptolemaic Egypt.
Also, I'm always happy to pass on recommendations for Seleucid sources. I've done a lot of work thus far on Seleucid land ownership and administration (which is pretty obvious from the timeline I've written I guess) as well as Seleucid-era Arabia and the Indian Ocean. I specialise a bit more into the Ptolemies than the Seleucids on the whole but I've done a fair amount of work on both. The Seleucids have been undergoing a lot of rewriting recently so a lot of the information and many of the perspectives I use in this timeline come from quite recent scholarship on the empire which is a problem because it means that a lot of readers might not be able to access the same sources.
Chapter Twenty-Four
Chapter Twenty-Four: Moves and Countermoves
In May or June 227, Ptolemy III invaded Coele-Syria on the, quite flimsy, casus belli of ending the chaos and conflicts ongoing in Phoenicia at the time. By his side came Pausanias, the recently deposed king of Tyre who was now seeking any opportunity to return to power. Whether either of them knew it, the invasion of 227 would kick off nearly a decade of brutal warfare between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms which, by the end, would leave much of Coele-Syria devastated and tens of thousands dead. What neither of them knew was that the so-called 'Great Syrian War' would come to be a something of a literary phenomenon; an iconic war of the Hellenistic which made its mark in a lot of later literature. This literature, both historical and fictional, has shaped the perceptions and views of the war ever since and helped cement its place as one of the great and important conflicts of the Hellenistic. By all accounts, this literary importance, however, really began with the work of Euphemios, a Greco-Syrian author living sometime at the end of the 2nd Century BCE. The story goes that Euphemios, seeking inspiration for a story 'to rival that of Homer' had gone to visit a friend living down near Sidon. While staying with his friend, Euphemios heard the story of Prince Demetrius of Tyre and took a trip to the city to visit the Demetrium, a small shrine erected sometime in the 2nd Century by the people of Tyre. Inspired by the stories of Demetrius, Euphemios set out to record it in what became known as 'The Siege of Tyre' (although the Epic of Demetrius and the Demetrian Tragedy have both been used despite the fact that the story was neither an epic nor specifically a tragic work).
The 'Siege of Tyre' is a fictional work of prose narrative depicting the events of the siege of Tyre in which Demetrius and Ptolemy III are played off against one another as contemporary Homeric heroes struggling for control of Tyre, a conflict which is wrapped up in a political war between democracy and monarchy. In Euphemios, the siege is cast as a struggle between the ideals of democracy and monarchy in the city environment. The question, really, is: 'what is best for the people? Monarchy or democracy?' As you can imagine, in an environment where Hellenistic kings were still around, active, and dangerous, this was a topic which could very easily walk the line between literature and treason. Officially, Euphemios skirts the issue by presenting the idea that democracy is best for a city but can only achieve its greatest form under the 'patronage' and support of kings. Unofficially, the work still walked the line and seems to have been treated as somewhat dangerous by certain figures; one of Euphemios' friends is said to have cautioned him to destroy the work for fear of losing his head (although this may be an attempt to recreate the famous story of Sosthenes and Antiochus II). Under the surface, Euphemios' work is full of quite subtle subversion an, on occasion, outright dissent. Fundamentally, Demetrius is only able to achieve what he does because he casts off his royal affectations and effectively integrates himself into the citizen body. Neither Ptolemy nor Antiochus II ever appear as especially predisposed towards the interests of the people of Tyre beyond their own desire for control and even the conclusion, at the moment of Demetrius' greatest triumph, is loaded with tension in the subtle reminder that it is Demetrius' royal status which will, inevitably, lead to his downfall. We are left to ponder the question of whether, really, monarchy is such a good thing after all.
