The Berlin Blockade leads to World War III. Who wins?

Don't let your lying eyes fool you on watching MiGs bursting into flame from 20mm B-29 tailguns or .50s from F-86 gun camera footage. All Capitalist propganda.
Twas but a scratch, as the Soviet Black Knight said.

Yes, yes. When you don't have actual legs to stand on, scream "enemy propaganda!", appeal to nonexistent material (you won't find any footage of MiG-15s bursting into flames from B-29s), create strawmen (I never claimed that F-86s didn't shoot down MiG-15s which would be stupid, as the F-86s are known to have shot down MiG-15s), and don't respond to your opponents actual points. No sense in debating honestly, after all. The Soviets also used gun cam footage and still came away still massively overclaiming.You don't see me arguing that the Soviets must have downed the 70 B-29s they claimed they did because their aircraft were equipped with guncams.

In fact, that leaves you with something of a conundrum: if the mere existence of guncam footage renders all of the American bomber kill claims credible, then the same must apply to Soviet claims about the number of bombers they shot down, since those were checked out via guncam footage as well. So which is it: are guncam kill claims credible and thus the US really lost 70 B-29s to Soviet MiGs or did the US only lose 16 B-29s to Soviet MiGs, which means guncam kill claims are not credible? You can't have it both ways.

Lets see that list for Soviet Fighters then.

Already discussed this, citing an academic source with quotes and everything. I'd actually try and muster a response if you want me to start taking you seriously. Here, I'll quote it again, with emphasis in particular:

Soviet sources on the Korean War are among those open to academicians. They’ve been open since the fall of the Soviet Union and scholars have gone over them with a fine-comb and have been unable to find a single MiG loss to B-29s. I personally may not have access to Soviet archives (and since my knowledge of Russian is limited to a couple of words and being able to phonetically pronounce the alphabet, it probably wouldn't be of much use if I did), but academics do and academics publish their findings. Zhang in Red Wings Over the Yalu quotes the work of an American academic, Mark O'Niell's Other Side of the Yalu in observing that American B-29 gunner kill claims are "absurd". He goes on to state:


-Pg 129
 
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Knowledge of the overall priorities and conditions of the European states at the time. That the bulk of European combat forces (particularly the French) were off fighting colonial wars and that the economic conditions at home prevented them from establishing much in the way of additional forces is well recorded in the literature.

Vietnam in 1948 was described as 'a low level rural insurgency'.

Some hadn't even considered the Soviets a threat until very recently: the Dutch only concluded that the USSR was a threat after the London Conference of 1947, but the countries domestic economy prevented any additional funding in '48. The British, like the Americans, established that the Soviets would overrun Europe within a few months and hence intended to not even try to fight for the continent, so there would have been very little point for them to maintain more then token combat ready forces there. (Beginnings of the Cold War Arms Race, Raymond P. Ojserkis, Pg 8-9).

Read the footnotes - the sources for British military policy is a biography of Manny Shinwell who was Minister for Fuel and Power at the time. The focus of the book is on US policy, and is quite limited on the Soviet Union with only a couple of Rusian sources, although it does cite a Discovery Channel programme. :)
 
Some perspective on aircraft losses attacking the USSR in 1949 relative to losses over North Korea -1950-53: The prohibitive loss rates often quoted lump together early daytime missions and later night operations. Nuclear drops over Russia would be timed to take place during hours of darkness. Korean night B-29 raids were conducted in a relatively small area saturated with MiG 15s- often substantially outnumbering the bombers they were attacking. Many bomber losses to fighters involved the bombers over the target illuminated (coned) in RADAR directed searchlights. When not on run-in to targets, or flying well known SHORAN arcs, or flying at altitudes that permitted contrail generation on moonlit nights, B-29 losses were sparse.

The earliest nuclear strikes against the USSR in 1949 would have involved weapons stored in continental US AEC facilities, carried in Boeing B-50 series aircraft ( 1.5+ the power and takeoff weight and considerably longer ranged than the B-29) flown by "sharp tool" SAC crews, on transpolar shuttle missions. Considering the number of night or weather capable MiG 15s available at that time and the vast areas to be covered, I believe that, unlike the largely inappropriate Korea references, the bombers, flying individually, would get through.

