Chapter Twenty-Seven
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Chapter Twenty-Seven: The Long Seven Years (227-221 BCE)
Important Names:
Antiochus II: King of the Seleucid Empire
Kleopatra: Queen of the Seleucid Empire
Prince Seleucus: Eldest son and crown prince of the Seleucid empire
Prince Antiochus: Second son of Antiochus II
Prince Demetrius: Youngest son of Antiochus II
Sophokles: Cavalry commander and head of the royal bodyguard
Ariobarzanes: Persian aristocrat and cavalry commander
Amestris: Ariobarzanes' daughter
Ptolemy III: King of Ptolemaic Egypt
Caiatinus: Roman historian who recorded the Great Syrian War
Thus far, we have lavished a lot of time on the first year or so of the Great Syrian War. This, of course, follows historical precedent. Many authors have spent a lot of time in the past on this period between the invasion and the end of the Ptolemaic Siege of Tyre for obvious reasons. The result is that, typically, the last seven-odd years of the war get condensed into a general mess of fighting. It is easy to see why. In the absence of a Euphemios (and with Caiatinus' narrative missing a lot of information from this period), the 'romance' of the last seven years is often lost. When we do hear of it, it is usually being used to prop up the angle of Demetrius in direct imitation of Euphemios' own work. In general, a lot of the narrative is often focussed on Demetrius' exploits and, occasionally, the great clashes between Antiochus and Ptolemy who are here cast as arch-enemies seeking to destroy one another. The truth, of course, is a lot more complex. The rest of the war devolved rather quickly into a series of competing alliances in which both sides were full of largely independent conflicts, often between individual cities.
With that in mind, let's begin by talking about the events immediately after the Battle of Antioch. With his defeat, and Ptolemy's fall back to Tyre, Antiochus made his way straight to Seleukeia to begin reinforcing and rallying the remains of his forces. A lot of people had been killed and his defeat now left Syria basically exposed to the Ptolemaic army. Now in Seleukeia, Antiochus began making preparations for his next run-in with the Ptolemies, calling for support from across Central Asia and raising forces to try and relieve the siege of Tyre. Inside the court, the question of whether to actually support Demetrius was not uncontroversial. In particular, it seems to have exposed two separate camps within the court. Since taking the throne in 259 BCE, Antiochus had spent a lot of time in his Asian territories and increasingly less time back in Macedonia. He had, however, brought a lot of Macedonians with him, many of whom had enjoyed their dominance of the court. However, as time went on, more and more indigenous elements began to appear in the Seleucid court; Persians, Iranians, Scythians, Babylonians etc. This seems to have been a development even above the largely Macedonian-dominated courts of Seleucus I and Antiochus I and does indicate an increasingly diverse government across the empire.
For Antiochus, it made sense. As he campaigned or governed in the east, he found himself increasingly reliant on local supporters to raise armies and govern his vast territories. Of note amongst these was one Ariobarzanes, a Persian who came from a long line of powerful aristocrats. Born in 269 BCE, he joined up with Antiochus' army in 258 BCE, taking a place amongst the Persian cavalry. Renowned for his bravery and skill at command, he was soon elevated to commanding the same Persian cavalry force where he had a rather infamous rivalry with Sophokles, the head of the Thessalian and Macedonian cavalry. After the end of the Second Syrian War in the late 250s, Ariobarzanes was granted increased lands. During the 240s and 30s, he was a regular fixture of the Seleucid army and, increasingly, the court. In the campaigns of Antiochus, he continued to distinguish himself and was trusted with several important missions, including the acquisition of the Fergana horses for Antiochus' army. By the time the 220s dawned, he was fully ingratiated with the court and had drawn no end of criticism. Of particular concern for many was the issue of his daughter, Amestris (b. 248). Ariobarzanes had been angling for a marriage between Amestris and one of the royal family for a while and, during Antiochus' campaigns, had suggested a potential pairing between Amestris and Seleucus, or even Antiochus, on several occasions.