Regardless, Euphemios' story became immensely popular and seems to have sparked a wave of interest in the war which translated into both histories and literary works which began to mine the war for stories to adapt. The result of this is that many discussions of the war tend to follow a similar pattern in which the siege of Tyre, an event lasting less than a month all, is placed at the very centre of the events of the conflict as somehow being the most important event in a war full of other important events. In addition, many of the stories and anecdotes included in many histories are directly taken from the literary output produced in the cultural wave during the late 2nd and early 1st Centuries. With that said, it is difficult to not include many of these stories since they are so baked into the legends of the war as to be indistinguishable from it at times. As such, as we go through the historical narrative, we can only attempt to identify the bits and pieces that might be apocryphal and analyse them in the context of a 2nd and 1st Century literary environment. What can be said is that many of these authors, including Euphemios, made use of near-contemporary authors. In particular, they seem to have drawn extensively on Antiochus II's court biographer, Ambrosius (whose work does not survive) and the other contemporary; Lucius Atilius Caiatinus, a member of a senatorial family who spent time in Syria during the 210s and who, while there, wrote a short history of the Seleucid kings down to Seleucus II.
With that out of the way, let us begin recounting the actual narrative. Ptolemy II invaded in either May or June 227 BCE. At the time, Antiochus was in Seleukeia and would have received news of the invasion within a few days. By July at the latest, Antiochus' army was in the field and moving to intercept Ptolemy. For the most part, Ptolemy seems to have ignored the cities of Phoenicia themselves, instead banking on meeting the Seleucid army in battle in the hopes that a major victory might cause the Seleucids to outright capitulate. It is also likely that he was fully aware that he no time to waste on long sieges when Antiochus could arrive at any moment and threaten his rear. There are a handful of exceptions; at the very outset of the war, Ptolemy was able to convince the city to surrender, entering it and making a formal declaration that he had come to 'end the civil conflict within the city and institute good governance'. While there, he reorganised the city's government, placing a new 'Emergency Council' to govern Sidon until the war ended. In truth, the 'Emergency Council' was nothing more than a handy administrative tool for the Ptolemies to govern the city through and a means to pass power to their supporters. From Sidon, he also made a stop at Tyre where, apparently, he was hoping to be positively received but, finding Seleucid supporters already entrenched, decided to leave some 3000 soldiers to man the causeway under Pausanias' leadership. In turn, the Ptolemaic fleet moved in to blockade the Egyptian and Sidonian harbours and officially place the city under siege.
His other diplomatic success was Tripolis which, fearing his army, surrendered in June on the agreement that their democracy would be kept intact. By July, Ptolemy had reached the Orontes, encamping on the banks and according to one story, setting up an inscription stating that his army had reached the river and that, here, the Seleucid kingdom would meet its end. Antiochus had been busy; mobilising the main parts of his army, raising further levies and, importantly, augmenting his cavalry forces from central Asia while he was at it. When he marched in early July, he began with some 58,000 soldiers but, by August, that number had increased to as many as 70-75,000. Ptolemy, meanwhile, had made a beeline for Antioch, marching along the edge of the mountains and encamping just outside the southern gate where he began erecting siege weapons. In truth, however, Ptolemy's siege weapons were a ruse; he had no intention of trying to storm the city before Antiochus got there and left only enough soldiers to ensure that the garrison could not try to leave the city and aid Antiochus in battle. Instead, he spent the time in between his arrival and Antiochus' preparing for battle.
In May or June 227, Ptolemy III invaded Coele-Syria on the, quite flimsy, casus belli of ending the chaos and conflicts ongoing in Phoenicia at the time. By his side came Pausanias, the recently deposed king of Tyre who was now seeking any opportunity to return to power. Whether either of them knew it, the invasion of 227 would kick off nearly a decade of brutal warfare between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms which, by the end, would leave much of Coele-Syria devastated and tens of thousands dead. What neither of them knew was that the so-called 'Great Syrian War' would come to be a something of a literary phenomenon; an iconic war of the Hellenistic which made its mark in a lot of later literature. This literature, both historical and fictional, has shaped the perceptions and views of the war ever since and helped cement its place as one of the great and important conflicts of the Hellenistic. By all accounts, this literary importance, however, really began with the work of Euphemios, a Greco-Syrian author living sometime at the end of the 2nd Century BCE. The story goes that Euphemios, seeking inspiration for a story 'to rival that of Homer' had gone to visit a friend living down near Sidon. While staying with his friend, Euphemios heard the story of Prince Demetrius of Tyre and took a trip to the city to visit the Demetrium, a small shrine erected sometime in the 2nd Century by the people of Tyre. Inspired by the stories of Demetrius, Euphemios set out to record it in what became known as 'The Siege of Tyre' (although the Epic of Demetrius and the Demetrian Tragedy have both been used despite the fact that the story was neither an epic nor specifically a tragic work).
