The Berlin Blockade leads to World War III. Who wins?

While the US forces in the Pacific were not going to do an amphibious landing in Russia, that does not mean they would be idle. The USN can plaster Petropavlosk, and both carrier raids and land based raids against Vladivostok are possible. Soviet bases on Sakhalin which could threaten Japan are vulnerable. Any airfields on Soviet Aleutian Islands or in the seized Kuriles can be attacked by carrier aircraft, and installations on these islands can be subject to warship bombardment. The Soviet Pacific Fleet was small and obsolescent and was not capable of operations against the US fleet outside of local waters. Most of the submarines were of coastal types, and could be used for a while against traffic in and around Japan but would generally not last long.

In the case of a "WWIII" in 1948 US Pacific forces would initially concentrate on ASW as needed, and eliminating threats from closer Soviet facilities Petropavlosk/Aleutians/Kuriles. In particular, once any air assets were eliminated or significantly degraded in "forward" areas from the Kuriles east the 7th Fleet could operate relatively freely taking care for the potential of a submarine threat (limited). If desired selected Aleutian or Kurile islands could be seized with relatively little effort and used as forward air bases allowing tactical air to be used against the Soviet Pacific coast.

The Civil War is still going on in China, and the DPRK is not ready yet to attack south. In the midst of a no notice conflict as envisaged, the USSR is going to be busy and will probably not even supply OTL levels of military aid to Mao or Kim as they will be needing it. The resources needed for the actions listed are pretty much at hand, and are very much naval. They would not be used in Europe, and I am sure the USN would be more than willing to strike some blows rather than sit around in the Pacific. If the USSR needs to move some assets from elsewhere to defend the Pacific coast (defending the Kuriles/Aleutians/Sakhalin or reinforcing them is not practical) that can only be a plus for the US/NATO (yes I know NATO not there yet). Once US reserves are mobilized and spun up can the USSR be sure there won't be an amphibious attack on the Pacific Coast. Especially if the USN/USMC stages some raids or demonstrations, can the USSR ignore this?

This is case of valuable assets that are not really useful for Europe and can make life difficult for the USSR. Also such victories, even if relative pinpricks, are good for western morale.
 
While the US forces in the Pacific were not going to do an amphibious landing in Russia, that does not mean they would be idle. The USN can plaster Petropavlosk, and both carrier raids and land based raids against Vladivostok are possible. Soviet bases on Sakhalin which could threaten Japan are vulnerable. Any airfields on Soviet Aleutian Islands or in the seized Kuriles can be attacked by carrier aircraft, and installations on these islands can be subject to warship bombardment. The Soviet Pacific Fleet was small and obsolescent and was not capable of operations against the US fleet outside of local waters. Most of the submarines were of coastal types, and could be used for a while against traffic in and around Japan but would generally not last long.

In the case of a "WWIII" in 1948 US Pacific forces would initially concentrate on ASW as needed, and eliminating threats from closer Soviet facilities Petropavlosk/Aleutians/Kuriles. In particular, once any air assets were eliminated or significantly degraded in "forward" areas from the Kuriles east the 7th Fleet could operate relatively freely taking care for the potential of a submarine threat (limited). If desired selected Aleutian or Kurile islands could be seized with relatively little effort and used as forward air bases allowing tactical air to be used against the Soviet Pacific coast.

This is largely accurate, with some details incorrect. The Soviets could handily defend the Kuriles, but not the Aleutians although those are too far and small to be of any use to the Americans. Technically, the US at the time didn’t even expect to be able to defend Hokkaido and intended to focus on holding the other three home islands, but this was probably overly-pessimistic. The ability for US carriers to seriously reduce or eliminate Soviet air power is dubious: prepared airfields were always hard targets to attack and heavily defended. If they have surprise on their side for the first few go around a, The initial raids raids may have it fairly easy, but after surprise wears off and the Soviets reinforce their airfield AAA, things will get successively harder for each following raid. Casualties against such targets would be high and results minimal. While American aircraft carriers are liable to conduct lightning raids to smash coastal targets with good success, sticking around in a sustained campaign is just asking for the Red Airforce to find and bomb them. These aren’t isolated Japanese island garrisons we’re taking about.

