Chapter 21: Early Naval rearmament:
The Navy had prepared for re-expansion since 1925 and had expanded from the laying down of 5 light cruisers in 1929. The expansion which followed had been discussed between Erich Raeder and Adolf Hitler in 1928. Hitler had come to Eric Raeder to assure him that the NSDAP decision not to back the construction of panzerschiffe, but instead 5 light cruisers was not a demotion of the Reichsmarine, but rather his honest opinion that the original plans did not go far enough. Hitler had urged Erich Raeder to consider a navy which would one day be facing Great Britain as in the last war and consequently laid a plan integrating not only the strongest possible expansion of the German navy, but also a plan which went to great lengths to hide its true purpose and mislead with regards to the real possibilities. As it became clear after the 1930 election that Hitler would be dictating future rearmament, Erich Raeder and the Reichsmarine had organized accordingly for when the Nazis came to power.
Consequently, the Reichsmarine could immediately in May 1932 initiate works into the naval base infrastructure, including longer slipways, drenching of harbors and canals and ordering of accessory ships such as logistics ships, minesweepers and E-boats. Steel mills, gun pits, turbine and diesel manufacturers had either already been expanding or were prepared to do so as the pre-planned orders went out.
The construction of two large drydock’s of 300 m’s was also starting construction in Kiel and Hamburg, in addition to the massive drydocks in existende in Wilhelmshafen and the future construction of 4 large liners for the German passenger ship industry was announced to explain this necessity for these expansions*.
As indicated, a number of naval gun designs had been prepared and more profoundly, a new ship design philosophy had been developed. Implementing it was one of the most keenly watched and secretive programs. This was directly related to Hitlers strategic emphasis on threatening Britain, but without letting them know in advance. For this reason, only a few people had the overall overview of the new designs.
Hitler overall naval political strategy was to mislead Britain by capitalizing on his long-standing opposition to the treaty of Versailles. His plan thus were to buy time by claiming to adhere to the treaty of Versailles and restore credibility afterwards by acknowledging the break of the treaty of Versailles, but not other international promises and agreements. Germany was bound by the treaty to not make more than 6 ships of 10000 tons, but Hitler’s Germany did not recognize this treaty and because of it was not bound by any other treaties. In fact, they had tried to become bound by the international naval limitations treaty, but denied the opportunity by the French. Hitler’s overall plan from the moment he came to power was to rapidly rearm, and while he would never refute his pre-election point of view that the Versailles treaty was invalid, he would only officially admit non-adherence to the treaty of Versailles when it was obvious that he was breaking it. In particular, Hitler intended to postpone this moment and appear to pose as little a threat as possible for as long a time as possible, in the hope that he could prevent Britain and France from opposing him together. For this reason all of the initial naval activities were unofficial and initial naval buildings of war ships were shrouded in cover names and official orders for civilian ships. Also, direct stimulation of new constructs of liners and oil tankers (justified by the real increasing demand for oil in the agricultural sector) were provided to justify the very obvious buzz of activity at the ship yards.
The undeniable symbol of this rearmament, the 6 10000 tons ships which Germany admitted to have laid down was the most controversial. Dangerous surface raiders and submarines were counterproductive to Hitler’s official policy and the plans were therefore heavily intertwined with deception, lies and counterespionage.
For the Panzerschiffe, the problem emerging from the originally proposed, but postponed designs was that they would be vulnerable to conventional heavy cruisers, to slow to follow the battleship designs intended as follow ups and were not up to date considering the experiences the Germans had acquired from their naval base at Odessa in the Soviet Union. The ships needed stronger armor, in particular deck armor against aircraft as well as speed, and this could simply not be kept within the 10-12000 tons limit. Eventually, it was decided to focus on the requirements and create something which would be part surface raider and part expendable battle cruiser in the battle line. The real design would come in at 200 m’s and 18000 tons, and therefore it was originally decided to officially order the construction of 6 10000 tons 2x3 8’’ Ostsee (Baltic Sea) cruisers with a shallow draft and then as the Versailles treaty was officially rejected, acknowledge that the ships had come in overweight at 13000 tons. This admission would still be cheating regarding the draft and would thus hide their true capabilities in speed, armor and range, but the Versailles treaty would justify the used deception. The actually intended 2x3 13,5´´ turrets would only be installed at a later time, which goes to testify that Hitler was willing to pay the price of additional turrets for the gain of deception. The initially installed 2x3 8´´ turrets would, even with the addition of a spacer to fit the barbettes of the larger 3x13.5’’ turrets, be very spacious and they would serve as installation test-beds for rapid autoloading systems, with the intentions to reuse these at a later time.
