'the Victorious': Seleucus Nicator and the world after Alexander

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Chapter Twenty
  • Chapter Twenty: Connections and Interactions

    So far, we've talked a lot about the various interactions between the king and the constituent communities of his empire. We have, however, spent less time discussing the interactions within the empire, largely between those same communities. At the time, the empire of Antiochus II was a massively unifying force, stretching from Greece in the west to Afghanistan in the east and encompassing millions of people spread over hundreds of cities, towns, and villages. At the centre of this was, of course, the region around Mesopotamia and Syria. However, despite its apparent absence from the narrative thus far, areas such as Central Asia must not be treated simply as peripheral (despite my own using of the term in previous chapters). At the very centre of the empire lay the Tetrarchy and, especially, the cities of Antioch-on-Orontes, in Syria, and Seleukeia-on-Tigris in Mesopotamia. In the mid-3rd Century, Seleukeia's population was certainly somewhere in the hundreds of thousands and Antioch's possibly close to 100,000 (although we aren't sure). Certainly, by the beginning of the 2nd Century, Seleukeia's population has been estimated at close to 800,000 people and had, alongside Alexandria, gained a reputation for its fabulous wealth and connectivity.

    From Seleukeia, trade routes ran east through Iran (under the Seleucids, they largely moved through Ecbatana and the northern stretches of the country) towards Afghanistan and India and up into central Asia. These trade routes formed the backbone of the networks of interaction (and sometimes conflict) that stretched across the empire, providing wealth, influence and cultural exchange. In the north, trade routes ran up through Antioch-on-Margiana to Bukhara and, from there, east towards Samarkand and the Fergana valley or north towards the Kyzyl-kum desert. Margiana, by contrast, seems to have been preferred as a starting point for trade up to Chorasmia (around the Aral Sea). It was in Bukhara that, in 237 BCE, Antiochus II received some hundred horses from the Fergana valley, famous for their hardiness and size. Burials from across central Asia have revealed a wide variety of goods of Hellenistic origin including glass beads, faience, some pieces of pottery and, on one occasion, a whole Seleucid cuirass. From the Fergana valley, traders took goods ever further east, past the Taklamakan desert and on towards East Asia where some Hellenistic goods have been found in Chinese tombs as early as the 4th Century. In return, horses and gold are both known to have been exchanged by the peoples of the Kyzyl-kum and Fergana regions.

    One of Antiochus II's successors (either Seleucus III or Antiochus III) is known to have commissioned at least one periegesis of the Fergana valley and Taklamakan although it does not survive and the author is known to have turned back shortly after arriving at the Taklamakan desert itself. Of course, the other major trade active in the region was in soldiers. Under the Persians, Iran and Central Asia was the main source of cavalry and, at Gaugemala, some 20,000 cavalrymen had been supplied from Central Asia alone. In the armies of the Seleucid empire, cataphracts and horse archers had been popular since the time of Seleucus I and continued to be used under his successors. Despite a short rise in the prestige of Thessalian cavalry beginning with Antiochus II (and the continued trend of keeping some Thessalian cavalrymen until the time of Seleucus IV at the least), Iranian and Central Asian cavalry continued to rise in prominence in the Seleucid army. Many of these came from subject communities but not all. Here in the cities of Margiana, Bukhara, and Samarkand, all sorts of bands of warriors sought their riches. On occasion, this involved raiding; plundering raids or even larger expeditions were far from unknown. Indeed, in the mid-230s, Antiochus himself arrived in the region and fought a cavalry engagement not far from Bukhara. However, trade and the sale of military services were also well known facets of this relationship and Seleucid armies frequently employed Saka and Parni cavalry as the Persians had done before them.
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    Pastoral products also appear to have been regularly imported as well as, as mentioned, horses which were often bought (and on occasion seized) by Seleucid kings or governors. In 234, fresh from his campaigns against the Parni, Antiochus turned his attention towards campaigning in the Fergana valley. In the 300s, Alexander had founded the city of Alexandria-Eschate on the western end of the valley which formed the easternmost boundary of Seleucid control in this period. Nevertheless, Antiochus launched a campaign in 234 with mixed results, returning with another tribute of 3-400 horses but no lasting territorial gains (although it is unlikely that he intended to make permanent gains).
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    In Afghanistan, the cities of Ai Khanoum and Bactra were especially important. Ai Khanoum lay on the confluence of the Kokcha and Oxus rivers. The Oxus provided access north, running up near the Zeravshan river at Samarkand and neatly passing by the trade route between Margiana and Bukhara and Samarkand in the process.Traffic across the Hindu Kush appears to have been commonplace and busy; silk, spices, jewels, cotton, and many other goods were in high demand back in the heartland of the Seleucid empire. From Taxila, a major entrepot on the banks of the Indus River, goods passed further east towards Pataliputra and the heartlands of the Mauryan empire. Ideas, of course, were also passed along. Famous amongst these is Pyrrho who, having accompanied Alexander, may have adapted aspects of Buddhist philosophy into his o wn (although not scholars agree on this). To simplify things, part of Pyrrho's teachings involved finding ways to escape suffering which echoes Buddhist teachings. Without going into too much detail, we might also point to the influence of Greek art within India and, especially, the unique adaptation of Greek artistic forms for Indian uses beginning as early as the 3rd Century. In particular, objects such as the Pataliputra capital are very obvious with this; adapting the rosette style common from Corinthian columns but adapting the shape more from Achaemenid precedents (neither the 'flatter' shape of the capital, nor the sets of two volutes on either side are typical for Corinthian columns).
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    Of course, Afghanistan wasn't the only means by which contact and trade with India took place. Ptolemy II had exchanged diplomats with the Mauryan empire via naval trade routes, largely (but not exclusively) dominated by traders from Arabia and Ethiopia and export from India to Ptolemaic Egypt certainly took place. As regards the Seleucids, naval trade along the Persian Gulf to India is well attested, as are very active trade routes to eastern and southern Arabia, especially to the Gerrhaeans in the east, and Amithoscuta (Muscat) and the Sabaeans in the south. From here, one of the most popular products was incense, especially frankincense and myrrh although many Arabian traders were very active in the spice trade. In the north of the Arabian peninsula, Seleucid interactions largely revolved around a variety of nomadic groups who often crossed the desert, also trading in incense and, to some extent, spice.

    Whether from the Persian gulf or from Central Asia, many of these trade routes converged on Mesopotamia and, especially, the markets of Seleukeia. By the mid-2nd Century, at least, the markets of Seleukeia were famous for their wealth and variety, selling anything and everything you could want and, of course, greatly enriching the Seleucid kings themselves. This, in turn, required an intricate city bureaucracy. Exactly how this was run is largely unknown although we know that many major Seleucid cities, certainly by the mid-2nd Century, had a variety of magistrates and laws relating to preventing smuggling, theft, and fraud. Camel routes overland from Arabia seem to have largely veered west, skipping Mesopotamia entirely and making their way via the fort at Palmyra and on towards Antioch and Phoenicia. From there, trade routes ran by sea towards the wider Mediterranean or overland through southern Anatolia.​
     
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    Chapter Twenty-One
  • Chapter Twenty-One: The Campaigns of Antiochus II (253-230 BCE).

    The Second Syrian War was far from the end of Antiochus' ambitions. Within only two years of the end of the war, Antiochus II was back on campaign, this time in Anatolia. In 251 BCE, the Seleucid king sent some 6000 soldiers and 50 war elephants to Ptolemy to fulfil his end of the bargain made with Pyrrhus several years earlier, soldiers which would largely be used in several campaigns throughout Illyria over the next few years. At the same time, Antiochus launched his own campaigns deep into Anatolia. Cappadocia, though formally a Seleucid satrapy, seems to have been operating largely independently at this date and, between 251 and 250 BCE, Antiochus launched the first of two campaigns into the region. The official justification was a succession dispute in Cappadocia which provided the ideal opportunity and justification for a military intervention. In 247, Antiochus would return to Cappadocia to campaign against a rebellion in the north-western regions around Nyssa. In 246, this was followed up by a campaign even further north into Pontus which largely ended without much fanfare beyond a nominal submission by the Pontic kings at Amaseia. Perhaps his most famous campaign, however, was the conquest of Bithynia, taking place over some three campaigns in 244-3, 242-1, and 240 BCE. The invasion of Bithynia was a huge success, helping organise north-western Anatolia into a brand new satrapy and allowing Antiochus to establish an alliance with Heraklia in Pontus.

    In 239, Antiochus visited Pella where he was welcomed warmly and where he distributed huge sums of wealth to temples around the city. In the same year, he sent ambassadors to the Roman Republic, apparently having taken some interest in the affairs of the western Mediterranean after the conclusion of the Sicilian War (which had culminated in Rome's conquest of Sicily and, later, their seizure of Sardinia and Corsica). In all likelihood, these delegations were an attempt to establish and obtain information about what was going on in Rome and to size up the new republic which was now truly making waves in the Mediterranean, especially given the friendly relationship between Rome and the Ptolemies, established by Ptolemy Philadelphus in the early 3rd Century. It was also probably this interest which convinced Antiochus to restart the rebuilding of the Seleucid fleet and to renew his relations with Ptolemy who, fresh from his campaigns in Illyria, was currently riding high.

    Nevertheless, Antiochus does not seem to have remained in Macedonia for very long because, by 237 BCE, he was back in Central Asia. In that year, he bought horses from the Fergana valley and, famously, was so impressed by them that he declared that his cavalry bodyguard would only ride these horses. In 236/5, he fought the Parni just north of the border and sent ambassadors to several of the settled communities of the Kyzyl-Kum. In 234, apparently seeking more of those same horses, Antiochus launched a campaign into the Fergana valley but made few permanent gains beyond obtaining more horses. In the end, he seems to have attempted to bring back some of these horses to act as breeding stock, possibly hoping to expand his father's elephant breeding grounds at Apamea but, if that was the case, he was unsuccessful and continued to purchase horses for the foreseeable future. At the end of this campaign, Antiochus dedicated a new temple at Alexandria-Eschate and settled several hundred veterans in the city. After a short stint in Bactria, where Antiochus famously met the poet Sosthenes (apparently staying in Bactra at the behest of the satrap, Diodotus II), Antiochus began the long march back to Mesopotamia.

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    Note from the Author: Short one for today just to catch a few things up to speed before we go onwards and it neatly allows me to finish up 'Part One'. Going forward, I plan to try and expand the perspective somewhat to deal with things from other points of view beyond simply the Seleucid empire.
     
    Chapter Twenty-Two
  • Chapter Twenty-Two: A View from the South

    At risk of getting too Seleucid-centric, it is worth us taking some time to reorient our perspective somewhat. While the Seleucid empire under Antiochus II was experiencing a period of expansion and relative stability, Ptolemaic Egypt was prospering in its own way. Unlike the Seleucid empire, Egypt was blessed with readily defensible 'borders' and a readily available ideological framework into which the Ptolemaic kings could slot themselves. From the time of Ptolemy I, the Ptolemaic dynasty had cast itself as pharaohs in the Egyptian mould, continuing to patronise temples and issue edicts as any other pharaoh would. During the early phases of Ptolemaic rule, the varying ideologies of the Ptolemies were largely kept separate, however. To Greeks (both within and without Egypt), the Ptolemies cast themselves as Greek kings while, to Egyptians, they were happy to present themselves as pharaohs. Alexandria, while it may well have incorporated Egyptianising elements for its Egyptian population (including indigenous temples, although the date of their construction is debatable), was presented as a bastion of Greek identity in a foreign environment. Built from the vast quantities of immigration encouraged by the Ptolemies, the population of Alexandria seems to have been predominately Cyreneans and Cyrenaicans with large populations of Thracians, Judaeans, and Athenians as well. The city, according to one poem, was filled with soldiers, mercenaries (although the term is largely ahistorical for the ancient period, it is a convenient term for people), poets, playwrights, merchants and the vast court and various hangers-on of the Ptolemaic kings.

    From quite early, Alexandria achieved a reputation for being the location to go to for those seeking economic advancement or literary patronage. From all across Egypt and the Mediterranean came tens of thousands of people, all seeking fortune or better lives or access to the social and political capital of Alexandria itself. Of course, it did not simply emerge as such an iconic city; Alexandria had developed over the course of the reigns of Ptolemy I and II, starting off as a small city originally laid out under Alexander and turning into a bustling metropolis. In the 310s, Ptolemy I had moved his capital to Alexandria and it had been retained as the centre of their power ever since. Within the palace, which itself comprised between one-quarter and one-third of the city, lay the famous Library and Mouseion of Alexandria, a centre of royal patronage. The library probably emerged under Ptolemy I who was famous for his ruthless practices of acquiring literature to stock it with and, under his successors, the Mouseion became a major site of literary patronage. Part of the ideology of Hellenistic kingship was the production, and patronage, of literature of all varieties. Poetry, theatre, epic, even prose were all popular genres patronised by the kings. By building the Library and Mouseion, the Ptolemies were promoting their credentials as a major patron of Greek culture and literature while also promoting Alexandria as something of a new Athens (which the Ptolemies seem to have adopted as the cultural model for Alexandria to some degree, trying to create the image that Alexandria was the successor to Athens) as well as as a centre of Greek culture and identity in Egypt.

    Outside of Alexandria, the vast quantities of papyrus surviving has given us invaluable insight into the society and administration of Ptolemaic Egypt during this period. In order to fund the immense costs of building, and maintaining, their empire, the Ptolemies had instituted an exceptionally intricate administrative system dedicated to cutting down on fraud, ensuring the continued functioning of justice systems, and collecting tax on anything and everything they could. Under Ptolemy II, the Ptolemies issued the so-called 'Revenue Laws', a series of incredibly intricate laws governing everything from the assessment of crops to the movement and sale of oil to the production of wine or the contracts for farming tax. These were probably not all issued as a single document but collated later based on a series of laws issued over time. At every level, the Ptolemies attempted to institute a deep and very ambitious level of control over the functioning of the Egyptian economy and its society. Papyrus also permits us to see the functioning of these systems through hundreds of letters, tax records, instructions sent to a variety of people throughout the administration and even personal wills. Through the Dryton papyri, we see the marriage of the Greek Dryton to the Egyptian Senmouthis and their children (who bear both Greek and Egyptian names), the various different wills issues by Dryton approaching his death and the continued lives of his children afterwards. Through tax records we learn that there were somewhat different taxes imposed on Greeks than on Egyptians. Police were instituted all across Egypt and seem to have been present even in very small villages.

    Without going into too much detail, the impression we get is of a system that, at least, was intended to be a very centralised and controlled one. The exact success of all these many regulations is up for debate (certainly, we know that fraud was a very real problem) but what is clear is that the Ptolemies attempted to create an exceptionally bureaucratic system. Of course, this is not to say that the Seleucids did not have a very bureaucratic system; on the contrary, we know that they had a hierarchy of officials just as the Ptolemies did, but we see this more obviously in the Ptolemaic evidence owing to the survival of papyrus. It is also very probable that, given the size and relatively centralised habitation of Egypt, the Ptolemies were able to introduce this centralised system at a much more local and intimate level.

    Alongside this, the Ptolemies had worked hard to both neuter and win over the Egyptian priesthood. Throughout the 3rd Century, temples continued to be patronised and priests wooed by the Ptolemaic kings even as they slowly stripped lands away from many of them. Even before Ptolemy I had made himself king, this process of winning over the Egyptian religious institutions had been a constantly ongoing trend. This was important because the temples acted effectively as a barometer for measuring Egyptian support and a potential locus of dissent should they be angered. Priests did not spend all their time working but also spent a lot of time living outside of the temples in local communities. As such, they had the potential to act as representatives for the Egyptian people and, with the wealth of temples, to focus popular dissent. Alternatively, they could be used to spread the ideology and support of the Ptolemies. Ptolemy I and II had both patronised the temples of Edfu and Kom Ombo quite extensively, organising repairs and restorations at both sites but had also continued the pharaonic traditions of building new temples, repairing old ones and had built themselves a base of support amongst much of the priesthood. With that said, the level of their support should not be overstated. Of particular interest are the so-called 'Apocalypse Oracles', the most famous of which is the 'Oracle of the Potter', a Demotic text written sometime in the 3rd Century which prophesies the destruction and overthrow of the Ptolemies who are portrayed as foreign invaders.

    All of this was the base upon which Ptolemaic foreign policy was built. This administrative system, which I have only traced out in bare minimum to save time, provided the financial and political capital that the Ptolemies could use to look outwards and expand their power. In the Mediterranean, this was most famously accomplished through the Nesiotic League and their adventures in Coele-Syria and Southern Anatolia. They had also, from the time of Ptolemy II, made common cause with Rhodes and Rome, helping the former fight pirates in the Aegean and often exporting food to the latter. Just as important, however, were their political involvements inn the east and south. Under Ptolemy I, they had begun pushing into the eastern desert, building roads and cities to promote the exploitation of the mineral resources of the region (especially gold) and, in turn, building the ports of Myos Hormos and, more importantly, Berenice to open up the Red Sea. Under Ptolemy II, the Ptolemies began ever more political and financial adventures along the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. At this date, the trade in the Indian Ocean seems largely to have been dominated by peoples from East Africa and Southern Arabia who leveraged their position to connect the Ptolemies with India but from as early as Ptolemy II, the Ptolemies had begun trying to subvert this control somewhat. During the mid-3rd Century, Ptolemy II sent ambassadors to the Mauryan Empire and later Ptolemaic kings would fund exploration missions to trace the Indian Ocean monsoons and find trade routes directly to India itself.

    Through Berenice and Myos Hormos came silks, spices, incense, jewels and a host of other very desired goods upon which the Ptolemies often collected astoundingly high taxes (possibly as high as 25-50%). On several occasions, Ptolemaic kings even seem to have made attempts to entirely subvert the trade altogether and famously tried to transplant frankincense which ultimately failed but shows the importance of the crop as a potential source of revenue for the Ptolemies and their awareness of the huge wealth coming from the east. Ptolemaic embassies are known in western and southern Arabia, possibly seeking to establish friendly relationships with local leaders, as well as pirate hunting expeditions in the Red Sea to protect against raids on their shipping.

    To the south, the Ptolemies were drawn largely by the potential animal wealth of east Africa. Ptolemy II himself is said to have developed the so-called 'elephantegoi', a new ship built specifically for the purposes of carrying home live elephants and, from the 260s, the earliest hunting base known as 'Ptolemais of the Hunts' was established to the south. Live elephants were brought back both for the prestige (and association with kingship) and for their military utility although, in battle they tended to be easily frightened by the larger Asian elephants employed by the Seleucids. This required a huge investment of resources; the camps established by the Ptolemies were often semi-permanent residences for hunters who needed to capture and train the elephants before they could be brought onto ships. This involved direct state involvement and frequent supply expeditions were organised with hunters paid well above the average wages of the time (as much as double other labourers for their work!).

    Ivory hunting was also important and, during the 3rd Century, ivory prices dropped in the Mediterranean as the Ptolemies began to export huge quantities of ivory brought from east Africa. In time, their hunters began to deplete local hunting grounds, forcing them to travel ever further south. These hunts would eventually die off during the 2nd Century but, by that point, the Ptolemies had reached as far as Cape Guardafui in the Horn of Africa. Under Philadelphus, the Ptolemies campaigned in Nubia, bringing back captives, ivory and gold which were paraded through the streets of Alexandria in a grand display of wealth and power. As their influence and connections spread ever further out, the Ptolemies were able to expand their ambitions. Do not misunderstand, the loss of Coele-Syria was indeed a loss but it was far from being one that they could not recover from; the Ptolemaic empire continued to dominate the seas and was far from down and out (as events would soon show). Under Ptolemy II, Ptolemaic soft power and political influence had reached a height. In 246 BCE, Ptolemy II died and passed the throne to his son, the 34-year-old Ptolemy III.

    The Reign of Ptolemy III:

    Alongside Antiochus II, Ptolemy III was one of the great commanders of the age. The clash between Antiochus and Ptolemy in the 220s, the infamous 3rd Syrian War (or Great Syrian War) in which Ptolemy III earned the nickname 'Nikator', has gone down in history as one of the most important wars of the 3rd Century, one which would set the tone for the two powers going forward. However, the early parts of Ptolemy III's reign were remarkable peaceful on his northern front. If Ptolemy sought to reclaim Syria at this date, he did not show it. Instead, he originally seems to have placed his focus on shoring up his position in the eastern Mediterranean after the defeats of the 250s. In particular, he took advantage of the declining popularity of the Seleucids in Greece to cement and increase Ptolemaic influence there. In 244, Ptolemy welcomed several Athenians to Alexandria where one orator gave a speech about Antiochus II, naming him 'The Seleucid Xerxes'. Around the same time, he was also active in the Peloponnese where the spectre of Seleucid imperialism won him supporters amongst the Achaean League, and in Corinth. Several cities in Judaea were fortified as well, possibly in preparation for another war with the Seleucids in the future.

    At the same time, he turned his attention south and east as his father had done. As mentioned, embassies were sent to several leaders in western Arabia and Ptolemy seems to have promoted further relations with the Mauryas at this date. In the south, he continued the relentless push south in search of ivory and elephants but, possibly seeking more room in which to build his empire, made several campaigns south along the Nile valley. Ptolemy II had already begun carving out a province in the region but Ptolemaic control seems to have largely declined during the wars of the 250s. As such, in the 240s, Ptolemy III began a new series of campaigns against the Kingdom of Kush. The first of these campaigns, undertaken during the late 240s, was probably more of a tribute seeking mission. However, during the 230s, Ptolemy seems to have made more attempts to carve a lasting empire out in the region. It is possible that he saw Nubia as an opportunity to build his empire, accrue more soldiers, and expand his economy or simply as a place where he could match the military expansionism of Antiochus and carve out his own 'conqueror' identity in a period where retaking Syria was currently not on the cards while the Ptolemies rebuilt. Regardless, the campaigns of the 230s brought Ptolemaic control as far south as the second cataract where he famously made a visit to the mortuary temple of Ramesses II (and had sand cleared away), an area which was carved out into the province named the very easy to remember Triakontaschoinos, originally placed under the leadership of Mosollamos, a Jewish commander who had distinguished himself in the campaigns.

    Here, the Ptolemies patronised the construction of a whole series of grand new Egyptian temples, likely in an attempt to try and syncretise Nubian and Egyptian gods to make ruling the region easier. Forts were established and new roads carved which helped access the gold resources of the region. In the 220s, Mosollamos would fight a Second Ptolemaic-Kushite war which would result in a temporary extension of the Triakontaschoinos as far as the third cataract where a 3rd Century Ptolemaic fort was found, occupied likely between 228 and 226 BCE when Mosollamos would have had to pull his soldiers out of Nubia to help provide extra resources for the campaign against Antiochus II.

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    Note from the Author: I have tried very hard not to indulge too much in talking about Ptolemaic East Africa and the Red Sea but it is, in my opinion, one of the most interesting topics in Hellenistic history and one which not a lot of people pay enough attention to. Thank you all for reading and all the support you've given, I hope you enjoy this chapter!
     
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    Chapter Twenty-Three
  • Chapter Twenty-Three: The Tyrian Revolution (255-227 BCE)

    By the late 250s, most of the cities of Phoenicia had emerged under republican regimes. From the 270s onwards, we begin to see more and more cities throughout Phoenicia issuing coins and inscriptions referencing the peoples of their cities, coins with local kings disappear and are replaced with Greco-Phoenician issues which embraced Phoenician images on one side and usually a Hellenistic king on the other. The earliest of these cities was Sidon, probably around 278 BCE, which began issuing coins in 'the Era of the people of Sidon' but, by the end of the decade, Tyre had also emerged as a democratic city and, by the 250s, most of the other cities in Phoenicia had followed. Despite being treated as effectively Ptolemaic cities, these Phoenician democracies seem to have been rather opportunist at various points. Between 280 and the mid-250s, they pursued relationships with both kingdoms at various points. For instance, around 279 or 278, Tyre became one of the cities to acknowledge Seleucus as King of Macedon, even when the Ptolemies held off on doing so. During the First Syrian War, Tyre had fallen on the side of the Ptolemies as it did several decades later in the 250s but, in the interim, continued its middle ground policy; in the 260s, Tyre had welcomed benefaction from Antiochus I and, in 259, also received promises of a new temple from Antiochus II.

    As we have discussed, none of this should be seen as unexpected. For the most part, Phoenicia seems to have fallen into the Ptolemaic sphere of influence but a certain amount of back and forth political wrangling was entirely expected and accepted by Hellenistic kings. In a world without fixed borders, most ancient states had a tendency to 'breathe' somewhat, growing and shrinking constantly without any real concern by its leaders or even rivals. Even during the Second Syrian War, both kings are seen appealing to the Phoenician cities, implying that, despite Ptolemaic garrisons and fortifications, these cities were considered as potential third players in the wars between the two kings. During the course of the war, Antiochus had seized opportunities from local elites to take control of the cities by force and, in the process, had displaced the democratic constitutions of the cities of Phoenicia in order to establish more pro-Seleucid monarchical governments. One of these opportunities was Philocrates of Tyre.

    Born in 294 BCE to a Tyrian father and Greek mother, Philocrates had made himself at home moving between Tyre and the various Hellenistic courts of the eastern Mediterranean. His Greek name is almost certainly a 'double name' but his Phoenician name is unknown to us and he only appears as Philocrates in the Greek sources. By the mid-260s, Philocrates was active in the courts of Ptolemy II and Antiochus I, moving freely between both courts as the situation demanded it. In 262, Philocrates was in Alexandria where he is said to have fallen in love with the enormous Ptolemaic palace complex there. Nevertheless, by 255 BCE, Philocrates emerged as part of a group of elite Tyrians involved in turning the city over to Antiochus II. In return, Philocrates' cabal of rich Tyrians was placed in command of the city alongside a Seleucid garrison some 600 strong led by a commander named Hyginos. In 254 BCE, the cabal was still issuing coinage and inscriptions in the name of the 'People of Tyre' and, for at least a short while, seems to have maintained at least a premise of democracy, even as they massively restricted access to political power. Philocrates seems to have made his move quite quickly; in the weeks after the Seleucid capture of the city, he began wooing Hyginos and, with the help of two other conspirators; Azemilkos (possibly related to the old king of Tyre back in the 4th Century) and Diotimos (a Phoenician who, again, only appears through a Greek name), started fabricating conspiracies against Seleucid rule. Over the next year, with the help of Hyginos' garrisons, the three conspirators began to whittle down the rest of the cabal until, by 253 BCE, inscriptions from the city refer to the Tritarchs of Tyre.

    Even this situation didn't last very long, however. Between 253 and 251, the three began to dismantle the old political institutions of the city; the old councils and assemblies were side-lined and new laws issued investing the three with increased powers and authority. Alongside this, each of the three started to reach out to outside forces to strengthen their own position against each other. In particular, each of the three reached out to similar elite groups (or kings) in other Phoenician cities, many of whom were happy to lend soldiers in return for pay, as well as either (or both) of the relevant Hellenistic kings. Philetairos, in particular, reached out to the Seleucid authorities while Azemilkos turned to Ptolemaic support in turn. When Diotimos died in 251 BCE, the two survivors turned to outright conflict in the streets of Tyre. Accusing Azemilkos of treating with the Ptolemies to overturn Seleucid authority, Philocrates was able to convince Hyginos to move against him. Azemilkos, finding himself outmanoeuvred and without direct Ptolemaic support, fled the city. In the aftermath, Philocrates made himself basileus.

    It didn't take long for everything to go wrong. By himself, Philocrates quickly earned a reputation for heavy-handed rule. His first act was to establish a more official fortress for the Seleucid garrison (and himself) near the Sidonian harbour and the temple of Melqart in the northern part of the city. Having just had their republic stripped away, the Tyrian population was only further outraged by the construction of this new fortress-palace in their city. As rumours of dissent grew in the city, Philocrates very soon stumbled into making the exact wrong decision, deciding that the people of Tyre were upset over a constitution they should never have had and promptly ordering for the old boule (council building) to be demolished. Incensed by the destruction of the physical infrastructure of their lost democracy, the people of Tyre went to prevent the demolition, going so far as to engage in fistfights with the men sent to demolish the building. Philocrates proceeded to respond by demanding that Hyginos step in to stop the revolting Tyrian populace. To his credit, Hyginos promptly refused to do so, stating that his job was to maintain Seleucid authority and protect the city, not to help destroy buildings. Furious, Philocrates turned to his Phoenician 'mercenaries', the same soldiers from across Phoenicia who had helped him come to power in the first place, ordering them to intervene.

    And intervene they did, in mid-250, the Phoenician mercenaries descended on the site and tried to disperse the groups of people gathered there. When they fought back, things turned violent. In the battle, the mercenaries killed some 50-60 Tyrians and drove the rest off. Their victory wouldn't last long, however, as news quickly began to spread throughout the city and groups of Tyrian citizens began to gather in the streets in response. This time, when ordered to disperse, they responded with rocks and improvised weapons. For several weeks, Philocrates' mercenaries and the people of Tyre fought in the streets for control of the boule until, finally, Philocrates' forces emerged triumphant once again and successfully dismantled the chambers once and for all. For the next two years, this pattern repeated itself time and again. The people of Tyre, increasingly frustrated with Philocrates' abuses of power, would rise up and find themselves going head to head with the mercenary forces of the king and (on several occasions) the Seleucid garrison itself. Things really came to a head, however, in 247 BCE during the so-called 'First Tyrian Revolution'.

    The inciting incident, this time, was a murder during a drunken brawl. Some of Philocrates' mercenaries killed a local resident during the fight but were forced to retreat when a larger crowd began to gather. News spread quickly and, by morning, a huge crowd had gathered outside of the palace demanding for the culprits to be handed over. At first, Philocrates refused to compromise, demanding the citizens retreat and threatening to have them dispersed. When he tried to do so, however, things went somewhat differently. As his mercenaries streamed out, the Tyrians fell back, luring Philocrates' forces into the streets of the city. There, the Tyrians turned around trapping them in tight streets and surrounding them, bombarding them with rocks from upper stories and even rooftops, capturing and repurposing weapons. A few were able to fight their way back to the palace but, by the evening, many of the mercenaries were dead. Now, sensing that there was a very real possibility of wholesale revolution, Hyginos intervened. That night, he ordered Philocrates to turn his mercenaries over to Hyginos' command and took control of the walls himself. The next morning, the crowds had gathered again, swelling as news of the victory the previous day spread. In an attempt to sate them, Hyginos had the culprit of the murder a few days before arrested and publicly tried. It wasn't enough and the crowd began to call for their own trial. Hyginos complied, turning the mercenary over to the people who, the next evening, organised their own trial and execution.

    Contrary to his expectations, however, the crowd did not disperse. On the contrary, emboldened by their victories, they demanded the removal of Philocrates and the re-institution of the old Tyrian democracy. Indeed, for a while, Hyginos seemed close to agreeing despite the best efforts of Philocrates himself. However, when the crowd demand also called for the dismantling of Philocrates' fortress and the removal of the Seleucid garrison from the island, he finally chose his side. Refusing the demands, Hyginos instead called for mediation and offered to help institute a new political system that could incorporate the demands of the people. It was too late, however. For many, the very image of the fortress and the Seleucid garrison were intimate parts of Philocrates' regime, they were symbols of anti-democratic sentiment and oppression that the Tyrians were not about to stand for. Finally, with negotiations stalling, Hyginos took action. The next morning, Seleucid forces marched out into the city to disperse the crowd and end the siege of the palace. At first, the Tyrians were able to gain the upper hand, succeeding in luring some contingents of Seleucid soldiers into the streets and ambushing them as they had done a couple of days earlier. However, Hyginos was able to rally his soldiers and drive off many of the rebels. For the next two weeks, this pattern continued to repeat itself until, finally, a larger Seleucid force arrived and put down the revolution once and for all.

    In the aftermath, Seleucid control of the city grew stronger. Hyginos remained in command of the garrison and, increasingly, began to side-line Philocrates. All decisions now had to be run past Hyginos before being made and the Phoenician mercenaries were officially disbanded. In turn, the garrison was also increased from 600 to 1000 soldiers. Again, to his credit, Hyginos seems to have made very real attempts to assuage the people of Tyre. Between 247 and 246, Hyginos assisted Kleopatra in helping provide for the food requirements of the city and, in 245, Hyginos convinced Philocrates to reconstruct the boule, providing Seleucid soldiers to help in its construction. However, dissent continued; Philocrates was still in power, his palace still intact and the Seleucid garrison still in control of the city. What's more, Seleucid soldiers were ever more visible, present in the marketplace, patrolling the city and arresting several popular leaders of the rebellion. In 244 BCE, a second (though smaller) rebellion broke out near the Egyptian harbour in the southern part of the city culminating in a pitched battle in which several Seleucid soldiers were killed and Hyginos injured. A third rebellion, just over a year later, marked the third and final major uprising (before the 220s at least).

    Afterwards, however, active dissent seems to have undergone a general downwards trend. By 234 BCE, Tyre found itself in a reasonable state of equilibrium. Hyginos died in 241 BCE and, in 235, Philocrates also died and passed the throne to his son, Pausanias. For a time, a certain amount of peace seems to have continued. In the late 230s, however, a charismatic young Tyrian came to the fore by the name of Melqartamos. Melqartamos seems to have been only one of a general wave of pro-democratic sentiment rising in the Phoenician cities at the time. What is interesting is that the general patterns seen in Tyre seem to have been borne out in other Phoenician cities at the time. In the 250s, Tyre had been only one of many Phoenician cities to find itself under oligarchic or royal rule and, throughout the 250s and 40s, several cities seem to have found themselves in states of turmoil. But the decade between 245 and 235 saw a decline in this dissent before another rise in democratic feeling amongst the younger people of a new generation headed by figures such as Melqartamos. Born in 258 BCE, Melqartamos had grown up through the early waves of revolt and was deeply affected by the events of the early 240s. Probably part of a wealthy family, Melqartamos travelled to Athens around 238 BCE where he remained for two years, learning oratory, philosophy, and, in particular, the history and constitution of the old democracy.

    His return to Tyre was delayed somewhat, however, and he spent a few more years travelling around the eastern Mediterrnaean, visiting both Antioch and Alexandria where he spent a lot of time at the library of Alexandria. Upon his return to Tyre in 233, he initially turned his attention to the creation of new genres of Phoenician literature, seeking to emulate the cultural and literary output of the Greek world in a form adapted for Phoenician tastes and interests. Melqartamos was one of the first to begin popularising 'Neo-Phoenician script', a variation of the Phoenician alphabet which adapted the Greek vowels to better emulate speech and make literature more accessible. The first of his works was published either in 232 or 231 and entitled 'The Phoenician Politea' in imitation of Aristotle's 'Athenian Politea'. Unlike Aristotle's work, however, the Phoenician Politea was not an attempt to describe an existing constitution but an attempt to imagine an ideal constitution for the future of the Phoenician city states. Modelling it off Athenian democracy, Melqartamos adopted the Assembly and Boule but reintroduced the sufets which, until the overthrow of the democracies in the 250s, had been annually elected in many Phoenician cities. He may also have been, to some degree, inspired by Carthage which sent votive offerings to the temple of Melqart at Tyre every year. To some extent, this was simply a call for a return to the old pre-Seleucid system but the political context of Melqartamos' work was very much rooted in his environment. In a break from previous policy, Melqartamos argued that no true democracy could be beholden to a Hellenistic king but must be treated as autonomous. While he didn't entirely call for the removal of all Seleucid authority (to do so may well have had him arrested), he did argue for an autonomous and ungarrisoned status for Tyre similar to that of Ionian poleis.

