The Berlin Blockade leads to World War III. Who wins?

Through the 1960s there were missions for nuclear strike against the USSR that were "one way" in the sense that from an expected launch point the aircraft would not be able to exit enemy airspace before it ran out of fuel. The crew was planning to get as close as possible to friendly or neutral territory, and also plan to avoid other known nuke strikes and then bail out and hike out to "safety". Let me just say I will state authoritatively this was the case. Exactly when these missions fell off the SIOP plans I can't vouch for.
 
Hate to quibble with the Leader of 10,000,000 Men, but...

Even ferry range is not enough for that. Leaving aside that India by '48 is a neutral third party, which means any aircraft heading there is gonna be interned, the aircraft having to sacrifice fuel to carry ordinance means that it would run out well before leaving Russia. The Guam to Washington and Hokkaido to Washington trick flights were done without any ordinance onboard and shoved full of fuel. That isn't going to work for a genuine combat mission.(End Quote)

Disagree with your contentions; With regard to possible end point of a transpolar mission, I believe I wrote "latitude of Delhi", which leaves an infinite number of possible landing locations without internment. Next, the exact distance between two points and a pilot's flight log may differ. Here the Earth great circle distance between Guam and Washington, DC and my recollection of Col Irvine's estimate may differ up to 3.5%. Recall, we are discussing B-29 records, including the Hawaii to Egypt flight which has an EGC distance of about 9400 miles between locations, but shows a substantial dogleg to the south in the readily available public record. The actual distance flown is likely closer to 10,000 miles. The B-50, with a substantially higher takeoff weight would easily be capable of lugging tail guns and at least one Fat Man over this demonstrated distance, which exceeds the polar shuttle distance discussed. Range is range.

ObssesedNuker continues:

Right on the latter half, seems I got those two confused. Although the Guam to Washington flight was 7,916 miles, not 8,200 miles (which is the distance from Guam to Washington as any check. In any case, citing trick flights with aircraft that have been modded for nothing but range tells us little about how combat flights would work out.

No It don't tell us how the flights would work out, any more than, for example, Korean events- but it does tell us the the flights could have been flown with readily prepared aircraft.

Dynasoar

Note: The second paragraph should not have been shaded since it is my text.
 
Resurrecting this thread a little bit to pontificate a bit on the Middle Eastern Theater of War. I recently got my hands on Michael Cohen's Fighting WW3 From the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945-1954, which not only discusses US and British (mainly British) war planning for the Middle East in this period but also relates these war plans to military and political realities in the region. The US left most of the specific defense planning for this region to the British, so it's their plans we have to turn too.

The nearest such plan, Sanddown technically post-dates the POD, being drafted in July/August of 1948 for a war in 1949 but it's the closest to a specific war plan for the region I've seen rather then the more overarching US Pincher-series which dominate this time period. The plan identified four potential strategic defense lines: the outer-ring, the inner ring, the Lebanon-Jordan line, and the Ramallah line. The outer-ring encompasses the series of mountains and mount passes in a broad semi-circle across Southeastern Anatolia down through coastal Iran. The Inner Ring . Given the utter lack of military resources and their proximity to the initial start of the Soviet assault, no hope was given to defending inner ring save as delaying. Not even that much was achievable for the outer-ring, save in so far as the Turks could manage on their own. The Lebanon-Jordan line was deemed a feasible line for a stand, but the British doubted they could achieve more then delay even if they had everything in place and so concluded it would all come down to the Ramallah line ( the dotted line in the picture below). Once that was breached, the Suez Canal and Abu Sueir air base would be within range of Soviet short-range tactical air and hence would be easily within Soviet capacity to be neutralized. The initial Soviet assault along the Eastern Anatolia and Iran-Iraq routes would be combined to equal some 30-35 western divisions at the outset, but by the time the Soviets reach Israel and West Jordan, the logistical bottlenecks, occupation demands, and needs to secure LOCs were projected to reduce this down to around 9 to 11 divisions by the time they hit the Lebanon-Jordan and Ramallah lines. On the whole, the British expected to have a little over 8 Anglo-American divisions, plus Arab Legion and Israelis forces (although the latter were never explicitly counted). So in sum, the British based their hopes that they could confront the Soviets on more-or-less equal numerical terms by the time the Soviets reached the Ramallah Line.