Dynasoar (USAF 1950-54)
 
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Vietnam in 1948 was described as 'a low level rural insurgency'.

Which requires extensive force deployments to cover, as most widespread insurgencies do.

Read the footnotes - the sources for British military policy is a biography of Manny Shinwell who was Minister for Fuel and Power at the time. The focus of the book is on US policy, and is quite limited on the Soviet Union with only a couple of Rusian sources, although it does cite a Discovery Channel programme. :)

I’m not sure why we’d look at Russian sources for Western European defense policy, but in reality Ojserkis cites 4 different sources in his two paragraphs on British defense policy: Shinwell’s biography (which I’ll get to in a moment), a study on British post-WW2 naval policy, a study on the politics of British Defense Policy from 1945-1962, and another study on the Truman era balance of power called Preponderance of Power. As to Shinwell, your claim is, as I'm increasingly coming to expect from you, a blatant misrepresentation and half-truth: while he was Minister for Fuel and Power in 1945 through to September of 1947, he became War Secretary in October 1947 and the page of the biography Osjerskis cites indeed covers his time in the War Office, during which he would have had thorough access to British war planning both currently and over the past few years. But nothing really slams the door closed on this issue like Paul Cornish's British Military Planning for the Defence of Germany 1945–50, who shows that between VE Day and the Korean War the British Military "were not even beginning to think, seriously, about a continental strategy for Britain" (Pg 168), noting that the British Prime Minister at the end of 1947 declared that he "agreed that at the outbreak of war there was no hope of providing an Army capable of holding an attack directed against the West European Coast" (Pg 105).

The earliest nuclear strikes against the USSR in 1949 would have involved weapons stored in continental US AEC facilities, carried in Boeing B-50 series aircraft ( 1.5+ the power and takeoff weight and considerably longer ranged than the B-29) flown by "sharp tool" SAC crews, on transpolar shuttle missions. Considering the number of night or weather capable MiG 15s available at that time and the vast areas to be covered, I believe that, unlike the largely inappropriate Korea references, the bombers, flying individually, would get through.

Totally ridiculous. The B-50's combat range is quite publicly listed as 2,394 miles and that makes clear quite clear that it lacks the range for transpolar bombing raids. Claims that it could achieve are quite simply unfounded. American warplanning of the time only discusses the half-dozen B-36s that would be available for combat runs as flying out of the US (and even then, from Alaska rather then the CONUS). The 200 B-29/50s that were called for in the Offtackle Plan, which was the standing nuclear warplan in 1949-1950, were to fly out of the United Kingdom, which means they'd be flying into the main teeth of Soviet fighter defenses. The B-50 also represented a serious technical/maintenance challenge:

Exacerbating the maintenance problem was a lack of spare parts for the medium bomber fleet, especially for the B-50s. While the B-50 looked similar to the B-29, only 25 percent of their parts were interchangeable and most of these were minor items like nuts, bolts, and gaskets. As a result, maintenance personnel in units equipped with newly fielded B-50s were struggling to keep the airframe airworthy.
-Bigger Bombs for a Brighter Tomorrow: The Strategic Air Command and American War Plans at the Dawn of the Atomic Age, 1945-1950, Jon M. Curatola, Pg 164

SAC crews also were not trained at this time for night-missions and given that they proved unable to locate entire cities in the United States when flying in broad daylight over vastly shorter distances, their likely to find it even more difficult in finding the far-flung Soviet cities at night.
 
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The issue I am having with this thread is that on the one hand it is my understanding that the Americans (who built the B29 that the Tu4 was based on) considered that soviet Tu4 attacks against at least portions of North America were feasible (as did their Canadian allies.)

On the other hand there seems to be a belief held by some that the U.S. was somehow essentially incapable of doing the same thing to the Soviet Union despite having far more opportunities for forward basing.

As much as I enjoy this debate I am going to try very hard to avoid further comments as the dialogue is becoming very circular.

Edit to add:
IMHO
The realitive lack of accessible Soviet era commentary about these issues doesn't help the situation.

Best regards
Blue cat
 
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The issue I am having with this thread is that on the one hand it is my understanding that the Americans (who built the B29 that the Tu4 was based on) considered that soviet Tu4 attacks against at least portions of North America were feasible (as did their Canadian allies.)