    Alongside the literary publication of this work, Melqartamos often lectured on the topic, supposedly memorising the pamphlet and reciting entire passages to other young Tyrians. In 229, Pausanias, worried about the implications of this philosophy, stepped in and ordered the pamphlet destroyed, having several copies rounded up and burned. However, in a display of how hard ideas can be to truly destroy, Melqartamos simply rewrote the pamphlet word for word and had a copy smuggled out of the city where it would spend several years in Alexandria in the possession of a friend. Melqartamos' written work wouldn't return to Tyre until after the end of the Second Tyrian Revolution in 229 BCE. In the meantime, he continued to lecture, attracting ever growing crowds. Realising that destroying the literary work of Melqartamos hadn't worked, Pausanias stepped in again and, along with the commander of the Seleucid garrison, ordered for Melqartamos and several other democratic leaders to be arrested. Anticipating this, however, Melqartamos relied on the safety of the crowd. During the days, he would travel around the city very visibly, lecturing in increasingly public places and staying at different friends' houses each night. When the soldiers came to arrest him one morning, they found their way blocked by listeners. Forcing their way through, they seized Melqartamos but found the crowd unwilling to let them leave. Calls for his release soon turned into direct action as people surged forward to free him from arrest. In the scuffle, several Seleucid soldiers were injured and forced to abandon the arrest entirely.

    Next day, the Seleucid garrison marched out in force to arrest Melqartamos and, once again, found a fight. This time, the soldiers made better headway and Melqartamos was successfully captured alongside several other ringleaders. Taken back to Pausanias' palace, Melqartamos was tried in private and sentenced to imprisonment. In his absence, however, dissent began to swell yet again. Demands for his release grew throughout the city and old slogans of the rebellions of the 240s began to be employed. In one particularly striking instance, a group of Tyrians are said to have made an effigy of Pausanias and publicly beheaded it before parading the severed 'head' around the city. Several were arrested and executed. Once again, the Seleucid garrison commander seems to have made an attempt to step in and restore some order but without much success; demands for the release of Melqartamos and, increasingly, rumours that the young man had been executed, began to grow. Trying to avoid turning Melqartamos into a martyr, Pausanias took the radical step of having him brought up onto the walls to show the crowd that he was alive. However, the sight of Melqartamos, haggard and injured, only increased the anger amongst the crowd. In response, several hundred Tyrians marched from the palace to the Sidonian port, driving off the Seleucid guards and storming the port where they set fire to several ships, chanting for the release of Melqartamos and his friends.

    For two weeks, the Seleucid garrison was placed under effective siege until, finally, news of an approaching Seleucid force arrived. Emboldened by the news, Pausanias demanded that the rioters stand down, only to be ridiculed. One story states that, a few days after the news of the approaching army arrived, Pausanias went up onto the walls of his palace only to see hundreds of effigies outside, each of them with their heads removed. Finally, sometime in June 229, a Seleucid army entered the city and marched, entirely unopposed, to the palace. Hearing of their approach, the protestors had evaporated back into the city to wait for another opportunity. Pausanias, now with a larger force at his back, had Melqartamos sentenced to death and set out to round up more of the democratic ringleaders. He was, fatefully as it turned out, stopped by the intervention of one of the men accompanying the Seleucid force; the 19-year-old Prince Demetrius of the Seleucid empire.

    Prince Demetrius:

    Demetrius has become something of a romantic figure in the memories of many. In the Hellenistic, his actions during the Great Syrian War and, ultimately, his tragic downfall turned him into a tragic hero of true Greek fashion. As a young man, Demetrius was often compared to his father and achieved fame as much for his love of fighting and bravery in combat as for his even-handedness and good temperament. Unlike his brothers, Demetrius is said to have enjoyed following his father on campaign and was lauded for refusing to travel on horseback, marching alongside the infantry instead. Much of this may well be fiction, the romanticised image of Demetrius that would later become popular in Hellenistic literature, but it shows the popularity of Demetrius even in his own time. By the time he was 19, Demetrius was a fully active member of the Seleucid court and, possibly on his own initiative, was part of the force (perhaps 2-3000 soldiers maximum) sent to Phoenicia in 229. Tyre was not the only ongoing issue there; democratic movements had been breaking out in several cities with varying responses. In Sidon, the transfer of power was largely peaceful and, by 230, the city was once again a republic. In Tyre and Byblos, however, civil unrest had broken out, often prompted by the reactionary responses of their leaders.

    We have focussed on Tyre for a reason; the political environment of Tyre is crucial for the events of the Great Syrian War and for Demetrius' own actions within it, but that is not to say that the events in the other Phoenician cities were any less interesting or important. Regardless, the focus on Tyre is the easiest way to describe the general events ongoing in the Levant during this period. Upon his arrival, Demetrius immediately took command of the situation, ordering Pausanias to release Melqartamos and issuing a general pardon for the rebels. He agreed to negotiate with the rebels personally and organise a peaceful transfer of power from Pausanias to a new constitution and ordered for Pausanias to be deposed. Fearing that his deposition would lead inevitably to his murder, however, Pausanias escaped the city under cover of night and fled south to Egypt. In the end, Demetrius' republic would not come to pass. Not yet, at least. In early 228 BCE, Pausanias, now in Alexandria, approached Ptolemy III for help restoring him to power. In truth, Ptolemy may well have had no such intention; the Seleucids themselves had learned that monarchy was not currently popular in Phoenicia. However, Pausanias gave Ptolemy a handy casus belli; later that year, he began mobilising his army and, in 227 BCE, he launched his invasion of Coele-Syria with the stated goal of 'protecting the cities of Phoenicia against rampant rebellion and ending internecine violence'.

    ------------------------
    Note: I know I've used 'republic' and 'democracy' interchangeably here and that they are not interchangeable. I cannot find much information on the OTL Phoenician cities and their governments but they may well have been republican in a similar manner to what we see in Carthage. Phoenician cities had been republics before, some going back a lot further than the Hellenistic. However, many cities do seem to have had kings during the time of Alexander, many of whom appear to have been overthrown during the 3rd Century. Mostly, I really use republic and democracy interchangeably here for my own convenience and to make the reading a bit less samey and varied. Understand that I am working on the basis that these 'democracies' are probably Carthage-style republics albeit, in this case following Melqartamos' ideology, with a possibly wider franchise.
     
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    Chapter Twenty-Four
  • Chapter Twenty-Four: Moves and Countermoves

    In May or June 227, Ptolemy III invaded Coele-Syria on the, quite flimsy, casus belli of ending the chaos and conflicts ongoing in Phoenicia at the time. By his side came Pausanias, the recently deposed king of Tyre who was now seeking any opportunity to return to power. Whether either of them knew it, the invasion of 227 would kick off nearly a decade of brutal warfare between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms which, by the end, would leave much of Coele-Syria devastated and tens of thousands dead. What neither of them knew was that the so-called 'Great Syrian War' would come to be a something of a literary phenomenon; an iconic war of the Hellenistic which made its mark in a lot of later literature. This literature, both historical and fictional, has shaped the perceptions and views of the war ever since and helped cement its place as one of the great and important conflicts of the Hellenistic. By all accounts, this literary importance, however, really began with the work of Euphemios, a Greco-Syrian author living sometime at the end of the 2nd Century BCE. The story goes that Euphemios, seeking inspiration for a story 'to rival that of Homer' had gone to visit a friend living down near Sidon. While staying with his friend, Euphemios heard the story of Prince Demetrius of Tyre and took a trip to the city to visit the Demetrium, a small shrine erected sometime in the 2nd Century by the people of Tyre. Inspired by the stories of Demetrius, Euphemios set out to record it in what became known as 'The Siege of Tyre' (although the Epic of Demetrius and the Demetrian Tragedy have both been used despite the fact that the story was neither an epic nor specifically a tragic work).

    The 'Siege of Tyre' is a fictional work of prose narrative depicting the events of the siege of Tyre in which Demetrius and Ptolemy III are played off against one another as contemporary Homeric heroes struggling for control of Tyre, a conflict which is wrapped up in a political war between democracy and monarchy. In Euphemios, the siege is cast as a struggle between the ideals of democracy and monarchy in the city environment. The question, really, is: 'what is best for the people? Monarchy or democracy?' As you can imagine, in an environment where Hellenistic kings were still around, active, and dangerous, this was a topic which could very easily walk the line between literature and treason. Officially, Euphemios skirts the issue by presenting the idea that democracy is best for a city but can only achieve its greatest form under the 'patronage' and support of kings. Unofficially, the work still walked the line and seems to have been treated as somewhat dangerous by certain figures; one of Euphemios' friends is said to have cautioned him to destroy the work for fear of losing his head (although this may be an attempt to recreate the famous story of Sosthenes and Antiochus II). Under the surface, Euphemios' work is full of quite subtle subversion an, on occasion, outright dissent. Fundamentally, Demetrius is only able to achieve what he does because he casts off his royal affectations and effectively integrates himself into the citizen body. Neither Ptolemy nor Antiochus II ever appear as especially predisposed towards the interests of the people of Tyre beyond their own desire for control and even the conclusion, at the moment of Demetrius' greatest triumph, is loaded with tension in the subtle reminder that it is Demetrius' royal status which will, inevitably, lead to his downfall. We are left to ponder the question of whether, really, monarchy is such a good thing after all.

    Regardless, Euphemios' story became immensely popular and seems to have sparked a wave of interest in the war which translated into both histories and literary works which began to mine the war for stories to adapt. The result of this is that many discussions of the war tend to follow a similar pattern in which the siege of Tyre, an event lasting less than a month all, is placed at the very centre of the events of the conflict as somehow being the most important event in a war full of other important events. In addition, many of the stories and anecdotes included in many histories are directly taken from the literary output produced in the cultural wave during the late 2nd and early 1st Centuries. With that said, it is difficult to not include many of these stories since they are so baked into the legends of the war as to be indistinguishable from it at times. As such, as we go through the historical narrative, we can only attempt to identify the bits and pieces that might be apocryphal and analyse them in the context of a 2nd and 1st Century literary environment. What can be said is that many of these authors, including Euphemios, made use of near-contemporary authors. In particular, they seem to have drawn extensively on Antiochus II's court biographer, Ambrosius (whose work does not survive) and the other contemporary; Lucius Atilius Caiatinus, a member of a senatorial family who spent time in Syria during the 210s and who, while there, wrote a short history of the Seleucid kings down to Seleucus II.

    With that out of the way, let us begin recounting the actual narrative. Ptolemy II invaded in either May or June 227 BCE. At the time, Antiochus was in Seleukeia and would have received news of the invasion within a few days. By July at the latest, Antiochus' army was in the field and moving to intercept Ptolemy. For the most part, Ptolemy seems to have ignored the cities of Phoenicia themselves, instead banking on meeting the Seleucid army in battle in the hopes that a major victory might cause the Seleucids to outright capitulate. It is also likely that he was fully aware that he no time to waste on long sieges when Antiochus could arrive at any moment and threaten his rear. There are a handful of exceptions; at the very outset of the war, Ptolemy was able to convince the city to surrender, entering it and making a formal declaration that he had come to 'end the civil conflict within the city and institute good governance'. While there, he reorganised the city's government, placing a new 'Emergency Council' to govern Sidon until the war ended. In truth, the 'Emergency Council' was nothing more than a handy administrative tool for the Ptolemies to govern the city through and a means to pass power to their supporters. From Sidon, he also made a stop at Tyre where, apparently, he was hoping to be positively received but, finding Seleucid supporters already entrenched, decided to leave some 3000 soldiers to man the causeway under Pausanias' leadership. In turn, the Ptolemaic fleet moved in to blockade the Egyptian and Sidonian harbours and officially place the city under siege.

    His other diplomatic success was Tripolis which, fearing his army, surrendered in June on the agreement that their democracy would be kept intact. By July, Ptolemy had reached the Orontes, encamping on the banks and according to one story, setting up an inscription stating that his army had reached the river and that, here, the Seleucid kingdom would meet its end. Antiochus had been busy; mobilising the main parts of his army, raising further levies and, importantly, augmenting his cavalry forces from central Asia while he was at it. When he marched in early July, he began with some 58,000 soldiers but, by August, that number had increased to as many as 70-75,000. Ptolemy, meanwhile, had made a beeline for Antioch, marching along the edge of the mountains and encamping just outside the southern gate where he began erecting siege weapons. In truth, however, Ptolemy's siege weapons were a ruse; he had no intention of trying to storm the city before Antiochus got there and left only enough soldiers to ensure that the garrison could not try to leave the city and aid Antiochus in battle. Instead, he spent the time in between his arrival and Antiochus' preparing for battle.
    1684186637161.png

    Map of Antioch. Note that the fortified sites on the island to the north were not built until later.
    The story goes that Ptolemy, apprised of the political environment within the city, knew that the garrison commander was of an anxious temperament and quick to panic. At the approach of Ptolemy's army he had, apparently, been so afraid as to almost cause a mutiny amongst his soldiers who saw his fear and lost hope. They were only brought back to discipline by the timely intervention of several Macedonian aristocrats who calmed them and began taking command of the garrison. Sensing the opportunity, Ptolemy had his spies spread rumours to the garrison commander that there were traitors within the city who would open the gates any day now and let Ptolemy in at which point his soldiers would sack the city and kill the commander. Afraid for his life, the commander began writing to Antiochus, urging him to please hurry up and save us already. These letters, of course, found their way to Antiochus who, worried the city was days away from falling, had his army force march to reach Antioch before it was taken. In the meantime, Ptolemy had trenches dug, fortifications built on the surrounding slopes and sent much of his cavalry to encamp out of sight a few miles south.

    When Antiochus' army arrived, he encamped across from Ptolemy. Next morning, Antiochus' army arose and prepared for battle. Exhausted by the march and still not properly recovered, however, Antiochus' soldiers were no match for Ptolemy's refreshed and energetic army. As they advanced, his army found itself caught up against trenches and defensive positions, lacerated by Ptolemaic archers and forced to retreat. Changing tack, Antiochus instead sent forward his horse archers to bombard the Ptolemaic forces and try to lure them out of their defensive positions but found that few of them were willing to move. Pulling back to his line, Antiochus instead attempted to make use of the greatest strengths of his army; its extra flexibility. That night, he sent contingents of infantry up the hills to try and outflank Ptolemy's lines so that, come morning, they could trap the Ptolemaic forces between them. Ptolemy, however, was a step ahead and had already fortified the high ground to the east and, as Antiochus' soldiers approached, they were killed or captured to a man. Taking advantage of the situation, Ptolemy once again employed deception; falsifying a letter by Antiochus' commander, he sent back a spy dressed in Seleucid armour to 'inform' the king that his soldiers had made it safely and were ready. At the same time, Ptolemy prepared to lay his own ambush.

    Next morning, Antiochus, emboldened by his perceived success, began another assault on Ptolemaic lines only to quickly realise that they were not, in fact, about to be outflanked. On the contrary, Antiochus himself now found his army outflanked by the Ptolemaic infantry appearing behind his own army and smashing into his rear. Caught now between the Ptolemies on both fronts, his army exhausted and trapped in tight spaces where, suddenly, the flexibility of his infantry and strength of his cavalry didn't matter quite as much, Antiochus' army began to shatter and flee south. Ptolemy, however, was not finished; as Antiochus' army made their way south, Ptolemy's cavalry saw them and, as instructed, swarmed down to cut off the retreating Seleucid forces, harrying them for miles and splitting the routing forces up. In the bloodbath that followed, the Orontes river was said to have run red and, in one account, the people of Antioch were horrified to see bodies floating down the river towards the city. Several thousand Seleucid soldiers had been driven back and found themselves marching back north where they were quickly caught by Ptolemy's army and surrendered while many other groups were slaughtered wandering the countryside over the next few days. Antiochus himself escaped with some of his forces intact but was forced, at one point, to hide in a barn to evade capture and, by the time he made it to Apamea, was stained and apparently covered in animal excrement such that nobody recognised him.

    A lot of this story is apocryphal at best. The Battle of Antioch certainly did take place and was a crushing defeat for Antiochus who may have lost as many as 20-30,000 soldiers in a single day. Certainly, it would be almost a year before another Seleucid army of this size was in the field once again. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to be sure of exactly what events led up to the battle itself. The garrison commander is present in some accounts but not in others, as is the story of the Macedonian cavalrymen taking command of the garrison, probably written to appeal to Macedonians who had a tendency to look down on the courage and ability of those from the eastern portions of Antiochus' empire. That said, the broad events of the story; Ptolemy besieging Antioch, Antiochus rushing to fight and being ambushed in some manner are almost certainly true and proved to be the most devastating defeat suffered by a Seleucid army until that point. It would also trigger something of a military disaster. While Ptolemy was unable to take Antioch just yet (or didn't yet want to commit to such a long siege), he devastated the land around it, erected another trophy, and began marching unopposed through the Syrian countryside. By October at least, he had compelled the surrender of several cities in Syria as well as several others in Phoenicia including Damascus and Byblos which, realising that no help was coming, were all the more willing to take the offer of peaceful surrender over the prospect of a lengthy siege. Except, of course, for Tyre.

    See, in the meantime, Tyre, under the command of Prince Demetrius, had not only proved stubborn but outright problematic; in the interim between his first approach and the Battle of Antioch, Demetrius had not only broken the land blockade but had killed Pausanias and begun preparations for a siege. Given that Pausanias was, ostensibly, the very reason he had invaded in the first place, it wasn't exactly a good look, nor was leaving a hostile city under the command of a Seleucid prince in his rear. Encouraged by the defeat of Antiochus, Ptolemy raced south to put an end to this upstart once and for all.​
     
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    Chapter Twenty-Five
  • Chapter Twenty-Five: The Siege of Tyre Part One: Demetrius the Besieged


    4UF-pZuh24oKRiAF0PvTScmx_uztUhjuxbFUA6206Zc.jpg


    Map of the city of Tyre looking across from the west towards the coast of Phoenicia. The citadel of Philocrates and Pausanias lay near the western wall and close to both the Sidonian port and the Temple of Melqart.



    Important Names:
    Demetrius: Prince of the Seleucid Empire
    Kallias: Head of the Seleucid garrison in the city of Tyre
    Melqartamos: Leader of the Tyrian democratic movement
    Hamilcar: General of the Tyrian army and former ally of Pausanias
    Ptolemy III: King of Ptolemaic Egypt and commander of the Ptolemaic forces
    Isokrates: Commander of the Ptolemaic phalanx
    Gorgias: Commander of the Ptolemaic naval contingent at Tyre
    Demodocus: Subcommander of the Ptolemaic naval contingent at Tyre
    Kosmas: Commander of the Ptolemaic cavalry force
    Pausanias I: Son of Philocrates and would-be King of Tyre
    Philocrates II: Teenage son (and heir) of Pausanias

    In the events to follow, there are a lot of names, characters, and events that can make the actual narrative of the siege of Tyre sometimes quite overwhelming and confusing. I have attempted here to break the narrative down into its most important events divided day by day with analysis of the literary context behind several key scenes in the story but there is no need to remember every detail of the account for a general understanding of its events. At the end, I have provided a summary timeline of the siege and its most important events beginning in June and ending, with the siege, in September. In truth, of course, the 'Siege of Tyre' is a misnomer. Despite being condensed into a single siege by many, the 'Siege of Tyre' actually comprises two separate and distinct sieges which are often known as the 'Pausanian Siege' (in June 227) and the 'Ptolemaic Siege' (August-September 227). In between are two months in which the city of Tyre was not under any form of siege. The condensing of these two separate sieges into a single historical event stems from Euphemios who also condensed the story; changing the inter-siege period from two months into a period of only a week or so. Between the Euphemian tradition and the fact that the protagonists of both sieges are (for the most part) similar, many historians have tended to treat the siege as a single event, on ongoing period of siege if you will in which the city was not consistently blockaded but, to quote one historian, 'remained in the frame of mind of a city under attack'. This chapter will largely deal with the period between the first arrival of Ptolemaic forces sometime before June 9th and the end of the Pausanian Siege on June 27th. The next chapter, then, will focus on the Ptolemaic siege between August 15th and September 13th.

    Ptolemaic Arrival (Before June 9th):

    Ptolemy's first arrival at Tyre came sometime in early June. Fresh from the surrender of Sidon, the Ptolemaic army marched unopposed to Tyre wherein he hoped to re-establish Pausanias as king. Once there, however, his initial offer of surrender was curtly refused. His first appeal was made to the people of Tyre themselves, hoping to convince them to open the gates and let Pausanias retake control with the promise that no harm would be done to the city or its people and that only the Seleucid garrison would be taken prisoner. Once that failed, he turned instead to Demetrius, offering to allow his garrison to exit the city and retreat intact to Syria on the condition they lay down their arms and Demetrius himself surrendered as a hostage. The terms were rather fair as well, promising Demetrius a safe captivity back in Alexandria and a return to the Seleucids upon the conclusion of the war. For his part, however, Demetrius seems to have been rather confident. Given the strong hostility within the city to Pausanias and his family, the Tyrians had no intention of simply letting him retake the city and Demetrius was set upon defending the city, possibly betting that Ptolemy himself would not waste time besieging the city for months but would, instead, move to confront the Seleucid army in the north. If so, he was correct and, not wanting to waste time, Ptolemy instead left some 3000 soldiers and 40 ships to keep the pressure on Tyre until he could defeat Antiochus.

    The traditional explanation of this is that Ptolemy was betting on the Seleucid garrison being too low on numbers and the Tyrians too unwilling to fight for them to really do much while Ptolemy cleaned up elsewhere. Possibly, he expected that a major defeat against Antiochus would convince Demetrius to just surrender outright. It seems odd though that he would leave as few as 3000 troops and only 40 ships. Don’t misunderstand, the 3000 troops he left were far from a weak force, under the command of one of his phalanx commanders, Isokrates, they were a dangerous fighting force. His ships, meanwhile, led by Gorgias, an experienced marine and, apparently expert archer, were outfitted with siege weapons and may have fielded as many as 2500-3000 marines. Still, these are small numbers for the Hellenistic, especially considering that Demetrius, alongside the original garrison of 600 had some 2000 further soldiers brought to Phoenicia in 228 BCE. In all, we are talking about 6000 Ptolemaic soldiers to fight against a garrison of 2600 Seleucid soldiers and capture the entire city. Don’t forget that Demetrius had a rather huge advantage in the form of walls and a population already emboldened by already having thrown Pausanias out the first time.

    It is rather odd, then, that Ptolemy didn’t try leaving more soldiers, at least to hedge his bets against Demetrius managing to raise a larger army and storming the Ptolemaic encampment. One explanation is that Ptolemy was betting on Pausanias’ own plans to take the city and truly believed that Pausanias could do so. On June 10th, Pausanias sent messengers to the new government of Sidon asking for military support and, in return, received another 4000 soldiers who arrived sometime between then and the 13th. According to Euphemios, he also managed to use his own personal fortune to hire more soldiers from pro-Ptolemaic governments in Judaea to the tune of some 1500-2000 extra soldiers. In all, he perhaps was fielding some 11500-12000 soldiers (if we include the marines) by the 19th when the first assault began. Of course, this is also confusing because the government of Sidon had only taken power a few days earlier. How, then, could they simply spare 4000 troops? And why, if Pausanias already intended to take the city (knowing that he would need soldiers to maintain power) had he not attempted to raise this support before he got to Tyre? Surely, he knew that, with Demetrius and Melqartamos at the helm, Tyre wouldn’t simply open the gates to another period of royal rule.

    A recent reconstruction has attempted to parse a more reliable narrative out of this. The suggestion, made in an article published last year, is that Pausanias began raising support during the march through Judaea and that the soldiers only arrived during the period between June 10th and June 19th. It is also thought that these probably were not mercenaries so much as Ptolemaic military settlers or the armed forces of Ptolemaic subject cities incentivised by Pausanias’ cash to lend their support to his expedition. As for the 4000 Sidonian soldiers, they may not have been Sidonian at all but supporters of the various exiled governments of Phoenicia accompanying Ptolemy and moving from city to city to help each other get into power. In this case, Ptolemy leaving 3000 infantry is simply his contribution to what amounts to a large private expedition to reclaim Phoenicia organised by a network of aristocrats and monarchs trying to reclaim their power.

    Regardless, by the time of the Ptolemaic strategy meeting on the 13th, Pausanias’ army had (at least on paper) swelled to perhaps as many as 12,000 soldiers, dwarfing Demetrius’ own garrison. Encamped on the landward side of the bridge to Tyre, the Pausanias, Gorgias and Isokrates envisaged a three-pronged strike against the city. Pausanias had been in contact with surviving supporters and anti-Melqartamos factions within the city, probing for a break in the Tyrian ranks that might open the gates and, by the 13th, seems to have been reasonably confident that he could have those gates open. The plan called for the gates to be opened during the night, allowing Pausanias’ land forces to sweep into the city and establish a bridgehead. If they hadn’t already taken the city by morning, they would be joined by Gorgias’ soldiers launching attacks on the Sidonian and Egyptian harbours in conjunction. Caught between them, Demetrius’ small forces would be forced to split their energies and ultimately be overwhelmed.

    Back in the city, all was not well. Melqartamos was not a general but an orator and few of the pro-democrats had any military experience of any kind to speak of. Instead, Demetrius had turned to Hamilcar, an old supporter of the Philocritean and Pausanian regimes who had acted as a commander during the fights against the democratic insurgencies. During Demetrius’ initial overthrow of Pausanias, Hamilcar had been one of those that many had called upon to be executed but had ultimately been pardoned by Demetrius on the basis of preventing further civil bloodshed. It says something that, as of June 227, Hamilcar and Demetrius were, effectively, the most experienced generals in the city. The problem was that Melqartamos and many others disliked Hamilcar and had grown wary of a pro-Pausanian movement within the city. Fearing that Pausanias’ ex-supporters might, you know, betray the democracy, Melqartamos approached Demetrius asking to have many of them arrested. He was, of course, outraged when not only did Demetrius not have them arrested but instead recruited Hamilcar to act as a secondary military commander. Between them, Demetrius, Melqartamos, and Hamilcar took the official positions of ‘general’ with Demetrius famously refusing to use any royal titles to try and endear himself to the Tyrian populace.

    It soon became clear, however, that Melqartamos and Hamilcar were too ideologically opposed. Both saw the other as an enemy and often refused to work together. In the end, Demetrius was forced to meet with each of them separately since every meeting between them soon devolved into, sometimes physical, fights. To his credit, Demetrius himself did not seem to fully trust Hamilcar either and, instead, assigned him to a command in the southern part of the city, near the Egyptian harbour and away from the citadel itself so that, even if he did turn on Demetrius, he wouldn’t be able to take the citadel. To hedge his bets further, he assigned a subcommander, one of his own retinue named Cleomenes, to act as Hamilcar’s second-in-command. Secretly, however, he gave Cleomenes authority to detain Hamilcar should he take any actions against the city or Demetrius.

    Between them, the three (Demetrius, Hamilcar, and Melqartamos) began mobilising their forces. The exact population of Tyre is unknown at this date but has estimated at somewhere between 20-25,000 (still a ways lower than it had been before Alexander’s sack of the city but having recovered somewhat). Out of these, the three seem to have organised a truly monumental defensive effort on which no expense (or person) was spared. Between the 10th and 18th June, the men of Tyre were organised into units and equipped with whatever weapons could be scrounged up. Workshops were converted into makeshift weapons factories to produce all weapons and armour they could. Both men and women were brought up to dig trenches and erect makeshift barricades, sometimes out of old furniture or chunks of broken buildings. Merchant ships in the harbour were seized and renovated. Curfews were established and some form of martial law imposed with set regimens and night watches. Most of all, access to the main gates and harbours of the city was limited to only a few people.

    June 19th – 20th: The Assault Begins

    In the early hours of June 19th 227 BCE, a contingent of Pausanian supporters donned stashed weapons and armour, possibly smuggled into the city under cover of night a few days earlier (although the weapons and armour mentioned by Euphemios may just as well be those issued by Demetrius himself) and began making their way to the gates. Supposedly the band was small, only a dozen or so people, yet they managed to catch the guards by the surprise and kill many of them, taking control of the gates. From there, they sent a signal and began opening the gates for Pausanias’ soldiers.

    Back at the citadel, Demetrius was awoken by a soldier frantically telling him of the attack but, even so, by the time he reached the city proper, Pausanias was already inside. Attempting to rally his soldiers, Demetrius mounted a horse and rode through the city, borrowing soldiers from Melqartamos’ forces near the Sidonian harbour and gathering any Tyrians or Seleucid soldiers he could to try and hold the line. Nevertheless, it was already too late and Pausanias’ soldiers were able to reach the Temple of Melqart nearly unopposed before the Seleucids could rally themselves enough to make a last stand. It was at the Temple of Melqart that the tide first began to turn. As his soldiers entered the district, Pausanias supposedly sent a contingent to demolish the nearby boule as a sign of his impending victory. Seeing their approach, the Tyrians are said to have rallied and launched a devastating counter-attack. At the same time, Demetrius launched his own counter-attack from the other side and, between them, the two killed hundreds of Pausanias’ soldiers.

    This is the story in Euphemios but the real story is possibly less dramatic. In truth, Demetrius seems to have somewhat fortified the Temple of Melqart, possibly hedging against this very possibility and knowing that, as an important central location, it would be crucial for maintaining control should Pausanias enter the city. Demetrius, failing to push Pausanias back in the streets, instead made his way to the next fortified position to make his stand there. Nevertheless, the stand was no less impressive; according to Caiatinus, the Seleucid and Tyrian defenders held out at the temple for hours, pushing back no fewer than seven assaults on their positions, assisted by non-combatants on the roof of the temple (and nearby houses) who cast down tiles and stones on the attackers. In both Euphemios and Caiatinus, however, a particularly dramatic moment includes an attempt by Pausanias’ soldiers to storm a local house only to be beaten back by a local woman wielding a deadly combination of boiling water and chunks of stone.

    A lot of these stories are possibly apocryphal but they are interesting in their own right. As far as we can tell, a lot of Euphemios and Caiatinus’ anecdotes came from Tyre itself and, as such, seem to reflect a degree of post-siege mythmaking by the populace. That said, there is no reason to doubt the general basis of what is being communicated here; the Tyrian population didn’t sit back and let their city be conquered because of course they wouldn’t. Instead, they fought back. It is very easy in history to look at the conquest of cities only through the lenses of armies and generals and to ignore the very real ability, and often desire, of people to resist. Part of what made this an interesting story for people was this element of communal resistance which is at the heart of Euphemios’ own stories. When he hear accounts such as the ‘Women’s Battalion’, a group of local weavers who donned armour and spears and ambushed some of Pausanias’ soldiers, or the story in which several merchants threw flour into the air and ignited it, apparently detonating several houses and some 50-odd soldiers, the important point isn’t the veracity of these specific events but the general sensation of communal resistance that drew Euphemios’ eye in the first place.

    Caught between an enraged Tyrian populace and the refusal of Demetrius’ garrison to break, Pausanias instead changed tack, seeking instead to help secure the ports and simply wait out Demetrius’ forces in the Temple of Melqart. Sure, they couldn’t quite dislodge the prince here but they could try to take the rest of the city. Moving through the city, however, proved difficult. Every house became another potential battleground; Demetrius’ garrison had become scattered in some areas and while a few had surrendered or been killed, others were putting up desperate stands, supported by the citizenry, on houses or in streets. Even the walls hadn’t been fully pacified and, as morning approached, Isokrates was even forced to pull back to try and prevent some soldiers from retaking the gates. Sure, Pausanias’ soldiers may well have had better equipment than the majority of those they were fighting, and certainly better training, but the city itself acted as a potential death trap for all concerned.

    As morning approached, Pausanias’ army quickly found itself unable to make any real headway. Sure, they were getting there but it was very slow going indeed. Interestingly, in Euphemios’ account, we see something quite familiar; the same mob tactics used in the original opposition to Pausanias and Philocrates seem to have been employed en masse here. We are talking about ambushes, a lot of skirmish tactics and a back-and-forth flow of citizenry in often unorganised waves that could easily catch soldiers unprepared. Houses and tight streets made for perfect kill boxes, especially for people wielding very heavy roof tiles or spears or a hundred and one another potentially deadly weapons (such as flour or boiling water as Euphemios claims). In truth, what had really undone Pausanias’ assault was most likely the strict rota imposed by Hamilcar and Demetrius and the general willingness of the Tyrians to resist. After years under the rules of Philocrates and Pausanias, the demos was not about to roll over and seems to have bought into the defensive measures rather quickly.

    As such, Pausanias’ original assault took Demetrius by surprise but was quickly reported and the people amassed in much greater numbers than Pausanias may ever have expected. As morning dawned, Gorgias’ fleet made its approach. Their catapults had probably either been dismantled and left on the beach or otherwise were not being used, anticipating more of an amphibious assault than any attempt to make a breach in the walls. Gorgias himself was leading the southern attack, aiming for the Egyptian harbour while one of his subcommanders (Demodocus) led the northern assault.

    As Demodocus approached the Sidonian port, everything seemed to be rather quiet. Probably thinking that Demetrius was holed up the Temple at Melqart, he sailed onwards, anticipating a quiet capture of the port. As he approached, however, he noticed that none of the merchant ships were actually beached but instead were floating free in the water. Reasoning, however, that they looked abandoned and were probably simply left as obstacles, he instead decided to push on to take the beach. The first of his ships reached the beach easily enough, and began unloading their marines.

    However, as more ships approached, the idle merchant ships sprang to life and, apparently, began moving of their own accord. They travelled in two sets, targeting the ships closest to the beach (those which had not docked yet, that is) and those furthest away. As they collided with them, flames began to spew forth from the ships, enveloping those they hit. In the narrow confines of the harbour, Demodocus’ fleet was unable to properly manoeuvre and many of the ships soon caught fire. For those in the middle, unable to either advance or retreat, they found themselves soon going up in flames as well and, before long, several ships had sunk. Seeing their friends burning alive, hearing the screams and watching many others drown, Demodocus’ marines on the beach were demoralised and soon were even more demoralised when Melqartamos’ troops swarmed forward to surround them. Many threw down their arms and surrendered while others elected to fight and, promptly, die.

    So what do we make of this story? The bones of it are true; in 2015, excavation around the port of Tyre found the submerged remains of an old Ptolemaic warship which showed very distinctive signs of burning. In fact, the ship had survived because of how close it was to the beach and had been covered in silt over time. What is certain is that the fire ship tactic was used in some form, possibly using amphorae full of flammable material and torches of some variety which were broken against the edges of ships. Another possibility suggested has been some variation of the flour tactic mentioned by Euphemios elsewhere. The merchant ships themselves must have been arrayed near to the beaches but close to the edge and manned by skeleton crews who began rowing once Demodocus was suitably lured in. Why exactly Demodocus failed to see the danger is uncertain, but it is very likely that he simply didn’t see the merchant ships as a threat. For all he knew, Demetrius was pinned in the centre of the city and, even if the merchant ships did have men in them, they lacked either the rams or the trained marines to take out a Ptolemaic warship.

