...are we down to tossing around anecdotes (completly unrelated anectodes removed by decades from the discussed topic,at that)? Because I am certain I can find american nuclear bombers falling out of the sky even without anybody actually shooting at them,clearly this means the USAF was utterly impotent.
The Berlin Blockade leads to World War III. Who wins?
- Thread starter Ricardolindo
- Start date
marathag
Banned
That's O.N. claim, it seems
Only B-29s would have engine troubles, because the USSR never documented troubles with their copy of the Tu-4 Bull.
West weak, Soviet Stronk
He pretty much has. He can't even be honest with the anecdotes, as can be seen by the fact he completely neglects to mention that Rust's Cesna was tracked by Soviet air defense but they designated it as a non-threat once they identified it as a civilian light sports plane because why the fuck would they regard that as any sort of threat? Marathag simply can’t put together a coherent argument or back up his claims with actual sources by this point and has been reduced to red-herrings and dishonest strawmen like these...
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To recap some prior posts of mine these were the same Tu-4's that the USAF and the RCAF felt were a credible threat to at least parts of North America. Yet some how USAF B29's can't fly similar missions against the USSR ?
I realize I am repeating my self
but this thread seems to have come back to life Generally because people are looking solely at the planes and ignoring everything else that is essential for the planes to operate, like adequate crew training, basing, maintenance, logistical support, and so-on and so-forth. The consistent analysis across a broad array of scholarship, up too and including strategic air command at the time, was that these issues were crippling and would (and did, in fact) take a significant amount of time to overcome, although admittedly in a long-war there is also no doubt that the US would have that time. The focus on the specifications of the aircraft themselves is hence something of a red-herring.
The sense I'm getting is that the denialism over this is fundamentally a result of nationalistic sentiment of the "American Exceptionalism" variety. It's not enough that the US would win such a war. It also has to win painlessly and effortlessly because for it to be otherwise means the US isn't as Exceptional as their world view holds it to be. For the case of a late-1940s WW3, that requires an idealization of SAC's (if not the US military as a whole, like in the case of Aber) capabilities which tries to pretend the myriad of issues that were afflicting it don't matter and a downplaying of the USSR's capabilities to the point that it comes off as less of the military superpower it actually was and more a cartoonish strawman.
And when someone comes along and points out that, hey, issues like a lack of training, maintenance, and prepared forward bases actually matter and hey, here are sources which say the Soviets have set-up a effective air defense system that would be a up-hill struggle for SAC when combined with all of the aforementioned issues... well, that offends them because they view it not as an analysis of reality and an attack on their world view. So when all their attempts at dismissal are debunked by actual analysis, they start resorting to the sort of fallacies we see Marathag has been resorting too.
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Well... Having studied the history of early Cold War North American air defence I'm inclined to believe that the decision makers took the TU4 threat seriously. I also believe prudent Soviet decision makers would have been foolish not to take the threat posed by B29's equally seriously.
As this is a rather circular debate on an alternate history forum I expect I'll let you have the last word.
I don't recall ever claiming that SAC would have a painless experience attacking the USSR under the circumstances outlined in this convoluted thread. I do believe that one way or another they would have managed to get some air craft over their targets (and probably loose the vast majority of the planes and crews that flew the missions.)
Honestly? I don't quite disagree that each side took the other sides potential threat seriously. As I observed sometime ago in this thread, it isn't clear that the Soviets were aware of SAC's dysfunctionalism. And even if they were aware of SAC's condition, then the Soviets would also be aware that it is something the US could overcome after a little time. They had the example of WW2 to show them that is the case. Added to that is the question of what the Soviets closest counterpart to SAC, the VVS's Long-Range Aviation Corps, in the late-40's was like in terms of personnel, basing, maintenance, and all that other stuff. I've talked a lot about SAC, but I haven't discussed the LRA much. Partly because there isn't quite as much information on them out there. From what I've gleaned, their training and maintenance state seems to have been okay, but their equipment was mostly older Ilyushin twin-engine medium bombers (as the Tu-4s had their teething issues) and the nature of the training, organization, and basing indicates they were mainly set-up for counter-air missions to try and suppress the American forward bases in Britain and the MidEast, not for over-the-pole suicide missions into North America. It is worth noting that most of this information comes from just a couple of paragraphs of Chapter 11 in David Holloway's Stalin and the Bomb and it is admittedly a bit thin compared to the full, multiple books I've read about SAC's issues so there's definitely gaps there for me to fill in.
Oh, that part of the post wasn't really about you. It was more about guys like Marathag.
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Warning
thorr97
Banned
Standard American practice was to essentially demobilize its military right down to the bare bones after having just wrapped up a major war. The US did this after the Civil War, it did this after the Great War, and it did this after World War Two as well. I think it was Marshall who commented about the reduction of US forces in Europe after the war's end not being so much a demobilization as it was "a rout."
So to find that the status of America's strategic bombing capability, its Atom Bomb production capability, and its conventional forces formation and projection capabilities were all grossly inadequate to face the Soviets in 1948 - barely three years after WWII's end - is hardly surprising.
The US had a lot of "house cleaning" to do after the war - i.e. rooting out the Soviet spies and sympathizers which had come to infest every aspect of the American government and military. The US also had to formulate both the doctrine and the technical capabilities for waging an "atomic war." And it had to do that on a "shoestring budget." All this occurring against the backdrop of American's expecting that this last go 'round was truly "the war to end all wars" since the US "had the Bomb" and no one would be stupid enough challenge that. Plus, everyone else in the whole world was exhausted from the war. So the expectations were that the nation could focus on other things and let the military slide - like the US had always done in the past.
Yeah, it's rather sobering to realize just how appallingly bad the US military capabilities had sunk to by 1948. And it's equally compelling to realize just how quickly the US had turned things around by 1951.
So to find that the status of America's strategic bombing capability, its Atom Bomb production capability, and its conventional forces formation and projection capabilities were all grossly inadequate to face the Soviets in 1948 - barely three years after WWII's end - is hardly surprising.
The US had a lot of "house cleaning" to do after the war - i.e. rooting out the Soviet spies and sympathizers which had come to infest every aspect of the American government and military. The US also had to formulate both the doctrine and the technical capabilities for waging an "atomic war." And it had to do that on a "shoestring budget." All this occurring against the backdrop of American's expecting that this last go 'round was truly "the war to end all wars" since the US "had the Bomb" and no one would be stupid enough challenge that. Plus, everyone else in the whole world was exhausted from the war. So the expectations were that the nation could focus on other things and let the military slide - like the US had always done in the past.
Yeah, it's rather sobering to realize just how appallingly bad the US military capabilities had sunk to by 1948. And it's equally compelling to realize just how quickly the US had turned things around by 1951.
Like you not knowing the actual strength of the Red Army in 1948?
Here’s the last post I made on the matter of the Red Army’s strength in which I can’t help but notice that you’ve continued to fail to muster any sort of actual reply too. Feel free to do when your ready to bring more then this kind of bluster.
I post "Play the Ball" and you decide to do a hand check with the very next post?Like you not knowing the actual strength of the Red Army in 1948?
DO NOT push your luck again