knqytaB.png


However, Cohen notes that there was significant disconnect between political and military realities and what the plan called for. In addition to noting that the plans demanded more military resources to be deployed already in region at the start of the war then actually ever existed in this time period and was impossibly optimistic about the timeframes for reinforcement given persisting logistical and military weakness, he also observes that pre-war cooperation between the UK and Israel that would be required to make these plans work never occurred. There were attempts made to open discussion in 1949, after the PoD, but they tended to founder on British reluctance to subordinate their relation with Arab countries to that of Israel, the Israelis (understandable) unwillingness to be subordinated, and the Americans lack of interest in getting involved in the whole mess (Cohen observes that the US had a contradictory policy of not getting involved in regional politics despite the fact their use of regional bases would require them to do so). Given that the OPs posited WW3 in June 1948, Anglo-American troops would be inserting themselves into the dead middle of the first Arab-Israelis War. The possibility of their entire defense of the region, such as it exists, collapsing due to the political complications this could cause is quite real. Expecting the Arab Legion and Israelis to smoothly join together when just a little while ago they would have been machine gunning each other is one rather glaring problem, as is the Israelis reaction to possibly having to abandon half their country should the Allies be forced to fall back to the Ramallah line.

Cohen, in summing it all up, states:

In retrospect, Allied contingency plans appear as little short of a farce! With the wisdom of hindsight, one might now ask what was the point of it all? Did the planners not realize how far their drawing-board schemes were removed from reality?

The Soviets could have conquered the Middle East with relative ease at any time during the first decade after the war, although they would have had to run the risk of nuclear retaliation. In 1949, Britain lost American military commitment to the Middle East. And the main strategic function of that theatre, to serve as a launching platform for the Allied strategic air offensive, was in fact never consummated. Even if the runways at Abu Sueir were readied for the B-29s*, the special refueling system they needed was never installed.

Both the Americans and the British knew that there was no question of manning the optimal defense line, the Outer Ring, in the foreseeable future. Nor were there sufficient forces even to hold the Inner Ring.
-Pg 328

Of course, Cohen goes onto observe:

But the historian is required also to ask what were the alternatives open to the Allies? Should they have simply abdicated power to the Soviets, and evacuated the Middle East? Had the Soviets established themselves consequently in the Near and Middle East, would Britain have felt safer? Would not NATO have been outflanked?

It has been suggested recently that the COS (Chief of Staffs) tended 'to plan on the basis of geostrategic concepts rather than economic or political reality'. The inference appears to be that the COS should have taken into account factors other than military and strategic requirements.

However, it was the CoS's duty to recommend to the government the best military measures to protect the nation's interests, and to warn of the risks if their recommendations were not adopted. Indeed, in respect of the need to hold Abu Sueir, the COS argued that nothing less than Britain's very survival as a state was dependent upon it. It was the government's, not the military's responsibility to define national priorities, to distribute the nation's resources as it saw fit - and to bear responsibility for the consequences.
-Pg 328-329

What matters to us is less that latter conclusion, but the consequences he alludes too had a full war actually broken out given that the military, political, and economic requirements for a successful defense of the Middle East were not yet met.

Given the above military political difficulties, I have to reassess that the likelihood of the Soviets seizing the Suez region is higher then I originally anticipated. If that happens, then it's a massive setback to the US plans for an atomic bombing campaign. The Trans-Volga-Ural and West Siberian industries would be pushed out of range and the proportion of Soviet petroleum targets which are within of range of B-29s drops from 72% to 12% and within range of B-50s from 94% to 25%, and this is without taking into account the fact that the approach from the Middle East was less well defended by Soviet air defenses in the late-40s then the approach from Britain. While it probably doesn't change the ultimate outcome, the US simply has to wait to push out more B-47s and B-36s, it does lengthen the war even further then I anticipated and give the Soviets more chance to get in atomic counter-punches and do overall more damage.