Such a match would make sense. It was far from uncommon for Seleucid princes to marry Persian aristocracy as Seleucus I and II had done and Ariobarzanes, with his ties to Persian and Iranian nobility, was not a bad choice. However, back in the court, this was a potential problem. Not everybody had welcomed the rise of this Persian aristocrat, nor the concomitant rise of other Babylonian, Iranian, and Persian notables at the same time. For many, the dominance of the Macedonian elite was something which had to be preserved for fear that the Seleucid court would become increasingly 'Persianised' and Greco-Macedonian culture pushed out. To some degree, it is easy to understand their concerns. Macedonia was only a small part of the empire and, despite Antiochus II's claims to be a 'Macedonian' king, even he had increasingly ignored the region in favour of the richer and larger portions of his empire. From the perspective of the Macedonian elites, it was easy to see how the empire was increasingly becoming a Persia and Babylonia-focussed state rather than the 'Macedonian' empire it had been founded as.
For Kleopatra, the possibility of a marriage between the crown prince and a Persian aristocrat was unacceptable. She had been angling instead for a more traditional Macedonian match which might bolster the influence of the Macedonian faction at the court and help maintain the influence of her and her family within the royal court. In the late 230s, Sophokles had taken up a command of the royal bodyguard and Kleopatra allied herself with the commander to try and force out Ariobarzanes from being able to access the king. In turn, however, Ariobarzanes had allied himself with the crown prince Seleucus to try and win over his support. Supposedly he did so by engineering a 'surprise' meeting between the prince and Amestris in which Seleucus was invited by Ariobarzanes to visit one of the old Persian gardens (or paradeisos) and, while there, ran into Amestris while walking around the grounds. Despite the best efforts of Kleopatra and Sophokles to prevent the meeting, Seleucus' love of gardens was well known and he simply ignored their protests and travelled anyway. The plan was a huge success and, by 230, Seleucus was enamoured with Amestris and began petitioning his own father for a marriage between the two. Nevertheless, Antiochus refused to sign off on the marriage.
In 227 BCE, things changed. The defeat at Antioch and subsequent retreat to Seleukeia left Antiochus looking for support, especially in Babylonia and Central Asia from which he hoped to secure more cavalry for his next encounter with Ptolemy. Ariobarzanes, now, saw his opportunity. In August 227 BCE, Ptolemy laid siege to Tyre and a debate broke out as to whether or not to try and relieve the siege. Initially, the general opinion was that relieving Tyre was an impossibility and that Demetrius was on his own and could, simply, be ransomed later in the war or returned during peace talks later. It is interesting that nobody seems to have seriously worried that the prince might be killed. Then Ariobarzanes spoke up. He proposed that he lead a cavalry force to try and break the siege. If he succeeded, then Demetrius and Tyre would be saved but, if he failed, there would be no harm whatsoever. At first, Antiochus shot the idea down; there was simply no way that they could risk leading a force into Ptolemaic-controlled Phoenicia to try and attack an army so much larger than their own. What if the cavalry was ambushed or surrounded. Right now, there was no question of having a full army ready in the next few weeks or so so, at most, Ariobarzanes would be leading whatever cavalry could be thrown together at a moment's notice.
However, Prince Antiochus and Seleucus both spoke up in his defence, agreeing that a cavalry force might be enough to break the siege. On this, Ariobarzanes and Kleopatra seem to have been, for once, agreed and Antiochus II eventually relented. A contingent of 3-6000 cavalry was selected and placed under the command of Prince Antiochus and Ariobarzanes with the goal of breaking the siege which, after an ambitious crossing into Phoenicia and a battle with Ptolemaic forces near Byblos, they succeeded in doing. By October, the cavalry force was back in Seleukeia with Demetrius in tow. The prince, fresh from the siege of Tyre, had left much of the old Seleucid garrison within the city and now requested extra forces with which to refortify the city and prevent Ptolemy taking advantage of his absence to launch another siege. However, not willing to commit more resources to a city that was already surrounded by Ptolemaic territory, the king rejected these approaches and instead cautioned to wait for their counter-attack the following year.
No real military movements would take place again until March 226. Ptolemy spent the winter reinforcing his position, propping up pro-Ptolemaic governments in Phoenicia and bringing up reinforcements for his army. Still riding high after his victory at Antioch, he sent a force of 10,000 soldiers to Tyre to lay the city under siege yet again while he himself marched north into Syria. In the meantime, Prince Antiochus was sent to Anatolia with some 15,000 soldiers to try and dislodge Ptolemaic positions there. The king, his army now largely restored, began marching west to meet the Ptolemaic forces in Syria. In April or May, Antiochus II and Ptolemy met again at the Battle of the Orontes, somewhere to the south of Apamea but the Seleucids were unable to break through. It was a rather minor battle on the whole but served to secure Ptolemaic control of the west bank of the Orontes which, over the course of 226 BCE, allowed him to consolidate his position almost as far as Antioch itself. In July, he captured the port of Seleukeia-on-Orontes only a few miles from Antioch which had served as the main port for the city. An important harbour, Ptolemy's control of Seleukeia-Orontes would prove crucial for events moving forward, allowing him to import supplies and reinforcements by sea and keep his army in the field for longer.
