Somehow I don't see the Imperial Court, with its enormous entourage of servants and hangers-on, and its leaders reflexively accustomed to complete luxury, and its vast amounts of physical baggage, actually "disappearing" into wilderness or desert. Such a move would require willingness to abandon nearly all personal luxuries, and endure harsh conditions under the command of some strong-minded, realistic, and capable trail boss. This crowd is incapable of that.
The March of Time - 20th Century History
- Thread starter Karelian
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Somehow I don't see the Imperial Court, with its enormous entourage of servants and hangers-on, and its leaders reflexively accustomed to complete luxury, and its vast amounts of physical baggage, actually "disappearing" into wilderness or desert. Such a move would require willingness to abandon nearly all personal luxuries, and endure harsh conditions under the command of some strong-minded, realistic, and capable trail boss. This crowd is incapable of that.
True, the whole imperial clan and the exiled court isn't just going to disperse like a murder of crows. I'll edited the text accordingly.
Prince Tuan and his small entourage of trusted guardsmen together with his son Pujun (the Ch'ing heir presumptive) and Empress Dowager Longyu are no longer in the court. Where they are headed and what they are up to is a topic I'll deal later on.
Prince Tuan and his small entourage of trusted guardsmen together with his son Pujun (the Ch'ing heir presumptive) and Empress Dowager Longyu are no longer in the court. Where they are headed and what they are up to is a topic I'll deal later on.
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Glad to hear you like it
Fèng came to being in the last years when such a development was realistically possible in China, considering the rapid changes of Chinese society. By OTL 1911 revolution monarchy was firmly dead as a political option, but a decade earlier things were still considerably different.
Chapter 15: Reformers and revolutionaries - status and goals of different segments of Chinese elite
Reformers and revolutionaries - status and goals of different segments of Chinese elite
Experts, compradors and merchants
Western matters and contact to the outside world had been swiftly transforming China in the beginning of 20th century – and an emerging group of Chinese had embraced this change and the possibilities it promised. Whether they were officials or officially employed experts such as technicians (shen and kuan), middlemen and compradors in foreign trade (mai-pan) or ordinary merchants (shan), they found their employment and fortunes in the Treaty Ports, in the field of business and industry education and other forms of contact with the foreign powers and the outside world. Collaboration within this new element in Chinese society was frequent and common. Compradors were recruited among traditional merchant families, and were likely to become independent businessmen again upon leaving the service of their foreign employers. With the knowledge they had gained from these contacts they could also often find new jobs as official experts in government service. And official experts often found that their knowledge and skills enabled them to start successful businesses of their own. As a whole these groups constituted only a fraction of the upper stradas of Chinese society, and they allied themselves with the old elite to exert political influence. They could and did serve as advisors and were often themselves related to influential literati families, but in spring 1901 the true power was still firmly in the hands of traditionally trained men.
Literati
Ideologically the Confucian mandate and demands of continuation of traditional paternalistic rule were the key guidelines of the older, conservative members of this group. Even the most commonly stated overall goal - yung ju-sheng ling nung – “use the scholars to lead the peasants” was only a slogan rather than the basis of a unifying political program. Their political demands for reforms in China were linked to the traditional social roles of literati. As managers of religious and educational institutions, guilds and welfare and public services they formed the low-and middle-level bureaucracy that the new regime needed to administer and run the state. Being fed up with corruption and lack of opportunities, the younger and lower members of this group were especially vocal and active in their demands for reform. Yet different ties of friendship, origin and common teachers connected the younger and older generations of educated Chinese, and to a large degree this group shared generally similar worldview, assumptions and objectives in all corners of China in spring 1901. 90% of the members of local assemblies were nobility with only classical Confucian education, and while they lacked the foreign connections of their more economically oriented urban kin of the Treaty Ports, they were far from ignorant of the status of the world. A few of them had already chosen to further educate themselves with Western curriculum, and many families were seeking opportunities to send their younger sons to study abroad or in Western model academies. While lacking the muscle of military men and zeal of the new kind of revolutionaries, they knew that their support had been the primary reason why the Qing Wang Revolution had managed to topple the old dynasty rule in China so swiftly and decisively. Eagerly hoping that the new regime would meet their demands for reform, they were also closely watching and steering the development of Chinese internal affairs to directions that would retain their traditional position and prestige within the Chinese society.