Secondary guns would have to be DP 150 mm guns. There was no question that the Reich’s future enemy would have superior number in destroyers and light cruisers and it was critical that the rapid-firing german secondaries could match the cruisers and out-gun the destroyers. On the other hand, the navy anticipated wide-spread use of naval aviation and the importance of the ability to engage enemy dive bombers and torpedo bombers could not be overstated. The loading system for rapid sustained fire had been under development since the late 1920’s, but was not fully developed yet in 1932. This resulted in rather poor heavy AA defenses with a slow rate of fire of about 8 rounds/min, but design compromises to accommodate 2 gun categories were avoided. Despite the inadequate testing of this new system, Hitler allowed it to go ahead, because it could be compensated for AA defense with lavish installment of fully automatic 37 and 20 mm FLAK cannons. The 1932 designs including both 37mm, 150 mm and 206 mm guns consequently had Germany committed to a continuous development path for gun auto-loading.
Also, in 1932, the orders were secretly placed for the new guns, steel and engines for a next generation of battleships. These would come to feature 40´´ 50/49 caliber guns with a pre-planned design feature to bore out the gun from 406 to 420 mms. It was expected that such guns and newly developed APCBC shells could ensure penetration at longer ranges. This was seen as beneficial as the next generation of German ships would by necessity be constructed to incorporate stronger deck armor and better torpedo protection against aircraft, both features which would help against underwater near-misses and deck penetrating shells. This priority was in turn a consequence of the new navy’s own intention to rely of the ship killing capabilities of aircraft and the expectation that the opposition might do the same. Accordingly, the new battleships with these attributes were heavily influenced by this requirement as combined heavy deck armor, speed, range and large guns which would optimally require massive ships. The compromise that was struck reduced the number of heavy guns, but not the caliber, as Hitler personally liked the more impressive heavy guns (cf. Design posted below). Furthermore, the emphasis of very heavy shells, speed and large numbers of DP guns to prevent interference from destroyers would allow the Germans to choose which battles to fight and they had the option of trying their luck outside the range of the opposing forces. As part of the deception it was also intended that the battleships might initially claim to be designed as 3x3 13.5 inch ships at 35000 tons, when in fact they were to be 3x2 40 inch ships at 45000 tons and the 13.5 inch guns were intended for the Panzerschiffe.
Also in 1932, the naval shipyards would receive orders for new destroyers and be told to expect new orders. Initially 6 were ordered for completion in 1934 and 6 in 1935 with the expectation that 6 new destroyers would be needed annually from 1936. These destroyers would all receive combined diesel and steam propulsion. Mann Diesel had been expecting this request and the Panzerschiffe and battleship requests since 1930 and received funding to increase capacity.
Submarines were easily the most controversial point, but the initial designs were nothing special. Crude designs intended to be quickly produced so training could commence and expertly camouflaged (as regular warehouses, factories) with submarine pens constructed inland adjacent to rivers to hide their numbers.
A next generation of submarine designs were subsequently called for and like for the panzership design teams, heavy surveillance of the teams were applied by Heydrichs Sicherheitsdienst. Crucially, this led to the apprehension of Otto Krueger. Otto Krueger had been an SIS agent since WW1 and had high reliability**. Upon his apprehension he was turned into a double agent and his handlers in the Netherlands identified. During the next couple of years two more double agents were allowed to be recruited by the British who now received constructed intelligence on surface warships and naval aviation capabilities. Credibility of this deception was initially high as it was decided to leak the later official, but still falsified displacement of 13000 tons of the new classes of Panzerships through this network before Germany admitted to have violated the Treaty of Versailles.