Important Names:
Antiochus II: King of the Seleucid Empire
Kleopatra: Queen of the Seleucid Empire
Prince Seleucus: Eldest son and crown prince of the Seleucid empire
Prince Antiochus: Second son of Antiochus II
Prince Demetrius: Youngest son of Antiochus II
Sophokles: Cavalry commander and head of the royal bodyguard
Ariobarzanes: Persian aristocrat and cavalry commander
Amestris: Ariobarzanes' daughter
Ptolemy III: King of Ptolemaic Egypt
Caiatinus: Roman historian who recorded the Great Syrian War
Thus far, we have lavished a lot of time on the first year or so of the Great Syrian War. This, of course, follows historical precedent. Many authors have spent a lot of time in the past on this period between the invasion and the end of the Ptolemaic Siege of Tyre for obvious reasons. The result is that, typically, the last seven-odd years of the war get condensed into a general mess of fighting. It is easy to see why. In the absence of a Euphemios (and with Caiatinus' narrative missing a lot of information from this period), the 'romance' of the last seven years is often lost. When we do hear of it, it is usually being used to prop up the angle of Demetrius in direct imitation of Euphemios' own work. In general, a lot of the narrative is often focussed on Demetrius' exploits and, occasionally, the great clashes between Antiochus and Ptolemy who are here cast as arch-enemies seeking to destroy one another. The truth, of course, is a lot more complex. The rest of the war devolved rather quickly into a series of competing alliances in which both sides were full of largely independent conflicts, often between individual cities.
With that in mind, let's begin by talking about the events immediately after the Battle of Antioch. With his defeat, and Ptolemy's fall back to Tyre, Antiochus made his way straight to Seleukeia to begin reinforcing and rallying the remains of his forces. A lot of people had been killed and his defeat now left Syria basically exposed to the Ptolemaic army. Now in Seleukeia, Antiochus began making preparations for his next run-in with the Ptolemies, calling for support from across Central Asia and raising forces to try and relieve the siege of Tyre. Inside the court, the question of whether to actually support Demetrius was not uncontroversial. In particular, it seems to have exposed two separate camps within the court. Since taking the throne in 259 BCE, Antiochus had spent a lot of time in his Asian territories and increasingly less time back in Macedonia. He had, however, brought a lot of Macedonians with him, many of whom had enjoyed their dominance of the court. However, as time went on, more and more indigenous elements began to appear in the Seleucid court; Persians, Iranians, Scythians, Babylonians etc. This seems to have been a development even above the largely Macedonian-dominated courts of Seleucus I and Antiochus I and does indicate an increasingly diverse government across the empire.
For Antiochus, it made sense. As he campaigned or governed in the east, he found himself increasingly reliant on local supporters to raise armies and govern his vast territories. Of note amongst these was one Ariobarzanes, a Persian who came from a long line of powerful aristocrats. Born in 269 BCE, he joined up with Antiochus' army in 258 BCE, taking a place amongst the Persian cavalry. Renowned for his bravery and skill at command, he was soon elevated to commanding the same Persian cavalry force where he had a rather infamous rivalry with Sophokles, the head of the Thessalian and Macedonian cavalry. After the end of the Second Syrian War in the late 250s, Ariobarzanes was granted increased lands. During the 240s and 30s, he was a regular fixture of the Seleucid army and, increasingly, the court. In the campaigns of Antiochus, he continued to distinguish himself and was trusted with several important missions, including the acquisition of the Fergana horses for Antiochus' army. By the time the 220s dawned, he was fully ingratiated with the court and had drawn no end of criticism. Of particular concern for many was the issue of his daughter, Amestris (b. 248). Ariobarzanes had been angling for a marriage between Amestris and one of the royal family for a while and, during Antiochus' campaigns, had suggested a potential pairing between Amestris and Seleucus, or even Antiochus, on several occasions.