The 'Siege of Tyre' is a fictional work of prose narrative depicting the events of the siege of Tyre in which Demetrius and Ptolemy III are played off against one another as contemporary Homeric heroes struggling for control of Tyre, a conflict which is wrapped up in a political war between democracy and monarchy. In Euphemios, the siege is cast as a struggle between the ideals of democracy and monarchy in the city environment. The question, really, is: 'what is best for the people? Monarchy or democracy?' As you can imagine, in an environment where Hellenistic kings were still around, active, and dangerous, this was a topic which could very easily walk the line between literature and treason. Officially, Euphemios skirts the issue by presenting the idea that democracy is best for a city but can only achieve its greatest form under the 'patronage' and support of kings. Unofficially, the work still walked the line and seems to have been treated as somewhat dangerous by certain figures; one of Euphemios' friends is said to have cautioned him to destroy the work for fear of losing his head (although this may be an attempt to recreate the famous story of Sosthenes and Antiochus II). Under the surface, Euphemios' work is full of quite subtle subversion an, on occasion, outright dissent. Fundamentally, Demetrius is only able to achieve what he does because he casts off his royal affectations and effectively integrates himself into the citizen body. Neither Ptolemy nor Antiochus II ever appear as especially predisposed towards the interests of the people of Tyre beyond their own desire for control and even the conclusion, at the moment of Demetrius' greatest triumph, is loaded with tension in the subtle reminder that it is Demetrius' royal status which will, inevitably, lead to his downfall. We are left to ponder the question of whether, really, monarchy is such a good thing after all.
Regardless, Euphemios' story became immensely popular and seems to have sparked a wave of interest in the war which translated into both histories and literary works which began to mine the war for stories to adapt. The result of this is that many discussions of the war tend to follow a similar pattern in which the siege of Tyre, an event lasting less than a month all, is placed at the very centre of the events of the conflict as somehow being the most important event in a war full of other important events. In addition, many of the stories and anecdotes included in many histories are directly taken from the literary output produced in the cultural wave during the late 2nd and early 1st Centuries. With that said, it is difficult to not include many of these stories since they are so baked into the legends of the war as to be indistinguishable from it at times. As such, as we go through the historical narrative, we can only attempt to identify the bits and pieces that might be apocryphal and analyse them in the context of a 2nd and 1st Century literary environment. What can be said is that many of these authors, including Euphemios, made use of near-contemporary authors. In particular, they seem to have drawn extensively on Antiochus II's court biographer, Ambrosius (whose work does not survive) and the other contemporary; Lucius Atilius Caiatinus, a member of a senatorial family who spent time in Syria during the 210s and who, while there, wrote a short history of the Seleucid kings down to Seleucus II.
With that out of the way, let us begin recounting the actual narrative. Ptolemy II invaded in either May or June 227 BCE. At the time, Antiochus was in Seleukeia and would have received news of the invasion within a few days. By July at the latest, Antiochus' army was in the field and moving to intercept Ptolemy. For the most part, Ptolemy seems to have ignored the cities of Phoenicia themselves, instead banking on meeting the Seleucid army in battle in the hopes that a major victory might cause the Seleucids to outright capitulate. It is also likely that he was fully aware that he no time to waste on long sieges when Antiochus could arrive at any moment and threaten his rear. There are a handful of exceptions; at the very outset of the war, Ptolemy was able to convince the city to surrender, entering it and making a formal declaration that he had come to 'end the civil conflict within the city and institute good governance'. While there, he reorganised the city's government, placing a new 'Emergency Council' to govern Sidon until the war ended. In truth, the 'Emergency Council' was nothing more than a handy administrative tool for the Ptolemies to govern the city through and a means to pass power to their supporters. From Sidon, he also made a stop at Tyre where, apparently, he was hoping to be positively received but, finding Seleucid supporters already entrenched, decided to leave some 3000 soldiers to man the causeway under Pausanias' leadership. In turn, the Ptolemaic fleet moved in to blockade the Egyptian and Sidonian harbours and officially place the city under siege.