*And they weren't: Cohen observes that the lengthening didn't occur until 1950.

No It don't tell us how the flights would work out, any more than, for example, Korean events- but it does tell us the the flights could have been flown with readily prepared aircraft.

The Korean War actually is much more closer to what reality would look like, given that they were actual combat missions against armed opposition rather then the trick flights which devoted their weight to fuel and were devoid of any armaments. If anything, the Korean War was far more favorable to the USAF then a WW3 scenario, given that the B-29s only had to cover a much smaller distance in enemy controlled territory from bases in quite close proximity, encountered much weaker opposition, and had to deal with enemies bases and air defense posts that were beyond the target they were trying to get at rather then between them and the targets, and could count on significant escorts from nearby US fighter bases. None of this is true for raids in a late-40s WW3 scenario.

In any case, USAAC/USAF documentation is quite explicit on the actual combat radius of a B-29S and B-50S when loaded down with an atomic bomb: 1,600 and 2,000 miles respectively. So talk about 10,000 mile atomic bomb strikes in the late-40s is pure persiflage.
 
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In any case, USAAC/USAF documentation is quite explicit on the actual combat radius of a B-29S and B-50S when loaded down with an atomic bomb: 1,600 and 2,000 miles respectively.

August 14th, 1945 Standard B-29A of the 315th with typical late war armament of just tailguns, planned what would be the last mission of WWII to hit the Nippon Oil Refinery well north of Tokyo

14,500 pounds of bombs 1870 miles away, with 360 mile fuel reserve.

Fatman was 10,300 pounds, so that leaves 4200 pounds more for fuel. At low cruise(220mph) the B-29 would burn 475 GPH. That adds a bit to range right there.

B-50s had a far higher MTO than the B-29A, too.
 
August 14th, 1945 Standard B-29A of the 315th with typical late war armament of just tailguns, planned what would be the last mission of WWII to hit the Nippon Oil Refinery well north of Tokyo

14,500 pounds of bombs 1870 miles away, with 360 mile fuel reserve.

Fatman was 10,300 pounds, so that leaves 4200 pounds more for fuel. At low cruise(220mph) the B-29 would burn 475 GPH. That adds a bit to range right there.

On the one hand, we have actual USAC/USAF documentation on what the B-29S combat radius looks like when loaded with an atomic bomb as cited by academics (like Curatola's book, to which I have repeatedly referred too). And ones in which the returning aircraft only barely managed to make it back to base on fumes as it was.

On the other hand, we have an appeal to a completely different non-atomic bombing raid using aircraft optimized in a manner the USAF can't hope to resort to against the USSR if they want their aircraft to actually survive fighting through Soviet air defenses.

I know which one I'm looking too as an example.
 

kernals12

Banned
I worked some of this out on my own thread.

Here's what I assume the nuclear strikes would look like.
screen-shot-2019-03-29-at-8-40-58-am-png.450063

The USSR's major industrial areas, population centers, and ports would get hit, including 3 strikes on Moscow and 2 on Leningrad. The most important goal would be disrupting Russian tank production
screen-shot-2019-03-29-at-8-41-18-am-png.450064

To keep the Russians out of Iran and India, there would be strikes on the major cities in Central Asia
screen-shot-2019-03-29-at-8-45-05-am-png.450066

Vladivostok certainly would not be spared given its naval importance, and the major cities in the Communist controlled parts of China, plus Pyongyang would get hit.
In total that's 21 Atomic Attacks.




Life on the home front:

Purging and Internment of Communist Sympathizers and Fellow Travelers
Vito Marcantonio
Paul Robeson
Earl Browder
Dalton Trombo
Pete Seeger
William Z Foster
Harold Laski
Willie Gallacher
Phil Piratin
Harry Pollitt

Distribution of Anti-Communist Propaganda
412px-is_this_tomorrow-371x540-jpg.453389

1950-red-octopus-leaflet-600x400-jpg.453392


Rationing of scarce war materials:
Total substitution of rubber and cotton for synthetics?
Increased use of plastic, perhaps total disappearance of wooden furniture

Industrial Changes:
Quicker switch to basic oxygen steelmaking
Increased use of Underground Coal Gasification?
Assembly line production of homes becomes the norm

Social Impact:
First war where a non-negligible share of the population owns television sets
First war with desegregated military
Boost to "Great Migration"
Interruption of Baby Boom?
Wyoming sees population boom from Uranium mining
Earlier construction of highway networks?

