The Battle at Dawn: The first battle between the United States and Japan December 7-10, 1941
- Thread starter galveston bay
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her engineering plant was undamaged and so was her speed .. she lost an elevator and her hanger deck is gutted and will require yard repair
if necessary she can recover aircraft but cannot service them
It has cost the USA but hopefully they will learn the lesson about aviation tactics against carriers, and also begin to spread the word how to deal with Zeros. Japan has lost a large number of aircrew, pilots/navigators/gunners. The aircraft losses hurt but those are more easily replaced. Being down two carriers and all those aircrew will impact operations planned for beyond PH and the dockspace and resources repairing one carrier now will mean something else doesn't get done on schedule compared to OTL.
The Americans know where the Japanese are, the general direction they are taking, and the rough composition of the fleet - the false report of one BB sunk is really irrelevant. They are retreating at 24 kts, and they have no clue as to where any American carriers are. With their markedly reduced air groups they can't fire off scouts willy-nilly, and if they have to alter course to launch/retrieve that means they are losing their lead which they don't want. Also running away from Hawaii at 24 kts means the range of scouts is reduced as they have to make up 50-75 nm to get back to the ships. Since the Japanese don't know where the American carriers are, the first clue they will have is when any ships spot incoming aircraft and not any scouts because they could come from Hawaii. Unless they have planes armed and fueled and spotted on deck or ready in the hanger, going down a reciprocal course will take time to arrange and means reversing course. Of course if they have a strike ready to go, that means any hits will be disasterous - you don't want aircraft armed and fueled on deck or in the hanger deck when you are under attack.
This can only get worse for the IJN tomorrow, and the downward spiral has started. Unless the USA loses both carriers without any more Japanese losses this will be an overall win for the USA in Hawaii, and will make MacArthur look like a complete buffoon. Even his coterie of sycophants (OTL the "Bataan Gang") won't be able to salvage his reputation. If he has the same "breakdown right after PH that paralyzed things it won't be covered up.
The Americans know where the Japanese are, the general direction they are taking, and the rough composition of the fleet - the false report of one BB sunk is really irrelevant. They are retreating at 24 kts, and they have no clue as to where any American carriers are. With their markedly reduced air groups they can't fire off scouts willy-nilly, and if they have to alter course to launch/retrieve that means they are losing their lead which they don't want. Also running away from Hawaii at 24 kts means the range of scouts is reduced as they have to make up 50-75 nm to get back to the ships. Since the Japanese don't know where the American carriers are, the first clue they will have is when any ships spot incoming aircraft and not any scouts because they could come from Hawaii. Unless they have planes armed and fueled and spotted on deck or ready in the hanger, going down a reciprocal course will take time to arrange and means reversing course. Of course if they have a strike ready to go, that means any hits will be disasterous - you don't want aircraft armed and fueled on deck or in the hanger deck when you are under attack.
This can only get worse for the IJN tomorrow, and the downward spiral has started. Unless the USA loses both carriers without any more Japanese losses this will be an overall win for the USA in Hawaii, and will make MacArthur look like a complete buffoon. Even his coterie of sycophants (OTL the "Bataan Gang") won't be able to salvage his reputation. If he has the same "breakdown right after PH that paralyzed things it won't be covered up.
Assuming we work with the increase in ships and guns, its still hard to imagine the Pacific Fleet's AAA from claiming more than 30-60 Kills, it depends on the variables, with about as many lost to Fighter Intercepts. (It should be remembered that on the 15th September 1940, over 1,500 Aircraft fought a Battle over Southern England and 630 Fighters shot down just 61 Planes, losing 29 of their own, we shouldn't over-estimate the number of successful engagements even amoungst the experienced).
Not necessarily enough to be decisive, although the increased number of damaged and out of commission might be in any Alt-TL.
Still that's easily 2 to 4 times the Historical Loses (29).
Or a much as a third of the Strike Force (Some Japanese estimates expected loses approaching this)
Its called "John Boying" and can be put to song to the tune of "Like a Rhinestone Cowboy . . ."
carrier battles are brief bursts of highly intense air combat... The Philippine Sea saw roughly 1000 American and Japanese aircraft and around 350 Japanese and about 50 American aircraft lost in one day from all causes
Santa Cruz saw roughly half of all aircraft involved shot down or otherwise lost in a day and Midway was even more costly as a percentage of aircraft involved being lost. (not counting the ones destroyed with their ships).
Assume the American Fleet claims roughly double what it shot down, the American pilots double their actual kills and of course so do the Japanese fighter pilots. It was the way things worked in combat.