Well, maybe they could hit Alaska.

Otherwise, it would be years before the Soviets fielded a heavy bomber with the range to hit targets in CONUS.

The difficulty is, the United States in summer 1948 was not a whole lot better off.
 
Well, maybe they could hit Alaska.

Otherwise, it would be years before the Soviets fielded a heavy bomber with the range to hit targets in CONUS.

The difficulty is, the United States in summer 1948 was not a whole lot better off.[/QUOTE
That is interesting as I have read credible Canadian accounts that discussed how certain weapon systems that were deployed after ww2 for North American air defence use were really only considered capable of dealing with the Tu4 threat.

I also seem to recall reading that the Tu4 was credited with an ability to reach substantial parts of North America on a one way mission.

I also recall reading that Stalin asked that a bomber be developed that could attack North America and return (which implies to me they already had bombers such as the Tu4 that could attack North America but not return.)

Perhaps the Americans and the Canadians assumed that in an actual nuclear war their opponents would do what had to be done to get bombs to their targets. I am inclined to believe the U.S. would have displayed a similar level of initiative and determination if need be.

Regards blue cat
 
Totally ridiculous. The B-50's combat range is quite publicly listed as 2,394 miles and that makes clear quite clear that it lacks the range for transpolar bombing raids. Claims that it could achieve are quite simply unfounded. American warplanning of the time only discusses the half-dozen B-36s that would be available for combat runs as flying out of the US (and even then, from Alaska rather then the CONUS). The 200 B-29/50s that were called for in the Offtackle Plan, which was the standing nuclear warplan in 1949-1950, were to fly out of the United Kingdom, which means they'd be flying into the main teeth of Soviet fighter defenses. The B-50 also represented a

Also totally ridiculous that an unmodified (except for increased tankage and Silverplate type fuel injection) B-29 flew 8000 miles nonstop and unrefueled from Guam to Washington DC in November 1945. (I believe that even the gun turrets were still in place.) Takeoff was overloaded at about 150,000 pounds, 23,000 pounds less than the considerably more powerful B-50 was cleared for. And all of Canada could be available if necessary for subsequent launches. Sorry if facts differ from your "quite publicly listed" data.

Dynasoar
 
Well, maybe they could hit Alaska.

Otherwise, it would be years before the Soviets fielded a heavy bomber with the range to hit targets in CONUS.

The difficulty is, the United States in summer 1948 was not a whole lot better off.

Athelstane, The Soviet raids likely in the early 1949 timeframe I've been discussing were anticipated to be one way, bio-warfare missions. Light payload, but ability to hit Northern US population centers. And strictly retaliatory... No attack on the West until correlation of forces predict a Socialist victory.

Dynasoar
 
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The issue I am having with this thread is that on the one hand it is my understanding that the Americans (who built the B29 that the Tu4 was based on) considered that soviet Tu4 attacks against at least portions of North America were feasible (as did their Canadian allies.)

The US assumed the Soviets would send their Tu-4s (and later the Tu-16s) on one-way suicide missions, but there isn't anything on the other end to substantiate it. The US also contemplated one-way suicide missions against the ~20% of Soviet targets that were out of range of their B-29s even from forward bases, but ultimately shelved the idea in favor of waiting for the B-36. Of course, the US didn't have the same sort of insight we do into the state of LRA, which in the late-40s was largely geared to launch pre-emptive strikes on the European and Japanese bases the US intended to stage their '29s out of. Actually, since we're on the subject, it isn't exactly clear how much the Soviets understood of SACs deficiencies in the late-40s. They had a pretty good idea of the number of nukes the US had, but how well they understood the capacity of the US system for the delivery of those bombs is unclear.

I also recall reading that Stalin asked that a bomber be developed that could attack North America and return (which implies to me they already had bombers such as the Tu4 that could attack North America but not return.)

Stalin asked for the development of a jet-powered bomber able to hit the US and return in 1948, but Tupolev told him it couldn't be done given the fuel consumption of the Soviet jet engines then in existence. Miyacheslav said otherwise and the result was ultimately the M-4... which proved Tupolev correct as it couldn't hit the US (and also only reached service after Stalin had kicked it). In 1951, the Tu-85, which was a further development of the B-29/Tu-4 and is often viewed as the "ultimate" development of it, entered prototyping and did have the range to hit the US and return and proved quite reliable, but since the Korean War had just demonstrated prop bombers were exceedingly vulnerable to modern fighter interceptors, only the two prototypes were ever made. Focus instead went to development of the Tu-95, which was the first Soviet bomber to reach operational service which proved capable of reaching the CONUS and returning.