Overall, the US will dominate the oceans, no doubt about that, but being able to leverage that into anything meaningful in the opening phase of the war is doubtful.

The Civil War is still going on in China, and the DPRK is not ready yet to attack south. In the midst of a no notice conflict as envisaged, the USSR is going to be busy and will probably not even supply OTL levels of military aid to Mao or Kim as they will be needing it.

With Europe overrun in the first few months and Soviet arms industry pushed to full wartime footing, the Soviets will be operating with extreme supply of armaments output and little in the way of demand: only the expeditionary war in the Middle East and the war over Northwest Europe would have any noticeable impact on Soviet resources. Given this surfeit of supplies and Stalin’s likely interest in expanding the war into Southeast Asia, aid to Korea and Communist China will likely be much greater aid then OTL (particularly the Chinese communists, who received more aid from the US, via their nationalist enemies corruption and incompetence, then they did the Soviets in the ‘46-‘48 period). And South Korea can be trivially overrun by the Soviets with the forces they have at hand after a month. At least the US won’t lose anyone there: their plans to completely abandon the peninsula would ensure it.

The resources needed for the actions listed are pretty much at hand, and are very much naval. They would not be used in Europe, and I am sure the USN would be more than willing to strike some blows rather than sit around in the Pacific. If the USSR needs to move some assets from elsewhere to defend the Pacific coast (defending the Kuriles/Aleutians/Sakhalin or reinforcing them is not practical) that can only be a plus for the US/NATO (yes I know NATO not there yet).

Sakhalin is eminently defendable and reinforcable for the Soviets. The relevant crossings are small enough that they could easily be protected by coastal guns, mines, and land-based air.

This is case of valuable assets that are not really useful for Europe and can make life difficult for the USSR. Also such victories, even if relative pinpricks, are good for western morale.

And what assets would those be? Amphibious and transport assets would be desperately needed for the liberation of Europe and defense of the MidEast and the handful of divisions that could be put ashore left would be trivial for the 30+ divisions the Soviets kept around in the Far East, plus whatever mobilization divisions they send that way, to sweep back into the sea, even with naval support. Getting multiple divisions butchered for no appreciable gain is the opposite of good for Western morale. The WAllies would be much better off using their superior navy to stand off and bomb the Vladivostok if they want pinpricks that boost home morale.
 
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honestly . USSR has the initial advantage.. end result the west.. and they will fight. by this time everyone knowns the USSR is not some paradise.
 
Once the fighting starts the ability of the USSR to reinforce/supply the Kuriles and Petropavlosk (which is even today only supplied by sea/air) goes away pretty rapidly. With the exception of submarines, and that limited, the Soviet Pacific Fleet has no capability to conduct operations outside the Sea of Okhost. The Kuriles represent a minimal barrier to USN incursion, such aviation assets that are on the Kuriles can be suppressed rapidly. The USN has a lot of experience with this sort of thing. Petropavlosk is entirely exposed and can be rendered impotent and isolated from supply rapidly. Invading Sakhalin, no but air attacks and coastal bombardments for sure. Once the Kuriles are neutered, USN surface forces (destroyer/cruiser) can run in to bombard coastal facilities.

The Red Air Force has almost zero experience in WWII of air raids against rapidly moving naval forces, and absolutely zero against any with naval air support (carrier air).

Once Soviet industry gets ramped up and producing, sure the flow to Mao and Kim can increase. Until then, the reality is that expenditures of materiel will require priorities for the Red Army.
 

No US war plans from the 1940s involved operations in Sakhalin or the Kuriles. In fact, a couple even considered abandoning Hokkaido. Obviously plans can change, but why would the US even consider operations in this area? Would it make sense to send forces there, when men and materiel are needed in Europe and the Middle East? Would Stalin be troubled if the Americans take Kamchatka?
 
Threatening the Soviet Pacific Coast and Vladivostok is worthwhile. Aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers are not going to be in high demand in Europe and there are more than enough of these in the Atlantic Fleet. This also eliminates much of the potential submarine threat in the Pacific.
 