    The Sidonian port wasn’t that small either and it is quite possible that the trap relied largely on an attack from one side, probably the southern side of the port, smashing into ships and using the weight of the large, heavy merchant ships as well as the fire to try and force the others back, creating an effective wall of burning wood. It also worked because it was summer and the wood on the ships’ decks was drier as a result, allowing the fire to spread more easily. In all, Demodocus probably lost about 8-10 of his ships, a huge loss but not enough to really put his half of the fleet entirely out of action. He himself was not so lucky and joined those captured on the beach.

    In the South, Gorgias had more luck. Despite another, less successful, fire-ship tactic which claimed a handful of his own ships, he was able to reach the beach and storm it. For the first couple of hours, his marines were able to steadily push Hamilcar and his contingent back, killing Cleomenes in the process. He was, however, unable to fully dislodge Hamilcar who soon took control of several houses on the edge of the port, using them as improvised fortifications to drive back several of Gorgias’ assaults.

    With Gorgias hemmed in in the Egyptian port, Demodocus’ fleet neutered in the north and Pausanias making a slow advance through the city, the situation felt like something of a deadlock as night fell on June 19th. Gathering his forces, Pausanias took stock of the situation and resolved to launch an attack to the south to relieve Gorgias and link up with his forces. Isokrates and his Ptolemaic soldiers were to hold the gate. On June 20th, Pausanias made better headway, pushing back the Tyrian populace and inflicting heavy casualties (and, according to Euphemios, very serious war crimes) and reaching the port around midday. There, he was able to rout Hamilcar and his forces and take control of the port.

    June 21st-24th: Height of the Battle

    The next four days in Euphemios are a jumble of various engagements and battles. In short, Pausanias and Gorgias joined up on June 20th and rested overnight in the harbour. Hamilcar returned to the Temple of Melqart where he joined up with Demetrius and Melqartamos and the three made an attempt to take control of the gate, only to be forced back by Isokrates. As Pausanias and Gorgias approached, still harassed by the population in several more of Euphemios’ ‘communal resistance scenes’, they fell back again to the Temple of Melqart. This time, things went worse for them and the defenders fell back again and began a fighting retreat to the north, heading for the citadel.

    On June 22nd, Demetrius staged a retreat, drawing Pausanias and Gorgias forward only to then ambush them in the streets. Once again, employing the Tyrian mob tactics used previously, a combination of skirmishing and set warfare in narrow streets allowed him to leverage his resources against a foe that, even now, was still stronger. Numbers are hard to gauge since few of our authors are very clear on the exact losses at each stage. In Euphemios, Pausanias loses hundreds of soldiers all the time and yet still seems to have endless forces. Generally, however, the understanding is that casualties were probably relatively low at this stage and probably higher on Demetrius’ side. Despite the communal resistance, the biggest impact was to delay, damage, unsettle and disrupt Pausanias’ formations which made movement hazardous. Fighting was brutal but, as in all ancient warfare, the truly high casualty numbers didn’t come until later.

    For Demetrius, the biggest losses were probably mostly non-combatants and poorly trained Tyrian soldiers who seem to have lost most of their direct confrontations with Ptolemaic soldiers. What allowed him to keep fighting despite this was a mixture of popular sentiment and home ground advantage as well as the impact of constant skirmishing in helping break Pausanias’ momentum and formations. Until June 24th, the two basically fought back and forth. In Euphemios, this is full of personal anecdotes and duels and communal resistance stories. Amongst these we have Hamilcar duelling Gorgias, which almost certainly did not take place, Demetrius duelling Pausanias which also probably did not take place and may well have been written as foreshadowing for the more famous Demetrius vs Ptolemy duel during the second siege and a somewhat ridiculous story in which Demetrius tricks Pausanias into an ambush by sending a local Phoenician to pretend to be the ghost of Philocrates (again, probably not true but always worth mentioning).

    June 25th-27th: Conclusion

    The turning point came on June 25th. After several days of fighting, Pausanias himself was killed sometime in the morning. In Euphemios, he is killed by a Tyrian who, apparently, was a relative of a man killed by Philocrates’ father but we have no real idea of how Pausanias died. Nevertheless, his death seems to have finally broken the morale of his Phoenician allies who finally began to rout. A very real possibility is that his death accompanied another, possibly larger, ambush. In Euphemios, the events of the 23rd and 24th June have sometimes appeared strange because, despite the constant series of successes attributed by Euphemios to Demetrius’ forces, they seem to constantly be pulling ever further back. We hear, for instance, of Demetrius’ forces killing dozens of Pausanias’ troops on the 24th and yet, only a few hours later, they’re practically on the verge of retreating to the citadel.

    One explanation for this is that Demetrius was staging another retreat-ambush, pulling back enough to give his forces time to move around and cut off Pausanias’ retreat. When Pausanias was killed, his forces (between the ambush and his death) began to rout en masse. In the end, the effect was the same; Pausanias’ Sidonian allies began to rout and the Ptolemaic army was forced back. As they reached the Temple of Melqart, Demetrius sent Hamilcar southwards towards the port, taking advantage of their greater knowledge of the city to cut off the Ptolemaic retreat and overrun the defences at the port and even capturing several ships. At the same time, he sent Melqartamos north-west, once again moving through the city faster than the retreating Ptolemaic army could, where he stormed the walls, killing many of the defenders in a brutal (and costly) assault, taking control of the gate and shutting the Ptolemies in.

    Now hemmed in by Melqartmos, Demetrius and Hamilcar, the Ptolemies surrendered, throwing down their arms and accepting capture by the Seleucids. Isokrates and Gorgias were both taken as prisoners and the arms and armour of the Ptolemaic forces were stripped. The casualties on both sides had been, to be honest, rather steep. According to Caiatinus, the Tyrians had suffered some 15,000 casualties and Pausanias’ army was wiped out. In truth, the numbers were probably less dramatic. Modern estimates place the casualties amongst Demetrius’ force at close to 1000-1200 and perhaps 3-4000 Tyrians killed. The fighting was brutal and costly. When we envisage the Siege of Tyre, especially the Pausanian Siege, we should not imagine a clean or neat battle. Instead, especially compared to the later Ptolemaic siege, this was a brutal and close fight. In many areas, it was a battle of ambushes and skirmishing. While many of the stories in Euphemius are apocryphal, they capture the essence of what was a truly chaotic and brutal battle. We hear of a whole variety of war crimes on both sides; Pausanias’ soldiers slaughtering a family, the Tyrians executing prisoners (including after the battle during which Demetrius intervened when a group of Tyrian soldiers kidnapped Ptolemaic soldiers and began pushing them off the walls of the city to their deaths).

    For all the glory and ‘communal resistance’ of Euphemios, the Pausanian Siege of Tyre was a tragedy of some sort. By the end of the second siege in September 227 BCE, the population of Tyre would have dropped dramatically. Some estimates have suggested that from the original pre-siege estimates of 20-25,000 people, the population by the end of 227 BCE might have dropped as low as 15,000 or even lower. This, of course, was just Tyre and gives us some insight into the true costs of the Great Syrian War. During the late 3rd Century and beginning of the 2nd, we find that Phoenicia seems to have been quite badly depopulated by the events of the war. Despite a rather great deal of post-war rebuilding, cities such as Tyre, Sidon, Byblos, Tripolis and others saw a very real decline in their populations that would have serious impacts going forward.

    Literature and Pausanias:

    It is worth taking a second to step back and think about the literary impact of the Pausanian Siege. Despite often being lost in the events of the Ptolemaic Siege, Euphemios’ account of the Pausanian Siege is just as important and interesting. One of the overarching themes in Euphemios is the importance of the demos as a community in the protection and elevation of the city. Accordingly, the Pausanian siege is a key literary tool in Euphemios’ accounting of the events. For him, the defeat of Pausanias is the first real triumph of the Tyrian demos, it is the moment at which the monarchy of Tyre is fully cast off by its people whose embracing of their shared identity is what allows them to triumph.

    In this, Pausanias is not strictly a villain (indeed, Euphemios’ characterisation of Pausanias is sometimes tragic, casting him as an ultimately pathetic figure who fails to understand the nature of the polis and loses everything for it) but an obstacle, a symbol of the inevitable anachronism of monarchy within the polis. In Euphemios, the Pausanian siege of Tyre is, in effect, the final Tyrian revolution and, to quote one scholar:

    The rejection of Pausanias as king is a sign that the Tyrians have embraced the Athenian history of the Tyrannicides. In his death at the hands of a Tyrian citizen, Pausanias is cast as the final obstacle to the freedom of the people of Tyre, his death is a necessary outcome for the elevation and achievement of democratic rule. It is, we might say, the final triumph of democracy.

    In this, Euphemios seems to be basically following the tradition of Phoenician democratic writers such as Melqartamos. In the context of the Hellenistic, a political environment in which cities could often find their governments changed against their will, Tyre is an interesting case study of the means to which a people might go to resist the overarching and overwhelming powers of Hellenistic kings. We should not forget that, in the end, the history of cities such as Tyre is a human history in which the people of the city played their own roles in deciding their fates. That is why Euphemios saw the romance in the story of the siege and why, even as Demetrius is cast as its royal saviour, his triumph begins with casting off his royal regalia.

    Throughout the story, Demetrius’ development is his move away from his royal status. At the outset of the siege, he casts off his royal regalia and demands he be addressed only as a general. By the time the siege concludes in September 227 BCE, Demetrius is included as part of the demos of Tyre. It is with some tragedy, then, that he ultimately is compelled to leave (against his will in Euphemios as he is called off by Antiochus to fight the Ptolemies) and return to royalty. The tragedy in Euphemios rests on our own knowledge. The rise and fall of Demetrius was well known to his contemporaries, allowing Euphemios to cast it as the result of his return to royal life. As the story ends, concluding with Demetrius leaving Tyre, we are left to wonder whether or not his status as a prince of Seleucid empire is ultimately what dooms him.


    June 227:

    Sometime before June 9th: Ptolemy III leaves 3000 infantry and 40 ships to put pressure on Tyre and drive a surrender.

    First Siege of Tyre (June 10th-June 27th):

    June 10th/11th: Pausanias rallies support
    June 13th: Ptolemaic strategy meeting; Demetrius and Hamilcar organise Tyrian armed forces
    June 19th: Initial naval assault on the Sidonian and Egyptian ports; Pausanias' allies open the gates; burning of the ships.
    June 20th: Battle for the Egyptian Port
    June 21st: Fighting near the Temple of Melqart
    June 22nd: Demetrius' ambush and counterattack
    June 23rd-24th: Urban fighting
    June 25th: Pausanias is killed and his Sidonian allies rout; Tyrians capture the Ptolemaic ships
    June 26th-27th: Urban fighting, Ptolemies driven back to the gates and captured; Ptolemaic encampment captured.

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    Note: Bit of a long one today, sorry! The next one or two will also be quite long although I may split things somewhat, we'll see. Thank you all for reading and feel free to drop any comments or questions below!
     
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    Chapter Twenty-Six
  • Chapter Twenty-Six: The Siege of Tyre Part Two: Dionysus and Herakles

    Important Names:

    Demetrius: Prince of the Seleucid Empire
    Kallias: Head of the Seleucid garrison in the city of Tyre
    Melqartamos: Leader of the Tyrian democratic movement
    Hamilcar: General of the Tyrian army and former ally of Pausanias
    Ptolemy III: King of Ptolemaic Egypt and commander of the Ptolemaic forces
    Isokrates: Commander of the Ptolemaic phalanx
    Gorgias: Commander of the Ptolemaic naval contingent at Tyre
    Demodocus: Subcommander of the Ptolemaic naval contingent at Tyre
    Kosmas: Commander of the Ptolemaic cavalry force
    Pausanias I: Son of Philocrates and would-be King of Tyre
    Philocrates II: Teenage son (and heir) of Pausanias

    Between June 27th and August 15th, Demetrius busied himself preparing for another run at the city. In the immediate aftermath of Pausanias' death, the Tyrian and Seleucid defenders swept out of the city, capturing the Ptolemaic encampment and scattering the guards there. With it, they captured food and weapons that would be brought back to the city and used to stock its granaries (kept in the citadel most likely) and equip its soldiers. For his part, Demetrius began trying to root out the supporters of Pausanias who had let the king into the city in the first instance. In the days following June 27th, dozens of suspected Pausanian sympathisers were hunted down and executed. Even Hamilcar, who had fought during the siege and helped defeat Pausanias, was not immune and found himself increasingly side-lined by Melqartamos' democratic movement. In Caiatinus, there is a general sense given of fear and anxiety within the city and an environment in which nobody knew who to trust and almost anyone could be caught out. This is a far cry from Euphemios who presents the post-siege purge as a simple act of rounding up known traitors and putting them to death. It is almost certain, however, that Caiatinus is a fair bit closer to the truth given the demotion of Hamilcar and elevation of Melqartamos to command over the entire Tyrian armed forces.

    Demetrius also found himself having to contend with many of the demands being made from across the city. In the chaos of the battle, ships had been lost, cargoes drowned, houses burned and even the Temple of Melqart had suffered some serious damage in places. That is to say nothing of the loss of life and the social impacts already being felt across the city. Demetrius and Melqartamos found themselves beset by requests for financial support, rebuilding, compensation and, of course, help in organising body disposals. Indeed, the impact of this has been seen archaeologically in the so-called 'Demetrian' Cemetery, an apparently new cemetery built in 227 BCE near the site of the old Ptolemaic encampment. For their part, the Tyrian demos voted that the same Ptolemaic encampment be turned into a shrine to Melqart to which Demetrius lent financial... promises.

    For the most part, very few issues were resolved just now despite a monumental effort. As it stood, goal was to reinforce and maintain the war-time government under the leadership of Melqartamos, the sufet for 227 alongside a man named Adirbaal about whom very little is known except for his singular appearance in Euphemios in which he is killed during the first few days of the Ptolemaic siege. In particular, Melqartamos and Demetrius put much of their focus upon reinforcing the defences of the city. Large chains were ordered to be created to block off the Sidonian and Egyptian harbours and new watches set up on the edge to keep an eye out for any naval assaults. Demetrius repaired parts of the walls using rubble from damaged buildings. Steps were also taken to house the newly homeless citizens of some parts of the city including temporary camps and even some citizens agreeing to house others. Alongside this, a messenger named Kleophrades was sent out to try and reach Seleukeia and ask for reinforcements, there to inform the king that Tyre still held under Demetrius' command. Supposedly, Kleophrades was only barely able to evade Ptolemaic forces and, at one point, was forced to abandon his horse and swim across a river under cover of night to escape. Nevertheless, he was able to arrive in Seleukeia and pass the message on to Antiochus who was still raising his army to meet Ptolemy in battle.

    In early August, probably around the 2nd or 3rd of the month, Ptolemy defeated Antiochus at the Battle of Antioch and began making his way south. Hearing of his approach, Demetrius once again sent a second messenger but this time was captured. Having heard of Pausanias' death, Ptolemy was intent on ending the defiance of Tyre once and for all. From his perspective, the loss of Pausanias was both embarrassing (he had lost the very reason he had come to Phoenicia) and rather problematic given that Pausanias was a key part of the network of elite interests that he hoped to establish as friendly governments in the region. Luckily, he had a back-up in the form of Pausanias' 11-year-old son, Philocrates II (Hellenistic royal families had thrown originality in naming to the wind a long time ago). At the time, Philocrates was still in Alexandria but, at Ptolemy's request, was to be quickly brought up as far as... Sidon. There was simply no way that Ptolemy was about to risk throwing another would-be Tyrian king under the bus.

    On August 15th, Ptolemy arrived at the city. As Pausanias had done, his first instinct was to negotiate, both with the demos and with Demetrius but to no avail. Even offers to depose Philocrates II and maintain the democracy were curtly rejected. That is not to say that some within Tyre would not have wanted to take these offers. In fact, Caiatinus gives us an interesting point of view when he claims that much of the demos was incentivised to take the offer and only overruled by Demetrius who gave a speech in which, to paraphrase, he effectively denounced Ptolemy as a liar who would burn the city to the ground and reimpose Philocrates as king over the bones and ashes. In fact, in a much later source, Demetrius had unilaterally renounced any and all negotiation even before Ptolemy met with the Tyrian populace, hoping to cut off any hope of an agreement. Demetrius, it seems, had no intention of surrendering or backing down, even with the renewed offer of a very comfortable house-arrest in Alexandria.

    For the next five days, negotiations were ongoing while both sides attempted to position themselves for an increasingly inevitable confrontation. For his part, Ptolemy set about bringing up more ships (as well as the survivors of Gorgias' fleet) and probably began making preparations for an assault on the city. Not wanting to worry about feeding prisoners, Demetrius also was able to negotiate a trade of several prisoners from the last assault in return for a ransom. Amongst the prisoners returned were Gorgias and Isokrates, both of whom would later be seen during the fighting back on the front lines despite having been captured only recently. For Demetrius, the real goal had been achieved, reducing the mouths he had to feed in case of a prolonged siege and making a display of his previous victory to the besieging Ptolemaic army. Sure, the granaries had been restocked but he had no intention of maximising his food consumption.

    Fighting Begins: August 21st-September 5th:

    On August 21st, the Ptolemaic fleet made several probing attacks against the Egyptian harbour, hoping to break through but were foiled by a mixture of the harbour's chains and several attacks by Tyrians, now manning the very ships they had captured during the Pausanian siege. It was far from a major assault but it marks the beginning of the fighting and probably forced Ptolemy to change his tactics. Yes, Ptolemy could have attempted to starve Tyre out but Demetrius had had time to try and restock his food supplies and clearly no intention of just backing down. Who knows how long it would take to starve the city out or wait for a traitor to let him in, especially when the bodies of those who had helped Pausanias were still quite graphically displayed along the old Alexandrian mole to the city.

    For the next few days, Ptolemy began reorienting his forces. He either built, or had brought up to the front, siege weapons and outfitted several of his ships with catapults. In return, Demetrius prepared his forces. He had probably also spent the last month or so training some of the Tyrians, preparing them for a much larger battle than the last one. According to Euphemios, the Tyrians knew how to fight in a phalanx and use sarissae although, even with their extra training, they were dismayed at the sheer size and strength of Ptolemy's army. They wouldn't have long to wait to feel the strength of Ptolemy's army because, on August 30th, Ptolemy began a direct assault on the city. During the night of the 29th, Ptolemy had sent his ships around to the west side of the city facing out into the Mediterranean from which they began using catapults and rams to assault the walls. Forced to react, Demetrius had assigned soldiers there to prevent against another naval landing but, when the walls fell, found that the ships didn't move in at all. Instead, they continued around the walls to assault another part. If the goal was exhaustion, it worked wonderfully and succeeded in distracting parts of Demetrius' forces and command structure. The ships simply could move quicker and there was no guarantee of when, or where, they would actually assault.

    In the east, meanwhile, Ptolemy began his assault in the early morning. Bringing up siege towers and rams, his forces were soon at the walls. For the next few hours, the Ptolemies and Tyrians fought back and forth for control of the walls. The fighting, as described by Euphemios, was nothing short of brutal. In the melee, hundreds were killed as the Ptolemies attempted to establish themselves and Demetrius and his forces fought to stop them. In this, Demetrius was often seen on the front lines, fighting on the walls during all four days of the fighting there. Even Ptolemy took part in the fighting both in September 2nd and 3rd. Indeed, for the next few days, the assaults on the walls continued. In particular, Euphemios takes note of Ptolemy's Jewish and Nubian contingents which he describes as having fought 'with valour equal to that shown by any Greek'. According to the chronology laid down by Euphemios, it was a Nubian contingent that first took part of the walls. The first assault, on August 30th, was thrown back but many more were to follow. On September 2nd and 3rd, during the peak of the fighting, the Ptolemies assaulted the walls several times a day, failing each time to take them but making headway every single time. Meanwhile, the Ptolemaic fleet continued to probe for weaknesses elsewhere. According to Euphemios, they bombarded the city near constantly (although doing so would probably be impossible logistically) and made their own assaults (led by Gorgias no less) against some of the breaches with one contingent even reaching the citadel before being driven back.

    The most famous incident of the early Ptolemaic siege came, however, on September 3rd. That morning, the Macedonian infantry of the Ptolemaic army made a brutal assault on the walls led by Ptolemy himself. Demetrius, leading some of his Seleucid garrison to meet them, soon found himself face to face with Ptolemy himself. In what Euphemios described as the greatest duel since Achilles and Memnon, the two leaders are said to have fought a furious battle against one another, both injuring the other but neither succeeding in landing a killing blow. This may sound apocryphal and was traditionally considered a work of fiction until, in 2017, a letter was uncovered by a Macedonian soldier who claims he 'fought alongside Ptolemy' and saw the king 'greatly injure the [Seleucid] prince'. This doesn't mean that the duel was anything like that in Euphemios but it does confirm that Ptolemy and Demetrius may well have actually met during the battle and fought one another. In Euphemios, of course, the duel between Ptolemy and Demetrius is one of the emotional highpoints of the story. To him, it is the single greatest engagement of the entire siege and is described in lavish detail by the author. In his account, the fighting stops around them to let the two duel until one winner can emerge. Of course, unlike the Ptolemaic letter mentioned above, in Euphemios they are equally matched although Demetrius takes something of a lead, wounding Ptolemy twice and only receiving a single blow himself.

    More likely, however, is that Demetrius himself was wounded during the fighting, allowing Ptolemy to make his breakthrough the following day. By the end of September 3rd, the Ptolemies had captured several sections of the wall but fighting continued the next day when they attempted to extend this control beyond what they currently held. Despite resistance, they were able to slowly expand their control over more and more of the main wall and had soon captured the gates. Throughout the rest of September 4th, the Ptolemaic army began a slow, but steady, advance through the city. This continued the following day when they were able to dislodge Demetrius' forces from the Temple of Melqart led by Ptolemy's cavalry commander, Kosmas.

    September 6th-10th: The Siege of the Citadel

    By the end of September 5th, Demetrius had lost the city. Isokrates led a contingent south to the Egyptian port, capturing the Ptolemaic ships again and opening the harbour for Gorgias to sail in unopposed. That evening, Ptolemy's army reached the citadel but found it still held against them. Instead of beginning an assault that day, he sent Kosmas further north to take the northern reaches of the city and prevent any retreat from the citadel. This next period, between September 6th and 10th, marks the most desperate stage of the fighting. Demetrius, still recovering from his injuries, was holed up in the citadel alongside what remained of his garrison, perhaps as few as 3-4000 soldiers against Ptolemy's army. Melqartamos, captured over the course of the previous day alongside several other democratic leaders was kept in the Ptolemaic camp outside the city and news sent to Philocrates II to come to the city.

    On September 6th, Ptolemy began his siege of the citadel, bringing up more siege weapons to batter the walls and setting out to establish the new pro-Ptolemaic government in the city. As part of this, he started bringing several of the democratic leaders to trial on charges of treason. The bodies of Pausanias' supporters had already been taken down and buried just outside the city in the old Tyrian cemetery and now, in a gory display of power, were to be replaced with those of his enemies. Several were executed by decapitation but, for the more resilient of his opponents, including Melqartamos, the punishment was significantly worse. Melqartamos was to be tied to a stake outside the citadel where, over the course of the next few days, he would slowly die of thirst in full view of the defenders. Of course, this is a Euphemian story so its reliability is hard to establish but what is certain is that, by September 10th, many of the leaders of Melqartamos' democracy had been executed including the sufet himself. News of the trial spread quickly, igniting another round of uprisings on September 7th and 8th, one attempting to take control of the Egyptian port only to be driven back and another focussing its energies on the boule. This culminated, however, on September 9th when the murder of a Tyrian woman by a Ptolemaic soldier led to another uprising and the capture of the gate for several hours until Isokrates was able to dislodge the rebels.

    Back in the citadel, things had grown all the more desperate. Now back in the fighting, Demetrius found himself beset by Ptolemaic assaults. For days on end, the Ptolemies battered the walls of the citadel and, on several occasions, came within a hair's breadth of taking the citadel before being driven back. Demetrius' numbers were growing thin, morale was starting to waver and the walls seemed set to fall. News of Melqartamos' execution had done its job, demoralising the defenders and encouraging talk of surrender which Demetrius took drastic steps, including executions, to prevent. According to Euphemios, the height of this came on the evening of September 9th when a group of soldiers attempted a coup against Demetrius only to be captured before they could reach the gate and executed. Realising that his citadel was about to fall, Euphemios claims that Demetrius began a mass prayer to Dionysus, offering half of the remaining food in the citadel to the god and having it burned as an offering.

    The Dionysiac Miracle

    This is the precursor to Euphemios' 'Dionysiac Miracle', an event which requires some analysis. By the end of the 2nd Century BCE, the militaristic 'war god' version of Dionysus had become rather well-established. Following the Sosthenic tradition, a lot of interpretation of Dionysus as a god had focussed on his role as a traveller and wanderer, a theme very appropriate for the Hellenistic. This had split somewhat into very diverging traditions of the god throughout the 2nd Century. Back in the centres of power, a more literary version of Dionysus was very popular in which he was a traveller bringing all manner of great things back to the Greeks through his many wanderings. In a world where the Seleucid empire prided itself on his size and reach and ability to bring together products of places all across the world, this was a very appropriate and popular incarnation of Dionysus. Amongst soldiers, however, the Sosthenic tradition of Dionysus had broken up into a more militaristic version. Gone were the humorous journeys across the Afghan mountains, replaced instead with Dionysus as a bringer of Greek civilisation to every corner of the world. Where soldiers went, Dionysus had already been and thus he became something of a guide and patron for travelling soldiers. These two versions, named accordingly Dionysus-Planetes and Dionysus-Nikos were not alone, however, and joined by a third and somewhat more rogue version named Dionysus-Demos.

    Dionysus-Demos first emerges in our record sometime in the mid-2nd Century in Ptolemaic Egypt in a letter in which an Alexandrian decries the 'excesses' of this version of Dionysus and its popularity 'in foreign places'. Dionysus-Demos enjoyed a somewhat complicated relationship with the Hellenistic kings, and, by the end of the 2nd Century, was very popular in a lot of cities throughout the Seleucid empire. To some, Dionysus-Demos represented a break from a social order that some had been trying to reject. Following Melqartamos, several cities in Phoenicia had developed notions of the 'perfection' of democracy, touting the system as an escape from oppression. We recognise this in the complex relationship between Euphemios' works and the Seleucid kings of his day. In short, some contemporary democrats were... uncomfortable about the influence that Hellenistic kings had over their, ostensibly democratic cities. Dionysus-Demos was a popular god because, in his role as a god of lowered inhibitions, he represented a potential threat and break to social establishments that were not especially popular in many cities. For some, he was effectively a 'people's god', a god for the demos interpreted as having the ability to free people from the constraints imposed upon them by a royal or aristocratic social order. No wonder, then, that many saw it as a threat.

    In Euphemios, the 'Dionysiac Miracle' is both an example of Dionysus-Nikos and Dionysus-Demos, a ritualistic triumph of Dionysus as both a god of the soldier (that being Demetrius' garrison) and of the demos. In an environment where Dionysus-Demos was, at best, controversial, the choice to embrace two aspects of the god is ambiguous in a very Euphemian manner. It is never specifically stated which incarnation of Dionysus is responsible but, given the militaristic aspect and the context of a democratic movement, it is implied that it could be either and the reader can interpret this subversive democratic element if they so desire.

    So why do I mention this? Because, in the 3rd Century, Demetrius was almost certainly not praying to Dionysus. Yes, a sacrifice and prayer may well have taken place but whatever did happen, it would have been to Herakles and not to Dionysus given the association between Melqart and Herakles. With that said, it is very interesting that, by the end of the 2nd Century BCE, the 'Demetrium' at Tyre was placed alongside a shrine to Dionysus and suggests that, by the time Euphemios was writing, the idea of Demetrius' prayer to Dionysus and the 'Dionysiac Miracle' was well-established.

    What, then, is the Dionysiac miracle? Supposedly, on the night of the 9th September, Ptolemy's army began to get exceptionally drunk. The weird part was that they hadn't actually drunk anything. Dionysus had, apparently, stepped in and, as the Ptolemaic army began to grow more and more inebriated, the defenders were able to launch a devastating night attack. Swarming out from the gates, the defenders within the citadel killed thousands of Ptolemaic soldiers, burning their encampment and sending the rest running through the streets. But Dionysus wasn't done. As the Ptolemies fled, they were overtaken by a madness and turned on each other, seeing other soldiers in the streets and fighting amongst themselves leading to ever more thousands of deaths. By the next day, Demetrius had retaken the gates and Ptolemy had only just escaped with his life.

    Of course, there is no way that this happened, right? One possibility is that there is a kernel of truth here. The murder of a Tyrian woman which had led to the uprising on September 9th may be used as an indication that Ptolemy had started to lose control of his army somewhat which, having taken the city, had already turned towards looting even before the citadel had fallen. It has been argued that the army simply lost control, getting exceptionally drunk in their 'victory' celebrations and being routed by the defenders during a last ditch night raid. Convinced they had no other way out (since Demetrius was clearly not about to surrender), the heightened morale of the desperate Seleucid soldiers allowed them to fight back the Ptolemaic army despite its much greater numbers, especially when aided by the darkness and the inebriated soldiers. Another possibility is that Demetrius, once again, launched a very successful night raid or ambush although we don't know where he would have gotten the soldiers from to do so. Another interpretation, suggested by some, is that Demetrius had been able to poison the wine of the Ptolemaic soldiers and they suffered heavy casualties during the night which, again, lowered morale and fitness amongst the survivors and allowed the Seleucids to overcome them.

    Whatever the case, the Ptolemies had very suddenly lost control of the situation. This was a victory of morale; Demetrius had spent ages convincing his soldiers that the only way out would be over a mountain of Ptolemaic bodies while the Ptolemies had, through one means or another, allowed their discipline to slip which, under cover of night, led to a devastating rout. We shouldn't overestimate the damage here (nor should we underestimate it, of course; several Ptolemaic contingents kept their discipline and fought, even as the Tyrians, emboldened by the victory, rose up yet again. Regardless, by the morning of September 10th, Demetrius had pushed the Ptolemies back to the walls, killing Isokrates and Kosmas in the process, and taken control of the city once again. It was a huge turn in the tide and would mark the last time the Ptolemies would take control of the city in any meaningful way.

    For the next four days, the two settled into a stalemate, licking their wounds while Ptolemy planned out his next move. In the end, of course, that next move wouldn't come. On September 14th, a Seleucid cavalry contingent (perhaps as many as 6000 strong) led by Prince Antiochus arrived and launched an attack on Ptolemaic supply lines, killing hundreds of Ptolemaic soldiers and forcing Ptolemy to retreat. See, since the defeat at Antioch, the king had not been idle. Aware of the ongoing siege, he remained hopeful that he could relieve it and quickly raised a cavalry force to try and drive Ptolemy back. Led by Prince Antiochus, the cavalry was largely made up of light cavalry with a contingent of some 600 cataphracts and, moving quickly, was able to outflank Ptolemy. While he outnumbered them still, the losses in Tyre and the low morale of his men was enough to convince him not to try and fight, especially against a more mobile force. Instead, still harassed by Prince Antiochus' cavalry, he began a retreat to Sidon where his army would rest and recuperate.

    Analysis: The Siege of Tyre

    So what do we make of the Siege of Tyre? Between June and September 227, the Ptolemies had made two attempts at taking the city from Demetrius and had been badly beaten both times. Despite the importance given to Tyre by Euphemios, it was not really a war-deciding engagement. In scale, it paled in comparison to the Battle of Antioch and Demetrius would fight plenty of other battles against Ptolemy. Certainly, by 226, Ptolemy was back in the field and would keep fighting for several more years. This was not some great decisive victory but, at most, a minor side conflict in a much larger war. So why have we given it so much importance? Because to Euphemios and his successors, the Siege of Tyre was an important story. There is a limit to the justice I can do to it here but the story was important to the culture of the 2nd and 1st Century BCE Hellenistic world and marked the beginning of Demetrius' very successful, and very popular, career. It is also simply an interesting story that gives us an insight into the workings of a city that we might not have had otherwise. We see the actions of people such as Melqartamos, Pausanias, Philocrates, Hamilcar and many others as well as a rare insight into the fact that the people, not just kings and queens, could have a very real impact on their situation.

    It was, of course, brutal. Tyre suffered extensive damage and huge population losses and in a letter written as late as 160 BCE, the Seleucid king is still referring to places left abandoned after the siege. Thousands died, homes were lost and families destroyed. Demetrius would, of course, visit the city again on several occasions and his memory would be long within Tyre but so would the memory of tragedy and loss. When the Shrine to Melqart was constructed on the edge of the city during the 210s, it contained weapons and armour taken from the Ptolemies as well as a plaque commemorating those killed in the siege.

    Timeline:

    June 27th-August 15th: Preparations; Demetrius rallies the Tyrians, Pausanias' body mutilated, the Tyrian assembly, Demetrius' call for help

    Second Siege of Tyre (August 15th-September 14th)

    August 15th: Ptolemy III arrives and lays siege to the city
    August 15th-20th: Negotiations, prisoners ransomed
    August 21st: Probing attacks against the Egyptian port
    August 22nd-29th: Preparations for the assault
    August 30th-September 3rd: Assaults on the walls, back and forth fighting, Demetrius and Ptolemy's duel
    September 4th: Walls captured, Ptolemaic incursions begin
    September 5th: The City of Tyre falls, Demetrius retreats to the Citadel
    September 6th: Siege of the Citadel begins, Trial of the Rebels, uprising in the harbour
    September 7th-8th: Precursor Uprisings
    September 9th: Tyrian rebels capture the walls, coup in the Citadel, 'Dionysiac Miracle'.
    September 10th: Ptolemaic assault broken, Ptolemy injured, Tyrians retake the gates
    September 14th: Seleucid reinforcements arrive, Ptolemy retreats
     
    Chapter Twenty-Seven
  • Chapter Twenty-Seven: The Long Seven Years (227-221 BCE)

    Important Names:
    Antiochus II: King of the Seleucid Empire
    Kleopatra: Queen of the Seleucid Empire
    Prince Seleucus: Eldest son and crown prince of the Seleucid empire
    Prince Antiochus: Second son of Antiochus II
    Prince Demetrius: Youngest son of Antiochus II
    Sophokles: Cavalry commander and head of the royal bodyguard
    Ariobarzanes: Persian aristocrat and cavalry commander
    Amestris: Ariobarzanes' daughter
    Ptolemy III: King of Ptolemaic Egypt
    Caiatinus: Roman historian who recorded the Great Syrian War

    Thus far, we have lavished a lot of time on the first year or so of the Great Syrian War. This, of course, follows historical precedent. Many authors have spent a lot of time in the past on this period between the invasion and the end of the Ptolemaic Siege of Tyre for obvious reasons. The result is that, typically, the last seven-odd years of the war get condensed into a general mess of fighting. It is easy to see why. In the absence of a Euphemios (and with Caiatinus' narrative missing a lot of information from this period), the 'romance' of the last seven years is often lost. When we do hear of it, it is usually being used to prop up the angle of Demetrius in direct imitation of Euphemios' own work. In general, a lot of the narrative is often focussed on Demetrius' exploits and, occasionally, the great clashes between Antiochus and Ptolemy who are here cast as arch-enemies seeking to destroy one another. The truth, of course, is a lot more complex. The rest of the war devolved rather quickly into a series of competing alliances in which both sides were full of largely independent conflicts, often between individual cities.