Soldiers
The armies that chose to topple the monarchy and declare their support for the new dynasty were led by a new generation of officers. These commanders had started their military life in the campaigns against popular uprisings and rebellions fought in the later decades of the previous century. As organizers of militias and leaders of armies they had fought against Taipings, Niens, Muslims - and often Boxers as well. As a rule they also had official government degrees, and many had used military service as a mere stepping stone into the higher ranks of civilian bureaucracy, since even during the last years of the century positions within the hierarchy of civil officialdom were considered more valuable than military rank. By 1900 the southern viceroys had the support of two main military forces – the Self-Strengthening Army (Tzu-chi’ang chün) of Chang Chih-tung and Newly Created Army (Hsin-chien lu-chün) of Yuan Shih-k’ai. These armies were manned by Western-trained officers corps. Their officers knew how to read and write, and thus carried prestige due their high level of education and their technical understanding of Western methods and strategies. These military men were like their merchant and literati counterparts, and sought to modernize the military life in China. Keenly aware of the necessity of their support the new regime soon created plans for historical reforms in Chinese military matters.
Correctly identifying them as the strongest possible opposition to their new rule (and the power of new educated officer corps), the government declared that the traditional Manchu Banner Armies (pa-ch’i) would be gradually disbanded and replaced with a new Regular Army (Ch’ang-pei chün). As a part of this program the Lü-ying (Green Standard) forces would also be reorganized into guard and police militia battalions (hsun-fang ying), which would be tasked to maintain the peace by catching thieves and robbers, with wartime tasks of serving as auxiliary forces and support troops. New divisional structure was standardized to 12,500 men and officers, and these new formations would be supported by a new reservist system. 1st-call (Hsu-pei chün) and 2nd-call (Hou-pei chün) reservists forces would be created from soldiers who had served in the regular army for three years. Afterwards they would return home, and still receive salary in exchange being bound to participate to occasional drills. This group would form the 1st-call reserves. After four years they would be transferred to the 2nd-call reserve, which would receive less salary and less drills. Upon completing this second four-year term, they would be freed from further military duty. As a change of traditional recruitment policy, the new Regular Army wouldn’t accept just anybody to service. From now on only men of 20-25 years of age would qualify, provided that they were also in a good physical shape, resided in their native province and had a family. Further demands that decreed that all regional units should prefer local gentry as officials and local natives as soldiers were added in to ensure that the new provincial units would oppose any attempts of centralization, and instead remain primarily loyal to their local regional commanders.
Revolutionaries
The revolutionaries who had led the peasant armies that swept through southern China in the summer were a diverse and small group. They often had close links to secret societies, and many among them still held romantic views where secret societies were seen as guardians of popular Confucian values of righteousness and loyalty, and as repositories of a genuine Chinese identity. Baohuanghui, the umbrella organization of revolutionaries was led by Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, who had assumed this position upon the death of his teacher, K'ang Yu-wei. Liang, who had just recently returned to the country had lived two years in exile. Most of this time he had spent in Japan, and during his stay there he had immersed himself to Japanese literacy and books, which influenced his thinking profoundly. Upon returning to lead the Baohuanghui, his first efforts were focused on progress of reforms and preservation of the idea of a Chinese state. Stressing the need for civic solidarity, popular sovereignty, and loosely democratic institutions based on clear sense of the nation Liang influenced a whole generation of future Chinese leaders. According to his political views, the right kind of education and state intervention were critical to achieve civic nationalism, a pivotal component of any successful modern state. Liang pointed out that modern imperialism did no longer stem from traditional state power like the empires of old, but from nationalistic expansions of whole peoples. While he worked ardently to create a semblance of structure and order to the revolutionary ranks, he followed the advice his dearest Japanese friend, Kojô Teikichi, had given him when Liang headed back to his homeland: “You should not abolish the learning of the Classics, histories and ancient Chinese philosophers. The educational system of European countries also made use of their own national learnings as backbones.” Yet educational reforms and other ambitious goals of the revolutionary intellectuals were still far away in spring of 1901.
Everyone was making demands and hoping that the new Constituent Assembly would be able to meet and gather to session as soon as possible. But for now a new status quo was slowly taking shape in China. Local leaders performed a number of state functions on a regional level, and a new kind of alliance between gentry-literati minority and merchants ruled the richer provinces at the blessing of viceroys. Culturally the power of local elites still rested on the prestige gained from classical education and examination success of the literati minority, and was bolstered a combination of military power, landholding, commercial wealth from trade and usury combined with patronage of their client networks. This increasingly urban reformist elite was now swiftly creating a public sphere, as lifting of government censorship marked the beginning of dozens of new newspapers and journals, which in turn allowed the views previously expressed in private teahouse discussions to create a heated national debate about the kind of China the new regime should seek to create.