Such a match would make sense. It was far from uncommon for Seleucid princes to marry Persian aristocracy as Seleucus I and II had done and Ariobarzanes, with his ties to Persian and Iranian nobility, was not a bad choice. However, back in the court, this was a potential problem. Not everybody had welcomed the rise of this Persian aristocrat, nor the concomitant rise of other Babylonian, Iranian, and Persian notables at the same time. For many, the dominance of the Macedonian elite was something which had to be preserved for fear that the Seleucid court would become increasingly 'Persianised' and Greco-Macedonian culture pushed out. To some degree, it is easy to understand their concerns. Macedonia was only a small part of the empire and, despite Antiochus II's claims to be a 'Macedonian' king, even he had increasingly ignored the region in favour of the richer and larger portions of his empire. From the perspective of the Macedonian elites, it was easy to see how the empire was increasingly becoming a Persia and Babylonia-focussed state rather than the 'Macedonian' empire it had been founded as.
For Kleopatra, the possibility of a marriage between the crown prince and a Persian aristocrat was unacceptable. She had been angling instead for a more traditional Macedonian match which might bolster the influence of the Macedonian faction at the court and help maintain the influence of her and her family within the royal court. In the late 230s, Sophokles had taken up a command of the royal bodyguard and Kleopatra allied herself with the commander to try and force out Ariobarzanes from being able to access the king. In turn, however, Ariobarzanes had allied himself with the crown prince Seleucus to try and win over his support. Supposedly he did so by engineering a 'surprise' meeting between the prince and Amestris in which Seleucus was invited by Ariobarzanes to visit one of the old Persian gardens (or paradeisos) and, while there, ran into Amestris while walking around the grounds. Despite the best efforts of Kleopatra and Sophokles to prevent the meeting, Seleucus' love of gardens was well known and he simply ignored their protests and travelled anyway. The plan was a huge success and, by 230, Seleucus was enamoured with Amestris and began petitioning his own father for a marriage between the two. Nevertheless, Antiochus refused to sign off on the marriage.
In 227 BCE, things changed. The defeat at Antioch and subsequent retreat to Seleukeia left Antiochus looking for support, especially in Babylonia and Central Asia from which he hoped to secure more cavalry for his next encounter with Ptolemy. Ariobarzanes, now, saw his opportunity. In August 227 BCE, Ptolemy laid siege to Tyre and a debate broke out as to whether or not to try and relieve the siege. Initially, the general opinion was that relieving Tyre was an impossibility and that Demetrius was on his own and could, simply, be ransomed later in the war or returned during peace talks later. It is interesting that nobody seems to have seriously worried that the prince might be killed. Then Ariobarzanes spoke up. He proposed that he lead a cavalry force to try and break the siege. If he succeeded, then Demetrius and Tyre would be saved but, if he failed, there would be no harm whatsoever. At first, Antiochus shot the idea down; there was simply no way that they could risk leading a force into Ptolemaic-controlled Phoenicia to try and attack an army so much larger than their own. What if the cavalry was ambushed or surrounded. Right now, there was no question of having a full army ready in the next few weeks or so so, at most, Ariobarzanes would be leading whatever cavalry could be thrown together at a moment's notice.
However, Prince Antiochus and Seleucus both spoke up in his defence, agreeing that a cavalry force might be enough to break the siege. On this, Ariobarzanes and Kleopatra seem to have been, for once, agreed and Antiochus II eventually relented. A contingent of 3-6000 cavalry was selected and placed under the command of Prince Antiochus and Ariobarzanes with the goal of breaking the siege which, after an ambitious crossing into Phoenicia and a battle with Ptolemaic forces near Byblos, they succeeded in doing. By October, the cavalry force was back in Seleukeia with Demetrius in tow. The prince, fresh from the siege of Tyre, had left much of the old Seleucid garrison within the city and now requested extra forces with which to refortify the city and prevent Ptolemy taking advantage of his absence to launch another siege. However, not willing to commit more resources to a city that was already surrounded by Ptolemaic territory, the king rejected these approaches and instead cautioned to wait for their counter-attack the following year.