Had the Soviets ignored the vulnerabilities of prop bombers, maybe because of a wartime rush to have some ability to hit the US NOW, and put the Tu-85 into production, it probably would have reached operational service in 1952 or 53. But that'd be rather too late for a war starting in 1948.

Also totally ridiculous that an unmodified (except for increased tankage and Silverplate type fuel injection) B-29 flew 8000 miles nonstop and unrefueled from Guam to Washington DC in November 1945. (I believe that even the gun turrets were still in place.) Takeoff was overloaded at about 150,000 pounds, 23,000 pounds less than the considerably more powerful B-50 was cleared for. And all of Canada could be available if necessary for subsequent launches. Sorry if facts differ from your "quite publicly listed" data.r

That's not ridiculous nor does it contradict either me or the publically listed data. As it is, the ferry range of the standard B-29 is 5,600 miles, so a B-29 specifically modified for extra-range (which by your own admission, these B-29s were) reaching just under 8,000 miles is perfectly plausible. The problem is that we aren't talking about ferry range, but combat radius, which is generally 1/3rd of Ferry Range as you have to take into account things like returning back to base, having to take routes that avoid enemy defenses, having to sacrifice fuel loads for ordinance loads, and things like that.

I also can't help but notice how the goalposts are already starting to shift. Originally, the claim is that they would be flying from the AEC facilities in the continental US. Now their starting from airfields in Canada.

It's also a minor quibble, but the flight in question took place in January 1946, not November 1945. The November 1945 flight intended to fly 6,500 miles from Hokkaido to Washington DC, but unexpected headwinds meant they had to stop and refuel in Chicago.
 
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The US assumed the Soviets would send their Tu-4s on one-way suicide missions, but there isn't anything on the other end to substantiate it. The US also contemplated one-way suicide missions against the ~20% of Soviet targets that were out of range of their B-29s even from forward bases, but ultimately shelved the idea in favor of waiting for the B-36. Of course, the US didn't have the same sort of insight we do into the state of LRA, which in the late-40s was largely geared to launch pre-emptive strikes on the European and Japanese bases the US intended to stage their '29s out of. Actually, since we're on the subject, it isn't exactly clear how much the Soviets understood of SACs deficiencies in the late-40s. They had a pretty good idea of the number of nukes the US had, but how well they understood.

IMHO assuming your opponent will fly more or less one way missions in a nuclear war is a reasonable assumption to make. In my view the U.S. was entirely correct in assuming such missions would be flown against North America.

In my view a one way mission against a target in North America or the Soviet Union is by no means a guaranteed suicide mission so long as the air crew can expect to bail out or perhaps even land a reasonable distance from the target area in a remote area. In the case of Soviet missions against North America I wouldn't rule out having Soviet agents on the ground in remote areas to help the aircrew.

I've also read credible accounts of other more or less one way nuclear missions that were expected to be flown in the Cold War era.
 
I also seem to recall reading that the Tu4 was credited with an ability to reach substantial parts of North America on a one way mission

It's just possible western intel overestimated the capabilities.

Well: one way *might* be possible. Tu-4 with 3,000kg bomb load has a 3300mi range. Murmansk to Bangor is...3600mi.

But then Soviet first generation bombs (which, mind you, would not be available until 1950) were heavier than that. Plus, they'd have divert out of their way to avoid US/UK/Norwegian air patrols in the Norwegian Sea, too...

They could just dump conventional ordnance, but that seems a terrible waste to send a bomber on a one-way mission just to do that.
 
It's just possible western intel overestimated the capabilities.

Well: one way *might* be possible. Tu-4 with 3,000kg bomb load has a 3300mi range. Murmansk to Bangor is...3600mi.

But then Soviet first generation bombs (which, mind you, would not be available until 1950) were heavier than that. Plus, they'd have divert out of their way to avoid US/UK/Norwegian air patrols in the Norwegian Sea, too...