A subject which was initially postponed was the attempt to make aircraft carriers. Following their own experiences in Odessa, the marine saw aircraft as pivotal in the future. Hitler was however not convinced that the KM knew what they were doing and instead sent a delegation to Japan to gain inspiration for a fleet carrier. They would remain there for two years and participate in exercises and carrier operations before a fleet carrier design was submitted in 1934. Rather than building their own fleet aircraft carrier, the Kriegsmarine supported Loyds shipping in the construction of 4 liners of 22000 tons each***. These were designed with more compartmentalization than usual on civilian hips and prepared for the later addition of torpedo bulges. A low strength deck would allow the later removal of the superstructure and addition of a hangar and flight deck. These ships would be fitted with combined diesel and steam propulsion to enable a speed of 30 knots. When the ships were commissioned in 1935, the CODAS arrangement was heralded as a showcase of German technology which allowed Loyds shipping to either use the same liners for either weekly cross-atlantic trips and for very long-distance Asiatic trips.
The simultaneous ordering of 6 heavy cruisers, 4 ocean liners prompted a reassessment of the German shipbuilding capacity for larger ships which was enhanced with enlargement of 2 slipways at Howaldtswerke Hamburg and Howaldtswerke Kiel****. The official intention was that two more ocean liners would be ordered from Howaldtswerke Hamburg and Howaldtswerke Kiel in 1934.
*The German naval expansion and its rapidity, while officially within ToV limits does not go unnoticed abroad. Foreign reactions will be covered in a later chapter.
**Importance of Otto Krueger:
https://books.google.dk/books?id=O0mEDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA102&lpg=PA102&dq=Otto+Kruger+submarine&source=bl&ots=QMwRAwsc1y&sig=HDDssVRo5zGuGmDnisMX4nwwXIM&hl=da&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi2ouzNx9PYAhXmC5oKHXnaB2sQ6AEIVjAI#v=onepage&q=Otto%20Kruger%20submarine&f=false
***Enlargement of the admirals classes of OTL
****[Slipway capacity in the 20000/200+ m’s class. Number of large slipways in parenthesis:
(3) AG Weser (Deschimag) Bremen: (launched Bremen of 286 m and 51000 tons), had slipways for simultaneous building of 2 admirals class liners and 20000 tons Terje Viken at the same time. Many destroyer sized vessels build simultaneously.
(2) Reichsmarinewerft Wilhelmshaven: Build Tirpitz. 2 battleships build at a time before WW1
Expanding to two 300 m ships.
(2) Blohm and Voss Hamburg: Build RMS Majestic of 291 m’s and 56000 and Leviathan simultaneously. Also Bismarck.
(2) Germania Werft Kiel: Major U-boat producer in WW1 and WW2. Slipways for building 2 BB’s at the time during WW1. Order for 816 feet battlecruiser during plan Z.
(2) Deutsche Werke Kiel: Build the Gneisenau, Blücher and the Graf Zeppelin and were designated for a H-39 BB under plan Z. Graf Zeppelin and Blücher were on the slipways at the same time. Blücher spent only 10 month on the slipways
Howaldtswerke Hamburg: Smaller ships, less than 200 m’s documented at the time. Expanding to build 200+ m liner
Howaldtswerke Kiel: Smaller ships, less than 200 m’s documented at the time. Expanding to build 200+ m liner
[Overall, the driver for a change from OTL is the early reinstallment of the emperial design agencies, the continuous research into large diesels and combined diesel and steam (CODAS) propulsion plants since the mid-20’s and the formation of a German naval aviation base in Odessa in the early 1920’s. The potential of the propulsion system for high speed and long range appealed to TTL Hitler while it had the in-build fall-back position, that it would always be as good as combined diesel or steam (CODOS) used in the German navy IOTL. The diesel focus has led to pronounced performance improvements that will have even higher impact on the German destroyers and escorts. The importance of the naval aviation base in Odessa cannot be overestimated. That experience, in essence about of Germany’s total interwar aviation experience, coupled with an emphasis on aircraft in the general reformation of the Wehrmacht leads them to believe in a future with powerful air borne torpedoes and armor piercing bombs. That has the knock-on effect that the Germans require greater bomb and torpedo protection which is difficult to maintain with their very long armored belts. Heavier deck armor combined with better targeting systems, makes it logical to consider fighting naval battles at longer ranges as a way of getting a decisive edge. Notably, the Germans are unaware that American and British designs are also preparing for longer ranged engagements event though and this design philosophy only becomes decisive with the later adjunct of radar guided gun-laying.