    With that in mind, let's begin by talking about the events immediately after the Battle of Antioch. With his defeat, and Ptolemy's fall back to Tyre, Antiochus made his way straight to Seleukeia to begin reinforcing and rallying the remains of his forces. A lot of people had been killed and his defeat now left Syria basically exposed to the Ptolemaic army. Now in Seleukeia, Antiochus began making preparations for his next run-in with the Ptolemies, calling for support from across Central Asia and raising forces to try and relieve the siege of Tyre. Inside the court, the question of whether to actually support Demetrius was not uncontroversial. In particular, it seems to have exposed two separate camps within the court. Since taking the throne in 259 BCE, Antiochus had spent a lot of time in his Asian territories and increasingly less time back in Macedonia. He had, however, brought a lot of Macedonians with him, many of whom had enjoyed their dominance of the court. However, as time went on, more and more indigenous elements began to appear in the Seleucid court; Persians, Iranians, Scythians, Babylonians etc. This seems to have been a development even above the largely Macedonian-dominated courts of Seleucus I and Antiochus I and does indicate an increasingly diverse government across the empire.

    For Antiochus, it made sense. As he campaigned or governed in the east, he found himself increasingly reliant on local supporters to raise armies and govern his vast territories. Of note amongst these was one Ariobarzanes, a Persian who came from a long line of powerful aristocrats. Born in 269 BCE, he joined up with Antiochus' army in 258 BCE, taking a place amongst the Persian cavalry. Renowned for his bravery and skill at command, he was soon elevated to commanding the same Persian cavalry force where he had a rather infamous rivalry with Sophokles, the head of the Thessalian and Macedonian cavalry. After the end of the Second Syrian War in the late 250s, Ariobarzanes was granted increased lands. During the 240s and 30s, he was a regular fixture of the Seleucid army and, increasingly, the court. In the campaigns of Antiochus, he continued to distinguish himself and was trusted with several important missions, including the acquisition of the Fergana horses for Antiochus' army. By the time the 220s dawned, he was fully ingratiated with the court and had drawn no end of criticism. Of particular concern for many was the issue of his daughter, Amestris (b. 248). Ariobarzanes had been angling for a marriage between Amestris and one of the royal family for a while and, during Antiochus' campaigns, had suggested a potential pairing between Amestris and Seleucus, or even Antiochus, on several occasions.

    Such a match would make sense. It was far from uncommon for Seleucid princes to marry Persian aristocracy as Seleucus I and II had done and Ariobarzanes, with his ties to Persian and Iranian nobility, was not a bad choice. However, back in the court, this was a potential problem. Not everybody had welcomed the rise of this Persian aristocrat, nor the concomitant rise of other Babylonian, Iranian, and Persian notables at the same time. For many, the dominance of the Macedonian elite was something which had to be preserved for fear that the Seleucid court would become increasingly 'Persianised' and Greco-Macedonian culture pushed out. To some degree, it is easy to understand their concerns. Macedonia was only a small part of the empire and, despite Antiochus II's claims to be a 'Macedonian' king, even he had increasingly ignored the region in favour of the richer and larger portions of his empire. From the perspective of the Macedonian elites, it was easy to see how the empire was increasingly becoming a Persia and Babylonia-focussed state rather than the 'Macedonian' empire it had been founded as.

    For Kleopatra, the possibility of a marriage between the crown prince and a Persian aristocrat was unacceptable. She had been angling instead for a more traditional Macedonian match which might bolster the influence of the Macedonian faction at the court and help maintain the influence of her and her family within the royal court. In the late 230s, Sophokles had taken up a command of the royal bodyguard and Kleopatra allied herself with the commander to try and force out Ariobarzanes from being able to access the king. In turn, however, Ariobarzanes had allied himself with the crown prince Seleucus to try and win over his support. Supposedly he did so by engineering a 'surprise' meeting between the prince and Amestris in which Seleucus was invited by Ariobarzanes to visit one of the old Persian gardens (or paradeisos) and, while there, ran into Amestris while walking around the grounds. Despite the best efforts of Kleopatra and Sophokles to prevent the meeting, Seleucus' love of gardens was well known and he simply ignored their protests and travelled anyway. The plan was a huge success and, by 230, Seleucus was enamoured with Amestris and began petitioning his own father for a marriage between the two. Nevertheless, Antiochus refused to sign off on the marriage.

    In 227 BCE, things changed. The defeat at Antioch and subsequent retreat to Seleukeia left Antiochus looking for support, especially in Babylonia and Central Asia from which he hoped to secure more cavalry for his next encounter with Ptolemy. Ariobarzanes, now, saw his opportunity. In August 227 BCE, Ptolemy laid siege to Tyre and a debate broke out as to whether or not to try and relieve the siege. Initially, the general opinion was that relieving Tyre was an impossibility and that Demetrius was on his own and could, simply, be ransomed later in the war or returned during peace talks later. It is interesting that nobody seems to have seriously worried that the prince might be killed. Then Ariobarzanes spoke up. He proposed that he lead a cavalry force to try and break the siege. If he succeeded, then Demetrius and Tyre would be saved but, if he failed, there would be no harm whatsoever. At first, Antiochus shot the idea down; there was simply no way that they could risk leading a force into Ptolemaic-controlled Phoenicia to try and attack an army so much larger than their own. What if the cavalry was ambushed or surrounded. Right now, there was no question of having a full army ready in the next few weeks or so so, at most, Ariobarzanes would be leading whatever cavalry could be thrown together at a moment's notice.

    However, Prince Antiochus and Seleucus both spoke up in his defence, agreeing that a cavalry force might be enough to break the siege. On this, Ariobarzanes and Kleopatra seem to have been, for once, agreed and Antiochus II eventually relented. A contingent of 3-6000 cavalry was selected and placed under the command of Prince Antiochus and Ariobarzanes with the goal of breaking the siege which, after an ambitious crossing into Phoenicia and a battle with Ptolemaic forces near Byblos, they succeeded in doing. By October, the cavalry force was back in Seleukeia with Demetrius in tow. The prince, fresh from the siege of Tyre, had left much of the old Seleucid garrison within the city and now requested extra forces with which to refortify the city and prevent Ptolemy taking advantage of his absence to launch another siege. However, not willing to commit more resources to a city that was already surrounded by Ptolemaic territory, the king rejected these approaches and instead cautioned to wait for their counter-attack the following year.

    No real military movements would take place again until March 226. Ptolemy spent the winter reinforcing his position, propping up pro-Ptolemaic governments in Phoenicia and bringing up reinforcements for his army. Still riding high after his victory at Antioch, he sent a force of 10,000 soldiers to Tyre to lay the city under siege yet again while he himself marched north into Syria. In the meantime, Prince Antiochus was sent to Anatolia with some 15,000 soldiers to try and dislodge Ptolemaic positions there. The king, his army now largely restored, began marching west to meet the Ptolemaic forces in Syria. In April or May, Antiochus II and Ptolemy met again at the Battle of the Orontes, somewhere to the south of Apamea but the Seleucids were unable to break through. It was a rather minor battle on the whole but served to secure Ptolemaic control of the west bank of the Orontes which, over the course of 226 BCE, allowed him to consolidate his position almost as far as Antioch itself. In July, he captured the port of Seleukeia-on-Orontes only a few miles from Antioch which had served as the main port for the city. An important harbour, Ptolemy's control of Seleukeia-Orontes would prove crucial for events moving forward, allowing him to import supplies and reinforcements by sea and keep his army in the field for longer.
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    The capture of Seleukeia would prove a major turning point and would act as Ptolemy's base of operations for much of the rest of the war, even above Antioch itself. Over the winter of 226, he placed Antioch under siege from both sides but was forced to retreat when Demetrius and Antiochus II launched a two-pronged counter-attack, almost trapping his forces between them and the city. In some tellings, this is then followed by a series of three battles in which Ptolemy is outsmarted by Demetrius and Antiochus twice before winning a third battle due to what can only be described as luck. However, the only battle we can attest archaeologically is the third battle, the so-called 'Battle of Seleukeia-Orontes' in January 225 BCE. Regardless, Ptolemy seems to have won a major victory at Seleukeia-Orontes, smashing the Seleucid army against the banks of the river and forcing a desperate retreat to Antioch from which they pulled back further north.

    In the west, things went slightly better. Antiochus and Ariobarzanes made some headway in Anatolia and, in mid-late 226, the Seleucid navy scored its first real victory over its Ptolemaic counterpart off the coast of Halonnesos. However, in February 225 BCE, Kleopatra, fearing that Ariobarzanes' successes would gain him further influence in the court, especially after his return to favour following his and Antiochus' relief of Tyre, organised his demotion and movement away from the front lines to instead head up the garrison at Tarsos. Antiochus, apparently not that great of a commander in his own right, found his progress increasingly frustrated and suffered a major defeat in June of that year near Korakesion. Ptolemy's successes reached their peak near the end of 225 BCE when, after defeating a relief force led by Demetrius, he was able to finally force Antioch to surrender and sacked the city. By the beginning of 224 BCE, his reach had expanded ever further; Alexandreia, Issos, and Kastabala had fallen and he had appointed a satrap of northern Syria.

    For a moment, Antiochus seems to have even been considering an outright surrender, turning over Syria in return for a cessation of hostilities but negotiations broke down since Ptolemy, riding high, saw no real reason to stop his advance. It was, of course, then that his luck ran out. In May 224 BCE, he left a force of some 8000 soldiers at Kastabala to protect his rear while he turned his attention east towards Mesopotamia, apparently gunning for Seleukeia itself. As he advanced, however, he found that Antiochus had changed tack somewhat. At Nikopolis, the two kings met yet again but, when Ptolemy went to attack, Antiochus fell back. Ptolemy took the city but was soon forced to retreat when Demetrius circled around the city and cut off the Ptolemaic supply lines. As he attempted to fall back to Issos, Demetrius and Antiochus shadowed him, relying on their cavalry to keep the Ptolemaic soldiers on edge and preventing them from properly resting. At night, Seleucid cavalry would ride near the Ptolemaic encampments, retreating before an attack could be mustered and, during the day, Seleucid forces would remain close enough to be visible but fall back when approached.

    Antiochus was able to do this by splitting his army into two. Relying on his flexible infantry and his large cavalry forces, he had a designated 'night force' and 'day force', each responsible for keeping the Ptolemies occupied at all times. It worked wonders. As Ptolemy retreated, his army grew frustrated and restless; why would Antiochus not just fight already? What's more, Prince Antiochus had rallied his forces (possibly at the king's command) and abandoned the Anatolian campaign to meet up with Ariobarzanes in Tarsos. As Ptolemy retreated, they made an extraordinarily quick advance to Kastabala where they surrounded the city and cut off Ptolemy's garrison. A relief attempt ended in disaster when Demetrius ambushed the head of Ptolemy's army and forced them to pull back. By November, Kastabala had surrendered and the garrison taken captive. The retreat of Ptolemy marked something of a turning point in the grand narrative of the war but not, per se, in the smaller scale aspects of the war.

    See, alongside these large battles, we see a lot of local fighting as well. Apparently various communities took the opportunity to strike out at their own rivals or increase their own power. For instance, during his campaigns in Anatolia, Prince Antiochus' army seems to have comprised a lot of Anatolians, some of whom had been offered in return for promises of wealth taken from captured cities. In the capture of Kastabala, Ariobarzanes included some 6000 Tarsians and, according to Caiatinus, afterwards 'Tarsos enjoyed unparalleled wealth and influence in the area and built many great things to celebrate their victory'. Interestingly enough, Caiatinus describes it as just as much a Tarsian victory as a Seleucid one. In western Anatolia, Samos (part of the Nesiotic league) launched its own attacks against Miletus and Priene and, temporarily, gained a stretch of territory along the Ionian coast before being thrown back. In Greece, the Nesiotic League engaged in some fighting with Athens and it was a largely Nesiotic fleet (with some Ptolemaic ships) which was defeated at Halonnesos. This back and forth fighting between local communities was widespread and, to some degree, even persisted after the end of the war. Even in 219, when Seleucus took the throne, the city of Tyre was still fighting its rivals in Sidon and a Nesiotic fleet plundered part of Attica before being dissuaded by Seleucid forces in the region.

    Unfortunately, a lot of these communal rivalries and local history is lost to us, leaving us with only a sometimes incomplete narrative. By the end of 224 BCE, Ptolemy had retreated to Antioch itself but seemed to still be in control of Syria at large. In Antioch, he knew that Antiochus and Demetrius were not likely to be able to dislodge him and so instead resolved simply to wait them out; so long as he could maintain the supply lines to Seleukeia-on-Orontes, he could keep his forces intact. To that end, he seems to have established a fortification network along the Orontes of hastily erected forts to keep the Seleucids from taking control of the river and cutting off the supplies. For close to a year, the Seleucids would pound at this fort network to no avail, unable to quite break the Ptolemies and frequently being driven off by Ptolemaic support. Two attempts were made on Seleukeia itself but were driven back. It wouldn't be until close to the end of 223 BCE that something of a breakthrough would be achieved. In July, Demetrius had decided to, once again, subvert the Ptolemaic position. Riding south, he arrived at the still-Seleucid fort at Apamea.

    Apamea was a crucial location. It had started as a fort under Seleucus I but, over the last few decades, had rapidly grown into a wealthy city lying, as it did, on important trade routes running up to Antioch. To the north lay the Ghab valley through which ran the Orontes river towards Antioch and to the east and south lay the river itself. The city formed an important crossing point for the Seleucids and had been heavily fortified over the years such that Ptolemy had attempted, but failed, to take it twice in 227 and 226 BCE. Unable to really capture it, Ptolemy had left a garrison on the other bank but, needing to defend Antioch, had been forced to call up reinforcements from wherever he could find them. This seems to have been worsened by news of a revolt in Egypt which authorities were struggling to contain. The revolt had started somewhere in Upper Egypt and spread in the absence of the king; with so many soldiers away, it had caused serious disruption to the country. Not to mention, the constant financial and manpower demands of the war were beginning to strain both sides. In 227, after the Battle of Antioch, a series of revolts broke out in the North-East of the Seleucid empire and, in 225 BCE, another revolt by someone claiming to be a descendent of Antigonus rose up in Macedonia.

    Despite Seleucid forces marching out to meet them, fighting was still ongoing and seemed to be getting somewhat worse. In 224 BCE, raids by tribes beyond the boundaries of the Seleucid empire began to take their toll and several Seleucid garrisons were forced to retreat. One or two of the rebels even seem to have been conquered by outside forces in the absence of Seleucid armies to put them down. With all this in mind, the Ptolemaic garrisons in Syria were being stretched thin. In 225 BCE, the force besieging Tyre was called away to join Ptolemy and help reinforce garrisons. In the wake of this, the Tyrians and Sidonians came to blows along the coast when Tyre, harbouring a whole lot of exiles from a variety of Phoenician cities, came under attack by the Sidonians. A series of battles were fought and, while the Sidonians won, the Tyrians don't seem to have ceded all that much land.

    Upon his arrival at Apamea, Demetrius began an assault on the Ptolemaic garrison across the river, smashing them and driving them aside. Taking whatever soldiers he could, close to 9000 infantry and 600 cavalry, he began marching to the coast where he was able to convince several cities to defect and turn over their pro-Ptolemaic governors. A couple, including Arados and Gabala, seem to have held out but Demetrius was still able to capture a reasonable amount of the coast and raise soldiers from them. With these, he swept north to outflank Ptolemy's lines. A force was sent out to meet him but crushed in the field and Ptolemy, realising his fortifications would soon be outflanked and overrun, chose to retreat. As he left, Antioch was once again ravaged, sections of the city burned and holes left in the walls just to deny its full utility to the Seleucids. Seleukeia-on-Orontes, however, would manage to hold out against Seleucid forces right up until the end of the war when it was turned over in the peace terms of 221.

    The exact details of 222 and 221 are very sketchy so we know rather little. We do know that Antiochus and Demetrius won a decisive victory at Orthosia and pushed Ptolemy ever further backwards sometime in 222 BCE and that Demetrius captured Tripolis and sacked the city at some point in early 221 BCE (apparently after a lengthy siege). Sidon, still in Ptolemaic hands, was attacked but held out (and would retain its pro-Ptolemaic government well after the end of the war, remaining in Ptolemaic hands for several decades). By mid-221 BCE, however, the war was largely rounding down for the two kings. Ptolemy had lost interest; too many casualties had been sustained and too much money spent, not to mention the spreading revolt in Egypt was still a problem while Antiochus was facing much the same problem. In August, a peace agreement was made which amounted to effectively nothing. The Ptolemies once again withdrew from Phoenicia (officially including Sidon although they would walk back on that when it became apparent that the Sidonian government wasn't going anywhere) and the Seleucids returned several cities taken in Asia Minor in response. It was, after nearly a decade of war, a total status quo ante bellum- a grand total of nothing for either side.

    Tens of thousands were dead. Phoenicia and Syria had been ravaged. The Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms were both plagued with revolts. Nothing had been gained by either side. What had been gained, however, was a series of social changes within the Seleucid kingdom. During the war, Antiochus had fallen back more and more on local support, cut off from Macedonia as he was, leading to a distinct increase in the power of the Perso-Babylonian faction in the Seleucid court. Sometime in 225 or 224 BCE, Antiochus agreed to the marriage between Amestris and Seleucus which would produce a son, appropriately named Antiochus, in 221 BCE. By the end of the war, Ariobarzanes was more powerful than ever and seems to have held some sort of official position somewhere in the Seleucid court throughout the 210s until his death in 214 BCE at the age of 55. His triumph, however, would only set the stage for a much larger political clash between him and the Macedonian faction in the years to come.

    As has been stated, the war would have a significant literary effect on the Seleucid empire in the 2nd Century but it also seems to have had its own cultural effect in the Ptolemaic empire as well. As early as 186 BCE, Ptolemaic writers were turning out pieces inspired by events from the war. Of these, the most famous is Agathocles' 'Syrian Epic', a Sosthenic tradition mock-epic which, like the works of the earlier Seleucid writer, recast real events (in this case, the Syrian War) in an earlier, mythological narrative using deities for satire of the events. In the case of Agathocles' work, the story revolves around Heracles and Dionysus meeting during their various travels in the region and fighting to see who would become the patron of Syria. Dionysus, the mythological ancestor of the Ptolemies, is obviously cast as the Ptolemaic army while Heracles represents the Seleucids. The two get into a variety of humorous episodes before finally getting bored and going off to travel elsewhere, a fitting end for the 'Great Syrian War' which proved to be a whole lot of slaughter and bloodshed and achieved next to nothing. More serious texts were also produced, including a series of tragic poems collected in a book named 'The Syriaca', which were written by a Greco-Syrian author living in Alexandria which lament the towns and cities destroyed during the war.

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    Note: That brings an end to the Great Syrian War. I've decided to keep the 'Important People' bit just to make following everything a bit easier for people. I will be posting an updated family tree in the next few chapters cause I will soon have new family members to introduce so don't worry too much about all the new names that might be coming up, I'll have a tree so everybody can follow things.

     
    Chapter Twenty-Eight
  • Chapter Twenty-Eight: Dissent

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    Important People:
    Antiochus II 'Megas': King of the Seleucid Empire
    Kleopatra I: Queen of the Seleucid Empire and head of the 'Macedonian' faction
    Seleucus III: King of the Seleucid Empire
    Amestris: Queen of the Seleucid Empire and head of the 'Persian' or 'Perso-Babylonian' faction
    Prince Antiochus: Second son of Antiochus II
    Prince Demetrius: Third son of Antiochus II
    Ariobarzanes: Amestris' father and Seleucid general
    Sophokles: Commander of the royal bodyguard of Antiochus II and (later) prince Antiochus
    Mithridates: Commander of the royal bodyguard of Seleucus III

    The end of the Great Syrian War in 221 BCE had left the Seleucid empire in a tough spot. Seleucid control had slipped somewhat in many regions of the empire and now needed to be rebuilt wherever, and however, it could. In October 221 BCE, Prince Antiochus was married to Berenice, a granddaughter of Ptolemy III, as part of the peace terms, a marriage which would only hold until his death in 218 BCE. Nevertheless, the marriage would produce one child; Argeus, born in 220. By all accounts, the marriage between the two was happy. In January 220 BCE, Seleucus (who, by this point, was co-king) was sent to Macedonia to act as the royal representative in the region. At the same time, Prince Demetrius and Ariobarzanes were sent east to try and restabilise Seleucid control in central Asia. That left Antiochus II and Prince Antiochus to secure Anatolia. The result was a mixed series of successes. In Anatolia, Seleucid forces were successful in a campaign in Cappadocia despite Antiochus II's worsening health and, in Central Asia, Demetrius was able to put down a revolt in Sogdiana and negotiate, if not conquer, with the recent arrivals of Parni and Saka peoples in parts of Central Asia (around Parthia especially). The exact terms of these agreements are often unknown, especially since Seleucus would spend much of his reign reckoning with these peoples in one way or another anyway, but Demetrius seems to have left satisfied anyway.

    In Macedonia, Seleucus was less successful. Arriving with Amestris in February 221 BCE, Seleucus soon faced a problem of unpopularity. Not his own unpopularity, of course, but that of his wife. Back in Macedonia, many resented the queen and saw her as a foreign threat to their own elites and position. This was a matter worsened when Seleucus was, apparently, approached by a Macedonian aristocrat to try and convince him to divorce Amestris and marry a Macedonian noblewoman and, incensed at this, he attempted to have him executed. This story may well be false, stemming likely from anti-Persian sentiment in the late 3rd or early 2nd Centuries, but it does indicate that there was some ongoing friction between Seleucus and the Macedonians. Supposedly, he also generally had no love for Macedonia as a region and often resented the time he spent in Pella, a fact that he struggled to hide. On top of that, the many Persian, Babylonian, and Central Asian retainers he brought with him seem to have provoked further hostility form the Macedonian elites, forcing Seleucus to send many home that very summer.

    At the same time, back in Anatolia, Prince Antiochus appears to have grown somewhat resentful of Ariobarzanes who, we may recall, wasn't even in Anatolia at the time. It seems that the prince had realised, while campaigning with his father, that the king believed that many (or all) successes in the Anatolian campaign, including the capture of Kastabala, had stemmed from Ariobarzanes' actions more than the prince's. Alongside this was the influence of Queen Kleopatra who may have been attempting to cultivate Antiochus as a pro-Macedonian influence in the court to counter Seleucus' own pro-Persian sentiments and Demetrius' suspected pro-Persian sentiments (especially given his absence from the court while on campaign in the east). For these reasons, Antiochus began to take a more pro-Macedonian stance throughout the course of 220 BCE.

    All of this would come to a head when, at the beginning of 219 BCE, Antiochus II's condition worsened and, quite suddenly, he died. Supposedly he died in the middle of the field where, while on a march, he simply keeled over. At the age of 67, Antiochus II 'Megas' was dead. Throughout his reign, Antiochus had acted as a massively stabilising force for the Seleucid empire, expanding its borders, subduing rebellions and otherwise consolidating its position in the Hellenistic world. He had fought the Ptolemies twice, winning both times and finally reconquering Coele-Syria, incorporating it into the empire where it would remain until its end. Under him, the Seleucid empire had emerged as one of the, if not the, most powerful Hellenistic kingdom. At the same time, his record is far from unblemished. Throughout his reign, his military adventurism had proven expensive and, at times, had nearly bankrupted the kingdom. Much of southern Syria was devastated and many other regions had suffered a significant loss of life under Antiochus' conquests. What would prove worse, however, was that it often paved over very real problems within the court and Seleucid family, problems which would soon break out into a very real conflict.

    At the time of his death, the layout was as follows: Demetrius and Ariobarzanes were somewhere in Central Asia, possibly Samarqand with somewhere between 15 and 20,000 soldiers. Antiochus, now in command of his father's body, was in Anatolia with the main brunt of the royal Seleucid army, some 25-30,000 soldiers at the time of the end of the campaigns in 220. Seleucus and Amestris were in Pella and Kleopatra, seemingly, in Seleukeia. Knowing the importance of speed, Seleucus made immediately for Anatolia where he planned to take control of his father's army and, more importantly, body. For their part, the princes all began making their way back towards Antioch, armies (and corpse) in tow. Antiochus didn't make it especially far before word came from Seleucus ordering him to wait for the king before proceeding to Antioch. Word was also sent to Demetrius commanding him to stop at Babylon and not to approach Antioch until Seleucus had arrived there. Then, and only then, would Demetrius be allowed to enter.

    The recent war had left Antioch nearly flattened so it seems odd that so much emphasis was being laid on it. Of course, this seems somewhat less odd when we remember that it was still a royal city, even in its largely destroyed state, and that it was still close to the royal burial grounds on the outskirts (which Ptolemy had left largely untouched). For Seleucus, it was imperative that he be the one to bury the king if only so that there would be no uncertainty as to who his successor was and that Demetrius not be allowed to be there, with an army, waiting for him. Seleucus, it seems, already suspected which way the tide was turning. See, the relationship between the three brothers had soured in the last few years. Demetrius had won a lot of prestige and fame for his role in the war against Ptolemy III, he was popular with the army, with the generals and, importantly, with Ariobarzanes. This had created no end of resentment from Seleucus and Antiochus, both of whom were often negatively compared with their younger brother; Antiochus was not an especially talented commander and Seleucus showed very little interest in military command of any kind. At the very least, it made Demetrius a potential threat to the new king.

    As for Antiochus, he had grown increasingly hostile to Amestris and the Persian (or Perso-Babylonian) faction in the last year or so, something which seems to have put him more and more at odds with Seleucus. Then there was his alignment with Kleopatra, diametrically opposed to Seleucus' own queen and her association with the Persian and Central Asian elites. Of course, that same alignment made her opposed to the Macedonian faction through which Kleopatra could call upon resources from Macedonia. Whether or not Seleucus truly believed Kleopatra, or Antiochus, might mastermind an overthrow, he certainly couldn't risk ignoring the possibility.

    Nevertheless, Antiochus, for now, followed Seleucus' commands and, in February 219, the two met near Tarsos from which they marched on to Antioch. There, Demetrius joined them shortly afterwards (without his army, of course) and all three attended the burial of Antiochus II. But the burial had done little to stabilise the situation; Demetrius still had an army in the field (albeit in Mesopotamia) and tensions were still high between Antiochus and Kleopatra on the one hand, and Seleucus and Amestris on the other. In fact, having all of them in the city only served to heighten tensions. Within days of the burial, it had become increasingly apparent that the tide of political power had shifted against Kleopatra's faction somewhat. This was most obvious through the increasing appointment of non-Greeks to powerful administrative positions within the court beginning from the very outset of Seleucus' reign. That isn't to say that Macedonians were necessarily ignored, but their stranglehold on high government saw a significant decline. In particular, Kleopatra was alarmed at the increasing prominence of Ariobarzanes and his close associates as well as moves by Amestris to increasingly break Kleopatra's own influence on government.

    It is worth noting that the simple monikers of 'Macedonian' or 'Perso-Babylonian' are very vague and not always accurate. For instance, several of those aligned with Amestris seem to have been Greek and we know of Persians and Babylonians accompanying Antiochus to Macedonia in late February. A lot of the time, the most important thing was the network of personal relationships between various elites. Kleopatra had allies, both Greco-Macedonian and Perso-Babylonian, who fell into her faction. Her rivals, and the rivals of those allies, tended to form their own factions and had found Amestris a natural focal point for this coalition. This was simple court politics. However, the increasing prominence of non-Greeks and Macedonians at court had added fuel to the fire and served as a point of contention. That is to say that this topic was an important issue but it, alone, did not decide who fell on what side since personal connections and rivalries were often just as important in shaping the contours of this conflict.

    This came to a head when Sophokles, long the captain of the royal bodyguard of Antiochus II, was replaced with Mithridates, a cousin of Ariobarzanes' and the first non-Greek (or Macedonian) to hold the position. The move sparked outrage and a procession, led by Kleopatra and Antiochus, approached the king demanding he restore Sophokles to his position. This was only the head, however, of a series of demands that Seleucus restore other positions to Greek nobles and remove Ariobarzanes from the city altogether. When Seleucus refused, Antiochus abandoned the city in protest and set up camp on the other side of the Orontes, refusing to return to the city. Finally tiring of this, and sensing that Antiochus was slipping from his grasp, Seleucus sent soldiers to force his brother to return to the city. Fearing that he was about to be arrested, Antiochus decided to flee Syria altogether and make his way for the only place he could think was safe; Macedonia. That evening, under cover of dark, Kleopatra and several other Macedonian nobles also fled the city.

    Come morning, messengers were sent demanding that the defectors return to the city or be declared traitors. At the same time, he began mobilising his army to march out and recall Antiochus. The royal army was still at hand and, through the influence of Ariobarzanes, so was Demetrius' force which was now brought up from Mesopotamia to crush Antiochus with. In April, the Seleucid army marched from Antioch. Back in Macedonia, Antiochus and Kleopatra scrambled to raise their forces but to no avail; in May 219 BCE, the two met in battle somewhere near Byzantium and Antiochus' army was crushed. He was able to retreat to Pella but, after a short siege, was captured and executed. Kleopatra, however, had fled the city as soon as news arrived of her son's defeat, fleeing first to Euboea and from there to Egypt where she took up residence at the court of Ptolemy III. It is quite likely that she attempted to convince him to launch another invasion to avenge her son but Seleucus, attempting to head this off, simply had Berenice remarried to Demetrius that same year. This marriage would prove far less happy and, while Demetrius and Berenice would have a daughter in 216 BCE, their relationship was often strained with rumours that of frequent adultery by both partners.

    For the next few years, the political situation would remain tense, however. With the death of Antiochus, the faction that he and Kleopatra had headed didn't die out by any means. On the contrary, they now began to refocus their attentions. By the end of 219 BCE, the Macedonian faction had begun to focus on Demetrius as a new figurehead of their movement. With Antiochus out of the way, the relationship between Seleucus and Demetrius now continued to deteriorate. The big issue at stake became Kleopatra. Seleucus had begun negotiations with Ptolemy for the return of their mother to the Seleucid empire to face punishment for her support of Antiochus earlier that year. Demetrius, while eager for her return, however, was concerned that the return of Kleopatra to Seleucus' grip would lead to her execution. On this basis, the pro-Macedonian and pro-Kleopatra faction soon began to throw its weight behind Demetrius, heightening fears that Demetrius was about to take his own stand against Seleucus. For the king, this was a much greater threat than Antiochus had ever been; Demetrius was very popular with the army and, increasingly, with the Macedonian faction as a symbol of royal martial excellence. There also seem to have been rumours that Demetrius was working with Ptolemy to protect Kleopatra, possibly with the implication that he might, at some stage, go as far as defecting to Ptolemy.

    To his credit, Seleucus took few of these rumours seriously and responded by assigning Demetrius to a command in the eastern regions of the empire with the job of stabilising the region. For close to three years, Demetrius did just that and their relationship improved somewhat when, in 218, Kleopatra was returned to the Seleucid empire but placed under house arrest rather than being executed. It was not to last, however, as Demetrius' successes in the east continued to mount and the Macedonian faction, emboldened by their success in protecting Kleopatra, continued to push him as a potential figurehead. The real turning points came in 217 when, feeling that enough time had passed since Antiochus' death, Demetrius adopted the prince's two-year-old son, Argeus without consulting Seleucus. A year later, on a visit to Seleukeia, he disciplined Mithridates, also without consulting Seleucus, and had a major falling out with Ariobarzanes after criticising the latter's conduct. The widening hostility between Demetrius and the Perso-Babylonian faction would soon do him in. Convinced by the growing hostility amongst his close favourites and by several instances of 'improper' conduct (i.e., acting without Seleucus' consent in several instances), Seleucus took action. In March 215, Demetrius, then travelling through Ecbatana, was invited to a symposium by local aristocrats where, upon entering, he and his guards were set upon and stabbed to death.

    For obvious reasons, the assassination of Demetrius has typically been assigned to Seleucus. With that said, it's hard to prove per se, something that Seleucus, if he was the assassin, was clearly counting on. The men charged with killing Demetrius were soon arrested and several executed and Berenice and her children given safe conduct back to Seleukeia where they would remain for several years. By killing Demetrius through assassination, Seleucus would have avoided the risk of his brother's popularity sparking a major revolt. At the very least, he certainly wasn't now seen as having had his brother imprisoned and executed without clear cause. Even so, suspicion very quickly fell upon him anyway; in mid-late 215 BCE, several revolts broke out across Central Asia and Syria, including one in Phoenicia led by the city of Tyre. Three months later, the Tyrian revolt was crushed and over two-dozen Tyrians executed for treason. Seleucus would spend the next few years fighting to put down many of these revolts and restore order.​
     
    Chapter Twenty-Nine
  • Chapter Twenty-Nine: The Illyrian Crisis (236-214 BCE)
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    Map of Epirus and Illyria
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    Simplified Aeacidae family tree from Pyrrhus I to Helenus I
    Seleucus III inherited a problem. Okay, he inherited several problems; the ongoing dispute between the Macedonian and Perso-Babylonian factions being one such issue but far from the only one. Another issue he had inherited from his father was the so-called 'Illyrian Crisis'. To contextualise this, we should go back a few decades to 236 BCE and the death of Ptolemy I of Epirus. Throughout his reign, Ptolemy had aggressively expanded the Epirote kingdom, both south into Aetolia and, more notably, north into Illyria. By the time of his death in 236 BCE, he had expanded Epirote power as far north as Rhizon and seemed set to push further. However, his expansion had riled people on the other side of the Adriatic in the Roman Republic. Few had forgotten the invasion of Pyrrhus of Epirus and now watching his son expand Epirote power along the Adriatic coastline of Illyria, some grew apprehensive. It's unlikely they seriously expected Ptolemy to launch an invasion but, given the recent war with Carthage, they also didn't particularly want to risk him siding with their enemies in the future. As such, in 239 BCE, Roman delegates had attempted to negotiate a solution, establishing alliances with several Illyrian peoples in the north to attempt to cut off Ptolemy's route of expansion. To his credit, the strategy had been something of a success and, until his death, Ptolemy had pushed no further than Rhizon, instead focussing on consolidating his gains.

    Of particular interest was Ptolemy's adoption of Illyrian pirates as a political tool. This probably came in imitation of Aetolian practice in which the Aetolian League had often used the many pirates living in Aetolia to help pressure others into favourable deals, providing safe harbours and markets for pirates along the Adriatic coast. During his campaigns in the 240s, Ptolemy had established treaties with conquered peoples granting them continued autonomy and even certain privileges in return for placing Illyrian pirates at his command. This was by no means an uncommon or unknown approach and, in Ptolemy's case, it worked marvellously, helping him exert influence throughout the Adriatic and bolstering his naval power even in pitched battles (their ships were small but, we are told, quick and could be devastating when properly led). By 236 BCE, Epirote-sponsored Illyrian piracy had rapidly expanded through the Adriatic, even outstripping piracy from the northern Ardiaei who had similarly been gaining power in Illyria during the 240s.