Once the fighting starts the ability of the USSR to reinforce/supply the Kuriles and Petropavlosk (which is even today only supplied by sea/air) goes away pretty rapidly. With the exception of submarines, and that limited, the Soviet Pacific Fleet has no capability to conduct operations outside the Sea of Okhost.

You manage to contradict yourself rather neatly. Soviet ability to conduct operations in the Sea of Okhost and in coastal regions overall is all they need to be able to do to reinforce and supply the Kuriles and Petropavlosk. Hell, the Kuriles are close enough that, like with the Sakhalin crossings, they can be covered by mines and coastal guns. Of course, it isn't like Petropavlosk is of the importance in 1948 that it gained later on.

The Kuriles represent a minimal barrier to USN incursion, such aviation assets that are on the Kuriles can be suppressed rapidly.

Unsubstantiated claim.

The Red Air Force has almost zero experience in WWII of air raids against rapidly moving naval forces, and absolutely zero against any with naval air support (carrier air).

Soviet naval aviators who bombed German warships in the Baltic would be surprised to know that. What's more, this still ignores that attempts by carrier air to attack Soviet air fields will result in heavy losses to carrier air wings for little gain.

Once Soviet industry gets ramped up and producing, sure the flow to Mao and Kim can increase. Until then, the reality is that expenditures of materiel will require priorities for the Red Army.

Given the overwhelming Soviet superiority at the outset, expenditures are likely to be low in it's rapid conquest of Europe and even as industry ramps up supply is likely to outpace demand by a large amount. As it was, the Soviets had enough assorted tanks, artillery pieces, and other equipment in storage that they planned to raise an additional 125 rifle divisions under the late-1940s TO&E on top of their standing army of 175 divisions in the first three months of war.

As an irrelevant aside, there's something of a dark comedy act that will probably be a footnote in this war: between 1948 to 1953, Stalin had the 14th Assault Army deployed on the Chukchi peninsula, with apparent intent to invade and occupy the opposite Steward Peninsula in Alaska if war with the US broke out. Even assuming they successfully make the crossing (which is doubtful), what this army was supposed to actually achieve by seizing this barren, worthless piece of Arctic Alaskan territory way away from anything important, besides starve to death, isn't exactly clear. Perhaps STAVKA will talk Stalin into using those troops somewhere more important, like China.
 
Eh? No B-29 groups were sent to Europe until spring of '49.

_Strategic Air Command People, aircraft and Missiles_ 2nd ed. Polmar and Laur
pg15. One Squadron of the 301st was present June. The others I listed were all in place in W.Germany and East Anglia by the end of July.

Communist supply throughput increased during the course of the war and unlike in Korea,

We have been over how awesome the DPRK logistics were in earlier discussions, moving by night, off the roads.

Logistical demands. From https://www.nj.gov/military/korea/effectiveness.pdf



U.S. division (15,000 men) - approx. 500 tons

CCF division (10,000 men) - approx. 60 tons

NK division (11,000 men) - approx. 70 tons


By best estimate, the maximum number of enemy divisions in Korea at one time during the war was 58 Chinese and 19 North Korean. Assuming for purposes of discovering maximum needs that all of these were in action at the front, and using the tonnage requirement for an infantry division in action, the peak daily Chinese requirement would be 3,480 tons, the peak North Korean daily requirement would be 1,330 tons; and the enemy's
total daily requirement would be 4,810 tons.


From the capacity of Korea's major lines of communications, judgments can be made as to how much reduction of that capacity could be sustained before enemy forces at the front no longer could obtain the needed quantities of supply. In their main structure, Korea's rail and road systems have a north-south orientation and assume an X-shaped pattern with the crossing at Seoul in western central Korea. The rail system in North Korea is divided by the mountainous backbone of the peninsula into a western and eastern network. The maximum peacetime capacity of the western network stood at 9,000 tons per day, of the eastern network at 5,000 tons per day. North Korea's road system, generally speaking, parallels the rail system, although the entire area is crisscrossed with roads of varying quality. During the war, 2,000 miles of roads were estimated to be in each half of North Korea. Although the peacetime capacity of North Korea's roads is not known, road engineers during the war estimated the capacity of these roads to be at least 1,500 tons
nightly.