Then of course there is the damage claims regarding ships hit, sunk etc
December 8 1941 The prelimanries to the Battle of Midway
December 7 Night – December 8 Evening
Japanese Forces
Japanese striking Force
1030 hours 180 miles NNW Oahu (150 NM due north Kaui) (final recovery position)
speed 24 knots for 12 hours (2230 hours) 120 NM west
course change N 27 knots (2230 hours – 0830 hours) puts them 500 miles north of Nihoa Island, meets with supply group 2. Destroyers refuel 0900 – 1700 hours
Position is 700 miles from Oahu and 800 miles from Midway Island, just out of air search range for both. After refueling, the Zuikaku, 3 destroyers, 5 fleet oilers (from supply group 1) all head for Japan at 12 knots (reaching Japan on December 21). Remainder of the Striking Force steams toward Midway beginning 1700 hours December 8 at 21 knots, which will put them strike range of Midway Island on the afternoon of December 9, and the bombardment force can reach the island after dark.
Midway Invasion Force and Supply Group 3 is 600 miles west of Midway Island heading due east heading directly for Midway as of dusk on December 8. This fleet accelerates to its best speed of 15 knots just after dark, which will place them off Midway the morning of December 10.
Meanwhile
American Forces
Scouting Force completes refueling 200 miles south Laysan Island until 1350 hours December 7. Turns east and runs at 18 knots until 0700 hours December 8 to meet with TF 15 (2 CL) which steams from just off Pearl Harbor at 31 knots from 1100 hours December 7 until 0700 hours December 8 where it joins Yorktown task force. At that point the Scouting Force has no idea where the enemy is as it waits for contact reports. Halsey orders the fleet to steam north in 3 task forces, each 10 miles apart, to a Point Option, at 30 degrees N, 170 degrees W. Worried that the Japanese might have slipped by air search from Midway and Pearl Harbor, he has 36 SBDs operating in pairs searching out to 200 miles, and 30 TBDs looking for submarines, which are suspected to be nearby in strength. By nightfall the American carriers have reached Point Option and there is still no report regarding the Japanese.
Air search from Midway looks Northeast, North and Northwest out 500 miles, does not spot enemy, nor does the air search from Oahu, which is also patrolling out 500 miles.
However, American destroyers and destroyer minesweepers along with float planes and B18s are searching off the coast of Oahu for enemy submarines. They find two of them, sinking the I-3 and the I-70 near Oahu.
Task Force 1 loads up reinforcements for Midway in Pearl Harbor with orders to head to Midway on the morning of December 9.
The Saratoga is loading its airgroup off San Diego along with 6 destroyers and 2 fleet oilers. In addition, it is loading a Marine Corps bombing squadron with orders to steam to Pearl Harbor on December 10. A Warning Order is issued for several patrol squadrons on the West Coast to prepare for deployment to Hawaii.
The Louisville and Pensacola convoys are diverted to Brisbane, Australia pending further decisions. In Washington DC, the Navy Department and President Roosevelt are suddenly looking for a new commander of the Pacific Fleet and several names are discussed. Overnight reports reach Pearl Harbor of heavy losses suffered by the USAAF Far East, attacks on Guam, a disastrous air raid on Wake Island, Japanese attacks on Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Malaya. The US Navy issues instructions to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare on Japan.
Japanese Forces
Japanese striking Force
1030 hours 180 miles NNW Oahu (150 NM due north Kaui) (final recovery position)
speed 24 knots for 12 hours (2230 hours) 120 NM west
course change N 27 knots (2230 hours – 0830 hours) puts them 500 miles north of Nihoa Island, meets with supply group 2. Destroyers refuel 0900 – 1700 hours
Position is 700 miles from Oahu and 800 miles from Midway Island, just out of air search range for both. After refueling, the Zuikaku, 3 destroyers, 5 fleet oilers (from supply group 1) all head for Japan at 12 knots (reaching Japan on December 21). Remainder of the Striking Force steams toward Midway beginning 1700 hours December 8 at 21 knots, which will put them strike range of Midway Island on the afternoon of December 9, and the bombardment force can reach the island after dark.
Midway Invasion Force and Supply Group 3 is 600 miles west of Midway Island heading due east heading directly for Midway as of dusk on December 8. This fleet accelerates to its best speed of 15 knots just after dark, which will place them off Midway the morning of December 10.
Meanwhile
American Forces
Scouting Force completes refueling 200 miles south Laysan Island until 1350 hours December 7. Turns east and runs at 18 knots until 0700 hours December 8 to meet with TF 15 (2 CL) which steams from just off Pearl Harbor at 31 knots from 1100 hours December 7 until 0700 hours December 8 where it joins Yorktown task force. At that point the Scouting Force has no idea where the enemy is as it waits for contact reports. Halsey orders the fleet to steam north in 3 task forces, each 10 miles apart, to a Point Option, at 30 degrees N, 170 degrees W. Worried that the Japanese might have slipped by air search from Midway and Pearl Harbor, he has 36 SBDs operating in pairs searching out to 200 miles, and 30 TBDs looking for submarines, which are suspected to be nearby in strength. By nightfall the American carriers have reached Point Option and there is still no report regarding the Japanese.
Air search from Midway looks Northeast, North and Northwest out 500 miles, does not spot enemy, nor does the air search from Oahu, which is also patrolling out 500 miles.
