The issue I am having with this thread is that on the one hand it is my understanding that the Americans (who built the B29 that the Tu4 was based on) considered that soviet Tu4 attacks against at least portions of North America were feasible (as did their Canadian allies.)
The US assumed the Soviets would send their Tu-4s (and later the Tu-16s) on one-way suicide missions, but there isn't anything on the other end to substantiate it. The US
also contemplated one-way suicide missions against the ~20% of Soviet targets that were out of range of their B-29s even from forward bases, but ultimately shelved the idea in favor of waiting for the B-36. Of course, the US didn't have the same sort of insight we do into the state of LRA, which in the late-40s was largely geared to launch pre-emptive strikes on the European and Japanese bases the US intended to stage their '29s out of. Actually, since we're on the subject, it isn't exactly clear how much the Soviets understood of SACs deficiencies in the late-40s. They had a pretty good idea of the number of nukes the US had, but how well they understood the capacity of the US system for the delivery of those bombs is unclear.
I also recall reading that Stalin asked that a bomber be developed that could attack North America and return (which implies to me they already had bombers such as the Tu4 that could attack North America but not return.)
Stalin asked for the development of a jet-powered bomber able to hit the US and return in 1948, but Tupolev told him it couldn't be done given the fuel consumption of the Soviet jet engines then in existence. Miyacheslav said otherwise and the result was ultimately the M-4... which proved Tupolev correct as it couldn't hit the US (and also only reached service after Stalin had kicked it). In 1951, the Tu-85, which was a further development of the B-29/Tu-4 and is often viewed as the "ultimate" development of it, entered prototyping and did have the range to hit the US and return and proved quite reliable, but since the Korean War had just demonstrated prop bombers were exceedingly vulnerable to modern fighter interceptors, only the two prototypes were ever made. Focus instead went to development of the Tu-95, which was the first Soviet bomber to reach operational service which proved capable of reaching the CONUS and returning.
Had the Soviets ignored the vulnerabilities of prop bombers, maybe because of a wartime rush to have some ability to hit the US NOW, and put the Tu-85 into production, it probably would have reached operational service in 1952 or 53. But that'd be rather too late for a war starting in 1948.
Also totally ridiculous that an unmodified (except for increased tankage and Silverplate type fuel injection) B-29 flew 8000 miles nonstop and unrefueled from Guam to Washington DC in November 1945. (I believe that even the gun turrets were still in place.) Takeoff was overloaded at about 150,000 pounds, 23,000 pounds less than the considerably more powerful B-50 was cleared for. And all of Canada could be available if necessary for subsequent launches. Sorry if facts differ from your "quite publicly listed" data.r
That's not ridiculous nor does it contradict either me or the publically listed data. As it is, the ferry range of the standard B-29 is 5,600 miles, so a B-29 specifically modified for extra-range (which by your own admission, these B-29s were) reaching just under 8,000 miles is perfectly plausible. The problem is that we aren't talking about ferry range, but combat radius, which is generally 1/3rd of Ferry Range as you have to take into account things like returning back to base, having to take routes that avoid enemy defenses, having to sacrifice fuel loads for ordinance loads, and things like that.
I also can't help but notice how the goalposts are already starting to shift. Originally, the claim is that they would be flying from the AEC facilities in the continental US. Now their starting from airfields in Canada.
It's also a minor quibble, but the flight in question took place in January 1946, not November 1945. The November 1945 flight intended to fly 6,500 miles from Hokkaido to Washington DC, but unexpected headwinds meant they had to stop and refuel in Chicago.