His other diplomatic success was Tripolis which, fearing his army, surrendered in June on the agreement that their democracy would be kept intact. By July, Ptolemy had reached the Orontes, encamping on the banks and according to one story, setting up an inscription stating that his army had reached the river and that, here, the Seleucid kingdom would meet its end. Antiochus had been busy; mobilising the main parts of his army, raising further levies and, importantly, augmenting his cavalry forces from central Asia while he was at it. When he marched in early July, he began with some 58,000 soldiers but, by August, that number had increased to as many as 70-75,000. Ptolemy, meanwhile, had made a beeline for Antioch, marching along the edge of the mountains and encamping just outside the southern gate where he began erecting siege weapons. In truth, however, Ptolemy's siege weapons were a ruse; he had no intention of trying to storm the city before Antiochus got there and left only enough soldiers to ensure that the garrison could not try to leave the city and aid Antiochus in battle. Instead, he spent the time in between his arrival and Antiochus' preparing for battle.
Map of Antioch. Note that the fortified sites on the island to the north were not built until later.
The story goes that Ptolemy, apprised of the political environment within the city, knew that the garrison commander was of an anxious temperament and quick to panic. At the approach of Ptolemy's army he had, apparently, been so afraid as to almost cause a mutiny amongst his soldiers who saw his fear and lost hope. They were only brought back to discipline by the timely intervention of several Macedonian aristocrats who calmed them and began taking command of the garrison. Sensing the opportunity, Ptolemy had his spies spread rumours to the garrison commander that there were traitors within the city who would open the gates any day now and let Ptolemy in at which point his soldiers would sack the city and kill the commander. Afraid for his life, the commander began writing to Antiochus, urging him to please hurry up and save us already. These letters, of course, found their way to Antiochus who, worried the city was days away from falling, had his army force march to reach Antioch before it was taken. In the meantime, Ptolemy had trenches dug, fortifications built on the surrounding slopes and sent much of his cavalry to encamp out of sight a few miles south.
When Antiochus' army arrived, he encamped across from Ptolemy. Next morning, Antiochus' army arose and prepared for battle. Exhausted by the march and still not properly recovered, however, Antiochus' soldiers were no match for Ptolemy's refreshed and energetic army. As they advanced, his army found itself caught up against trenches and defensive positions, lacerated by Ptolemaic archers and forced to retreat. Changing tack, Antiochus instead sent forward his horse archers to bombard the Ptolemaic forces and try to lure them out of their defensive positions but found that few of them were willing to move. Pulling back to his line, Antiochus instead attempted to make use of the greatest strengths of his army; its extra flexibility. That night, he sent contingents of infantry up the hills to try and outflank Ptolemy's lines so that, come morning, they could trap the Ptolemaic forces between them. Ptolemy, however, was a step ahead and had already fortified the high ground to the east and, as Antiochus' soldiers approached, they were killed or captured to a man. Taking advantage of the situation, Ptolemy once again employed deception; falsifying a letter by Antiochus' commander, he sent back a spy dressed in Seleucid armour to 'inform' the king that his soldiers had made it safely and were ready. At the same time, Ptolemy prepared to lay his own ambush.
Next morning, Antiochus, emboldened by his perceived success, began another assault on Ptolemaic lines only to quickly realise that they were not, in fact, about to be outflanked. On the contrary, Antiochus himself now found his army outflanked by the Ptolemaic infantry appearing behind his own army and smashing into his rear. Caught now between the Ptolemies on both fronts, his army exhausted and trapped in tight spaces where, suddenly, the flexibility of his infantry and strength of his cavalry didn't matter quite as much, Antiochus' army began to shatter and flee south. Ptolemy, however, was not finished; as Antiochus' army made their way south, Ptolemy's cavalry saw them and, as instructed, swarmed down to cut off the retreating Seleucid forces, harrying them for miles and splitting the routing forces up. In the bloodbath that followed, the Orontes river was said to have run red and, in one account, the people of Antioch were horrified to see bodies floating down the river towards the city. Several thousand Seleucid soldiers had been driven back and found themselves marching back north where they were quickly caught by Ptolemy's army and surrendered while many other groups were slaughtered wandering the countryside over the next few days. Antiochus himself escaped with some of his forces intact but was forced, at one point, to hide in a barn to evade capture and, by the time he made it to Apamea, was stained and apparently covered in animal excrement such that nobody recognised him.