Political Impact:
Strengthening of calls for economic planning and social insurance
Complete ostracization of isolationists (e.g. Robert Taft, Henry Wallace)
Promise of independence for colonies in exchange for wartime support
 
I worked some of this out on my own thread.

Obviously done without any research into the matter. The US aimed for three strikes per city as a matter of in their wartime planning.

Promise of independence for colonies in exchange for wartime support

Probably the opposite. The Soviet and socialist sympathies of many nationalist movements would result in greater opposition to them, as happened OTL in Vietnam.

EDIT: Also, reading into the thread, I can't help but notice that Sloreck is peddling fantasies again.

If the USSR is fighting in Europe trying to reach the Channel, and dealing with restive populations in Eastern Europe, as well as having to guard the Soviet Far East against raids by USN and USAF forces in the Pacific/Japan, their ability to do much in Persia/Iran is limited. The locals are not going to be happy seeing communist Russians in their country, and the northern part of the country is well set up for defense. The part of the country that really matters, the major oil fields, is further south and along the coast where western naval and air power can be used very effectively to protect this. The USSR does not have the forces or logistic infrastructure in 1948 to get to the oil fields here and do the other tasks at hand. Getting to Iraqi oil fields let alone Saudi ones and/or closing the Gulf to tanker traffic is really beyond what they can do.

This is pure wishful thinking devoid of any actual research into the matter.
 
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kernals12

Banned
Obviously done without any research into the matter. The US aimed for three strikes per city as a matter of in their wartime planning.



Probably the opposite. The Soviet and socialist sympathies of many nationalist movements would result in greater opposition to them, as happened OTL in Vietnam.
3 strikes per city with an arsenal of 50 bombs in 1948?
 
3 strikes per city with an arsenal of 50 bombs in 1948?

Hey, as I have observed repeatedly in this thread: what American war planning called for and what it's forces could actually deliver were two completely different things. To be frank, it's forces weren't set-up to successfully deliver one atomic strike in 1948, as I have repeatedly demonstrated in this thread. It simply doesn't have the crews, aircraft, bases, logistical, and maintenance support.
 
On the one hand, we have actual USAC/USAF documentation on what the B-29S combat radius looks like when loaded with an atomic bomb as cited by academics (like Curatola's book, to which I have repeatedly referred too). And ones in which the returning aircraft only barely managed to make it back to base on fumes as it was.

On the other hand, we have an appeal to a completely different non-atomic bombing raid using aircraft optimized in a manner the USAF can't hope to resort to against the USSR if they want their aircraft to actually survive fighting through Soviet air defenses.

I know which one I'm looking too as an example.

Yeah, why use an Combat mission that actually happened with 132 older, less capable bombers as a template? You think 7.25 tons of individual bombs over that distance couldn't be done with the improved Silverplates or B-50s after the war?
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Caden.jpg
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all 315th BW
 
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Yeah, why use an mission that actually happened with 132 older, less capable bombers as a template?

Because it's a mission in a configuration that is completely inappropriate for an atomic strike against a foe with significant IADS like the Soviet Union possesses in 1948?

You think 7.25 tons of individual bombs over that distance couldn't be done with the improved Silverplates.

Seeing as the B-29S's available in mid-1948 were leftovers from the 1945/46 program who, by SAC's own description, "were heavily worn out" and "beginning to show their age" back in 1947 (Bigger Bombs for a Better Tomorrow, Curatola, Pg 159)... no.

or B-50s after the war?

Well, if you reread my posts you'll see that I noted the USAF rated a atomic-ladened B-50s combat radius as 2,000 miles, so no duh the B-50 could manage a 1,700 mile raid so you can cut it out with the strawman. The bigger problem was that even the unmodified variants of the B-50 had such teething problems that they couldn't reach operational service until 1949, nevermind those modified under the Saddletree program which didn't reach operational service until 1950 (same source as above).
 