No real military movements would take place again until March 226. Ptolemy spent the winter reinforcing his position, propping up pro-Ptolemaic governments in Phoenicia and bringing up reinforcements for his army. Still riding high after his victory at Antioch, he sent a force of 10,000 soldiers to Tyre to lay the city under siege yet again while he himself marched north into Syria. In the meantime, Prince Antiochus was sent to Anatolia with some 15,000 soldiers to try and dislodge Ptolemaic positions there. The king, his army now largely restored, began marching west to meet the Ptolemaic forces in Syria. In April or May, Antiochus II and Ptolemy met again at the Battle of the Orontes, somewhere to the south of Apamea but the Seleucids were unable to break through. It was a rather minor battle on the whole but served to secure Ptolemaic control of the west bank of the Orontes which, over the course of 226 BCE, allowed him to consolidate his position almost as far as Antioch itself. In July, he captured the port of Seleukeia-on-Orontes only a few miles from Antioch which had served as the main port for the city. An important harbour, Ptolemy's control of Seleukeia-Orontes would prove crucial for events moving forward, allowing him to import supplies and reinforcements by sea and keep his army in the field for longer.
The capture of Seleukeia would prove a major turning point and would act as Ptolemy's base of operations for much of the rest of the war, even above Antioch itself. Over the winter of 226, he placed Antioch under siege from both sides but was forced to retreat when Demetrius and Antiochus II launched a two-pronged counter-attack, almost trapping his forces between them and the city. In some tellings, this is then followed by a series of three battles in which Ptolemy is outsmarted by Demetrius and Antiochus twice before winning a third battle due to what can only be described as luck. However, the only battle we can attest archaeologically is the third battle, the so-called 'Battle of Seleukeia-Orontes' in January 225 BCE. Regardless, Ptolemy seems to have won a major victory at Seleukeia-Orontes, smashing the Seleucid army against the banks of the river and forcing a desperate retreat to Antioch from which they pulled back further north.
In the west, things went slightly better. Antiochus and Ariobarzanes made some headway in Anatolia and, in mid-late 226, the Seleucid navy scored its first real victory over its Ptolemaic counterpart off the coast of Halonnesos. However, in February 225 BCE, Kleopatra, fearing that Ariobarzanes' successes would gain him further influence in the court, especially after his return to favour following his and Antiochus' relief of Tyre, organised his demotion and movement away from the front lines to instead head up the garrison at Tarsos. Antiochus, apparently not that great of a commander in his own right, found his progress increasingly frustrated and suffered a major defeat in June of that year near Korakesion. Ptolemy's successes reached their peak near the end of 225 BCE when, after defeating a relief force led by Demetrius, he was able to finally force Antioch to surrender and sacked the city. By the beginning of 224 BCE, his reach had expanded ever further; Alexandreia, Issos, and Kastabala had fallen and he had appointed a satrap of northern Syria.
For a moment, Antiochus seems to have even been considering an outright surrender, turning over Syria in return for a cessation of hostilities but negotiations broke down since Ptolemy, riding high, saw no real reason to stop his advance. It was, of course, then that his luck ran out. In May 224 BCE, he left a force of some 8000 soldiers at Kastabala to protect his rear while he turned his attention east towards Mesopotamia, apparently gunning for Seleukeia itself. As he advanced, however, he found that Antiochus had changed tack somewhat. At Nikopolis, the two kings met yet again but, when Ptolemy went to attack, Antiochus fell back. Ptolemy took the city but was soon forced to retreat when Demetrius circled around the city and cut off the Ptolemaic supply lines. As he attempted to fall back to Issos, Demetrius and Antiochus shadowed him, relying on their cavalry to keep the Ptolemaic soldiers on edge and preventing them from properly resting. At night, Seleucid cavalry would ride near the Ptolemaic encampments, retreating before an attack could be mustered and, during the day, Seleucid forces would remain close enough to be visible but fall back when approached.
Antiochus was able to do this by splitting his army into two. Relying on his flexible infantry and his large cavalry forces, he had a designated 'night force' and 'day force', each responsible for keeping the Ptolemies occupied at all times. It worked wonders. As Ptolemy retreated, his army grew frustrated and restless; why would Antiochus not just fight already? What's more, Prince Antiochus had rallied his forces (possibly at the king's command) and abandoned the Anatolian campaign to meet up with Ariobarzanes in Tarsos. As Ptolemy retreated, they made an extraordinarily quick advance to Kastabala where they surrounded the city and cut off Ptolemy's garrison. A relief attempt ended in disaster when Demetrius ambushed the head of Ptolemy's army and forced them to pull back. By November, Kastabala had surrendered and the garrison taken captive. The retreat of Ptolemy marked something of a turning point in the grand narrative of the war but not, per se, in the smaller scale aspects of the war.