    The death of Ptolemy I was followed by only a short two-year reign under his son, Pyrrhus II who died in 234 BCE having accomplished little of note. In turn, the throne would pass to his 8-year-old son, Helenus I who immediately found himself under the joint regency of his uncle, Alexandros, and grandmother, Stratonice. Alexandros, a talented commander who had led Epirote forces throughout the late 240s and early 230s. Under their command, the aggressive expansionism of Epirote territory would continue, as would the rise in Epirote-Roman tensions. For the most part, attacks on Roman shipping were rare; Ptolemy had recognised the danger of outright attacking the Romans and had strayed away from it. Alexandros, on the other hand, proved far less cautious. In 231, a diplomatic incident with the Ardiaei led to an outright Epirote invasion of their territory and a significant Epirote victory somewhere along the banks of the Neretva River. When the Epirote army went to advance, Roman ambassadors arrived and commanded they stop or risk a Roman retaliation. Needless to say, Alexandros had no intention of stopping and, instead, simply continued his push north.

    The response was quick and decisive; in 230, a Roman army landed in northern Illyria and began a march south led by Marcus Aemilius Barbula, the consul for 230 BCE. In a battle fought near to the site of the Epirote victory of 231, Barbula was able to defeat Alexandros' army and force his retreat south. At the same time, Roman ships had moved against Epirus itself but were driven back in a battle just off the coast of Orikos by the combined Epirote-Illyrian fleet. Despite this victory, the tide of the war continued to shift in Rome's favour; Barbula advanced south throughout 230 as far as Lissos where he won a second victory over Alexandros. Despite his professed victory over Epirus, the Roman war was far from done; Barbula set up treaties with several communities in Illyria, effectively rendering them subjects in all but name of the Romans and, in February, left Illyria with only a handful of garrisons at Lissos, the Neretva River and Skodra to keep order. Over the winter, however, Alexandros reorganised and rallied his forces in preparation for another campaign the following year. Sure enough, in 229 BCE, Alexandros launched a joint invasion of Illyria alongside his allies, the Autariatai, an Illyrian kingdom living further into the interior of the country. At first, the campaign of 229 BCE was actually a huge success; the Roman garrisons were quickly defeated and the Ardiaei lost another major battle against the Autariatai which forced them to once again retreat north. What's more, when a Roman army did arrive, it was ambushed by the Autariatai and defeated.

    Nevertheless, the Romans would soon return; in 228 BCE, another Roman army under the command of Spurius Carvilius Maximus Ruga, now in his second consulship, arrived in Illyria and began a brutal campaign against the Autariatai and Epirotes. Over the next year, the Autariatai were crushed in a major battle near Lake Skodra and hundreds of captives taken and, by November, the Romans had managed to carve out a sizeable portion of Illyria as securely under their control. In 227 BCE, Ruga's successor in the region, Marcus Cornelius Arvina, drove Roman control ever further and was able to force the Autariatai to sue for peace in August of that year. His record against Epirus would prove somewhat less secure and he made rather little headway against them. It wouldn't be until 226 BCE under Lucius Aemilius Papus that the Romans finally brought the war to a near-conclusion, crushing Alexandros in the field and once again driving the Epirote kingdom out of Illyria and even threatening to invade Epirus itself. Worried that they were about to lose everything, Stratonice sent desperate letters to Antiochus, then fresh from his defeat at Antioch. Knowing that he was unlikely to actually be available to help, she also sent word to the, then, Seleucid representative in Macedonia, Heron asking for military support. In a fateful move which would, ultimately, led to his disgrace and demotion, Heron consulted with several Macedonian aristocrats and, together, they agreed to send military support. In late 226 BCE, Seleucid forces entered Epirus and set up garrisons across the river from Lissos, sending their own warnings to Papus not to advance any further.

    While the Romans maintained their right to push the war further and defeat the Epirote kingdom once and for all, they were clearly not in the mood to start an all-out war with the Seleucids. They did, however, send several complaints to Antiochus who, at the end of his own war in 221 BCE, would send Seleucus to Macedonia to, in part, relieve Heron of his command. By now, Helenus was more than able to take up the reigns of power in his own right, now 21 years old he seems to have seriously considered that this whole regency business should be swept away and he be allowed to take up his rightful place on the throne. However, the Seleucids had already taken their bets against Helenus. Simply put, the young king showed a disturbing amount of free thought and, in particular, seemed quite ready to criticise Seleucid actions. As early as 224 BCE, Alexandros had recruited Heron and his Seleucid garrisons in a project to keep Helenus from holding any actual power. As such, over the late 220s, Helenus had become more and more isolated from the court while Alexandros and Stratonice ruled in his stead. Much more pro-Seleucid than the young king, Alexandros and Stratonice would oversee a period of increasing ties to the Seleucid court, especially that in Macedonia. Even when Heron was demoted and disgraced, Seleucus proved more than willing to continue this state of affairs and even sent extra soldiers to Epirus.

    Alexandros, however, had never forgotten his loss of Illyria and seems to have felt, quite seriously, that with Seleucid support he could defeat the Romans, retake Illyria and restore his kingdom. In 223 BCE, Alexandros had requested Seleucid help to his effect but was denied by Antiochus II who saw no reason to throw the Seleucids into another, potentially huge, war with Rome right off the bat. Despite this, Antiochus' position was far from widely accepted. In particular, the pro-Macedonian faction led then by Kleopatra seems to have seriously supported the idea of a Seleucid intervention in Illyria, seeing in it an opportunity to expand Seleucid power along the Adriatic coast and protect Macedonia from an increasing outside threat; the Romans. Upon Antiochus' death in 219 BCE, things would really come to a head under Seleucus' rule. Following the defeat of Prince Antiochus at Byzantium in May of that year, Seleucus spent several months in Macedonia organising affairs and trying to repair his damaged relationship with the Macedonians. Having learned from his experience in 220, Seleucus this time had brought only Macedonian soldiers into Macedonia proper and left Amestris at home, alongside the ever-popular Demetrius, he was able to, for now, paper over the cracks between the Macedonians and the king. Part of this involved agreeing to take a tougher stance on the question of Epirus and Illyria and, at the behest of another delegation by Alexandros, Seleucus agreed to send soldiers to help protect Epirus although he did not, yet, sign off on any invasion.

    This would all prove something of a mistake when, growing frustrated and seeing what he perceived as a general weakening in Rome's position in Illyria, Alexandros absconded with the Seleucid soldiers, raised his own army and invaded Illyria in 218 BCE. In the meantime, war had once again broken out between Carthage (led by the famous general Hannibal Barca) and Rome and it is possibly the outbreak of this war, as well as an overall decline in the strength of Roman garrisons in Illyria, which convinced Alexandros his time was right. Forging a letter from Seleucus signing off on lending Seleucid soldiers to an invasion, Alexandros began a push into Illyria. Over the course of 218 BCE, his forces would push deep into Illyria only to be met by a Roman force sent to stop him and promptly crushed. Alexandros may have been a talented general but, apparently, his track record against Rome was not very good. Sure enough, in a repeat of the events of 226, Alexandros' army was beaten in the field multiple times and driven back to Lissos where, with the Romans threatening to invade yet again, they turned to Seleucus for help. By this point, Seleucus was in Anatolia but, hearing that Epirus was about to fall, he turned back around and called both Alexandros and Rome to peace talks at Pella. There, the notion of peace quickly broke down; the Romans demanded that Seleucus give up Epirus while Alexandros called on Seleucus to lend him the Seleucid royal army with which they would crush the Romans and drive them from Illyria forever.

    Despite the fervent encouragement of many of the Macedonian aristocrats, however, Seleucus decided against an invasion. Instead, he chose to leverage his army against Rome here, offering terms under which Rome would keep Illyria, free from Epirote invasion, and agree never to invade Epirus again. The boundary between the two would be marked with a stone stela at Lissos which would mark the northern end of Epirote control in the region. With the war against Hannibal heating up, Rome agreed to the terms and, in 217 BCE, the treaty of Pella was signed ending the standoff. This short event, known as the Illyrian Crisis, was to have serious ramifications. In effect, it allowed Rome a foothold on the eastern side of the Adriatic sea, granting them control over Illyria uncontested at what was, perhaps, the best time for the Seleucids to actually push them out of the region. It would also herald an increasing Roman intervention in Greece going forward and would begin the rise in Seleucid-Roman tensions in the next few decades. It would also prompt Alexandros to outright revolt in 217 BCE, a revolt which would last for nearly a year and a half before being put down by Isidoros, a Seleucid general, in 215 BCE. With the defeat of Alexandros, Helenus was restored to the throne under the sole regency of Stratonice and, despite his objections, was 'encouraged' to sign off on a new Seleucid military base in the region as well as a renewed, and renegotiated, alliance with the Seleucid kings.

    The Illyrian Crisis: Analysis

    Okay, what do we really take away from this story? Traditionally, the Illyrian crisis has been seen as one of Seleucus' great failings; Antiochus II, some say, would have invaded Illyria when given the chance, dislodged the Romans and taken control of the Adriatic coast once and for all. With the Seleucids established there, it would be a lot harder for Rome to make serious headway in Illyria in the future. By abandoning any thought of an invasion, Seleucus gave up on Illyria and allowed the Romans to entrench themselves, a choice which would come back to bite the Seleucids in the future and introduce a new rival into Greek and Macedonian politics. Certainly, Alexandros was confident that they could win and it is rather likely that the Seleucid army of 218 BCE might have been able to make headway.

    With that said, it's very easy to fall into this spiral of blame based entirely on our own hindsight of the situation. By 218, Seleucus must have known that Rome was a threat but, in truth, his focus was (rightly) still on the Ptolemies. Until three years earlier, the Ptolemies had been laying waste to huge tracts of the Seleucid empire, parts of the empire were still in revolt and nobody was entirely sure how long the truce with the Ptolemies would actually last. Nor was Seleucus entirely sure how secure his rule was; Antiochus had revolted only a year earlier and Demetrius was still out there, not to mention Argeus who, as the son of Antiochus, was a potential political piece that could threaten Seleucus' rule. Even if Seleucus could win, and we should not assume that his campaign would be a success given how many things could go wrong (and Alexandros' own poor track record against Rome does not make him a particularly reliable source on the Seleucid empire's chances in Illyria), the cost could be another huge war only shortly after the war with the Ptolemies. For his part, Seleucus III had very little appetite for war at the best of times but his choice to avoid an out and out conflict with the rising power in Italy was honestly the right thing.

    With the execution of Alexandros in 215 BCE, Seleucus effectively rendered Epirus a client state. Sure, he surrendered Illyria in the process, but he had brought Epirus inexorably into the Seleucid sphere of influence where it would remain for the foreseeable future. He had also taken Epirus' ships (and some of its Illyrian allies) into his own service, helping restore and expand the Seleucid navy. In fact, under Seleucus, the navy was expanded quite dramatically to the point at which, for the first time, the Seleucid navy would actually be able to compete with its Ptolemaic counterparts. All this had been achieved without needing to confront Rome on the battlefield at all. Despite the many objections people have had to the reign of Seleucus III, we will see that a lot of criticism of the king is misplaced and that, on the whole, he had a reasonably good track record, he simply isn't romanticised in the way that Antiochus II or Demetrius was and often appears as a villain simply because of Euphemios' work on Demetrius and the Siege of Tyre which would make Demetrius out to be a much more sympathetic character than Seleucus and created this mythos of Demetrius as a tragic hero and glorious martial of the Seleucid kingdom brought down in his prime by a treacherous brother.

     
    Chapter Thirty
  • Chapter Thirty: Seleucus III (219-210 BCE)

    The reign of Seleucus III has often been seen as something of a period of decline; a downhill slope after the supposedly glorious reign of Antiochus II which will, eventually, necessitate (and facilitate) the overthrow of his line of kings during the first half of the 2nd Century BCE. The idea is that Seleucus III and his successors would ultimately let the power of their empire slip into decadence, weak administration, rebellion and backstabbing, halting the expansion of the empire seen under Seleucus' father and allowing Seleucid power to slip across its territory. In truth, things are a lot more complex than this. Seleucus III ruled at the end of a huge period of expansionism, not just under Antiochus II but under his predecessors Antiochus I and Seleucus I. Over the last century, the Seleucid empire had been nearly constantly expanding in one form or another and it was only under Seleucus that this constant expansionism came to something of a halt. This does not inherently mean that the empire was growing weaker, however. Seleucus has often appeared as a weak king only in the light of someone who, unlike his father, simply did not prioritise the martial excellence and military adventurism so common under Hellenistic kings. Seleucus instead prized his status, rightly or wrongly, as a philosopher king who patronised art and literature and philosophy. There are very valid criticisms to be raised about his handling of the satrapies, especially in allowing those satrapies at either end of the empire (especially in Sogdiana, Bactria, and Parthia in the east, and Macedonia and Thrace in the west) to gain ever increased autonomy and localised power. However, as we will see, most of these issues wouldn't really crop up until after his death and much of what occurred after Seleucus III was not of his own making.

    To begin, it is worth just looking at the basic outline of his reign. In 219, Seleucus took the throne of the Seleucid empire and was, almost immediately, thrown into a civil war. Antiochus was killed by mid-219 and Demetrius had been sent off to the eastern provinces to try and restore order in the region. This he did semi-effectively. Demetrius' approach was a mixed military and diplomatic one, putting down the most dangerous revolts and negotiating with anyone he could. In particular, the last few years of Antiochus II's reign had seen several nomadic groups moving into Parthia and Sogdiana, with at least one group reaching as far as Bactria. Many of these groups are poorly specified in these sources although certainly some were the Parni and some were 'Saka', at least some of whom were still in Parthia several decades later. Despite attempts to dislodge the Parni, Demetrius made reasonably little headway and, in the end, seems to have negotiated with them, allowing several Parni groups to settle in Sogdiana as Seleucid subjects. For the most part, these newcomers had made few gains against the fortified cities of the region but were granted lands which they would govern mostly autonomously going forward. Relations, however, were rarely good and several cities soon complained about their new neighbours and about encroachments on their lands. One particular issue occurred when a dispute broke out between a band of Parni and the government of Samarqand in 217 BCE, leading to an incursion by Demetrius to put the Parni down and resulting in a Seleucid defeat. Another campaign the next year would see the Parni defeated and officially accepting Seleucid suzerainty.

    Still, the Seleucids quickly found out that few of these nomadic groups were particularly keen to work within the Seleucid system and that, as much as they officially accepted Seleucid rule, they rarely truly abided by it. Most of the time between his arrival in 219 and his assassination in 215 BCE seems to have been made up of Demetrius trying to establish some form of order over the region to little effect. With that said, however, the arrival of the Parni and Saka was not entirely a bad thing. In return for Seleucid gold and silver, they willingly fought in Seleucid armies and often to great effect. At the time of his murder in 215, Demetrius is known to have had, for example, several Saka bodyguards and a contingent of some 400 Parni cavalry with him. Then there was their impact on trade, helping maintain the trade connections between the north-eastern portions of the empire and the rest of Central Asia. With that said, their oftentimes difficult relationship with Seleucid government structures and Greek cities also led, in turn, to ever-increased local military forces. This process began under Demetrius' watch when, following the events of 217 BCE, he ordered several cities to organise their own local defence forces, even purchasing horses for them to help them fight against raiders in the absence of the Seleucid army, but would largely speed up under Seleucus III.

    The assassination of Demetrius caused a series of revolts to break out across the empire including here in Central Asia and amongst his own troops. In the immediate aftermath of the murder, much of his army revolted and laid siege to Ecbatana intending to kill those responsible for their commander's death and were only stopped by the arrival of relief forces. They would continue their rebellion for another year, however, eventually changing their focus to Demetrius' adopted son, Argeus, who they now sought to prop up as Argeus I. It was almost certainly for this reason that, as soon as Ecbatana was relieved, Berenice and Argeus were spirited away from the city, for fear of this very outcome. They would spend the next few years in Seleukeia, a period during which several more revolts would spring up attempting to push Argeus as a potential replacement to Seleucus. Many of these revolts seem to have stemmed either from Demetrius' supporters, either those seeking revenge for his death or others fearing they would meet the same fate as him, or from members of the army displeased at the popular prince being murdered. It became apparent rather quickly that Argeus was a threat and that, eventually, he would have to be dealt with. In response, Berenice took to hiding the infant, changing rooms each night and ensuring that he was never out of her sight. Seleucus wouldn't risk murdering Berenice, knowing that doing so would risk another Ptolemaic attack, so by making sure he was constantly with her (and even tasting all his food and drink personally), she attempted to protect him.

    Finally, in either 213 or 212 BCE, Berenice was able to disguise herself as a servant and escape her guards, disappearing into the city and then travelling southwards to the Persian Gulf from which she, and Argeus, would travel by sea first to Gerrha and thence aboard a merchant ship to Egypt. At least, that is the most popular story although a separate tradition holds that she instead joined an Arab caravan travelling across the desert towards Judaea. Whatever the case, she was back in Egypt by the middle of 212 BCE at the latest, her now eight-year-old son with her. Over the next few years, Argeus would be raised within the Ptolemaic court before being shipped off to a command in Nubia where neither Ptolemy IV (then king) or Seleucus III (or his successors) expected to ever hear from him again.

    Back in the Seleucid Empire, the post-Demetrius revolts would continue on and off for the next decade and a half. For the most part, the Seleucid army succeeded in slowly restoring order although they, like Demetrius, made reasonably little headway in the east. Instead, Seleucus began investing local actors with more and more localised power, enabling them to raise and maintain small private armies for defence. Increasingly, the satraps of Bactria and Sogdiana (then a Greek named Megasthenes in Bactria and a Greco-Persian ruler named Gorgias or Mithridates in Sogdiana) began to act effectively as local dynasts to the extent that they would pass their positions on to their children and even take up regnal names by around 200 BCE. In Macedonia, Heron's successor, Callistratus, would similarly come to command more and more power over the late 3rd Century, effectively commanding the resources of Epirus, Macedonia and (after 208 when Antiochus III's government invested him with command over the satrapy), Thrace. For obvious reasons, these choices have drawn extensive criticism over the years for effectively setting the stage for future issues. With that said, they may well have made sense at the time. Officially, these regions continued to provide resources but, by investing them with localised power, Seleucus reduced the expenditure on administration in the region, important at a time when they were already expensive and unstable and the empire was still reasonably fresh from a devastating and, yes, expensive war. That said, by investing Megasthenes, Gorgias and Callistratus with more and more power, Seleucus was starting a very short road to very real problems.
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    What was a lot more successful was Seleucus' building programme, much of which centred around the royal city of Antioch. Recently devastated in the war against Ptolemy, Antioch was first in line for a whole series of renovations. However, rather than simply rebuilding it, Seleucus went a step further and expanded it well beyond its pre-war prime. The old sections of the city were rebuilt, now with wider and better facilitated roads, but a new sector was built on the island in the centre of the Orontes which housed the new palace sector complete with Seleucus' new library and, inspired by both Athens and Alexandria, academy. While it would never reach the heights of the Alexandrian library and museum, the Antiochian academy would be a popular centre of discussion and research for more than a century. It was in this area that people such as Euphemios wrote their works.

    Caiatinus writes:

    'On this island, he laid down many walls, roads, and fountains which run day and night. He built a library which they say is the biggest in the world after that in Alexandria and filled it with books from all over Greece and here, too, he built an academy so that all the great thinkers of the world would come to his city so that it might be elevated and that one day men will look upon it and say "this is truly the greatest city in the world".'

    But his building programme did not end at self-aggrandisement by any means:

    'He brought out the people from the city and gave them homes and shelters, providing them with great quantities of grain, meat and fruit from all the corners of his empire. For those killed in the war against Ptolemy, he provided burials and tombstones of the finest stone. He ordered his courtiers to distribute their food to the people and punished those who did not comply.'

    It's important to remember that Caiatinus was a first-hand source for this; having arrived in the Seleucid court sometime around 217 or 216 BCE, he spent the next few years travelling around with Seleucus' court and would have seen at least some of the rebuilding first-hand. What is certain is that, by the end of the century, the city of Antioch seemed to have rebounded quite a lot and was once again a bustling city. This, of course, was helped by renovations to Seleukeia-on-Orontes, the port at the mouth of the Orontes river which had also been captured by Ptolemy III during the war and had suffered damage as well. Here, Seleucus expanded out the port even beyond its original design with the inclusion, quite notably, of a new military wharf although this would not be completed until the 180s. The walls and defences were also expanded and a new series of forts built to the south to help protect the port against future attack. Similarly, the Ghab valley through which the Orontes ran between Apamea and Antioch was further fortified as was Apamea itself which also received a brand new temple to Apollo as thanks for its role in the war.

    Following its revolt in 215 BCE, Tyre was eventually given new constructions as well, including repairs to the Temple of Melqart (some of which had been started by Demetrius between 217 and 215 BCE) and repairs to the harbours made. Roads were cleared and repaired all across Phoenicia and, by the end of the 210s, Seleucus had agreed to pull back some of the Seleucid garrisons in the cities (save for Tyre which continued to have a complex and often difficult relationship with its Seleucid garrison). By and large, in fact, Seleucus' reign saw a general prosperity return to Syria after years of war, something which would continue even in the post-Seleucus III chaos as Syria, against all odds, continued to grow and prosper. This process would begin under Seleucus III but continue well on into the 2nd Century to the point that, by around 100 BCE, Syria had grown to be exceptionally rich. This may well also reflect something of a move in political power, especially under Seleucus III who had a particular affinity for Syria and enjoyed the regions around Antioch (although his love of Seleukeia in Mesopotamia is also well known). Under his successors, Syria would increasingly come to be seen as the heartland of the empire and would thus receive ever more patronage and development in decades to come.

    In 210 BCE, after a reign of only 9 years, Seleucus III died, quite ironically, in Ecbatana in the very same palace where, some five years earlier, he had had his brother, Demetrius assassinated. In his stead, power passed to his eleven-year-old son, Antiochus III although actual power would be invested in a regency led by Diomedes, a powerful Greek aristocrat living in Syria who had endeared himself to Seleucus III over the last few years. Known for his skill in finance, Diomedes had spent much of Seleucus' reign building a powerbase in the court, especially following the death of Ariobarzanes in 214 BCE which had led to a fracturing in his own powerbase and networks. In his stead, Diomedes had risen to take an ever-more prominent position in the court as a personal favourite of Seleucus, gradually managing even to push Amestris out of her place at the heart of Seleucid court life by, steadily, disempowering many of her supporters through a variety of means, many of which involved finding ways to convince the king to remove them from power. The result was that, by 210 BCE, Diomedes was powerful enough to effectively step in as regent until the young king came of age.​
     
    Chapter Thirty-One
  • Chapter Thirty-One: The Rise of Diomedes

    The year is 186 BCE and Seleukeia is burning. Much of the city is already in flames, tens of thousands are dead or have fled the city for the refuge of nearby Babylon as soldiers swarm through the remains of the city looting and killing. At their head is Aristarchus, a member of the Seleucid family and respected general of the eastern frontiers. He has sworn revenge; everybody in the palace is going to die and there is nothing anybody can do to stop it. Inside the palace, Diomedes, 'Hand of the King', hurries to rally whatever defence he can and sends messengers to try and run Aristarchus' siege and get help. Whether he knows it or not, no help is coming; the empire has begun to fracture and beyond the narrow confines of Mesopotamia, it's every man for himself. Back in the palace, King Seleucus IV 'Epimanes' has been confined to his chambers, sustained by a steady supply of food and held under strict guard to prevent anyone from getting to him. After the things the king has already done, everybody knows he wont last long. Still, Diomedes needs him, he needs a king or his head will soon be on the chopping block. Only two men could break the siege now, both currently cutting a bloody swathe through the empire as they converge on the city. On one side, the self-styled Gorgias I a Seleucid general who has recently emerged from the chaos of Iranian politics in the 190s as a powerful figure and, on the other, the undefeated general Argeus I 'Aniketos', King of Egypt.

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    Note: This is a simplified family tree to emphasise the important figures for our narrative and not to provide a comprehensive outlook on the entire Seleucid family.

    Everything had gone very very wrong by the 180s, a quite dramatic change over a period of only about 24 years. When we left off with the death of Seleucus III, the empire was still rather stable and intact for the most part but his death, and the accession of his eleven-year-old son Antiochus III. To really understand what happened here, however, we should take some time to step back and look at the rise of one of the most important figures of the age; Diomedes. To understand this, however, we should understand his personal relationship to the royal family itself. See, Diomedes wasn't just an aristocrat but a member of the royal family if only a very minor one. Nor was he alone. See, Seleucus I's second son Achaeus had four children named (confusingly) Antiochis, Alexander, Andromachus, Laodice and Laodice. To make matters even more difficult, his eldest son, Alexander, had married yet another Laodice, the daughter of Antiochus I and sister of Antiochus II. During his lifetime, Achaeus emerged as a very wealthy landowner, especially in Asia Minor, especially after his brother's defeat of the Gauls in the 270s after which Achaeus seems to have come into possession of extra lands around the Meander River. Upon his death in 265 BCE, the lands were largely split between his children with the lion's share going to his sons Alexander and Andromachus but with some lands and wealth being provided as dowries for his daughters.

    For his part, Alexander remained active mostly in Asia Minor and was elevated by Seleucus II to be the king's representative in the region in 260 BCE. Upon Seleucus II's death, however, he was quick to change sides to Antiochus II and was rewarded with extra lands and allowed to keep his position. He would oversee most of Asia Minor for the next few decades until his death in 232 BCE. His son, Apollonios has made very little impact on our source evidence save for that he married a Greek woman from Samos and administered his share of his father's lands (which, again, had been split between he and his two brothers: Alexander and Demetrios) ably. His marriage would produce Aristarchus in 235 BCE, a name worth keeping in mind for his significance later on. Achaeus' daughter Laodice (the elder of the two Laodices) married a Macedonian elite named Polyphontes and sometime around 262 BCE gave birth to Callistratus 'Kalos' (not the same Callistratus who would later govern Macedonia however). This Callistratus would spend much of his time around the Seleucid court in Seleukeia and supposedly kept a close friendship as a young man with the poet Sosthenes in the 240s. He would also marry an Iranian woman by the name of Artunis, a marriage which would produce Gorgias in 239 BCE. In the 230s, Callistratus was made satrap of Sogdiana and would remain in this position until 226 BCE when he died and the satrapy was transferred. In 218 BCE, Seleucus appointed his son, Gorgias (then 21) as the new satrap, a position he would hold for some 38 years until his death in 180 BCE. For his part, Gorgias would marry Agathokleia (a descendant of Antiochis, Achaeus' daughter) and produce two sons: Gorgias II, born in 219 BCE and Antiochus, born in 217 BCE.

    Finally, we get to Diomedes, the great-grandson of Achaeus by his second son, Andromachus. Andromachus was active in Syria during Antiochus II's first war against the Ptolemies during the 250s, possibly as a sub-commander of some description and was granted lands in the region near Apamea in return for his service. Little is known about his son Alexander except that he was active in the court during the 240s and knew Callistratus 'Kalos' during his time there. His son Diomedes was born in 253 BCE and grew up in Apamea in Syria. At the age of 16, he travelled to Antioch and from there to Greece where he would spend a few years studying philosophy which he is said to have truly hated. At age 21, Diomedes joined the Seleucid court as something of a minor official. A year later, in 231, he was appointed as an oikonomos, a minor financial official of a small region in northern Phoenicia. He excelled and by 229 had been appointed dioiketes (financial officer for an entire region) in Syria itself, a position which put him in direct contact with Antiochus II. His rapid rise was probably just as much a result of his high born status and links to the Seleucid family, but he was also renowned for his financial talents even in his day. Between 229 and 227 BCE, he oversaw an increase in the tax revenue from Syria and was involved directly in the actual workings of the Seleucid financial system, allocating funds for projects and sending commands down the hierarchy as needed. In 228 BCE, he married Isadora, the daughter of the guard commander Sophokles.

    In doing so, Diomedes aligned himself more and more with the pro-Macedonian faction under Queen Kleopatra. This was to prove a mistake since the outbreak of war in 227 BCE would precipitate a fall from grace for Diomedes over the next few years. During the Ptolemaic invasion, Diomedes' involvement at court fell to nearly nothing and he largely abandoned his post while Syria was under Ptolemaic occupation. This would lead to claims that he had collaborated with the invaders later in his life but there isn't sufficient evidence to say either way whether or not Diomedes aligned himself with the Ptolemies or not. Regardless, the 220s saw the rise of Ariobarzanes' influence at court and the decline of the pro-Macedonian faction as Antiochus II leaned ever more on his Iranian supporters. His death in 219 BCE sealed the deal and many of the pro-Macedonian aristocracy fell out of power including Diomedes as the Perso-Babylonian faction saw its own power increase between Ariobarzanes and Amestris. This all changed again, however, in 217 when the rebuilding process in Syria provided an opportunity for Diomedes to regain his influence. While Seleucus III was in Antioch, Diomedes travelled personally to the city and, daring to forgo court practice, simply approached the king himself, almost being arrested by Mithridates, the commander of the king's bodyguard since the early 210s, but avoiding arrest by claiming that he could so much as halve the costs of rebuilding parts of Antioch. According to Caiatinus, Diomedes was able to leverage his personal connections across Syria to obtain better prices on supplies and workmen and dramatically reduce the cost (although whether he achieved his 50% discount is unknown).

    Regardless, the display was enough to earn him some favour and Diomedes was soon returned to his position as dioiketes of Skyria. At a time of thorough rebuilding in the region, the result was that Diomedes saw frequent interactions with Seleucus who is said to have enjoyed his company and frequently sought him out for recommendations and discussion. All this, of course, despite the reservations of Ariobarzanes and his own faction. Soon enough, Ariobarzanes began recommending that Diomedes be removed from power for being too dangerous, especially given his ties to Sophokles, a known conspirator who had worked with Prince Antiochus and Kleopatra to plot rebellion. Diomedes, however, had a response to this, claiming that his marriage to Isadora was one of passion above reason and offering to divorce her should it make the king more comfortable but asking that he be allowed merely to continue acting as a loyal servant to the king. Accordingly, the two were divorced in 216 BCE but Diomedes did in fact continue to act as dioiketes of Syria. In addition, Diomedes' two sons and two daughters were to be taken to the court as hostages for good behaviour.

    In truth, Diomedes emerged from this no worse for wear and, over the next two years, continued to consolidate his own base of power. His focus was largely trying to reorganise the pro-Macedonian faction in the wake of Kleopatra's flight to Egypt in 219 and house arrest in 218 BCE. Astonishingly, Kleopatra would continue to live until 208 BCE, outliving Seleucus III and dying at the age of 71. Her flight to Egypt hadn't entirely destroyed the pro-Macedonian faction but it had fractured it into two. Some supported the possibility of an outright replacement for Seleucus right up until the murder of Demetrius in 215 BCE and flight of Berenice in 213/12 BCE. Diomedes, however, now became the voice of an increasingly popular Macedonian faction which was willing to work with Amestris and Ariobarzanes but championed the cause of Macedonian elites under the rule of Seleucus III and his descendants rather than those of Antiochus. Seeing an opportunity to outmanoeuvre their own enemies, Amestris and Ariobarzanes mostly allowed Diomedes to rally and continue operating until Demetrius' death in 215. See, with the downfall of Demetrius, Diomedes was able to make serious political gains, scooping up the support of many of the active Macedonian elites in the empire and forging a new pro-Macedonian faction. Their first real triumph here was the reconstruction of Antioch which took place almost entirely in the hands of these Macedonian elites and with little influence from the Perso-Babylonian faction under Ariobarzanes and Amestris.

    Nor was this a small thing; the entire fabric of Seleucus' new grand city was Macedonian in character and design with reasonably few adaptations from Persian or Babylonian cities in its image. The statement being made was that the Seleucid empire and its kings were still Greco-Macedonian kings first and foremost and that they were rejecting an outright adoption of Persian precedent or infrastructure. Not that Diomedes abandoned these altogether since he himself was famously partial to Persian gardens and, during his regency, would fund the construction of a new garden on the banks of the Orontes known as the 'Antiochian Gardens' after its official patron, Antiochus III. The garden built by Diomedes was extensive, gathering plants from all across the Seleucid empire and even beyond with plants and animals brought from India including elephants and an enclosure which, for a few months, held a live captive tiger. Under better times, Diomedes' garden would have become a wonder in its own right but many of the features, including the fountains which were described by one historian as 'the most beautiful ever constructed' were never finished and the whole thing fell into disrepair under Argeus I. Diomedes' success, even if only ideological, had worked by his convincing the king to grant him increased authority over the hiring of architects, planners, and even construction teams many of which he brought from Greece and Macedonia, especially along the Ionian coast. During this period, Diomedes also spent time with Caiatinus and agreed to send the diplomat several marble statues for his rural villa back in Italy, a fact which demonstrates Diomedes' immense personal wealth.

    In 214 BCE, Ariobarzanes died and his faction's power over the throne began to fracture. This stemmed from a steadily growing dislike between Queen Amestris and her father's cousin, Mithridates, then the commander of the royal guard. The exact origin of their distrust is unknown save for that he assumed that he would take command of the Perso-Babylonian faction and attempted to command her, something which she, as queen, deeply resented. In their squabbling, the supporters of Ariobarzanes soon found themselves forced to take sides, caught between the military power of Mithridates and his royal guard and the political power of Amestris. Looking to overcome Mithridates, Amestris turned to Diomedes asking for his help and together, the two hatched a plot. Between them, they forged reports that Mithridates was planning to usurp the throne and then squashed any information to the contrary. Between them Diomedes and Amestris worked to monopolise access to the king and, soon enough, he was only recieving word of Mithridates and his supposed treachery. Mithridates was arrested along with many of the royal bodyguards and executed.

    In the aftermath, however, Diomedes was quick with suggestions. There were, he argued, many worthy of the position including, say, Aristarchus, a member of the royal clan and a first cousin once removed of Seleucus no less, a much closer relation to the king than Diomedes himself was. Aristarchus, to his credit, had military experience and may well have fought under Demetrius in the early 210s. While he was no great commander, or even especially clever by any means, he had the backing of Diomedes and enough military experience for the position as well as having spent time at court recently. Regardless, by the end of 214 BCE, Aristarchus was commander of the royal bodyguard and firmly in Diomedes' pocket. With Aristarchus at his back, Diomedes now began dismantling the rest of Mithridates' support network, having several arrested for conspiring with Mithridates in a series of purges in 213 BCE and convincing Seleucus to demote, or fire, several others on the basis of their performance. In their place, Diomedes was quick to institute his own people. Not all of these were Macedonian and, in fact, very few came from Macedonia itself at all. Instead, Diomedes' support network was almost entirely comprised of Greeks and Macedonians living in Syria, many of whom had been there since the time of Seleucus I almost a century earlier.