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Only time will tell if it is in any way feasible in the first place, as right now the whole system exists only in paper. Overally decentralization of power is the prime aim of nearly all influential groups, and unlike the postwar Ch'ing government of OTL, the new government aims to go along with this trend instead of trying to actively oppose it - not that it would have the muscles to do it in any case, since right now all available military forces are required for guard duties against possible foreign military incursions and further revolutionary or counter-revolutionary activities.
This decentralization, how will it look? Will the army for example be paid from the capital or locally or a combination of both?
oh, and I vote C
Chapter 16: Treaty of Peking
Treaty of Peking
“...The Chinese motive would be of course to escape from a capital too accessible to foreign pressure...The best way would be to find a Ming claimant and set him up “counter” at Nanking.”
R. S. Gundry in a telegram to Campbell, head of the Far Eastern Department at the Foreign Office in August 1900.[1]
The settlement that finally ended the Boxer War marked a new chapter in the history of foreign relations of China. In the protracted discussions which led to it in winter and spring 1900-1901, the Chinese representatives had followed a long-standing principle of preferring territorial integrity to equal treatment, and had been willing to make great sacrifices to avoid even worse results. For the new Chinese government the international conference at Peking had additionally been an ideal occasion for the inauguration of their ambitious pledges of national progress "under the enlightened guidance and friendly assistance of the non-aggressive Powers." For the new regime led by the viceroys the course was clear, and toadying diplomacy towards the foreign Powers was merely a way to keep the barbarians at bay. From their point of view, they had now proven once and for all that the center of stability and trade in postwar China and the vital forces of the Chinese people would be located on the Yangtse, and not in Peking.
For their part the compromise the Powers had finally reached among themselves had left none of them entirely satisfied. The joint occupation of Peking and Russian and French advantages to Manchuria and Yunnan had sharpened international rivalry, and caused the Powers to fear conflict among themselves and the subsequent end of Open Door policy of equal trade opportunities. It was thus primarily the general international desire to reduce tensions in the Far East that led to an agreement where reparations from the Chinese authorities were primarily sought in increased facilities and concessions for trade rather than by direct money indemnities. The powers agreed that while suitably harsh, the indemnities should ultimately be limited in nature and no burden imposed on the new government of China should be severe as to endanger her stability or future progress. This conclusion was not a sign of general goodwill towards China - the alternative of a breakup of China was simply far more alarming than the idea of securing future collaboration of a new reformist-minded regime.
Signals supporting a change of policy from general punishments towards a more conciliatory settlement had been raised more and more frequently after it was increasingly certain that Ch'ing dynasty had truly been toppled. In November 1900 Lord Balfour had declared in Parliament that the British government would "gladly" support the new Chinese regime in the promotion of measures for the development of China and opening of trade.[2] During spring the American consul in Shanghai had secretly urged Chang Chih-tung to press his views on a reduced indemnity through the official Chinese plenipotentiaries at the conference table and promised him American support, stating that the United States was primarily interested in administrative reforms and removal of obstacles to foreign trade. In the end Chang and other viceroys were promoting ideas directly based on a memorandum Minister Rockhill had drawn up. Among the list were the abolition of likin, the internal trade tax, the opening of Chinese interior territories to foreign trade and residence, the improvement of regulations for waterway navigation and mining industry, and assurances of China's strict adherence to the principle of equal opportunity to people of every nationality.[3]
At the start of negotiations French Foreign Minister Delcassé had sent a circular[4] to Western diplomats, summarizing and confirming “what he had found to be the general accord of Powers in regard to China":
1.) Guarantee the welfare of foreign nationals residing in the country.
2.) Maintenance of territorial status quo.
3.) Guarantees against repetition of anti-foreign uprisings.