See, alongside these large battles, we see a lot of local fighting as well. Apparently various communities took the opportunity to strike out at their own rivals or increase their own power. For instance, during his campaigns in Anatolia, Prince Antiochus' army seems to have comprised a lot of Anatolians, some of whom had been offered in return for promises of wealth taken from captured cities. In the capture of Kastabala, Ariobarzanes included some 6000 Tarsians and, according to Caiatinus, afterwards 'Tarsos enjoyed unparalleled wealth and influence in the area and built many great things to celebrate their victory'. Interestingly enough, Caiatinus describes it as just as much a Tarsian victory as a Seleucid one. In western Anatolia, Samos (part of the Nesiotic league) launched its own attacks against Miletus and Priene and, temporarily, gained a stretch of territory along the Ionian coast before being thrown back. In Greece, the Nesiotic League engaged in some fighting with Athens and it was a largely Nesiotic fleet (with some Ptolemaic ships) which was defeated at Halonnesos. This back and forth fighting between local communities was widespread and, to some degree, even persisted after the end of the war. Even in 219, when Seleucus took the throne, the city of Tyre was still fighting its rivals in Sidon and a Nesiotic fleet plundered part of Attica before being dissuaded by Seleucid forces in the region.
Unfortunately, a lot of these communal rivalries and local history is lost to us, leaving us with only a sometimes incomplete narrative. By the end of 224 BCE, Ptolemy had retreated to Antioch itself but seemed to still be in control of Syria at large. In Antioch, he knew that Antiochus and Demetrius were not likely to be able to dislodge him and so instead resolved simply to wait them out; so long as he could maintain the supply lines to Seleukeia-on-Orontes, he could keep his forces intact. To that end, he seems to have established a fortification network along the Orontes of hastily erected forts to keep the Seleucids from taking control of the river and cutting off the supplies. For close to a year, the Seleucids would pound at this fort network to no avail, unable to quite break the Ptolemies and frequently being driven off by Ptolemaic support. Two attempts were made on Seleukeia itself but were driven back. It wouldn't be until close to the end of 223 BCE that something of a breakthrough would be achieved. In July, Demetrius had decided to, once again, subvert the Ptolemaic position. Riding south, he arrived at the still-Seleucid fort at Apamea.
Apamea was a crucial location. It had started as a fort under Seleucus I but, over the last few decades, had rapidly grown into a wealthy city lying, as it did, on important trade routes running up to Antioch. To the north lay the Ghab valley through which ran the Orontes river towards Antioch and to the east and south lay the river itself. The city formed an important crossing point for the Seleucids and had been heavily fortified over the years such that Ptolemy had attempted, but failed, to take it twice in 227 and 226 BCE. Unable to really capture it, Ptolemy had left a garrison on the other bank but, needing to defend Antioch, had been forced to call up reinforcements from wherever he could find them. This seems to have been worsened by news of a revolt in Egypt which authorities were struggling to contain. The revolt had started somewhere in Upper Egypt and spread in the absence of the king; with so many soldiers away, it had caused serious disruption to the country. Not to mention, the constant financial and manpower demands of the war were beginning to strain both sides. In 227, after the Battle of Antioch, a series of revolts broke out in the North-East of the Seleucid empire and, in 225 BCE, another revolt by someone claiming to be a descendent of Antigonus rose up in Macedonia.
Despite Seleucid forces marching out to meet them, fighting was still ongoing and seemed to be getting somewhat worse. In 224 BCE, raids by tribes beyond the boundaries of the Seleucid empire began to take their toll and several Seleucid garrisons were forced to retreat. One or two of the rebels even seem to have been conquered by outside forces in the absence of Seleucid armies to put them down. With all this in mind, the Ptolemaic garrisons in Syria were being stretched thin. In 225 BCE, the force besieging Tyre was called away to join Ptolemy and help reinforce garrisons. In the wake of this, the Tyrians and Sidonians came to blows along the coast when Tyre, harbouring a whole lot of exiles from a variety of Phoenician cities, came under attack by the Sidonians. A series of battles were fought and, while the Sidonians won, the Tyrians don't seem to have ceded all that much land.