    Attacking Amestris was harder and there was no hope that Diomedes could ever remove her from power. In 213 BCE, he instead began targeting her supporters. Several were arrested as part of the Mithridates purges, largely on forged evidence of their intention to help Mithridates in the coup but his most successful tactic was simply to disgrace them. Scandals of incompetence, impropriety, bribery, and even adultery began to rock the court as official after official was caught out and dismissed. In their place came a whole legion of Greco-Syrian bureaucrats eager to take up the reigns of power for themselves. While Amestris herself kept power, Diomedes effectively disarmed her. While he did so, he made sure to keep her occupied, encouraging the king to send her off on long trips to visit cities and satrapies on the far extremes of the empire. By the time he was done, her own power over the government was neutered and almost every administrative decision was working through Diomedes or his supporters. For now, at least, Diomedes had emerged triumphant. Around 211, Amestris was able to make something of a comeback when she convinced her husband to begin weakening Diomedes for fear that he would launch a coup. Several officials were fired but Seleucus died in 210 BCE before Diomedes could be seriously weakened. With his death and the need of a regent for Antiochus III, Diomedes now stepped in to take control.


     
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    Chapter Thirty-Two
  • Chapter Thirty-Two: Antiochus III and Seleucus IV

    Important People:


    Diomedes: Regent of the Seleucid Empire (until 205) and 'Hand of the King' (from 205)
    Antiochus III: King of the Seleucid Empire
    Seleucus IV: King of the Seleucid Empire
    Aristarchus: Head of the royal guard and close ally of Diomedes
    Alexander: Son of Diomedes and satrap of Syria (after 200)
    Andromachus: Son of Diomedes (after 200)

    The ascent of Diomedes to the regency in 210 BCE marked the systematic downfall of Amestris and her Perso-Babylonian faction in court politics for the next 24 years, a period during which Diomedes would come to form the political backbone of the Seleucid empire. Now in his defence, Diomedes initially seems to have planned to actually turn power back over to Antiochus III from the outset. In one of the many letters attributed to Diomedes, written in the mid-200s, he lamented his position as permanent regent, claiming that it would have been better had he stepped back when he intended to. This may well be just political pandering by an increasingly unpopular regent as he attempted to justify his hold on power as being simply for the good of the kingdom (that is to say, pretending that he didn't want to be regent forever, he just had to... oh no). However, several others letters by Diomedes repeat this same concept, suggesting that he came to resent the very power he held or, at least, the sheer obviousness of it. See, there is no doubt that Diomedes intended to maintain control over the empire and he had no intention of giving up the control he held but his biggest issue seems to have been the fact that, as regent, he couldn't operate behind the scenes any longer and was forced to out himself as the real power behind the throne. As we will come to see, this would pose several major issues for the regent over the course of his reign.

    Born in 221 BCE, Antiochus III was 11 at the time of his ascent to the throne and, most likely, was intended to take the throne in his own right around the age of 14. I say 'was intended to' because Antiochus would remain on the throne for only a year and a half before dying in 208 at the age of only 13. The death itself was not actually particularly suspicious; Antiochus was recorded as having had several bouts of illness throughout his childhood and youth and was often prone to taking to his bed for weeks or months on end. Nevertheless, the timing of his death was enough to raise concerns about what exactly had happened. In the Seleucid court, suspicion very quickly fell upon Diomedes who was accused by some of having had the young king poisoned. In truth, he almost certainly didn't; Diomedes is recorded as having had a good relationship with Antiochus and had actually spent much of the intervening period working to smooth the path to the king's accession to the throne in his own right. In particular, Diomedes had arranged for Antiochus to tour much of the empire and had even organised educational visits to a variety of local officials to teach the king about how his empire actually ran. All this made perfect sense for a man who had risen to power through these very positions and knew the importance of understanding the workings and mechanisms of the empire.

    Of course, Diomedes had also taken the time to assert his own control over the government. As regent, one of Diomedes' first acts was to appoint a brand new 'queen's guard' to protect Amestris (now the queen dowager. These soldiers, chosen and appointed by Diomedes himself, acted as a de facto house arrest for the queen, limiting her movements and largely confining her to her chambers for months on end. In addition, her meetings with Antiochus were increasingly limited to the point that, by the time of his death in 208, he almost never saw his mother whatsoever. By the end of 209 BCE, Amestris had even stopped travelling with the court and remained almost constantly in Seleukeia, finally divesting her of the remains of her political power. Several of her supporters were removed from power and Diomedes' own allies put in their stead. What really cemented his grip on control, however, was the effective movement of the Seleucid power-base from Mesopotamia to Syria. As we said previously, this was an ongoing trend regardless of what Diomedes had done but his move towards Syria was based on his own political position since that was his own power base. Over the course of his regency, Diomedes and the court would come to spend more and more time in Antioch and make fewer and fewer trips to Seleukeia. Indeed, they began to make fewer and fewer trips to the eastern half of the empire altogether.

    Diomedes seems to have cared little for affairs in Central Asia or Afghanistan and largely appears to have seen both regions as little more than a collection of mountains and deserts inhabited mostly by barbarians and dotted here and there by the odd Greek city. In one letter, penned in the 190s, Diomedes described Sogdiana as:

    'So barbarous that even the Greeks are corrupt. They deck themselves in finery and gold and care little for the gods whose temples they would rather desecrate for their own glory than raise them high with offerings... they care more for silk and incense than for virtue and diligence and their soldiers are so weakened by luxury that they resemble the hordes of Xerxes more than the armies of Seleucus and Antiochus'.

    It should come as no surprise, then, that Diomedes did little to change the ongoing trend of political power moving more and more into the hands of local officials in the eastern regions of the empire. This began in 208 BCE when renewed raids in the east led Diomedes to agree to allow local powerholders to increase their defence forces and to construct, and maintain, their own fortifications outside of the Seleucid army's control. Now, before we assume that this all came down to Diomedes' own disregard for the region, we should acknowledge that there was more to his decision than just his own prejudices. The death of Antiochus III threw the court into a period of chaos. The heir was not a really a problem; Seleucus IV was soon crowned as king and the regency renewed until he would come of age in 205 BCE. However, the concerns that Diomedes had had Antiochus III murdered had begun to percolate through the court and there were several calls for Diomedes to step down. Okay, this all seems okay, right? After all, Diomedes didn't even want to be regent so why not take the opportunity to step back? Well there are several problems here. First was the fact that Diomedes didn't want to lose his power and stepping down now, and under these circumstances, would almost certainly lead to his political downfall; nobody, after all, was going to keep a potential regicide close to the throne. Secondly, there was the risk that he would simply be arrested should he step down. Even if he didn't kill Antiochus, there was no telling what the next regent would think or do. Even if said regent didn't think Diomedes had committed any crime whatsoever, he might simply have the former regent arrested and executed to shut people up or to prevent a counter-coup against his power.

    This is all to say that Diomedes could not have simply stepped down yet. The best, and only, time would have been in 205 BCE when Seleucus took the throne and Diomedes could simply retreat to some sort-of high position within the court and keep the king on a tight leash while avoiding the spotlight of the regency. That was probably his plan with Antiochus prior to the king's untimely death, after all. So when, in 208 BCE, the local governors east of the Zagros mountains came asking for either a Seleucid military intervention to put down raids and protect their cities or for the right to increase their own power, Diomedes chose the latter. Doing so would not only potentially create allies in the east, but prevent him from having to order a costly and difficult military campaign at a time when his own power was relatively weak. He wouldn't abandon the east entirely, however, and in 206 BCE he would send a force to the east under the command of general Aristarchus to respond to requests for help but for the most part, the divestment of more military power to local actors seemed to work and with their increased armies they were able to protect their regions and put down raids and revolts.

    The next problem became very apparent very quickly. See, with Seleucus IV on the throne, all focus now lay on the young king. As he had done with Antiochus, Diomedes began a very systematic education programme for the new king; touring the empire, introducing him to his subjects and government, visiting Macedonia etc. Seleucus, however, showed very little interest in any of this. In fact, he showed an entire lack of talent for any business of government whatsoever and an absolute disdain for the people who ran his empire. The impression we get through the sources is that Seleucus was not especially bright nor charismatic and cared little for the empire he had inherited beyond the luxury and wealth it afforded him. One history, admittedly written much later, sums it up by quoting Seleucus as having said:

    'The kingdom is but a farm and the people are but pigs and cattle- they exist only to provide food and wealth'

    Again, the quote itself is certainly invented but it does neatly sum up the impression we get of Seleucus through our sources. Indeed, the most distinguishing thing about Seleucus from this point in his life is his very worrying love of animals. That is to say, his love of torturing and killing animals. We are told a whole litany of crimes committed against all sorts of animals by the young king but, for the sake of the reader and myself, I shall not detail them here. That said, king Seleucus IV quickly began to worry his courtiers and, not least, Diomedes himself. Not only was the king unsuitable for rule but his cruelty seemed only to grow by the day. Still, he was the king and right up until his coming of age in 205 BCE, the court seems to have held out hope that he might turn things around. Given that history remembers Seleucus IV as 'Seleucus Epimanes' or Seleucus 'the mad', I'm sure that savvy readers will be able to tell where this is going.

    With that said, it was not Seleucus' psychotic tendencies that convinced Diomedes not to relinquish power, at least not by themselves. In truth, it was the increasingly strained relationship between the king and his regent. Convinced of his own power and rights as king, Seleucus cared little for Diomedes or for his guidance or education and his active rejection of Diomedes' instruction began to worry the regent. See, Diomedes' refusal to step down had begun to fracture his once-strong support base. Several of his own supporters had begun to eye up his position and the rumours of Diomedes' murder of the former king were only growing stronger as he refused to address them. Fearing that Seleucus would be predisposed towards removing him from power (and possibly his head from his body), Diomedes began plotting to prevent his opponents from accessing the king whatsoever. Throughout 206 and early 205, Diomedes increasingly sequestered Seleucus, keeping him quiet with a steady supply of animal victims to torture and kill while he tried to work out exactly what to do about his position. His solution was as heavy handed as it was effective; he simply brought the army in. In March 205, only a few weeks before Seleucus' birthday, Diomedes had several members of the court arrested on, probably forged, accounts of treason and, on this basis, ordered the royal guard to be increased. Under the command of Aristarchus, the royal guard grew dramatically, granting Diomedes complete control over the court once again.

    A few days later, the 'king' (that is, Diomedes issuing decrees in Seleucus' name), issued a new series of regulations on court protocol. Now, all business with the king was to be conducted only through the person of the new 'Hand of the King', a position which had no real defined powers but, under Diomedes, effectively amounted to controlling anything and everything he wanted. In name, the 'Hand of the King' was something close to a high chancellor or chief minister of the Seleucid empire and would act as a liaison between the king and the court. In truth, the 'Hand of the King' now controlled all business of the court and any and all access to royal power. With this, Diomedes formally relinquished the regency in April 205 BCE and Seleucus, officially, ascended to the throne in his own right. Of course, if anybody wanted to actually see the new king, they would have to go through Diomedes. Even at official events such as symposia or meetings, Seleucus was often absent or sequestered away from the court itself, often behind a curtain. Convincing Seleucus to go along with this was not especially difficult and Diomedes continued to feed him the idea that he was simply too good to have to deal with all these petty aristocrats. What had started out as an attempt to protect himself had now very quickly spiralled; Diomedes' presence as regent, the rumours of regicide and his increasingly heavy-handed approach to rule was making more and more enemies in the court and left him with fewer and fewer friends.

    In this, Aristarchus grew ever more powerful as well, heading up the royal guard and acting as Diomedes' right-hand man. In 204, he was married to Diomedes' 20-year-old daughter Demetria. In the same year, Diomedes' two sons, Alexander and Andromachus, were raised to captaincy positions within the royal guard from which they would quickly move to other high positions. By 200, Alexander was satrap of Syria while Andromachus was satrap of Mesopotamia. Between them, the two would wield an immense amount of power over both the financial and political power of their regions. Indeed, over the early 190s, the positions of satrap and dioiketes within both Mesopotamia and Syria were simply fused under the commands of Alexander and Andromachus so as to consolidate more and more power in their hands. The final nail in the coffin for Diomedes' opponents came in 199 BCE when Amestris 'committed suicide' after years of increasingly strict house arrest. With the death of the queen dowager, Diomedes finally felt secure in his control of the throne and now turned his attention to reshaping the empire in his own image. One of Diomedes' major concerns was the collection of revenue, an issue that he had come to have very passionate thoughts about.

    Estimates are difficult but the population of the Seleucid empire between 281 and 190 BCE is estimated at somewhere between 20 and 25 million people, a bit lower than Alexander's empire at its height (about 25-30 million). By the middle of the 3rd Century, the population of Mesopotamia was probably about 4-5 million and the population of Northern Syria about 1.5 million but by the time of Antiochus III, these may well have risen to about 6-7 million in Mesopotamia and 2-2.5 million in Northern Syria. Over time the population of Syria would increase to the point at which the total population of Syria (northern and Coele Syria combined) has been estimated at about 6 million in the mid-2nd Century under Argeus I. Revenue is also difficult and varies a lot over the entire empire but one scholar estimates an average of about 1.5 talents per thousand people in the Mediterranean region, 1.25 per thousand in Mesopotamia and 0.5 per thousand in the Upper Satrapies east of the Zagros mountains. This would mean that, if these numbers are true, Syria alone provided about 9000 talents in revenue every year from taxes alone. That is, of course, not taking into account issues such as tolls and trade as well as mitigating issues such as tax exemptions, declines in income, environmental issues reducing tax, crime etc. This is all to say that estimating the actual wealth of the empire is exceptionally difficult. That said, one estimate places the income of the empire around 230 BCE at around 19-20,000 talents per year in taxes before the Great Syrian war. Estimates are even dodgier afterwards however but one scholar has suggested that the impact of the war may have reduced income to about 14-15,000 when he account both for the devastation in Syria as well as population loss in Mespotamia, the impact of the court's prolonged stay in the region and the increasing chaos in the Upper Satrapies.

    (For context, a talent was about 36,000 obols. An average daily wage for a labourer in Classical Athens would be about 2 obols a day. To put this in context, then, 19-20,000 talents equated to between 684 and 720 million obols a year).

    Antiochus' military campaigns had also been very expensive. His ship building, massive building projects, constant adventurism and endless wars with the Ptolemies had cost vast sums of money over the course of his long reign. Forts had to be maintained, crews paid, soldiers paid, food bought, horses maintained, buildings constructed, roads constructed, the court maintained and many other expenses. In peace, one estimate places the 'peacetime' expenditure of the Seleucid army at around 7-8000 talents per year and some 2-3000 talents for the running of the administration. That equates to around 9-11,000 talents per year while at peace. So at the height of revenues under Antiochus II all seemed well; a total surplus of 9-11,000 talents per year. However, between the constant expenditure of wartime activities had also taken their toll, especially during the latter half of his reign. Over the course of the great Syrian war, revenues had plummeted while costs skyrocketed and these revenues had never really picked up again.

    Diomedes' focus, then, was to try and increase the revenue of the empire by any means necessary and decrease its expenditure. To this end, he began to roll out more and more local prerogatives for localised military control, granting increased rights to local communities and even satraps to maintain certain forts at their own expense. Major forts would remain under central control, but some local sites would either be mothballed or handed over to local authorities to staff with militias and defence forces. In mid-190s, Diomedes also experiments with grouping satrapies together and granting these new groups the right to raise joint armies and defence forces to protect their own interests. These local defence forces would become more and more common over the 190s and early 180s and existed in one form or another, especially in the Upper Satrapies and Macedonia well into the reign of Argeus I and his successors.

    In the short term, they did manage to reduce the expenditure of the empire but they also risked destabilising it, increasing the risk of local powerholders creating their own bases and coming to resent centralised control. It would be a problem that the later Seleucid kings would struggle against for much of the 2nd Century and one that Diomedes would come to know well before the end. In addition to this, he increased the taxes on landholders with particularly large estates and attempted to introduce a more formalised system of tribute collection. In particular, he attempted to move the collection of taxes away from the satraps themselves and towards the dioiketes beginning around 199 or 198 although this wouldn't go very far since a series of major protests would put a halt to it soon enough. In 196 BCE, increased tribute demands in Ionia led to a major revolt and the deployment of the army under Aristarchus to put it down. More problematically, Diomedes made a very radical attempt in the 190s to establish a single capital at Antioch, effectively attempting to end the process of mobile kingship in the Seleucid empire and centre it upon a single city in the vein of Alexandria. This would end in disaster as the costs of maintaining the court (and armed forces) indefinitely began to exhaust the population of northern Syria and led to a serious revolt in 194 BCE.

    In addition, the ever increased costs of making the trip to Antioch for satraps further from the court began to reduce these trips over time. One of the more difficult decrees was issues in 197 BCE, shortly after the settlement of the court at Antioch. Under this, every satrap was required to visit Antioch for at least three weeks every year in the case of satrapies between Macedonia and Mesopotamia or ever two years in the case of those beyond the Zagros mountains. As a power move it made some sense; by forcing satraps to come to the capital, Diomedes was forcing them to spend money and take time away from their power bases in a location where they would effectively be hostages of the crown (that is to say, Diomedes). In theory, it would also reduce the expenditure of the throne which no longer had to travel to the satraps to engage with them. Of course, this went down like a lead balloon; worsening conditions along the roads, especially in the Upper Satrapies, made it more expensive, dangerous, and difficult for satraps to make the trip to Antioch and the constant demands for increased revenue and travel began to grate upon them more and more. In an ever-worsening political situation in Central Asia, it soon became ever more common for satraps to outright rebel against the throne as they failed to actually make the trip (or refused to do so for political reasons). We'll discuss this situation more next time but, for now, it suffices to say that all of this went down pretty badly.

    Simultaneously, Diomedes was empowering and trying to neuter local political actors across the entire empire and it was not very popular. At court, his decisions rightly drew criticism of effectively undermining the Seleucid empire at its very base while, out in the satrapies, it drew criticism for increased surveillance of satraps and the attempt to steal their ability to collect taxes as well as the ever increased demands placed upon satraps to travel to Antioch and bring more income. For a man whose career had been built on his financial ability, it all seems rather strange. However, Diomedes seems to have been attempting to create a more bureaucratised system. In his mind, the Seleucid empire (which was already very bureaucratic, let us not deny that) was something which needed to be reformed into a system of appointments and highly regulated satrapies. Sure, he was empowering the satrapies but, in theory, he was taking other powers away to strengthen other arms of the bureaucracy in turn. Despite the increasing divestment of power to the provinces, Diomedes appears to have seen this was being a centralisation programme, one which would break local powerholders, end any local dynasts and, eventually, create a uniform bureaucracy across the whole of the empire in which satraps simply governed and fought conflicts at the local level and the dioiketes collected taxes. In this system, satraps would ultimately be subject to the king's oversight upon their 'reports' back in Antioch and all the central authorities would have to do is keep order and march out whenever the satraps faced a problem they couldn't handle. If that was the case, of course, these reforms simply didn't work.

    --------------------
    Note: For sources on the revenue and expenditures of the Seleucid Empire, check out Aperghis (2004), 'The Seleucid Royal Economy'. Many of the numbers come from Aperghis himself with some jumbling for my own timeline but they are very heavily estimated and there really is no way of truly knowing. Population and revenue are notoriously difficult as are the questions of what these numbers actually mean. We know, for instance, that daily wage in Classical Athens was about an obol or two but how that translates to modern money is not only controversial but often a meaningless discussion.
     
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    Chapter Thirty-Three
  • Chapter Thirty-Three: The Rise of Megasthenes and Gorgias

    To understand the origins of the revolt of Megasthenes II and Gorgias (alternatively known as 'The Eastern Revolt' or the 'Megasias Revolt' by at least one scholar), we need to step back in time somewhat to understand their respective rises to power. Megasthenes I was born some time around 270 BCE and was destined from a young age to make a name for himself. I say destined because like so many of the figures we have discussed, he was high aristocracy. By the age of 20, Megasthenes was already in a command position in the armies of Antiochus II and would serve, probably as an infantry commander, in many of his campaigns. Around 235 BCE, Megasthenes transitioned entirely into civic government and took up a financial position as dioiketes of Bactria, the same position Diomedes had once held in Syria. Around 230 BCE, he became satrap following the death of the old governor. As satrap, Megasthenes earned a reputation for diligence, shrewd governance and his unusual popularity with the local population. Throughout the 220s, while Antiochus was battling things out with Ptolemy in the west, Megasthenes was busy overseeing the running of Bactria and was generally seen as a very able governor. Perhaps the most dramatic example of Megasthenes' work comes from his irrigation programmes.

    Already in the early Achaemenid and early Hellenistic periods, canals had been dug across Bactria to help irrigate new lands and bring them under cultivation. Near Ai Khanoum, for example, canals brought water from the Kokcha river to some of the higher areas of land to the north. Irrigation was a long practice down in the plains around Ai Khanoum but, until the Hellenistic, few attempts had been made to extend this into higher ground. Indeed, already by the late 200s, Hellenistic rule had managed to dramatically impact even the settlement patterns of the region around Ai Khanoum. Prior to the Hellenistic, most of the population of the region had been concentrated in a few villages, the largest of which was known as Kohna Qala. By the time of Megasthenes, however, Kohna Qala was gone, replaced with a fortification. Instead, settlement had become more dispersed with Ai Khanoum at the centre as a major urban environment and a lot more smaller farmsteads spread around the plains and up into the hills. While the western empire was facing destruction and chaos, then, the period of Megasthenes' governance saw Bactria prospering. Sometime around 227 or 228 BCE, Megasthenes is known to have expanded the northern canal in the the Dasht-i Qala plain (to the north of the Kokcha river and east of the Oxus, bordering the Rustaq Hills) as well as increased irrigation further in the Khwaja Ghar plain opposite which, until then, had been largely focussed around the bridge area.​

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    The Dasht-I Qala plain lies west of the Rustaq hills and is the area of greatest occupation here. The Khwaja Ghar plain is to the south of the Dasht-I Qala across the Kokcha River.
    Nor did he limit his building to Ai Khanoum, with other irrigation programmes under Megasthenes and his successor in the Archi plain (further along the Oxus to the south and west of Ai Khanoum. To the north, the Samti and Yangi Qala plains seem to have been largely uninhabited during the early Hellenistic although, under Megasthenes I, a new series of forts would be built along the Oxus river there, possibly heralding a move towards resettlement of the region under he and his successor. I don't want to spend too long and bore potential readers with too many details but the gist of everything is that Megasthenes' building programme saw a dramatic increase in the amount of land brought under irrigation during the 220s. Other building also took place including repairs to roads and forts, as well as a new granary built within the Bala Hissar, the fort above the city of Bactra and even a new temple in Aornos.
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    However, if the 220s saw a flourishing in Bactria, the same was not true in Sogdiana to the north. In the mid-230s, Callistratus 'Kalos' was appointed satrap of Sogdiana, a position he would hold until his death in 226 BCE. At the time of his death, Sogdiana was already beginning to experience an increase in attacks from nomadic peoples. In truth, Sogdiana had already been home to the Saka for a long time (at least since the time of Cyrus the Great in the 6th Century), but the late 3rd Century (and, as we will see; the 2nd Century as well) would see an influx of new nomadic peoples taking advantage of Seleucid weakness. The 220s especially saw a significant uptake in attacks and population movements as the frontiers weakened. This was nothing new by any means of course. Alexander himself had spent two years trying to bring Sogdiana to heel and Seleucus I had had to send troops as well. Turmoil in Sogdiana seems to have been ongoing in at least some capacity through the entire third century and we know that Antiochus II sent troops during the 230s. Indeed, Callistratus was probably sent to Sogdiana as part of Antiochus' own campaigns in Central Asia and one of his first acts was an expansion of the defensive walls at Samarkand.
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    Exact evidence is difficult but the 220s certainly saw a very real uptake in violence well into Sogdiana. Damage can be seen to the walls at both Samarkand (Samarqand) and Bukhara but both cities seem to have resisted their attacks while nearby Koktepa was razed. The same cannot be said for several sites further south; the city of Xenippa near Karshi survived intact but the forts and settlements at the nearby Karshi-Guzar oasis were sacked sometime after 226 BCE. To the east, devastation has also been found at the oasis at Shakhr-i Sabz. A particularly bad attack came in 223 BCE when a Saka army tore through southern Sogdiana and made its way towards Bactria where it was eventually stopped by a combined force of Bactrians and Sogdians at the Battle of the Iron Gates. Following the battle, Megasthenes would send troops regularly to help fortify Sogdiana against threats, creating a strong relationship between the leadership of the two regions which would last for decades.

    Around 219, the situation worsened when several local communities revolted against Seleucid rule, upset by increased military and tax demands and the inability of the local satrap to resolve attacks against their homes. The revolt seems to have begun with a local defence force which had managed to drive off an attack but, when asked to disband, had chosen instead to revolt and had quickly spread through the region. A force sent to put it down was ambushed and destroyed. In 218 BCE, Demetrius was sent east and, around the same time, the satrap was replaced with Gorgias I. Throughout the 210s, the two satraps began to grow more and more powerful. In 216 BCE, Megasthenes died and was replaced by his son, Megasthenes II. Between them, Megasthenes and Gorgias enjoyed a generally friendly and cooperative relationship. After 215 BCE, their increased autonomy and scope of military (and political) options led to a series of close working relationships between the two. Demetrius had allowed several groups of Saka to remain in Sogdiana, many of whom had settled alongside (or displaced) existing groups of Saka in the same region. This had created a position of some instability with a lot of roaming groups as well as a whole variety of settled peoples who didn't entirely acknowledge the political dominance of the satrap.

    In this situation, Megasthenes II and Gorgias I began to see opportunity. Between 215 and 212 BCE, joint campaigns became a regular occurrence as well as agreements to resettle certain groups; Megasthenes took on large numbers of Saka and distributed them throughout his territory in both 214 and 212 BCE. In addition, many of these same groups were soon being rolled into the local armed forces where they began to form a very significant cavalry force which would prove itself time and again in a variety of battles. This was most notable in the north where, in the late 210s and early 200s, Gorgias began a series of campaigns to the north in which his Saka cavalry demonstrated its ability in several engagements. Had anyone really been paying attention, they surely would have found Gorgias' actions increasingly concerning; from his base in Alexandria-Eschate (in the south-west of the Fergana valley), Gorgias began making several campaigns to the east and north, likely in search of Fergana horses, many of which he brought back. By around 203 BCE, it was clear that Gorgias intended to stay in Fergana where he had 'founded' a city (that is to say, renamed an existing city with the addition of some Greek settlers and new Greek cities) named Agathokleia (old Ershi or Andijan) near the eastern end of the valley. The Fergana valley would come to provide most of the mounts for the Sogdian cavalry in the 190s and would come to form the eastern end of the Seleucid empire under the reigns of Argeus I and his successors.

    Rather successful punitive campaigns were also launched across the Syr Darya in the late 200s and early 190s. However, the most concerning of all these campaigns was that against Parthia in 196 BCE. The reason for this campaign, though officially to deal with nomadic raids, seems to have been more to do with a personal dispute with the satrap who had, sometime in 197 BCE, allowed groups of Parni and Saka to cross the Oxus into Sogdiana. His goal seems to have simply been to just get them out of his own satrapy but, once in Sogdiana, they had effectively started settling (or raiding) wherever they liked. In October 197 BCE, Gorgias crushed a group of Parni near Bukhara and the following year he launched an incursion against the satrap of Parthia himself. Back in Antioch, Diomedes simply wasn't paying attention, too wrapped up in his own failed reform efforts, he didn't care much for the ongoing problems in Central Asia. As such, when Gorgias invaded Parthia in 196 BCE, nobody acted. When he occupied several Parthian settlements, nobody reacted. When he defeated the Parthian satrap in late 196 BCE and executed him, nobody reacted beyond grumbles of displeasure which were quickly stymied by the fact that nobody really wanted to go fight Gorgias who seemed to be on a rampage east of the Zagros mountains.

    What really stood out, however, was not Gorgias I but his son, Gorgias II nicknamed 'Soter' for his victories against (apparently) raiding groups but, more unconventionally known by later historians as the 'butcher of Bukhara'. Born in 219 BCE, Gorgias II joined his father's army as young as 16 and quickly distinguished himself. Known for his brilliant tactical mind, Gorgias 'Soter' was infamous for his cavalry charges, leading Sogdian cavalry on several very ambitious raids across miles of territory against his enemies. During his father's campaign in 200 BCE (up in Fergana), Soter had had rafts built to cross the Kara Darya river one night with his cavalry in order to outflank an enemy army and smash them against the river. He had also then earned a reputation for his brutal conduct in battle; at the very same battle, he had chosen not to take the captives prisoner but to have every single one of them drowned in the river as, quote, 'an offering to the god of the river'. In 197 BCE, it was Soter who had crushed the Parni attack and, in 196 BCE, it was he who had the satrap of Parthia executed. His reputation had very quickly spread back to Antioch where Diomedes, still struggling against internal dissent and trying to push a reform programme that simply wasn't going to work, had elected to broadly ignore the problem. For now, at least, Gorgias and his son were still nominally loyal to the throne and that was really all that mattered.

    Again, it is important to understand what Diomedes was trying to do. In his mind, the Seleucid empire should be run entirely bureaucratically; it should have been an empire built around a very strict and legally bound set of roles, responsibilities and appointments. That isn't to say that the empire didn't already have an extensive bureaucracy because it did but Diomedes' goal seems to have been to effectively unify the jumble of different rights, responsibilities, communities and interactions into a more unified and cohesive whole. If you remember, we discussed early on the idea that the Seleucid empire was built just as much on royal interaction as it was on bureaucracy. While the empire had a strict administrative bureaucracy (with satraps, their subordinates, the extensive financial administration, judges etc.), it also ran on a series of very complex and often very different sets of interactions with the people it ruled over. As such, a given satrap may have had directly administered territories but also intact local communities which retained their own autonomy, Greek poleis with their own laws and rules, local dynasts, and a whole host of other political statuses that could be intensely localised and entirely different to anything elsewhere. Nor was this the same as the Roman republic which had set offices, term lengths and routes of advancement; satraps could be appointed or reappointed but it was by no means unusual for a satrap to rule until they died.

    What Diomedes seems to have been trying to do was to effectively condense this system down, ultimately remove all the variations and distinctions and local confusions and, eventually, try to reorganise this system into a much more fixed, organised, and bureaucratised system. That is to say, he probably envisaged a system in which satraps had set term lengths and responsibilities alongside a whole slew of different bodies and officials and organisational groups. So why, then, did he let Gorgias do whatever he wanted? Firstly, aside from the invasion of Parthia, Gorgias' victories seemed to underline Diomedes' own perspective. Satraps had always held at least some military power but his reforms aimed to increase it such that they would become military governors and effectively avoid the central government having to really get involved in expensive and difficult campaigns too often. Gorgias was a perfect example of this; not only had the satrap defeated raiders but he had expanded the Seleucid empire in the process without needing to call upon centralised power at all.

    Secondly, Diomedes didn't care about the Upper Satrapies except in his acknowledgement that they were a potential threat. Until around 210 BCE, Gorgias had been a close supporter of the Perso-Babylonian faction but, with the ascent of Diomedes, had very quickly changed sides. In doing so, Gorgias had ingratiated himself more and more with Diomedes over the course of the 200s to the point at which, by the time of the revolt of Gorgias and Megasthenes, his was seen as one of the foremost champions of Diomedes' own reforms. To us, it is perfectly obvious that Gorgias was simply playing the political game and buying time for his own chance to come and it may well have been so to Diomedes but the regent was very unpopular in the Upper Satrapies and, at least in the 200s, Gorgias was a useful ally. When he invaded Parthia, Diomedes was probably willing to look the other way both because the Upper Satrapies were not that important to him and because there was no use in upsetting a potential political partner when the regent doesn't seem to have enjoyed many other friends in the region.

    Thirdly, military interventionism simply wasn't politically or financially viable at the time. Diomedes must have known that a war against Gorgias, even if successful, would be a painful one. Diomedes, even if he could convince the political actors of his day to really commit to a war against the satrap, would have been committing the Seleucid empire to an expensive and potentially politically ruinous war which might provide his enemies an opportunity to strike against him and potentially could create a brand new, extremely powerful, enemy.​
     
    Chapter Thirty-Four
  • Chapter Thirty-Four: The Rise of Argeus or: The Great Black Hole

    A few years ago, one academic wrote:

    'Appreciating, studying, or understanding Seleucid history, especially in the early period between the reigns of Seleucus Nicator and Seleucus Epimanes, is inherently and inescapably complicated by Argeus I. As a figure, he is oftentimes comparable to Alexander the Great in his tendency towards mythologising and the singularity of his existence. That is to say that the sheer existence and fame of Argeus I often tricks people into perceiving Seleucid history as being defined by a pre-Argeus and post-Argeus world. In this sense, Argeus is comparable to a great black hole, sucking everything and everybody around him into this perception of "his" world.'

    This categorisation is fair to some extent. King Argeus I is a name that many will be familiar with and one that, so far, I have deliberately strayed away from so as to avoid the tendency of some to see Seleucid history as defined by his reign. Some hundred years ago, the Seleucid empire was very notably described as:

    'The march of great conquerors from that greatest of Macedonians, Alexander, to the only man to ever truly come close to his fame and prestige, Argeus'

    Sometimes known as Argeus 'Aniketos' (or Argeus 'the Invincible'), his reign of an astonishing 43 years from 186 BCE until his death in 143 BCE at the age of 77 saw the so-called 'Golden Age' of the Seleucids in which the empire would reach its territorial, cultural, and political heights. It was a period never to be repeated and the death of Argeus would herald the beginning of its long decline. That, at least, is the traditional telling. As we will discuss going forward, modern interpretations are somewhat less simplistic and it is important for us to try and see Argeus from a more complex standpoint. With that in mind, let us discuss the 'rise' of King Argeus I.
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    Born in 220 BCE, Argeus was the only son of the marriage of Prince Antiochus of the Seleucid Empire and Berenice, granddaughter of Ptolemy III. His grandfather, the soon-to-be Ptolemy IV, was born in 259 BCE and married his sister Eurydice, in 241 BCE at the age of 18. A year later, they produced Berenice. This meant that Argeus was the scion of both the Seleucid and Ptolemaic royal families, a status which would very quickly get him in hot water. In 219 BCE, Antiochus was killed by Seleucus and a year later, Argeus was adopted by Demetrius, Antiochus' brother. This status would last for only a few years until 215 BCE when Demetrius too was killed. In around 213 or 212 BCE, Berenice and Argeus finally fled the Seleucid empire for fear that Seleucus would have them killed as a threat to his power, eventually finding their way to the Ptolemaic court, now ruled by Ptolemy IV.