The audacity in the German designs ITTL stems from the peculiar limbo of German treaty adherence ITTL and IOTL. Germany is bound by ToV which it almost officially don’t respect and have not been able to be accepted into other treaties. Hitler therefore can use France as the reason why he has to lie on the Deutschland class ships and come (semi)clean when he decide to refute the ToV. He sticks with the 8’’ guns for the first ships to calm authorities abroad and they will even be installed, all the while 13,5’ and 16’’ guns are being build as the real guns for the Deutschlands and BB’s. The 13,5’’ guns are next envisioned as Germany’s official battleship guns while the 16’’ guns are kept secret and if exposed are for coastal installations.
The original 8’’ guns and turrets is a cost of deception that TTL Hitler is willing to pay, and they may later find use on a future generation of heavy cruisers.
Below, please find the Shipsharp of the official Deutschland class design and the unofficial real design (please consider the engine slide does not work and actual performance of engines at the stated weight is about twice as high. The official speed of the fake design is 32 knots and the unofficial speed of the real ship is 31,3 knots. Range is about double when going exclusively on diesels. At that speed they are slightly wet ships:
Alt Deutschland class, Germany Heavy cruiser laid down 1932
Displacement:
9.276 t light; 10.023 t standard; 12.585 t normal; 14.635 t full load
Dimensions: Length (overall / waterline) x beam x draught (normal/deep)
(649,30 ft / 623,36 ft) x 59,06 ft x (22,97 / 25,83 ft)
(197,91 m / 190,00 m) x 18,00 m x (7,00 / 7,87 m)
Armament:
6 - 8,11" / 206 mm 45,0 cal guns - 269,01lbs / 122,02kg shells, 200 per gun
Breech loading guns in turret on barbette mounts, 1933 Model
2 x 3-gun mounts on centreline ends, evenly spread
1 raised mount - superfiring
10 - 5,91" / 150 mm 45,0 cal guns - 103,86lbs / 47,11kg shells, 500 per gun
Dual purpose guns in turret on barbette mounts, 1933 Model
6 x Single mounts on sides, evenly spread
2 x 2 row twin mounts layout not set
2 raised mounts
16 - 1,46" / 37,0 mm 45,0 cal guns - 1,57lbs / 0,71kg shells, 1.000 per gun
Breech loading guns in deck mounts, 1933 Model
8 x Twin mounts on centreline, evenly spread
8 raised mounts
32 - 0,79" / 20,0 mm 45,0 cal guns - 0,24lbs / 0,11kg shells, 3.000 per gun
Breech loading guns in deck mounts, 1933 Model
8 x Quad mounts on centreline, forward deck aft
8 raised mounts
Weight of broadside 2.685 lbs / 1.218 kg
Armour:
- Belts: Width (max) Length (avg) Height (avg)
Main: 3,94" / 100 mm 360,89 ft / 110,00 m 9,84 ft / 3,00 m
Ends: 0,79" / 20 mm 229,66 ft / 70,00 m 9,84 ft / 3,00 m
32,81 ft / 10,00 m Unarmoured ends
Main Belt covers 89 % of normal length
- Torpedo Bulkhead - Additional damage containing bulkheads:
1,38" / 35 mm 360,89 ft / 110,00 m 16,40 ft / 5,00 m
Beam between torpedo bulkheads 52,49 ft / 16,00 m
- Gun armour: Face (max) Other gunhouse (avg) Barbette/hoist (max)
Main: 4,72" / 120 mm 3,15" / 80 mm 3,15" / 80 mm
2nd: 1,57" / 40 mm 0,79" / 20 mm 0,79" / 20 mm
4th: 0,79" / 20 mm 0,79" / 20 mm -
- Armoured deck - multiple decks:
For and Aft decks: 3,15" / 80 mm
Machinery:
Oil fired boilers, steam turbines, plus diesel motors,
ERROR: Revise drives, 3 shafts, 61.568 shp / 45.930 Kw = 28,65 kts