Because it's a mission in a configuration that is completely inappropriate for an atomic strike against a foe with significant IADS like the Soviet Union possesses in 1948?

Using Radar that wasn't any better than Chain Home in 1940, sure, you bet. The newer Soviet Radars introduced for 1948 were almost as good as midwar UK Sets.
But you seem to never want to admit that their perimeter was not that well covered by even those older Radar sets at this time
 
Seeing as the B-29S's available in mid-1948 were leftovers from the 1945/46 program who, by SAC's own description, "were heavily worn out" and "beginning to show their age" back in 1947 (Bigger Bombs for a Better Tomorrow, Curatola, Pg 159)... no.

From SAC wanting more B-36, that's why they would downplay the existing aircraft. Of course that is what they would say. They wanted as many new planes as they could get out of Congress!
 
@ObssesedNuker : Feel free to disagree with me, but do keep it polite, thank you. However:
1. In 1948 the populations in Eastern Europe were not exactly thrilled to be under Soviet domination, there were partisan movements in Ukraine, Baltics, elsewhere still going on - not very effective to be sure but certainly indicative of a level of dissatisfaction. In case of a war between "NATO" (yes I know it wasn't officially there yet) and the USSR if the western allies are not doing their best to amp these folks up they are dumber than a bag of hammers.
2. In 1948 the Soviet naval force in the Pacific was miniscule, and had functionally minimal if any amphibious capability. Once the US mobilizes to any extent the US Pacific Fleet is going to be able to attack the Kuriles and Petropavlosk relatively freely, and represents a threat to Sakhalin and Vladivostok especially in conjunction with air forces out of Japan.
3. It is a matter of fact that the oil rich areas of Iran/Persia are in the south close to the Persian Gulf. The Soviets have zero ability in 1948 to put any naval power in that area, the Red Sea, or the Western Indian Ocean. Even with the improvements made by the USA/UK during WWII to the infrastructure from the ports to the Soviet border, it is limited and has many choke points. Until you get well south in Iran/Persia the terrain is quite mountainous which significantly favors the defense.

If the USSR decides that the Schwerpunckt is going to be the oil fields in Iraq, Iran/Persia, and Saudi Arabia they are going to have to move significant distances through areas with poor infrastructure. If they are massing the resources needed to crush "NATO" in the west getting to the Rhine quickly and hopefully to the Channel and Pyrenees before the US can get much mobilization done I would love to see the OOB for the west, and what is left over for a thrust south.

#'s 1-3 are facts, not speculation. Whether or not you think they matter is a different story.
 
Using Radar that wasn't any better than Chain Home in 1940, sure, you bet. The newer Soviet Radars introduced for 1948 were almost as good as midwar UK Sets.
But you seem to never want to admit that their perimeter was not that well covered by even those older Radar sets at this time

I've already debunked this assertion in this thread and you haven't mustered any actual reply:

So what? Chain Home was inferior to a lot of it's German counterparts at the time, yet the British still mounted a more effective air defense intercept better then the Germans would a year later. What mattered is how the British used it, integrating it into a national air defense system. Given the poor state of SAC ECM as late as 1950, that would be more then enough.

David Holloway disagrees and unlike you, his assertion has a citation from the Soviets (Col. N. Iakimanskii and Maj. V. Gorbunov, "Nekotorye voprosy razvitiia teorii operativnogo iskusstva i taktiki Voisk PVO strany v poslevoennyi period," Voenno istoricheskii zhurnal, 1973, no. 3, p. 39.) which clearly shows the European ingress routes are covered.

Seems to me the issue is more that you don't want to admit that the bomber doesn't always get through, don't want to actually face up to the reality of the state of SAC's readiness and the Soviet's capabilities in 1948, and are going through massive contortions to try and deny the preponderance of evidence and associated conclusions that actual academic scholars have presented on the matter.

From SAC wanting more B-36, that's why they would downplay the existing aircraft. Of course that is what they would say. They wanted as many new planes as they could get out of Congress!