They could just dump conventional ordnance, but that seems a terrible waste to send a bomber on a one-way mission just to do that.
Or the Soviets improvise extra fuel tankage and or carefully study the prevailing winds and pick up an extra 10 to 20 percent in range..

IMHO the U.S. had to assume the Soviets could have flown such missions.

And conversely the U.S. could have flown similar missions if need be.
 
In my view a one way mission against a target in North America or the Soviet Union is by no means a guaranteed suicide mission so long as the air crew can expect to bail out or perhaps even land a reasonable distance from the target area in a remote area. In the case of Soviet missions against North America I wouldn't rule out having Soviet agents on the ground in remote areas to help the aircrew.

I've also read credible accounts of other more or less one way nuclear missions that were expected to be flown in the Cold War era.

From the perspective of the attacking country, whether the crew actually survives or not doesn't actually matter: their still lost either way. I mean, how is a Soviet air crew who ditches in the Northeast Seaboard or a American aircrew who ditches in Central Russia supposed to make it back to the USSR or America? One-way missions mean that, even discounting the high likelihood of failure, even success means you've still expended a bomber and air crew which in a late-40 war would be in high demand, low supply.

Or the Soviets improvise extra fuel tankage and or carefully study the prevailing winds and pick up an extra 10 to 20 percent in range..

IMHO the U.S. had to assume the Soviets could have flown such missions.

It is true that the US at the time probably had to mount "worst-case" assumptions, given lack of intelligence that the Soviets might not do otherwise. Hope for the best and plan for the worst and all that. I personally find it more likely that if the Soviets employ atomic bombs in a '49/'50 war, they would have done so by striking the bases in Britain and Japan that the US intended to stage out of. If successful (even though it's a big if), those bases destruction would buy the Soviets time to try and rush a plane like the Tu-85 which could possibly deliver an atom bomb to the US and return.
 
.ObsessedNuker said: That's not ridiculous nor does it contradict either me or the publically listed data. As it is, the ferry range of the standard B-29 is 5,600 miles, so a B-29 specifically modified for extra-range (which by your own admission, these B-29s were) reaching just under 8,000 miles is perfectly plausible. The problem is that we aren't talking about ferry range, but combat radius, which is generally 1/3rd of Ferry Range. (QUOte)

Not combat radius- shuttle bombing- North Dakota over the pole and Russia to, typically, the latitude of Delhi for example.

Another ObsessedNuker:
It's also a minor quibble, but the flight in question took place in January 1946, not November 1945. The November 1945 flight intended to fly 6,500 from Hokkaido to Washington DC, but unexpected headwinds meant they had to stop and refuel in Chicago.[/QUOTE]

Agree, it is a minor quibble. The flight I'm discussing took place over the 8200 miles from Guam to Washington DC on November 19-20 1945. You may be referencing the aborted LeMay flight in September from Japan to Chicago. A few weeks after the Guam-DC flight, the same aircraft and crew (Dec 11, 1945) flew from Burbank California to NYC at a ground speed of over 450 MPH. In October 1946, a B-29 (armament removed) flew from Hawaii to Egypt non-stop non-refuelled, over the north (magnetic) pole to Cairo. About 9500 miles direct, over 10,000 miles as flown.

As for moving goal posts, wouldn't think of it. Please reread my post, particularly the word "subsequent".
Minot North Dakota was not an AEC facility, but a SAC base with nice long runways pointed North.

Dynasoar
 
From the perspective of the attacking country, whether the crew actually survives or not doesn't actually matter: their still lost either way. I mean, how is a Soviet air crew who ditches in the Northeast Seaboard or a American aircrew who ditches in Central Russia supposed to make it back to the USSR or America? One-way missions mean that, even discounting the high likelihood of failure, even success means you've still expended a bomber and air crew which in a late-40 war would be in high demand, low supply.



It is true that the US at the time probably had to mount "worst-case" assumptions, given lack of intelligence that the Soviets might not do otherwise. Hope for the best and plan for the worst and all that. I personally find it more likely that if the Soviets employ atomic bombs in a '49/'50 war, they would have done so by striking the bases in Britain and Japan that the US intended to stage out of. If successful (even though it's a big if), those bases destruction would buy the Soviets time to try and rush a plane like the Tu-85 which could possibly deliver an atom bomb to the US and return.
Well I have read seemingly credible estimates of perhaps 40 percent or higher loss rates being expected for nuclear missions that were nominally expected to land at a friendly base that might or might not still exist by the time the air craft reached it.