...
procurement and distribution started with a combined North Korean-Chinese Rear Services Command under which six logistical commands operated. The distribution system extended from these logistical commands through a series of depots, sub-depots, and supply points to the front.

In moving supplies through this system, every available means of transportation was employed: railroads, trucks, pack animals, oxcarts, pushcarts, and human portage. This
display of versatility was both the strength and the weakness of the distribution system.
Whereas the wide use of more primitive modes of transportation permitted the delivery of supplies, it also restricted the enemy's ability to sustain offensive operations. Without
regard for any effect that UN interdictory efforts might have on the flow of enemy supply, it appears that enemy logistics, largely because of a lack of sufficient motor
transportation, were geared to sustain the impetus of an offensive for no more than 14 days.

...
In Phase I, which lasted from August through November 1950, selected rail and highway bridges were the principal targets. Until mid-September, the bridge targets were located variously from the bombline in southwestern Korea to the Yalu River boundary between Korea and Manchuria. It was the FEAF concept that destroying the main bridges in North Korea would sever enemy road and rail traffic from the north and that concurrent attacks on river crossings in South Korea would completely interdict the flow of enemy troops and materiel to the battlefront. In September and October, as UN troops pushed the NorthKoreans out of South Korea and moved above the 38th parallel, FEAF concentrated on bridges whose destruction could help to prevent an orderly retreat by the North Koreans.
Then, when the Chinese first appeared in Korea in late October and early November, interdictory air attacks centered on the international road and rail bridges spanning the Yalu

The best available evaluation of air operations during Phase I is found in the official Army history of that period of the Korean War. It gives air operations during the period the same credit as that given by General Walker, but presents a more moderate evaluation of the degree of effectiveness than that claimed by FEAF:

[By early July 1950,] UN air attacks on North Korean armor, transport, and foot columns had become ... sufficiently effective so that the enemy no longer placed his tanks, trucks, and long columns of marching men on the main roads in broad daylight. Afterward ... the enemy generally remained quiet and camouflaged in orchards and buildings during the daytime and moved at night. The North Koreans also used back roads and trails more than in the first two weeks of the invasion, and already by day were storing equipment and supplies in tunnels.


The Far East Air Forces probably exercised a greater relative influence in August 1950 in determining the outcome of the Korean battles than in any other month. [But] while it is clear that air power wrought great destruction of enemy equipment and troops during [August 1950], it is not possible to state accurately just how great it really was. Pilot claims are the basis of most estimates of air damage and destruction. Experience has shown that these are subject to many kinds of error.

[Overall,] the North Korean People's Army had shown a remarkable ability to maintain transport to its front lines over long lines of

communications despite heavy and constant air attacks. This accomplishment is one of the outstanding feats of the North Korean war
effort in the Pusan Perimeter period. The United Nations air effort failed to halt military rail transport. Ammunition and motor fuel, which took precedence over all other types of supply, continued to arrive at the front, though in diminished quantity. There was still a considerable resupply of heavy weapons, such as tanks, artillery, and mortars, at the front in early September, although a steady decline in artillery can be traced from the middle of August. There was a sufficient supply of small arms ammunition, but a shortage of small arms themselves became apparent by mid-August
and continued to worsen with each passing week. Rear areas were able to fill only about one third of the requisitions from the front for small arms in mid-August and resupply
ceased entirely about the middle of September. New trucks were almost impossible to obtain. There was no resupply of clothing. At best there were rations for only one or two

meals a day.

The above assessment, probably the most carefully researched study of the period in existence, does indeed credit air operations with a great deal of effective support. But it hardly permits the FEAF claim that air power was the decisive factor in defeating the North Korean Army. Contrary to FEAF expectations and claims, the North Korean's ability to repair bridges quickly, the fact that many streams were fordable, and a lack of effective night attack capability among the UNC air units allowed the flow of some enemy reinforcement and resupply to the front. At most, the interdictory effort did hamper enemy movements, especially of heavy equipment and guns, and in combination
with the UN ground defense, helped to dissipate the enemy's offensive capability and to reverse the course of the war.
 