His three-point list received official diplomatic confirmation from all the other powers, and thus set the tone for the actual negotiations. As disappointing as it was to the most feverish armchair imperialists in Europe, the official international reactions to suchs demands for the integrity of China were bound to be positive. Though strained by the war, the international conditions had not deteriorated to a level where any of the Powers could have publicly admitted plans of establishing new colonies to Chinese territory without finding herself opposed by her former allies. And since interests of Powers were territorially dispersed through China, in case of partition many valuable holdings would have most likely been lost to their rivals. In the previous years the dash for concessions had made it impossible to carefully calculate their value, and now it was still too early to determine and decide which areas would be worth retaining. And though parts of her armies had been driven from the field and her capitol sacked, China was still a colossus, and after months of difficult campaigning the prospect of having to control the vast and often hostile local population was enough to make even the most daring imperialists to reconsider their options. As the situation in Europe was becoming increasingly tense, European powers sought to avoid costly complications in Far Eastern diplomacy and opted for a solution that promised them economical benefits and still enabled them to represent the outcome as yet another victory of Western civilization over Asiatic barbarism.
“Securing foreign rights as treaty ports by adequate foreign concessions, either as an international settlement or as separate concession to the interested nations, but not by forcibly acquisition.” The official view of Roosevelt administration was typical to the attitude of all Powers at the time[5], and at the end of negotiations the map of China was indeed transformed, even though her official borders were still intact. Nearly all major regional cities through the country were now regarded as treaty ports. Economically the balance of power within China was also shifting towards southeast: in the payment of the indemnities finally agreed upon, the share of provinces that had seen the worst of the Boxer troubles in northern China was disproportionately heavy. The surprising leniency in final indemnities had much to do with the lobbying that the merchant communities residing in China had done back in the Europe. This was especially true for Britain. The influential China Association had been traditionally controlled by the powerful representatives of the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank and Jardine, Matheson & Co, and their representatives back in London had been busily lobbying in the press, Parliament, Chambers of Commerce through the winter. For these influential supporters of the ideas of “gentlemanly capitalism”, the true enemy in China had always been the backwardness of the official regime. The downfall of Ch'ing dynasty was from their point of view a golden opportunity, and they strongly urged their government to secure her traditional interests in the region by supporting the new regime against the Continental competitors and would-be imperialists by any means necessary.
As the viceroy with best international connections and diplomatic experience, Li Hung-chang was selected as the interim Premier of the new government. Diligent and cunning, he was able to steer the Fèng government through the scheming at Peking negotiations with notable skill.
The question of Manchuria - Russia changes course
As the Treaty of Peking was being finalized, leaders of Russian foreign policy pondered their options in the new situation. From the outset, the Russian position seemed strong. The railway north from Taku to Shanhaikuan was still occupied by Russian troops “by right of conquest”, and they had recently denied British rights over the railway under the Anglo-Russian railway agreement. In the current situation Minister Witte preferred to return Shanhaikuan-Yingkow railway to Chinese - and thus indirectly British - ownership, and withdraw Russian troops to the eastern side of the Liao River. As the guiding spirit of Russian diplomacy in the Far East he now sought to preserve his own railway empire while being adamant on his view that annexation of Manchuria would not be solution to the problems in the area. Thus he concluded that complete administrative and military evacuation was essential, and that railway guards would be enough to ensure the railways security. In essence Witte proposed a return to pre-Boxer situation.
General Kuropatkin did not agree. He wanted to withdraw from southern Manchuria, which he considered indefensible in the light of recent troubles. But Kuropatkin argued that the Boxer War had proven that the Amur river was an unsatisfactory frontier, and that Russia should seek to secure the Eastern Chinese Railway more firmly by turning northern Manchuria into a province that would be nominally subject to China, but in practice under Russian influence on the same lines as the state of Bokhara. In order to avert international opposition to such steps, he recommended the immediate restoration of Fengtien and part of Kirin to Chinese control while holding on temporarily to the north. While Kuropatkin was certainly a solid supporter of Russian expansionism and believed that armies and railways were the best ways to achieve results, he was ultimately a cautious professional soldier and wanted to avoid unnecessary trouble with other Powers. Command of the international relief force had also grown his prestige at home and abroad considerably, and he wasn't shy to use it to affect the opinion of czar Nicholas II in order to promote his foreign policy agenda in Manchuria.[6]
As the views of Witte (who always hated counter-proposals on principle) and Kuropatkin now clashed, the third member of the triumvirate had the final say in the matter. Count Muraviev sought to find a common ground, and together with Kuropatkin and Witte they agreed that instead of large indemnities Russia would seek further economic concessions in Manchuria. As Muraviev and Izvolski were both eurocentrics in their outlook, they preferred to secure a solution to Far Eastern Questions now instead of leaving the matter be, since that would only give time for the independent-minded Russian frontier officials to stir up further trouble.[7] By vigorously defending his corner in foreign affairs, Muraviev was able to steer Russian foreign policy away from collision course with the other Powers in southern Manchuria.