    Under Ptolemy's protection, the 7 or 8 year old Argeus would spend the next decade or so being educated and raised alongside the Ptolemaic princes. Supposedly, Argeus seems to have always had something of a difficult relationship with the Ptolemaic princes. Ptolemy IV's eldest son, Ptolemy (b. 236 BCE) seems to have disliked Argeus from the start and the two never had an especially close relationship in any way shape or form. For Argeus, one of the prime difficulties was the fact that technically he wasn't a Ptolemaic prince at all but a Seleucid one, the same kingdom that had spent the 220s butting heads with the Ptolemies and killing thousands of their soldiers. Of course, the many biographies of Argeus tend to give us another reason for the crown prince's distaste for Argeus which is that Argeus soon proved himself so virtuous and talented that Ptolemy IV grew to like him even above his own son and, at one point, even told his son that, when he became king, he should always listen to Argeus above any other advisor 'for only by those means shall the kingdom grow to encompass all its enemies'. In these biographies, the crown prince began to resent his father's clear preference for Argeus and, in turn, to hate him.

    Of course, this story is almost certainly false but the biographies do give us some interesting information on both the conflicts between Argeus and the Ptolemaic court and the solutions devised initially by his mother but eventually carried on by Argeus himself. The earliest significant surviving biography of Argeus was written at the beginning of the 1st Century BCE, sometime around 90-80 BCE and tells us one interesting titbit when it says that:

    'Argeus' ambition outstripped all the other Ptolemaic princes and it has been said that even as a child he longed the conquer the world'

    This single line gives us some context for a lot of the division between Argeus and the court. See, going forward, Argeus' career will be often impacted by both fear and envy within the Ptolemaic court and it seems likely that the real conflict may well have emerged from Argeus' own ambitions, spoken out of turn and in an environment that could not withstand an ambitious prince. At a time when the peace with the Seleucids was still fresh and for the crown prince, statements of Argeus' intention to rule vast kingdoms or conquer the world could well have been interpreted as a threat. For Argeus, the issue may well have been more related to his inability to fit in and his personal perception that he simply was not accepted by the Ptolemaic court and would continue to be an outsider the rest of his life. Whether the main issue was Argeus' isolation from the Ptolemaic court or the fears of the Ptolemaic princes that Argeus might one day become a threat, he remained unpopular with many amongst the court. During the first decade of his time in Egypt, Ptolemy IV was consulted on several occasions by concerned officials seeking to have him sent back to the Seleucid empire as Diomedes, then controlling the court, was requesting. Nevertheless, probably knowing that Argeus would be killed upon taking one step into Antioch, Ptolemy IV instead chose to protect him.

    In the traditional biographies, Argeus' first sign of 'greatness' came at only 12 when he and the king were travelling together and their guards were ambushed by bandits on the road. Argeus sprung into action, organising the guards and, apparently, through sheer force of personality was able to devise a strategy and lead the guards to a stunning victory, thus saving the king. Undoubtedly, this story is made up but it does indicate a certain truth; Argeus seems to have shown a very real propensity for athletics and, especially, wrestling from a young age and was renowned for his physical stature as a young man, being both taller and stronger than any of the Ptolemaic princes. Still he struggled to fit in and, in a very interesting and important point, his solution was apparently to turn to religion. Specifically, Argeus became a close follower of the cult of Dionysus in Alexandria. This was not a sign of his particular love of drinking (in fact, Argeus seems to have had no love for excessive drinking whatsoever) but instead an indicator of an interesting political move. Remember the Dionysiac miracle and how Euphemios, writing in the 2nd Century, seemed to be pushing back the origins of a real Dionysiac war cult present in the 2nd Century Seleucid empire? This, right here, is the earliest incarnation that we know of.

    See, Dionysus was an ancestor god of the Ptolemies and very popular in Ptolemaic ideology. In particular, Ptolemy II had cultivated a very close relationship with Dionysus given his ability to easily cross cultural boundaries and work as both a Greek and Egyptian god. However, the connections went back even further since even Alexander had considered himself a descendant of Dionysus. In short, the Ptolemies through their connection to Dionysus were both connected to Egyptian culture (in which Dionysus could act very well as a Greco-Egyptian god and was often syncretised with Osiris at various points) and to the Argeads and Alexander. It has also been argued that Ptolemy II's association with Dionysus helped to cultivate an image of him as bringing wealth and rejuvenating Egypt given the god's association with regeneration and renewal. Under Ptolemy II, the Ptolemaia festival held in Alexandria was closely associated with Dionysus and many of the coins of Ptolemy I issued under his son feature an elephant headdress, a reference back to both Alexander's eastern conquests in India and the Dionysiac invasion of India.

    By the time Argeus came along, Sosthenes' works on Dionysus would also have reached Alexandria and Argeus himself was said to have been very fond of the work and enjoyed many of the so-called 'Sosthenic-tradition works', many of which were produced in Alexandria at the end of the 3rd Century and beginning of the 2nd. These were often satirical, light-hearted and included themes of travel, exploration, and conquest with Dionysus (or occasionally other Dionysiac figures) at their centre. Argeus' association with the god, then, was an attempt to fit in with the Ptolemaic dynasty, to create a personal ideology that integrated him into the Ptolemaic ideology and helped portray him as, in effect, part of the family. It was something he would continue throughout the rest of his life, especially during his time in Nubia at the end of the 3rd Century when he, and his soldiers, would really begin the emergence of the militaristic 'war-god' Dionysus.

    Still, Argeus' relationship with the Ptolemies doesn't seem to have improved all that much. Argeus continued to drift further and further away from the centre of power and, by 206 BCE, the now-14 year old seems to have only seen the king or even many of the other Ptolemies on rare occasions. He is said to have complained at length about being 'treated as lower than the diplomats and petitioners who crowd the halls of the palace', to which the crown prince is said to have replied: 'if only you were as useful as any of them'. However, Argeus was coming of age and naturally was starting to expect that he would end up with some sort of position in the army. He was, therefore, not surprised when he was given a command. He was, however, both surprised and disappointed to learn that it was a minor fort command down in Nubia.

    This fort, somewhere near Semna south of the Second Cataract, lay right on the very border of the Triakontaschoinos (the Ptolemaic region of Lower Nubia). Since the mid-220s, Semna had been the effective southern end of Ptolemaic control following a general pull back during the Great Syrian War. Argeus' command involved a small, and somewhat dilapidated, fort garrisoned by only 140 soldiers to the south-east of Semna along one of the desert paths leading north. Of these, only about 20 were Greek, another 35 were Jewish, 35 were Egyptian and 50 were Nubian. It was, in short, about as small a command as one could expect to have been given. According to the biographies, the command itself was a punishment after Argeus had been caught either having a relationship with a palace maid or the son of a local farmer, sneaking the latter in under cover of night. He had also been accused of then proceeding to give away valuables from within the palace as gifts to his lover. None of this was illegal by any means and it is unlikely that the concern for the Ptolemies was anything more than image. It is very possible that Ptolemy IV had plans for Argeus' marriage or figured that his gallivanting off with maids and farmer's sons was simply a bad look, especially his tendency to steal from the palace to give them gifts. It is also possible that the hostility between Argeus and the crown prince played a role, helping condemn him to this temporary exile.

    And temporary it was intended to be, in 203 BCE, only a year after his assignment to the fort, Argeus was recalled with the promise of a more lucrative command in Egypt. Famously, however, he now turned the opportunity down. In the year in between, Argeus had set about rebuilding and reforming the fort, training the soldiers there and setting them to work repairing damage built up over the last several years. He had also fought several small engagements, largely with bandits along the roads and built up relationships with local traders. He had also, however, begun a correspondence with the, then, governor of the Triakontaschoinos, Euphranor who was impressed by the boy's talent and his soldiers' discipline. Towards the end of 204 BCE, Euphranor had visited the fort and was amazed to find his small band of soldiers to be highly trained and disciplined well beyond what Argeus' predecessor had left. Whether or not we really trust the biographies on this, Argeus certainly did make a name for himself as a hard leader with a staunch focus on discipline above all else. His punishments were extremely severe and drew criticism even during his own life such as in 201 BCE when he was criticised for having a cavalryman executed and his body strung up for more than a week for a minor act of indiscipline.

    Regardless, Argeus would stay in Nubia for several more years. Having refused a command elsewhere, Ptolemy IV instead chose to reassign Argeus to a higher command in Nubia, a position he would hold until 200 BCE when he replaced Euphranor as governor of the Triakontaschoinos. Now in full command, Argeus set out to really make his name; between 200 and 197 BCE, he began a rapid advance south towards the third cataract where, some 30 years earlier, the Jewish commander Mosollamos had set up a Ptolemaic fort. This was restored by Argeus in 198 BCE, the same year in which he was said to have sent back some 4000 Kushite captives to Alexandria. However, in 197 BCE, Argeus would find himself subject to a massive counter-attack consisting of, apparently, some 30,000 Kushites against his own force of 8000. Suspecting that no Ptolemaic support was coming, especially when Ptolemy IV had only just died that year, Argeus instead settled in for a fight. In September or October 197 BCE, Argeus met the Kushite army at the Battle of Tombos. Tombos, an island in the middle of the third cataract, had been fortified by Argeus before the arrival of the Kushite force and all but one bridge destroyed. He had then hidden some 3000 soldiers over a ridge on the mainland and left the rest of the 5000 on the island. When the Kushites arrived, they prepared to attack the Ptolemaic force at which point Argeus ordered all the food and water destroyed. Famously, he then told his soldiers that they would leave the island 'only over the bodies of the enemy'.

    When the battle began, the desperate Ptolemaic soldiers fought for their lives, pushing back several Kushite assaults until, Argeus finally sprang the trap and his waiting forces emerged from the rear and ambushed the Kushite army. Taken by surprise, the Kushite soldiers began to flee but lost thousands of soldiers in the rout as Argeus led his infantry in a charge against their routing foes. As they retreated, however, Argeus chose to keep up the pressure and pushed their army as far as Dongola before returning to Tombos with loot and captives. Supposedly, of the original 30,000 Kushites, some 14,000 were killed or captured to only 16 of Argeus' own soldiers. Again, regardless of whether this is true, it was a huge victory and seemed to cement Argeus' name back in Egypt. As captives began to stream north, Argeus was emboldened to ask Ptolemy V for more soldiers, a request which was curtly refused. The next year, Argeus would again find himself going head to head with the Kushites and would manage to ambush, and nearly destroy, another Kushite army.

    Another of his major achievements during this period would be the near-total capture, and fortification, of the so-called Pselkis (or Korosko) route, beginning at Pselkis just to the south of Aswan far to the north and ending well into Upper Nubia past the 4th Cataract. This route bypassed what was known as the Dongola bend, a very wide bend in the Nile which would dramatically increase travel times for merchants. The bend began about 190km south of Aswan (at the first cataract and the traditional 'end' of Egypt) and ended between the 4th and 5th Cataracts for a total distance of 160 km of river. That is to say that the route cut off a lot of distance for the average merchant. However, since it was also not on the Nile, it was a lot harder for the Ptolemaic kingdom to control. Over the course of the early 190s, Argeus established a network of new forts along much of the road and was able to regulate traffic rather effectively. He was able to do this, in part, through his negotiations and deals made with the Noba and Makorae peoples (nomadic groups inhabiting the regions between the First and Third and Fourth and Fifth cataracts respectively). Indeed, Noba and Makorae cavalry would be present in several engagements during Argeus' rise to power and we know he had a contingent of Noba during his second battle with the Kushites in 196 BCE.

    Regardless, Argeus' time in Nubia would come to a sudden end in late 196 BCE when news of a major revolt in Upper Egypt reached him. Initially, he assumed that the revolt would be put down soon enough but, as the months passed, he began to realise that the situation was worse than he had expected. As news filtered south, rumours that Aswan itself has fallen to rebels and of a potential uprising in Lower Nubia caused him to finally call a retreat from the Third Cataract. His time at Tombos had been brief and was never to be repeated as he began the march north. Sure enough, in 195 BCE, he faced a major Nubian uprising near Anibah which he was able to crush before continuing on north towards Aswan. When he got there, he found that the news had been exaggerated but only barely; Aswan was under siege and and the garrison about to fall. With his arrival, however, he was able to turn the tide and drive back the rebels in a brutal battle outside of the city. In the aftermath, he displayed his already well-known penchant for harsh justice when he had every single one of the rebels hanged on the banks of the Nile.





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    Note:

    For information about Ptolemy II and Dionysus: Goyette, M. (2010), 'Ptolemy II Philadelphus and the Dionysiac Model of Political Authority', Journal of Ancient Egyptian Interconnections 2 (1).​
     

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    Chapter Thirty-Five
  • Chapter Thirty-Five: Everything Goes to Shit

    Diomedes had never been especially popular with many people. However, the years after the death of Antiochus III saw his popularity begin an, ultimately terminal, nosedive. More and more, his position within the court aroused an ever-growing sense of discontent driven by rumours of his role in Antiochus' death and by his own heavy-handed antics within the court. The fact of the matter was, of course, that Seleucus IV did him no favours. See, when Seleucus first came to power back in 208 BCE, he had a reputation for not really caring about his empire and for his tendency to torture and kill animals. Well, that had all changed by about 204 or 203 BCE. Now instead of torturing and killing animals, he had fixed his attentions rather firmly on people and found, in the court, a whole slew of different people willing to supply him for his needs. In a satire, written during the 160s BCE, Diomedes is famously characterised as being effectively a pimp for Seleucus' psychotic tendencies, acquiring young women for the king to torture and kill. These accusations may well be overblown but it is clear that Seleucus did have a source of victims given the numbers mentioned in the sources which, even if overestimated, are terrifyingly high.

    For a long time, the murders committed by Seleucus were considered apocryphal at best and there is no doubt that his successors (namely Argeus) played up his actions to portray him as an evil needing thwarted by a usurper. However, letters dating to the 170s and 160s BCE do attest to members of the Seleucid court who claimed to have seen Seleucus' crimes up close. If we read the traditional literary sources, Seleucus is credited with close to 70 murders between about 204 and 186 BCE. In truth, the numbers may well be lower than that with historians typically placing a 'true' number at between 20 and 30 maximum. That said, it is important not to downplay the impact of his actions upon those around him. Unfortunately, the names and lives of many of his victims have been lost save for the notable exception of Demetria, a fact which betrays the typically classist attitudes of those around him. Seleucus, most likely, was not killing aristocrats but lower class people acquired for him by members of the court eager to curry favour with the king. Bare in mind that, for many, there was no real legitimate alternative to the throne in the late 200s and 190s and too many people were invested in keeping their place within the court, a position which might be liable to change should the king also change. Diomedes' goal, most likely, was simply to replace Seleucus as soon as he had a viable successor but that would prove more difficult than he expected. Instead, then, the court chose simply to put up with their king, give him enough entertainment to keep him quiet and otherwise try to stifle the information before it could cause problems.

    Not that that worked whatsoever. By the 190s, Seleucus had grown up and was starting to take a worrying interest in the affairs of state. By 198, at least, he was starting to demand that Diomedes allow him to meet with court officials more often and was growing displeased with Diomedes' control of the court and kingdom. Realising very quickly that the crux of Diomedes' power was Aristarchus, Seleucus made several attempts to break down the relationship between the two, only to find that the marriage alliance between Aristarchus and Diomedes via Demetria was close to unbreakable. While Diomedes had Aristarchus and Aristarchus had the royal bodyguard, Seleucus didn't have a leg to stand on. Instead, he began sneaking out of the palace and holding secret rendezvouses with other members of the court to establish what has been termed the 'secret' or 'mystery' court. This secret court would last all of seven years between 198 and 191 BCE and would be the means by which he would begin to try and wrest control of the palace from Diomedes. What this amounted to was an increasing collection of anti-Diomedes figures brought together under the auspices of Seleucus to act as his own power base with which to challenge the Hand of the King for dominance. At its heart, however, was his ace in the hole; Amestris, still effectively in house arrest back in Seleukeia.

    His first real move came in 196 BCE when he declared his intention to celebrate his ancestors and tour the great cities of his empire including, of course, Seleukeia. Diomedes, finally seeing Seleucus take some interest in affairs of state, was wary of this but also knew that control over the empire required active engagement and involvement by the king. The fact of the matter was that very few people had actually seen Seleucus since his enthronement over a decade earlier and his sequestration in Antioch was beginning to raise dissent. So, Diomedes acquiesced and in 196 BCE the court went on the road. Upon their arrival in Seleukeia, however, Seleucus effectively ignored everything else and marched straight to the location where Amestris was residing. Taken by surprise, Diomedes attempted to have Seleucus stopped but was prevented from doing so by the intervention of Seleucus' allies who, very publicly, raised a fuss by loudly declaring that the Hand of the King was attempting to arrest Seleucus and take the throne. The result was a riot in the streets of Seleukeia during which several members of the court encouraged the people of the city to stop the usurpation in its tracks. Diomedes was able to put down the revolt with Aristarchus' help but it was too late, Seleucus had met up with Amestris and taken her into his protection. She was to accompany him wherever they went and, by 195 BCE, was finally back at the court. This, however, would prove to be the last clever move Seleucus would make before a series of schemes which might, generously, be termed 'hare-brained'.

    This was where everything went wrong for basically everybody involved. Seleucus and Amestris began plotting; Diomedes still retained control of the court and so long as he did so, he effectively controlled the empire. As it stood, Seleucus and Amestris had access to what amounted to a handful of court officials in the face of Diomedes' overwhelming military power. Nor had the Hand of the King been idle during this and, in 195 BCE, he introduced the 'Eyes of the King', modelled after Achaemenid precedents. This amounted to a secret service intended to root out dissent and opposition to his control of the court which would remain active for several decades, even after Diomedes' downfall. It was also, however, his main counter against Seleucus' secret court. That same year, two of Seleucus' close allies were arrested and executed on entirely fabricated charges of treason. This convinced the two to finally pull the plug and act. In early 194 BCE, Aristarchus was sent west in response to rumours of a major revolt brewing in Ionia which Diomedes was eager to put down. In his absence, Seleucus took a direct swipe at the link between Aristarchus and Diomedes; Demetria. The murder of Demetria has become a well-known image of the Seleucid empire; the symbol of court intrigue taken to a brutal end by a whole slew of political actors too self-obsessed to care about the lives of those around them. It should come as no surprise; in August 194 BCE, Seleucus himself killed Demetria and her young son in a scene described by one of Argeus I's biographers as 'the worst murder ever known'.

    The moments before the murder were very famously depicted in art including the 1st Century BCE statue entitled 'The Murder of Demetria', depicting the woman moments before her death. However, the art and even romanticism applied to her death often serves to obscure the very real life lost. Demetria is often undermentioned in our sources, her personality or achievements ignored in favour of the gory and brutal details of her death. However, it is important to remember that she was only thirty years old with at least two children; Alexander (b. 200), and Diomedes (b. 196, d. 194). Her relationship with Aristarchus is known to have been very happy and it is said that she was known to have generally had a very good life. The tragedy of Demetria is that we know effectively nothing beyond that. We know everything about her death and about the man who killed her, but very little about her herself. It is the same as the dozens of other victims of Seleucus that I have had to skim over whose names are forever lost to us. We know much about their sensationally gory deaths with stories of human heads placed on display and the king supposedly bathing in human blood (much of which is almost certainly apocryphal), but almost nothing about their lives. As for Demetria, the story is full of all the sensational details biographers love so much; torture, dismemberment and, yes, cannibalism.

    Her death, however, would prove to be a monumentally bad mistake. Aristarchus received a letter around the same time as the death, probably sent in advance to cover Seleucus' tracks. In effect, the letter claimed that Demetria had been killed on the orders of Diomedes who, Aristarchus was expected to believe, had had her dismembered, killed, and partially eaten. Well, as a close ally of Diomedes', Aristarchus wasn't buying it. Wracked with grief, Aristarchus withdrew into his tent for an entire month during which time his army never saw him save for his second-in-command. When he emerged in September, he had made up his mind to turn right around and march back to Antioch where he would have the king promptly put to death. In Antioch itself, Diomedes was also grieving but, unlike Aristarchus, had already made up his mind not to avenge Demetria's death. Sure, he had a few people executed here and there and a scapegoat hanged but Seleucus who, let's face it, everybody knew was responsible, continued to walk free. Amestris, however, was less lucky. As Aristarchus began the long march home, Diomedes made several attempts to dissuade the general from, you know, murdering the king, reminding him that this would be an act of treason and he would lose his life. Eventually, realising that Aristarchus would not be dissuades, he had Amestris arrested and turned over to Aristarchus who promptly executed her.

    If he had hoped to assuage the general, Diomedes was sorely mistaken as Aristarchus continued to demand the king's head. So what had happened to that whole, simply replacing Seleucus thing? You would think that now would be a good time for Diomedes to simply... replace him, right? Well, no. See, Seleucus was married off quite quickly, as early as 198 BCE. His first wife, however, had lasted all of ten minutes before she fled the capital and ran back off to Upper Satrapies to hide. Unable to actually retrieve her, despite Diomedes' best efforts, the king had simply divorced her in 197 BCE and remarried. However, even with his second wife, the king simply proved unable (or unwilling) to produce an heir. He would have a single daughter, born in 195 BCE, but she would die as an infant and would prove to be the only child he would ever have. His infertility only added to the general sense that Seleucus was increasingly incapable of actually ruling and, more and more, voices were starting to question whether or not he was really best for the throne. The pro-Argeus faction within the court was now rearing its ugly head again, seeing the exiled prince as the best option and discussing (very quietly of course) that perhaps he should be invited back. Of course, Argeus was effectively next in line to the throne but, should he come to power, Diomedes wouldn't last very long and neither would Seleucus. If there was one thing the two could agree upon, it was that Argeus could not be allowed back. Nor, for that matter, could anybody else. Diomedes had invested his power in controlling the king, something which would promptly disappear the moment any stronger candidate took the throne, while Seleucus wasn't going to survive not being king.

    So what did Diomedes do? He continued to prop up Seleucus, turning over everything he could to stop Aristarchus' rampage. The result was that Diomedes now began to be seen as effectively enabling Seleucus' crimes. The murder of his own daughter had failed to stir Diomedes and, while his devotion to the king was commendable to some, his refusal to look past the obvious unsuitability of this king to rule was not. Remember how personal Hellenistic kingship was? Well, this is exactly the problem; Seleucus was not just a bad king but he entirely failed to embody the justice and virtue and strength expected of Hellenistic kings. Had he simply been weak, it might not have been a problem but his tendency to dismember young women and his recent murder of a well-liked aristocrat was a step too far when there were better options currently down in Egypt making a name for themselves. The murder of Demetria was a breaking point, one which would shatter the basis of Diomedes' power forever.

    By the end of 194 BCE, Aristarchus was coming very close to Antioch indeed and Diomedes, fearing the city would soon fall, instead chose to retreat back to Seleukeia where he would remain until 186 BCE. As he marched east, he sent word out to the Upper Satrapies demanding they send more soldiers and gold to support his war against Aristarchus, probably planning to rally his forces and prepare a return to Antioch for the next year. However, Gorgias and Megasthenes had already caught onto the fact that Diomedes was running out of time and that, if they just waited, they could simply crush him in turn. Indeed, many of the other satraps of the Upper Satrapies seem to have decided much the same; Diomedes had done nothing for them so why should they go out of their way to help him? The one major exception was Persis which, until 193 BCE, blamed Aristarchus for the death of Amestris and, remembering the close ties between the Persian aristocracy and Amestris' family, sent soldiers. Once they are at court, however, the Persian soldiers quickly realised that Diomedes had, in fact, sold Amestris down the river to Aristarchus and was currently selling anyone else he could down the river as well. The result of this was a straight-up riot in Seleukeia in February 193 BCE which led to a pitched battle and the death of several hundred soldiers. The Persian soldiers would ravage the city itself for several days before Gorgias, finally, stepped in after Diomedes sent a letter agreeing to make his son, Gorgias II 'Soter', satrap of Persis should he save them. In March, Soter took several thousand cavalry and rushed down the road to Seleukeia where they helped relieve the siege. Sure enough, a couple of months later, the satrap of Persia was overthrown and Soter took up leadership.

    This, of course, was pretty far out from what would be considered normal or acceptable under other circumstances and would mark a period of some seven years during which Central Asia rapidly fell into warlordism and chaos. In effect, the sanctioning of the usurpation of Persis by Gorgias II effectively legitimised the rise of dynastic positions within the upper satrapies. In the aftermath, the upper satrapies increasingly began to disregard any notion of centralised control and, instead, started to rush for power themselves. There really is no use in trying to parse out all the many competing factions present in the period between 193 and 186 BCE as fighting became increasingly common. Instead, the general trend was towards the gradual rise of Sogdiana under Gorgias and Bactria under Megasthenes to gradually control much of the Iranian plateau. The alliance between the two provided a secure basis to their north and south respectively and allowed a series of wars of political expansion during which much of the region was carved up between them. With that said, these conflicts were a constant and ongoing process for both and even in 187 BCE, control by the Bactrians and Sogdians was far from uniform.

    In the west, Aristarchus' revolt tore through the empire at a blistering rate. After a siege of Antioch lasting several months, he took the city and plundered much of it, trashing Seleucus III's gardens and then continuing onwards towards Seleukeia. In late 193 BCE, he crushed an army sent against him on the banks of the Euphrates and swept southwards towards Seleukeia. The first siege of Seleukeia would, however, end in disaster only a year later. Despite several attempts to take the city, Aristarchus' army failed to breach the outer defences (which, remember, were still intact since the Persian riot had taken place inside the city) and, in 192 BCE, Gorgias II Soter arrived with another relief army and crushed his army in return for a sizeable bribe (both to save the city and then, afterwards, to leave in peace) before returning to Persis. The defeat at Seleukeia was rather huge and Aristarchus wouldn't actually return for another three years. The relief, while short-lived, would be welcomed as Aristarchus retreated to Antioch to lick his wounds. Despite Diomedes' encouragements, however, neither Soter nor Gorgias I would pursue the revolting general to Antioch. Instead, Diomedes raised his own force, comprised of Greeks and Babylonians, to march out against the general and, surprisingly, was able to actually gain some ground. While he was unable to take Antioch, Diomedes' forces (probably not under his personal command) did succeed in reaching, and capturing, Apamea which was, yes, sacked, probably in order to pay his soldiers.

    To his credit, Aristarchus now set about consolidating his position; in 191 BCE, he approached the Macedonian aristocracy for support and received their alliance (and several thousand soldiers to boot). In addition, he repaired some of the damage to Antioch and to several other cities and finally set about issuing what might be termed an official statement of intent. In this, he declared his intention to punish an undefined set of criminals at the heart of the kingdom and free the 'legitimate' (although he did not specify who this was) king from their control. In truth, Aristarchus' goal is summed up quite neatly by one author's description as being to 'kill them all'. Aristarchus, especially in the biographies of Argeus I (which treat him rather well, all things considered) is usually characterised by his immense and ongoing rage towards the court of the day. Seleucus had killed his wife and son, yes, but he had been encouraged by those around him including Diomedes who, even if he was not responsible, had done everything in his power not to punish the king for his transgressions and seemed intent on protecting him. This rage seems to have driven Aristarchus in his campaigns time and again and would, in 186 BCE, lead to the infamous sack of Seleukeia. Finally, in 189 BCE, a battle on the Orontes river saw Diomedes' army defeated and his advance broken and allowed Aristarchus back on the offensive. By August, his army had reached the city of Seleukeia which he now placed under siege.
     
    Chapter Thirty-Six
  • Chapter Thirty-Six: Uprising

    In Egypt, the period of 195 to 190 BCE would see a significant sea change in the fortunes of Argeus. In 195 BCE, having put down a Nubian rebellion, Argeus found himself pitted against a major Egyptian uprising against Ptolemy V. The uprising, beginning in Upper Egypt, had swept aside several Ptolemaic garrisons and occupied Egypt between Aphroditespolis in the north and even besieged Aswan in the south. That year, sometime in October, another uprising began in the Delta led by one of Amenhotep's commanders. This latter rebellion would actually outlast Amenhotep's own revolt by decades, lasting until the 170s. By contrast, 195 BCE would prove to be the effective peak of Amenhotep's power; that same year, his forces were routed by Argeus at Aswan and faced a counter-uprising in the Faiyyum by Greek settlers which eventually would push the rebels out of the region entirely. Over the course of 194 and 193 BCE, Amenhotep's forces would be forced to cede more and more land to Ptolemaic forces from the north and south. In an attempt to break out of this vice, the rebels turned their attention south and tried to smash Argeus in battle near Hierakonpolis in April or May 194 BCE. There, on the banks of the river, Argeus would face an army claimed by some to be between two and three times his own. Whether this is true or not, the fact remains that Argeus won a stunning victory, capturing several rebel commanders and smashing their army in battle. In the aftermath, he would then proceed to sweep up north and capture Thebes itself by the end of June at the latest.

    Amenhotep immediately moved to retake Thebes but would once again be outdone when Argeus sent a cavalry contingent to Kerameia nearby to hide and, ultimately, outflank Amenhotep's forces. As the rebels engaged Argeus' army just outside of Thebes, the cavalry swept around from behind and flanked them. Amenhotep himself was captured and, by the end of the year, the rebellion had more or less been crushed. It was a stunning victory and one which raised Argeus' prestige and political prospects all the more. Back in Alexandria, news had been filtering of Argeus' many victories for several years now and rumours of this brilliant commander had helped endear him to the court. This had been helped, of course, by a steady stream of captives and booty brought back from Nubia and, now, by the capture of Amenhotep himself. The result was that, in 194 BCE, Ptolemy V made Argeus a general and assigned him to the Delta to finish crushing Amenhotep's rebellion. However, this situation was soon to change. Back in Alexandria, the political situation was tenuous. Following the death of Ptolemy IV, the court had found itself riven by the same issue plaguing the Seleucid empire; political factionalism. Towards the end of the reign of Ptolemy IV, beginning probably at the end of the 200s BCE, a series of powerful ministers had risen to prominence in the Ptolemaic court. Described by one scholar as a series of 'pseudo-Diomedes' figures, they had successively replaced one another in a series of factional conflicts. The most prominent of these, Timoleon, had emerged sometime around 196 BCE after ousting his chief rival from power.

    This isn't to say that Ptolemy didn't try to rule in his own right; Ptolemy made several attempts to outwit his own ministers, only to, time and again, find himself effectively relegated to the side-lines. This had come to a head in 195 BCE with the Egyptian uprising during which time the minister then controlling the court had been forced to play his hand by deploying an army to put down the rebels. The problem with this is that the uprising effectively placed a whole load of extra soldiers into the field who could, potentially, cause a real problem. And cause problems they would. In 194, Ptolemy sent a letter to a general named Kleopatros leading Ptolemaic forces in the north, asking him to come free him from the control of the ministers. Sure enough, Kleopatros received the letter, turned right back around, and marched on Alexandria. However, Timoleon had already bet against this very outcome; placing loyal retainers in Kleopatros' army who, upon his defection, immediately had him assassinated. Ptolemy, for his part, was effectively placed under house arrest in his room where all letters and interactions were closely monitored. With the death of Kleopatros, his army was put directly under Timoleon's control by commanded by one of those same subordinates; Thales. All these names can be confusing but they won't remain very important for very long. In short, in 194 BCE, the rebellion was crushed and Argeus brought back to the north with an immensely loyal and popular army. Suddenly, there was a brand-new player in the field and, despite Timoleon's best efforts, Argeus simply would not return to Nubia. As a general, Argeus now found himself with a much bigger armed force and now a much bigger threat to Timoleon.

    Argeus, for his part, now became a much more prominent figure at court and quickly caught on to Timoleon's dislike of him. Accordingly, he began to plot against the chief minister and, under the cover of his own military operations in the delta, moved his army to Canopus, not far from Alexandria itself and, most importantly, near Thales' encampment at Heraklion. Spurred on by this clear threat, Timoleon attempted to have Argeus demoted in early 193 BCE, a move which finally gave Argeus exactly what he needed. Claiming that Ptolemy, who had only just promoted his most loyal commander, would surely not immediately have him demoted having committed no crime, Argeus accused Timoleon of illegally sequestrating the king and, most importantly, of plotting his overthrow. Of course, this letter was sent a day after, Argeus had already moved against Thales' position. By the time Timoleon knew for sure that Argeus had revolted, Thales was already defeated and his army scattered. With the main defensive force out of the way, Argeus now marched straight on down to Alexandria and, by the end of 193 BCE, took the city. In the chaos of the fighting, however, several male members of the royal family all found themselves dead including, yes, Ptolemy V. Argeus, for his part, was only too eager to claim that his claims had been vindicated; Timoleon had committed the worst crime of trying to overthrow the king and had, in the process, murdered the king and several other princes. It's very strange considering Timoleon had no claim to the throne and no reason to kill his puppet king.

    A much more insidious explanation is that Argeus himself was responsible. Sure, Argeus would go through the motions of propping up a new Ptolemy VI for some two years but his designs on the throne were clear by this point. Ptolemy V and several other men in the Ptolemaic family turned up dead, yes, but only after the battle. They could have died during the fighting, but it is just as likely that Argeus had them killed immediately afterwards and then simply put the blame on the ongoing chaos and Timoleon's own actions. Regardless, Argeus would prop up Ptolemy VI as an effective puppet until 191 BCE at which point the puppet mysteriously dropped dead and Argeus saw fit to simply plop himself on the throne as King Argeus I. These two years, however, would prove crucial. During the period between 193 and 191 BCE, Argeus would set about reorganising the court, pushing out opponents and stacking a whole slew of appointments with his own supporters. Famously, Argeus would prove himself to be very active at nearly every level of the administration, reading and writing Demotic as well as Greek so as to involve himself in the lower levels of the government where Demotic was more commonly used. It's also very possible that, unlike many of the Ptolemies, he spoke Egyptian as well as Greek. Famous for being nearly constantly on the go, Argeus earned a reputation for his constant work-ethic, staying up well into the night to deal with petitions and letters, court cases and even issues of tax revenue.

    He also earned a reputation, however, for a very uncompromising attitude towards his enemies. In 192 BCE, he 'foiled' a 'plot' (that is to say, likely had enemies arrested on falsified charges) and executed several members of the court and their families on charges of treason. During this same period, he would also prove himself a very lavish patron of the cults of Dionysus and Herakles in Egypt, most likely to continue building up his own legitimacy as another descendant of Dionysus like the Ptolemies themselves. This included another Ptolemaia like that held by Ptolemy II, organised and held in 191 BCE, as well as a series of Dionysiac and Heraclean shrines throughout Upper Egypt and Nubia. In 191 BCE, he also married Euphrosyne, a surviving daughter of Ptolemy V, likely to secure his connections to the Ptolemaic dynasty ahead of his usurpation. Finally, in 191 BCE, he made himself king. Of course, being king of Egypt was not really enough for Argeus, not when he also had a very clear claim through his father and adopted father to the Seleucid throne, then held by the unstable Seleucus IV and, apparently, falling apart. With that said, Argeus wouldn't simply throw himself in and, instead, began biding his time, rebuilding his resources while, to the north, the Seleucids tore themselves apart.​
     
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    Chapter Thirty-Seven
  • Chapter Thirty-Seven: Kill Them All

    The siege of Seleukeia is quite indicative of the fundamental problem facing many ancient generals which is that, faced with a determined enemy, sieges were difficult. Aristarchus' siege of the city shows that pretty perfectly. Between 189 and 186 BCE, Aristarchus would largely prove unable to actually make any real headway against Seleukeia despite his best efforts. By this point, he nominally held control of the western portions of the empire between Macedonia and northern Mesopotamia but, in truth, his power was significantly more limited than that. Aristarchus' main military force came from his own army, held together by a cult of personality based around him and his own military successes. This was the natural downside to having had the main military commanded by the same person since at least 210 BCE. Don't misunderstand, Aristarchus was not a bad or incompetent military leader and had thoroughly trounced Diomedes' forces in the field. Historically, however, he has tended to suffer largely from the presence of Gorgias 'Soter' and Argeus who just so happened to live at the same time as him. What he wasn't, however, was an especially good leader beyond that. Now in control of the western portions of the empire, Aristarchus had effectively no idea as to what to do with it or really what to fight for beyond his own revenge, a problem which soon became very apparent. It was clear that he couldn't, or wouldn't, let Seleucus or Diomedes live but, eventually, he needed some cause to actually keep his soldiers in line. In 191 BCE, as mentioned, he had issued his statement of intent by which he claimed to be acting to 'free' the legitimate king from Diomedes' illegal control which amounted to little more than effectively kicking the question down the road.