However, American destroyers and destroyer minesweepers along with float planes and B18s are searching off the coast of Oahu for enemy submarines. They find two of them, sinking the I-3 and the I-70 near Oahu.
Task Force 1 loads up reinforcements for Midway in Pearl Harbor with orders to head to Midway on the morning of December 9.
The Saratoga is loading its airgroup off San Diego along with 6 destroyers and 2 fleet oilers. In addition, it is loading a Marine Corps bombing squadron with orders to steam to Pearl Harbor on December 10. A Warning Order is issued for several patrol squadrons on the West Coast to prepare for deployment to Hawaii.
The Louisville and Pensacola convoys are diverted to Brisbane, Australia pending further decisions. In Washington DC, the Navy Department and President Roosevelt are suddenly looking for a new commander of the Pacific Fleet and several names are discussed. Overnight reports reach Pearl Harbor of heavy losses suffered by the USAAF Far East, attacks on Guam, a disastrous air raid on Wake Island, Japanese attacks on Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Malaya. The US Navy issues instructions to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare on Japan.
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Shadow Master
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what I have not yet seen in the responses to this most excellent ATL, is any discussion about what "bad things" might happen in a carrier vs carrier battle in early dec, 1941. The Japanese have 4 carriers intact, and although their air-groups have suffered some serious depletion, they still are a very serious threat, and should,'t be underestimated.
We will see what GB has in mind, soon enough. Absolutely loving this ATL, GB, and thanks for writing this for us.
We will see what GB has in mind, soon enough. Absolutely loving this ATL, GB, and thanks for writing this for us.
Lots of failed searches, refueling, and sailing to new positions on both sides. Japan is able to save Zuikaku and escorts it and the oilers with the loss of a few destroyers.
The 9th and 10th are going to play out the next set of battles and encounters. Shadow Master makes a good point but as has been said, even if the US loses all 3 carriers, they may take more Japanese carriers. The carriers being built on the current docks will start to arrive soon enough.
The 9th and 10th are going to play out the next set of battles and encounters. Shadow Master makes a good point but as has been said, even if the US loses all 3 carriers, they may take more Japanese carriers. The carriers being built on the current docks will start to arrive soon enough.
So is the Waldorf Astoria getting the suite ready for he-who-should-not-be-referred-to now?
I've enjoyed this timeline immensely, and am always looking for a new installment...
One question though, how bad was the damage at Wake?
I've enjoyed this timeline immensely, and am always looking for a new installment...
One question though, how bad was the damage at Wake?
historical results for Wake Island (they are down to 4 fighters out of 12). That wasn't incompetence but lack of equipment and not enough preparation time for the airgroup to get properly dug in (no revetments)
Of course, Hiryu and Soryu likely won't be able to divert to support the 2nd landing on Wake. Even if they survive undamaged, their air groups will be absolutely gutted.
the loss of the Soryu and the Zuikaku being knocked out of action has already added to the butterflies from the heavy losses on the attack on Oahu
Unless the Japanese sink all the US carriers with minimal air group losses, which is highly unlikely, even if the Japanese manage to land on Midway and deal with the garrison, Wake is unlikely to fall and now Midway is in between the two with no way to be reinforced. For the Japanese the best move would be to decide not to invade Midway, or if they do to make it a raid only. Of course the Japanese, especially right now, are not in the rational mode.
The Japanese expect Wake Island to fall when they land on December 11
It was very embarrassing in OTL when it didn't
They are using the forces historically assigned and nothing from this timeline has yet affected that battle
I know they are doing the same at Wake as OTL, the butterflies won't hit until they try the second assault absent some of the OTL support. It also looks like Wake will get some of the reinforcement they did not get OTL when the convoys were cancelled which does not appear to be happening here.
Great update, the Soryu type ships were good offensive weapons but they were not built to take damage. They sacrificed a lot of hull strength to carry so many aircraft on so small a hull and you then combine that with the IJN's damage control of the time which was basically shit and never got any better than poo even up to 1944 and you find the IJN's carriers are great offensive weapons with real glass jaws.
Thoughts on 'Dugout Doug' MacArthur...
(this is after reading page thirty, so I might be ninja'd or overtaken by events)
I don't think Mac is going to get a evacuation order. Instead of being rescued to Australia to command SW Pac, he's going down with his men in Corregidor ("Hold to the last shell"). He'll either be killed or captured, and safely out of the way both militarily and politically. If he performs as he did historically, he may even be relieved of his command (for cause) and still not evacuated.
(this is after reading page thirty, so I might be ninja'd or overtaken by events)
I don't think Mac is going to get a evacuation order. Instead of being rescued to Australia to command SW Pac, he's going down with his men in Corregidor ("Hold to the last shell"). He'll either be killed or captured, and safely out of the way both militarily and politically. If he performs as he did historically, he may even be relieved of his command (for cause) and still not evacuated.
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