Range 10.500nm at 19,00 kts
Bunker at max displacement = 4.612 tons
Complement:
593 - 772
Cost:
£3,914 million / $15,657 million
Distribution of weights at normal displacement:
Armament: 776 tons, 6,2 %
- Guns: 776 tons, 6,2 %
Armour: 2.373 tons, 18,9 %
- Belts: 646 tons, 5,1 %
- Torpedo bulkhead: 302 tons, 2,4 %
- Armament: 410 tons, 3,3 %
- Armour Deck: 1.015 tons, 8,1 %
Machinery: 1.794 tons, 14,3 %
Hull, fittings & equipment: 4.333 tons, 34,4 %
Fuel, ammunition & stores: 3.309 tons, 26,3 %
Miscellaneous weights: 0 tons, 0,0 %
Overall survivability and seakeeping ability:
Survivability (Non-critical penetrating hits needed to sink ship):
20.650 lbs / 9.367 Kg = 77,4 x 8,1 " / 206 mm shells or 3,3 torpedoes
Stability (Unstable if below 1.00): 1,07
Metacentric height 2,6 ft / 0,8 m
Roll period: 15,4 seconds
Steadiness - As gun platform (Average = 50 %): 79 %
- Recoil effect (Restricted arc if above 1.00): 0,96
Seaboat quality (Average = 1.00): 1,59
Hull form characteristics:
Hull has a flush deck,
an extended bulbous bow and a cruiser stern
Block coefficient (normal/deep): 0,521 / 0,539
Length to Beam Ratio: 10,56 : 1
'Natural speed' for length: 24,97 kts
Power going to wave formation at top speed: 49 %
Trim (Max stability = 0, Max steadiness = 100): 50
Bow angle (Positive = bow angles forward): 30,00 degrees
Stern overhang: 9,84 ft / 3,00 m
Freeboard (% = length of deck as a percentage of waterline length):
Fore end, Aft end
- Forecastle: 30,00 %, 27,89 ft / 8,50 m, 22,97 ft / 7,00 m
- Forward deck: 30,00 %, 22,97 ft / 7,00 m, 19,69 ft / 6,00 m
- Aft deck: 20,00 %, 19,69 ft / 6,00 m, 18,04 ft / 5,50 m
- Quarter deck: 20,00 %, 18,04 ft / 5,50 m, 19,69 ft / 6,00 m
- Average freeboard: 21,42 ft / 6,53 m
Ship space, strength and comments:
Space - Hull below water (magazines/engines, low = better): 76,6 %
- Above water (accommodation/working, high = better): 163,4 %
Waterplane Area: 25.005 Square feet or 2.323 Square metres
Displacement factor (Displacement / loading): 150 %
Structure weight / hull surface area: 110 lbs/sq ft or 539 Kg/sq metre
Hull strength (Relative):
- Cross-sectional: 0,95
- Longitudinal: 1,59
- Overall: 1,00
Excellent machinery, storage, compartmentation space
Excellent accommodation and workspace room
Ship has slow, easy roll, a good, steady gun platform
Excellent seaboat, comfortable, can fire her guns in the heaviest weather
Actual planned Deutschland design:
Deuschland, Germany Panzerschiffe laid down 1930
Displacement:
13.225 t light; 14.642 t standard; 18.215 t normal; 21.073 t full load
Dimensions: Length (overall / waterline) x beam x draught (normal/deep)
(645,14 ft / 626,64 ft) x 71,16 ft x (27,23 / 30,52 ft)
(196,64 m / 191,00 m) x 21,69 m x (8,30 / 9,30 m)
Armament:
6 - 13,58" / 345 mm 45,0 cal guns - 1.403,62lbs / 636,67kg shells, 150 per gun
Breech loading guns in turret on barbette mounts, 1930 Model
2 x 3-gun mounts on centreline ends, evenly spread
10 - 5,91" / 150 mm 55,0 cal guns - 111,16lbs / 50,42kg shells, 500 per gun
Breech loading guns in turret on barbette mounts, 1930 Model
2 x Twin mounts on centreline ends, evenly spread
2 raised mounts - superfiring
6 x Single mounts on sides, evenly spread
24 - 1,46" / 37,0 mm 45,0 cal guns - 1,57lbs / 0,71kg shells, 2.000 per gun