While American aircraft carriers are liable to conduct lightning raids to smash coastal targets with good success, sticking around in a sustained campaign is just asking for the Red Airforce to find and bomb them.

I agree with the rest of your post, but I will niggle at this point: bombing a few KM destroyers and minesweepers in the confined waters of the Baltic is a far cry from taking on American fast carrier groups in the vast spaces of WestPac.

That said, I don't expect any sustained campaign against the Soviet Far East in the opening months of the war, not least because CINCPAC really wasn't ready to mount one. Lightning raids, and that's about it. A Soviet amphibious invasion of Hokkaido might change things, but I'm also doubtful that the Soviets would attempt one.
 
I don't know if I'd describe that as a wonder. In 1940, the Red Army was a incoherent mess with only sheer size going for it. By 1945, it was arguably most powerful ground force on the planet. In 1939, the US Army was weaker then Belgium's. By 1944, it was a lean, mean mechanized fighting machine capable of throwing down with any other Great Power's. 4-5 years is really a long time, in military terms particularly if your country possesses a lot of latent capacity.

Not to knock the Soviet achievement, which is truly awe inspiring; but it was achieved in the heat of total war.

What SAC became in the early 50's was accomplished in peacetime. Yes, in a Cold War, and yes, with a hot war in Korea; but that is just not the same thing as what the Soviets were undergoing in 1940-44.

More to the point, the Red Army - the greatest land combat force human history had ever seen - even on a good weekend couldn't have killed more than a couple hundred thousand combatants on a defended front. Whereas in the same period of time, Lemay by 1953 could kill a good 15-20 million Soviet citizens and utterly destroy a major industrialized economy stretching over a dozen time zones, even without multi-stage bombs. By the last 50's, of course, you could multiply the body count by ten.

Of course, the growth in Soviet strategic nuclear forces in the 1960's and 70's was almost as rapid and impressive.
 
Not to knock the Soviet achievement, which is truly awe inspiring; but it was achieved in the heat of total war.

What SAC became in the early 50's was accomplished in peacetime. Yes, in a Cold War, and yes, with a hot war in Korea; but that is just not the same thing as what the Soviets were undergoing in 1940-44.

But the Soviet Union isn't the only example I listed. I also listed the US Army's transformation in WW2. If one wants peacetime build-ups, then how about Germany's military build-up in the mid/late-30s. Or France and Britains military build-up in 1938-1940 which, while it still failed to produce a force capable of defeating Germany in that timeframe, still saw massive expansion in capability. Going in the opposite direction, the US Army's deformation after both world wars was even more rapid then their increases. The bottom line is that a year is, from a military perspective, a longer period of time then people can appreciate.

In modern times, it's really cases where a military has failed to improve despite having years or even decades of investment in it. Like Iraq, which has only ever managed to sidestep their defects at best and not solve them at worst.

More to the point, the Red Army - the greatest land combat force human history had ever seen - even on a good weekend couldn't have killed more than a couple hundred thousand combatants on a defended front. Whereas in the same period of time, Lemay by 1953 could kill a good 15-20 million Soviet citizens and utterly destroy a major industrialized economy stretching over a dozen time zones, even without multi-stage bombs. By the last 50's, of course, you could multiply the body count by ten.

Well, of course. But that's more due to the nature of nuclear weaponry then SAC's organizational transformation. Had SACs transformation as a military organization occurred in a world where the ASB, it's ability to kill and harm would be vastly less impressive yet that wouldn't change the fact SAC would have undergone an extreme improvement in military effectiveness.

_Strategic Air Command People, aircraft and Missiles_ 2nd ed. Polmar and Laur
pg15. One Squadron of the 301st was present June. The others I listed were all in place in W.Germany and East Anglia by the end of July.