A lot of this story is apocryphal at best. The Battle of Antioch certainly did take place and was a crushing defeat for Antiochus who may have lost as many as 20-30,000 soldiers in a single day. Certainly, it would be almost a year before another Seleucid army of this size was in the field once again. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to be sure of exactly what events led up to the battle itself. The garrison commander is present in some accounts but not in others, as is the story of the Macedonian cavalrymen taking command of the garrison, probably written to appeal to Macedonians who had a tendency to look down on the courage and ability of those from the eastern portions of Antiochus' empire. That said, the broad events of the story; Ptolemy besieging Antioch, Antiochus rushing to fight and being ambushed in some manner are almost certainly true and proved to be the most devastating defeat suffered by a Seleucid army until that point. It would also trigger something of a military disaster. While Ptolemy was unable to take Antioch just yet (or didn't yet want to commit to such a long siege), he devastated the land around it, erected another trophy, and began marching unopposed through the Syrian countryside. By October at least, he had compelled the surrender of several cities in Syria as well as several others in Phoenicia including Damascus and Byblos which, realising that no help was coming, were all the more willing to take the offer of peaceful surrender over the prospect of a lengthy siege. Except, of course, for Tyre.
See, in the meantime, Tyre, under the command of Prince Demetrius, had not only proved stubborn but outright problematic; in the interim between his first approach and the Battle of Antioch, Demetrius had not only broken the land blockade but had killed Pausanias and begun preparations for a siege. Given that Pausanias was, ostensibly, the very reason he had invaded in the first place, it wasn't exactly a good look, nor was leaving a hostile city under the command of a Seleucid prince in his rear. Encouraged by the defeat of Antiochus, Ptolemy raced south to put an end to this upstart once and for all.
When Antiochus' army arrived, he encamped across from Ptolemy. Next morning, Antiochus' army arose and prepared for battle. Exhausted by the march and still not properly recovered, however, Antiochus' soldiers were no match for Ptolemy's refreshed and energetic army. As they advanced, his army found itself caught up against trenches and defensive positions, lacerated by Ptolemaic archers and forced to retreat. Changing tack, Antiochus instead sent forward his horse archers to bombard the Ptolemaic forces and try to lure them out of their defensive positions but found that few of them were willing to move. Pulling back to his line, Antiochus instead attempted to make use of the greatest strengths of his army; its extra flexibility. That night, he sent contingents of infantry up the hills to try and outflank Ptolemy's lines so that, come morning, they could trap the Ptolemaic forces between them. Ptolemy, however, was a step ahead and had already fortified the high ground to the east and, as Antiochus' soldiers approached, they were killed or captured to a man. Taking advantage of the situation, Ptolemy once again employed deception; falsifying a letter by Antiochus' commander, he sent back a spy dressed in Seleucid armour to 'inform' the king that his soldiers had made it safely and were ready. At the same time, Ptolemy prepared to lay his own ambush.
Next morning, Antiochus, emboldened by his perceived success, began another assault on Ptolemaic lines only to quickly realise that they were not, in fact, about to be outflanked. On the contrary, Antiochus himself now found his army outflanked by the Ptolemaic infantry appearing behind his own army and smashing into his rear. Caught now between the Ptolemies on both fronts, his army exhausted and trapped in tight spaces where, suddenly, the flexibility of his infantry and strength of his cavalry didn't matter quite as much, Antiochus' army began to shatter and flee south. Ptolemy, however, was not finished; as Antiochus' army made their way south, Ptolemy's cavalry saw them and, as instructed, swarmed down to cut off the retreating Seleucid forces, harrying them for miles and splitting the routing forces up. In the bloodbath that followed, the Orontes river was said to have run red and, in one account, the people of Antioch were horrified to see bodies floating down the river towards the city. Several thousand Seleucid soldiers had been driven back and found themselves marching back north where they were quickly caught by Ptolemy's army and surrendered while many other groups were slaughtered wandering the countryside over the next few days. Antiochus himself escaped with some of his forces intact but was forced, at one point, to hide in a barn to evade capture and, by the time he made it to Apamea, was stained and apparently covered in animal excrement such that nobody recognised him.