When it all came down to settling down the actual details, Li Hung-chang and Izvolski were able to achieve success relatively quickly based on these outlines.[8] When Li presented the matter to other viceroys, he suggested them to approve the deal Russia was representing. He reminded them that Russia had no commercial interests or missionaries in China - she was out for territorial aggrandizement and military expansion, and had the advantages of geography and brute force to impose her wishes if needed. Thus it would be best to keep on her good side and sign the agreement regarding Manchuria as quickly as possible. In the end China agreed to protect the Russian-dominated Chinese Eastern Railway together with Russian railway guards. And to make sure that the move would avoid foreign suspicion of Russian ultimate intentions, the Russian negotiation team led by Izvolski agreed when the Chinese government (eager to play one barbarian against another) publicly promised Britain, Germany, the United States, Japan and other Powers equal commercial rights in Manchuria according to the Open Door policies.
This move, while strongly opposed by many factions in Russia had a calming effect in northern China, where the tensions caused by the presence of strong Russian armies in Manchuria had alarmed other powers, and especially Japan. Upon hearing the news of Russian guarantees for Open Door in Manchuria, Japanese Prime Minister Itō remarked:
"Russia has considerable interests in Manchuria, and it is legitimate for her to protect them. During last years troubles, she was the only one to send troops and maintain order in this part of China. She thereby helped the other Powers, limiting the area where their troops had to intervene. If she continues to maintain order in northern Manchuria without hindering the commercial development of other nations, Japan will be able to safeguard her interests, in spite of the presence of military forces."
When he returned to his his post in Tokyo, Izvolski soon found out that his role in the Peking negotiations and evacuation of southern Manchuria had raised his status in the eyes of Japanese officials, who had earlier viewed him much less favourable than his predecessor, Rosen. This would have long-reaching consequences as the ambitious diplomat started another scheme count Muraviev had authorized him to do as soon as he returned to Japan. As both diplomats agreed, it was time to secure the new status quo in Far East by agreements that would enable Russia to focus on matters of Europe...
[1-5] All OTL.
[6] Proposals of Witte and Kuropatkin are both from OTL. But whereas Kuropatkin and Witte were opposed Admiral Alekseyev in OTL, here his influence has been considerably reduced due the failure to seize Taku forts in summer 1900 and because he did not have have the command in Manchuria.
[7] Unlike OTL Lamsdorf, who failed to hold firm with his views and was quickly sidelined by military men, creating the impression that Russian foreign policy was run by her military. This created deep international mistrust to future Russian diplomatic efforts in China.
[8] And without the ill-fated Tseng-Alekseyev draft agreement the foreign powers are less suspicious of Russian intentions and don't mount united opposition as per OTL. The final agreement is close to the OTL one that Li wanted to sign just before his death.
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Russia and Japan both may want to have a status quo but Japan's natural expansion path is through Korea, that is if they want to expand more. Russia can focus on Europe, the Balkans and Poland, but Japan have few avenues of expansion. Sure, with increased influence in Southern China they may not want to expand more and status quo will be held.
Oh, I'm enjoying this. I'm having to read up on the Sino-Japanese war at the moment for my master's, and there's lots of good stuff there about just how paranoid everyone was that the Russians were coming south...
At the moment provincial-level funding seems more likely given the high level of autonomy viceroys have gained.
Nishi-Rosen Agreement is the basis where they will start to look for common ground.
You will most likely like the next updates then.
So if Japan is content with economic dominance but no or close to none military presence there will be no problems. Perhaps that is enough for Japan, perhaps not.
Japan is mostly conserned of her security in territories viewed as her "Near Abroad" in Korea and Manchuria, with economical issues in Korea being also increasingly important to her growing economy. ITTL Russians, while still acting harshly, have so far avoided most of the early blunders they did in Manchuria in OTL.
Then again there are also plenty of people on both sides who'd prefer to solve the matter by military means if necessary.
A.
Finish that little arc for the moment, then you can swing through to somewhere else.
Finish that little arc for the moment, then you can swing through to somewhere else.