    For the next year and a bit, this non-answer would effectively be the default for Aristarchus: free the legitimate king... whoever that might be and whatever that might mean. It is probable that most people interpreted Aristarchus' 'legitimate king' as being that of Seleucus but considering what Seleucus had done to his wife and son, that was hardly about to be the case. With that in mind, the natural next choice was, of course, Argeus. In 189 BCE, Argeus was a very nice choice indeed; fresh from having taken control of Egypt, the king would have plenty of resources with which to help Aristarchus and the general had every reason to suspect that they would be natural allies. That is, of course, save for the fact that others had already reached out to Argeus, asking for his help against Aristarchus. Remember how I said that Aristarchus, while a competent commander, was not the best ruler? Well, the last few years had proven that. Aside from plundering Antioch (then attempting to rebuild it), Aristarchus had effectively operated as a roving military band and, in doing so, had managed to anger pretty much everyone. Compared to Diomedes' overly centralised approach, Aristarchus acted as effectively a plague of locusts, ruling more through his own personal military power than through governors, many of whom quickly began to resent the impositions he put upon them for military support.

    The result was that, by 190, Aristarchus was facing revolts of his own, including back in Syria where a local man had led a people's uprising in Antioch, killing some of Aristarchus' soldiers and taking control of several bridges in the northern parts of the city. In the same year, an uprising began in Phoenicia and, 189, Cappadocia effectively broke off from the empire entirely. Elsewhere, many of the satraps simply began to act as pseudo-independent pseudo-kings. By 190, many of these anti-Aristarchus figures had already started to reach out to Argeus, pushing him as possibly the next best thing. For the next two and a bit years, Aristarchus saw very little positive change as he instead began to throw himself against Seleukeia. Headway was slow but the situation within the city was also deteriorating. By 186 BCE, starvation and disease ran rampant throughout the city causing riots and revolts as Diomedes struggled to keep control. Within the palace, Seleucus seems to have devolved between 189 and 186 as his mental state deteriorated and, apparently, his violence increased. By the end of the siege, the king was said to have been chained to the bed on several occasions in order to prevent him from hurting those around him. In truth, this may well have been exacerbated by a clear period of psychological and physical abuse by Diomedes throughout the siege. Stories of Seleucus being locked in his room and denied any company, often for weeks or even months, are known including a period of some 5 months in 188 BCE when Seleucus was supposedly even denied sunlight. Diomedes soon grew to loathe the king, apparently going so far as to get drunk and beat him, shouting obscenities at him until restrained by guards.

    This is all to say that, if Seleucus was devolving during the siege then Diomedes was too. Nearly three years of siege, exacerbated by Aristarchus' continued rage against the court, served to quickly sour relations even further in the court. Diomedes grew paranoid, sensing threats everywhere and lashing out in anger, supposedly turning to alcohol to soothe himself, something which only worsened his temper. At the same time, Diomedes still attempted to find help. In early 186 BCE, as Aristarchus breached the city and street fighting began, Diomedes turned to leading the defence himself, rushing out and even fighting on some occasions while trying to get Gorgias, Argeus... anybody to just help him already, even offering both of them the throne. But by this point, everybody had seen the writing on the wall. In the west, Argeus figured that his time had come and, instead of simply accepting defections, launched an outright invasion. In the east, Gorgias 'Soter' upped and made himself king (confusingly, 'Gorgias I' but we will call him Gorgias 'Soter' so as not to confuse him with Gorgias I, his still very alive father). No help came. Well people did come, but not for Diomedes. As Argeus and Gorgias closed in on Seleukeia, neither lifted a finger to stop Aristarchus storming the city and, famously, sacking it.

    Supposedly, it began as an accident. A soldier, entering a baker's store, started a fire which caught and rampaged through the city. This is probably unlikely. Aristarchus had shown relatively little care for stopping his soldiers from running amok and it's quite possible that the same held true here. The real problem was the scale. For almost two weeks, his soldiers swept through the city pillaging everything they could find. In a very famous piece, written by none other than Euphemios (yes, the same Euphemios who wrote the Siege of Tyre), the impact of the sack is quite poignantly described:

    'They say there are places where the ground and the walls are still red. That there are places where bodies were piled high and stripped of their valuables, right down to the bones which the soldiers would collect and trade. One would say: "here is a child" and another: "here is their mother". Fires can still be seen in the walls and homes, in the district where even today bones are found. A farmer told me: "when they took the city, the river ran red for a month and none of the cows would drink". I look upon it and think: "This is Troy".'

    Over the two weeks of the fall of Seleukeia, the city was nearly flattened as soldiers and fire took their toll. Much of the western portions of the city went up in flames, the palace was ransacked (once it finally fell) and, yes, the library of Seleucus was stormed and much of it destroyed. It would be another decade before the library was rebuilt and even longer before Seleukeia would recover in any meaningful way. Even then, the sack was so bad that the city would never again reach its pre-Aristarchus population or prestige. Much of the population had left even before the siege, many of them travelling to nearby Babylon and afterwards, many more would continue to the city as refugees in the wake of the city's plundering. Famously, the story goes that Seleukeia itself was left abandoned for close to a year afterwards since the impact of the sack, and the trauma of its memory, was such that nobody would dare enter the city for fear of vengeful spirits. When Argeus eventually re-founded it in 184 BCE, he began by dressing up as Heracles and leading his army through the city several times to demonstrate his mastery over the supernatural threats living within before building a whole new temple complex and making grand dedications to the gods to help cleanse the city.

    Seleukeia is interesting because, after 186 BCE, it became what might be termed a 'landscape of trauma', one in which, for decades afterwards, the inhabitants of the city would memorialise large parts of it as a means of coping with the trauma of its sack. Until 186 BCE, remember, Seleukeia had been one of the golden cities of the empire; an image of the splendour of the Seleucid kingdom with a population in the hundreds of thousands. Way back in chapter twenty, the population of Seleukeia around 200 BCE was estimated at close to 800,000 people, a huge number for the period and rivalled only by cities such as Alexandria. In 160 BCE, the population is estimated as being close to 40,000. This isn't to say that 760,000 people died during the sack because that is entirely unlikely. Instead, the vast majority simply left as refugees and, eventually, long-term migrants. Many seem to have eventually found their way to Syria where they bolstered the local economy and helped drive the move of economic and political power towards Syria during the 2nd Century. It's been estimated that some 100-150,000 Seleukeians eventually ended up settled in northern Syria, especially in Antioch and Seleukeia-on-Orontes, both of which grew significantly under Argeus I and II. Others went east where, in time, a reasonably large population of Seleukeians was known as residing in Bactria with a few even travelling into India.

    For now, however, the city of Seleukeia was effectively gone. With it, of course, went Diomedes and Seleucus, neither of whom survived the siege. In turn, it wouldn't be long for Aristarchus to go either. Aristarchus seems to have thrown all of his eggs into one basket; the capture of Seleukeia. Whether driven by his need for revenge or possibly even by political goals (his hope being that he might capture or replace the king and thereby take up Diomedes' position), Aristarchus had effectively focussed all his energies on Seleukeia and, in the process, gained a whole lot of money and a very angry empire. By the end of 186 BCE, his army would have met its fate when Gorgias Soter came crashing down upon it on the banks of the Tigris, virtually annihilating it to a man and, promptly, executing Aristarchus. With his death, the empire now fell effectively to two people, both now bent on a confrontation: Argeus and Gorgias Soter.​
     
    Chapter Thirty-Eight
  • Chapter Thirty-Eight: Argeus and Gorgias

    And so there were two. By the end of 186 BCE, the empire was, effectively, split into two camps. In the east, between Southern Mesopotamia and Afghanistan, lay the dominion of Gorgias 'Soter'. This had been a hard-fought for region, one which had taken years for Gorgias I and II to actually subdue between competing warlords, revolts, and outside raids and attacks. However, with its subjection, Gorgias 'Soter' now stood as 'king'. That, of course, is to say that he was king largely in name. See, Gorgias' claim to the throne of the Seleucid empire was beyond weak. He was not only the great-great-grandson of Seleucus 'Nikator's' second son, but only descended matrilineally from the Seleucid dynasty to which he bore very little real connection. In truth, his dynasty was far from being a real continuation of anything resembling the Seleucid empire and has, accordingly, been identified as the Polyphontic Dynasty (after Polyphontes, Gorgias 'Soter's great-grandfather and the actual marriage by which he was connected to the Seleucids). Typically, the Polyphontic Dynasty as a political entity is dated between about 194/3 until the death of Gorgias I, satrap of Sogdiana, in 180 BCE. It is also sometimes rather confusing.

    See, the 'Polyphontic Kingdom' found its first ruler in Gorgias II Soter who, by virtue of his own military strength and tactical excellence, had come to head the joint powers of Sogdiana, Persia and Bactria (then led respectively by his father, Gorgias I, Gorgias II 'Soter' and Megasthenes). However, following his death, power fell first to his son, Polyphontes I, and then reverted to Gorgias I, Soter's own father until finally becoming defunct in 180 BCE). It was also something of a political mess in many ways. The Polyphontic Kingdom really only comprised Persia and the territories it had conquered which, by 186 BCE, included much of western and southern Iran and regions such as Sogdiana and Bactria were attached more by their alliances than by any actual allegiance. This would come to cause a problem when, in 185 BCE, Megasthenes died and passed Bactria to his son, Dionysios, who proved to be somewhat less inclined to actually work with Gorgias. This would force Gorgias to campaign, with little success, against the Bactrians in 183 BCE. For now, however, the Polyphontic Kingdom and its alliance remained broadly united by a shared aim to topple Aristarchus, a goal which was very quickly achieved in a stunningly effective campaign in 186 BCE. By the end of the year, Gorgias 'Soter' was established in Seleukeia and had taken control of much of southern Mesopotamia. Soter himself would only stay in Seleukeia for a few weeks, apparently finding little to like in the burnt-out wreckage of the city and instead taking residence in Babylon which he would confirm as a new royal city in October of that year.

    While in Babylon, Soter, Gorgias I, and Megasthenes met for a war council to decide what to do about the advance of Argeus. For his part, Megasthenes seems to have been inclined to try their hand at negotiation. Possibly, he reasoned, Argeus could simply be bought off and a treaty dividing the Seleucid empire agreed upon. Most likely, Megasthenes had simply reached the end of what he really cared to be involved in; any further campaigns would do little to actually consolidate his position and only serve to strengthen Soter at the expense of Bactrian troops. At the very least, he argued, Bactrian soldiers should go no further and instead return east to protect against revolts. To his credit, Megasthenes seems to have truly thought that this war was simply a waste of the lives he was supposed to protect; he was governor of Bactria and these were his people who were dying in a war far from Bactra or Ai Khanoum for what was effectively a foreign ruler. Soter, however, wouldn't hear of it. Soter argued that the alliance between the three was key to securing their futures and to reuniting the kingdom of which they were all a part; de jure, all three remained parts of a greater Hellenistic empire and only by working together could they seek to reunify it. Note the difference. To Soter, he was king of the entire Seleucid empire, even if he was effectively now ruling a separate kingdom. As such, Bactria was de jure his subject and Megasthenes his governor. To Megasthenes, Bactria was de facto independent and his relationship with Soter one of allies rather than king and subject.

    In the end, however, neither Soter nor Megasthenes would have the chance to really bring this debate to a conclusion since, almost as soon as they had come to disagreement, they found themselves faced with Argeus bearing down upon them from the north. By the end of 186 BCE, Argeus was most likely in Europos further up the banks of the Euphrates where he would remain until early 185 BCE. It was in that year that Argeus made a decision for Soter, choosing to march straight to Babylon to take control of Mesopotamia. Argeus couldn't have known the mistake he had made; by marching on Soter, he effectively helped push back the division between the Bactrians and Soter, ensuring that his rival retained Bactrian support for longer. Had he waited, Argeus may well have seen a split between Soter and Megasthenes which might have been exploited. Regardless, Argeus simply could not have known about the breakages taking place within Soter's encampment when he marched at the beginning of 185 BCE. Crossing the river, Argeus made a beeline straight for Babylon itself, intending to take the city by storm and end Soter once and for all. For his part, Soter had no intention of waiting for Argeus to come and meet him and rushed out to confront him in the field.

    The result was a very complex campaign of moves and counter-moves as both kings attempted to gain traction against the other. Conventionally termed 'The Battle of Mesopotamia', it would take place over several weeks in early 185 BCE and prove to be a major turning point in the history of the Seleucid empire. As he marched, Argeus very quickly realised that he and his army was outclassed; in March or April 185 BCE, Argeus' cavalry met Soter's in the field and was routed with ease. Shortly afterwards, Argeus' main army found itself beset by Iranian horse archers which launched a series of devastating raids against his forces. As he attempted to keep going, Argeus found his advance slowed more and more by Soter's raids and attacks on his supply lines, forcing him to change tactics. Argeus' solution was honestly rather brilliant. Instead of continuing his march, he began fortifying local towns and villages along the Euphrates, turning them into small forts. He also sent diplomats to Arabian travellers on the other side of the Euphrates to bring food to the banks of the river where he could sail it across to his waiting soldiers. With his cavalry unable to actually breach the defences or starve Argeus out, Soter finally threw himself into an assault and right into the waiting arms of his enemy.

    In May, Soter's army arrived at Idu, the first town under Argeus' control and one which was heavily fortified against him. It was here that Argeus himself had, apparently, taken refuge, choosing to lead from the front so as to fight with his soldiers. A bold move but one which would, surely, get him killed. Soter knew the dispositions of Argeus' forces, spread out in a series of fortified towns along the Euphrates from which they had been unable to really leave without either crossing the river to Arabia and effectively retreating or fighting his cavalry. His scouts reported that the fortifications of the other towns were still manned and no movements had taken place. Argeus, it seemed, was hoping to simply beat back Soter's assault. When he arrived at Idu, that seemed initially to be the case; heavy fighting ensued and for several hours, Soter tried and failed to take the city. When he awoke the next morning, however, Soter found an astonishing sight; Argeus' food supplies were on fire and his soldiers were launching an attack. Having been told by their commander that they would either break free or die from starvation, Argeus' soldiers fought to the death, proving a much more difficult nut for Soter's armies to actually break. For hours, the fight raged on until, quite suddenly, news came; Argeus' army had appeared... behind him. The night before, Argeus had apparently taken a page out of Soter's own tactical playbook, sailing his soldiers down the Euphrates under cover of night and outflanking Soter's army. Between the desperation of the soldiers in Idu and the flanking manoeuvre, Soter's army began to rout.

    In the aftermath, Argeus pursued Soter for miles, running down many of his soldiers and capturing or killing thousands. With Soter's defeat, Argeus wasted no time in making his move. Sweeping southwards, Argeus left a contingent of some 12-13,000 soldiers to cut off the retreat of Soter's cavalry from northern Mesopotamia and sent a message to various communities along the Tigris that any which let Soter's Iranian cavalry return east would be destroyed once the campaign ended. Alongside this, he charged the forces left in northern Mesopotamia to garrison important bridgeheads and effectively trap Soter's remaining cavalry forces. In the meantime, Argeus himself led the rest of his army south towards Babylon. There, Soter attempted to make another stand but, without much of his cavalry force (which had been largely spread out in northern Mesopotamia since he believed Argeus' army to be mostly trapped), he was quickly outflanked and his forces defeated. By the end of 185 BCE, Babylon was under Argeus' rule and the war entered its second phase.


    The Upper Satrapies:

    In truth, much of the rest of the conflict between Argeus and Soter is lost to us. What we do know is that the battle for the Upper Satrapies was long and exhausting for both parties; Argeus and Soter fought a very lengthy conflict over the next few years in which both sides attempted to gain the upper hand. In 185 BCE, Megasthenes died and his son turned against Soter, encouraged in part by promises of continued Bactrian autonomy under Argeus' regime should he change sides. The result was that, from 184 BCE, the Bactrians were effectively in open revolt against Soter who made two failed attempts to break their power, defeated by mountain ambushes on both occasions. In the west, Argeus marched back north in 184 BCE and was able to convince many of Soter's cavalrymen to surrender in return for new lands in Mesopotamia and large gifts of gold and silver. Those that didn't surrender were soon boxed in and killed.

    In 183 BCE, Gorgias Soter and Argeus once again fought in western Iran but reached a stalemate, with neither side able to really break the other. It wouldn't be until 182 BCE, therefore, that Argeus would succeed in breaking through due, by and large, to pure luck. It turned out that, in the mountains, Soter was simply better prepared and more experienced, a fact which played against Argeus quite dramatically. In 183 BCE, Argeus was able to make no headway against Soter's defences, even when the king wasn't even present such as when he was off fighting Dionysios that same year. By sheer force of personality and prior preparation, Soter was able to hold the line against Argeus' best efforts throughout 183 BCE. What changed was simply that Soter died. In January 182 BCE, Soter dropped dead apparently out of nowhere. In truth, this may well not have been sheer luck and more like a simple case of poison, possibly by Argeus' own plans. Regardless, the death of Gorgias Soter effectively left the writing on the wall. His son, Polyphontes I, would reign for just over a year until he too was killed by an ambitious minister. Gorgias I would avenge his grandson and take over the Polyphontic kingdom for only two years until his own death in 180 BCE at the age of 59 when Argeus finally entered Sogdiana and executed him.

    See, the death of Soter effectively broke open the dam which he had been holding shut for a long time. Political rivalries, revolts, and dislike of Soter's own ruling family (and his own propensity for cruelty) had been pushed down by Soter's own force of personality and military strength. With his death, Polyphontes lacked the ability to keep everything together and it all just fell apart. Argeus almost certainly had a hand in this, exploiting political divisions to make a rapid series of advances and allying himself with Dionysios in 182 BCE in which Dionysios formally recognised Argeus as king in return for a guarantee of Bactrian autonomy going forward (a situation which would remain the same until the end of the Seleucid empire). Between them, Argeus and Dionysios were soon able to retake the upper satrapies... officially. In truth, it would take over a decade for Argeus to really secure the upper satrapies and there would be at least one Polyphontic resurgence when a revolt broke out in Persia in 175 BCE by a man claiming to be Soter's son who had survived the coup against him and gone into hiding.​
     
    Chapter Thirty-Nine
  • Chapter Thirty-Nine: The Empire Long Divided...

    The reign of Argeus I is, in some ways, a turning point. For the first time since 306 BCE (with the formal dissolution of Alexander's empire), the old Hellenistic empire was reunited under a single king. Finally, some 126 years later (counting from 180 BCE with the death of Gorgias I and the dissolution of the Polyphontic kingdom), a single Hellenistic king ruled from Greece in the west to Bactria in the east, from Sogdiana to Egypt and, nominally at least, even into Nubia. It was, at the time, the largest empire in the world and, under Argeus' rule, it would finally reach its political, economic, and cultural height. Of course, that wasn't due to happen right away and the first few years of Argeus' reign would prove... difficult in many ways. Of particular note was the continued issue of actually restabilising the Upper Satrapies and putting down pro-Polyphontic or otherwise secessionist tendencies. Amongst his many concerns was the large number of central Asian peoples who had moved into Sogdiana and Parthia over the last 30 years, many of whom had settled in Sogdiana but others of whom had come into the service of Gorgias I and II during the rise of the Polyphontic kingdom.

    Between 184 and 180 BCE, Argeus had started dealing with this problem by effectively trying to fold these same elements into his own armed forces, establishing a series of deals with different central Asian groups through which he could access their cavalry strength for his own benefits. This had worked wonders and, by the time of Gorgias I's death in 180, Argeus possessed a rather significant cavalry force. Iranian and Central Asian cavalry would continue to form a very significant part of Argeus' army in the years to come, even as he attempted to try and integrate the Ptolemaic and Seleucid military systems and manpower sources. Indeed, when Argeus fought the Romans during the 170s, his cavalry seems to have been as much as 60% Saka or Parni with another 20-30% being Persian and only a few being of Greek origin. Nevertheless, Argeus would continue to face sporadic raiding parties or uprisings through the Upper Satrapies for years to come, both in the form of Polyphontic resurgence movements (most famously the revolt of 175 BCE) and just others who disliked the encroachment of Argeus' power. Still, centralised power (as it were) in the upper satrapies would never quite be the same as it was under Antiochus II, especially in the furthest eastern regions such as Bactria and, indeed, Sogdiana which would remain as semi-autonomous satrapies throughout Argeus' reign. In particular, the satraps of Bactria, going forward, would often have to be treated with as being almost foreign kings and tended to not always obey the king's directives. With that said, this was a situation which would work well, at least under Argeus, as Bactria and Sogdiana continued to pay tribute and provide soldiers without the need for any direct interventionism and all the costs that would entail.

    At the local level, this was a situation which would allow Sogdiana and Bactria both to prosper under their respective dynasties. In the case of Sogdiana, the relevant dynasty is the so-called Anakletiads (named after the first satrap of Sogdiana after Gorgias I's death, Anakletos). Anakletos, a Greco-Egyptian general from Alexandria, would be placed in command of Sogdiana and would remain devoted to Argeus until his death in 167 BCE at which point Argeus gave command over to his son, Damianos, and, from there, Sogdiana came back under effectively dynastic rule. In Bactria, the Megasthenic dynasty continued under Dionysios and his descendants. Some people have suggested that what Argeus did here was a huge mistake and, in some ways, it is easy to see why. Effectively, Argeus was surrendering the royal ability to dictate who governed these two regions at will and reducing royal involvement to a rubber stamp of these dynastic lines. In the long run, this effectively strengthened regional powerbases and reduced royal authority quite dramatically. On the other hand, however, it also allowed reduced the expenditure and interventionism required in both regions. Certainly, under Argeus I and II, there seems to have been no break in trade routes to and from the centre of the empire and no point at which this situation prevented the king from marching through or into these lands with his armies. Seleucid judges continued to travel, laws were promulgated and we still see Seleucid letters popping up in cities through networks of benefaction. Indeed, if we were to go by epigraphic evidence alone, we could easily be fooled into thinking that nothing had changed.

    For example, two inscriptions, one in Ai Khanoum from the reign of Antiochus II (around 240 BCE) and another from Bactria during that of Argeus I are effectively identical and make no mention of local dynasts or powerholders in any way shape or form. The only clear break we see in tradition is that, from 210 or so onwards, we start to see other, local, benefactions in greater numbers. That is to say, these local dynasts begin to promulgate their own letters and benefactions in greater quantities and on larger scales than previously. Under Diomedes, Seleucid inscriptions die off, especially after 200 BCE, and only really pick up again in 182 with the earliest known Argeus I inscription in Bactria. What is also interesting is that, under Argeus I, no fewer than 53 inscriptions have been found across Bactria and Sogdiana, of which 31 are from the period between 180 and 170 BCE. It seems that this period saw extensive benefactions and royally funded building works across both satrapies shortly after Argeus' reconquest in the late 180s, probably as he attempted to consolidate his power and secure his rule. Certainly, Argeus would travel through the Upper Satrapies almost every year between 180 and 178 BCE, fighting several battles and generally trying to prop up his own control in the region.

    Alongside Sogdiana and Bactria, Persia was of real concern. This, of course, had been the powerbase of Gorgias Soter and many there still remained loyal to his cause. In 181 BCE, several of Soter's supporters were purged and both trials and 'sudden deaths' would continue throughout the early 170s. Some cities were banned from having walls and a series of new garrisons appear dotted around Persia from the 180s onwards. Perhaps the most drastic impact, however, was Argeus' forced relocation of several thousand Persians in 179 BCE and their movement to Syria. Many of these seem to have been bureaucrats with a few poets and other literary figures and the goal seems to have been largely to help strip some of the cultural 'power' of Persia and bring as many resources back to Syria as possible. Certainly, it was here that Argeus now attempted to create the very centrepiece of his empire. In 177 BCE, Argeus returned to Antioch where he set about repairing much of the damage caused by Aristarchus. Of note, he rebuilt damaged sections of the old Seleucus III-era library, repaired the walls and otherwise encouraged urban growth. In truth, Argeus left a reasonably small impact on Antioch beyond just repairing the damage of the last few decades at least in terms of direct royal building programmes. There are certainly some developments worth noting; the construction of a new shrine to Dionysus just outside of the royal necropolis as well as a brand-new 'Demetrium' to honour his adoptive father, the deceased prince Demetrios. Argeus is also said to have added a new wing to the palace complex. Perhaps the most dramatic addition, at least within the royal necropolis, was the construction of a monumental stoa across from the main entrance to the complex.

    Architecturally, the stoa is interesting. It was a two-story stoa (quite unusual in its own way) with two rows of columns in each level. On the ground floor, the columns were largely of the Corinthian order on the outside with thinner Ionic columns on the inside. On the upper level, the order was reversed with Ionic columns on the outside and a series of Corinthian columns on the inside. Entering the complex, a visitor would have been unable to see the tombs at first, hidden as they were by the stoa and were forced either to go around the structure or through it, entering the actual burial grounds through doorways at either end of the structure which would take visitors through low, dark, corridors until they emerged into the bright light of the necropolis and were confronted with the tombs of past Seleucid kings. This was important because it shows a very Hellenistic choice in playing with light and dark in contemporary architecture. That is to say that, for a visitor, the stoa effectively disguised the site until they, quite literally, emerged from the darkness into the bright sunshine and would be met with the grandeur of the old tombs. It also forced the visitor to reckon with the ideology and imagery of Argeus himself. The back wall of the stoa was brightly painted with images of mythological scenes taken from the stories of Dionysus (one of Argeus' own patron god and, as a conqueror of the 'east', a very relevant topic for the king), Herakles (another traveller and conqueror god and one quite popular amongst Argeus' soldiers) and, between both, Apollo the dynastic god of the Seleucids. Placed below these were captured shields and weapons given as dedications from all across the empire. It was, in effect, masterful propaganda. A visitor was not only faced with three gods relevant to Argeus' ideology (all of which he could claim descent from), but a clear reminder of his own many victories and of the sheer scale and diversity of those he had conquered.

    Within the complex itself, Argeus also took the time to spruce up the environment. The tombs themselves were reminiscent of old Macedonian tombs; large tumuli with buried architectural elements. They did, however, take things a good few steps further than the old Argead tombs. Of note was their sheer size, a good deal larger than most of the Argead tombs at Aigai and utilising architectural elements in a manner more reminiscent of certain 4th-Century tombs in Thrace rather than in Macedonia. Of course, this was not universal since tomb design had changed over time. For instance, Seleucus 'Nikator's' tomb, built around 179 BCE, is very reminiscent of the tombs at Aigai as are those of Antiochus I, Seleucus II and Antiochus II. From the time of Seleucus III onwards, we see tumuli being raised somewhat both through retaining walls and through positions on higher ground, forcing the visitor to literally climb up to them. This was not usually done in the tombs at Aigai (not deliberately anyway) but is seen in at least one 4th Century Thracian tomb. Exactly which tomb is which is not always clear to us; Tomb A has been positively identified as that of Antiochus II although any grave goods (and the body) are now lost. Tomb B has been suggested as being either Antiochus I or Seleucus II while Tomb C is, sometimes controversially, designated as that of Seleucus Nikator (although some have suggested it to be Antiochus I). Tomb F is the fourth of these 'early' tombs and must be either Antiochus I, Seleucus Nikator or Seleucus II depending on who you ask although it is the smallest of the tombs at the Antioch necropolis. Many of these seem to have been located directly behind the stoa itself, probably because they were built before the site itself was expanded under Argeus II.

    Tombs D and E are smaller, and have been positively identified as Seleucus III and Antiochus III respectively such that Tomb G, surprisingly a good deal bigger, is most likely that of Seleucus IV and was probably built by Argeus in the 180s or 70s. By this point, the old boundary of the necropolis was becoming limiting and Argeus I instituted the first expansion to the north around the same time at which he was building the tomb of Seleucus IV. At around the same time, Argeus erected a series of free-standing columns topped with relevant statues; Alexander the Great, Seleucus Nikator, Antiochus II and Apollo. Later, Argeus II would expand the complex dramatically to fit the tomb of his own father. Not far from the site was a second necropolis which has been termed the 'Queen's Necropolis' although the term is somewhat misleading. Here, a series of smaller tumuli were found which were traditionally designated being the tumuli of Seleucid queens. Several were most likely those of queens and Tomb 14 was positively identified as Apama, Seleucus 'Nikator's' wife a few years ago, but not all of them seem to have been. In 2018, archaeologists excavating at the site found a small shrine just outside of Tomb 11 which was identified as a Demetrium, leading to the conclusion that the occupant of Tomb 11 was most likely Demetrios himself. Certainly, literary sources confirm that Argeus paid tribute to both Prince Antiochus (his biological father) and Demetrios at Antioch upon first taking the city, suggesting that this secondary necropolis was reserved for Seleucid royal family members who were not kings.

    So why am I talking about this? Well aside from the fact that it is interesting, it has an interesting parallel to what Argeus did in Egypt. His building works on the royal necropolis in Alexandria would have to wait until the 160s and 50s but they were on a much smaller scale due to the more limited space (notably, the royal necropolis in Alexandria was inside the palace complex and, yes, was the burial place of Alexander). Here, Argeus erected another series of statues (although we don't know whether they were on columns) including one of Alexander identical to that in Antioch, Ptolemy I, Ptolemy II and Dionysus. Another series of statues would also be erected at Aigai including Alexander, Philip, Olympias (interestingly enough), and Heracles. These statues seem to have been an attempt to connect these three burial sites and begin to create a joined ideology of royal descent. Argeus' entire claim to power rested on him claiming ties to both the Seleucid and Ptolemaic royal families (and to the Argeads via the Ptolemies). This gave him potential descent from three gods and connections to a lot of powerful kings who were buried all over the place. As such, Argeus was trying to stamp his presence and image all across these burial sites, reinforcing the notion of his own descent from these powerful figures and tying their legacy intimately to himself.

    Outside of Antioch, Argeus actually had a much larger impact. Syria would see a series growth in population and urbanisation under Argeus, reaching perhaps as many as 6 million people by around 150 BCE. Antioch, of course, grew as did Seleukeia-on-Orontes and Apamea but population growth has been noted all across Syria and as far as Phoenicia. Sometime around 164 BCE, the city of Tyre would be 'refounded' as an official polis and, by this point, the city seems to have had quite an extensive Greek population alongside its Phoenician population. Of note, Argeus set about a series of major changes to the road networks in southern Syria and Judaea, working to rationalise and join the Ptolemaic and Seleucid road networks more thoroughly to promote trade and interactions. Ports were expanded along the Syrian coast and, through his authority over Cyprus, garrisons established on the island to help protect trade. In particular, Argeus seems to have been at great pains to ensure easy transport between Antioch and Alexandria, probably to help protect his position in Egypt even when he was away. What he never did was fully adjoin the political systems of both. It is interesting that, even in the reign of Argeus II, Cyprus and the Nesiotic League are still referred to as having ties with 'Egypt' or 'the Ptolemies'. At no point did Argeus ever truly attempt to create a uniform system of governance across both regions and, to some degree, Egypt and the Seleucid Empire seem to have been governed both separately and as a single empire. Certainly, the Romans seem to have viewed Argeus as ruling a single unified empire but Argeus' own documentation does not always support this. In Egypt, at least, Argeus still uses Ptolemaic and Egyptian titulary and there is no attempt to replace the old Ptolemaic administration.

    Indeed, during the early periods, we see very little cross-movement of administrators either. Anakletos, who took over Sogdiana in 180, is a very rare example of a Greco-Egyptian entering the Seleucid administrative system. While we do hear of a uptake in the numbers of people from Syria, Anatolia, and Central Asia in Egypt, there is no evidence that they were included in the Egyptian administrative system. In some of the more odd cases, we know that cities even in Asia Minor and Greece still paid allegiance to either the Seleucid Empire or Ptolemaic Egypt and Argeus himself doesn't seem to have attempted to really do anything about that since the result was effectively the same. What we certainly do see is a much greater ease (and volume) of movement between Egypt and, especially, Syria during this period. In the 150s, an author claimed that it was not uncommon for people to travel between Antioch and Alexandria on a frequent basis to the point at which he asks whether an Antiochean would have more in common with an Alexandrian than either would with Greeks living elsewhere in Syria or Egypt respectively. Indeed, during the reign of Argeus I, we begin to see references to an identity known as 'Antiochean', a distinct social identity comparable to the 'Alexandrians' of Egypt which would, under his successor, be a legally recognised identity separate from the population of Syria at large.

    Movement between major libraries seems to have been quite common under Argeus as well. Certainly, a flourishing industry of literary copying took place as copies of various books were made and moved, probably due to royal orders, between some of the Seleucus III-era libraries. This is, incidentally, confirmed by a note found in excavations near Oxyrhynchus and dating to around 167 BCE. The note in question (designated P. Oxy. 672) is a letter addressed to a scholar at the Library of Alexandria by the name of Irenaeus by a powerful local official enquiring about the arrival of 'those copies ordered from Ant[ioch]'. Incidentally, this same Irenaeus would later become the head of the library in 162 BCE and is known to have spent in Antioch, visiting both the king and library on several occasions. Later, a young Euphemios is known to have travelled extensively between Alexandria and Antioch and his work on the Siege of Tyre actually had two copies made from the outset, one for each library.

    This does not mean that Antioch was a capital city. Argeus, in fact, returned to the system of several 'royal cities' including Pella, Sardis, Seleukeia (refounded in 184 BCE), Babylon (because Seleukeia, in 180 BCE, was still small and badly damaged), Ecbatana and Alexandria amongst others. However, Antioch and Alexandria do appear in our sources as the most prominent of these although we should note that that is, in part, because they were the two main literary centres of the empire and produced a lot of written sources and thus have a certain bias in their perception. Still, the general centre of Seleucid power under Argeus does appear to have been largely based around the Levant, running up from Egypt to Syria, a region which absolutely flourished in the 2nd Century. Syria is the most dramatic example of growth but Judaea also seems to have seen some reasonably largescale development, partly because of Argeus' own good relationship with the Jewish population, a holdover from the Ptolemies who had also enjoyed good relations with the Jews, both in Judaea and in Egypt itself. Jewish soldiers continued to be an important part of Argeus' armies and it is said that he maintained a personal bodyguard comprised mostly of Jewish and Nubian soldiers from his own campaigns in Nubia in the 190s.



     
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