A lot of this story is apocryphal at best. The Battle of Antioch certainly did take place and was a crushing defeat for Antiochus who may have lost as many as 20-30,000 soldiers in a single day. Certainly, it would be almost a year before another Seleucid army of this size was in the field once again. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to be sure of exactly what events led up to the battle itself. The garrison commander is present in some accounts but not in others, as is the story of the Macedonian cavalrymen taking command of the garrison, probably written to appeal to Macedonians who had a tendency to look down on the courage and ability of those from the eastern portions of Antiochus' empire. That said, the broad events of the story; Ptolemy besieging Antioch, Antiochus rushing to fight and being ambushed in some manner are almost certainly true and proved to be the most devastating defeat suffered by a Seleucid army until that point. It would also trigger something of a military disaster. While Ptolemy was unable to take Antioch just yet (or didn't yet want to commit to such a long siege), he devastated the land around it, erected another trophy, and began marching unopposed through the Syrian countryside. By October at least, he had compelled the surrender of several cities in Syria as well as several others in Phoenicia including Damascus and Byblos which, realising that no help was coming, were all the more willing to take the offer of peaceful surrender over the prospect of a lengthy siege. Except, of course, for Tyre.
See, in the meantime, Tyre, under the command of Prince Demetrius, had not only proved stubborn but outright problematic; in the interim between his first approach and the Battle of Antioch, Demetrius had not only broken the land blockade but had killed Pausanias and begun preparations for a siege. Given that Pausanias was, ostensibly, the very reason he had invaded in the first place, it wasn't exactly a good look, nor was leaving a hostile city under the command of a Seleucid prince in his rear. Encouraged by the defeat of Antiochus, Ptolemy raced south to put an end to this upstart once and for all.
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This is all fascinating stuff. You've clearly done a lot of research on the period and it shows.
The Tyrian affair shows the potential weakness of an empire containing a large number of self-governing polities that may have not just their own local issues but their own ideas about just how subject to the Empire they were. And it's somehow a very Hellenistic touch that Philocrates the father is put into power by the Seleucids, and Pausanias the son ends up going over to the Ptolemies and starting a massive war after the Seleucids eventually decide his regime isn't worth the effort of continually propping up.
And now Ptolemy is at least temporarily victorious and we're going to see how the Great King's authority holds up now he's suffered a severe defeat and lost much of his army.
Is it possible to have a family tree of your Seleucid dynasty? I'm starting to lose track.
The Tyrian affair shows the potential weakness of an empire containing a large number of self-governing polities that may have not just their own local issues but their own ideas about just how subject to the Empire they were. And it's somehow a very Hellenistic touch that Philocrates the father is put into power by the Seleucids, and Pausanias the son ends up going over to the Ptolemies and starting a massive war after the Seleucids eventually decide his regime isn't worth the effort of continually propping up.
And now Ptolemy is at least temporarily victorious and we're going to see how the Great King's authority holds up now he's suffered a severe defeat and lost much of his army.
Is it possible to have a family tree of your Seleucid dynasty? I'm starting to lose track.
As you request, here is the current family tree:
Yes, Seleucus I did in fact marry Stratonice and then divorce her just so she could marry her stepson Antiochus...
I'll keep updating the family tree as we go along and can post it on demand
And yeah, it is very on point for the Hellenistic for cities and rulers to swap sides as they feel like it. There's a city in Anatolia (I forget which one though it may have been Priene) which, in our timeline, switched sides from the Ptolemies to the Seleucids to Pergamon over the course of three decades, welcoming each new king in turn and then dispensing of them when need be.
just a heads up, chapter twenty one and twenty three don't have a trademark
Reading this chapter and the next has me looking forward to the first appearance of Antiochus III. This is a great story and I can't wait for the next few chapters. With Macedonia part of Seleucid rule it makes me wonder where Antiochus III will invade, perhaps try to conquer Egypt once and for all, or perhaps an expansion into India?
Conquering the Ptolemaic Kingdom should be a priority, it will allow the Seleucids to eliminate their most dangerous rival, unify the entire Hellenistic world and recreate the empire of Alexander. Also, the Seleucid borders in India and Central Asia appear to be stable, so there is no reason to start warring there. Maybe the Seleucids will try and better consolidate their control over Anatolia as well, there are some pockets still outside their empire.
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