Breech loading guns in turret on barbette mounts, 1930 Model
6 x Twin mounts on centreline, evenly spread
6 raised mounts
6 x Twin mounts on sides, evenly spread
Weight of broadside 9.571 lbs / 4.341 kg
Armour:
- Belts: Width (max) Length (avg) Height (avg)
Main: 3,94" / 100 mm 423,23 ft / 129,00 m 13,12 ft / 4,00 m
Ends: Unarmoured
Main Belt covers 104 % of normal length
- Torpedo Bulkhead - Strengthened structural bulkheads:
1,18" / 30 mm 524,93 ft / 160,00 m 16,40 ft / 5,00 m
Beam between torpedo bulkheads 52,49 ft / 16,00 m
- Gun armour: Face (max) Other gunhouse (avg) Barbette/hoist (max)
Main: 3,94" / 100 mm 3,15" / 80 mm 3,15" / 80 mm
2nd: 5,91" / 150 mm 1,97" / 50 mm 1,97" / 50 mm
3rd: 0,79" / 20 mm 0,39" / 10 mm 0,39" / 10 mm
- Armoured deck - multiple decks:
For and Aft decks: 3,35" / 85 mm
Machinery:
Oil fired boilers, steam turbines, plus diesel motors,
Geared drive, 3 shafts, 56.685 shp / 42.287 Kw = 26,34 kts
Range 10.000nm at 20,00 kts
Bunker at max displacement = 6.431 tons
Complement:
783 - 1.019
Cost:
£6,456 million / $25,825 million
Distribution of weights at normal displacement:
Armament: 1.974 tons, 10,8 %
- Guns: 1.974 tons, 10,8 %
Armour: 3.492 tons, 19,2 %
- Belts: 902 tons, 5,0 %
- Torpedo bulkhead: 376 tons, 2,1 %
- Armament: 670 tons, 3,7 %
- Armour Deck: 1.545 tons, 8,5 %
Machinery: 1.718 tons, 9,4 %
Hull, fittings & equipment: 6.041 tons, 33,2 %
Fuel, ammunition & stores: 4.989 tons, 27,4 %
Miscellaneous weights: 0 tons, 0,0 %
Overall survivability and seakeeping ability:
Survivability (Non-critical penetrating hits needed to sink ship):
23.274 lbs / 10.557 Kg = 18,6 x 13,6 " / 345 mm shells or 3,5 torpedoes
Stability (Unstable if below 1.00): 1,18
Metacentric height 4,1 ft / 1,2 m
Roll period: 14,8 seconds
Steadiness - As gun platform (Average = 50 %): 60 %
- Recoil effect (Restricted arc if above 1.00): 1,00
Seaboat quality (Average = 1.00): 1,21
Hull form characteristics:
Hull has a flush deck,
a normal bow and a cruiser stern
Block coefficient (normal/deep): 0,525 / 0,542
Length to Beam Ratio: 8,81 : 1
'Natural speed' for length: 25,03 kts
Power going to wave formation at top speed: 47 %
Trim (Max stability = 0, Max steadiness = 100): 50
Bow angle (Positive = bow angles forward): 30,00 degrees
Stern overhang: 6,56 ft / 2,00 m
Freeboard (% = length of deck as a percentage of waterline length):
Fore end, Aft end
- Forecastle: 20,00 %, 20,67 ft / 6,30 m, 16,73 ft / 5,10 m
- Forward deck: 30,00 %, 16,73 ft / 5,10 m, 16,40 ft / 5,00 m
- Aft deck: 35,00 %, 16,40 ft / 5,00 m, 16,40 ft / 5,00 m
- Quarter deck: 15,00 %, 16,40 ft / 5,00 m, 16,40 ft / 5,00 m
- Average freeboard: 16,83 ft / 5,13 m
Ship tends to be wet forward
Ship space, strength and comments:
Space - Hull below water (magazines/engines, low = better): 102,7 %
- Above water (accommodation/working, high = better): 121,9 %
Waterplane Area: 30.403 Square feet or 2.824 Square metres
Displacement factor (Displacement / loading): 122 %
Structure weight / hull surface area: 159 lbs/sq ft or 778 Kg/sq metre
Hull strength (Relative):
- Cross-sectional: 0,97
- Longitudinal: 1,41
- Overall: 1,00
Adequate machinery, storage, compartmentation space
Excellent accommodation and workspace room
Good seaboat, rides out heavy weather easily
Edit: inconsistant Numbers. 4 large liners, not 6 mega liners.