Again, I can't find any full group basing prior to 1949. Squadrons being rotated through, sure. Furthermore, and again since you ignore (and probably can't answer) this, to expect these bombers to accomplish anything from bases that are vulnerable to Soviet air attack, and even ground attack in the case of Western Germany, against the masses of fighter aircraft the Soviets have available to them or how the enormous list of issues in maintenance and crew training iterated in this thread will hamstring the B-29, whether in the conventional or nuclear role, even if the ASB waves his wand and wishes the VVS/PVO away.

We have been over how awesome the DPRK logistics were in earlier discussions, moving by night, off the roads.

Yes, we have. And as I pointed out last time, how the North Koreans and Chinese increased supply throughput does not change the fact that they did improve supply throughout throughout the war and did so with but a fraction of the resources available and under air conditions far less favorable then the Soviet Union could expect. Even your quoted bits toward the end are limited to a brief period of the war in 1950 and even it admits that it was due to North Korea's own logistical incompetence rather then the air effort. It does not at all pay attention to the period after the Chinese intervention in 1951-53 when, for example, the quantity of communist supply of shells in July 1953 was 22 times that of August 1951 and Korean/Chinese soldiers went from being half-dead of starvation in the winter of 1950/51 to eating better then they had in civilian life by the spring of '53. What's more, your still desperately trying to ignore that this was done with but a fraction of the logistical resources the USSR possesses and under air conditions which favored the US rather then the USSR, when the opposite would be true in a war in 1948. You simply have no answer to that fact.

I agree with the rest of your post, but I will niggle at this point: bombing a few KM destroyers and minesweepers in the confined waters of the Baltic is a far cry from taking on American fast carrier groups in the vast spaces of WestPac.

If the USN wants to conduct a sustained campaign against the Soviet Far East, their gonna have to leave the West Pacific, come into the Sea of Okhotsk (sailing past Soviet aligned territory in Korea and the Kuriles to boot, which could give the Russians a heads-up), and stay there. It will also help that a fleet of the size you need for continuous operations won't be hard to find either and conducting continual air operations puts its own restrictions on your movement. For the VVS and AV-MF to find the carrier groups would then be much more akin to hunting in the confines of the Baltic Sea rather then the West Pacific and once they have the location of a group that's in range, it becomes a numbers game that the carriers can't hope to match. Mind the carriers would also have to enter the Sea of Okhotsk for lightning raids, but the difference is that they can strike a quick succession of targets with a much lighter footprint, leave before Soviet air recon can home in on them, quickly resupply and replenish lost aircraft, and then come back for another series of raids after a little bit.
 
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Given the overwhelming Soviet superiority at the outset, expenditures are likely to be low in it's rapid conquest of Europe and even as industry ramps up supply is likely to outpace demand by a large amount. As it was, the Soviets had enough assorted tanks, artillery pieces, and other equipment in storage that they planned to raise an additional 125 rifle divisions under the late-1940s TO&E on top of their standing army of 175 divisions in the first three months of war.

No, the Soviets did not have a "standing army" of 175 divisions.

The formations existed but few were at full strength; US intelligence did not know that at the time and overstated Soviet capabilities.
 
How far into the Middle East could the Soviets get? If the Red Army can capture most of the Persian Gulf's oil reserves intact, that could be a major problem for western energy.

Capturing the Turkish Straits and the Suez Canal (or making it inoperable for the allies) seem like possible Soviet goals.
 
No, the Soviets did not have a "standing army" of 175 divisions.

The formations existed but few were at full strength; US intelligence did not know that at the time and overstated Soviet capabilities.

We've been over this. That only a third of the Soviets standing army was at full readiness at any given moment does not change the existence that the Soviets had 175 divisions all of which could all be at full strength and ready to go within a month, which is months faster then the Western Allies ability to reinforce Europe. Even the full-readiness formations, about 1/3rd the Soviet force, represents a force several times larger then that of the global US Army in 1948, let alone the Allied forces in Western Europe. I have already shown that not only was US intelligence aware that not all Soviet formations were at full strength, but also that their overestimates were minor enough that even factoring them out, their analysis of Soviet capabilities were accurate Red Army.