So SAC internal reports on the status of their aircraft inventory are completely falsified then? This is conspiracy theorist levels of argument.

@ObssesedNuker : Feel free to disagree with me, but do keep it polite, thank you. However:
1. In 1948 the populations in Eastern Europe were not exactly thrilled to be under Soviet domination, there were partisan movements in Ukraine, Baltics, elsewhere still going on - not very effective to be sure but certainly indicative of a level of dissatisfaction. In case of a war between "NATO" (yes I know it wasn't officially there yet) and the USSR if the western allies are not doing their best to amp these folks up they are dumber than a bag of hammers.
2. In 1948 the Soviet naval force in the Pacific was miniscule, and had functionally minimal if any amphibious capability. Once the US mobilizes to any extent the US Pacific Fleet is going to be able to attack the Kuriles and Petropavlosk relatively freely, and represents a threat to Sakhalin and Vladivostok especially in conjunction with air forces out of Japan.
3. It is a matter of fact that the oil rich areas of Iran/Persia are in the south close to the Persian Gulf. The Soviets have zero ability in 1948 to put any naval power in that area, the Red Sea, or the Western Indian Ocean. Even with the improvements made by the USA/UK during WWII to the infrastructure from the ports to the Soviet border, it is limited and has many choke points. Until you get well south in Iran/Persia the terrain is quite mountainous which significantly favors the defense.[/quote]

1. Yes, eventually the East European partisans would become an issue. However, it's a long-term development that is completely irrelevant to whether the Soviets could invade the Middle East.
2. Soviet Pacific naval forces, while certainly inadequate for any conceivable offensive engagement, is capable of mounting defensive operations that will make WAllied operations within the Sea's of Okhotsk riskier then you are portraying, especially since they'll be operating in conjunction with Soviet land-based air, which will make continuous naval operations too risky. We have previously discussed this in this very thread. As threats, the US Pacific Fleet can certainly launch attacks but they'll be pinpricks incapable of representing serious draws on Soviet land resources or doing any substantial damage above the tactical level to Soviet ground and air forces. They may ultimately wipe out the Soviet Pacific Fleet, but with the Soviets having solid land connections to the Far East Asia, that is an irrelevancy to their ability to continue to fight in the Far Eastern Theater. It is also, again, irrelevant to their ability to invade the Middle East (or even occupy South Korea, which would be rather trivial given the US intended to abandon it).
3. The Soviets don't need naval forces to close the straits. Once they secure southern Iran, which was universally agreed to occur in a matter of weeks, they could close the straits with airpower, tossing mines off of commandeered fishing boats (or, again, dropping them from airplanes), and coastal artillery. Your appeal to the mountainous terrain ignores that there are no significant forces with which to actually defend it and in the absence of that, overcoming difficult terrain is just a matter of marching. In 1941 the Iranians put up a quite earnest effort at opposing the Soviet invasion and barely even annoyed the invading Soviet forces: the Soviets reached Qoms, south of Tehran, after a mere 4 days. And this was the Red Army of 1941 using a bunch of hastily slapped together reservists that could be spared from the main front against Germany! The 1948 Red Army is far better equipped, trained, and led and has vastly better logistical support infrastructure while the Iranian Army has barely changed at all. The Red Army has a solid history of moving and supplying large mechanized forces across regions of relatively poor logistical infrastructure with inclement terrain and actual studies of the region by expert logisticians have concluded that the Soviets could easily support up to 35 divisions plus support elements through the Caucuses and Central Asian routes, far in excess of what is needed to actually conquer the Middle East against local forces.

If the USSR decides that the Schwerpunckt is going to be the oil fields in Iraq, Iran/Persia, and Saudi Arabia they are going to have to move significant distances through areas with poor infrastructure.

Which the Red Army has a solid track record of doing, against opposition much stronger then they could be expected to face in Iran and Iraq, and they have even more logistical resources to support it with by '48.

If they are massing the resources needed to crush "NATO" in the west getting to the Rhine quickly and hopefully to the Channel and Pyrenees before the US can get much mobilization done I would love to see the OOB for the west, and what is left over for a thrust south.