Upon his arrival at Apamea, Demetrius began an assault on the Ptolemaic garrison across the river, smashing them and driving them aside. Taking whatever soldiers he could, close to 9000 infantry and 600 cavalry, he began marching to the coast where he was able to convince several cities to defect and turn over their pro-Ptolemaic governors. A couple, including Arados and Gabala, seem to have held out but Demetrius was still able to capture a reasonable amount of the coast and raise soldiers from them. With these, he swept north to outflank Ptolemy's lines. A force was sent out to meet him but crushed in the field and Ptolemy, realising his fortifications would soon be outflanked and overrun, chose to retreat. As he left, Antioch was once again ravaged, sections of the city burned and holes left in the walls just to deny its full utility to the Seleucids. Seleukeia-on-Orontes, however, would manage to hold out against Seleucid forces right up until the end of the war when it was turned over in the peace terms of 221.
The exact details of 222 and 221 are very sketchy so we know rather little. We do know that Antiochus and Demetrius won a decisive victory at Orthosia and pushed Ptolemy ever further backwards sometime in 222 BCE and that Demetrius captured Tripolis and sacked the city at some point in early 221 BCE (apparently after a lengthy siege). Sidon, still in Ptolemaic hands, was attacked but held out (and would retain its pro-Ptolemaic government well after the end of the war, remaining in Ptolemaic hands for several decades). By mid-221 BCE, however, the war was largely rounding down for the two kings. Ptolemy had lost interest; too many casualties had been sustained and too much money spent, not to mention the spreading revolt in Egypt was still a problem while Antiochus was facing much the same problem. In August, a peace agreement was made which amounted to effectively nothing. The Ptolemies once again withdrew from Phoenicia (officially including Sidon although they would walk back on that when it became apparent that the Sidonian government wasn't going anywhere) and the Seleucids returned several cities taken in Asia Minor in response. It was, after nearly a decade of war, a total status quo ante bellum- a grand total of nothing for either side.
Tens of thousands were dead. Phoenicia and Syria had been ravaged. The Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms were both plagued with revolts. Nothing had been gained by either side. What had been gained, however, was a series of social changes within the Seleucid kingdom. During the war, Antiochus had fallen back more and more on local support, cut off from Macedonia as he was, leading to a distinct increase in the power of the Perso-Babylonian faction in the Seleucid court. Sometime in 225 or 224 BCE, Antiochus agreed to the marriage between Amestris and Seleucus which would produce a son, appropriately named Antiochus, in 221 BCE. By the end of the war, Ariobarzanes was more powerful than ever and seems to have held some sort of official position somewhere in the Seleucid court throughout the 210s until his death in 214 BCE at the age of 55. His triumph, however, would only set the stage for a much larger political clash between him and the Macedonian faction in the years to come.
As has been stated, the war would have a significant literary effect on the Seleucid empire in the 2nd Century but it also seems to have had its own cultural effect in the Ptolemaic empire as well. As early as 186 BCE, Ptolemaic writers were turning out pieces inspired by events from the war. Of these, the most famous is Agathocles' 'Syrian Epic', a Sosthenic tradition mock-epic which, like the works of the earlier Seleucid writer, recast real events (in this case, the Syrian War) in an earlier, mythological narrative using deities for satire of the events. In the case of Agathocles' work, the story revolves around Heracles and Dionysus meeting during their various travels in the region and fighting to see who would become the patron of Syria. Dionysus, the mythological ancestor of the Ptolemies, is obviously cast as the Ptolemaic army while Heracles represents the Seleucids. The two get into a variety of humorous episodes before finally getting bored and going off to travel elsewhere, a fitting end for the 'Great Syrian War' which proved to be a whole lot of slaughter and bloodshed and achieved next to nothing. More serious texts were also produced, including a series of tragic poems collected in a book named 'The Syriaca', which were written by a Greco-Syrian author living in Alexandria which lament the towns and cities destroyed during the war.
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Note: That brings an end to the Great Syrian War. I've decided to keep the 'Important People' bit just to make following everything a bit easier for people. I will be posting an updated family tree in the next few chapters cause I will soon have new family members to introduce so don't worry too much about all the new names that might be coming up, I'll have a tree so everybody can follow things.