I've also read accounts (that were perhaps a bit less credible) that indicated that certain nuclear missions were considered to be a "success" once the air craft released a weapon over a primary target.

In that context a mission plan that assumes the crew can bail out or make an emergency landing in a remote area doesn't seem that bad to me (especially if it lessens their chance of being shot down and the crew killed on the return flight or landing at a friendly base that is subsequently nuked. In reality none of the options seem all that appealing to me.

Edit to add:

Some time ago I also recall reading a fairly well reasoned analysis that basically said that prior to the wide spread introduction of the B52 and the KC135 tanker fleet many SAC missions were in reality expected to be "one way." I can't vouch for its accuracy but it seemed credible at first glance.
 
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From the perspective of the attacking country, whether the crew actually survives or not doesn't actually matter: their still lost either way. I mean, how is a Soviet air crew who ditches in the Northeast Seaboard or a American aircrew who ditches in Central Russia supposed to make it back to the USSR or America? One-way missions mean that, even discounting the high likelihood of failure, even success means you've still expended a bomber and air crew which in a late-40 war would be in high demand, low supply.



It is true that the US at the time probably had to mount "worst-case" assumptions, given lack of intelligence that the Soviets might not do otherwise. Hope for the best and plan for the worst and all that. I personally find it more likely that if the Soviets employ atomic bombs in a '49/'50 war, they would have done so by striking the bases in Britain and Japan that the US intended to stage out of. If successful (even though it's a big if), those bases destruction would buy the Soviets time to try and rush a plane like the Tu-85 which could possibly deliver an atom bomb to the US and return.
Another comment..

If the Soviets assume by destroying staging bases they can blunt the American attack and the Americans subsequently don't use those staging bases and launch perhaps more or less one way missions from more distant bases then I would argue that is not a very sound plan.

I'm thinking one way attacks against nuclear weapons facilities in the CONUS might have been a better use of a limited Soviet nuclear arsenal in this time frame. Perhaps for this reason nuclear weapons related targets in the U.S. were some of the first targets that were protected by the evolving US air defence network.
 
Not combat radius- shuttle bombing- North Dakota over the pole and Russia to, typically, the latitude of Delhi for example.

Even ferry range is not enough for that. Leaving aside that India by '48 is a neutral third party, which means any aircraft heading there is gonna be interned, the aircraft having to sacrifice fuel to carry ordinance means that it would run out well before leaving Russia. The Guam to Washington and Hokkaido to Washington trick flights were done without any ordinance onboard and shoved full of fuel. That isn't going to work for a genuine combat mission.

Agree, it is a minor quibble. The flight I'm discussing took place over the 8200 miles from Guam to Washington DC on November 19-20 1945. You may be referencing the aborted LeMay flight in September from Japan to Chicago.

Right on the latter half, seems I got those two confused. Although the Guam to Washington flight was 7,916 miles, not 8,200 miles (which is the distance from Guam to Washington as any check. In any case, citing trick flights with aircraft that have been modded for nothing but range tells us little about how combat flights would work out.

Another comment..

I don't really have much to say since your posts at this point are pure opinion, but could you avoid double-posting in the future? It gets a bit annoying. Please use the edit function instead.
 
Even ferry range is not enough for that. Leaving aside that India by '48 is a neutral third party, which means any aircraft heading there is gonna be interned, the aircraft having to sacrifice fuel to carry ordinance means that it would run out well before leaving Russia. The Guam to Washington and Hokkaido to Washington trick flights were done without any ordinance onboard and shoved full of fuel. That isn't going to work for a genuine combat mission.



Right on the latter half, seems I got those two confused. Although the Guam to Washington flight was 7,916 miles, not 8,200 miles (which is the distance from Guam to Washington as any check. In any case, citing trick flights tells us little about how combat flights would work out.



I don't really have much to say since your posts at this point are pure opinion, but could you avoid double-posting in the future? It gets a bit annoying. Please use the edit function instead.
Well I felt I was responding to your opponion with my opponion :)

All the best
Blue cat
 
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