This reveals the lack of research you have done on the subject and you should really read the article I've linked too repeatedly in this thread. As it illustrates, the Soviets mobilization system could have their standing army of 175 divisions fully staffed and ready to go by the end of 20-days from the start of mobilization, which is months faster then the US could send over even a single additional division. They could allot 60 divisions to an invasion of Western Europe (which is a force the United States wouldn't be expected to be able to mobilize globally until after a year-and-a-half), another 30-35 divisions for the Middle East via the Caucasus (as I previously noted), and would still have more then 80 divisions for duties like the expected operations in Southeast Europe (against Greece and the Bosphorous/Western Anatolia), occupation, area defense, and supporting operations in the Far East to occupy South Korea and probably assist Mao in China. This is before we factor in that at 2-3 months from mobilization, which is still faster then the US could send over even a single additional division to Western Europe, the Soviets would be able to stand-up another 125 divisions from equipment-in-storage alone.


#'s 1-3 are facts, not speculation.

So is everything I just posted
 
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Seems to me the issue is more that you don't want to admit that the bomber doesn't always get through
Don't think I've ever said that, but that the B-29 was more capable than you wish to let on
What mattered is how the British used it, integrating it into a national air defense system
That wasn't duplicated in the USSR for some time, given that the area that Chain Home had to protect was roughly the same as just the Baltic Coastline, and the Soviets had built fewer radar sets than what the UK deployed- and there is so much more of the USSR to cover, and what passed for their direction centers had so much more area to cover between those sets.
So SAC internal reports on the status of their aircraft inventory are completely falsified then? This is conspiracy theorist levels of argument.

You don't need a tinfoil hat to think that the Armed Services(of any country) weren't always clamoring for better gear that what was currently in service, and to get more funding than other, rival services.
 
Don't think I've ever said that, but that the B-29 was more capable than you wish to let on

You don't need to say it: it's pretty much the attitude you've been expressing in their arguments. I also know exactly how capable the B-29 is, as does the US Air Force and numerous scholars who have studied the state of SAC in relations to Soviet air defenses, and their analysis does not at all agree with the assertions you have made.

That wasn't duplicated in the USSR for some time, given that the area that Chain Home had to protect was roughly the same as just the Baltic Coastline, and the Soviets had built fewer radar sets than what the UK deployed- and there is so much more of the USSR to cover, and what passed for their direction centers had so much more area to cover

Again, I've already backed up my claim with a academic source which states that the European routes were solidly covered by Soviet EW nets by 1948. You've backed up your claim up with precisely fuck all.

You don't need a tinfoil hat to think that the Armed Services(of any country) weren't always clamoring for better gear that what was currently in service, and to get more funding than other, rival services.

Yes, yes. SAC reports are always untrustworthy when they don't agree with you. Particularly when it's the private ones for internal circulation and not for advertising to Congress... :rolleyes:
 
Hey, as I have observed repeatedly in this thread: what American war planning called for and what it's forces could actually deliver were two completely different things.

But Soviet war planning and what its forces could deliver were actually the same thing. :rolleyes:
 
But Soviet war planning and what its forces could deliver were actually the same thing. :rolleyes:

In so far as we can tell what Soviet warplanning was, the prevailing evidence does point that way. The wonders of a nation state which actually allocates it’s resources to ensure it’s forces to maintain a high state of readiness and ensures it’s forces retain the armaments and skills to do the missions set for them. I know your in denial about this, but a well-led and rigorously trained force with a plethora of armor and artillery is going to prevail against a force of garrison infantry largely bereft of such heavy armaments and whose personnel have lost basic soldiering skills. I heavily suspect you know this to some degree, which is why you’ve been reduced to passive-aggressive sniping like this after all your more substantive arguments were debunked.
 
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The wonders of a nation state which actually allocates it’s resources to ensure it’s forces to maintain a high state of readiness and ensures it’s forces retain the armaments and skills to do the missions set for them.

Soviets Stronk, like Bull: the West, decadent like pastry. Soviet Supermen and their awesome gear always at 100%

Except when guys like Rust could fly a Cessna to Red Square past a much advanced defense network with 40 years of upgrades
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