Given the qualitative and quantitative superiority of the Red Army, that’s eminently doable. Hell, the Germans in 1940 would have killed for the sort of numerical and material advantages over the French that the Red Army had over the Anglo-French-Americans in ‘48. As one post-Cold War study noted, the enactment of the Berlin blockade saw the Red Army deploy 8 full-readiness divisions into assembly areas along the border in the course of a single night. That is only one shy of three times the number of divisions the western alliance have in Western Germany, none of which were more then half-ready. Compare this to 1940, when the Germans were operating at numerical parity, and even inferiority in several categories, and won through a mix of skill and luck (that is, qualitative superiority). The outlook is simply awful good for any unfortunate American, British, or French serviceman on the European continent in '48.

Did you actually read it? Because paging through, it pretty clearly largely verifies it. It declares the overestimate in 1948 to be extremely minor and goes on to say:

"These new sources make clear that American and NATO intelligence did not purposely exaggerate Soviet capabilities. In fact, they seem to have underestimated them as often as they overestimated them. Moreover, the problems they had in estimating Soviet capabilities concerned primarily the interior of the Soviet Union, not the forces in Eastern Europe and the western districts of the Soviet Union that would have participated in any invasion of Western Europe. American and NATO leaders were generally able to construct an accurate estimate of Soviet capabilities oriented towards Western Europe and of the policy options available to them."

The fact that western estimates about Soviet Union's capabilities towards Western Europe are judged as accurate and western estimates on this account, at this time projected the USSR's ability to rapidly overrun the whole of continental Western Europe in a full-scale invasion really rather says it all.

It also marks 1948 as the year western intelligence went from overestimating the Red Army's size (although, notably, not it's quality, which seems to be consistently underestimated throughout this period) to underestimating it, as the Red Army built up it's strength during the course of the year. The fact it was able to make NATO estimates undershoot their mark in the course of what was (by Soviet standards) a slow build-up says rather a lot about how rapidly it could increase it's strength in a all-out mobilization that war would entail.

By this point, it's rather clear that the idea that the Soviets wouldn't inflict crushing battlefield defeats at the start of the war and seize Europe are completely whistling in the dark.

How far into the Middle East could the Soviets get? If the Red Army can capture most of the Persian Gulf's oil reserves intact, that could be a major problem for western energy.

Capturing the Turkish Straits and the Suez Canal (or making it inoperable for the allies) seem like possible Soviet goals.

The US and British expected the Soviets to be able to overrun Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and much of Jordan-Palestine. The fact the Soviets would capture so much of the Persian Gulf's oil was of great concern to the Western Allies, although they had plans to sabotage the Middle Eastern refineries that were of... variable quality, but the America's had an excess of oil and could pick up the slack for Britain.
 
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Well, of course. But that's more due to the nature of nuclear weaponry then SAC's organizational transformation.

It's actually a testament to four things: the nature of nuclear weaponry, the resources available to the United States to produce and improve them on a massive scale (resources only available to the two superpowers), the political will to use those resources in peacetime, and the tremendous effectiveness of Curtis Lemay as SAC commander, who, right murderous bastard that he was, is still the most brilliant and effective leader United States military aviation has ever produced.

And on top of that, it is not just the bombs, but the bombers which could deliver them on a large scale literally halfway around the world. In less than 20 years, the United States went from the Martin B-10 to the Boeing B-52. That is also amazing to think about.

But yes, inventing the bomb was the most important breakthrough. And it made possible a scale and speed of destructive power which would have been regarded as utter fantasy just a few years before. My observation was really more about the stunning rapidity of human technological and organizational advances in the mid-20th century than it was American awesomeness, if that wasn't clear.
 
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The fact the Soviets would capture so much of the Persian Gulf's oil was of great concern to the Western Allies, although they had plans to sabotage the Middle Eastern refineries that were of... variable quality, but the America's had an excess of oil and could pick up the slack for Britain.

Yes, the real blow here would be that this oil would be denied to the Allies more than that it would accrue to the Soviets. The Brits would end up even more dependent on the US.

Anyway, even if the Allies didn't manage to destroy all the oil infrastructure before the Soviets overran it all, there would be no infrastructure in place to transport it back to the USSR. But then the Soviets didn't need the oil urgently at that point anyway.
 
