The Congress of Stockholm (4)
Lycaon pictus
Donor
Around the end of May, two seemingly unrelated things happened in Stockholm; word got out that Caulaincourt was quietly meeting with Niels Rosenkrantz of Denmark, and Kapodistrias pressed Russian claims toward the Posen/Poznan area. The Russian ambassador hinted that the tsar might be willing to consider an alliance between France and Russia if he were denied this.
Historians continue to debate the exact role played by either Castlereagh or Metternich in what happened next. What is known is that on June 10, Karl August von Hardenburg and Leopold von Plessen, who represented both Mecklenburg grand duchies, made an announcement — that Prussia would cede Posen to Russia, and in return, the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Mecklenburg-Strelitz would accept Prussian sovereignty. In return for this, the grand dukes would be permitted to divide the Duchy of Holstein between them.
There was only one problem — Holstein, although not a part of Denmark per se, was in personal union with that kingdom. This gave King Frederick VI a choice — to renounce his claim to the duchy, or to fight for it. If he chose to fight, and if France helped him by invading Prussia, it would greatly reduce the capacity of France to assist the Italian rebels.
As a counterfactual, in this author’s opinion both Denmark and France would have been better off if Frederick had chosen to cede Holstein peacefully. He could then have pursued an open alliance with France while retaining all overseas possessions. Unfortunately, at this point the king was cracking down on dissidents and constitutionalists at home. He could ill afford to show weakness in the foreign relations of the kingdom. By the end of the month, he had declared war.
France was also mobilizing — but not on Denmark’s behalf. The situation in Italy demanded most of the kingdom’s attention at the moment. According to Rosenkrantz’s letters, Caulaincourt had assured him that if Denmark could hold out until next spring, France would be able to spare an army for the northern campaign.
Caulaincourt never had a chance to make good on his promise. The Baltic Straits War was brief, brutal and humiliating. Prussia’s armies had by now completed their reforms and gained experience fighting Polish rebels, and were reinforced by the Mecklenburgs and Brunswick. To make matters worse for Denmark, Sweden had entered into the war. The fighting lasted six weeks.
When it ended, Denmark had lost not only Holstein, but Schleswig (of which Gneisenau was created duke). The dependency of Iceland was transferred to Sweden (which also acquired Greenland, for whatever that was worth). What was left of Denmark declared itself a British ally, in exchange for which it was allowed to keep the remainder of its overseas possessions.
For Prussia, it was proof that their nation had recovered its martial reputation after the catastrophe at Velaine. (Von Hardenburg pressed his luck by trying to persuade Castlereagh to ask Parliament to reconsider the Corn Law, but he did not succeed.)
H. Michael Wolcott, A History of Western International Diplomacy, 1648-1858
Historians continue to debate the exact role played by either Castlereagh or Metternich in what happened next. What is known is that on June 10, Karl August von Hardenburg and Leopold von Plessen, who represented both Mecklenburg grand duchies, made an announcement — that Prussia would cede Posen to Russia, and in return, the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Mecklenburg-Strelitz would accept Prussian sovereignty. In return for this, the grand dukes would be permitted to divide the Duchy of Holstein between them.
There was only one problem — Holstein, although not a part of Denmark per se, was in personal union with that kingdom. This gave King Frederick VI a choice — to renounce his claim to the duchy, or to fight for it. If he chose to fight, and if France helped him by invading Prussia, it would greatly reduce the capacity of France to assist the Italian rebels.
As a counterfactual, in this author’s opinion both Denmark and France would have been better off if Frederick had chosen to cede Holstein peacefully. He could then have pursued an open alliance with France while retaining all overseas possessions. Unfortunately, at this point the king was cracking down on dissidents and constitutionalists at home. He could ill afford to show weakness in the foreign relations of the kingdom. By the end of the month, he had declared war.
France was also mobilizing — but not on Denmark’s behalf. The situation in Italy demanded most of the kingdom’s attention at the moment. According to Rosenkrantz’s letters, Caulaincourt had assured him that if Denmark could hold out until next spring, France would be able to spare an army for the northern campaign.
Caulaincourt never had a chance to make good on his promise. The Baltic Straits War was brief, brutal and humiliating. Prussia’s armies had by now completed their reforms and gained experience fighting Polish rebels, and were reinforced by the Mecklenburgs and Brunswick. To make matters worse for Denmark, Sweden had entered into the war. The fighting lasted six weeks.
When it ended, Denmark had lost not only Holstein, but Schleswig (of which Gneisenau was created duke). The dependency of Iceland was transferred to Sweden (which also acquired Greenland, for whatever that was worth). What was left of Denmark declared itself a British ally, in exchange for which it was allowed to keep the remainder of its overseas possessions.
For Prussia, it was proof that their nation had recovered its martial reputation after the catastrophe at Velaine. (Von Hardenburg pressed his luck by trying to persuade Castlereagh to ask Parliament to reconsider the Corn Law, but he did not succeed.)
H. Michael Wolcott, A History of Western International Diplomacy, 1648-1858