We've been over this. That only a third of the Soviets standing army was at full readiness at any given moment does not change the existence that the Soviets had 175 divisions all of which could all be at full strength and ready to go within a month, which is months faster then the Western Allies ability to reinforce Europe. Even the full-readiness formations, about 1/3rd the Soviet force, represents a force several times larger then that of the global US Army in 1948, let alone the Allied forces in Western Europe. I have already shown that not only was US intelligence aware that not all Soviet formations were at full strength, but also that their overestimates were minor enough that even factoring them out, their analysis of Soviet capabilities were accurate Red Army...

Months to re enforce Europe? This is not D-Day, then a case of attacking, but a defence this time around. Hold the Russians at the Rhine, hopefully, if not, before Paris? There are no U-Boats to worry about, and with aircraft like the C-54, let alone the C-47 (yes it will take longer to get across, need to refuel) but there's a hell of a lot of them. Hell just pack them into B-24's if needs be. 15,000 within a week, just by air? Two weeks and 50,000 men?
 
Months to re enforce Europe? This is not D-Day, then a case of attacking, but a defence this time around. Hold the Russians at the Rhine, hopefully, if not, before Paris? There are no U-Boats to worry about, and with aircraft like the C-54, let alone the C-47 (yes it will take longer to get across, need to refuel) but there's a hell of a lot of them. Hell just pack them into B-24's if needs be. 15,000 within a week, just by air? Two weeks and 50,000 men?

Your right this is not D-Day. That's why I said it would take months and not years. That's based on the actual history, where between the decision being made to reinforce Europe in the wake of the Chinese Yalu offensive was made in December 1950 and the first actual units arriving in Europe was May 1951 and that was with Europe receiving priority. Going "why don't the US just airlift men over" ignores two things. First, that the bulk of US airlift capacity was committed to supplying Berlin and a large proportion would be lost if things got violent (something that caused the JCS no end of concern, since it would undermine plans to reinforce Japan and Britain in certain timeframes). The second problem is that you need more then just raw manpower. The men need to be trained and disciplined to adequate standards, something which the US Army was distinctly lacking in 1948, and they need to be organized into coherent military units and formations. And their going to need more then just personal weapons, which is the most airlift can efficiently provide. Prepositioned weapon stocks weren't established in the 40s and most of the WW2 equipment has either been scrapped or is already in use, so your basically relying on stumbling across WW2 leftovers that have been forgotten about (and hence are probably poorly maintained) for things like crew-served weapons, armor, and artillery, plus the munitions and spare parts for them. And you need enough of them. Even your figure of 50,000 pales in comparison to the 7-800,000+ men the Soviets will have storming westward before we factor in mobilization, never mind what they'll have two weeks into the conflict.

The US airlifting 50,000 poorly trained, poorly disciplined, unorganized light infantry into France at the two week mark is basically just tossing the Soviets 50,000 POWs.
 
something which the US Army was distinctly lacking in 1948, and they need to be organized into coherent military units and formations.

A lot of people just don't realize how drastically drawn down the United States Army was by the late 1940's. Demobilization reduced the Army "to a state of near impotency,....weakened the prestige of our national policy, and endangered the security of the Nation." (Sparrow, John C. History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army Center of Military History, United States Army, 1994, p. 383)

Sparrow, by the way, recounts George C Marshall's comments to the orientation conference at the Fourth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in March and April 1947 - which failed principally because of the Soviet attitude on the status of Germany
and Austria and the question of reparations:

I remember, when I was Secretary of State I was being pressed constantly, particularly when in Moscow, by radio message after radio message to give the Russians hell .... When I got back, I was getting the same appeal in relation to the Far East and China. At that time, my facilities for giving them hell - and I am a soldier and know something about the ability to give hell - was 1 ⅓ divisions over the entire United States. That is quite a proposition when you deal with somebody with over 260 and you have 1⅓. We had nothing in Alaska. We did not have enough to defend the air strip up at Fairbanks ... .​

There *were* millions of men in the civilian workforce with combat experience and training and still of age for service, and you could draft many back into the ranks - but obviously, that can't be done overnight.
 
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